

Opening and closing doors: US postwar aviation policy: 1943–1963

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This article examines the development of US international civil aviation policy between 1944 and 1964, as the USA instituted policies to expand and protect the global aviation opportunities of its airlines. This entailed hard bargaining with the British and others to establish and maintain the Bermuda formula as well as efforts to contain and isolate Soviet and Soviet Bloc aviation behind the Iron Curtain. By the mid-1950s, the success of American aviation policy was clear. But thereafter, as the capabilities of non-American airlines increased and the needs of American carriers changed, the effectiveness of containing Soviet Bloc aviation and maintaining the Bermuda formula waned. Responding to the changing realities of international aviation, the Kennedy administration undertook a reassessment of American aviation policy that recognised the inability of isolating Soviet and Soviet bloc aviation and the need to modify the Bermuda principles to better protect the competitiveness of American flag carriers.

Keywords: US civil aviation policy; Chicago air conference; Bermuda formula; cold war; Civil Aeronautics Board

In 1941, publisher Henry Luce pronounced the future as ‘America’s Century’. Few agreed more than those connected with American aviation. The American century would be accompanied by an American-led empire of the air which would provide air travel for nearly every destination on the globe. In turn, travel through the world’s open skies would contribute to expanding world trade and understanding. It would help reduce political and cultural barriers, and, almost magically, elevate mankind to higher levels of civilisation. According to Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, Americans flying on American planes ‘to any place in the world’ was part of ‘the American concept of an expanding world economy and a closer and better understanding between nations’.¹ In a more pedestrian moment, Congresswoman Clair Booth Luce bluntly said: ‘We want to fly everywhere. Period!’²

Meeting the congresswoman’s goal, however, was not an easy task. Commercial interests needed to be balanced with national needs – and those reconciled with the desires of other nations. Further, within the USA there was no single entity making aviation policy. Often it involved a minimum of three players: the airlines, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and the State Department. Although their goals were similar, reaching agreements were frequently difficult. The airlines rarely cooperated with each other and, often supported by Congressional allies, wanted as many destination doors opened as soon as possible. The CAB’s responsibility was to provide order and ensure competitive advantages for American carriers by controlling

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competition and approving routes. Its decisions, however, regularly were disappointing to the airlines that saw them as too limiting or not protective enough. The State Department's role was to negotiate aviation treaties with other governments, each also wanting to maximise their air carriers' interests. The consequence was not a smooth or easy path for those shaping a commercial air policy for the USA.

As American policymakers began to visualise how to facilitate American airlines flying anywhere on the globe, two broad goals emerged. The first was to open aviation doors for American carriers around the world. The second was to structure an international system that best fit those carriers' economic needs. This involved obtaining international acceptance of what were called the 'Four Freedoms', and the addition of a 'Fifth Freedom'.³ Until the conclusion of the 1944 Chicago Air Conference, these goals seemed mutually attainable. But when the Chicago conference rejected the American vision of a system based on non-restrictive and non-predetermined air traffic that allowed planes to pick-up and discharge passengers, mail, and cargo along a multi-country, international, route, the USA was forced to rely on bilateral agreements.⁴ The American commercial aviation system sought at Chicago now needed to be obtained one nation at a time.

For many in the CAB and the State Department, the prospect of bilateral negotiations was welcome. On a country by country basis, American officials recognised that they commanded several potent negotiating weapons. At the top of the list was reciprocity which included granting landing rights in the USA and its possessions. Because most nations had 'aspirations to establish their own international air routes' and wanted access to the American market, reciprocity provided the best means to gain American airlines the right to 'operate to virtually all parts of the world'.⁵ Still, American officials were not naïve. Chicago had shown that many countries, led by the British, wanted to place restrictions on international aviation to protect their own, weaker, airlines. Thus, other inducements might be required, including the distribution of aviation equipment, including the much sought after Douglas DC 4, and economic and technical aid packages.⁶

Bilateral negotiations began even before the Chicago Air Conference ended and, at first, successes came quickly. Spain readily agreed to a new aviation treaty that precluded restrictions and included a Fifth Freedom provision. Similar treaties with Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland soon followed. British opposition to the treaty with Ireland caused a slight delay, but it too was completed by early February, 1945.⁷ Stanley Morgan, the State Department's Chief of the Aviation Division, expected it would not take long to complete similar treaties with Norway, Turkey, Switzerland, Portugal, and Czechoslovakia.⁸ Czechoslovakia was 'anxious' to conclude a treaty that would allow 'their own airline to begin service' and for Pan American Airways to initiate flights to Prague. To expedite the Czech agreement, Livingston Satterthwaite, the US Air Attaché in London, informed Washington, that a few 'thousand gallons of aviation gasoline' was needed.⁹ The Czech request seemed to confirm that providing reciprocity and needed aviation supplies provided sufficient incentives to convince other countries to accept the American vision of air treaties.¹⁰

