

A study of voting behaviour in an exceptional context: the 2017 Catalan election study

Eric Guntermann¹ · André Blais¹ · Ignacio Lago² · Marc Guinjoan³

Published online: 15 May 2018

© European Consortium for Political Research 2018

Abstract The Making Electoral Democracy Work project conducted a unique survey prior to the election held on 21 December 2017 in exceptional circumstances in Catalonia. In spite of a series of major events in fall 2017, overall election results were similar to those of the previous regional election, held in 2015. In addition to standard demographic, attitudinal, and vote choice questions, the survey included novel questions on identity, support for independence, perceptions of corruption, and acceptance of the result by losers. The data will be particularly useful to scholars seeking to assess the impact of long- and short-term factors on vote choice in such unusual circumstances, the crystallisation of public opinion, and voters' willingness to accept that their side lost the election.

Keywords Catalonia · Election study · Independence · Voting behaviour

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-018-0173-8>) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

✉ Eric Guntermann
ericguntermann@gmail.com

André Blais
andre.blais@umontreal.ca

Ignacio Lago
ignacio.lago@upf.edu

Marc Guinjoan
marc.guinjoan@uab.cat

¹ Département de science politique, Université de Montréal, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, C. P. 6128, succ. Centre-ville, Montreal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada

² Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain

³ Department of Political Science and Public Law, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Plaça Cívica, Campus de la UAB, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona, Spain



On 21 December 2017, an election to the Catalan regional Parliament took place in a very particular context. On 1 October, the Catalan government organised a referendum on independence for the region from Spain, which the Spanish government and Constitutional Tribunal considered illegal. Over two million Catalans (43% of eligible voters) participated in the vote and over 90% voted in favour of independence (Generalitat de Catalunya 2017a). To try to prevent it, the Spanish government sent riot police and injured over 1000 Catalans who were trying to vote (CatSalut 2017).

Nearly a month after the vote, on 27 October, the Parliament of Catalonia, claiming it had obtained a mandate from voters on 1 October, declared Catalonia an independent state in the form of a republic. In response, the Spanish government invoked Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, which had never been used before, to suspend Catalan autonomy. It also called an election to the Catalan Parliament, hoping to elect a government that would put an end to the independence process. However, it failed and pro-secessionists won another majority of seats (but not of votes), with vote and seat shares that were similar to those they received in the previous regional election, held in 2015 (Generalitat de Catalunya 2017b).¹ It is in the particular context of this election, that Making Electoral Democracy Work decided to conduct the survey of Catalan voters we present in this article.

In spite of the overall stability in vote and seat shares, there were some minor changes in the outcome. In 2015, the two major pro-independence parties, the Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT) and Catalan Republican Left (ERC), formed a pre-electoral coalition, Together for Yes (JxSí), with the goal of making Catalonia an independent state in spite of resistance by the Spanish government. In 2017, they ran separately. While these two parties nearly evenly split the pro-independence vote on 21 December, PDeCAT, which ran under the name Together for Catalonia (JxC), unexpectedly won more votes than ERC. The far-left pro-independence party Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), which was not part of the 2015 independence alliance, lost half of its vote share. Moreover, the 2017 leftist coalition Catalonia in Common-We Can (Catalunya en Comú-Podem) won a smaller vote share than its 2015 counterpart, Catalonia Yes We Can (CSQP). Among pro-unity parties, support for the conservative People's Party (PP), which currently governs Spain, plummeted, while Citizens (Cs), which is also strongly opposed to independence, surged in 2017 and won the most votes and seats. The Catalan Socialists' Party (PSC) increased its vote share by one percentage point. Finally, it is important to note that turnout in 2017, 79.09%, beat the previous record of 74.95%, set in 2015 (Generalitat de Catalunya 2017b).

Table 1 shows the results of the past two elections.

This election raises several questions that are central to the study of citizens' voting behaviour. Most fundamentally, to what extent do long-term factors, such as demographic characteristics and underlying attitudes, on the one hand, and short-term factors, like reactions to political events, on the other hand, influence vote choice? The stability in the vote and seat shares of pro- and anti-secessionist parties

¹ For more details about the 2015 election, see Orriols and Rodon (2016).



