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# Taming dissent: the United States and the Italian centre-left, 1948–1978

Alessandro Brogi*

*Department of History, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USA*

Italy was the first country in which the United States tested its 'political warfare', the integrated application of overt and covert strategies to stabilise internal politics. This article illustrates that while America's most intrusive and aggressive methods against Communist power in Italy often backfired, its diplomatic use of Italy's interplay of domestic politics and foreign policies was relatively successful. It was an indirect method that hinged on America's flexibility towards the moderate centre-left forces. American counterintuitive toleration and sometimes encouragement of mild political and cultural dissent in Italy helped refute and isolate the determined opposition of the strong Italian Communist Party.

**Keywords:** the United States; Italian Christian Democrats; Italian Communist Party; Eurocommunism; Vietnam War

'Democracy is a young somewhat delicate plant in Italy,' Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi explained to a U.S. diplomat in 1951, and his government could not 'go outside the constitution in attempting to suppress the Communists without risking the destruction of democracy'.[1] Through most of the Cold War, Washington concurred that the Italian democracy was a delicate plant to nurture. It also often disagreed with leaders in Rome about the methods to be used against the strong communist presence in Italian political and cultural life. The 'delicate' nature of that plant, in the American opinion, could be fortified by eradicating the problem. Sometimes invited, sometimes resisted by Italian leaders, U.S. officials had turned Italy into a testing ground for some of their most sophisticated and intrusive forms of political or psychological warfare. But to what extent did Washington exert univocal pressure to outcast the Left from Italy? The politics of U.S. stabilisation in Italy, particularly after the fear of a possible communist takeover had somewhat subsided by the early 1950s, worked not through strength and propaganda, but in most cases through flexibility. A more nuanced American approach emerged from the mid-1950s, based on diplomatic flexibility, and even a cultivation of political and intellectual dissent from the moderate nationalist and left-wing Italian forces, in order to isolate the Communist party, and to weaken its cultural clout. Far from being consensual or consistent, this approach nevertheless informed some of the most important decisions by Washington's diplomats and policy-makers, and, as I will demonstrate, it helped the U.S.-dialogue in three main respects: it improved the image of the United States in Italy as a pluralist society attuned to its allies' needs; it assisted Italian political pluralism, too, mitigating the conservative grip on power in Rome;

*Email: abrogi@uark.edu

and it kept Italy's few autonomous diplomatic initiatives channelled towards pro-Atlanticism. Far from marking a triumph of liberal internationalism – a tradition in U.S. interventionism, particularly from Democratic ranks, that favoured strong reform-oriented capitalist democracies through multilateral approaches in international relations – this subtle U.S. manoeuvring of Italian internal politics at least mitigated the rather heavy-handed, unilateral aspects of American political strategies in Italy.

Puzzled by the resilience of Italy's Marxist Left (the Communist and Socialist Parties – PCI and PSI), which, combined, kept earning between 35% and 40% of the electorate (two-thirds of which consistently went to the PCI), even after the country started experiencing strong economic growth and the first consumerist trends in the mid-1950s, Washington devised strategies that attacked the political, cultural, and bureaucratic sources of Italian communist power. As was the case with other countries under U.S. influence, these strategies did not rule out fostering unsavoury elements of the extreme right: the list of programmes or names is remarkable, from the predilection of the arch-conservative Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce for monarchist and far right groups in the mid-1950s, to the dealings by Ambassadors Graham Martin and John Volpe with neo-fascist General Vito Miceli, head of the *Servizio Intelligenza Difesa*, and with corrupt financial dealers Michele Sindona and Paul Marcinkus (the administrator of the Vatican Bank) in the 1970s. Even the notorious Gladio project – a secret military apparatus set up by the CIA and Italy's intelligence services from the late 1950s – has led to much speculation on the extent it involved neo-fascist groups. The PCI and even some of Italy's mainstream press surmised that the United States might have conspired with Italy's domestic terrorists in an effort to halt the 'Historic Compromise', the political deal by which, through the late 1970s, the strong Communists had begun to break from isolation and to cooperate with the Christian Democrats (DC) for their gradual inclusion in a coalition government.[2]

All these were perhaps deteriorated forms of the U.S. 'political' or 'psychological warfare' strategies that had their inception in Italy from the late 1940s.[3] My main point is that these extreme cases actually coexisted, and to a large extent were superseded by more subtle and indirect methods of intervention. This was a gradual adaptation for U.S. leaders and diplomats, an adaptation that became intensified during key events in Italy's internal and foreign policies from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s.

Indeed, the intersection, or interplay of those domestic and international factors became crucial. The United States used diplomatic support of Italy to fend off the rising power of the Marxist left from as early as the Liberation period, in 1943–1945, especially mitigating Great Britain's more severe, punitive approach towards the former enemy.[4] But it was not until the mid-1950s that the United States began to follow this diplomatic approach with increasing coherence and astuteness, realising that diplomacy was its most indirect, refined way to help stabilise Italian politics and to correlate that influence with the priorities in the Atlantic alliance. U.S. pressures over Italian politicians, and more or less shady deals persisted, not only through covert operations, but, sometimes in overt form too: suffice to mention Ambassador Clare Luce's heavy-handed pressures on the DC during the mid-1950s, or National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger's open opposition to the Historic Compromise in the mid-1970s. But, even in those instances, Washington privileged diplomatic tools aimed at averting any possibility of Italy's moving further to the left, or adopting a neutralist stance in the Cold War. Furthermore, Washington came to understand

that taming, or even fostering mild forms of political or cultural dissent (if not actual anti-American expressions) in Italy helped discredit and isolate the most virulent and destabilising forms of anti-Americanism mostly inspired by the Italian extreme Left. This article focuses on three significant developments in which both diplomatic manoeuvring and toleration of mild dissent deeply affected Italy's internal politics and their consequences on Italy's international stance. The two approaches, of course, were not decided in a unilateral vacuum by the United States; Italy's officials, intellectuals, and opposition leaders interacted with or responded to their American counterparts, also trying to favour subtle strategies for political stabilisation, at the same time also pursuing their traditional goals of international status with its consequent tangible rewards.

## 1. Before the 'Opening to the Left'

While France and Italy were the first experimental grounds for the aggressive tactics of the Psychological Warfare Board (PSB), which was created in 1951 as an annex to the National Security Council, it was in Italy that the United States, under the rubric of 'Political Warfare', devised its broadest anti-communist strategy. From as early as 1948, George F. Kennan, as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, defined the main task of Political Warfare as one of coordination: an integrated application of diplomatic, economic, cultural, ideological, propaganda, and covert tools – an integrated approach that was first applied, though more haphazardly than expected, to U.S. intervention in the first Italian democratic elections, in April 1948, which resulted in an astounding success: a landslide victory for the Italian Christian Democratic Party against the Popular Front of Socialists and Communists.

The PSB, as explained in one of its first memoranda, ultimately followed the guidelines earlier established by the Policy Planning Staff's Political Warfare concept:

> We can reach our objective not solely, not even chiefly by means of military force – the document read – [ … ] So, our intention is to use all other conceivable means to reach our objective; means that are lumped together under the general heading of 'Psychological Operations'.[5]

Having realised that economic assistance was not sufficient to curb communist power, and that 'the doctrine of economic determinism [was] too simple a hypothesis for France and Italy',[6] the PSB thus opted for more aggressive measures, ranging from propaganda to covert operations, aimed at the bureaucratic and cultural influence of the PCI and PCF (Parti communiste français). Most of its pressures, on both the French and the Italian governments, including strong encouragements to outlaw the Communist Parties, backfired.[7]

The PSB's focus on the intersection of cultural and diplomatic factors, however, remained crucial. The setup of a psy-war organisation was at first an immediate response to the effectiveness of the Soviet-sponsored Peace campaign of the early 1950s in France and Italy.[8] Drawing from a strong popular as well as intellectual appeal, the PCI and PCF had recast themselves (especially after their simultaneous expulsion from government in 1947) as strong actors on both the domestic and the international scenes. Worse still, their anti-NATO campaigns, increasing popular pressures on the French and Italian governments, raised serious doubts in Washington

about the two countries' steadfastness on both Atlantic and European integration. Indeed, the PSB's diplomatic efforts, rather overlooked by historians, bore more consequence than its rather ineffective direct assault on the PCI and PCF.

By diplomatic and covert means, the PSB promoted European integration against the appeal of the Soviet-led pacifist and nationalist campaigns in Western Europe. As Richard Aldrich has noted, by the early 1950s, the CIA, assisting the European Movement and the European Youth Campaign, had turned the promotion of European unity into its 'largest operation in Western Europe'.[9] The operation had two purposes: forestalling Soviet 'phony' pacifism, and simultaneously taming the Western allies' nationalist resurgence, which the PCF and PCI exploited for anti-American purposes. By identifying pacifism with Western integration, Washington also meant to encourage statesmen such as Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi to increase their international prestige as leaders of the European movement rather than as guardians of national prerogatives.[10]

The Eisenhower administration further coordinated diplomatic, economic, covert, and propaganda actions, turning the PSB into an Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), and placing it under stricter control of the State Department and the National Security Council. Under Eisenhower the battle for minds and hearts, as has been noted, did turn the Cold War 'total'.[11] But that very coordination also reflected the subtlety required to confront an enemy, such as the Western European Communists, who, by the mid-1950s, no longer seemed to pose an immediate threat, but who still held considerable power to sway French and Italian politics, or even foreign policies. Washington thus gradually dismissed the most direct forms of psychological warfare, in part because the political conflict in France and Italy had now a lower intensity, and in part because America's political allies, especially in Italy, had eluded or manipulated Washington's psy-war tactics.