In London, however, there was a growing sense of urgency. Unless such treaties could be blocked, the Americans would 'be so "dug-in" ... nobody else would be in a position to compete'. Consequently, the Foreign Office wanted to convince other countries to resist the 'benefits flowing from Uncle Sam's cornucopia' and negotiate treaties that placed limits on capacity and frequency, and reject the Fifth Freedom.¹¹

London's efforts quickly caught the eye of American officials. The British had 'undoubtedly woken up', and were 'more determined than ever to prevent their aviation from being swamped'.¹² In response, the State Department intensified its efforts to complete treaties and addressed the British problem directly. It called for a conference and connected it to the negotiations taking place over the American loan to Britain.¹³ Despite British protests over linking the loan to aviation issues, discussions began in August and resulted in the Bermuda conference (January 15 – February 11, 1946).¹⁴

The Americans arrived on the island with high hopes, confident that the British objections, especially over Fifth Freedom rights, would be overcome.¹⁵ After days of 'frank' and 'heated' negotiations in Bermuda and high-level meetings between American and British officials in Washington and London, the British succumbed to American pressure and agreed to the USA's position on the Fifth Freedom, frequency, and capacity. The USA, in return, agreed on standardising fares through the International Air Transport Association (IATA).¹⁶ To ensure the British government's acceptance of the Bermuda agreement, the American Ambassador to Britain repeated the message that swift approval of the agreement would 'contribute materially' to Congressional approval of the loan. Despite the British government's distaste for the American tactics, it grudgingly agreed. As Hugh Dalton warily noted, the treaty should be accepted before the USA added 'stiffer demands'.¹⁷

Praise for the agreement in Britain was muted, but not in the USA. Truman called it a 'great opportunity' for all airlines. *Time* magazine wrote: the 'air clears – sun shines, [and] U.S. companies make hay'. James Landis, the new Chairman of the Civil Aeronautical Board, hailed it as a triumph of the 'American way' and the country's 'pioneer' spirit over 'petty bureaucratic jealousies and selfish and short-sighted nationalism'.¹⁸

Landis was too optimistic. Jealousies and nationalism still existed, as did efforts to place restrictions on American aviation. In the months following Bermuda, the State Department's Garrison Norton concluded that American aviation was like 'a young man dressed up but with permission to go only as far as the corner store'. The USA, he said, could 'outbuild [*sic*] and outfly the rest of the world', but was unable to open the doors necessary for its airlines to 'fly around the world'. He admitted that some of the problems were institutional, within the convoluted system of making American aviation policies, but, nevertheless, placed most of the blame on those advocating restrictions on regional and international aviation.¹⁹ American officials in the field were more specific, the British were the primary culprits. They were still promoting 'restrictive agreements whenever they could'.²⁰ Satterthwaite wrote that the British were most effective when 'pointing out' that the Fifth Freedom resulted 'in splitting a melon three or more ways, which need only be split in two'.²¹

The American response was twofold. It increased its economic incentives and diplomatic pressures to complete air agreements and requested another round of discussions with London to resolve misunderstandings and to issue a joint reaffirmation of the Bermuda formula.²² The results were encouraging. In the spring of 1946, the USA signed Bermuda-style aviation treaties with France, Greece, and Egypt – the latter against the recommendation of the Foreign Office.²³ The meeting to resolve their 'apparent differences' took place in London in September. The discussions met American desires. It produced a public affirmation supporting the Bermuda formula and affirmation that British officials would not obstruct American efforts to sign Fifth Freedom agreements. In a confidential message to its officials in the Middle East,

the Foreign Office instructed that ‘on request of your United States colleague afford him all appropriate assistance in the negotiation of an agreement on Bermuda lines’.²⁴ With the treaties with France and Egypt in-hand and with renewed British affirmation of the Bermuda principles, over the next year American diplomats completed Bermuda-style agreements that effectively opened the aviation doors for Pan American Airways and Trans World Airways to fly to most of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Despite their successes, however, some in the State Department believed that the victories were incomplete. In their view the bilateral system was a wobbly foundation for American commercial aviation. They pointed out that despite American incentives and diplomatic pressures, some countries continued rejecting the Bermuda formula and that those with existing Bermuda treaties could cancel, or threaten to cancel them in an attempt to get a better deal. ‘Weaker air transport countries will continue to seek to limit ... foreign long-range carriers in order to protect their own air lines’, a State Department report concluded. To strengthen the American position, some within the Aviation Division of the State Department wanted an internationally approved Bermuda – style model treaty. They believed that with British support that the 1947 meetings of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal and Geneva would produce a positive result. They miscalculated. In both cases those favouring restrictions on fares, frequencies, capacities, and the Fifth Freedom gained the upper hand. After the defeat at Geneva, an American official grimly commented that it was a sign that the ‘period of relatively unrestricted international operations of our airlines may be coming to a close’.²⁵

