


Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

Diversity and Contestations over Nationalism in Europe and Canada



Edited by
John Erik Fossum, Riva Kastoryano, and Birte Siim



Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology

Series Editors

Carlo Ruzza

Department of Sociology and Social Research
University of Trento
Trento, Italy

Hans-Jörg Trezz

Department of Media, Cognition and Communication
University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology addresses contemporary themes in the field of Political Sociology. Over recent years, attention has turned increasingly to processes of Europeanization and globalization and the social and political spaces that are opened by them. These processes comprise both institutional-constitutional change and new dynamics of social transnationalism. Europeanization and globalization are also about changing power relations as they affect people's lives, social networks and forms of mobility. The Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology series addresses linkages between regulation, institution building and the full range of societal repercussions at local, regional, national, European and global level, and will sharpen understanding of changing patterns of attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups, the political use of new rights and opportunities by citizens, new conflict lines and coalitions, societal interactions and networking, and shifting loyalties and solidarity within and across the European space. We welcome proposals from across the spectrum of Political Sociology and Political Science, on dimensions of citizenship; political attitudes and values; political communication and public spheres; states, communities, governance structure and political institutions; forms of political participation; populism and the radical right; and democracy and democratization.

More information about this series at
<http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14630>

John Erik Fossum
Riva Kastoryano • Birte Siim
Editors

Diversity and Contestations over Nationalism in Europe and Canada

palgrave
macmillan

Editors

John Erik Fossum
ARENA Centre for European Studies
University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway

Riva Kastoryano
CNRS
Sciences Po
Paris, France

Birte Siim
Department of Culture and Global Studies
Aalborg University
Aalborg, Denmark

Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology
ISBN 978-1-137-58986-6 ISBN 978-1-137-58987-3 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58987-3>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018935943

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Ronnie Chua / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

Preface and Acknowledgements

This book has been long in coming. It is composed of a selection of the contributions that were presented at two Reconsidering Complex Diversity in the European Union and Canada (RECODE) workshops. RECODE was funded by the European Science Foundation (ESF) and ran during 2010–2014. When we started the RECODE project in 2010, the financial crisis had certainly already started to affect Europe, but we did not anticipate its depth or gravity, nor the successive confluence of crises when the refugee crisis and the Ukraine crisis struck. Consequently, there was much more optimism than today with regard to how modern societies would be able to handle difference and diversity. In retrospect, it might be fortuitous that the book has taken some time in completion, because this has allowed us to incorporate better the intentions that mar our societies at present—between the *onus* on opening up and fostering inclusion, on the one hand, and closing down and fostering exclusion, on the other. The book seeks to provide an overview of these competing tendencies. We are grateful to our colleagues in the RECODE project for a very stimulating intellectual *milieu*. Peter Kraus and Ivan Greguric have, in addition, helped us overcome various practical hurdles. We are grateful to Thomas Hylland Eriksen (University of Oslo) and Birte Siim (University of Aalborg) for having (co-)organised the two workshops that we have based the book on. We would like to thank our chapter contributors, without whose support and patience the book would never

have come about. We also wish to express our gratitude to the ESF for its financial and administrative support. We are also grateful for the support provided to us from ARENA at the University of Oslo and the University of Aalborg. We would like to extend a special thanks to Chris Engert for his excellent language editing, formatting and proofreading of the entire manuscript. Finally, we are grateful to our Palgrave editors for their support and patience.

Oslo, Norway

John Erik Fossum

Paris, France

Riva Kastoryano

Aalborg, Denmark

Birte Siim



RECODE

Contents

1	Introduction: Negotiating Territoriality and Nationalism	1
	<i>John Erik Fossum, Riva Kastoryano, and Birte Siim</i>	
	Part I The Transnational Challenge	25
2	Theorising About and Beyond Transnational Processes	31
	<i>Nina Glick Schiller</i>	
3	Transnational Politics of Integration and an “Imagined Global Diaspora”	63
	<i>Riva Kastoryano</i>	
4	Transnationalism and Interculturalism: Overlapping Affinities	89
	<i>Ricard Zapata-Barrero</i>	
5	Political Engagement Among Young Adults with Minority Backgrounds: Between Identity and Interest	123
	<i>Mette Andersson and Jon Rogstad</i>	

Part II	The European Union and Canada as Vanguard?	149
6	Can We (Still) Think About the European Union and Canada as “Cosmopolitan Vanguard?” <i>John Erik Fossum</i>	155
7	Negotiating Equality and Diversity: Transnational Challenges to European Citizenship <i>Monika Mokre and Birte Siim</i>	187
8	Wither the Canadian Model? Evaluating the New Canadian Nationalism (2006–2015) <i>Patti Tamara Lenard</i>	211
9	Recognition, Re-distribution and Solidarity: The Case of Multicultural Canada <i>Yasmeen Abu-Laban</i>	237
Part III	Contestations over Nationalism	263
10	Lessons Learned or a Missed Opportunity? Norway After the 22 July Terrorist Attack <i>Thomas Hylland Eriksen</i>	269
11	The New Nationalism and its Relationship to Islam <i>Sindre Bangstad</i>	285
12	The New <i>Front National</i>: Still a Master Case? <i>Hans-Georg Betz</i>	313

13	“Needed but Undeserving”: Contestations of Entitlement in the Danish Policy Framework on Migration and Integration	337
	<i>Martin Bak Jørgensen and Trine Lund Thomsen</i>	
14	Cultural Recognition and Democratic Participation: Immigrant Organisations in Oslo	365
	<i>Marianne Takle</i>	
15	Conclusion: Contestations Within, Rather Than About, Nationalism	395
	<i>John Erik Fossum, Riva Kastoryano, and Birte Siim</i>	
	Index	413

Notes on Contributors

Yasmeen Abu-Laban is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta in Canada. Her research interests centre on Canadian and comparative politics. Her published research examines: ethnic and gender politics; nationalism, globalisation and processes of racialisation; immigration policies and politics; surveillance and border control; multiculturalism and anti-racism, human rights and citizenship theory. Among her book publications, she is editor of *Gendering the Nation-State: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives* (UBC Press, 2008) and the co-author of *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalization*, with Christina Gabriel (University of Toronto Press, 2008).

Mette Andersson is Professor of Sociology at the University of Oslo. Her interests are within cultural and political sociology focusing on themes such as migration, ethnicity, identities, social and political mobilisation and research communication in public spheres. Her recent publications include: “Race: A Contested and Travelling Concept, in Peter Sohlberg and Håkon Leiulfstrud (eds), *Concepts in Action: Conceptual Constructionism* (Brill, 2017); “Theorizing through Comparative Case Studies”, in Peter Sohlberg and Håkon Leiulfstrud (eds), *Theory in Action: Theoretical Constructionism* (Brill, 2017); “Religious Symbols on Rearview Mirrors: Displays of Faith or Hopes for Safe Travel?”, with Anders Vassenden, in Roman R. Williams (ed), *Seeing Religion: Toward a Visual Sociology of Religion* (Routledge, 2015).

Sindre Bangstad is a Norwegian social anthropologist and an Associate Researcher at KIFO (the Institute for Church, Religion and Worldview Research) in Oslo, Norway. He holds a cand. polit degree from the University of Bergen, Norway (2002), and a Ph.D. from Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Netherlands (2007). His recent publications include: *Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia* (Zed Books-University of Chicago Press, 2014); *The Politics of Mediated Presence: Exploring the Voices of Muslims in Norway's Mediated Public Spheres* (Scandinavian Academic Press, 2015); *Hva er rasisme? (What is Racism?)*, with Cora A. Døving (Universitetsforlaget, 2015); and *Anthropology of our Times: An Edited Anthology in Public Anthropology* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

Hans-Georg Betz is an adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Zurich. He has published extensively on radical right-wing extremism in advanced liberal democracies, including the seminal study entitled *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1994). He is currently studying the link between populism and nativism, both from an analytical and a historic perspective. Forthcoming publications include, "Nativism Across Time and Space", *Swiss Political Science Review*; *The Radical Right and Populism*, in Jens Rydgren (ed), *The Oxford Handbook on the Radical Right* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming), and "Populism and Islamophobia", in Reinhard Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Oscar Mazzoleni (eds), *Political Populism: A Handbook* (Nomos, 2017).

Thomas Hylland Eriksen is Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Oslo and Visiting Research Fellow at the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI). His research has had a main focus on identity politics and globalisation, but he has also published widely on other topics. His most recent books are: *Globalization: The Key Concepts* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2014); *Fredrik Barth: An Intellectual Biography* (Pluto Press, 2015); *Identity Destabilised: Living in an Overheated World* (Pluto Press, 2016), co-edited with Elisabeth Schober; and *An Overheated World: An Anthropological History of the Early Twenty-first Century* (Routledge, 2017).

John Erik Fossum is Professor of Political Science at the ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. His main fields of interest include issues

of democracy, identity and constitutionalism in the EU and Canada, Europeanisation and the transformation of the nation state. Recent publications include *The European Union's Non-Members: Independence Under Hegemony?* (co-edited with Erik Oddvar Eriksen) (Routledge, 2015) and *Federal Challenges and Challenges to Federalism* (co-edited with Markus Jachtenfuchs) (Routledge, 2017) and *European Federalism: Pitfalls and Possibilities*, *European Law Journal*, forthcoming.

Nina Glick Schiller is Emeritus Professor at the University of Manchester, UK, and the University of New Hampshire, USA; Associate of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, and Visiting Distinguished Professor, University of Aalborg, DK. Her co-authored books include *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*, with Linda Basch and Cristina Szanton Blanc (Routledge, 1994), and *George Woke Up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home*, with Georges Eugene Fouron (Duke University Press, 2001). Among her recent co-edited books are *Whose Cosmopolitanism? Critical Perspectives, Relationalities and Discontents*, with Andrew Irving (Berghahn Books, 2015); *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants*, with Ayse Çağlar (Cornell University Press, 2011); and *Migration, Development and Transnationalization: A Critical Stance*, with Thomas Faist (Berghahn Books, 2010), and *Migrants and City-Making: Multiscalar Perspectives on Dispossession* (Duke University Press, forthcoming).

Martin Bak Jørgensen is Associate Professor in the Department for Culture and Global Studies at Aalborg University, Denmark. His main research areas include migration and integration policies, social movements, activism and civil society, precarity and new forms of politics and neo-Marxist theory. He has co-edited with Carl-Ulrik Schierup the volume entitled *Politics of Precarity: Migrant Conditions, Struggles and Experiences* (Brill, 2017), and, with Óscar García Agustín, he has co-edited the special issue *Civil Society and Immigration: New Ways of Democratic Transformation* (Migration Letters, 2013) and the books *Politics of Dissent* (Peter Lang, 2015) and *Solidarity without Borders: Gramscian Perspectives on Migration and Civil Society* (Pluto Press, 2016).

Riva Kastoryano is Research Director at the CNRS (National Centre for Scientific Research) and Professor at Sciences Po, Paris. Her work focuses on identity and minority issues and more specifically to their relations to states in France, Germany and the United States. Her books include: *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany* (Princeton University Press, 2002). Her last book, *Que faire des corps des Djihadistes? Territoire et Identité*, was published by Fayard (2015), while *Burying Jihadists: Bodies Between State, Territory and Identity*, forthcoming Hurst and Oxford University Press, will come out in 2018.

Patti Tamara Lenard is Associate Professor of Ethics in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa. She is the author of *Trust, Democracy, and Multicultural Challenges* (Penn State, 2012). Her work has been published in a range of journals, including *Political Studies*, *Politics*, *The Review of Politics* and *Ethics and Global Politics*. She is the co-editor, with Christine Straehle, of *Health Inequalities and Global Justice* (Edinburgh University Press), as well as *Legislated Inequality: Temporary Labour Migration in Canada* (McGill-Queen's University Press). Her current research focuses on the moral questions raised by migration across borders in an era of terrorism, as well as on multiculturalism, trust and social cohesion and democratic theory more generally.

Monika Mokre is Senior Research Associate at the Institute of Culture Studies and Theatre History of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Recent publications include: "We Demand our Rights. The Refugee Protest Camp Vienna", in S. Rosenberger, N. Merhaut and V. Stern (eds), *Taking Sides: Protest Against the Deportation of Asylum Seekers* (Springer, forthcoming 2017); "Inclusion and Exclusion by the Arts", in R. Alagjovovski, J. Vukmir, M. Karic, M. Peitler and D. Radosavljevic-Vasiljevic (eds), *From Diaspora to Diversities. Project Publication 2015-2017* (Esperanca: Svetski kulturen centar, 2017); "European Media Policies and the European Public Sphere", in H. Sicakkan (ed), *Integration, Diversity and the Making of a European Public Sphere* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016); *Solidarität als Übersetzung zum Refugee Protest Camp Vienna* (Transversal, 2015); and *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere (Gender and Politics)* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), co-edited with Birte Siim.

Jon Rogstad is Research Director at Fafo (*Fafo Institutt for arbeidsliv- og velferdsforskning*), the Institute for Labour and Social Research, Oslo, and Professor in sociology at the University of Trondheim, NTNU. His main fields of interest are the integration of ethnic minorities, political participation and the role of civil society. His latest publications include: “Additive or Multiplicative Disadvantage? The Scarring Effects of Unemployment for Ethnic Minorities” (2016) 33 *European Sociological Review*, with Gunn E. Birkelund and Kristian Heggebø, and “Religious Threats and Institutional Change in the Mass-media”, in Fredrik Engelstad, Håkon Larsen, Jon Rogstad and Kari Steen-Johnsen (eds), *The Public Sphere in Change: An Institutional Perspective* (De Gruyter, 2017), written with Olav Elgvin.

Birte Siim is Professor in Gender Research in the Social Sciences, Department of Culture and Global Studies, Aalborg University, Denmark. Recent publications include “Gendering European Welfare States and Citizenship: Revisioning Inequalities”, in P. Kennett and N. Lendvai-Bainton (eds), *Handbook of European Social Policy* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), with A. Borchorst; “Right-wing Populism in Denmark: People, Nation and Welfare in the Construction of the ‘Other’”, in G. Lazarides, G. Campani and A. Benveniste (eds), *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populist Shifts and “Othering”* (Palgrave, 2016) with S. Meret; “Gender Diversities—Practising Intersectionality in the European Union” (2014) 14 *Ethnicities*, with L. Rolandsen Agustín, *Negotiations Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2013), edited with M. Mokre; and “Citizenship”, in K. Celis and V. Waylen (eds), *The Oxford Handbook on Gender and Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2013).

Marianne Takle is Research Professor at NOVA, Norwegian Social Research, Oslo and Akershus University College. Her publications include: “Migration and Asylum Statistics as a Basis for European Border Control”, in (2017) 5 *Migration Studies*; “Is the Migration Crisis a Solidarity Crisis?”, in Andreas Grimmel (ed), *The Crisis of the European Union: Challenges, Analyses, Solutions* (Routledge, 2017); “When Policy Meets Practice: A Study of Ethnic Community-Based Organisations for Children and Youth”, in Marie Louise Seeberg and Elżbieta M. Goździak (eds), *Contested Childhoods: Growing Up in Migrancy: Migration, Governance, Identities* (Springer, 2016); “Immigrant Organisations as Schools of Bureaucracy” (2015) 15 *Ethnicities*; and “Institutional Design and

Political Representation: The Council of Immigrant Organisations in Oslo” (2015) 16 *Journal of International Migration and Integration*.

