Abstract
Auction systems allow many entities, each possessing a unique secret value, to interact in order to reveal the winning value from the set of secret values, based on the rules of interaction. A platform to achieve this goal is sealed bid auction. We propose a schema and a concrete design to achieve this goal in a simple, efficient and secure fashion. The schema will facilitate the use of existing and future knowledge in providing anonymity.
Research supported by the Australian Research Council grant A49804059
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Viswanathan, K., Boyd, C., Dawson, E. (2000). A Three Phased Schema for Sealed Bid Auction System Design. In: Dawson, E.P., Clark, A., Boyd, C. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10718964_34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10718964_34
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