Table 1 Percentage of Votes Won in 2015 and 2017. *Source:* Reproduced with permission from Generalitat de Catalunya (2017b)

	2015	2017
Pro-independence parties		
Together for Yes (JxSí, Junts pel Sí)	39.59	
Together for Catalonia (JxC, Junts per Catalunya)		21.65
Catalan Republican Left-Catalonia Yes (ERC-CatSí, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya–Catalunya Sí)		21.39
Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular)	8.21	4.45
Total pro-independence parties	47.80	47.49
Other parties		
Citizens (Cs, Ciutadans)	17.9	25.37
Catalan Socialists' Party-United to Advance (PSC, Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya-Units per avançar)	12.72	13.88
People's Party (PP, Partit Popular)	8.49	4.24
Catalonia Yes We Can (CSQP, Catalunya Sí que es Pot)	8.94	
Catalonia in Common-We Can (Catalunya en Comú-Podem)		7.45
Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya)	2.51	

between the 2015 and 2017 elections in spite of the major events that took place between the two votes suggests that long-term factors play a role in stabilizing vote choice. Another important question is how did citizens react to the unusual decisions by both the Catalan and Spanish governments? A key aspect of democracy is that elites and citizens accept the result even when their side loses (Anderson et al. 2005; Lago and Martínez 2017). The Catalan government held a referendum on independence that was illegal under the established rules, while the Spanish government took the unusual and unprecedented step of suspending Catalan autonomy and calling an election to the Catalan Parliament. Were citizens willing to accept losing when both the national and regional governments were taking actions that depart from the way democracy usually works?

It is also important to understand the extent to which citizens' opinions are crystallised, on the one hand, or influenced by parties (Cohen 2003; Guntermann 2017) and question wording (Schuman and Presser 1996), on the other hand. This question is particularly important in the context of the independence crisis. A solution to the conflict over Catalan independence depends partly on how crystallised opinions are. If opinions depend to a large extent on context, it may be possible to find a solution to the conflict in Catalonia. The survey included four experiments that assess the impact of party conflict on secessionist attitudes. Guntermann (2017) found evidence that such conflict leads to polarisation in nationalist attitudes. If conflict is still polarising attitudes, a reduction in the intensity of party conflict may make Catalans more open to a compromise solution.

The Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project was a seven-year cross-national research project funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and directed by André Blais (Blais 2010). Its goal was






Fig. 1 Comparison of sample vote choice with the election result

to examine how the rules of the game affect both parties' and voters' behaviour. The project was innovative in studying these actors' behaviour at various levels (local, regional, national and supranational). MEDW conducted pre- and post-electoral surveys in Catalonia during the Spanish national election in 2011, the Catalan regional election in 2012 and the European election in 2014.² Wanting to understand how the exceptional political context of the recent Catalan election influenced voting behaviour, we decided to run a survey right before the election. The dataset and documentation are attached to the online version of this article.

We recruited a representative sample of 1500 respondents through Survey Sampling International (SSI). While no hard quotas were set, SSI sought to ensure the sample was representative on age, sex, and province of residence (Catalonia is composed of four provinces). Respondents participated in an online survey programmed in Qualtrics. Distributions of key variables are similar to those in the population. The survey was conducted in the eight days leading up to the election (from 17 December to 21 December 2017). We allowed respondents to select in which of the official languages of Catalonia, Catalan and Spanish, they preferred to answer the survey.

² Survey data can be downloaded from <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RR0NNQ>. See Golder et al. (2017) for more about the 2012 Catalan regional election.



Figure 1 compares the distribution of vote choice in the survey data with the actual election result. We can see that, in spite of some minor biases, the sample broadly represents actual vote choices. Users who want to correct for sampling biases can use one of two types of weights that are included in the dataset. The first weights by demographics (age, sex, education, place of residence) and turnout. The second weights by vote choice in addition to these variables.