Trine Lund Thomsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Culture and Global Studies at Aalborg University, Denmark, and affiliated with the research group CoMID (Centre of Migration and Diversity). Her key areas of research are globalisation and social transformation, migration regimes and immigration management (policy), migration process and life course, diversity policy/management, integration processes and identity formation. Her relevant publications include: “Deservingness in a Danish Context: Welfare Chauvinism in Times of Crisis” (2016) 36 *Critical Social Policy* and “Crises now and then—Comparing Integration Policy Frameworks and Immigrant Target Groups in Denmark in the 1970s and 2000s”, with Martin Bak Jørgensen (2013) 14 *Journal of International Migration and Integration*.

Ricard Zapata-Barrero is Professor at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain. His main lines of research deal with contemporary issues of liberal democracy in contexts of diversity, especially the relationship between democracy, citizenship and immigration. He is director of GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration) and the Master on Migration Studies at UPF. He is member of the Board of Directors of the largest research network on Immigration in Europe, IMISCOE, and has been expert of the intercultural cities programme of the Council of Europe since 2008. For more details about research and publications, see <http://dcpis.upf.edu/~ricard-zapata>.

List of Abbreviations

AKP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi</i> —The Justice and Development Party (TR)
AUF	<i>Arbeidernes ungdomsfylking</i> —Norwegian Labour Youth (NO)
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
CPR	Canadian Pacific Railway
DI	Danish Industry
DivCon	Diversity and Contact Project
ECRE	European Council on Refugees and Exiles
ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
EMI	Unit for Diversity and Integration (NO)
ENAR	European Network Against Racism
EnoMW	European Network of Migrant Women
EP	European Parliament
EPS	European Public Sphere
EU	European Union
EWL	European Women's Lobby
FCN	First Country Nationals
FN	<i>Front National</i> (F)
G7	Group of Seven: the seven major advanced economies, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRS	<i>Human Rights Service</i>

xviii List of Abbreviations

IMDi	Directorate of Integration and Diversity (NO)
IS/ISIL/ISIS	Islamic State
LGBT	Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender
MP	Member of Parliament
NaNe	<i>Nők a Nőkért Együtt az Erőszak Ellen Egyesület</i> (Women for Women Together Against Violence)—Hungarian Women’s Rights Association
NGO	Non-government Organisation
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
NPNS	<i>Ni Putes Ni Soumises</i> —French Feminist Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Research Council
NRK	<i>Norsk Rikskringkasting</i>
OMOD	<i>Organisasjon mot offentlig diskriminering</i>
PDI	Percentage Difference
PPS	<i>Partida populara Svizra</i> (CH)
PS	Public Spheres
PST	<i>Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste</i> —Norwegian Police Security Service
PTNP	Provincial/Territorial Nominee Program (CA)
PVV	<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i> —the Freedom Party (NL)
SC	Supreme Court
SCN	Second Country Nationals
SF	Socialist People’s Party (DK)
SIAN	Stop the Islamisation of Norway
SMO	Social Movement Organisation
SVP	<i>Schweizerische Volkspartei</i> (CH) (German); <i>Partida populara Svizra</i> (PPS) (Romansh); <i>Union démocratique du centre</i> (UDC) (French); <i>Unione Democratica di Centro</i> (UDC) (Italian)
TCN	Third Country Nationals
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UDC	<i>Union démocratique du centre</i> (CH) (French)— <i>Unione Democratica di Centro</i> (CH) (Italian)
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	UK Independence Party
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US/US/USA	United States of America
WAD	Women’s Alliance for Development (BG)
WPR	What’s the Problem Represented to Be

List of Figures and Tables

Figure

Fig. 10.1	Two social ontologies	280
-----------	-----------------------	-----

Tables

Table 6.1	Unpacking cosmopolitanisation—core components	162
Table 13.1	Attitudes to immigrants in electoral surveys from 2001 to 2011	349
Table 13.2	Narratives and tools targeting labour migrants	352



1

Introduction: Negotiating Territoriality and Nationalism

John Erik Fossum, Riva Kastoryano, and Birte Siim

Our contemporary societies are increasingly diverse and interconnected. These developments have, on the one hand, brought up questions of how to *manage* the ensuing diversity and, on the other, of how to *retain* people's sense of community and belonging. Increased diversity has spurred a range of schemes bent on multicultural accommodation and “soft” forms of integration. At the same time, in recent years, we have witnessed significant nationalist reactions against globalisation, immigration, cultural diversity and multiculturalist visions and policies. Brexit, the election of Donald Trump as US President and the general rise of right-wing populist parties are part of a new nationalism that propounds an exclusivist—ethnic—nationalism that is deeply committed to reducing immigration and the ensuing cultural diversity.

J. E. Fossum (✉)
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

R. Kastoryano
Sciences Po, Paris, France

B. Siim
Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

How to make sense of these apparently conflicting or contradictory tendencies? There are both increased difference and diversity and significant efforts to reduce them. Underpinning this tension, we find qualitatively different visions of contemporary societies and the role and salience of nationalism. The issue is not merely one of identity; it also includes the political organisation of territory and the relationship between nationalism and the state. One powerful line of argument refers to the “crisis” of the nation-state in today’s globalised world. Prominent analysts have noted that, since the end of the Cold War, the transformations that our states and societies have undergone are so profound that they weaken or perhaps even undermine our familiar *national* attachments and affiliations. The claim to the effect that these transformations may be engendering a post-national constellation is a case in point (Habermas 2001¹; Ferry 2005). Another line of argument underlines the role of a distinctive form of transnational nationalism. This is not, strictly speaking, a new phenomenon. Historically speaking, as several of the chapters in the book underline, the transnational dimension to nation-building has largely been ignored. It deviated from the hegemonic account, which underlined the role of the territorially based *nation-state*, which refers to a fusion of nationalism and the state. Wars, disruptions and instability on Europe’s borders are giving rise to waves of asylum-seekers and immigrants. They form part of broader changes in patterns of immigration and emigration in the Western world and give added salience to transnational accounts. Thus, we see that important changes in states are closely associated with altered conceptions of identity and community, which have given rise to both post-national and cosmopolitan, as well as transnational, accounts of what is unfolding around us.

At the same time, and, as was noted above, far from all the developments that we are currently experiencing, are pointing in the same - national - direction. Changes may operate differently in different states or regions of the world. In Europe, there are significant national reactions and reassertions, especially but, far from exclusively, by right-wing movements and parties. They protest against immigration, multiculturalism and globalisation.

At present, we are therefore faced with quite different interpretations of the magnitude and *direction* of state and societal transformation. It is

not clear whether the patterns of transformation are taking place *within* a nationalist framework or whether *that framework itself* is part of the transformation. With the term “nationalist framework”, we refer to the ideas, the concepts, the sentiments and identities and the communal configurations that are associated with nationalism.

In order to address this, we need to establish more precisely *what* contemporary nationalism is and *how* it is contested. Do we need to revise our conception of nationalism’s sociopolitical embedding? Are we better served by abandoning nationalism, opting instead for an alternative frame of reference, such as cosmopolitanism, for instance? Given that a key aspect of transformation is heightened diversity, where, for instance, would multiculturalism figure in this picture?

This book addresses these questions by including chapters on all three main developments: transnational nationalism, cosmopolitanism and nationalist reactions. It provides a range of case studies and reflections aimed at obtaining a clearer view of the overall directions, including the magnitude of these transformations and the reactions to the transformations. The questions posed in this book are very large; our objective is to lay some of the groundwork for further studies to build upon when grappling with these important questions.

1 Community, Identity and Territory

Our point of departure is the particular constellation of territory and identity that we associate with the nation-state. Even if there are very few “real” nation-states around, in the sense of perfect contiguity between those sharing the same national identity and the state’s bounds, the nation-state forms the point of departure for all transformative accounts. The notion that the world is composed of nation-states is the master narrative in today’s political world. We will spell out the core components of this master narrative by unpacking the nation-state and approach the nation-state as a model. What we are interested in are the underlying constitutive principles and institutional and procedural arrangements.

The nation-state is made up of the state as a political institution and an organisational form and the nation, which is a cultural community

and an idea. To Max Weber, the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims *the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory” (Weber [1948] 1991: 78). This definition only applies to the nation-state (Kaldor 1995: 73). The state is sovereign.² It is a powerful organisation in the sense that it organises and wields power. Through a distinct combination of force and socialisation effected through state formation and nation-building, the Westphalian state system that now spans the globe highlights nationalism *within territories designated and internationally recognised as states*. In nation-states, nationalism enjoys status as a kind of umbrella over, and a form of unifying device for, a range of sources of identification that could, under other ideological and structural conditions, have given rise to alternative ways of thinking and organising communal co-existence. History holds numerous examples of how the key markers of culture, language, religion, gender, ethnicity and tradition have been configured in widely different ways and have helped to give rise to a broad range of forms of communal co-existence.

Nation refers to a specific type of community based upon a form of solidarity. This is the common designation that has been extended in different directions to underline a common destiny (Otto Bauer), a common project and will (Ernest Renan) and a set of common ancestors (Johan Gottfried Herder). The form of solidarity translates into a sense of community—and both the sense of community and that of solidarity are maintained and shaped by patterns of communication and interaction (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1994). A nation is an invented or even *imagined* community (Anderson 1991), that is, some symbols and aspects of a community’s past are highlighted at the behest of other:

Only the symbolic construction of ‘a people’ makes the modern state into a nation-state. (Habermas 2001: 64)

National identity derives from historic territory:

common myths and historical memories; common, mass public culture; common legal rights and duties for all members; [and] a common economy with territorial mobility for members. (Smith 1991: 14)

National identity is based upon the conception of a collective national consciousness whose sources are culturally based, but need not be pre-determined or given, and can be forged.³ Nationalism is so pervasive that it can be deemed to be the dominant ideology today (Smith 1991).⁴

Nationalism as a doctrine of popular freedom, sovereignty and self-determination, not the type of community associated with the nation, has given the phenomenon such political force and ubiquity. The nation-state has enjoyed a privileged status in the normative imagination because of the way in which it has incorporated the values of democratic self-governing and social solidarity. In effect, the democratic welfare state has offered a way of linking three core principles of justice: representation, recognition and redistribution (Fraser 2005, 2008). This, in turn, has given nationalism pride of place, as one of, if not *the*, the dominant mind frames, not simply because of nationalism as such but because of the close connection to other supportive justifying norms and principles, namely, democracy and social solidarity.

Greatly aided by the unifying thrust of the modern state,⁵ nationalism gives unified communal shape to a range of factors that are considered designative of us as persons. State formation and nation-building have been directed at putting such emotionally salient issues as language and religion at the service of the nation-state. Within a national context, they are kept from fully flourishing (according to their own logic). Through the marriage with the state, nation builders were able to eliminate competitors, to subsume them under the national label or to relegate them to the private sphere. The modern nation-state's complex and multifaceted relationship with religion is particularly instructive in this connection.

Nationalism has been sustained by factors internal to each state; in addition, this internal process of national inculcation draws sustenance and re-enforcement from the fact that each state is (and many regions are) similarly nationally encoded. The nation-state vision of the world is one of the system of states exercising a mutually reinforcing effect on all the components (nation-states and aspiring regions) within the system. The global system of states is literally encoded in the conceptual categories associated with sovereign statehood and the prescriptive mode of community embedded in nationalism. They are universally shared. Their hallmark is that each state should be both the sovereign and the bearer of

a distinct national community and identity. This isomorphic pressure takes a distinct form, which we might label as “the universal programming of national specificity” (Fossum 2011). In other words, nationalism is programmed to highlight certain forms of specificity as being distinctive of the community; these are not natural distinguishing features but are raised to prominence by those in charge of the nation-building process. When the nation-state was established in Europe:

the whole European vocabulary of association ... [was] ransacked for suitable expressions with which to describe and to appraise the formal character of a modern European state. (Oakeshott 1975: 320)

A successful nation-building process incorporates these features as “natural”, distinctive and designative of a given community. They appear as institutional facts (Searle 2005). In a world of states, national self-government at regional (sub-state) levels will have state-based national self-government as the model or aspiration.

Thus, in European modernity, under the guise of the nation-state, we find a distinct configuration for the accommodation of difference and diversity that takes the form of a distinct political culture and a socially and culturally demarcated public sphere. The nation is closely associated with a distinct political culture, a set of socialised attitudes and orientations (institutionally shaped and conditioned) and patterns of participation of individuals who understand themselves to be and see themselves as members of a political community, that is, the nation (Almond and Verba 1963: 14). This has long figured as the dominant rendition of how life is communally conducted in modern Europe and North America.

2 Alternative Accounts: Challenges to the Master Narrative

Today, however, a different story is in the ascendancy, namely, that this “national grip” or hegemony is slipping. Processes and patterns of globalisation, Europeanisation and transnationalisation are seen to usher in

profound changes in underlying conceptions of both culture and social and political organising. Through these and other processes, states are becoming far more interconnected than ever before across the whole range of political, social, cultural, economic and legal domains. Tight links are amplified by the revolution in microelectronics, in information technology and in computers. New international and transnational actors have emerged. The obvious implication is that states are faced with a whole range of boundary-spanning problems pertaining to the environment, international crime, terrorism, tax evasion and so forth. These and other pressing problems reveal grave inadequacies in the state as a problem-solving entity. States face grave challenges in controlling internal affairs; they both produce and are subjected to all sorts of externalities. The developments listed above also affect the ability of states to claim sole allegiance and also affect the very legitimacy of such a claim.

The argument is that these problems are rendered particularly pressing given that today's globalisation process is unprecedented in both spatio-temporal and organisational terms. Global flows are far more extensive and intensive and have a far higher velocity and impact than earlier processes of globalisation. Globalisation post-World War Two is more strongly institutionalised than before, through international treaties and conventions, regimes, networks and patterns of interaction and contact. The present situation is unique in its *confluence* of factors and processes (Held et al. 1999).

Referring to these developments, many analysts claim that the various patterns and transformations amount to a post-Westphalian turn (Archibugi 2008; Fraser 2005, 2008, 2011; Held et al. 1999; Linklater 1996, 1998). State transformation is, in turn, also associated with identitarian changes, in that a number of analysts associate the post-Westphalian turn with the rise of a post-national constellation (Habermas 2001).

One implication is that social science may be forced to own up to the fact that its own projection of culture, what Ulf Hannerz (1992) has called the mosaic image of culture that represents relatively unitary and differentiated societies, no longer holds sway. If so, social science must critically examine a number of its own core pre-suppositions because these are so profoundly embedded in the nation-state as the master narrative.

2.1 Moving Beyond Methodological Nationalism

The current transformations have made a number of analysts question whether the privileging of the nation-state in our normative imagination might not also be a hallmark of the social-scientific imagination and the conceptual tools whereby we depict the world. Accordingly, the national framing of our societies has become a matter of scientific inquiry, in which analysts have questioned whether social science inquiry is imbued with a nation-state bias or what some have referred to as *methodological nationalism*. Methodological nationalism is an intellectual orientation that assumes national borders to be the natural unit of study, equates society with the nation-state and conflates national interests with the purposes of social science (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002). This intellectual orientation comes with a range of distortions that stem from the assumption of a direct link between state and nation. They pertain, for instance, to a biased rendition of history, one that systematically singles out and amplifies our distinct nation-state existence—through projecting the present ideological stance on nationalism onto the past and thus rendering the past a captive of the nationalist account. As Nina Glick Schiller notes:

If we shed the assumptions of methodological nationalism, it is clear that nation-state building was from the beginning a trans-border process. While nation-states are always constructed within a range of activities that strive to control and regulate territory, discipline subjects, and socialize citizens, these processes and activities do not necessarily occur within a single national territory. However, if you accept the prevailing paradigm that divides a state's affairs into internal, national matters and international affairs that have to do with state-to-state relations, the history of trans-border and transnational nation-state building becomes invisible. The writing of national histories compounds this invisibility by confining the national narrative within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. This restricted view of national history became increasingly marked after World War I and continued until the end of the Cold War. (Glick Schiller 2009: 22–23)

What is being contested here is the master narrative's assumption that nationalism has been established in a close marriage with the state so that the territorial reach of the state corresponds with and sustains distinct

national communities and identities. This, in turn, has normative implications: it re-enforces the notion that the authentic way of conducting one's life can only be assured through the national experience, that is, living within state-controlled and nationally defined and delineated borders. Glick Schiller's main criticism centres on the problem of national compartmentalisation because she is concerned with cultural hybridity and intercultural interaction. Her critique focuses on the prevailing tendency to think of societies as nationally distinct and separate. Another way of putting this may be to say that her concern is *not with nationalism as such*, but with the distinct features of the *modern marriage* between nationalism and the state. She underlines, for instance, that states 100 years ago did not have a system of border control akin to that which we have and take for granted today. There is no doubt that state-building in the last century served to privilege certain readings of national distinctness and fostered greater contiguity between the state and the nation. But even that did not prevent cultural hybridity; it has certainly not rendered states as closed and self-contained entities bent on unified national exclusivity; and it has even, to some extent, been driven by transnational processes.