There was a degree of irony in the statement. At the time of the Geneva meeting, Washington was considering closing some aviation doors as part of implementing its cold war containment strategy. A March 1947 intelligence study argued that Soviet interference prevented further progress for ‘foreign commercial air interests’ in Eastern Europe and recommended a policy to halt air travel to and from the Soviet Bloc.²⁶ Some within the administration disagreed, arguing there still were valuable political and commercial opportunities available in Eastern Europe. The debate lasted until in March 1948 when National Security Council memorandum 15/3, initiating a ‘counter iron curtain’, was approved.²⁷

The new policy needed Western European participation to be effective, which at the moment appeared unlikely as they were still ‘scrambling for ill-conceived momentary advantages by making deals with satellite states’. To gain support for its closed door policy, Washington emphasised the security risks to the West, especially from Czechoslovakia’s air service. The Czech airline, (*Ceskoslovenske Aerolinie* (CSA)), had established routes to many European capitals as well as Istanbul and Beirut. By utilising the airline, the Soviets could gain valuable flight experience over non-Soviet territories and facilitate their espionage and political activities. Washington again turned to Britain to help ‘carry the ball’ on ‘an one-for-all and all-for-one basis’.²⁸

The request put Britain in a familiar dilemma. It disagreed with Washington’s security arguments – it was already easy for the Soviets to operate in the West. The Foreign Office also believed there were benefits to maintaining connections with Eastern Europe, including their flights to Prague and Warsaw. On the other hand, London did not want to offend the USA by rejecting its overture. The solution was to suggest to their Western European counterparts that they should grant the Satellite

States only the services 'absolutely necessary as a *quid pro quo*' for the services they needed. Britain also agreed to try to limit Soviet Bloc flights to the Middle East.²⁹

Washington was disappointed in Britain's and other Western European governments' responses. The 'British, Belgians, Dutch and perhaps other governments have little or no apprehension over ... flights to Western Europe by satellite aircraft ... as long [as] western controlled airlines are permitted reciprocal rights', the American Embassy in London concluded. While finding some solace in Britain's efforts in the Middle East, Washington accepted the continuation of flights between Western and Eastern Europe.³⁰ In 1950, however, Washington concluded that the conditions had changed and reasserted its efforts to close doors to and from the Soviet Bloc. This time most Western European nations agreed to join in the effort, allowing the State Department to boast that the 'counter iron curtain' was finally, 'on the whole, effectively implemented'.³¹

When President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953, America's policy of open and closed aviation doors appeared triumphant. Soviet Bloc aviation was contained and American international aviation was soaring high. American aviation diplomacy based on the liberal principles of Bermuda had produced over 40 treaties, creating a global American air empire which serviced nearly every significant destination, carried a majority of the world's passengers, and produced profits. Congresswoman Luce's statement, 'We want to fly everywhere' was a reality. But, it was an 'Indian Summer' and in many ways the zenith of the USA aviation diplomacy.

By the mid-1950s, maintaining Washington's policies of opening aviation doors to most of the world while closing them to the Communist Bloc was becoming increasingly difficult. The difficulty came from two sources: the Soviet Union was seeking to elevate its position in international aviation and non-Soviet bloc countries were trying to protect their own aviation industries by limiting American ones. The Soviet Union, recognising 'the significance of civil aviation ... as an element of national power and prestige', had modified its 'long established policy of excluding all foreign scheduled air carriers from the USSR'. In response, Western Europe, including Britain, began to abandon Washington's counter iron curtain policy in search of commercial opportunities. Their 'lack of enthusiasm ... over adopting strong measures to cope with the Soviet threat to civil aviation', prompted Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to suggest a reappraisal of policy was 'appropriate'.³²

In taking 'a new look the Eisenhower administration, accepted that a Free World 'common policy' limiting Soviet Bloc's expansion into Europe was impossible.³³ Still, there remained the imperative to obstruct Communist Bloc aviation wherever possible, especially in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, where 'opportunities for the furtherance of Bloc political and subversive activities ... are far greater than in Western Europe'. To accomplish this, the new policy (NSC 5726/1) called upon the USA to incorporate aviation programmes into its aid packages for underdeveloped regions and recommended that Western European governments further develop regional and local aviation in their former and current colonial possessions.³⁴ By 1960, Eisenhower concluded that 'commercial, political, and military interest', even within NATO, was taking precedence over its cold war aviation policy, and withdrew NSC 5726. President John F. Kennedy continued to promote, with mixed results, an aviation closed door policy to combat Sino-Soviet bloc activities in underdeveloped regions of the world, but by the time President Lyndon Johnson left office in 1968,

cold war aviation diplomacy had refocused to primarily deal with those Communist nations that the USA did not diplomatically recognise.³⁵

