Abstract
Becker and Wille derived a lower bound of only one round for multi-party contributory key agreement protocols. Up until now no protocol meeting this bound has been proven secure. We present a protocol meeting the bound and prove it is secure in Bellare and Rogaway’s model. The protocol is much more efficient than other conference key agreement protocols with provable security, but lacks forward secrecy.
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Boyd, C., Nieto, J.M.G. (2003). Round-Optimal Contributory Conference Key Agreement. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (eds) Public Key Cryptography — PKC 2003. PKC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2567. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36288-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36288-6_12
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