Other analysts, notably the late Ulrich Beck, go further and argue that the problem is not simply that the way of understanding nationalism as embedded in the sovereign state blocks out cultural hybridity and transnational sources of nationalism and nation-building; the problem is more fundamental because it pertains to the manner in which social science understands and analyses societies and political entities. Beck's claim is that social science is imbued with an inherent "methodological nationalism", which:

assumes this normative claim [every nation has the right to self-determination within the frame of its cultural distinctness] as a socio-ontological given and simultaneously links it to the most important conflict and organisation orientation of society and politics. These basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of social science. Indeed, the social-scientific stance is rooted in the concept of nation state. A nation state outlook on society and politics, law and justice and history governs the sociological imagination. To some extent, much of social science is a prisoner of the nation state. (Beck 2003: 454)

Beck argues that methodological nationalism has so permeated social science that the only way to escape it is through devising an alternative analytical framework, which he grounds in cosmopolitanism.⁶ Beck and Sznaider (2006) outline the key tenets of a methodological cosmopolitanism and devise a set of criteria for discerning how cosmopolitanised a given society actually is. They make the important observation that any assessment of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanisation faces the challenge of conflating what *is* with what *should be*.⁷ This is not least because we lack a clear sense of what a cosmopolitan polity would look like, how it would actually operate and how it would shape and be shaped by our experience. In this sense, there is still no explicit template or a set of precepts for how a cosmopolitan political entity will work in practice. Without a proper map where we have some reassurance of what will actually correspond with the terrain, any path sketched out will probably contain many treacherous portions. This is no doubt compounded by the fact that there are many different strands of cosmopolitanism.⁸ Thus, precisely where we stand today, in relation to a cosmopolitan world, requires more systematic attention.

These comments should in no way deter us from seeking to document how and to what extent cosmopolitanism manifests itself in our contemporary societies; it is rather a matter of saying that there is a need for a more systematic assessment of how, in what sense and to what magnitude cosmopolitanism permeates our existence. For this, we need proper criteria as well as an empirically grounded theory that is capable of properly translating historical and contemporary experience into cosmopolitan language—without overshooting its target. In other words, it needs to be capable of providing us with a proper account of what are genuine cosmopolitan traits, what are dubious cases and what are nationalist traits. This, in turn, requires clarifying whether cosmopolitanism is an alternative to nationalism or whether the two may be complementary. In the former case, we would look for some sharp transition; in the latter case, it is a matter of teasing out cosmopolitan traits in already established national contexts. The latter approach informs, for instance, the notion of rooted cosmopolitanism, which “attempts to maintain the commitment to moral cosmopolitanism, while revising earlier commitments to a world state or a common global culture, and affirming instead

the enduring reality and value of cultural diversity and local or national self-government” (Kymlicka and Walker 2013: 3).

Contemporary societies are transforming, but the question remains as to whether the patterns of transformation are taking place within a nationalist framework or whether this framework is part of the transformation. In order to consider this, we need to establish more precisely *what* contemporary nationalism is and *how* nationalism is being contested. One option would be to revise our conception of nationalism’s sociopolitical embedding; another would be to abandon nationalism, opting, instead, for an alternative frame of reference, as, for instance, Ulrich Beck insists we should. As noted, these questions have bearings on multiculturalism and require us to pay attention to the role and status of multiculturalism within this broader picture.

These questions are matters of identities, not to mention polities, undergoing transformation. When states transform their abilities to shape and condition, identities change. When states become more inclusive, they provide space for a greater number and range of identities on their territory. These may go beyond even civic nationalism in their inclusivity. Developments that foster transnationalisation and cosmopolitanisation may, therefore, usher in a different—more complex—conception of diversity no longer associated with, and sustained by, the constellation of a unitary political culture and public sphere that is supported by a state and legitimated by national democracy. For instance, insofar as the state is transforming so that the traditional, territorially bounded nation-state is transnationalised—in other words, linked to other states and societies through various forms of networks and structured forms of interaction—such new patterns of transnational structuring of political power and influence may “unleash” forms of difference and reconfigure diversity. With ethnicity, language, gender and religion, which are transnationally “unleashed”—no longer in the same way as before, to wit, subject to the distinct configuration of internally unifying and externally differentiating nation-state processes—should we then talk of a different, more complex, notion of diversity? In the existing body of literature, the processes of “unleashing” diversity have often been described in terms of a dissolution of (Western) culture, agonistic pluralism, cultural clashes and chaos (McNair 2006; Mouffe 2000). But the developments may also engender new transnational constellations.

One methodological problem is that, at the level of identity, it is not easy to determine whether a given identity should be considered as cosmopolitan or as transnational. Both are less rooted in particular territorial *loci* or communal settings than state-based nationalism and are, therefore, less susceptible to systematic socialisation pressures. In addition, many analysts consider inclusive forms of nationalism as largely compatible with cosmopolitanism.

We start from the notion that culturally diverse societies and societies undergoing transformation (through opening up to the world) can be located under a common heading, which we may label *complex diversity* in order to mark the transition from the traditional nation-state context to a transnational or even cosmopolitan world. There are two possible meanings of complex: as composite or as difficult to reconcile, to wit, as marked by contestation. With the term complex diversity, we refer to the former as a system made up of composite—or as consisting of multiple, co-existing—forms of identity and identification.

The *first* marker is that the polity officially recognises and praises its multiple co-existing identities, and manifests this in constitutional terms, in the polity's official doctrine and legitimising account and in concrete policy outputs. This might be the place where we can distinguish between transnational and cosmopolitan versions of complex diversity. The remaining markers are far more difficult to programme along either transnational or cosmopolitan lines.

The *second* marker of complex diversity is increased fluidity of identity. Fluidity speaks to a greater range of identifications, through societies containing a greater scope for people to take on different identities and shift them, as they see fit; it also refers to a greater difficulty in forming and sustaining stable and coherent identifications over time.

The *third* marker of complex diversity is that identities are inclusive and imbued with a strong norm of tolerance. These norms and attitudes do not emerge by themselves, but are generally the results of political and social struggles. Such societies will, therefore, often be marked by politicised struggles for recognition of difference, what is often labelled the politics of difference (Taylor 1994; Young 1990). The difference between complex diversity as made up of composite versus competing identities becomes apparent in the nature and dynamics of these struggles.

We assume that there is a broad compatibility between complex diversity as fostering composite identities—insofar as the struggles fit under the heading of the category of modern forms of belonging. Conversely, complex diversity will foster competing identities insofar as the struggles unfold under the heading of traditional forms of belonging and/or when traditional and modern forms are pitted against each other. The dimension we understand as *modern* is set in opposition to colonialism, paternalism and religious dogmatism and is oriented to the recognition of uniqueness, notably along group-based differences based upon gender, sex, race, and ethnicity and combinations of these.⁹

The other dimension draws sustenance from older, more *traditional* forms of belonging and conceptions of co-existence, which may be anti-modern and associated with strong reactions against the modernising thrusts of the more progressive forms of difference and diversity.

Complex diversity may either reproduce the difference between the categories—modern or traditional—or it may dissolve the categories. An interesting issue is to establish how the intersectionality of gender and multiple differences and inequalities, especially race/ethnicity, class and other categories of difference, would play out in this context (Yuval-Davis 2011). It might be argued that intersectionality is a methodological approach that may transcend both the above approaches through focusing both on inter-sections, that is, between gender and ethnicity/race, and intra-sections, that is, diversity within the different categories within the categories of men/women and ethnicity/race.

The *fourth* marker of complex diversity, which figures very prominently in this book, refers to its boundary-transcending character. Contemporary patterns of identity politics have become increasingly globalised, or, at least, less territorially confined and delimited, and, hence, they are more ambiguous in terms of defining in-group and out-group.

These four markers of complex diversity are not necessarily mutually reinforcing in terms of producing a coherent and sustainable identitarian constellation. They may be, but they may also engender conflict and contradiction.

The process of transformation of the Westphalian state system as the key territorially based system of governing brings up normative questions of how to conceptualise political and social justice in a world where the

state can no longer serve as the taken-for-granted determinant of the “who” of justice. A post-Westphalian theory of justice would then be needed to address the question of the “who” and the “how” (the basic political-institutional framework) of justice. As Nancy Fraser has noted:

an adequate theory of justice for our time must be three-dimensional. Encompassing not only redistribution and recognition, but also representation, it must allow us to grasp the question of the frame as a question of justice. Incorporating the economic, cultural and political dimensions, it must enable us to identify injustices of misframing and to evaluate possible remedies. Above all, it must permit us to pose, and to answer, the key political question of our age: how can we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation within a *post-Westphalian* frame? (Fraser 2005: 79; see, also, Fraser 2008)

A key premise that informs this book is that these questions cannot be adequately addressed without paying proper heed to the present status and understanding of contemporary nationalism. There are contestations over nationalism, which has certainly not disappeared and appears to be reasserting itself. The issue, then, is the extent to which what is emerging is different from the master narrative of nationalism—the nation-state nationalism that we are familiar with. It is therefore essential to establish nationalism’s role and status in the present situation.

2.2 Populist and National Reactions

In order to understand the status of nationalism in the light of developments on the ground, we need to take heed of what appears to be a significant nationalist *reaction* across Western countries, and beyond, such as in Russia, for instance.¹⁰ This reaction’s clearest manifestation is through a form of right-wing populism that is hostile to publicly recognised cultural diversity—and multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism especially.¹¹ It is important to establish the terms under which nationalism figures in these reactions.

There are different readings of these developments. Some analysts speak of these processes as driven by reactive forces who seek to *re-establish*

hierarchies of order and meaning and who fight tooth and nail against anything that might appear to threaten this. Here, no doubt, nationalism both figures and links in with religion, language, ethnicity and perhaps even race (notably understood as racism). For instance, Douglas Holmes lumped some of these forms under the label *integralism*, which he understands as a mixture of populism (understood as belonging to a group or culture), expressionism (understood as the idea that all aspects of human creativity are somehow marked by an inner logic which deserves preservation) and pluralism (understood as the notion of different cultures and ways of life as *incommensurable*) (2000: 6–7).¹² Along similar lines, Mark Lilla (2016) underlines the rise of a reactionary mindset that is hostile to present developments. One issue that warrants further attention and is touched on in several of the chapters of the book is whether nationalist reactions are powered by integralism or the reactionary mindset. Or whether integralism and the reactionary mindset are extreme positions mainly occupied by fringe groups.

Other analysts caution against pathologising these trends, in the sense of seeing them as standing out as distinctly different from the remainder of the political systems wherein they operate. Cas Mudde (2004), for instance, argues that modern societies are marked by a “populist *Zeitgeist*”, that is, populist discourse has become part of the mainstream. Mudde’s minimalist definition of populism sees it as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012: 8; Mudde 2007: 23). Key to the ideology of populism is a nativism that is hostile to immigration, for instance.¹³

In a number of countries across Europe, radical right-wing parties have entered government and/or are increasingly influencing government policy, especially on immigration and asylum policy. In addition, mainstream parties are adapting their policies to the stances propounded by these parties (Minkenberg 2013).

In this circumstance, knowledge of *precisely what* the reaction is oriented at is important to obtain—is it mainly oriented at especially culturally inclusive and difference-sensitive perspectives, such as either

multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism or both? Or is it made up of attacks on liberal and inclusive forms of nationalism, that is, for not taking cultural distinctness and authenticity seriously enough? Or is it mainly oriented at welfare nationalism—defining an understanding of welfare for national citizens against the immigrant “other”—as is the case in the Nordic contexts (Brochmann and Hagelund 2011, 2012)?

It is important to consider not only how radical right-wing populism understands nationalism but also how it envisages the relationship between nationalism and the state. An important question pertains to whether it is mainly about restoring state-based nationalism or whether there is an important transnational dimension involved. Despite the fact that populists espouse strong (ethnic) nationalist views, European populism is becoming more transnational (in EP party groups, in contact patterns, in learning and in copying from each other, etc.). An interesting question here is whether the transnational component is simply a means for improving national positions or whether the parties might develop genuine transnational attitudes. Islamophobia might be one such trigger insofar as they consider Europe (not simply the nation-state) as the natural unit to defend.

The question of the status of nationalism is interesting from normative and theoretical perspectives as well as from an empirical perspective. There is very little theoretically and normatively informed empirical research that seeks to juxtapose studies of national contestation with other, non-national, perspectives. Thus, there is a clear need for an approach that considers the intellectual contentions over nationalism in the light of developments on the ground.

2.3 What Is This Book About?

The different chapters in this volume are collected in three parts which address two fundamental contestations over nationalism, which we refer to as contestations *within* the ambit of nationalism (transnational nationalism and new nationalism), on the one hand, and contestations *about* nationalism (notably cosmopolitanism), on the other. Together, they make up the book's themes on contestations over nationalism.

The point of the book is to obtain a clearer sense of the salience of these two forms of contestation: within the terms set by nationalism, on the one hand, and about the very terms of nationalism, on the other. Clarifying the terms of contestation—is it still about nationalism, or is it about factors and phenomena that should be more suitably labelled under other categories of social identification and co-existence—is important in order to understand the nature of our contemporary societies and, not least, how they deal with diversity.

To this end, the book seeks to combine theoretical and normative with empirical-substantive analysis, but the main emphasis is on the latter, more applied, side. In addition to this framing chapter (Chap. 1) and a concluding chapter (Chap. 15), the book, as stated, is divided into three main substantive parts, each with its introduction and a collection of evocative case studies. The first part focuses on the transnational challenge, the second on alternatives to nationalism, notably cosmopolitanism, and the third focuses on forms of nationalist resurgence. The case studies are cast at meso (single organisation or field) and macro levels (entire political systems); the more specific case studies will figure within and give more substance to the broader more macroscopic analyses which draw inspiration, in particular, from the European and Canadian cases.

The first part of the book deals with the transnational challenge. It starts with a chapter by Nina Glick Schiller (Chap. 2) on theorising about and beyond transnational processes, proceeds with a chapter by Riva Kastoryano (Chap. 3), who spells out the nature of the transnational challenge in more detail, and discusses whether it might represent a new step in the development of nationalism that she calls transnational nationalism.

The next chapter is by Ricard Zapata (Chap. 4), who discusses why intercultural policies are so attractive. He argues that the intercultural policy paradigm has some affinities with the transnational framework of research that is now spreading in migration studies and seeks to explore further points of contact and complementarity between these two orientations. The final chapter in this part is by Mette Andersson and Jon Rogstad (Chap. 5), who approach the transnational *problématique* from a social movement angle and examine how the political involvement of ethnic minority young people is shaped within a broader transnational framework.