No doubt, being the Italian democracy such a 'delicate plant', De Gasperi and his successors kept mollifying American strongest requests for repressive measures against the Communists. As a centrist, inter-classist party, lacking the cohesion of the Right and Left, the Christian Democratic Party sought the path of compromise. These compromises involved delicate balancing, especially after the DC's setback in the 1953 elections, which reflected reformist or nationalist pressures coming from both left and right. Italy's DC also benefited from preserving the political stalemate. With a permanent communist threat, the DC party could exert better leverage on Washington; that threat, in Ambassador Clare Luce's cynical view, constituted 'Italy's most profitable business', an 'indirect source of U.S. dollars'. By marginalising, but not excluding the PCI from the country's political life, the DC actually expanded their hold on internal politics. For post-war DC leader Alcide De Gasperi, this choice was also a matter of legitimacy, for his regime rested on the anti-fascist constitutional agreement that had recognised the PCI as a mass party.[12] The DC resistance to U.S. demands thus was not simply a matter of opportunism as U.S. diplomats thought; it was also rooted in the diffidence that the most doctrinal (Catholic) elements of the party – generally coinciding with its left elements – nurtured towards America's alleged materialism, hedonism, and militarism.[13]

The tendency to deflect U.S. pressures had further consequences on the foreign policy-internal politics nexus. De Gasperi's successors after 1953 accentuated the party's already strong ambiguity regarding economic reform, adopting a mix of free market and corporatist structures inherited from fascism; and on foreign trade,

maintaining a 'modus vivendi' with the Communist trade union CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) in order to keep their commercial options open with the East. Both tendencies raised concerns in Washington about its elusive, if not even naive Italian political allies, who might actually favour, with such policies, the country's drift to the left.[14] Just as ambiguous were Italy's attempts at recasting its foreign policy as a 'Neo-Atlanticist' one, which mainly entailed a stronger drive to become an 'active' partner of the United States in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas. The tricky question was whether the accent would be on 'Neo' over 'Atlanticism' or on 'active' over 'partnership'.

To be sure, several conservative DC leaders wanted to turn Neo-Atlanticism into a new form of pro-Western consensus. Giuseppe Pella, who first coined the term while foreign minister in 1957, explained at a press conference, that 'primarily Neo-Atlanticism is against anti-Atlanticism'.[15] His predecessor, Gaetano Martino, a leader of the Liberal (free-market) Party, during the Suez Crisis of 1956, had flaunted a greater than usual Italian initiative, but still within Atlantic orthodoxy. But the main proponents of a more assertive, if not autonomous foreign policy belonged to the left-wing factions led by party secretary Amintore Fanfani. They largely responded to status concerns, trying to fend off the extreme Left's criticism of Italy's submissiveness to Washington. None of them seriously considered neutralism as an option. In fact, their greatest aspiration was to establish a special cooperation with Washington. Some of them, including Fanfani, believed this should be at the expense of the privileged Western partners, France and Great Britain, which now suffered a moral and power decline through the decolonisation process.[16]

But those leaders also did question America's growing militarism and unilateralism. The core element of 'Neo-Atlanticism' was its emphasis on economic cooperation among NATO members and the alliance's correlation with the emerging European Economic Community[17] – especially in the Middle Eastern area. The corollary of Neo-Atlanticism was indeed Italy's presumed 'Mediterranean vocation', a claim based on simple assumptions: geographic position, cultural contacts, trade flows, historic traditions, and not the least, its recent loss of status as imperial power, made Italy the best candidate for bridging the West and emerging Arab nations. Arguing that this had to be in strict coordination with Washington not only begged the question of how much the Italians would continue to cooperate with France, the leading nation in European integration and also the most stubborn of the colonial powers; it also contradicted Italy's persistent efforts to mitigate American unilateralism in the Mediterranean. Italy's most influential diplomats, out of the political fray, noted these contradictions; but they also recognised that Italy's Mediterranean diplomacy, if endorsed by the United States, could indeed favour a progressive, politically more effective coalition at home.[18]

Italy's NATO-coordinated plans for assistance in the Middle East were obvious alternatives to unilateral American aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine; as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles noted, they were also a ploy to 'extract a little more money out of the United States'.[19] Manipulation was just the beginning of the problem. The director of Italy's State Oil Company (ENI), the Christian Democrat Enrico Mattei married economic opportunism with anticolonial moralism, championing Arab political and economic emancipation against the Anglo-American companies. The president of the Republic, Giovanni Gronchi and other left-wing DC, for their part, intended the 'Mediterranean vocation' to establish closer relations with

Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the non-alignment leaders, and to reach out to the pro-neutral Socialists (PSI) of Pietro Nenni in an attempt to form a centre-left government coalition.[20] This became known as the 'opening to the Left'. Fanfani himself, an 'Italian Kerensky' according to Clare Luce, without ideological conviction and with a dangerous inclination to 'compromise with the Cominform Left', ostensibly sought cooperation with the Social Democrats only, but also winked at the Nenni Socialists. The PSI of Nenni had broken its alliance with the PCI over the de-Stalinisation process in the mid-1950s; it had also accepted Western European integration in principle; but it had given no reassurances about its pro-NATO stance.[21] Italy, in an effort to pursue a large reform-oriented coalition, could thus get more than it had bargained for, either by deliberately accepting the Marxist Left – as Gronchi's and Mattei's party factions wanted to do – or inadvertently drifting in that direction.

## 2. The opening to the left

Washington took notice. While the CIA, by initiative of William Colby, who directed political operations in Rome, began to include assistance to the Social Democrats in view of the 1958 Italian elections – a move for which he had received Clare Luce's endorsement shortly before she left her post in 1956[22] – other U.S. diplomats came up with a more cunning manoeuvre. Fanfani had gradually earned their trust, because of his apparent ability to mitigate the restless DC left factions including his own *Iniziativa Democratica*, and because of repeated evidence of his pro-Atlantic stance. The State Department, as well as the CIA understood that Fanfani's claim for more autonomy from Washington dealt with prestige considerations more than actual dissent from U.S. policies. So, as a Rome Embassy memorandum put it, it was better to appease the 'natural resurgence of Italian national pride' by '[…] consulting the Italians on all matters affecting the Middle East'. This would 'remove [any] pretext for uncoordinated actions and give the Fo[reign] Off[ice] and other realistic elements ammunition to defend themselves against [the] freewheeling [of] Gronchi [and others]'. It seemed therefore wise to be 'tolerant, considerate, and sympathetic' toward Fanfani's international activism, in spite of the DC leader's ostensible pro-Arabism. Eisenhower finally resolved to 'give the Italians an additional dose of prestige within NATO',[23] a broad mandate he was able to refine after Fanfani became prime minister in July 1958. Italy's diplomats helped reinforce this point, drawing comparisons with the new regime of Charles de Gaulle in France. What if, based on that experience – Ambassador Manlio Brosio told U.S. officials – the Italian, and perhaps German public opinion drew the conclusion that restoring an authoritarian system was the only way to secure international respect? Would this not subject Italy's 'young democracy' to authoritarian nationalism from both the right, and especially, the Marxist left?[24]

Both Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles cautiously gave discreet support to Fanfani's efforts to cast Italy as a potential mediator in the Middle East conflicts. For his part, Fanfani secured Washington's goodwill by lending logistical support for the U.S. military showdown in Lebanon in July, and by finalising the agreement for the installation of medium range ballistic missiles (IRBM) on Italian territory. In return, the prime minister expected a growing economic and diplomatic role for Italy in the Middle East. His main stated goal was to promote, through economic and diplomatic

means, a non-aggression pact – including Israel – in the region.[25] It was an ambitious plan, and he eventually failed, not least because of internal opposition from the DC conservative ranks, which also caused the downfall of his cabinet the following January.[26] But the main point here is that his policies had further moved the spectrum of Italian internal and foreign policies to the left, cautiously enough though to avoid a premature opening to the Nenni Socialists.

Even more significantly, the U.S. Foreign and Intelligence establishment assumed a 'wait and see' attitude towards the PSI. This was no endorsement yet, but, as CIA director Allen Dulles explained at a National Security Council Meeting in January 1959, the dialogue for a socialist reunification (between the Nenni Socialists and Giuseppe Saragat's Social Democrats) was 'a very interesting development', likely to isolate the Communists.[27] Furthermore, by favouring Italy's mild disagreements with Washington on foreign policy – on Middle East affairs, or on trade relations with Eastern European regimes – U.S. officials deflected the strong anti-American positions of not only the Marxist Left, but also of several left-wing DC, including the influential Mattei.

Such a supple approach, particularly when fostering mild dissidence from NATO allies, reflected similar methods used in U.S. cultural diplomacy. The main thrust of the CIA-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), which reached its heyday in the late 1950s, was the drafting of left-wing intellectuals, especially those who had abandoned the Marxist ranks after de-Stalinisation – the Non-Communist Left (NCL), as the CIA called it.[28] The influence of liberal Democrats such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Dwight McDonald over the CCF helped adjust the intolerant tones of conservative America. Rather than restricting the debate, Schlesinger invited toleration of 'dangerous opinions'. Acknowledging the importance of civil liberties, he emphasised that conflict and contradiction were the truly creative aspects of a free society.[29] By admitting the NCL's moderate criticism of America, the Congress conducted its most effective battle against the fellow-traveling Left and its appeal among anti-Americans in Europe and the Third World[30] – at least until its connections with the CIA were revealed in 1967.

This openness helped moderate the conservative mind-set of the Eisenhower administration, making its approach to the intellectual and political centre-left in France and Italy more malleable than in its early years. On this issue Ambassador Luce demonstrated some surprising flexibility, as she gradually understood the importance of interacting with intellectuals she would have normally reviled. That was how two leftist writers, Ignazio Silone (one of the leading voices of the CCF), and Alberto Moravia, ended up travelling and lecturing in the United States under Rome's USIS sponsorship in 1955–56. In his travel reports for Italian dailies, Moravia provided rather unflattering impressions of America, but at least his critique remained nuanced and mixed with ambiguous fascination.[31] The USIS itself, under Ambassador Luce's supervision, modified its approach from direct transmission with a heavy reliance on instruments of mass culture to an indirect use of local media and intellectuals, the cultural moulders, far more influential, by Luce's own admission, in Europe than in the United States.[32]

Under the Kennedy administration, the U.S. encouragement of a centre-left coalition in Italy became, expectedly, even stronger. But this was not only a natural result of the new cabinet's putative progressivism. Kennedy also intended to demonstrate pluralism in the Western alliance, refuting critiques to the contrary. The

North-eastern, Ivy League upbringing of the new president helped somewhat. As his ambassador to Italy Frederick Reinhardt recalled in an interview, Kennedy had a particular ability to communicate with Europeans, for 'there must have been something in the way he expressed himself, much nearer to them than the average American'.[33] But for all the cultural connection, the new administration could not easily dismiss its Western allies' criticism, especially of its exceptionalist tones, and therefore rather unilateralist tendencies. Kennedy's détente policies were eclipsed by an increasingly globalised Cold War, his brinkmanship, and his 'Flexible Response' strategy with its high military budgets and hierarchical distinction from Europe.