The changes occurring during the mid-1950s in international aviation and within the air transport industry not only encouraged the Eisenhower administration to reshape its aviation policy toward the Soviet Bloc, but to institute reexaminations of general American aviation policy both domestic and international.³⁶ By the mid-1950s, both domestic and foreign competition for international routes had increased. Foreign, especially European, airlines had extended their routes, improved their planes and services, tapped into the growing number of Europeans wanting to visit the USA, and were carrying more passengers. At the same time an increasing number of American carriers were trying to extend or begin their international services. This, combined with the introduction of larger capacity planes, encouraged modifying existing aviation agreements and negotiating new ones. While American international airlines still made profits their share of the market and level of profitability was shrinking³⁷ Both American carriers and foreign governments were becoming more assertive in requesting the USA modify its policies, especially on routes and capacity distribution. American carriers, supported by Congressional allies, wanted limits placed on foreign carrier operations to and from the USA, while foreign governments claimed the existing air treaties provided American airlines too many advantages and their airlines too few. The questions facing American policymakers were how best to protect market share of American carriers, and whether the policies adopted at the end of the war could continue to be useful 'under the radically changed conditions' that were taking place. Recommendation arising from the reexamination of US policy ranged from instituting 'full scale economic warfare' that included the possibilities of paying higher subsidies to American – flag carriers and instituting increased limits on foreign airlines' operations to American destinations to maintaining the 'less restrictive and more expansionist policy' of the existing system. The former would probably result in retaliation while significant success from the latter was 'an act of faith'.³⁸

The paths chosen by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations were similar. Both believed the Bermuda principles should remain the keystone of American international policy. Bermuda had effectively promoted the health and growth of international aviation, and, equally important, they saw no alternative that did not strengthen restrictionists at home and abroad. The modifications they adopted were based on the view that American aviation had achieved a 'fully developed' route system which was considered the most practical. Because American carriers flew 'to every continent and virtually every important country and traffic generating point', the USA could now effectively utilise its only remaining significant diplomatic weapon: landing rights in American cities. Because it needed less reciprocity, the CAB, could raise the economic standard when approving and recertifying routes and flights to the USA. Henry Deimel, the American air attaché to France, concluded that although the fundamental policies remained the same, the strategy had shifted from an offensive to 'a defensive position ... concerned with protecting the rights we have acquired, as much as if not more than with extending those rights'.³⁹

Consequently, throughout the next decade the CAB raised its economic yardstick, the so-called 'economic quid pro quo' when considering new routes and approving changes to existing ones. The basic consideration was that financial benefits for American carriers had to approximate or exceed those provided for foreign airlines.

Negotiations were more protracted, positions more rigid, and agreements fewer. International aviation diplomacy became more bitter and divisive. Foreign officials complained that the USA was 'not willing to practice what it preaches' and their threats of diplomatic and economic reprisals became more common.⁴⁰ In a reversal of the security argument used by the USA a decade earlier, in 1957, the Netherland's government informed President Eisenhower that American opposition to granting routes requested by KLM reduced its ability 'to pull its weight as a sound member of the Western Alliance'. Eventually, at Eisenhower's intervention the State Department and CAB reached a compromise solution that allowed the Dutch airline (KLM) some increased access to American destinations.⁴¹

As the negotiation with the Dutch indicated, despite the change made by the CAB and the State Department, as the Eisenhower administration left office, the position of American airlines was not improving. Their share of the market continued to decline while the conversion to more expensive and larger capacity jet airliners further exacerbated the issue of profitability. At the same time, domestic and international support for the Bermuda principles was declining and complaints about American air diplomacy were increasing. At home, Congress responding to pressure from the airlines and related business interests, considered legislation that deviated from the Bermuda formula, provided the CAB more authority, and created a congressional role in approving air agreements. Abroad, foreign carriers and their governments were voicing dissatisfaction with the Bermuda formula and seeking increased access to American destinations while limiting American air carriers operations in their countries. Even the British appeared willing to move away from their jointly negotiated Bermuda formula.⁴²

Responding to the challenges facing American international aviation, the newly elected Kennedy administration quickly formed an Interagency Steering Committee to consider altering international aviation policies. In appointing the committee, President Kennedy stressed that while the nature of aviation had 'profoundly' changed since World War II, he did not believe that 'the framework within which it operates' had not. After nearly a year and a half of hearings, debate, and drafts, the Committee issued its recommendations in January 1963.⁴³

The core of the Interagency Committee's recommendations focused on dealing with foreign competition (fares, routes, and capacities, including Fifth and Six Freedom traffic),⁴⁴ the powers of the CAB, and the efficacy of the Bermuda-model treaty. Although the report upheld the principles of the Bermuda model, it worked from the belief that there were few places that American carriers needed to fly that were not already available and that reciprocity should be limited. It recommended that the CAB should further raise the economic yard stick beyond the existing 'economic quid pro quo' standard. The new criteria for international aviation agreements should show 'demonstrable economic benefits' for American carriers and, furthermore, the country and the State Department and the CAB should consider 'carefully' whether proposed air agreements were beneficial to the needs of the country and the American traveller.⁴⁵