The second part focuses on contestations *about* nationalism, to the role of non-national theoretical perspectives and framing devices. The ones highlighted and discussed here are cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism and the specific questions and challenges that these perspectives raise. One aim here is to obtain a better understanding of how salient the alternatives are. This also applies to the debate on cosmopolitanism in the European and Canadian contexts. A second aim is to specify the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism: whether they are conflicting or compatible. A third and closely related aim is to understand how these putative alternatives to nationalism understand and seek to grapple with diversity. Attention is focused on problems associated with multiculturalism, challenges associated with intersectionality and challenges associated with immigrant political incorporation and participation in North America and Europe.

This part consists of four chapters. The first, by John Erik Fossum (Chap. 6), discusses Canada and the EU as possible cosmopolitan vanguards and develops an analytical approach for assessing degrees of cosmopolitanisation that he applies to the EU and Canada. The next chapter, by Birte Siim and Monika Mokre (Chap. 7), shows how the European transnational context contributes to reframe social divisions and develops the intersectionality approach further by analysing the role of actors in democratic politics from the multilevel European context. In the next chapter, Patti Tamara Lenard (Chap. 8) takes, as her point of departure, that Canada's success has depended on good public policy decisions but that these are also vulnerable as was seen during the Harper government's tenure in office (2006–2015). In the final chapter of this part, Yasmeeen Abu-Laban (Chap. 9) seeks to shed further empirical light on how support for the welfare state/economic solidarity, population diversity and support for multiculturalism/pluralism have been closely interrelated in its post-World War Two evolution in Canada.

The third and final part of the book focuses on national contestation, but through forms and shapes that unfold *within* the ambit of nationalism. The contributions in this part place emphasis on important changes in the manner in which nationalism is understood and analysed, but where the contestation takes place without the contending

parties abandoning the national point of reference. This part consists of five chapters which all, in different ways, testify to the continued relevance of nationalism as the frame within which such contestations take place. One important issue is the relationship of the new nationalism with Islam.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen, in his chapter (Chap. 10), focuses on a particularly odious case of Islamophobia and extreme nationalist reaction, the terrorist attack in Norway on 22 July 2011. He reflects on what lessons Norway has drawn from this traumatic experience, with particular emphasis on handling cultural difference and diversity.

The next chapter, by Sindre Bangstad (Chap. 11), focuses on the factors that propel anti-Muslim sentiment within new nationalism, with emphasis on anti-Muslim neo-nationalist discourses and the “realities” constructed both in and through these discourses in Norway between 2001 and 2014.

The next chapter, by Hans-Georg Betz (Chap. 12), is on the present *dédiabolisation* of the French *National Front* and the subsequent rebranding of the party as a populist party that seeks to defend ordinary citizens against the ravages of globalisation and to reaffirm the nation’s republican heritage against the threat posed by militant Islam.

The next chapter, by Martin Bak Jørgensen and Trine Lund Thomsen (Chap. 13), focuses on what Hollifield has termed “the liberal paradox”, which refers to the need to balance immigration control with humanitarian obligations. The authors discuss how this balance has been unfolding in Denmark, a setting where new nationalism has had a strong influence on government policy.

An interesting question here is whether societies bent on ensuring that both immigrants (and their civil society organisations) and in-born persons who are democratically trained and oriented are likely to alter the terms of cultural contestation both within the majority and within the cultural minorities. Might this be a buffer against nationalist excesses and foster political and social inclusion? To this end, in her chapter, Marianne Takle (Chap. 14) studies how a majority society (Norway) relates to immigrant organisations: as sites of cultural recognition or as schools in democracy and political participation?

What do these developments tell us about the role and status of nationalism in today's world? Is there a clear image of nationalism emerging, or is it rather the case of a deeper contestation over different conceptions of nationalism?

The final chapter (Chap. 15) holds the conclusion. Here, the three editors sum up the book's main findings. They place particular emphasis on clarifying the terms of contestation on nationalism, that is, whether the main contestations today could be said to be occurring *within* the ambit of nationalism or whether they, on balance, are rather contestations *about* nationalism, instead. Based upon this, the editors will reflect on the implications for how our contemporary societies deal with the various and multifaceted issues of diversity.

Notes

1. See, also, Habermas (1996, 2006, 2008, 2012).
2. The classical doctrine of sovereignty states that: "first, no one can be the subject of more than one sovereign; second, only one sovereign power can prevail within a territory; third, all citizens possess the same status and rights; and fourth, the bond between citizen and sovereign excludes the alien". The international *system* of states is marked by anarchy in the sense that sovereign states do not recognise any superior authority (Bull 1977; Linklater 1996, 1998; Morgenthau 1993; Waltz 1979).
3. There are different views as to how "thick" this sense of community and belonging is and from where it is derived. A widely accepted distinction is between the *civic* and *ethnic* nation. See Hutchinson and Smith (2000).
4. In all nation-states, there is a whole gamut of mechanisms and symbols that serve to remind us constantly that we are living in a national place and in a world of nations; and "this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding" (Billig 1995: 8).
5. For an incisive account, see, in particular, Scott (1998).
6. See, also, Beck (2006); Beck and Grande (2007).
7. That no doubt is related to the strong role of moral cosmopolitanism in contemporary scholarship. Some analysts also argue that this strong role has stymied the development of a more realistic *political* cosmopolitanism.

8. Robert Holton's (2009) comprehensive multidisciplinary survey brings that out very clearly. See, also, for instance, the contributions by Kendall et al. (2009), Delanty (2009), and Turner (2008).
9. In a number of important publications, Will Kymlicka (1989, 1995, 2009) developed a liberal theory of minority rights that has shaped the debates since.
10. For an overview of the strength and government participation of radical right-wing parties across Europe, see Minkenberg (2013).
11. There are different forms of right-wing populism, because this phenomenon is influenced by different national contexts—places and spaces. Some right-wing populist parties—for example in the Nordic countries—accept LGBT. Relations to the welfare state is an important marker—as long as there is no transnational alternative to the welfare state—and people may naturally defend the national welfare state, the so-called welfare nationalism.
12. He notes that the ideas underpinning integralism “form the basis of a distinctive intellectual and cultural movement in European history ... the ‘Counter-Enlightenment’, which assumed its most sophisticated manifestation within the artistic triumphs of romanticism and most malevolent expression in the politics of fascism” (2000: 8).
13. John B. Judis (2016) usefully notes that left-wing populism is dyadic, pitting people against the élite, and differs from right-wing populism because the latter is triadic—it includes an out-group (such as immigrants).

References

- Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso Books.
- Archibugi, D. (2008). *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Beck, U. (2003). Toward a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent. *Constellations*, 10(4), 453–468.
- Beck, U. (2006). *Cosmopolitan Vision*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beck, U., & Grande, E. (2007). *Cosmopolitan Europe*. London: Blackwell.

- Beck, U., & Sznaider, N. (2006). Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda. *British Journal of Sociology*, 57(1), 1–23.
- Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications.
- Brochmann, G., & Hagelund, A. (2011). Migrants in the Scandinavian Welfare State. The Emergence of Asocial Policy Problem. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 1(1), 13–24.
- Brochmann, G., & Hagelund, A. (Eds.). (2012). *Immigration Policies and the Scandinavian Welfare States 1945–2010*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- Delanty, G. (2009). *The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Deutsch, K. (1994). Nationalism and Social Communication. In J. Hutchinson & A. D. Smith (Eds.), *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ferry, J.-M. (2005). The European State. In R. Kastoryano (Ed.), *An Identity for Europe. Challenge to Multiculturalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fossum, J. E. (2011). Nationalism, Patriotism and Diversity – Conceptualising the National Dimension in Neil MacCormick’s Post-sovereign Constellation. In A. J. Menéndez & J. E. Fossum (Eds.), *Law and Democracy in Neil D. MacCormick’s Legal and Political Theory: The Post-Sovereign Constellation* (pp. 261–286). Dordrecht: Springer Law.
- Fraser, N. (2005). Reframing Justice in a Globalising World. *New Left Review*, 36, 69–88.
- Fraser, N. (2008). *Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World* (p. 2008). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fraser, N. (2011). *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis*. London: Verso Books.
- Glick Schiller, N. (2009). Theorizing About and Beyond Transnational Processes. In M. Cervantes-Rodriguez, R. Grosfoguel, & E. H. Mielants (Eds.), *Caribbean Migration to Western Europe and the United States: Essays on Incorporation, Identity and Citizenship* (pp. 18–42). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1996). *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (2001). *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Habermas, J. (2006). *The Divided West*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Habermas, J. (2008). A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society. In *Between Naturalism and Religion* (pp. 312–352). Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Habermas, J. (2012). *The Crisis of the European Union – A Response*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hannerz, U. (1992). *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (1999). *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Holmes, D. (2000). *Integral Europe – Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Holton, R. J. (2009). *Cosmopolitanism: New Thinking and Directions*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Hutchinson, J., & Smith, A. D. (Eds.). (2000). *Nationalism* (Vol. I). London: Routledge.
- Judis, J. B. (2016). *The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics*. New York: Columbia Global Reports.
- Kaldor, M. (1995). European Institutions, Nation-States and Nationalism. In D. Archibugi & D. Held (Eds.), *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (pp. 68–95). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kendall, G., Woodward, I., & Skrbis, Z. (2009). *The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism: Globalization, Identity, Culture and Government*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Kymlicka, W. (1989). *Liberalism, Community and Culture*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (2009). *Multicultural Odysseys*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W., & Walker, K. (2013). *Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Lilla, M. (2016). *The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction*. New York: New York Review of Books.
- Linklater, A. (1996). Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(1), 77–103.
- Linklater, A. (1998). *The Transformation of Political Community*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- McNair, B. (2006). *Cultural Chaos*. London: Routledge.
- Minkenber, M. (2013). From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 21(1), 5–24.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1993). *Politics Among Nations*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Mouffe, C. (2000). *The Democratic Paradox*. London and New York: Verso Books.

- Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(3), 541–563.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, R. (2012). *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Oakeshott, M. (1975). The Vocabulary of the Modern European State. *Political Studies*, 23(2–3): 319–341, and (4): 409–415.
- Scott, J. C. (1998). *Seeing Like a State – How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Searle, J. R. (2005). What Is an Institution? *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 1(1), 1–22.
- Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity*. London: Penguin.
- Taylor, C. (1994). The Politics of Recognition. In C. Taylor & A. Gutmann (Eds.), *Multiculturalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Turner, B. S. (2008). *Rights and Virtues: Political Essays on Citizenship and Social Justice*. Oxford: Bardwell Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Weber, M. ([1948] 1991). *Essays in Sociology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wimmer, A., & Glick-Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks*, 2(4), 30–334.
- Young, I. M. (1990). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). *The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations*. London: Sage Publications.

Part I

The Transnational Challenge

1 Introduction to Part I

This first substantive part of the book deals with the challenges associated with the fact that states and societies are increasingly transnationalised. In the European context, it is commonplace to associate transnationalism with the European Union, which presents a type of political space that differs in fundamental ways from national political spaces and induces a new type of transnationalism. By promoting free circulation of individuals (as well as goods and capital) and by encouraging economic activities and/or political participation across borders, it has led to the creation of interest groups which try to assert their independence vis-à-vis the state, placing their action directly on the European level and defining their activities as transnational (such as the ENAR, the EWL, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles ([ECRE] and the European Network on Migrant Women [ENoMW]). The supranational logic of European institutions stimulates the emergence of a European civil society in which transnational networks compete and turn Europe into a “communicative space”, to use Jürgen Habermas’ phrase. Information and media-exchange networks, institutional networks and networks of solidarity and interests—be they presented as economic, political, cultural or identitarian—constitute the very fabric of the European political construction. In the context of the European Union, the transnational community, based

upon a common identification of migrants, transcends the boundaries of the member states. It relates a vast European space, which includes the member states, to the immigrants' country of origin. Transnational actors such as leaders of voluntary associations, businesspersons or activists develop strategies that go beyond nation-states by expressing their solidarity through transnational networks based upon a common identity or interest or both.

Nevertheless, the transnational phenomenon was first explored by anthropologists who looked at migrants' experiences both "here and there", "at home and abroad". Since then, transnational studies have spread to an interdisciplinary approach. All transnational researchers agree on the importance of forms of solidarity beyond borders based upon identities (ethnic, religious, linguistic, national), upon the emergence of a new social field that transcends national boundaries, and participation in more than one national society. They all emphasise post-colonial immigration and the individual, commercial, institutional (political, cultural and social) relations that immigrants are party to in the two countries.

Thus, the challenge of transnationalism becomes a means of circumventing the homogenising effects of nation-states, in the context of the European Union with a specific focus on the experience of migrants. This part of the book presents the European Union as a transnationally structured polity and the migrant experience as a distinctive transnational mode of experience that the contributors have helped to bring together in the various parts of the book. The European Union as a transnational structure facilitates transnational experiences because European citizenship is so closely associated with mobility. Thus, a new mode of political participation emerges, brought about by a space open to the demands of both its citizens' and residents' interests and identities. This allows them to assert their autonomy with regard to territorially defined state systems. By the same token, transnational activity bolsters the demands of migrants who are residents in and/or who are citizens of European countries¹ both for equal rights and to combat racism and exclusion at the European level.

But, whereas the European Union is the transnational entity *par excellence*, the main focus of this part of the book is on transnationalism as

part of the migration experience. There are three aspects in particular that are of interest here. One pertains to clarifying what this phenomenon encompasses in terms of nationalism and national identity; the second pertains to how the modes of attachment that we find here relate to the relevant political authorities; and the third pertains to how transnationalism relates to other terms such as multiculturalism and interculturalism. Nina Glick Schiller, one of the initiators of the studies and reflections on transnational communities, asserts that a transnational community is constructed out of solidarity networks that stretch across national borders to connect populations with a communal identity, be it religious, national, regional or ethnic. All sorts of networks—economic, cultural and political—connect home and host countries. These networks ensure the transfer of norms, values and rights and also foster a transnational solidarity. The immigration experience binds together two national spaces, which are networked together, and where new forms of interaction occur, creating new symbols and engendering identities which seek to assert themselves in the two countries. According to this perspective, transnationalism corresponds to a new identity space relying on cultural references of both the country of departure and the country of arrival, thereby creating a new space of identification. In their study of Haitians in New York and the multiple links which they develop with their fellow citizens back in Haiti, Nina Glick Schiller and her co-authors show how, for the immigrants, these two spaces in effect constitute one single space. She argues that transnational studies have now begun to recover and re-interpret the strength of a cultural difference perspective, by going beyond territorially embedded views of culture popularised by British functionalist anthropology, and endeavouring to put aside the bounded vision and violent power of nation-states to construct borders and identities, even though states maintain the role of identity container. The most important in the studies of transnationalism is to see a transnational way of being and a transnational way of belonging. Riva Kastoryano claims that the emergence of transnational communities appears as a logical next step to cultural pluralism and to identity politics. The liberalism that favours ethnic pluralism has privileged the cultural activities that are guided by the association of immigrants, at the heart of which lie re-appropriated identities, organised and re-defined in relation to the state. She argues

that transnationalism, which stems from the extension of debates surrounding multiculturalism, has led to different perspectives in the analysis of transnationalism and to a new understanding of nationalism. Cultural, ethnic and religious communities recognised as such by states which increasingly rely on transnational forms of solidarity have sparked new upsurges of nationalism. This translates as the nationalisation of community sentiment (whatever its content may be) or the communitarianisation of networks of transnational solidarity accompanied by new forms of subjectivity. The territorial boundaries of these communities are not disputed. To the contrary, their non-territorial boundaries follow formal and/or informal network connections that transcend the territorial limits of states and nations. They thus create a new form of territorialisation—invisible and unbounded—and consequently a form of political community within which individual actions become the basis for a form of non-territorial nationalism that seeks to strengthen itself through speech, symbols, images and objects. These communities are guided by a de-territorialised “imagined geography” that gives rise to a form of transnational nationalism, or a type of nationalism without territory that should be conceived as a new historical stage in nationalism. States following their “migrants in movement” intervene in order to “re-territorialise” globalised identities. In doing so, they compete with communities for globalisation, a competition that leads to the confrontation of the two nationalisms—territorial (state nationalism) and non-territorial—transnational nationalism. Ricard Zapata-Barrero argues that the intercultural policy paradigm has some affinities with the transnational research framework. He argues that the concepts, logics and experiences overlap in many ways. But more important there is need for a clarifying debate between transnationalism and multiculturalism, since the specifics of their relationship have not yet been clarified. Conversely, it is possible to assert that there is a positive relationship between interculturalism and transnationalism. If the rough idea of transnationalism is to live with at least two identities, to have a bi- or multicultural mind, then this internal dialogue of transnational people is, in itself, an intercultural internal dialogue. This is why there is probably a link between transnational minds and intercultural minds that needs to be documented empirically. He asserts that what both transnationalism and interculturalism share today

is that they play the function of counterforces against the hegemonic theoretical frameworks governing migration studies, namely, national-state-based and multicultural-based approaches to diversity. Mette Andersson and Jon Rogstad approach the transnational problématique from a different angle. They are particularly concerned with the sources of political engagement among young adults with ethnic minority backgrounds. They draw on social movement studies and studies of transnational mobilisation from below in an effort to “obtain an empirically-based theoretical understanding of how the political engagement of young people from ethnic minorities is shaped within a broader transnational framework”. (p. 106) Since they want to tap into the transnational mindset, they are particularly concerned with the factors which motivate transnational action and engagement, less with the specific forms of engagement, as such. Even if the authors focus on young adults with ethnic minority backgrounds, it is quite obvious that the significance of transnational relations will partly have a substantial impact, in particular with regard to contact with family and friends in the country of origin. Transnational relations involve a sense of belonging to a collective identity, which is not limited by national borders. The authors reveal that collective identities and common interests are intertwined and serve to constitute political engagement mutually.