Communist pacifism in Western Europe was weakened, but, particularly in Italy, other political and religious groups had absorbed some of its arguments. This raised Washington's concerns about pro-neutralist trends. Significantly, the Italian campaign against nuclear testing began in 1962 under the auspices of the pacifist Christian Democrat groups around Florence's mayor Giorgio La Pira.[34]

To avert the danger of a contagious leftist pacifism and an out of control 'opening to the Left' in Italy, the Kennedy administration found diplomatic remedy in the usual reassurances to Italian leaders that they could attain partner, rather than subordinate ally status (for example, presenting the perspective of nuclear sharing),[35] and in a rather elaborate international network to promote and harness the formation of a centre-left government including the Nenni Socialists. It is no accident that the main American architect of this controlled diplomatic manoeuvre was Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his new role of presidential adviser. His same general tenets of diversity based on nurturing strong differences of opinion in a free society, as well as his reform agenda informed his acceptance of the DC–PSI coalition.

To be sure, some of the old methods persisted, namely a moderate financing of the whole operation, through both CIA and American trade unions funds. But the attack on the Marxist Left retained little of the psy-war methods. Schlesinger, together with National Security staff members, most notably Robert Komer, rather than trying to seduce the Italian Socialists, opted for the counterintuitive tactic of accepting their Marxist credentials, and even their open criticism of the United States. Reasoning that the best way to subtract votes from the PCI was to help the Nenni Socialists keep a firm hold on the Left, U.S. diplomats had, from the late 1950s, already engaged the PSI's directorate, in spite of Nenni's still strong criticism of NATO.[36] Far from being a unilateral decision, this flexible approach benefitted from an increasingly diffused diplomatic action, keeping the British Labour Party, which from 1955 had openly cultivated Italian politicians favourable to the opening to the Left, involved in the operation. Leopoldo Nuti has best described the

> tacit agreement between [the CIA and MI6 …] on a possible division of labour, with the British assigned responsibility for nudging Nenni's party away from its roughest ideological leanings and directing it toward the goal of social democratic respectability. The United States, for its part, would prevent the release of a premature certificate of good behaviour.[37]

The crucial point was that the U.S. hand in this act of persuasion would not show. This tendency to utilise proxy allies with a similar agenda would persist in the U.S. handling of difficult situations in Europe, and help deflect attention from American interference.

Diplomatic manoeuvring included the Vatican, with its reformist turn under Pope John XXIII. The Church's liberalised attitude, especially with its intensified concern for human misery, in conjunction with the Kennedy administration's neo-Keynesian approaches to the economy, helped project the image of reform capitalism. Catholic pacifism and compassion also helped limit the connection the PCI had established between its internal appeal and its influence in the Third World. Urged by the former first director for psychological warfare, C. D. Jackson, in 1962 the Catholic president began to 'watch Italy' closely, finally authorising Schlesinger to open a diplomatic channel with the Vatican to monitor the potential connection between the Church's new orientation and the centre-left in Rome.[38]

Schlesinger's vision of the centre-left transcended Italy's internal realities. Promoting a DC–PSI coalition, he believed, would likely shape a consensual Europe around reform. As he explained to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 'the success of the Italian experiment ha[d] a larger significance. If a CD-Socialist coalition [could] work in Italy, it [could] very likely provide an important model for France after de Gaulle, Germany after Adenauer, and Spain after Franco'. Italian leaders had also fed these predictions. Fanfani, again as prime minister in 1961, had told Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman that the British Labour Party and also the French Socialists led by Guy Mollet were 'anxious to see Nenni's Socialists detach themselves from the Communists'. If the opening to the Left worked in Italy, the trend towards a PCF-SFIO (French Socialists) could have been reversed.[39] The DC leader also knew how to strike a chord with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, reminding him of how difficult the right-wing de Gaulle was becoming on all strategic and economic aspects of transatlantic relations. A transformed Western Left helped marginalise the neutralists, increasing connections among the PSI's moderate factions, the German Social Democrats (SPD), and the British Labour Party.[40]

The Opening to the Left, finalised in December 1963 under U.S. auspices, had also a cultural dimension. The United States kept assessing correctly the correlation between political and cultural anti-Americanism in Italy. As first secretary of the Rome embassy, George Lister had earlier admitted that one of his challenging tasks was to overcome the Socialists' prejudice on the Americans as a people of 'fat, happy idiots, who had reached a position of world leadership more out of luck than from sacrifice, intelligence, and determination […]'. Kennedy's advisers, especially CCF-architect Schlesinger were confident in their ability to sway the Socialists in that sense, too. Under Kennedy's 'New Frontier' policies, they believed, the Americans would prove they had all the necessary qualities, including intellectual acumen, to face the challenges of global leadership.[41]

Indeed, the connection of the U.S. choice in Italy with a reformist design for Europe extended to a global vision that, ideally, would inspire similar developments under the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and other reform plans for most of the politically fragile world regions. But this reformist impulse became notable for its limits and for the compromises the Kennedy administration was forced to make with local conservative elites, in Italy and elsewhere.[42] Local conservatives enjoyed great power of persuasion about their loyalty (with the notable exception of de Gaulle) in times of American uncertainty. From the mid-1960s, with the U.S. 'world mission' and its application in Vietnam widely questioned, especially in the West, American confidence in controlling, let alone taming and utilising dissent risked waning.

### 3. The Vietnam years, Italy's mediation initiatives, and the fate of the centre-left

Under President Lyndon Johnson, and in the midst of the Vietnam War, this lack of confidence and detachment from European affairs reached a peak. But for all his provincialism and ignorance of Italian affairs, the president remained adept at understanding the allies' interplay between domestic and international policies, just as he had done as master of the Senate. His absorption in Vietnam affairs surely hindered that ability;[43] but Italy's own diplomatic involvement in those affairs was sufficient to test not only his but also his cabinet's perceptions of the intricate correlation of Italian domestic and foreign policies.

While Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who led the centre-left coalition from 1963 to 1968, maintained a rather sporadic attention to international affairs, Fanfani, holding the position of foreign minister for most of the same period, continued to advance Italy's mediation role, with a particular attention to Vietnam. The conflict in Southeast Asia, at the same time, gave another lease on life to the Communist party, right at the time when, as everywhere in the West, the combined effects of consumerist trends and of the individualist ethos of youth protest dealt a blow to its collectivist appeal. Naturally, the PCI took every opportunity to ride the wave of anti-American protest, but additionally it gained some credibility as a diplomatic channel with North Vietnam. While ostensibly co-opting large portions of the student movement, the PCI also gradually assumed an aura of moderate guarantor of constitutionality, leading Washington to question the parliamentary wrangling of Italian politics, and the reliability of the socialist factions led by the radical Pietro Nenni and Riccardo Lombardi. 'The new, different, democratic Italian Communism is a myth – a memorandum from the U.S. embassy commented in late 1964 – but it will continue to impede the slow course of non-Communist left-wing Italian political thought toward democracy.' A year later, the special assistant to President Johnson, Jack Valenti, recognised that 'Viet Nam [was] the one issue that threaten[ed]' the relationship between Nenni and DC leader Aldo Moro, on which the centre-left experiment depended. That was the main cleavage PCI secretary Luigi Longo urged his directorate to use against the government, while 'avoiding frontal attacks' on its domestic record.[44]

While Italy's activism in the Middle East, and particularly in North Africa, persisted, with a renewed peak after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, the new 'vocation' championed by the Fanfani-dominated foreign office was that of peace in Vietnam. Italy joined the long list of failed mediations in the Vietnam conflict, having a particular role in the codenamed MARIGOLD Polish peace initiative and, as a last-ditch effort in 1967–68, proposing its own initiative codenamed KILLY, significantly using again channels stationed in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia). At first profiting from his position as president of the UN General Assembly in 1965–66, Fanfani also benefitted from the expertise of Giovanni D'Orlandi, who held the post of ambassador to Saigon during the escalation of the conflict until 1968. Never trusting the North Vietnamese channels, Washington considered these proposals with a great deal of scepticism, sometimes deriding 'the eternally optimistic Italians'.[45] The complex diplomatic interactions[46] mattered for Italy's internal affairs in two respects. More than in the past, Fanfani expressed his criticism of U.S. choices, reminding Secretary of State Dean Rusk that 'while being a faithful ally of the United States, Italy cherishes the liberty to disagree'.[47] So, first, while embattled Washington might have expected a consensual position from the loyal partner, Rome's assertiveness seemed helpful to offset

the strong anti-American campaigns of the PCI. Secondly, the prestige of autonomy bore on moral credibility, too, for Italy's DC. That's what Fanfani bluntly conveyed to Rusk:

> Italy is the centre of the Catholic Church – the devout foreign minister told the secretary of state in February 1968 – and the Catholics are in power [but would be jeopardized] if the Communists make a better use of peace slogans, [for] they might even attract part of the Catholic electorate.
>
> Imagine our next election. – Fanfani then concluded – Thank God the present occupation of the universities by the students offers an alternative subject of attention from that of Viet-Nam. Were it not for that, Viet-Nam would be the centre issue in the electoral campaign […allowing the Communists] to increase their votes.[48]

Peace initiatives bearing the Church's (or a Christian Democrat) seal would have served not only the Atlantic alliance, but also the stability of Italy's centre-left coalition, keeping the PSI in tow with DC.

