Abstract
In this paper we analyse the ECIES encryption algorithm in the generic group model of computation. This allows us to remove the non-standard interactive intractability assumption of the proof of security given in the literature. This is done at the expense of requiring the generic group model of computation.
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Smart, N.P. (2001). The Exact Security of ECIES in the Generic Group Model. In: Honary, B. (eds) Cryptography and Coding. Cryptography and Coding 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2260. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45325-3_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45325-3_8
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