Notes

1. Research done by the Turkish Centre in Essen shows that 39.1% in Belgium, 26.4% in Denmark, 27.6% in Germany, 47% in France, 64.4% in the Netherlands, 40% in Austria, 62.2% in Sweden and 47.1% in Great Britain have the nationality of the host country.



2

Theorising About and Beyond Transnational Processes

Nina Glick Schiller

1 Introduction

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the developing field of transnational studies and the place of migration studies within it. I begin by examining the barriers that initially blocked the emergence of transnational studies. Briefly noting the emergence of four subfields, I suggest several distinctions that move us beyond some of the conceptual confusion that marked the euphoria of the emergence of a new paradigm and allow for the theory-building that is now necessary. The new paradigm can facilitate the analysis of structures of power that legitimise social inequalities. At the same time, transnational studies can generate their own forms of obfuscation. Concluding on this note, I caution that

This is an edited and updated version of a chapter first published in 2009 in *Caribbean Migration to the United States and Western Europe: Essays on Incorporation, Identity and Citizenship*. E. Mielants, M. Cervantes-Rodriguez and R. Grosfoguel (eds), Philadelphia PA: Temple University Press, pp. 18–42.

N. Glick Schiller (✉)

Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany

© The Author(s) 2018

J. E. Fossum et al. (eds.), *Diversity and Contestations over Nationalism in Europe and Canada*, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58987-3_2

transnational studies, while taking us beyond methodological nationalism, can produce new silences. Transnational studies may even obstruct the analysis of imperialism.

Throughout, I speak from my perspective as a scholar of the Caribbean and document the seminal role of Caribbean scholarship in documenting and theorising transnational processes. Globe-spanning connections, cultural syncretism, and cultural flows have been the substance of Caribbean history and society for more than 500 years, and transnational processes which exist everywhere, but which have been obscured by national historiography, have long been visible in the Caribbean.

2 Factors Obstructing Transnational Studies

If we look back, we can see that there have been several conceptual roadblocks on the path towards transnational studies. Among the factors that impeded the development of a transnational perspective were: (1) a bounded and ahistorical concept of culture and society, (2) methodological nationalism, and (3) migration studies that were mired in assimilationist or multicultural paradigms. Please note that in discussing the history of social science thinking about transnational processes, I use a set of terms that includes “nationalism”, “ethnicity”, and “identity” as they are commonly used in the migration literature in English. Different national traditions of scholarship have deployed these terms in different way, so that the terms cannot be readily translated and assumed to have the same meanings. These different national traditions, each with their own historical trajectories, also impede the development of a transnational paradigm and deserve in-depth discussion. My purpose here is not to impose Anglo-American understandings, but to begin the work of a dialogue about transnational processes that includes migration.

2.1 Unbounding Concepts of Culture and Society

Despite globalisation studies that have emphasised the fluidity of borders and boundaries, and although capital, goods produced by multinational

corporations, arms and armies, and media messages flow more freely than in the recent past, we are all today enmeshed in an increasingly impermeable regime of passports and surveillance regimes that stand as a barrier to migration. In the midst of these contradictions, in which borders seem, almost by definition, to be linked to the power of the state to limit migration, we often forget that the sanctity of borders and boundaries is rather new in both human history and social science theory. In the previous period of globalisation, which we can place, in general terms, between 1880 and 1914, migrants entered a new state with few impediments. There was a general understanding that tying people to the land was a remnant of feudal society that was rendered archaic with the growth of industrial capitalism and new modes of transportation such as railroads and steamships (Torpey 2000).¹

In general, this was a period when not even passports and entry documents were required.² After France took the lead in eliminating such barriers to the free movement of labour in 1861, most European countries abolished the passport and visa system that they had installed, primarily in efforts to retain, rather than exclude, labour. By 1914, all such documents had been virtually eliminated in Europe (Torpey 2000). Some states tried to keep workers from leaving, fearing labour shortages, but these efforts were relatively ineffective. Labour migration spanned the globe, with little or no restrictions in most states. Poles and Italians migrated to northern France; Switzerland welcomed diverse populations; England saw influxes from the continent; and German industrial development fuelled migrations from both the east and the south. Brazil welcomed migrants from Europe, the Middle East, and Japan. Indians and Chinese labourers went to the Caribbean and to Southern and Eastern Africa. Mexicans, Turks, Syrians, and populations from Southern Europe and Eastern Europe migrated to the United States (Wyman 1993).³

Workers migrated into regions in which there was industrial development and either returned home or went elsewhere when times were bad. Switzerland, France, England, Germany, the United States, Brazil, and Argentina all built industrialised economies with the help of billions of labour migrants who worked in factories, fields, mills, and mines. West Indians, primarily Barbadian, who migrated to Panama to build the canal, and Haitians and other Caribbean labourers who left for the

industrialised sugar plantations of Cuba were part of this vast dispersal of people. A considerable number of these migrants retained home ties; some even became circular migrants as they moved to perform activities seasonally. It was during this period that Randolph Bourne (1916) spoke of a “Transnational America”.

In this context of globalisation and the movement of capital, technology, and ideas, and people, scholars developed concepts of culture and society that were not confined to the borders of nation-states. Brought to great prominence by various theories of cultural diffusion, this unbounded approach to the study of social processes maintained some influence until World War II. Diffusionists understood that migration has been the norm throughout human history, including the history of the modern state, and that ideas, as well as objects, could travel long distances and not be associated with a specific territory. Today, the British diffusionist school of anthropology, which read the entire history of cultures as one of migration, is often used as an illustration of theory gone awry and as an example of the manner in which European scholars tried, with every possible means, to dismiss indigenous creativity around the world. But diffusionists were aware that cultural flows and social relationships are not limited by political boundaries; there are long-standing connections between disparate regions and localities. These insights informed the founders of anthropology. Transnational studies have now begun to recover and re-interpret the strengths of cultural diffusionist perspectives.

To do so, it was important to set aside the organic, territorially embedded view of culture popularised by British functionalist and structural-functionalist anthropology. This scholarship failed to examine the social and economic relationships that shaped the history and political economy of a particular locality. It overlooked the influence of colonialism and capitalism on the subject peoples. Beginning in the 1940s, US anthropologists adopted a similar mindset by studying “communities” as though they were discrete units subject only to local historical developments and divorced from larger social, political, and economic processes. The popularisation of Clifford Geertz’s influential work on culture as localised text continued this bounded approach to culture in anthropology long after the demise of community studies and forms of functionalism.

A transnational framework discards the assumption that the concept of society can be conflated with that of a nation-state and national culture (see Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). It was also necessary to set aside the paradigm of area studies that fixed culture to territory and which treated the Caribbean as an anomaly.

Even when social science began to examine transnational processes, the legacy of this bounded theory that approached culture as a discrete, stable, and historically specific local system of meanings continued to impede historical analysis. Those scholars, including the founders of cultural studies, who work within the Geertzian tradition of cultures as discrete webs of signification, spoke as though transnational processes were novel and transgressive, occurring in response to dramatic changes in communication technology and global capitalism. They framed the outcome of transnational processes as hybridity, which implicitly defined a previous stage of cultural production unblemished by diffusion. In the new “post-national moment”, the borders and structures of nation-states, they predicted, would become increasingly meaningless. In this theory-building in anthropology and other disciplines, which took the form of scholarship of multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1986, 1995) within transnational and global studies, the heritage of Caribbean scholarship was ignored.

However, by using a very different reading of global history linked to an understanding of the relationships between the emergence of capitalism and the slave trade, Caribbean scholars provided an important conceptual base that allowed both scholars and political actors to think beyond a concept of bounded culture. From the moment of conquest, Caribbean culture was openly hybrid, and its trans-border connections were apparent. Repeatedly, Caribbean researchers described migrations that connected people across borders and sought to conceptualise culture flows. At various times, Caribbean ethnographies and discussions of Caribbean life spoke of transculturation, creolisation, circular migration, remittance societies, and return migration (Ortiz 1995 [1940]; Rubenstein 1983; Thomas-Hope 1978; Wood and McCoy 1985).

Long-term patterns of migration that stretched across generations, investments in landholdings and businesses from abroad, and continuing home ties were widely reported. In 1971, Father Joseph Fitzpatrick noted

that it was best to see Puerto Ricans as “commuters” rather than immigrants because of their circulation between Puerto Rico and the United States. Building on this history, Constance Sutton and Susan Makiesky-Barrow (1992 [1975]: 114) spoke of a “transnational sociocultural and political system”. During the 1980s, studies of immigrants in the Caribbean routinely noted transnational connections (Georges 1990; Gonzalez 1988; Pessar 1988; Wiltshire et al. 1990). Nancy Gonzalez (1988: 10) raised the question of how the “individual segments of a transnational ethnic group can sustain a sense of unity” and spoke of the “Garifuna” forming “part societies within several countries”. However, this work was not brought to the level of theory to challenge the dominant understanding of culture and society. Even those scholars who drew on world systems in their discussion of migration in the Caribbean and Latin America, and who stressed the importance of migrant networks (such as Portes and Bach 1985) were constrained in their thinking by the limitations of dominant social theory with its bounded concepts of culture and society.

Anthropologists who developed a transnational paradigm for the study of migration began by setting aside this bounded vision, while keenly aware of the conceptual and violent power of nation-states to construct borders and identities. Many of us deployed a broader and older Tylerian concept of culture that encompasses social relations, social structure, and trans-generationally transmitted patterns of action, belief, and language. We also used a body of theory, methodology, and data that were not place-bound. Especially important were the ethnographies of Southern Africa and the Copperbelt and the methodological approaches to complex societies and colonial relationships developed by Max Gluckman (1967) and the Manchester School (Epstein 1958; Mitchell 1969).

The Manchester School researchers gave us a conceptual and methodological toolkit that was appropriate for the study of transnational processes. Because their research on urban life included the ongoing home ties of urban labour migrants, their observations of social relations extended across both time and space. Manchester School anthropologists approached the study of networks and social situations as a study of dynamic processes. In fact, these scholars were taking important steps in documenting the effects of globalisation, although they described it as an

industrial urban social system or in terms of colonialism. Other anthropological studies of migration, dating from the 1950s to the 1980s, while less engaged in relations of power, also pointed to the significance of the rural-urban connections of urban migrants and provided an intellectual and ethnographic foundation for transnational studies.

2.2 Methodological Barriers to Envisioning Transnational Processes

Methodological nationalism has been a potent barrier to the study of transnational processes. It is an intellectual orientation that assumes national borders to be the natural unit of study, equates society with the nation-state, and conflates national interests with the purposes of social science (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). If we shed the assumptions of methodological nationalism, it is clear that nation-state building was a trans-border process from the very beginning. While nation-states are always constructed within a range of activities that strive to control and regulate territory, discipline subjects, and socialise citizens, these processes and activities do not necessarily occur within a single national territory. However, if you accept the prevailing paradigm that divides a state's affairs into internal, national matters and international affairs that have to do with state-to-state relations, the history of trans-border and transnational nation-state building becomes invisible. The writing of national histories compounds this invisibility by confining the national narrative within the territorial boundaries of the state. This restricted view of national history became increasingly marked after World War I and continued until the end of the Cold War.

Within this growth of scholarship coloured by methodological nationalism, there was no conceptual space to examine the way in which the forging of each nation-state was not confined to its territorial borders, but took place in a complex dialectic between a state and its colonies, or between the population within a national territory and its political exiles and trans-migrants living abroad. Only recently has the scholarship on colonialism begun to illustrate the way in which the nation-state building of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (as it took on

colonies and began to police the Caribbean) was shaped by distinctions drawn between coloniser and colonised or between immigrants and natives (Gilroy 1991; Glick Schiller 1999a, 1999b; Lebovics 1992; Rafael 1995; Stoler 1989). These distinctions served to homogenise and valorise the national culture of the colonising country and popularise the notion that it was a unitary and bounded society, distinguishable from the subordinated peoples by the racial divide.

Again, Caribbean historians and scholars of Caribbean descent were often pioneers, insisting that the economies of imperialism were central to understanding the history of regions, rather than specific nation-states, and the relationship between colonised regions and the development of Europe (Mintz 1985; Williams 1994 [1944]). Caribbean scholars have understood that colonial “structures implanted in these societies served the economic requirements of the metropolitan systems which controlled Caribbean territories. Their economies were designed neither for self-sufficient nor independent growth” (Wiltshire 1984; Mintz 1985: 1, quote in Basch et al. 1994: 57). From the perspective of the Caribbean, it was possible to develop the concept of part societies that could be understood only in relationship to distant locations. In the United States, where nation-state building is older and the state is much more powerful, methodological nationalism had imposed greater constraints on historical analysis. Frank Thistlewaite (1964) called for a revisionist historiography that documented transatlantic connections that included migrant linkages, but this perspective gained a foothold only slowly, and a transnational paradigm has only recently been embraced.⁴

While global histories developed, including Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems perspective and Eric Wolf’s historically informed anthropology, most historical writing about states until the 1990s approached them as discrete entities. This continues to be the dominant perspective in the newly revived historiography, art history, and archaeology of many Eastern European academics. For example, Anastasia Karakasidou (1994) has documented these processes for Greece. When anthropologists worked in industrialised Western countries, methodological nationalism again shaped what they saw. The anthropology of ethnic groups within modernising or industrial nation-states tended to describe ethnic groups as culturally different from the “majority” population because of

their varying historical origin, including their history of migration, rather than see these differences as a consequence of the politicisation of ethnicity in the context of nation-state building itself. Yet it was a central part of the nation-state project to define all those populations not thought to represent the “national culture” as racially and culturally different, producing an alterity that contributed to efforts to build unity and identity (Glick Schiller 1999a, 1999b; Hall 1977; Williams 1989; Wimmer 2002).