But Catholic pacifism, per se, did not seem a force sufficient to marginalise the Communists. On the contrary, according to the top officials of the Johnson administration, it gave 'unconscious assistance' to them, inspired as it was by 'dupes such as Christian Democrat Giorgio La Pira'. In McGeorge Bundy's words, the Florence mayor was 'a rather fuzzy-minded non-Communist leftist who has been critical of our position in Vietnam'.[49] La Pira's trip to Hanoi in 1965 paralleled the efforts of the PCI's second in command, Enrico Berlinguer, who also met with Ho Chi Minh a few months later in an exploratory mission that he largely used to increase the party's international profile through a connection with Fanfani's UN channels. Even more upsetting for Washington was that Pope Paul VI himself had endorsed these diplomatic moves. The Johnson administration worried about a contagious anti-American pacifism in Italy, and among Roman Catholics worldwide.[50] Furthermore, the DC's 'Mediterranean vocation' took on an increasingly pro-Arab form, as Rome expressed confusion at Washington's intensified assistance to Israel. The PCI counted on this issue, even more than on the government's mixed attitudes about Vietnam, to at least mollify the DC's pro-NATO position.[51]

Using the PCI as a proxy for international subversion was of course a 'practical' choice for Moscow, some American officials noted.[52] But since the PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti had first announced the possibility of different national paths to socialism (his doctrine of polycentrism) in the aftermath of the Soviet repression of the Hungarian movement, the Italian Communists had started a slow, if inconsistent emancipation from Soviet tutelage. It was rather at the internal level that the PCI's 'subversive' diplomacy in Vietnam could have its most felt effects. It was not just the left-wing Socialists – with their growing sympathy for Third World causes, which climaxed with Nenni's trip to China in 1969 – who seemed seduced by the new North-South dialogue proposed by the Communists. Left-wing DC also started thinking of a possible external support, if not cohabitation with the PCI. In American eyes, La Pira was still the main culprit:

> to the integralist – a memo from the embassy in 1966 read – the believer in absolute Catholic hegemony, as typified in its most extreme and irresponsible form by Giorgio La Pira, a dialogue with the Communists is no worse than one with the Socialists. To La Pira being a little atheist and anti-clerical is like being a little bit pregnant.[53]

If the potential Catholic-Communist rapprochement on Third World issues was so upsetting, would it be wise to try buying back the DC? But the reduction of covert funding of the DC had already been long considered for other reasons. In 1965, McGeorge Bundy opted for minimum interference, reducing the amounts funding drastically. In this, he was following the views of the late President Kennedy, who, shortly before his death had noted that without 'energetic administrative leadership' in Italy, the United States was no longer 'getting [its] full money's worth'. In August 1967, also in light of 'other more pressing commitments', the CIA concluded that 'the continuation of a large-scale covert action program in Italy … no longer had pertinence'.[54]

It was precisely the administrative 'feebleness' of the Italian government that suggested a more viable solution: the continued catering to Rome's care for appearances. 'The Italians are quite sensitive about their position in the European structure,' Jack Valenti had earlier reminded Johnson. It was natural for a 'nation that once tasted great glory and then settled into decline' to crave such recognition. The president thus had to 'underscore the fact that the U.S. consider[ed] Italy to be part of a rectangle of London, Paris, Bonn, Rome'; he also tried to downplay Italy's 'strong support of the U.S. Vietnam policy', lest the Communists made 'some hay' from that convergence – a tactic that President Johnson agreed on with Fanfani, during their first meeting in May 1965. American acknowledgment of the DC's mediation role, in Southeast Asia now as much as in the Mediterranean in the 1950s, remained largely a matter of prestige.[55]

The second, even more daring diplomatic move consisted of intensifying contacts with the Communists themselves. Tentative, screened meetings with PCI members had been going on at the embassy in Rome since the late 1950s. By the late 1960s, U.S. officials were hoping that 'discreet contacts' would 'help break the orthodoxy' of both the French and Italian Communists. In Rome, by mid-1965, NSC staff member John De Luca's conversations with Giorgio Amendola were of particular significance. One of the top PCI leaders, Amendola was known for his moderation and for heralding the party's acceptance of Western European integration.[56] But besides testing the PCI's international orientation, these contacts eventually were also calculated to mollify the party's position on the students' unrest and to encourage its debate over Moscow's squelching of the Czech liberal movement. There was the acknowledged risk of giving the Communists some respectability; but the point was not to turn them legitimate, but rather to discern their tactics, or even visions, particularly from their most moderate, and seemingly influential, representatives, while checking the party's grip on the radical student movement. Indeed, the Italian Communists, even more than their French comrades, suffered from their own conundrum between pro-establishment acceptance and endorsement of the extreme leftist groups. Diplomats with divergent views from each other such as Sargent Shriver, ambassador to Paris, and John Volpe, at Villa Taverna in Rome a few years later, reached similar conclusions about contacts with Communist leaders in France and Italy: they would be 'useful, not harmful', Shriver wrote in 1969, and, according to Volpe in 1975, they would constitute 'fact finding' explorations, exposing the internal divisions within the Marxist movement.[57] The Vietnam issue had created divisions along ideological and generational lines, favouring the emergence of a 'New Left' within the party, a radical faction attuned to the Third World revolutionary moment, but also opposing the rule of 'democratic centralism'. And by the party's Twelfth Congress in 1969, the

U.S. embassy concluded, factions had made their 'formal appearance' in the PCI.[58] In sum, at the peak of an age seemingly characterised by worldwide opposition to America's war in Vietnam and by collectivist ideologies, the United States was able to discern the obsolescence of Marxist orthodoxy, at least in Europe, and decided to highlight it by (discreetly) engaging, not by ostracising Communist officials.

## 4. Eurocommunism and American management of interdependence

U.S. diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at nurturing the PCI's ambiguity between East and West, thus causing its internal divisions; but they did have unwanted effects. Without Washington's unwavering support, Italy's centre-left lost confidence. The DC–PSI coalition, to be sure, unravelled at the end of 1968 because of its growing divisions over domestic issues, with meagre results obtained in terms of progressive reform. But it was economic stagnation combined with international détente that favoured the growth of the increasingly moderate PCI, which by the mid-1970s reached the same electoral weight as the DC, and also strengthened its internal legitimacy, as it could now propose internal détente through a 'Historic Compromise' with the ruling DC party. That was one of the unsought consequences of Henry Kissinger's détente diplomacy. His position against Eurocommunism, as much as his diffidence towards Moro's centre-left governments, remained unwavering.

Eurocommunism, while premised on international networking, had primarily a domestic purpose not only in Italy, but also in France, where the PCF, in alliance with the Socialists, tried to form a viable alternative to Gaullism. The PCI's new party secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, while at first proposing only external support to a DC reform-oriented government, aimed at eventually entering and transforming the government coalition. The plan was also conceived, in the PCI's persistent mistrust of Washington, as a move to deflect or pre-empt heavy U.S. interference. Following the coup in Chile against Salvador Allende in 1973, Berlinguer believed a similar scenario could occur in Italy, unless he immediately invoked the common struggle against fascism (the still 'delicate plant' of Italian democracy), as in the post-war coalition of all democratic parties. Unlike Allende, he would cultivate the middle classes and the DC.[59]

But to Washington the international consequences of Eurocommunism seemed just as ominous. By re-evaluating Western European integration, the French and Italian Communists increased both their international profile and their domestic leverage. The PCI especially thought that continental integration would counteract American 'exceptionalism' with Europe's own: through a Europe-made détente, it would emancipate the continent from *both* superpowers, and through each country's *internal* détentes, it would pursue a 'third way' between Soviet socialism and European social democracy. The PCI endorsed German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, his gradual diplomatic opening to the East. It also began contacts with both German and Swedish Social Democrats, who were sympathetic to the idea of a truly independent European third force, envisioned to assert its exceptional traits on the world stage by upholding nuclear disarmament and an approach to the Third World independent from U.S.-driven globalisation.[60]

In this context, even Berlinguer's acceptance of NATO seemed primarily tactic. As the leader explained to his party's directorate, this move would help 'diminish U.S. concerns and interference in Italy's domestic affairs'. Of course, the other side of

the coin was to shelter the PCI's path towards 'compromise' and the Italian 'third way' from Soviet interference: only under the Atlantic umbrella, Berlinguer thought by 1974, could Western communism be free to advance the true socialism with a human face. Within NATO, a socialist Italy would be spared the fate that befell the Prague Spring.[61] Some of Berlinguer's closest advisors went as far as arguing that Italy's permanence in the Western alliance would help ease the path, during times of economic austerity, towards economic experimentation, nurturing the hope of gradually replacing reformed capitalism with socialist or planning elements. Berlinguer thus elaborated on the notion that NATO would shelter this experimentalism from Soviet interference, claiming that only under a democracy, which had a 'universal historical value', could a socialist society be truly built.[62]

Far from reassuring, the PCI's double domestic and international initiative raised the strongest alarm in Washington. Seeing through Eurocommunist tactics, the Nixon administration highlighted the twin danger of subversion in Italy and spreading neutralism in Europe. As prime minister, Aldo Moro, the main DC supporter of the Historic Compromise, candidly told Kissinger that 'although the Italian Communists profess[ed] to support NATO, we know they won't'. Kissinger added bluntly: 'we don't care if they sign onto NATO in blood'; a government with even external support by the PCI was simply 'incompatible with continued membership in the alliance'. Moro rebutted that he could not keep 'rigid barriers' against the PCI 'when you can see that the American president is talking to Soviet leaders'. Public opinion, he reminded Kissinger, was 'not very subtle'.[63] Kissinger's global strategy was indeed subtle, but not his handling of the Italian situation. Convinced that 'one of Kennedy's worst mistakes was to force the opening to the Left' in Italy, he at first followed ambassadors Martin's and Volpe's suggestion of combating communist influence by cultivating right-wing groups in Italy. But those connections confirmed suspicions that the United States might have been involved in the 'strategy of tension' – certainly in many Communists' opinion – that fostered right-wing terrorism, and, perhaps, even the operations of the communist group Red Brigades targeting the Historic Compromise.[64] By 1975, Kissinger issued a declaration against all forms of DC–PCI cooperation; the Carter administration followed with a more nuanced statement in January 1978 against a PCI participation in the government. Heavy interference, covert and overt, in Italian politics, which has been amply analysed even in its agonising reappraisals during the Carter years,[65] was however paralleled by indirect diplomatic action reinforcing Atlantic interdependence against the Eurocommunist 'Wespolitik'.[66]