To our knowledge, it was the only academic survey run so close to the election. It was also the only survey run in the context of the 21 December election that included questions about independence. The fact that the survey was run so close to the election is important, because vote intentions within the pro- and anti-independence blocs changed considerably in the month preceding the election.³ In particular, support for Together for Catalonia, the pro-independence coalition led by deposed leader Carles Puigdemont, and for anti-independence Citizens increased in the weeks leading up to the election.

The survey asked basic demographic questions (age, sex, education, income, first language, and place of residence; see [Appendix](#) for a full list of variables) as well as standard questions on political attitudes, turnout, and party preferences (see lists of questions in [Appendix](#)). Demographic questions notably allow scholars to see how strongly independence support is rooted in long-term factors, especially language. Previous research has shown that demographic variables are strong predictors of vote choice, of support for independence, and of nationalist attitudes more generally (Miley 2007; Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013; Orriols and Rodon 2016; Rodon and Guinjoan 2018; Verge et al. 2015).

Figure 2 shows vote choice by first language. It distinguishes those whose first language was Catalan from those who grew up learning Spanish, both languages or some other language. Parties are ordered from left to right from the most anti-independence to the most pro-independence party. We can see that Catalans whose first language is Catalan are much more likely to support pro-independence parties than other Catalans. Conversely, non-Catalan speakers are much more likely to support anti-independence parties.

The study included numerous questions on nationalism and independence. It asked respondents to place themselves on two measures of national identity, the Linz–Moreno scale (Linz et al. 1981; Moreno et al. 1998) as well as separate scales assessing identification with Catalonia and Spain. The Linz–Moreno scale is included in most surveys about voting behaviour and political attitudes in Catalonia. It asks respondents to describe their identity by placing themselves in one of five categories: ‘Only Catalan’, ‘More Catalan than Spanish’, ‘Equally Catalan and Spanish’, ‘More Spanish than Catalan’, and ‘Only Spanish’. While positions on the Linz–Moreno scale are strongly associated with attitudes towards independence

³ Note that the Catalan government’s Centre d’estudis d’Opinió (CEO) and the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) ran surveys with field dates in October and November. They were thus run before the changes in vote intentions that occurred between the end of November and 21 December. The Spanish government’s Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) ran a pre-election survey with field dates in November. It did not include direct questions on Independence.






Fig. 2 Vote choice by first language

in Catalonia (Serrano 2013), Guinjoan and Rodon (2015) have shown that separate national identification scales better account for identities, particularly Spanish identity, in Catalonia. Figure 3 shows the distributions of responses to the Linz–Moreno question as well as to the Spanish identification scale in the survey. The scale runs from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates no attachment to Spain and 10 indicates strong attachment. Responses to the former (panel a) suggest that Catalans overwhelmingly have ambivalent dual identifications, while a minority identify strongly with Catalonia. The Spanish identification scale shows that a significant minority of Catalans have a strong identification with Spain. This result helps us understand why the most anti-secessionist party, Citizens, won the most votes and seats in the 21 December election. Otherwise, it would be hard to account for the intense polarisation that currently exists in the region.

Respondents were also asked to indicate their support for independence on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means they totally oppose and 10 that they totally support it. This is a novel measure of support for secession in Catalonia that will allow scholars to understand how crystallised support for independence is. This question shows how divided Catalans are about this issue. Figure 4 shows the distribution of responses to the independence scale question. While conventional dichotomous measures show that the population is close to evenly divided on the issue of independence, the 11-point scale shows how intense the divide is. About a third of Catalans very strongly oppose independence, another third very strongly support it, and






Fig. 3 Distribution of measures of national identification. **a** Linz–Moreno and **b** scale of identification with Spain






Fig. 4 Distribution of independence scale

the rest of the population is somewhere in between. Thus, this question provides rich information that conventional questions fail to pick up on.

Two question-wording experiments also assess responses to different questions on independence. The survey includes an experiment for a binary independence question, one asking about support for Catalonia becoming an independent state, the other asking about separation from Spain. It also includes an experiment providing respondents with four options for Catalonia's relationship with Spain. One group was presented with the options of an autonomous community with less autonomy than it has now, an autonomous community with the same autonomy it has now, an autonomous community with more autonomy than it has now, and an independent state. The other group had the same options except that instead of an autonomous community with more autonomy, they were given the option of a state in a federal Spain.