In the 1970s and early 1980s, large corporations and financial institutions, aided and abetted by national and local governments, began a massive restructuring of capitalism around the globe. During the same period, social scientists noted aspects of this transformation, studying the global assembly line, rural-urban migration, the international division of and feminisation of labour, and the continuing and deepening dependence of peripheral states (Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983). However, neither anthropologists nor other social scientists developed either a term or a theory to address the totality of the changes that link economic restructuring to global cultural processes. Even when they looked globally, researchers identified nationally and could not develop paradigms that took them beyond the interests of their own state because of methodological nationalism.

3 Migration Studies and Immigration Identities: Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and the Return to Assimilation

The history of migration studies serves as an example of the effects of methodological nationalism on research paradigms. Scholars in both the United States and Europe looked at migration processes only through the political agendas of their own states and their particular migration policies. Although migration studies had an early effervescence in the social sciences, until the 1960s, immigrants were expected to assimilate by abandoning their own cultures and identities and merging into or helping to forge the mainstream culture. This process was thought to take

several generations. Ethnic communities might be formed along the way, but assimilation was the ultimate outcome and political goal.

Looking back at earlier scholarship, especially studies produced before World War II, it is interesting to note that many scholars actually documented the transnational ties of European and Asian immigrants—their patterns of sending home remittances, continuing family ties, and political engagement with homeland politics. Writing in 1949, R.A. Schermerhorn used the term “home country nationalism” for the transnational political activities of immigrants. As late as 1954, Nathan Glazer noted that many immigrants maintained their home ties, observing that:

In America, great numbers of German immigrants came only with the intention of fostering the development of the German nation-state in Europe ... the Irish, the second most important element in the earlier immigration, were also a nation before they were a state and, like the Germans, many came here with the intention of assisting the creation of an Irish state in Europe. On one occasion they did not hesitate to organize armies in America to attack Canada. (Glazer 1954: 161)

Many of these earlier researchers also understood that many immigrants left home with only very local or regional identities and dialects, and actually learned to identify with their ancestral land only after they had settled in the United States. However, the home country nationalism and the transnational ties of immigrants were portrayed as being short-lived because migration theory took assimilation to be an inevitable process. In the post-war years in the United States, even an acknowledgement of the home ties of migrants tended to disappear with the popularisation of Oscar Handlin’s highly influential *The Uprooted* (1973 [1954]) and his concept of immigrants as “uprooted”—that is, without transnational ties. What was forgotten was that, even in his book, Handlin had a chapter on return migration. The fact that, while he spoke of uprooting, and his methodological nationalism led him to centre his attention on the US social fabric, Handlin was not an assimilationist but this aspect of his scholarship has also usually been neglected. He documented the discrimination faced by immigrants such as the Irish and noted that they responded by maintaining Irish institutions and an Irish identity.

Cultural and ethnic persistence among immigrants became a subject of scholarship only with the development of cultural pluralist theory in the United States in the 1960s, as part of an effort to conceptualise the relationship between immigrants and a nation imagined as culturally homogeneous.⁵ However, it was not until the multiculturalist turn that scholars in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States generally acknowledged and celebrated the fact that generations after migration, cultural differences, and distinct identities remained among some sectors of the immigrant population. However, this acknowledgement did not lead to a theory of transnational connection in migration studies. Instead, methodological nationalism prevailed, and cultural diversity became an alternative narrative for celebrating national unity. Most recently, some US sociologists have resurrected the term “assimilation”, critiquing multicultural theory and transnational migration studies with evidence that most immigrants become well incorporated into US daily life (Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Barkan 1995; Morawska 1994, 2003).⁶

4 Transnational Studies Appear on the Scene

It is now clear that the development of transnational studies reflected both objective changes in the global structuring of capitalism and the subjective development of new ways to think about the world. However, in order to discuss transnational studies coherently, we must distinguish between the terms “global” and “transnational” (Glick Schiller 1996, 2004).⁷ Transnational processes take place across the borders of nation-states, and states shape, but do not contain, these ongoing cross-border interconnections or flow of people, ideas, objects, and capital. As a field, transnational studies examine the exercise of political power by governments. It notes the presence of the specific national forms of “governmentality” that make up people’s daily lives as they live within transnational social fields, and it also examines the nation-state building that occurs within transnational cultural processes.

The term “global” carries us into a different scale of analysis, one deployed by theorists such as those concerned with world systems or worldwide environmental processes. Here, the concern is with phenomena that affect the planet. Capitalism, for example, is now a global system of economic relations that has extended across the entire planet and has become the context and medium of human relationships, albeit with differential effects. Consequently, the term “globalisation” allows us to refer to periods of intensified and unequal integration of the world through capitalist systems of production, exchange, distribution, and communication.

When it first emerged as a field of study in about 1990, globalisation studies were primarily the domain of geographers and focused on the reconstitution of space through the growth of global cities. Soon researchers broadened the discussion and made it more historically grounded, looking at various periods in world history when transformations in capitalism led to various forms of economic and cultural integration. A focus on globalisation may frame various forms of transnational studies, but these fields of research ask different questions and address a different set of problems. The link between the two was the publication in 1989 of David Harvey’s *The Conditions of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Conditions of Cultural Change*. The excitement with which Harvey’s book was received was an indicator of a fundamental change in thinking that allowed transnational processes to become visible once again. Harvey, a geographer by training, stepped beyond disciplinary boundaries to link changing structures of capital accumulation, which he called flexible accumulation, with cultural transformations that included the development of new analytical paradigms such as postmodernism. As the interest in global connections and transnational processes flourished, scholarship went in several different directions that have emerged as distinct areas of transnational studies: culture, diaspora, and migration.

Transnational cultural studies usually do not distinguish between global and transnational cultural flows and study both. However, although some scholars have made it clear that the distinction is worth making, because certain cultural products and media flows must be seen as global, while the movements of other goods are shaped by state processes (Çaglar 2002). Films and television shows originating in India and Latin America,

as well as in the United States, are disseminated globally. People in Africa, Japan, and Brazil may watch the same *telenovela* and identify with its heroes and heroines. However, certain media are transnational, organised within specific transnational social fields and oriented to the publics within them. For example, English-language Caribbean newspapers, websites, and *Facebook* pages originating in the United States contain messages aimed at constituencies located in a transnational social field that extends between the Caribbean islands and the New York metropolitan area. These processes, while expanded by multiple cyberspace platforms, began with print media and embraced the invention of websites. For example, on its website the *New York Liberty Star* newspaper (2004) claimed that it:

... serves as a medium through which New Yorkers can stay abreast with the latest news and information that affects their community, the Caribbean and the rest of the world ... [T]he company's primary goal is to create a voice for those communities underserved by large scale media.

In contrast to transnational cultural studies, diaspora studies scholars are concerned with global articulations of identity that were not geographically confined. While many people place migrations within diaspora studies, keeping migrations studies as a separate field makes some sense. There is a certain sense of displacement that can exist in the realm of the imagination or identity politics, but a diasporic identification may be distinct from transnational political projects or domains of practice based upon the personal social relations of family and friendship. People may identify with the black *diaspora*, and this identification may have an important bearing on their emotions and self-identification. Black diasporic identities may or may not translate into a set of political practices. Those who identify as members of a black *diaspora* may engage in transnational political practices that link them to a specific homeland or to a region, such as the Caribbean or to a Pan-Africanist social movement. Or individuals may participate in transnational family networks or networks of personal relationship that stand apart from their identities or their political life (Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Glick Schiller 2003).

In the 1990s, researchers began finally to conceptualise migration as a transnational process, initiating transnational migration studies. Finally, scholars examined migrants' transnational familial, religious, political, and economic networks without their analysis being confined by the borders of a single nation-state. It is in the domain of transnational migration studies that the heritage of Caribbean scholarship has, perhaps, had its greatest influence, although certainly Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy, among others, have brought the Caribbean lens into discussions of diasporic identities and longings.⁸ Rosina Wiltshire, Winston Wiltshire, and Joyce Toney, scholars from the Eastern Caribbean, working with Linda Basch, who had studied oil workers in Trinidad, began to speak about transnational migration (Wiltshire et al. 1990). Beginning in 1987, Linda Basch, Cristina Szanton Blanc, and I (Glick Schiller et al. 1992), working together in New York, began to theorise about what we called "transnationalism" and proposed that the processes of living across borders was a significant aspect of migration globally. This effort was part of a growing scholarship that sought to analyse transnational processes and globalisation. I use the word "theorise" to describe our activities, to distinguish between the act of ethnographic description of people who migrate and maintain home ties, and the activity of conceptualising transnational migration as a different type of migration experience than the one posited by the existing literature.

The new migration scholarship acknowledged not only the multiplicity of cross-border ties maintained by migrants but also sought to understand the implication of these transnational connections for all of the localities and states to which the migrants were connected. At first, many researchers in all areas of transnational studies preached a form of technological determinism. They tended to see communications technology—computers, telephones, televisions, communication satellites, and other electronic innovations—as the motor of change. Suddenly, we could all visually experience the same war, the same concert, or the same commercial advertisement and share the information age. The power of the new technology, combined with insistence by postmodern theorists that the past was stable and the present fluid, led to an emphasis on the novelty of transnational processes. This reinforced the previous hegemonic anthropological paradigm so that scholars spoke as though people actually lived

within fixed, bounded units of tribe, ethnic group, and state. The past contained homogenous cultures, while now we lived in a world of hybridity and complexity.

However, more recent scholarship in all fields of transnational studies is more historically informed and nuanced. Researchers also have turned their attention to re-examining state processes, noting that the current phase of globalisation has been marked by the “hyper-presence” and “hyper-absence” of the state (Suárez-Orozco and Thomas 2001). States maintain the role of identity containers, formulating categories of national identity by differentiating foreigners from those who can claim the right to belong. These identity processes become the lens through which globally disseminated media, music, and commodities are both experienced and consumed.

4.1 The Concept of Simultaneity

The dominant paradigms of the past not only obscured the continuing transnational connections of immigrants but have also made it impossible to see that many migrants simultaneously become incorporated into a new land while preserving forms of transnational connection that connected them to the daily life and decision-making in other locations. I mean simply by simultaneity that people can live in more than one locality at the same time and be connected to the political processes of more than one state. There is no contradiction between being part of one place where you are physically located and, at the same time, being enmeshed in social relationships with others elsewhere, in the social relationships that pattern your daily decision-making. People may migrate and settle into a locality so that they and their descendants become part of that new locality, its neighbourhood life, its organisational activities, and its politics and economics. At the same time, their connections elsewhere may continue to shape their activities, structure their consumption, and organise their activities. My research on simultaneity challenges strongly held ideas about immigrant incorporation. It sets aside the argument, which has become common sense in Europe, that differing “political opportunity structures of particular countries” shape the degree to which migrants

become integrated into the political life of the receiving society or maintain transnational connections. Instead, it is possible to see that migrants tend to use their multiple transnational connectedness to become embedded in more than one state, despite public policies. At the same time, changing political conditions in various states, regions, and localities all serve to shape the possibilities for and the dynamics within transnational networks of connection.

5 Clarifying Our Basic Concepts

As the literature on transnational migration developed, several points of confusion persisted and impeded analysis. These include the failure (1) to theorise the difference between transnational social fields and transnational cultural flows, (2) to differentiate between transnational migrants and actors who live within transnational social fields, and (3) to distinguish between transnational *ways of being* and *ways of belonging*. The development within transnational studies of the four different tendencies listed above has seriously retarded the development of the field so that breakthroughs made in the first decade of transnational migration studies are frequently ignored and the basic tenets of the field reiterated. The division between the study of transnational cultural flows and transnational migration has been particularly problematical, leading to several problems.

5.1 Theorising the Difference Between Transnational Social Fields and Transnational Cultural Flows

In the first place, I want to stress that I do think that it is important to distinguish between flows and fields—the differing emphasis of transnational cultural studies and migration studies. Transnational cultural flows may include, but do not depend on, direct people-to-people relationships and interaction. In reading a book, newspaper, or magazine, listening to a radio, watching a film or television, or surfing the Internet, one can

obtain ideas, images, and information that cross borders. In contrast, a social field can be defined as an unbounded terrain of multiple interlocking egocentric networks. “Network” is best applied to chains of social relationships that are egocentric and are mapped as stretching out from a single individual. “Social field” is a more encompassing term than “network”, taking us to a multiscalar form of analysis. In this multiscalar analysis, social fields only exist when actual individuals have social relations with others. Social fields as a network of networks allow us to map the indirect connections between disparate individuals who do not know each other or even know of each other, and yet they are shaped by each other and shape each other. A transnational social field is composed of interlocking networks of interpersonal connections that stretch across borders (Glick Schiller 1999a; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999).

Why emphasise this distinction? Because in the euphoria that accompanied the ability finally to think about and study transnational processes, scholars began to speak as though every time we surf the Web or watch a soap opera produced elsewhere, we enter into some new social space that engenders transformation. The world of the imagination and the experience of social relations are different forms of human experience, although they may ultimately be interrelated. Flights of fancy that bring us to Jamaica, or Haiti, or Cuba, independently of whether my imagination is fuelled by an old-fashioned book or electronic media, have different life consequences than having ongoing commitments to people located across national borders. Of course, our imaginations may lead to action, and this kind of interaction between transnational imaginaries and social fields must be studied, but we cannot study the relationship between two distinct processes if we conflate them.

The term “transnational social space” has emerged as a means of moving transnational studies towards the study of social relationships (Faist 2000a, 2000b). For example, Thomas Faist has focused on social relations and institutions, defining these as spaces “characterized by a high density of interstitial ties on informal or formal, that is to say institutional levels” (Faist 2000b: 89). When used in this way, the terms “transnational social fields” and “transnational social space” refer to the same phenomenon, one only visible outside the conceptual frameworks provided by methodological nationalism. Striving to move beyond the

nation-state framework and building, in part, on the Dominican experience of migration, Luis Guarnizo (1997) and Patricia Landolt (2001) referred to a “transnational social formation”.

However, in contrast to these understandings, increasingly, the space metaphor morphed into a study of “transnational communities”. This approach defined an entire population as sharing norms, social relations, and identities just because of their categorisation as having a common national or ethnic origin. Defining the unit of study and analysis in this way, without investigating the actual degree of shared political relations or identity, introduces two barriers to analysis. Firstly, this discursive move re-inscribes a notion of bounded culture and society within transnational studies, independently of whether or not communal feelings and actions exist. Secondly, identity and social relations are conflated, making it difficult to study whether, and, if so, how they influence each other.

Whatever the term used, it is essential, as Peggy Levitt and I point out, to distinguish between “the existence of transnational social fields and the consciousness of being embedded in them” (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). For years, migrants in the United States maintained transnational networks, but, in keeping with the dominant assimilationist ideology, portrayed themselves as immigrants who were busy becoming American. Most Haitians I knew in New York in research that I conducted in 1969–1970 and 1985–1986 stated that they had a choice: to stay as exiles who planned eventually to return to Haiti or “to forget about Haiti” (Basch et al. 1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1987; see, also, Fournon 1984). Meanwhile, they were deeply involved in transnational family networks while simultaneously becoming incorporated into life in the United States.

5.2 Differentiating Between Transnational Migrants and Actors Who Live Within Transnational Social Fields

Because transnational social fields have been studied by scholars who work with migrants, there has been a failure to differentiate between

people who cross borders and other social actors who, maybe, live within transnational relationships, but who have either never migrated themselves or, having once migrated, never return to their birthplace. It is crucial to differentiate between transnational migrants and other people embedded in transnational social fields. Some of the people in a transnational field not only migrate but also continue to circulate across borders. However, to understand the significance of transnational processes, it is also important to note that transnational social fields include individuals who migrate and never return home and others who have never crossed borders themselves but who are linked through social relations to people in distant and perhaps disparate locations (Glick Schiller 2003). We miss much of the significance of transnational connections if we confine our study to people who frequently cross borders, as some researchers have suggested.