The decision to resort to diplomatic means was in part motivated by Washington's debate on covert actions – namely the Church Committee's decision to reduce the government's discretion in future covert actions. The now limited power of the executive and the CIA certainly explains how even Kissinger considered funding operations and other forms of 'black' psychological warfare to curb communist power in Western Europe counterproductive – if nothing else because of the risk of domestic backlash.[67]

But other considerations also warranted keeping an open channel with the Italian Communists. Some U.S. officials took the PCI's acceptance of NATO seriously. Moreover, stressing the party's responsibility in a position of national power, according to a National Security study of 1976, could be useful to coax the trade unions to accept the austerity measures needed for the Italian economic recovery.[68] A responsible PCI that was forced to make difficult economic choices, according to Ambassador Volpe, would

be unpalatable to its most radical grassroots. Through low level contacts, Volpe also intended to disprove myths about the 'proverbial efficiency' of communist local administration (for example, through talks with the mayor of the 'red' city of Bologna, he found out that it suffered from the 'highest debt in the country.'); he also wanted to defuse the Communists' suspicions that Washington might harbour a 'Chilean' solution for Italy.[69]

Grand diplomacy was also part of this indirect manoeuvre. As usual, it offered the opportunity to bolster the Italian government with some international prestige. It was also effective because the initiative came from Rome. The Italian leaders' invitation to the U.S. to play a special role in the Mediterranean persisted after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 (Yom Kippur). Unlike during the previous phase of the 'Mediterranean vocation', this time the Italian government never questioned U.S. policies as unilateral or hegemonic (Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy). Italy's foreign policy had largely lost much of the initiative and pursuit of autonomy that had characterised its previous approach to the Middle East. Not until the 1980s, under Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi would Italy resume an assertive role in the region, as well as on most foreign policy issues, in part seconded by Washington for the same reasons that had informed its earlier actions: dividing the Italian left, and isolating the PCI.[70] But throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, Italian leaders maintained the other aspect of Fanfani's original Mediterranean vocation, pursuing an ancillary role to the United States, again offering mediation in various controversies in the area. As foreign minister, Aldo Moro did that in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war. This time, however, the Italian government, in an effort to connect with Kissinger's strategy, downplayed its pro-Arabism.[71] These diplomatic moves were also meant to highlight Italy's reliability and stability in the midst of Mediterranean turmoil. Following Ambassador Martin's advice, President Nixon, in a meeting with Fanfani in 1970, had recognised that Italy was 'the greatest Mediterranean power', and that it should therefore play a role, next to the United States. Kissinger disparaged the Italian leaders' constant pursuit of prestige, and considered encounters with them a mere façade.[72] But at least this presence of Italy's centrist leaders on the world stage would help offset the PCI's appeal to not only European but also Third World nations and their rising trend of neutralism.

Prestige was also the main reason for including Italy in the group of the five industrialised nations, which by 1975 thus became the G-6 (and G-7, by the following year, with Canada, too). French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in particular pressed the case for Italy. Restoring this credibility, the argument went, would help convince those DC leading the Historic Compromise that closer cooperation with Washington would help their status as European leaders and also their country's economy. For their part, Italian leaders stressed electoral politics. In August 1975, Aldo Moro (now prime minister) and Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor told Kissinger that if Italy was excluded from the great powers summits it 'would be a mortification of the democratic forces in Italy […] Every time something like that happens it gives several percentage points to the Communists'.[73]

The G-7 was also instrumental in keeping Italy tied to its members' new monetarist trends. Under stagflation, the Fordist-Keynesian model, which had first informed the Marshall planners' anti-classist approach in Europe, was now reversed. To be sure, this was not without controversy or, since the reversal was first inspired by Washington, some popular resentment against the United States, too. But the G-7 neo-liberist

consensus was not driven solely from Washington. Europe's leading economy, Germany, under a social democrat, Helmut Schmidt endorsed anti-inflationary measures, deregulation, and privatisation.[74] Nothing was better to combat prospects of 'popular frontism' in Europe, Kissinger recognised repeatedly in 1974–75, than to give ample credit to the *new* social democrats in Germany. Thanks to that connection, the secretary of state argued 'the West, the alliance is going to be all right'. At a National Security meeting in May 1975, he emphasised that 'the trick in the world now [was] to use economics to build a world political structure', a trick best done if pursued indirectly, through Schmidt. The German chancellor helped discredit Brandt's wing of the SPD, and consequently any attempt of the socialist forces in Europe to establish a dialogue with the Eurocommunists.[75] Significantly, it was Schmidt, not Kissinger, who stressed the political importance of the following G-7 meeting in Puerto Rico in June 1976: the trend towards inclusion of the Communists in Europe's governments, he argued, had to be halted, and the summit's agreement to reform government regulations and remove 'restrictions to private enterprise' would help do that.[76] In Puerto Rico an aid package to Italy was made conditional on avoiding a PCI's increased influence over the government. But again it was Schmidt who publicly announced that the deal would be called off if the Communists came to power. Partly through economic blackmail, partly through the dismantlement of Keynesian solutions, Eurocommunism rapidly became ostracised.[77]

The acceptance of growing multipolarism and multilateralism, whether of show or substance, characterised the Carter administration even more strongly. Several of its cabinet members (including National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) had been founders of the Trilateral Commission, the private/public network that advocated a better understanding of interdependence and globalisation. Cognisant of the diminished U.S. leverage over its NATO allies, Brzezinski did not shy from suggesting a rather patronising approach towards the 'ambivalence of Europeans', early on telling the president to rely on 'prodding, cajoling, consulting – and a lot of stroking'; this, he added, would also mean 'accepting European views of policy that are different from ours', such as in the Middle East.[78] In this ostensibly pluralist vein, the Carter administration was even more keen that the Nixon-Ford cabinets on avoiding direct interference in Italy,[79] while it kept examining the whole question of Eurocommunism with even greater emphasis on the interlocking use of diplomacy, cultural relations, and economic means.

The administration not only maintained but even intensified contacts with the PCI and PCF, amid controversy for seemingly giving in to Eurocommunism. Ambassador Richard Gardner, though less conservative than Volpe, was equally determined to expose the faults in communist leadership. But, in line with the initial flexibility of the Carter presidency, he also persuaded the State Department to open a Washington office for the newspaper *L'Unità* and to start a new policy issuing visas for Communist Party members. Thanks to the new visa policy, leaders of Eurocommunism as varied as the Spanish Santiago Carrillo, the PCI radical leader Pietro Ingrao, and, most notably, the moderate Giorgio Napolitano toured the United States, visiting with state department officials or lecturing at Ivy League campuses. Brzezinski gave particular weight to American and French academic circles, which he consulted to fathom the intentions of the Eurocommunists.[80] A desire to prove America's openness and pluralism, and contrast it with the enduring restrictions on debate (the doctrine of democratic centralism) among the Western Communists certainly motivated the

Carter administration. But both Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance thought these initiatives would above all help disrupt the Eastern bloc, fostering separation of the Western Communists from Moscow and dissent within Moscow's satellite states. The risk of legitimising the PCI further, according to President Carter, paled in comparison to the loss of its populist strength.[81]

Cultural diplomacy also continued to matter considerably. Like Clare Luce in the 1950s, Ambassador Richard Gardner, an academic by background, tried to sway the opinion of many influential leftist intellectuals. As he recognised, Italy had 'not developed the same kinds of cultural relations with the United States [sic]… as have most of the Northern European states'. In particular, he noticed the 'gradual erosion of confidence in Western institutions – and even values – on the part of Italian intellectuals, including many of the centre-left who should know better'. Under the ambassador's recommendation, the State Department thus tried to remedy the situation by increasing the budget of its Cultural Affairs section and for the USIS in Rome, including an enhanced exchange of scholars under the Fulbright programme. On his own, the ambassador also took the initiative of entertaining Italian intellectuals at Villa Taverna, regardless of their political orientation. Indeed the group was an eclectic one, ranging from conservative Franco Zeffirelli and Luigi Barzini to leftist Alberto Moravia, Renato Guttuso and Federico Fellini. This was a genuine balancing act, Gardner thought, among the 'shapers of opinion in contemporary Italy', above all 'exposing them to visiting Americans of comparable stature' and constituting, in the ambassador's words, 'an important part of public diplomacy'.[82] Improvement of cultural programmes in Italy was one of the main topics on the agenda for discussion with the new prime minister, Giulio Andreotti during Brzezinski's visit in Rome in May 1978.[83]

But economic interdependence seemed to matter even more, certainly according to Andreotti, who promised to reform the Italian economy along the IMF agenda, an essential prerequisite for the loan discussed with Washington. The workings of the G-7, as well as Andreotti's desire to enter the new European monetary system, were yielding the expected results. As the secretary of Italy's ultra-leftist Party of Proletarian Unity, Lucio Magri, predicted, 'rather than using the PCI to control the economic crisis, Andreotti uses the economic crisis to control the PCI'. A veteran in DC politics, the conservative Andreotti received much credit from Washington for his manoeuvring skills on the Italian political scene. He was also attuned with Washington's diplomatic strategy. In July 1977, he conveyed to the American president his own plan about the Historic Compromise: the PCI's external support to the government, he argued, would, counterintuitively, reinforce Italy's Atlantic ties, while also weakening, through the Eurocommunist appeal, the Warsaw Pact. The PCI would then be forced to either adapt to the free market choices of his government, or withdraw its external support[84] – which it did early in 1979, going back into isolation.

As much as U.S. diplomats, from Kissinger to Gardner and Brzezinski, claimed credit for preventing the Historic Compromise with subtle diplomatic and cultural manoeuvres or direct interference, the record is rather improvised and contradictory. Indeed, Washington remained tentative between intransigent attitudes and indirect flexible interference. The Carter administration in particular remained ambivalent, caught in fear of appearing soft on communism, and finally complementing its subtle diplomatic moves with the official declaration against the PCI's presence in the government in January 1978. That statement, in fact, made DC leader Aldo Moro determined to go ahead with the Compromise. A mirroring backlash occurred

from Italy's conservative forces, resentful of the administration's contacts with PCI representatives. Further complications, for both the U.S. and the PCI, were caused by the dramatic kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades in the spring of 1978.