To provide guidance for both agencies, the report established three categories of nations: (1) underdeveloped nations, (2) countries with unused rights to provide flights to the USA, and (3) developed, industrialised states currently conducting flights to and from the USA. Most of the countries in the first two categories had poor aviation markets, the Committee observed, but for political reasons wanted to

'show their colors on the side of an aircraft' to gain 'prestige at home and abroad'. In these cases, the best course was to prevent those nations from flying to American destinations. The State Department should use diplomatic pressure and economic incentives to discourage reciprocity and, along with the CAB, set the demonstrable benefit criteria for 'new foreign carrier routes' to the USA 'so strict [that] ... new routes will not be easily or readily granted'. It added that the USA needed to be willing not only to deny reciprocity but to do without air service to those countries.⁴⁶

The recommended approach for the third category, which included most of Europe, was more complex and extreme 'caution' should be used before approving changes. American officials, using the stricter economic yardstick, should try to deny further access to American gateway cities and to limit foreign carriers' Fifth and Sixth Freedom rights. In a more controversial, majority, recommendation that tested the principles of Bermuda, the Committee suggested that the CAB should be in some cases allowed to unilaterally place capacity restrictions on existing and future bilateral agreements.⁴⁷

The Committee warned that using the new criteria would produce more diplomatic complaints, threats of retaliation, and even the denunciation of existing treaties. But threats and complaints were just part of doing business and that it was unlikely there would be a rejection of existing agreements because it would 'upset the economic balance' and risk a 'victory or defeat' solution that no one wanted.⁴⁸ The Committee concluded that its recommendations effectively 'tailor the Bermuda mechanisms to the changing needs and aspirations of the world aviation community'.⁴⁹

On 24 April 1963, the White House presented the report as the basis for its revised international aviation policy. In introducing the report, President Kennedy publically reaffirmed the USA continued commitment to the policies constructed at Chicago and Bermuda. It rejected the 'extreme positions' of 'unregulated freedom of the skies' as well as the restrictive, cartelisation of the aviation with its 'pre-determined divisions of the market'. 'The spirit of our aviation policy', the president proclaimed, remained the same as 'when President Roosevelt called upon all nations to 'work together so that the air may be used by humanity – to serve humanity'.⁵⁰

Yet, as the report showed, much had changed in the 20 years since the Chicago conference and new approaches were necessary. Despite the homage to Roosevelt, the optimism of serving humanity and elevating mankind to new levels was gone. In reality, both the premise and practice of policy had been reset. The guiding principles were more conservative than liberal, more status quo than growth, and recognised that, for the USA, the opening of aviation doors was no longer as necessary or beneficial. In the new world of 'demonstrable economic benefits', before entering into any aviation agreements, including opening new routes for American carriers, the 'public value' needed to be weighed against the cost for the American traveller and tax payer.⁵¹ To paraphrase, Congresswoman Luce: 'We want to fly everywhere – provided it is economically beneficial'.

Notes

1. Henry Luce, 'The American Century', *Life* (January, 1941); William Clayton to Josiah Bailey, 23 February 1945, Department of State Records, File 800.796, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD. (Hereafter cited document title, date, file number, DSR.); Joseph J. Corn, *Winged Gospel: America's Romance with Aviation, 1900–1950* (New York, 1987), 125–30.

