Abstract
Wiener has shown that when the RSA protocol is used with a decrypting exponent, d, which is less than N 1/4 and an encrypting exponent, e, approximately the same size as N, then d can usually be found from the continued fraction approximation of e/N. We extend this attack to the case when there are many ei for a given N, all with small d i . For the case of two such e i , the d i can (heuristically) be as large as N 5/14 and still be efficiently recovered. As the number of encrypting exponents increases the bound on the d i , which enables efficient recovery of the d i , increases (slowly) to N 1-∈. However, the complexity of our method is exponential in the number of exponents present, and therefore only practical for a relatively small number of them.
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Howgrave-Graham, N., Seifert, JP. (1999). Extending Wiener’s Attack in the Presence of Many Decrypting Exponents. In: Secure Networking — CQRE [Secure] ’ 99. CQRE 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1740. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46701-7_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46701-7_14
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