Various questions have been asked about independence in surveys in recent years. Our experiments allow researchers to see how levels of support for independence vary based on the question. Furthermore, they allow scholars to determine which groups' support for independence depend more on the question asked as well as which groups' independence positions are more crystallised and are invariant to question-wording effects. Prior research has shown that answers to survey questions depend on the way questions are asked (Schuman and Presser 1996). Our project allows scholars to test these effects on independence attitudes using experiments.



Table 2 Support for government decisions by independence position (% supporting each decision)

	Support inde- pendence	Oppose inde- pendence	Overall
Hold illegal referendum (Catalan government)	82.7	3.7	43.8
Send police to prevent referendum (Spanish government)	2.6	39.6	16.5
Declare independence (Catalan government)	73.8	1.4	36.0
Suspend Catalan autonomy (Spanish government)	3.5	60.6	24.8

Four other experiments also allow researchers to assess the impact of party cues on attitudes towards independence and on perceptions of objective factors. Previous experimental research in Catalonia has shown that cues influence nationalist attitudes (Guntermann 2017).

The survey also asked several standard questions about evaluations of the economy and of various political actors. In addition to a standard question about retrospective economic evaluations, the survey asked respondents to evaluate each party's level of corruption, a major issue in Spanish politics. Previous research has shown that such economic and political evaluations influence vote choice in Catalonia and in Spain more generally (Bosch 2016; Fraile and Lewis-Beck 2010; Orriols and Rodon 2016). For a better understanding of how the literature on voting behaviour and elections applies to multi-level contexts like Spain, we encourage readers to consult the recent book *Multi-Level Electoral Politics* (Golder et al. 2017).

The survey also asked questions assessing perceptions of Catalonia's economic relationship with the rest of Spain as well as the state of the economy in an independent Catalonia. Research by Muñoz and Tormos (2015) has shown that such considerations influence support for Independence in the region. We also asked respondents to evaluate the role of various actors' (the Catalan and Spanish governments, the European Union, the main parties) in the recent independence crisis.

Of particular interest in the context of the conflict over independence are questions about respondents' reactions to four major events that took place in fall 2017. People were asked to evaluate four decisions made by the Catalan and Spanish governments: the Catalan government's decision to call the illegal referendum, the Spanish government's decision to send the police to prevent the referendum, the Catalan government's decision to declare independence, and the Spanish government's decision to suspend Catalan autonomy. As Table 2 shows, Catalans were strongly divided on these issues. A large majority were critical of the Spanish government's actions. A minority of them though supported the Spanish government's decision to send the police to prevent the referendum as well as the decision to suspend Catalan autonomy. The table also shows that these attitudes are largely, but not entirely, rooted in attitudes towards independence. A non-negligible minority of pro-independence voters did not agree with the actions taken by the Catalan government and many anti-independence Catalans failed to support the actions of the Spanish government.

The survey also shows that many Catalans who had voted for the left-wing Catalonia Yes We Can coalition, which was ambivalent about the independence



Table 3 Willingness to accept a government formed by the other side (%)

	Yes	No	Don't know	Prefer not to answer
A government of parties supporting independence (by supporters of anti-secessionist parties)	47.8	29.6	16.3	6.4
A government of parties opposing independence (by supporters of secessionist parties)	45.3	37.4	13.3	4.0

issue, in 2015, shifted to a pro-independence party in 2017 if they adopted pro-independence positions on these issues (not shown). Thus, these questions allow us to see that, while long-term factors play a major role in explaining public opinion and voting behaviour, short-term factors can lead people to change their minds.

Finally, one particularity of the survey is that respondents were asked whether they would be willing to accept a government formed by the other side of the independence divide. The objective was to determine to what extent voters are willing to accept losing an election in such a polarised political context. As Table 3 shows, less than half of Catalans who voted for parties that did not support independence stated that they would be willing to accept a government formed by pro-independence parties even if the latter had won a majority of seats in the Catalan parliament. A similar proportion of anti-independence party supporters said they would accept a government formed by the pro-independence parties even if they won a majority. These results suggest that, in a crisis that questions the established rules of the game, many losers may not accept that they have lost the election. Since a key aspect of democracy is losers' willingness to accept the result, these findings are worrying for democrats. We believe that an interesting avenue for research would be to analyse in depth the attitudes of Catalans who stated that they would refuse to accept that they have lost in order to determine what distinguishes them from those who would accept a government formed by the other side.