2. Carl Solberg, *Conquest of the Skies: A History of Commercial Aviation in America* (Boston, 1979), 285; C. B. Luce, 'America in the Post-War Air World', *Vital Speeches* 9 (March 15, 1943): 331–6; 'The New Imperialism: Mrs. Luce's Speech', *New Republic* 108 (February 22, 1943): 253.
3. The first four were generally accepted and a necessity for international flying. The first (freedom of transit) allowed the right to fly through the air space of another country; the second (freedom for technical stops) allowed for landing in a foreign country for servicing aircraft, but not for commercial reasons. The Third and Fourth freedoms were the keys for commercial operations, allowing an airline to discharge passengers to a specific foreign destination (Third Freedom), and pick up passengers at a foreign destination and fly them to the airline's country of origin (Fourth Freedom). The Fifth Freedom was more controversial, but seen as necessary for the profitable operations of American international service. It allowed an airline to take on passengers at a destination city and take them to a third destination city on the airline's route. Solberg, *Conquest of the Skies*, 285–6; H. A. Wassenbergh, *Post-War International Civil Aviation Policy and the Law of the Air* (Hague, 1962), 11–23.
4. Solberg, *Conquest of the Skies*, 286–9. For an analysis of American and British aviation competitive policies, the Chicago Conference, and a discussion of the 'Fifth Freedom', see: Alan B. Dobson, *Peaceful Air Warfare: The United States, Britain and the Politics of International Aviation* (Oxford, 1991); Marc L. J. Dierikx, 'Shaping World Aviation: Anglo-American Civil Aviation Relations, 1944–1946', *The Journal of Air Law and Commerce* 57 (Summer, 1992): 795–840.
5. Dean Acheson to Congressman Wat Arnold, 10 May 1946, 841.796, DSR.
6. In August 1945 in response to a request from CAB Chairman Pogue that more economic bargaining levers be used to support aviation interests, the State Department responded that while 'a number of bargaining elements ... have and will be used', but the CAB needed to realise that 'requests ... often exceeds the economic assistance ... [the United States is] prepared to make' and that other issues were more important. Pogue to State, 16 July 1945; State to Pogue, 31 July 1945, 800.76, DSR; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. II*, (Washington, DC, 1967), 1463. (Hereafter cited as *FR, date, volume, page.*)
7. British concerns about and opposition to the treaty with Ireland were even discussed between President Franklin D. Roosevelt by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who after the agreement was signed wanted Roosevelt to annul the agreement. Warren F. Kimball, *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 3 Volumes (Princeton, NJ, 1984): III, 521, 543–4, 566–7; Secretary of State Stettinius, Memorandum for the President, 8 February 1945, Official File 218, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
8. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, Vol. II* (Washington, DC, 1967), 609; *FR, 1945, II*, 1462. State Department paper noted that until 1947 the United States 'actively pressed both the Soviet Union and the satellites for ... air transport agreements' and that American 'markets for aircraft, components, aids to navigation, etc. were open to the U.S.S.R.' 'Some Considerations Involved in U.S. Aviation Policy Toward the Soviet Union and Satellites', 28 May 1948, Policy Planning Staff, 1947–1953, Subject Files – Aviation, Box 7, Record Group 59, DSR.
9. Satterthwaite to State Department, 29 August 1945, DSF 860f.796; James L. Gormly, 'The Counter Iron Curtain: Crafting an American-Soviet Bloc Civil Aviation Policy, 1942–1960', *Diplomatic History* 17 (April, 2013): 248–79.
10. *Ibid.* The American representative at the Hague noted that prior to the air agreement with the Netherlands, the Dutch had received a C-54. Hague to State Department, 3 October 1945, 800.796, DSR.
11. Foreign Office Minute, 25 April 1945, Foreign Office File W 5713/24/802; Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, 5 September 1945, W 12291/24/802; Foreign Office Memorandum, 27 September 1945, W 12856/24/802; Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, C.A.C. (45)1, 14 September 1945, W 12574/24/802. While some responses were positive, France and Greece informed the Foreign Office they were 'very dependent on the Americans' and worried about 'displeasing' them. Paris to Foreign Office, 1 June 1945; Athens to Foreign Office, 31 March

