Abstract
Among the causes of many of the problems with safety analysis are impreciseness and ambiguity of the output data delivered by the safety analysis techniques and the resulting difficulties with interpretation of those data. An approach which can be undertaken to mitigate this problem is by providing the safety analysis techniques with more formal semantics. This paper aims to investigate this approach in more detail. First we give an overview of present practices during safety analysis. Then some problems with interpretation of the output from the presented methods are identified. This leads to the motivation to resolve ambiguities by adding more formality to the considered methods. The benefits of such approach are demonstrated by applying the formalism to some examples.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag London Limited
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Górski, J. (1994). Extending Safety Analysis Techniques with Formal Semantics. In: Redmill, F., Anderson, T. (eds) Technology and Assessment of Safety-Critical Systems. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2082-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2082-7_9
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-19859-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-2082-7
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