The survey also asked a variety of other questions, notably on populist attitudes and on obeying the law even when one considers it unfair. These and other questions should allow scholars to answer a large number of important research questions.

In short, we have prepared this survey to answer some key questions about voting behaviour and public opinion in such an exceptional context. The codebook and the dataset were entirely translated from Catalan and Spanish to English in order to allow researchers from both Catalonia and elsewhere to use them. Nevertheless, it is still possible to identify the language in which respondents answered the survey. The dataset and codebook are attached to the online version of this article. It is our hope that numerous scholars will benefit from the dataset to produce research that will help enhance our understanding of the Catalan situation as well as voting behaviour and public opinion more generally.



Acknowledgments This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant No. 412-009-1004). The authors acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Ruth Das-sonneville to question wording.

Appendix

See Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Table 4 Demographic variables

Variable	Description
Q3	Gender
Q4	Year of birth
Q6	Province where vote
Q7	Education
Q42	Income
Q43	Place of birth
Q45	First language
Q55	Description of place of residence

Table 5 Variables assessing political attitudes and turnout

Variable	Description
Q9_1	Interest in politics
Q9_2	Interest in independence debate
Q10A	Whether the respondent already voted
Q11A	Intention to vote
Q13	Perceived winner in Catalonia
Q14	Perceived winner in constituency
Q15	Turnout in 2015
Q17	Turnout in October 1 referendum
Q20_1	Agreement that citizens should vote on political decisions
Q20_2	Agreement that citizens should always obey the law even if they consider it unfair
Q24A/B	Acceptance of government formed by other side
Q35	Left–right self-placement
Q58	Attention to polls



Table 6 Party preferences and vote choice variables

Variable	Description
Q10B	Party respondent has already voted for
Q11B	Party respondent intends to vote for
Q12	Party respondent is most likely to vote for
Q16	Vote choice in 2015
Q22	Like/dislike scales of parties
Q23	Preferred party
Q31	Like/dislike scales of leaders
Q33	Evaluations of coalitions
Q37	Closeness to a party
Q38	Party respondent feels closest to
Q39	How close respondent feels to party

Table 7 Variables measuring nationalism and independence support

Q19	Referendum vote choice
Q26A/B	Support for independent state/separation from Spain ^a
Q27	Agreement with independence (11-point scale)
Q29A/B	Perception of parties' support for independence
Q30A/B	Preferences for Catalonia's relationship with Spain ^a
Q46	Perception of parties' support for increasing Catalan autonomy
Q49	Support for right to a referendum
Q50	Linz–Moreno national identification scale
Q51	Perception of the economy in an independent Catalonia
Q52	Perception of how much Catalonia pays vs what it receives
Q53	Support for continuing to pursue independence ^a
Q54	Strength of support/opposition to continuing to pursue independence
Q55	Support for seeking greater autonomy in Spain ^a
Q56	Perceived likelihood that the Spanish government will increase autonomy

^aExperiment**Table 8** Variables measuring evaluations of the economy, of governments, and of parties

Q21	Evaluation of the economy over past 12 months
Q32	Evaluation of role of actors in independence crisis
Q36	Attachment to Europe, Spain, and Catalonia
Q40	Evaluation of level of corruption of parties
Q41	Perception of number of Catalans who were injured in the referendum ^a
Q47	Perception of economic situation since the referendum ^a
Q48	Approval of government decisions during independence crisis