- 1945, W4460/24/802 Foreign Office Correspondence File 371, Public Record Office, Kew, Great Britain. (Hereafter cited FO 371, PRO).
12. Satterthwaite to Hickerson, 7 February 1945, DSR 800.796. In March 1945, the American Ambassador to Britain reported that he expected the British to use their national airline, BOAC, 'to restrict the spread of the Fifth Freedom ... by encouraging the formation of either regional companies or regional cabotage areas'. Such an arrangement, he concluded, would not exclude American airlines but they would place them 'at a serious disadvantage'. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. VIII* (Washington, DC, 1969), 65.
 13. *FR, 1945, II*, 1462; Pogue to State, 16 July 1945, 800.796; Hague to State, 3 October 1945, DSR 800.796; Pogue to State, 3 October 1945, DSR 800.79; Marc L. J. Dierikx, 'Shaping World Aviation: Anglo-American Civil Aviation Relations, 1944–1946', *The Journal of Air Law and Commerce* 57 (1992): 830–5.
 14. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin told the American Ambassador that he considered the linking of aviation issues to financial negotiations to be 'monstrous' and 'blackmail' and the 'the British people would go down rather than be clubbed'. David MacKenzie, 'The Bermuda Conference and Anglo-American Aviation Relations at the End of the Second World War', *The Journal of Transportation History* 12 (March, 1991), 61–73; Foreign Office to Lord Halifax, 3 January 1945, W543/8/802, FO 371, 1946; *FR, 1946, I*, 1451.
 15. Washington thought it also would be 'desirable' for the British 'to withdraw their opposition to our negotiations of full fifth freedom in countries like Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Iran, and Belgium'. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. I* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 1453. For an analysis of the conference see: MacKenzie, 'Bermuda Conference', 61–73; Dobson, *Peaceful Air Warfare*, 192–204.
 16. Colonel George Baker who headed the American delegation stated: 'We knew what we wanted when we came' and 'we have got it and more'. *FR, 1946, Vol. I*, 1463; MacKenzie, 'Bermuda Conference', 67–9.
 17. *Ibid.*; *FR, 1946, Vol. I.*, 1463, 1465, 1468–69; Secretary of State Byrnes to Ambassador Winant, 8 January 1946, 841.796, DSR; Dobson, *Peaceful Air Warfare*, 196–8.
 18. Extract from Cabinet Minutes (February 5–11), Cabinet Papers (46), Air 19/438, PRO; MacKenzie, 'The Bermuda Conference', 68–70; *Time*, 47 (February 11, 1946): 79.
 19. Norton was particularly critical of the way in which the USA selected and announced its international routes and then conducted its aviation diplomacy. Earl Burton to David Hulbund, 9 August 1946, W35/35/802, FO 371, 54628, PRO.
 20. American officials in the Middle East were among the loudest in complaining about British obstructionism regarding their efforts to negotiate air transport treaties. See: Gallman (London) to State Department, 4 September 1946, 800.786. Cairo (Tuck) to State, 9 January 1946, 800.796; Cairo (Tuck) to State, 1 February 1946; 883.796; London (Gallman) to State, 25 April 1946, 841.796; Cairo (Tuck) to State, 7 September 1946, 800.796, DSR.
 21. Satterthwaite also noted: 'the record is perfectly clear that the British will oppose by every means at their command the control or exclusive domination by an American company of an airline of any country in Europe, Middle or Near East'. Satterthwaite to State Department, 4 September 1946; 811.796, DSR.
 22. MacKenzie, 'The Bermuda Conference', 72; Cairo (Tuck) to State, 9 January 1946, 800.796; Cairo (Tuck) to State, 1 February 1946, 883.796; London (Gallman) to State, 25 April 1946, 841.796; Cairo (Tuck) to State, 7 September 1946, 800.796; Record of Conversation, London, 12–14 September 1946, 711.4127, DSR.
 23. To facilitate the Egyptian agreement, the USA put forth a better offer regarding Payne Airfield and nearly six million dollars of equipment. *New York Times*, March 26 and 28, 1946. British official feared that Egypt's decision would produce 'a landslide in the same direction throughout the Middle East'. Ambassador Campbell to Foreign Office, Foreign Office to Ambassador Campbell, 9 May 1946 W4866/541/802; Ambassador Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, 4 May 1946, W5191/451/802, FO 371, PRO.
 24. MacKenzie, 'The Bermuda Conference', 'Civil Aviation Talks with United States Officials in London, 14 September 1946, W 4226/8484/802; Record of Discussions Between Representatives of United States and United Kingdom, 12–14 September 1946, FO 371, 55627;

- Foreign Office to Representatives in Beirut, Angora, Cairo, Bagdad, Amman, Jedda, Tehran, Addis Ababa, 20 September 1946, W9210/422/802, FO 54628, PRO.
25. American officials were disappointed that both France and the Netherlands were now supporting and accepting some restrictive air treaties. Report on Postwar International Aviation Policies, 9 November 1948, Bureau of International Aviation, Negotiation Bureau, Records of Civil Aeronautical Board, Record Group 197, Box 1, National Archives, Suitland, Maryland.
 26. Gormly, 'The Counter Iron Curtain', 248–79; Central Intelligence Group, 'Future Soviet Participation in Long-Range International Air Transport', ORE-14, March 1947, National Archives, Washington, DC. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. 4* (Washington, DC, 1974), 440–1.
 27. 'Air Coordinating Committee Adopts Policy Toward USSR', Current Economic Developments, 7 March 1947, State Department Records, Group 59, Lot70D467, Box 2 (Hereafter cited Current Economic Developments, date); Department of State Memorandum, 'Air Transport Operations Through Satellite States', 9 June 1947, 711.0427, DSR.
 28. Telegrams, Steinhardt to State, 12 August 1946, 10 January 1947, 860F796; US Embassy Beirut to State, 17 August 1948, 860.7660. Bohlen told George F. Kennan that American aviation policy was based largely on 'security considerations'. Memorandum, 11 November 1948, 711.4027; *FR, 1948, Vol. IV*, 457–61, DSR; Gormly, 'The Counter Iron Curtain', 261–8.
 29. *Ibid.* In addition, London was hopeful that an aviation agreement was possible with Yugoslavia. Memorandum, 'US-UK Air Traffic to Satellites', 28 January 1949, W 540/45/802G, FO 371 54627, PRO.
 30. Gormly, 'The Counter Iron Curtain', 269–72. The Scandinavians, the French, Dutch, and Belgians seemed unwilling 'to co-operate' or even limit their efforts to obtain aviation rights with the Soviet bloc, and the Italians appeared unwilling to cut their air agreement with the Czechs. Current Economic Developments, 15 April 1949, 25 July 1949, Record Group 59, Lot 70D 476, DSR; *FR, 1948, Vol. IV*, pp. 471, 486; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. V* (Washington, DC, 1976), 196–7, 198–203.
 31. Among those changed conditions was the outbreak of the Korean War, increased Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and Czechoslovakia's confrontational and undiplomatic behavior that included arresting dissidents and foreigners. Gormly, 'The Counter Iron Curtain', 271–4. By 1951, for example, CSA was flying only to Helsinki, Stockholm, and Copenhagen, Current Economic Developments, 5 June 1951.
 32. Memorandum for Vice President, 26 June 1956, Security Council Staff Papers, 1953–1961, Box 2, Civil Aviation Folder National Security Council Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (Hereafter cited Eisenhower Library); Gormly, 'The Counter Iron Curtain', 274–7.
 33. In discussions with the United States over reshaping policy, London agreed that 'there was no further point in preserving the 'Containment Policy' toward the Satellites' and that the United States had failed to recognise that a 'common policy' was unattainable as well. Foreign Office Memorandum, 19 October 1956, GA 26/80, Foreign Office Note, 17 July 1957, GA 26/38. FO 371; 'U.S. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc', NSC Memorandum 5726/1, 9 December 1957, Box 2, Special Staff File, National Security Papers, 1953–1962, Eisenhower Library; Current Economic Developments, 8 January 1957, 10–12; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vol. IX* (Washington, DC, 1987), 488–503; Gormly, 'Counter Iron Curtain', 277–8.
 34. *FR, 1955–1957*, 490–9.
 35. The Kennedy had limited success in getting most Western European and some African nations to close their aviation doors to Soviet and Cuban aviation during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Once the crisis had passed, however, that cold war unity quickly vanished. See: Staff Study, United States International Aviation (Draft), 14 December 1962, Box 4, Folder: International Staff Study, Robert Murphy Papers, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.
 36. In 1953, President Eisenhower directed the Air Coordinating Committee to conduct an evaluation of commercial aviation. Part of the request arose from growing problems within the aviation industry, but it was also part of a larger effort by the new administration