Ultimately, it was thanks to the reiteration of transatlantic interdependence – through the G-7, the IMF, NATO policies, and, last but not least, the sense of inclusion given to Italian leaders in great power summits – that the United States exerted its strongest leverage over Italian politics. Here I stressed the importance of that influence, which however did not sway but rather complemented the strategies of local actors, particularly of DC leaders like Andreotti and Moro, who aimed, as their predecessors had done, at marginalising more than openly confronting the Communists. Also, Washington tuned in with, more than it guided its other European partners, particularly Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, who also had their own reasons for excluding Eurocommunist projects.

## Conclusion

But the striking shift in American attitudes towards its transatlantic allies, and the forces of dissent, at home as much as abroad, deserves particular attention. It was in times of uncertainty, of America's relative decline, that its capacity for flexibility and spontaneity was best tested – especially in comparison with the inability for self-reform in the East. America's power to influence Italian politics, many now concur, had its obvious limits. But at crucial times, those were self-imposed limits. By giving leeway to Italy's diplomatic initiatives – in most cases a matter of window-dressing anyway – the United States accepted a certain degree of interdependence. As it did with most European allies, it also controlled Italy's nationalist pressures, offsetting them with encouragement of the Italian leaders' search for statesmanship in European integration. In order to tame the most troublesome instances of dissent, and to combat the most virulent forms of anti-Americanism in Italy, the United States not only accepted but actually nurtured differences and criticism by Italian leaders whose ultimate pro-Atlantic position was not questionable. At the cultural level, the nurturing of dissent went even further, as the United States fought Marxist influence not by enlisting conservative intellectuals, but by catering to the progressive ones. By the 1960s, this flexibility coincided with the rising trends in multiculturalism in the United States. Aside from economic assistance and leverage, subtle diplomacy and cultural flexibility – including the general pluralism that spontaneously originated from below, through America's own anti-consensual forces in the 1960s and 1970s – constituted the main strength in the U.S. arsenal against communist influence or any other form of dissent in Italy. It crucially complemented its military and economic power. While gradually becoming prevalent, those subtle methods however never completely discarded heavy direct meddling and the most aggressive ways of political warfare, which, more often than not, demonstrated the unwanted limits of American influence in Italy.

## Notes

1. Thompson to Sec. State, 26 July 1951, 765.001, Record Group [RG] 59, National Archives, College Park, MD [hereafter NA].

2. On origins of 'Gladio' see esp. Leopoldo Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti, e l'apertura a sinistra. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 1999), 100–103; Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London: Routledge, 2005); cf. NSC 6014, 19 January 1961, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. Papers [ASP], Subject Files: Italy, box WH 12, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Boston, MA [hereafter JFKL]. On deals in the 1970s see esp. Ackley to State Dept., 18 February 1970, POL 12-IT 1970–73, b.2393, RG59, NA. Cf. Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, 'Gli anni settanta nel giudizio degli Stati Uniti: Un ponte verso l'ignoto', in *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni '70*, ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons (Rome: Istituto Enciclopedia Italiana, 2001), 89–122.
3. On 'Political' and 'Psychological Warfare' methods in the early Cold War see esp. Kaeten Mistry, *The United States, Italy and the Origins of Cold War: Waging Political Warfare 1945–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Mario Del Pero 'The United States and Psychological Warfare in Italy, 1948–1955', *The Journal of American History*, March 2001; Alessandro Brogi, 'Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce and the Evolution of Psychological Warfare in Italy', *Cold War History* 12, no. 2 (May 2012); and Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti*.
4. Moshe Gat, *Britain and Italy, 1943–1949: The Decline of British Influence* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 1999); and Ennio Di Nolfo, "Italia e Stati Uniti: un'alleanza diseguale", *Storia delle relazioni internazionali*, 1990/1.
5. PSB, 'Notes on a Grand Strategy for Psychological Operations', 1 October 1951, Staff Material and Office Files [SMOF], PSB, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO [hereafter HSTL].
6. Memo 'French and Italian Elections', 6 July 1951, SMOF, PSB, b.11, HSTL.
7. On those tactics, see esp. the records contained in SMOF, PSB, HSTL.
8. Andrea Guiso, *La colomba e la spada. 'Lotta per la pace' e antiamericanismo nella politica del Partito comunista italiano (1949–1954)* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006); see also, for more details, Alessandro Brogi, *Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 122–156.
9. Qtd. Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and the Cold War Secret Intelligence* (New York: Overlook Press, 2001), 343. See also Progress Report on various Psychological Operation in France and Italy, by Operations Coordinating Board [OCB], 23 February 1954, White House Office [WHO], NSC Staff, Operations Coordinating Board Central Files, b.82, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS [hereafter DDEL]; on beginning of funding of peace organizations in Italy: Memo Conv. Clare B. Luce with E. Sogno, 1 April 1954, 765.001, RG59, NA.
10. I analysed these developments especially in Alessandro Brogi, *A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944–1958* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), chaps. 3–4. On Italy's contribution to the 'relaunching' of European integration see esp. Antonio Varsori, *La Cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010), 119–158; and Paolo Acanfora, *Miti e ideologia nella politica estera della DC: Nazione, Europa e Comunità atlantica (1943–1954)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013), 77–114 and 197–239.
11. Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).
12. Qtd. Luce to Henry Luce, 31 October 1954, Clare B. Luce Papers [CBLP], b.X22, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington D.C. [hereafter LC]; On DC's resistance against U.S. Pressures see also the following works by Mario Del Pero: *L'alleato scomodo. Gli USA e la DC negli anni del centrismo (1948–1955)* (Rome: Carocci, 2001); 'Containing containment: rethinking Italy's experience during the Cold War', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 8 (Fall 2003); and 'American Pressures and Their Containment in Italy During the Ambassadorship of Clare Boothe Luce, 1953–1956', *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 3 (June 2004).
13. Vera Capperucci, 'Le correnti della Democrazia Cristiana di fronte all'America. Tra differenziazione culturale e integrazione politica, 1944–1954', in *L'antiamericanismo in Italia e in Europe nel secondo dopoguerra*, ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliarello (Soveria

Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004); and Paolo Pombeni, *Le 'Cronache Sociali' di Dossetti, 1947–1951: Geografia di un movimento di opinione* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1976), esp. 46, 165, and chap. 4.

14. See esp. Henry J. Tasca (Rome) to State Dept., 3 September 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, U.S. State Department, Washington D.C., various dates [hereafter FRUS], 1952–54, VI:1699–1700; Bruna Bagnato, *Prove di Ostpolitik. Politica ed economia nella strategia italiana verso l'Unione Sovietica, 1958–1963* (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2003); Brogi, *Question of Self-Esteem*, 191–210; and Federico Romero, 'La scelta atlantica e Americana', in *Nazione, interdipendenza, integrazione. Le relazioni internazionali dell'Italia (1917–1989)*, ed. Federico Romero and Antonio Varsori (Rome: Carocci, 2005), vol. 1.
15. Qtd. in Maria Rosaria Grieco, 'Politica estera italiana e mondo cattolico: la parabola del neo-atlantismo negli anni '50', in *L'Italia e la NATO. Una politica estera nelle maglie dell'alleanza*, ed. Salvatore Minolfi (Naples: CUEN, 1993), 85, 89.
16. I provide more detailed analyses of these developments in Alessandro Brogi, *L'Italia e l'egemonia americana nel Mediterraneo* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1996); Alessandro Brogi, '"Ike" and Italy: The Eisenhower Administration and Italy's "Neo-Atlanticist" Agenda', *The Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 3 (Summer 2002); and Alessandro Brogi, 'Competing Missions: France, Italy, and the Rise of American Hegemony in the Mediterranean', *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 4 (September 2006).
17. On first Italian emphasis on this correlation see Simone Selva, *National Integration and Domestic Economic Growth: The United States and Italy in the Western Bloc Rearmament Programs 1945–1955* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012).
18. Quaroni to Martino, 6 April 1956; see also Vittorio Zoppi (London) to Martino, 30 October 1956, both in Direzione Generale Affari Politici [DGAP], b.1062 and 1093, respectively, Archivio storico del Ministero degli affari esteri italiano [hereafter ASMAE]; Manlio Brosio (Washington) to Martino, 9 September 1956, DGAP, b.1093, ASMAE; Quaroni to Ministero Affari Esteri [MAE], 2 October 1956, DGAP, b.1062; Quaroni to Martino, 3 December 1956, and Brosio to Martino, 11 December 1956, DGAP, b.1093, ASMAE.
19. Qtd. Dulles to Eisenhower, 5 May 1956, FRUS, 1955–1957, IV:75; Dulles to Embassy in Rome, November 22, 1957, FRUS, 1955–57, XII:661–2; Memo C. B. Elbrick (WEA) to Dulles, 29 October 1957, 611.41, RG 59, NA; and Alessandro Brogi, 'Fanfani e l'unilateralismo americano nel Mediterraneo', in *Fanfani e la politica estera italiana*, ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi (Venice: Marsilio, 2010).
20. J. W. Jones to Under Sec. of State, 29 August 1957 (enclosed Progress Report on 5411/2, section 'Mattei's Threat'), Records of State Dept. participation in OCB and NSC, b.21, NA. On Gronchi cf. esp. Memo OCB, 3 May 1955, OCB files, b.111, DDEL; Egidio Ortona, *Anni d'America*, Vol. 2. *La diplomazia, 1953–1961* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986), 128–9. On Mattei, see, most recently, Ilaria Tremolada, 'Mattei, Fanfani, l'ENI e le relazioni internazionali dell'Italia', in Giovagnoli and Tosi, *Fanfani*.
21. Luce to C.D. Jackson, 29 September 1954, Jackson Papers, b.70, folder 'Luce', DDEL; Luce to J.F. Dulles, 24 August 1954, and Mtg. Luce-Segni (prime minister), 24 August 1956, both in 765.00, RG59, NA. Cf. Pietro Nenni, *Gli anni del centro-sinistra. Diari 1957–1966* (Milan: Sugarco, 1982), 288–9, 302.
22. Mtg. Luce-Segni (prime minister), 24 August 1956, 765.00, RG59, NA.
23. Qtd. John Jernegan (Rome) to J.F. Dulles, 11 September 1957, 665.80; qtd. Earl Sohm (Rome) to State Dept., 27 August 1958, 765.13, RG59, NA; Mtg. Eisenhower-Dulles, 5 February 1957, *Declassified Documents Reference System*, 1989, doc. 3426; A. Dulles in 381st NSC Mtg., 2 October 1958, AW, NSC, b.10, DDEL.
24. Letter n. 31/548 Adolfo Alessandrini (Secretary General of MAE) to Brosio, 11 June 1958, and tel. 8813 Brosio to Alessandrini (qtd.), 17 June 1958, DGAP I (1947–1960), b.8, ASMAE.
25. Mtg. Fanfani-Dulles, and others, and Mtg. Fanfani-Eisenhower, 29–30 July 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, VII:466–73; On Dulles see esp. the Italian version of Mtg. Fanfani-Dulles, 30 July 1958, Serie I, Sotteserie IV, Sotto-Sottoserie 2 [hereafter in sequence numbers only], b. 9, Fondo Fanfani [FF] Archivio Storico Senato della Repubblica, Rome, Italy [hereafter ASSR]; cf. Mtg. Torbert-Fanfani, 3 October 1958, 765.13, RG59, NA; on IRBM see Lauris Norstad Papers, b.89, DDEL; cf. Brogi, *L'Italia e l'egemonia*, 295–339; Evelina Martelli,