Today, as in the past, the vast majority of the world's people never move from their home localities, and large numbers of those who have migrated cannot or do not return to the place from which they originated. Nonetheless, because they are embedded in transnational social fields, the daily context of their lives, the resources on which they depend, and their patterns of decision-making are shaped by their relations with people who are geographically distant, embedded in other nation-states, and governed through diverse concepts of citizenship.

5.3 Distinguishing Between Transnational Ways of Being and Ways of Belonging

As we develop transnational theory, it is also essential that we distinguish between *ways of belonging* and *ways of being*. *Ways of being* refers to the actual social relations and practices that individuals engage in, rather than to the identities associated with their actions. *Ways of being* include the various quotidian acts through which people live their lives. Individuals can be embedded in a social field but not identify with any label or cultural politics associated with that field. They have the potential to identify with others with whom they interact upon the basis of some common identifier because they live within the social field, but not

all choose to do so. In contrast, *ways of belonging* refers to identity practices that signal or enact a conscious connection to a particular group. These actions are not individually imagined identities, but ones marked by visible actions that mark belonging such as flying a flag or wearing a religious symbol. Ways of belonging combine action and an awareness of the kind of identity that action signifies.

When the person displaying the Dominican flag is living in New York rather than Santo Domingo, then that person is participating in a transnational way of belonging. When lives are lived across borders, people experience transnational ways of being (Glick Schiller 2003, 2004).⁹ The term refers to the “life ways” of people who, independently of whether or not they themselves migrate, are shaped by their transnational relationships and interactions. They bring up children, sustain families, and act out family tensions and rivalries within transnational networks. They juggle, build, and break social relationships with sexual partners, spouses, friends, business connections, and acquaintances who live elsewhere. They engage in trade, investment, and the transfer of goods and information across borders. Their actions are shaped by gossip, rumours, and cultural production that are generated within their cross-border social relations. Because many descendants of migrants are embedded in transnational social fields, they may live transnational *ways of being*, independently of whether or not they have a homeland or diasporic identity and independently of whether or not they speak the native language of their ancestors. The fact that these *ways of being* take place in transnational social fields tells us nothing about how these activities will be represented, understood, and translated into an identity politics—that is, into a transnational way of belonging.

When we study transnational ways of belonging, we enter the realm of cultural representation, ideology, and identity, through which people reach out to distant lands or people through memory, nostalgia, and imagination. When the person displaying the Dominican or Haitian flag lives in Manchester, New Hampshire, he or she is participating in a transnational way of belonging. He or she may do this independently of whether or not he or she lives within transnational social fields. Transnational belonging, while not rooted in social networks, is more than an assertion of origins, optional ethnicity, multiculturalism, or

“roots”, which are all forms of identity that place a person as a member of a single nation-state. *Ways of belonging* denote processes, rather than fixed categories. People who adopt certain forms of cultural representation may then become new participants in transnational social fields and, specifically from their ways of *belonging*, they may find themselves entering into *a transnational way of being*.

Take, for example, Roger Carlos, a US politician who speaks no Spanish.¹⁰ His father came from Mexico but married a non-Hispanic Texan native and did not involve his family in either a transnational social field or a Mexican identity. When Carlos settled in Manchester, New Hampshire, a small city in the United States, and was elected to local office, he suddenly became the first Hispanic to hold office there. His Spanish surname led him to be identified as a representative of the “Hispanic community”, although he had never been to Mexico, or anywhere else in Latin America for that matter, and had not participated in any ethnic organisations or activities. When he accepted this identity and acted on it, he accepted a particular *way of belonging*. It was not yet, however, transnational or linked to a *way of being*. Carlos began by identifying himself in terms of a US-based ethnicity, namely, Hispanic. However, as he began to explain his Mexican roots, at some level, he began to define himself as someone connected to Mexico, despite the fact that he had never been there. This was a transnational *way of belonging*. This identity claim facilitated Carlos’ relationship with representatives of the Mexican government. In this way, he became a link between the Mexican government and the Mexican migrant population in New Hampshire. As a result, Carlos began a transnational *way of being* as a participant in a transnational social field.

However, people who live in transnational social fields may, at various times, adopt different forms of cultural representation. Transnational forms of belonging are emotional connections to people who are elsewhere, when that elsewhere is across a national border. The elsewhere may be a specific locality such as a village or a region—which produces a form of identification that some distinguish as translocal—a specific religious formation, or a social movement. Or transnational forms of belonging may arise from the evocation of membership of geographically dispersed populations who claim to be bound together within a notion of

shared history and destiny. Some scholars deploy the term “transnational communities” for these myriad types of transnational belonging. I argue that a more processual and dynamic approach to the construction of trans-border identifications seem warranted.

Building on work by Benedict Anderson (1994), I have adopted the term “long-distance nationalism” for a set of identity claims and practices that link together people who claim descent from an ancestral land (Glick Schiller 2005; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2002). These people see themselves as acting together to constitute, strengthen, overthrow, or liberate a homeland. Long-distance nationalism brings together transnational social fields and identity claims. It unites people settled in various locations abroad and those in the homeland in political processes organised within a transnational social field. It is upon this basis that Dominican political parties have offices in New York and that candidates for office in the Dominican Republic or in New York campaign in both locations (Grahm 2001). The first New York City councilman of Dominican birth, Guillermo Linares, was elected in a campaign conducted in both New York and the Dominican Republic, with funds coming from both locations. In 1996, the Dominican Republic elected President Leonel Fernández, who had spent significant periods of his life in both countries. Growing up in New York City in a Dominican neighbourhood, he had obtained a law degree in the Dominican Republic but then returned to the United States to attend graduate school at Columbia University. As in the case of candidates running for office from throughout the Caribbean, Fernández campaigned in both New York and the Dominican Republic.

However, long-distance nationalism is not the only way in which *transnational ways of being and belonging* are being brought together. The growth of a Caribbean identity and the growth of organisations in the United States interested in lobbying for the development of the Caribbean region reflect the development of transnational social fields and identity claims that extend beyond nation-state identities. In 1985, I attended a meeting of political activists that included newspaper editors, a judge, academics, and longtime participants in New York City politics. All had Caribbean backgrounds. Several were better known as African Americans or Hispanics. The meeting was called to build a local-level Caribbean politics that would both serve as a constituency for local electoral politics

and to ensure that US development policies served the Caribbean better. Several of the actors had interests that stretched between the United States and the Caribbean and wanted to extend their influence within a transnational social field that provided a bigger terrain than their home island.

The time was ripe, the meeting convener stated, because Caribbeans were becoming one of the biggest ethnic groups in New York City. In response, one of the participants, a Panamanian, noted that most people of Caribbean descent in New York did not usually identify that way. Not to worry, the convener replied: “First, you create the ethnic identity and then you create the constituency. By speaking as Caribbean leaders, we will get Caribbean followers”. Soon after that, the mayor of New York selected the head of a Haitian coalition of community organisations to be his adviser on Caribbean affairs. Mayors of New York are known to visit Caribbean islands as part of their efforts to strengthen their political base. A Caribbean identity and social field also serves their interests, thereby generalising their campaigns more widely than the constituency of any one island.

6 Thinking About and Beyond Transnational Processes: New Directions

6.1 Re-valuating Locality by Using the Concept of Multiscalar Social Fields

The concept of transnational social field also calls into question the neat divisions of connection into local, national, transnational, and global. In one sense, all are local in that near and distant connections penetrate the daily lives of the individuals living within a locale. But, within this locale, a person may participate in personal networks or receive ideas and information that connect them to others within a nation-state, across the borders of a nation-state, or even globally, without the person in question ever having migrated. Therefore, a better formulation is to see these networks that stretch across or “jump” scales as “multiscalar” (Smith 1992: 60; Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2016; Çağlar and Glick

Schiller 2018). By conceptualising transnational social fields as crossing the boundaries of nation-states, it is essential to note that individuals within these fields, through their everyday activities and relationships, are influenced by multiple sets of laws and institutions. That is to say, they become multiscale actors. To understand the multiscale nature of social relations everywhere is to develop and highlight the need to move beyond transnational analysis to the study of globe-spanning, locally enacted, and acted-upon networks of power within which people everywhere are living their lives (Glick Schiller and Çağlar 2011; Glick Schiller 2015; Çağlar and Glick Schiller 2018). Our daily rhythms and activities respond not only to more than one state simultaneously but also to social institutions, such as religious organisations, for example, that exist within many states, across borders, and within the configurations of locally emplaced social relations.

6.2 Re-valuating the Concept of Society by Using the Concept of Transnational Social Fields

The concept of transnational social fields challenges established notions of society, opening up new ways of understanding the structuring of social relationships. Once we put aside methodological nationalism and stop equating the boundaries of nation-states with the boundaries of normal social relationships, we need to rethink our notion of society itself. Working along similar lines, Eva Morawska (1994) speaks of migration as “structuration”, positing it as a continuing dynamic between structure and agency that extends into a transnational domain. Faist’s (2000a, 2000b) use of the term “transnational social spaces” for cross-border social relations also reflects an orientation that moves us beyond an equation of society with the nation-state. But as Peggy Levitt and I argued (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004), if social relations exist as part of normal life across, as well as within, the borders of nation-states, we need to think of society as precisely this network of networks, rather than as anything that has a single sense of consensus, unity, organicity, wholeness, the very starting points of social theory since among key figures in sociology from Spencer and Durkheim to Coolie and Parsons.

The exhilaration of new insights that comes from setting aside old paradigms continues to mark transnational studies. Having proclaimed its virtues, I must also warn of the weaknesses of the concept of simultaneity, weaknesses that illustrate the limits of the transnational paradigm itself. It is important to acknowledge that, as it develops, transnational studies are creating their own forms of conceptual blinders. Discussion of the balancing acts that migrants stage through simultaneous incorporation can deter us from examining the tremendous and growing imbalance between concentrations of wealth and poverty that make migration strategies and transnational families a necessity. We may also not see the degree to which migrants' transnational strategies are being substantively undercut as politicians obscure economic disparities and systemic crisis by fuelling nationalism, racism, and anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies.

If we become too entrenched in the way transnational studies frame its problem, we may not be able to make the necessary connections between the transnational processes that we are documenting and more global forces. Restrained by our theory, our scholarship will be limited in its contributions. Transnational studies that highlight the dynamics of specific transnational processes tend to lose sight of the broader multiscalar dynamics of capital accumulation and its dispossessive processes. Transnational processes are linked to more global phenomena, but are not identical to them. For example, it is important to confront the current moment of capitalism and discuss the contemporary hierarchy of global military and technical power and arm sales through which the most powerful military states seek to dominate political processes throughout the world. Our discourse about social fields that cross state borders must not neglect the vast variations among states. A continuing weakness of the concept of social fields is that it flattens our discussion of social difference including the need to analyse social class within and across states.

Therefore, while building on the strengths of the transnational paradigm, scholars cannot be confined to it. The past insights produced by scholars of the Caribbean about the "partial" nature of Caribbean "societies" as a result of the colonial appropriation of wealth maintained by military force prove relevant in our analysis of contemporary imperial power. But now, transnational and global studies need to come together within

a new analysis of imperialism and its contradictions, including the transnational social fields and cultural flows that can constitute anti-capitalist movements for global social and economic justice.

Notes

1. Of course, Europeans settled without impediment in their colonial territories, including the Caribbean.
2. Prussian development required migrant labour, but Polish workers were periodically defined as a threat and restrained intermittently during this period.
3. The United States, currently portrayed as the land of immigrants, unlike European states, was actually the first and, for a time, the only state to erect significant barriers when it passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 for a ten-year period that was renewed in 1892.
4. Bodnar (1985), Cinel (1982), and Wyman (1993) were able to break sufficiently with US methodological nationalism to document return migration and transnational connections, but they did not develop a theoretical framework to encompass this scholarship.
5. Horace Kallen used the term “melting pot” in the 1920s. However, until the 1960s and the growth of the third-generation, US nation-state building focused on the assimilation of immigrants. In immigrant studies, the term “ethnic group” was rarely used, and this alternative view of immigrant settlement received little attention. Caribbean discussions of “plural societies” were promoted by M.G. Smith (1965). These were reflections about relations within colonial empires that brought together culturally disparate peoples.
6. But see a summary of a related trend in Europe (Brubaker 2001), as well as a parallel redefinition of the term “assimilations” (Faist 2003).
7. Here I build on an article by Daniel Mato (1997).
8. In 1998, Sidney Mintz, building on a lifetime of Caribbean studies, took the emerging discussion of transnationalism to task for disregarding the long history of transnational processes and the heritage of Caribbean scholarship. However, Linda Basch, Karen Olwig, Patricia Pessar, Nnina Sorensen, Georges Fournon, Joyce Toney, and I, along with many others, developed studies of transnational migration and cross-border connections that built from Caribbean history and scholarship.

9. Faist (2000b) contrasts “social ties” with symbolic ties. He encompasses, in his sense of social ties, a commitment to a common interest or norm. My term “ways of being” decouples social ties from the common identities and norms that lead people to express shared “ways of belonging” (Glick Schiller 2003).
10. The name “Roger Carlos” is a pseudonym, in keeping with our research protocol.

References

- Alba, R., & Nee, V. (1997). Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration. *International Migration Review*, 31(4), 826–874.
- Alba, R., & Nee, V. (2003). *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Anderson, B. (1994). Exodus. *Critical Inquiry*, 20, 314–327.
- Barkan, E. (1995). Race, Religion and Nationality in American Society: A Model of Ethnicity – From Contact to Assimilation. *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 14(2), 38–101.
- Basch, L., Schiller, N. G., & Blanc, C. S. (1994). *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach-Routledge.
- Bodnar, J. E. (1985). *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Bourne, R. (1916). Trans-National America. *Atlantic Monthly*, 118(1), 86–97.
- Brubaker, R. (2001). The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24(4), 531–548.
- Çaglar, A. (2002). *Mediascapes, Advertisement Industries and Cosmopolitan Transformations: Turkish Immigrants in Europe*. Retrieved from http://www2.rz.huberlin.de/amerika/projects/newurbanism/nu_pt_caglar_a.html2002
- Çaglar, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2018). *Migrants and City Making: Dispossession, Displacement, and Urban Regeneration*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Cinell, D. (1982). *From Italy to San Francisco*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Epstein, A. L. (1958). *Politics in an Urban African Community*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Faist, T. (2000a). *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Faist, T. (2000b). Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(2), 189–222.
- Faist, T. (2003). Amalgamating Newcomers, National Minority and Diaspora – Integration(s) of Immigrants from Poland in Germany. In R. Sackmann, B. Peters, & T. Faist (Eds.), *Identity and Integration: Migrants in Western Europe* (pp. 205–234). Ashgate: Aldershot.
- Fouron, G. (1984). *Patterns of Adaption of Haitian Immigrants of the 1970s in New York City*. Ph.D. dissertation, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.
- Georges, E. (1990). *The Making of Transnational Community: Migration, Development, and Cultural Change in the Dominican Republic*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gilroy, P. (1991). *“There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack”: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Glazer, N. (1954). Ethnic Groups in America: From National Culture to Ideology. In T. Abel Morroe Berger & C. Page (Eds.), *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (pp. 158–174). New York: Van Nostrand.
- Glick Schiller, N. (1996). The Situation of Transnational Studies. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 4(2), 155–166.
- Glick Schiller, N. (1999a). Transmigrants and Nation-States: Something Old and Something New in the U.S. Immigrant Experience. In C. Hirshman, P. Kasinitz, & J. DeWind (Eds.), *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience* (pp. 94–119). New York: Russell Sage.
- Glick Schiller, N. (1999b). Who Are These Guys? A Transnational Perspective on National Identities. In L. Goldin (Ed.), *Identities on the Move: Transnational Processes in North America and the Caribbean Basin* (pp. 15–43). Houston, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Glick Schiller, N. (2003). The Centrality of Ethnography in the Study of Transnational Migration: Seeing the Wetland Instead of the Swamp. In N. Foner (Ed.), *American Arrivals* (pp. 99–128). Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research.
- Glick Schiller, N. (2004). Transnationality. In D. Nugent & J. Vincent (Eds.), *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics* (pp. 448–467). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Glick Schiller, N. (2005). Long Distance Nationalism. In M. Ember, C. Ember, & I. Skoggard (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World* (Vol. 1, pp. 70–80). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.