- to reevaluate programmes and agencies implemented by previous Democratic administrations in an effort to reduce government spending and implement a less intrusive federal government. Stuart I. Rochester, *Takeoff at Mid-Century: Federal Civil Aviation Policy in the Eisenhower Years, 1953–1961* (Washington, DC, 1976).
37. In 1955, for example, Pan American Airlines made, before subsidies, made nearly as much as the combined profits of all major foreign airlines. ‘Papers for the Conference on International Air Transport Policy’, 1–3 May 1962, Folder: Air Transportation Policy, Carl Kaysen Box 364, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.
 38. *Ibid.*
 39. Henry Deimel to Edward Bolster, 23 December 1953, Miriam Camp Files, Folder: France, 1963, Box 1, Records of the Office of European Regional Affairs, 1946–1953 – Subject Files, Record Group 59, DSR.
 40. ‘Relationship Between US Aviation and Foreign Lines’, 8 January 1957, Current Economic Developments; ‘Policies and Problems in the International Aviation Field, 18 September 1955, Current Economic Development; Dobson, *Peaceful Air Warfare*, 219.
 41. ‘Report on International Air Transport Policy of the United States’, January, 1963, International Air Transport Policy, Federal Aviation Agency Files, Department and Agencies Series, President’s Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA (Hereafter cited, ‘Report on International Air Transport Policy’); Giles Scott-Smith and David J. Snyder, ‘A Test of Sentiments’: Civil Aviation, Alliance Politics, and the KLM Challenge in Dutch-American Relations’, *Diplomatic History* 37 (November 2013): 917–48; Dierikx, *Clipping the Clouds*, 88–90.
 42. The British view arose in part from the inability since 1955 for the USA and the UK to successfully agree on major route matters.
 43. ‘Report on International Air Transport Policy’.
 44. Sixth Freedom traffic referred to passengers and cargo from a third or another country, flying to the carrier’s point of origin before boarding flights to another destination country.
 45. ‘Report on International Air Transport Policy’.
 46. *Ibid.*
 47. The State Department opposed the CAB ability to impose such limitation. It pointed out that in supporting the Bermuda agreement, the USA had strongly rejected other countries placing arbitrary and unilateral restrictions on air operations. The CAB responded that limitations would be applied only in cases where foreign carriers abused Fifth and Sixth Freedom traffic to the USA, and that such actions did not violate the Bermuda agreement. In adjudicating the two positions, the Justice Department found that neither had definitive argument, but the CAB’s position was the most persuasive. In the White House statement, the CAB position was adopted and that legislative authority should be given to support such CAB actions. *Ibid.*
 48. ‘Background Papers’, Conference on International Air Transport Policy. Box 364, Carl Kaysen Files, National Security Files, Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.
 49. *Ibid.*
 50. ‘Report on International Air Transport Policy’.
 51. *Ibid.*

Notes on contributor

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