*L'altro atlantismo. Fanfani e la politica estera italiana, 1958–1963* (Milan: Guerini, 2008), 53–56; and Fabio Grassi Orsini, 'La "svolta diplomatica" del secondo governo Fanfani', in *Atlantismo ed europeismo*, ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliarello (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003).

26. Tel. 1633 David Zellerbach to J.F. Dulles, 23 November 1958, and tel. 2306 Zellerach to J.F. Dulles, 13 January 1959, 765.00, RG 59, NA.
27. Dulles in 394th NSC Mtg., 22 January 1959, AW, NSC Series, DDEL.
28. On CCF and its effects in Italy see esp. Eugenio Capozzi, 'L'opposizione all'antiamericanismo: Il *Congress for Cultural Freedom* e l'associazione italiana per la libertà e la cultura', in Craveri and Quagliarello, *L'anti-americanismo in Italia*; Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony* (New York: Routledge, 2002); and Brogi, *Confronting America*, 180–196.
29. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 184; Scott-Smith, *Politics of Apolitical Culture*, 41–44; and Alan Wald, *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 267–71.
30. Intellectual defections from the PCI, from 1956, were caused not only by the Soviet repression of the Hungarian movement, but also by the growing appeal of the intellectual debate among liberal intellectuals in the United States. America's new social sciences also had a draw on Europe's academics: see for ex. the debates within the PCI's Cultural Committee: Italo Calvino and Gianfranco Corsini in Meeting of Cultural Committee, 13–24 July 1956, Archivio Storico del Partito Comunista Italiano, Istituto Gramsci, Rome, Italy [hereafter APCI]; see also response by Mario Alicata in Mtg. Cultural Committee, 15–16 November 1956, APCI.
31. Simona Tobia, *Advertising America: The United States Information Service in Italy (1945–1956)* (Milan: LED, 2008), 223–68.
32. Progress Report by Lloyd A. Free (director USIS Italy) to State Dept., 24 February 1953, 511.65, RG59, NA; Letter Luce to J. F. Dulles, 15 June 1956, JFD, Correspondence-Memoranda Series, Strictly Confidential, b.2, DDEL; cf. Tobia, *Advertising America*, 268–80.
33. Qtd. Interview Reinhardt with J. O'Connor, November 1966, Oral History Reinhardt, 10, JFKL.
34. Memo Reinhardt forwarded to Bundy, 18 May 1962, NSC Files, Italy, b.120, JFKL.
35. Memo Conv. Ambassador Harriman – President Gronchi, 11 March 1961, NSC Files, Italy, b.120, JFKL; Leopoldo Nuti, *La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche, 1945–1991* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); and Philip Nash, *The Other Missiles of October* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 45–53, 68–73.
36. See John Jernegan to John Wesley Jones, 26 June 1956, 765.00, RG59, NA, also in Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti*, 62–67; cf. Mtg. George Lister-Riccardo Lombardi (PSI), 3 February 1958, 765.00, RG59, NA; see also Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *L'Italia e la nuova frontiera: Stati Uniti e centrosinistra, 1958–1965* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998); and Alessandro Brogi, 'The AFL and CIO Between "Crusade" and Pluralism in Italy, 1944–1963', in *American Labor's Global Ambassadors: The International History of the AFL-CIO during the Cold War*, ed. Robert Anthony Waters, Jr., and Geert van Goethem (London: Palgrave, 2013).
37. Leopoldo Nuti, 'The United States and the Opening to the Left, 1953–1963', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 45; see also Ilaria Favetto, 'la nascita del centro-sinistra e la Gran Bretagna. Partito socialista, laburisti, Foreign Office', *Italia Contemporanea* n. 202 (March 1996).
38. Memo by C. D. Jackson, 7 August 1962 Overseas Report, Confidential, forwarded to JFK by John D., JFK Papers, Office Files, b.119a, JFKL; Schlesinger to Bernabei, 8 November 1962, Arthur Schlesinger Papers, Subject File 1961–1964, b.23, JFKL.
39. Memo Schlesinger to Bundy, 19 October 1962, NSC, Italy, b.120, JFKL; Mtg. Harriman-Fanfani, 11 March 1961, NSC Files, Italy, b.20, JFKL; William R. Tyler to Charles Bohlen (Paris), 11 June 1963, POL12-FR, RG59, NA.
40. Memo Conversation Fanfani, Rusk, Antonio Segni (foreign minister), 12 December, 1961, FF, II, IV, 3, b.14, folder 21, ASSR.

41. 'Policy Recommendations' drafted as part of Desp. 899 of 11 April 1961 in DDRS 1978 281B; cf. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 'The Kennedy Administration and the Center-Left', in *Italian Socialism Between Politics and History*, ed. Spencer M. Di Scala (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996).
42. On these points see esp. Nuti, 'Opening to the Left, 1953–1963', 47–48; and Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
43. See esp. Thomas A. Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 26–33; and Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 701–05.
44. William N. Fraleigh (Counselor Embassy Rome) to State Dept., 30 June 1968, and Letter Fraleigh to Givan Walker (Officer in Charge of Italian Affairs), 10 March 1965, FRUS 1964–68, XII, docs. 101 and 107; Fraleigh to Givan Walker 8 April 1965 Gen. Recs. BEA, Country Director, Italy 1943–1968, Lot 68 D 436, RG59, NA; and Memo Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson, FRUS 1964–1968, XII, doc. 109; Report Longo in Mtg. Direzione, 30 March 1965, VD, mf. 029, APCI.
45. Tel. 4590 Meloy to Harriman, March 4, 1968 (with note by Walt W. Rostow for Johnson, qtd.), National Security Files, Country Files [NSF, CF], Vietnam, b.139, folder 'Killy', Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX [hereafter LBJL].
46. This is not the place to examine these negotiations in detail, but see esp. docs. in ASSR, FF, 1, II, IV, 4, b.37, folders 16, 31, and 33, and b. 38, folders3 and 4; State Dept. to Embassy in Rome, 27 February 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, VI, doc. 87; Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, 12 February 1968, and attached translated note from Ortona to Rusk, 7 February, 1968, RG59, Pol 27–14 Viet/Killy, NA; Bernard J. Firestone, 'Failed Mediation: U Thant, the Johnson Administration, and the Vietnam War', *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 5 (November 2013); James Hershberg, *Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Angela Villani, 'Fanfani, l'Onu e la politica italiana di distensione internazionale', in Giovagnoli and Tosi, *Fanfani*. And on the controversy caused by Fanfani and La Pira with the pro-American Ambassador Giorgio Fenoaltea in Washington, see esp. Tel. 1349 Fenoaltea to MAE, 19 December 1965, in Archivio Aldo Moro [AAM], b.82, folder 232, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome, Italy [hereafter ACS].
47. Meeting Fanfani-Rusk, 22 December 1965, FRUS, 1964–68, XII, doc. 121.
48. Memo Conv. Fanfani-Rusk et als., 24 February 1968, FF, 1, II, IV, b.38, folder 4, ASSR.
49. Guthrie (Rome) to State Dept., 22 November 1965; Bundy to Johnson, 28 November 1965 (qtd.), FRUS 1964–1968, XII, docs.119, 120.
50. Enzo Roggi, '1966: Berlinguer mi affidò la custodia del carteggio segreto tra il Pci, Paolo VI e Ho Chi Min sull'attacco Usa al Vietnam,' www.Pontediferro.org, 8 May 2010; Reinhardt to State Dept., 9 April 1965, FRUS 1964–68, XII, doc.108; Memo Conversation Governor Harriman, Frazier Draper (Italian Affairs) – Giacomo Brodolini (Vice Secretary Italian Socialist Party), 17 August 1966, POL 12-IT, RG59, NA.
51. Amendola in Mtg. Direzione 6 September 1967 (see also comments by Longo on DC and Middle East in idem), VD, mf. 019, APCI; Luca Riccardi, *Il 'problema Israele.' Diplomazia italiana e PCI di fronte allo Stato ebraico (1948–1973)* (Milan: Guerini, 2006), chap. 6.
52. Qtd. Memo Fraleigh to State Dept. 'The 11th Congress of the PCI', 4 March 1966; qtd. Reinhardt to State Dept., 20 May 1965, POL 12-IT, RG59, NA.
53. Memo Thomas L. Hughes (Intelligence and Research) to Sec. State, 'Italy – Communist "Kindness" Embarrasses Government', 8 May 1969; Memo Gammon to Ambassador, 'Your Meeting with Nenni – China', 8 May 1969, POL 12-IT, RG59, NA; Tel. A-1439 Melloy to State, 26 May 1966, NSF, CF, b.198, LBJL; Memo De Luca to Rostow 'Communist Strategy Toward Roman Catholicism', 26 May 1966, NSF, Name Files, b.2, LBJL.
54. Memo Bundy to Johnson, 4 August 1965, and Memo for the Record by INR 'Italy – Covert Action Program for FY-1968', FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, docs. 116, 133.
55. Valenti to Johnson, 16 April 1965, cit.; and Memo Conversation Fanfani-Johnson, 24 May 1965, NSF, Country Files, Italy, b. 197, vol. IV, LBJL.
56. John A. Bovey, Jr. (Counselor Emb. Paris) to State Dept., 30 April 1965, POL 12-FR, RG59, NA; Memo De Luca to Rostow, August 1965 (no date), 'Summary of meetings

with Giorgio Amendola of the PCI on July 21 and August 12, 1965', NSF, Name Files, b.2, LBJL.