^aExperiment

References

- Anderson, C.J., A. Blais, S. Bowler, T. Donovan, and O. Listhaug. 2005. *Losers' consent: elections and democratic legitimacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blais, A. 2010. Making Electoral Democracy Work. *Electoral Studies* 29(1): 169–170.
- Bosch, A. 2016. Types of economic voting in regional elections: the 2012 Catalan election as a motivating case. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 26(1): 115–134.
- CatSalut-Servei Català de la Salut. 2017. Informe sobre els incidents dels dies 1 al 4 d'octubre de 2017. http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsyp/docs/2017/10/20/11/15/232799c8-755f-4810-ba56-0a5bbb78609c.pdf. Accessed 11 February 2018.
- Cohen, G.L. 2003. Party over policy: the dominating impact of group influence on political beliefs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85(5): 808–822.
- Fraile, M., and M.S. Lewis-Beck. 2010. Economic voting in Spain: a 2000 panel test. *Electoral Studies* 29(2): 210–220.
- Generalitat de Catalunya. 2017a. El Govern trasllada els resultats definitius del referèndum de l'1 d'octubre al Parlament de Catalunya. http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsyp/AppJava/notapremsavw/303541/ca/govern-trasllada-resultats-definitius-referendum-11-doctubre-parlament-catalunya.do. Accessed 14 March 2018.
- Generalitat de Catalunya. 2017b. Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya 2017. <http://gencat.cat/economia/resultats-parlament2017/09AU/DAU09999CM.htm?lang=ca>. Accessed 14 March 2018.
- Golder, S.N., I. Lago, A. Blais, E. Gidengil, and T. Gschwend. 2017. *Multi-level electoral politics: beyond the second-order election model*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guinjoan, M., and T. Rodon. 2015. Catalonia at the crossroads: analysis of the increasing support for secession. In *Catalonia: a new independent state in Europe?*, ed. X. Cuadras-Morató, 20–61. Oxford: Routledge.
- Guntermann, E. 2017. 'Party influence where predispositions are strong and party identification is weak: assessing citizens' reactions to party cues on regional nationalism in Spain', Party Politics advance online publication 2 November. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068817736756>.
- Lago, I., and F. Martínez. 2017. Challenge or consent? Understanding losers' reactions in mass elections. *Government and Opposition* 52(3): 412–436.
- Linz, J., M. Gómez-Reino, F. Andrés, and D. Vila. 1981. *Informe Sociológico sobre el Cambio Político en España 1975–1981: IV Informe FOESSA*, vol. I. Madrid: Euroamérica.
- Miley, T.J. 2007. Against the thesis of the "civic nation": the case of Catalonia in contemporary Spain. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 13(1): 1–37.
- Moreno, L., A. Arriba, and A. Serrano. 1998. Multiple identities in decentralized Spain: the case of Catalonia. *Regional & Federal Studies* 8(3): 65–88.
- Muñoz, J., and M. Guinjoan. 2013. Accounting for internal variation in nationalist mobilization: unofficial referendums for independence in Catalonia (2009–2011). *Nations and Nationalism* 19(1): 44–67.
- Muñoz, J., and R. Tormos. 2015. Economic expectations and support for secession in Catalonia: between causality and rationalization. *European Political Science Review* 7(2): 315–341.
- Orriols, L., and T. Rodon. 2016. The 2015 Catalan election: the independence bid at the polls. *South European Society and Politics* 21(3): 359–381.
- Rodon, T., and M. Guinjoan. 2018. When the context matters: identity, secession and the spatial dimension in Catalonia. *Political Geography* 63: 75–87.
- Schuman, H., and S. Presser. 1996. *Questions and answers in attitude surveys: experiments on question form, wording, and context*. San Diego: Sage Publications.
- Serrano, I. 2013. Just a matter of identity? Support for independence in Catalonia. *Regional & Federal Studies* 23(5): 523–545.
- Verge, T., M. Guinjoan, and T. Rodon. 2015. Risk aversion, gender, and constitutional change. *Politics & Gender* 1(3): 499–521.

Eric Guntermann is a postdoctoral researcher at the Canada Research Chair in Electoral Democracy. He was previously a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Gothenburg and research coordinator for Making Electoral Democracy Work.



André Blais Professor of Political Science at Université de Montréal. He was the leader of the Making Electoral Democracy Work Project.

Ignacio Lago is Associate Professor of Political Science at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Doctor-Miembro at Juan March Institute.

Marc Guinjoan is a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Political Science and Public Law at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, working in the research group Democracy, elections and citizenship.

