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Ranking Sets of Objects

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Handbook of Utility Theory

Abstract

This chapter focuses on criteria and methods for ranking subsets of a set of objects. There are many situations in which rankings of individual objects suffice for classification or decision making purposes, but many other situations call for rankings that involve subsets of two or more objects. The chapter identifies contexts in which subset rankings are important and discusses a number of ways in which such rankings might be obtained.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain

    Salvador Barberà

  2. Université de Montréal and CIREQ, Canada

    Walter Bossert

  3. University of California at Riverside, Canada

    Prasanta K. Pattanaik

Authors
  1. Salvador Barberà
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  2. Walter Bossert
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  3. Prasanta K. Pattanaik
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain

    Salvador Barberà

  2. Stanford University, USA

    Peter J. Hammond

  3. Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Germany

    Christian Seidl

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Barberà, S., Bossert, W., Pattanaik, P.K. (2004). Ranking Sets of Objects. In: Barberà, S., Hammond, P.J., Seidl, C. (eds) Handbook of Utility Theory. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7964-1_4

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