57. Shriver to State Dept., 29 July 1969, POL 12-FR, RG59, NA; Tel. 8205 Emb. Rome to Assistant Sec. State Hartman, 25 June 1975, National Security Adviser files [hereafter NSA], Country Files, Italy, b. 8, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI [hereafter GFL]; Memo Conv. Ford-Volpe, 6 November 1975, NSA, Memo Convs., b. 16, GFL.
58. Qtd. Ackley to State Dept. 18 February 1969, POL 12-IT, RG59, NA. Cf. Alexander Höbel, 'Il PCI di Longo e il '68 studentesco', *Studi storici* 45, no. 2 (April 2004).
59. Berlinguer and Gian Carlo Pajetta in Mtgs. Direzione 12 September and 9 October 1973, VD, mf 041, APCI; Agostino Novella, 'Il Cile, la DC, e noi', *Rinascita*, 20 September 1973; and cf. Antonio Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer* (Rome: Roberto Napoleone, 1994), 53–57.
60. On these developments see esp. Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006), 52–60; cf. Fiamma Lussana, 'Il Confronto con le socialdemocrazie e la ricerca di un nuovo socialismo nell'ultimo Berlinguer', *Studi Storici* 45, no. 2 (April 2004); Mauro Maggiorani and P. Ferrari, eds., *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer, 1945–1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005), 161–83; Michele Di Donato, *I comunisti italiani e la sinistra europea. Il PCI e I rapporti con le socialdemocrazie (1964–1984)* (Rome: Carocci, 2015).
61. The most significant archival record is Berlinguer in Mtg. Direzione 5 December 1974, VD, mf 073, APCI; cf. also Francesco Barbagallo, *Enrico Berlinguer* (Rome: Carocci, 2006), 217.
62. Antonio Tatò, ed., *Comunisti e mondo cattolico oggi* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1977); and Pons, *Berlinguer*, 43–44.
63. Memo Conv. Ford, Kissinger, Moro, Rumor, 1 August 1975, NSA, Memos Conv., b.13, GFL.
64. On this see esp. arguments by Arturo Colombi in Mtgs. Direzione 12 September and 9 October 1973, VD, mf 041, APCI; cf. Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il Caso Moro: Una tragedia repubblicana* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005), 9–13. Kissinger qtd. in Memo Conv. Kissinger-Ford, 25 September 1975, NSA, Memos Conv., GFL.
65. See esp. Irwin Wall, 'L'amministrazione Carter e l'eurocomunismo', *Ricerche di storia politica* IX, no. 2 (August 2006); Irwin Wall, 'Les Etats-Unis et l'Eurocommunisme', *Relations Internationales* 119 (Fall 2004); and Olav Njølstad, 'The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists Out of Power Without Interfering', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 3 (Summer 2002).
66. That is how Berlinguer's closest advisor, Sergio Segre, defined the whole approach to Europe's social democrats: in Pons, *Berlinguer*, 55.
67. In November 1974 former CIA Director John McCone acknowledged with President Gerald Ford that the Agency's image had been tarnished in Europe even more than at home, thus lowering the leverage and the morale of its officials abroad: Memo Conv. McCone, Scowcroft, Ford, 11 November 1974, NSA Papers, Memos Conv., b.7, GFL.
68. Memo Scrowcroft to Ford on 'CIA Interim Assessment of Italian Elections', no date June 1976, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Italy, b.8, GFL.
69. Tel. 8205 Emb. Rome to Assistant Sec. State Hartman, cit.; Memo by George H.W. Bush 'The Electoral Outlook in Italy', 19 May 1976, NSA, Country Files, Italy, b.8, GFL; Memo Conv. Ford, Volpe, 6 November 1975, cit.
70. For a good concise account on the evolution of Italy's Mediterranean policies through 2010 see Massimo De Leonardis, 'Italy's Atlanticism between Foreign and Internal Politics', UNISCI (Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation) Discussion Paper n. 25, January 2011, accessed online on 15 November 2014.
71. On Italy's increasingly cautious pro-Arabism see esp. Tel. 266 Vinci (New York) to Moro, 15 March 1970, b.150; Tel. 520 Plaja (Cairo) to Moro, 25 June 1970, b.150; Tel. 2068/C, Moro to various Embassies, 25 May 1972, b.154; Tel. 1834 Ortona to MAE, 18 October 1973, b.160, all in AAM, ACS; cf. Massimiliano Cricco, 'La politica estera italiana in Medio Oriente: dal fallimento della missione Jarring alla conclusione dello Yom Kippur (1972–1973)', in Romero and Varsori, *Nazione, interdipendenza*, vol. 2.
72. Memo Conv. Nixon-Fanfani, 7 July 1970, NP, NSC Files, Country Files-Europe, b.695, NA; Memo Conv. Ford-Kissinger, 25 September 1974, cit. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1979), 101–02.

73. Memo Kissinger to Ford, 27 September 1975, NSA, Country Files-France, b.3, GFL; Conv. Kissinger, Schmidt, Genscher 27 July 1975, NSA, and Moro and Giscard in Fourth Session Rambouillet Summit, 17 November 1975, Memos Conv., b.13 and b.16, GFL; Memo Conv. Ford, Kissinger, Rumor, Moro, 1 August 1975, NSA, Memos Conv., b.13, GFL. On how Italian diplomats had prepared the ground for Italy's participation see esp. Note by Egidio Ortona (Washington) to Moro, 10 September 1974, AAM, b.160, ACS.
74. See Duccio Basosi and Giovanni Bernardini, 'The Puerto Rico Summit and the End of Eurocommunism', and Fiorella Favino, 'Washington's Economic Diplomacy and the Reconstruction of U.S. Leadership', in *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985*, ed. Leopoldo Nuti (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008).
75. Conv. Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 6 September 1974, NSA, Memos Conv., b.5; Conv. Ford, Kissinger, Schmidt, 6 December 1974, Idem, b.7; Conv. Ford-Kissinger, 18 January 1975, Idem, b.8; Conv. Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Scowcroft, 24 May 1975, Idem, b.11; Conv. Kissinger, Schmidt, Genscher, 27 July 1975, Idem, b.13, all in GFL.
76. Schmidt in Memo Conv. Kissinger, Schmidt, Genscher, 27 July 1975, cit.
77. Basosi and Bernardini, 'Puerto Rico Summit', 262: Memo Conv. Ford, Kissinger, et als., 18 May 1976, DDRS.
78. Brzezinski to Carter, 26 February 1977, Weekly Report #2, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Weekly Reports [WR], b.41; Brzezinski to Carter, 'Western Europe: An Overview', 23 July 1977, Idem, James E. Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA [hereafter JCL].
79. Njølstad, 'Carter Administration.'
80. Giorgio Napolitano, 'Il PCI spiegato agli americani', *Rinascita*, May 1978; On Carrillo see Berlinguer in Mtg. Direzione, 11 November 1977, VD, mf. 309, APCI; Wall, 'Les États-Unis', 371–3; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Ferrar Straus Geroux 1983), 311–3; and Brogi, *Confronting America*, 339–42.
81. Leo J. Wollemborg, *Stars, Stripes, and Italian Tricolor* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990), 197–205; Cf. Memo Conv. Roberto Gaja (Italian Ambassador)-Brzezinski, 31 March 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, b.33, JCL; on Vance cf. George Urban to Brzezinski, 19 March 1977, White House Central File, Subj. File, Countries, CO-37, JCL; Njølstad, 'Carter Administration', 81. On Soviet anti-Eurocommunist activities see also Christopher Andrew (with Vasili Mitrokhin), *The Sword and the Shield: Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 294–301.
82. Qtd. Gardner in Hunter to Brzezinski, 5 July 1977; qtd. Richard Gardner, *Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 84.
83. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 312; John E. Reinhardt (Director of International Communication Agency, Washington D.C. ) to Brzezinski, 10 May 1978, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, b.39, JCL.
84. Magri qtd. in Memo Pierre Hassner to Brzezinski, 'For Ever Creeping?', 23 February 1977, WHCF, Subj. File, CO-37; Brzezinski to Carter, 'Visit of Italian Prime Minister Andreotti', 23 July 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, b.7, JCL.

## Notes on contributor

Alessandro Brogi is a professor of History of U.S. Foreign Relations at the University of Arkansas. He also held positions at Yale, Johns Hopkins-Bologna Center, and the Nobel Peace Institute in Oslo, Norway. His principal area of research is U.S. strategic and cultural relations with Western Europe during the Cold War, and his main works draw comparative analyses of France and Italy. His latest book, titled *Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy* (University of North Carolina Press, 2011 - Smith Award, Southern Historical Association) examines left-wing anti-Americanism in France and Italy during the Cold War, and U.S. reactions and strategies to stop the advance of communism in both countries. He has also published several articles in journals including *Diplomatic History*, *Cold War History*, and the *Journal of Cold War Studies*. Brogi is currently working on an interpretive work on U.S.–Italian relations during the entire span of the Cold War.