- Glick Schiller, N. (2015). Explanatory Frameworks in Transnational Migration Studies: The Missing Multi-scalar Global Perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 38(13), 2275–2282.
- Glick Schiller, N., & Çağlar, A. (2011). Locality and Globality: Building a Comparative Analytical Framework in Migration and Urban Studies. In N. Glick Schiller & A. Çağlar (Eds.), *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants* (pp. 60–84). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Glick Schiller, N., & Çağlar, A. (2016). Displacement, Emplacement and Migrant Newcomers: Rethinking Urban Sociabilities Within Multiscalar Power. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 23(1), 17–34.
- Glick Schiller, N., & Fouron, G. (1999). Terrains of Blood and Nation: Haitian Transnational Social Fields. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2), 340–366.
- Glick Schiller, N., & Fouron, G. E. (2002). *Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Glick Schiller, N., De Wind, J., Brutus, M. L., Charles, C., Fouron, G., & Thomas, L. (1987). Exile, Ethnic, Refugee: Changing Organizational Identities Among Haitian Immigrants. *Migration Today*, 15(1), 7–11.
- Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., & Szanton, C. B. (1992). *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered*. New York: New York Academy of Science.
- Gluckman, M. (1967). Introduction. In A. L. Epstein (Ed.), *The Craft of Social Anthropology* (pp. xi–xx). London: Tavistock.
- Gonzalez, N. L. (1988). *Sojourners of the Caribbean: Ethnogenesis and Ethnohistory of the Garifuna*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Graham, P. (2001). Political Incorporation and Re-incorporation: Simultaneity in the Dominican Migrant Experience. In H. Cordero-Guzman, R. Smith, & R. R. Grosfoguel (Eds.), *Transnational Communities and the Political Economy of New York in the 1990s* (pp. 87–108). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Guarnizo, L. E. (1997). The Emergence of a Transnational Social Formation and the Mirage of Return Migration Among Dominican Transmigrants. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 4(2), 281–322.
- Hall, S. (1977). Pluralism, Race, and Class in Caribbean Society. In UNESCO (Ed.), *Race and Class in Post-Colonial Caribbean Society: A Study of Ethnic Group Relations in the English Speaking Caribbean, Bolivia, Chile, and Morocco* (pp. 150–180). Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
- Handlin, O. (1973 [1954]). *The Uprooted*. Boston, MA: Little Brown.

- Harvey, D. (1989). *The Conditions of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Conditions of Cultural Change*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Karakasidou, A. (1994). Sacred Scholars, Profane Advocates: Intellectuals Molding National Consciousness in Greece. *Identities Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 1(1), 35–61.
- Landolt, P. (2001). Salvadoran Economic Transnationalism: Embedded Strategies for Household Maintenance, Immigration Incorporation, and Entrepreneurial Expansion. *Global Networks*, 3, 217–241.
- Lebovics, H. (1992). *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900–1945*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Levitt, P., & Glick Schiller, N. (2004). Transnational Perspectives on Migration: Conceptualizing Simultaneity. *International Migration Review*, 39(3), 1002–1039.
- Marcus, M. (1986). Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World System. In J. Clifford & G. Marcus (Eds.), *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (pp. 165–293). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Marcus, M. (1995). Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-sited Ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24, 95–117.
- Mato, D. (1997). On Global and Local Agents and the Making of Transnational Identities and Related Agendas in ‘Latin’ America. *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 4(1), 167–212.
- Mintz, S. (1985). *Sweetness and the Place of Sugar in Modern History*. New York: Viking.
- Mitchell, J. C. (1969). *Social Networks in Urban Situations*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Morawska, E. (1994). In Defense of the Assimilation Model. *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 13(2), 76–87.
- Morawska, E. (2001). Structuring Migration: The Case of Polish Income-Seeking Travelers to the West. *Theory and Society*, 30(1), 47–80.
- Morawska, E. (2003). Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and a Theoretical Model they Suggest. In C. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), *Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices*. London: Palgrave Press.
- Nash, J., & Fernandez-Kelly, M. P. (1983). *Woman, Men and the International Division of Labor*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Ortiz, F. (1995 [1940]). *Cuban Counterpoint, Tobacco and Sugar*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

- Pessar, P. (1988). *When Borders Don't Divide: Labor Migration and Refugee Movements in the Americas*. Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies.
- Portes, A., & Bach, R. (1985). *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Rafael, V. L. (1995). *Discrepant Histories: Translocal Essays on Filipino Cultures*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Rubenstein, H. (1983). Remittances and Rural Underdevelopment in the English Speaking Caribbean. *Human Organization*, 42(4), 306.
- Schermerhorn, R. A. (1949). *These Our People: Minorities in American Culture*. Boston, MA: D.C. Heath.
- Smith, M. G. (1965). *The Plural Society in the British West Indies*. London: University of California Press.
- Smith, N. (1992). Contours of a Spatialized Politics: Homeless Vehicles and the Production of Space. *Social Text*, 33, 54–81.
- Stoler, A. L. (1989). Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th Century Colonial Cultures. *American Ethnologist*, 16(4), 634–660.
- Suárez-Orozco, M., & Thomas, V. (2001). *Right Moves: Immigration, Globalization, Utopia, and Dystopia*. Paper presented at the School of American Research Advanced Seminar, Santa Fe NM.
- Sutton, C., & Makiesky-Barrow, S. (1992 [1975]). Migration and West Indian Racial and Ethnic Consciousness. In C. Sutton & E. M. Chaney (Eds.), *Caribbean Life in New York City: Sociocultural Dimensions* (pp. 86–107). New York: Center for Migration.
- Thistlewaite, F. (1964). Migration from Europe Overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. In H. Moller (Ed.), *Population Movements in Modern European History* (pp. 73–92). New York: Macmillan.
- Thomas-Hope, E. M. (1978). The Establishment of a Migration Tradition: British West Indian Movements to the Hispanic Caribbean in the Century After Emancipation. In C. G. Clark (Ed.), *Caribbean Social Relations* (pp. 68–81). Liverpool: University of Liverpool.
- Torpey, J. (2000). *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, B. (1989). A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain. *Annual Reviews of Anthropology*, 18(1), 401–444.
- Williams, E. (1994 [1944]). *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

- Wiltshire, W. (1984). *The Economic Impact of Caribbean Emigration on Labour Donor Societies: Grenada and St. Vincent*. Unpublished MS. Research Institute for the Study of Man, New York.
- Wiltshire, R., Basch, L., Wiltshire, W., & Toney, J. (1990). *Caribbean Transnational Migrant Networks: Implications for Donor Societies*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
- Wimmer, A. (2002). *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict Shadows of Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks*, 2(4), 301–334.
- Wood, C. H., & McCoy, T. L. (1985). Migration, Remittances and Development: A Study of West Indian Cane Cutters in Florida. *International Migration Review*, 19(2), 251–277.
- Wyman, M. (1993). *Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880–1930*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.



3

Transnational Politics of Integration and an “Imagined Global Diaspora”

Riva Kastoryano

1 Introduction

Politics of immigration and integration have always been analysed in relation to receiving states: control of borders, politics of entry, rules of participation and laws on citizenship. Settlement turns migrants into minorities who express their claims before the states in which they reside for equal citizenship, for recognition and for political representation. At the same time, the increasing importance of solidarity beyond national borders on the grounds of one or several identities—national, religious, ethnic, regional—and interests removes claims, mobilisations and participation from a national to a transnational level. The process re-defines solidarity beyond borders and involves a multilevel interaction between home and host countries and the transnational community spread throughout several countries, which, together, create a transnational space for action.

R. Kastoryano (✉)
Sciences Po – CERi – CNRS, Paris, France

Such an evolution is the result of the intense and complex ongoing ties that migrants maintain with their country of origin and the cultural, social, economic, political and ideological transfers that occur between both the country of departure and the receiving country and beyond. These multiple levels of participation are perceived as a challenge to the founding principles of nation-states with regard to territoriality, citizenship and membership in a single political community. Andreas Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002) argued that “methodological nationalism” has influenced studies on migration—its relations to states, societies, politics and sovereignty (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Nevertheless, transnational studies that take into consideration the process of globalisation as a source of the expression of solidarity and identification beyond borders also include states—at least for a comparative analysis—in order to establish the internal differences in such an organisation.

Indeed, transnational organisations and multiple identifications compel home states to position themselves and develop what is called “diaspora politics” as a means of maintaining the loyalty of the citizens on both their territory of settlement and “abroad”. For the countries of origin, the process involves extending their power beyond their territories, which leads to the de-territorialisation of nationhood, which becomes a resource for identity and for mobilisation. Receiving countries are driven to collaborate with the home countries in order to insure the integration to “re-territorialise” citizenship and identities. In both cases, the objective is to maintain the “power” of incorporation and citizenship while expanding state influences beyond territories and to compete with transnational communities in their engagement in the process of globalisation. Political participation in more than one political community, which brings to light multiple membership and multiple loyalties crystallised around dual citizenship, becomes, for immigrants, a way of maintaining an identity rooted in their home country. Citizenship thus becomes an entitlement within the country of residence. For home states, this means maintaining a link with citizens “abroad”; it involves, at the same time, the extension of the power of the state beyond its territories. What is at stake is the integration of the states (both states, host and home) like transnational communities into a global space.

In Europe, postcolonial migrants, Muslims comprising a large majority, spread in all member states express their attachment to the country of settlement in terms of citizenship and rights. They also express their loyalty to the country of origin, in terms of emotions and identity. Being a Muslim minority in Europe as a way of belonging to a new “imagined global diaspora” brings a third dimension based upon a religious identification that is transnational both in essence and definition. Pnina Werbner shows how “imagining their different diasporas, local Pakistani tended to position themselves imaginatively as the heroes of global battles” and argues that “diasporas are transnational communities of co-responsibility” (Werbner 2002). In an “imagined global diaspora” where individuals and groups and transnational communities are connected in global networks, the traditional diaspora loses its territorial bases in which home is an imagined place to express precisely “co-responsibility” without a territorial reference as “home”.

Receiving countries are driven to collaborate with home countries in order to insure the integration of Muslims and to “re-territorialise” Islam (both here and there), that is, to reject any identification with “globalised Islam” (Roy 2002), promoted by international organisations which, through images, symbols and speeches, try to create a transnational solidarity founded on a religious and/or ideological identification around Islam. What is at stake is state control over transnational actions, which, by definition, intend to bypass the state. Transnational politics reflect the changes in the perception of migration, increasingly linking the question of identity and participation to the question of security. In this perspective, this chapter attempts to show how the politics of integration is not a single state policy. I argue that cooperation among states ultimately targets the politics of integration by trying to re-territorialise globalised identities. Thus, transnational politics of both communities and states creates a new configuration of the nation and nationalism and territory and power within globalisation. Communities, based upon cultural, ethnic, religious identifications, and recognised as such by states that increasingly rely on transnational solidarity, have sparked new upsurges of nationalism, accompanied by new forms of subjectivity which claim to be non-territorial. States, on the other hand, expand their nationalism in order to maintain the “power” of incorporation and

citizenship, while expanding their influence beyond their territories, and compete with transnational communities in their engagement in the process of globalisation.

2 Transnationalism “En Œuvre”

“Transnational labor migration has now become a major structural feature of communities which have become truly transnational” (Kearney 1995). This observation is certified by the flourishing literature in social sciences with regard to studies on the settlement of the postcolonial immigrants and their social organisation, as well as their economic and political participation. What is meant by transnational community is a community structured by individuals or groups settled in different national societies, sharing common references—territorial, religious, linguistic—and expressing common interest beyond boundaries. Migrants or minorities or ethnic groups rely on a sense of belonging to a unity through transnational networks in order to consolidate their solidarity beyond territorial settings, which provides all the content to the term diaspora—that is, unity within dispersion.

The emergence of transnational communities is a “global phenomenon” and mainly concerns postcolonial migration. Immigrants are involved in structuring networks based upon economic interests, cultural exchanges, social relations and political mobilisations. Their action is de-territorialised. Transnational communities are thus considered as a new type of migrants’ experience. Obviously, migrants have always been de facto—at least for one generation or two—in more than one setting, maintaining ties with a real or “imagined community” to quote Anderson (in reference to home), that is, their nation-state of origin. Through new means of communication and their influence on institutions and national and international policies, transnational actors are also at the centre of networks through which knowledge and power circulate—knowledge about other cultures and institutional structures—and the power to act beyond territorial boundaries. An increasing mobility and the development of communication has contributed to intensify such transborder relations and even to create a transnational space of economic, cultural and political participation.

The emergence of transnational communities appears as a logical next step to cultural pluralism and to identity politics. The liberalism which favours ethnic pluralism has privileged the cultural activities that are guided by the association of immigrants, at the heart of which lie re-appropriated, organised and re-defined identities, to place them before the state (Kastoryano 1994). They have also acquired a political legitimacy in the countries of immigration that re-define these forms of solidarity and attempt to institutionalise their links with the country of origin. Thus, a transnational form of participation allows the immigrant populations to bypass national policies and generates a new space of socialisation for those involved in building networks beyond national borders, interacting with each other in a new global space where the cultural and political specifics of national societies (both host and home) are combined with emerging multilevel and multinational activities.

Transnationalism leads to a new imagined community that goes against the unified community brought together around the same territorialised political project. This new community is imagined upon the basis of a religion or an ethnicity that encompasses linguistic and national differences and breaks away from the territorialised nationalist project to assert itself beyond national borders, without geographical limits, as a de-territorialised nation in search of an inclusive (and exclusive) centre, around an identity or an experience constructed out of immigration, dispersion and a minority situation that aims to achieve legitimacy and recognition not only from states but also from supranational or international institutions. This quest generates "a permanent tension between the idea of the state as a source of absolute power and the reality of the state as something limited from beyond".¹ These tensions crystallise around the issue of minority nationalisms, be they national, territorial, ethnic or religious.

Recent studies in the United States have developed other concepts such as that of "pan-ethnicity". According to its author, Yen Le Espiritu, this concept underlines "the generalisation of solidarity among ethnic subgroups".² He is referring, in particular, to the Asian population established in the United States, a population that is internally diverse in terms of nationality, language and even religion. Pan-ethnic identity would thus, by definition, be a multiple identity, in which groups of various origins blend into a single group with the aim of building a political unity

that draws its legitimacy from its institutions and asserts its self-determination upon the basis of “race”.³ Other times, other “races”, but the issue remains the same. Like black nationalism, analysed as an innovative policy developing new paradigms to understand the history of racial and ethnic relations in the United States, pan-ethnicity is hailed, by its author, to be the future of ethnicity, in which the group’s internal diversity will be bound together by identity-based and institutional links, thus giving rise to new dynamics.⁴

In Europe, Islam, the common denominator for much of the post-colonial immigrant population, leads to similar interpretations, that is, an encompassing identity that transcends national, linguistic and ethnic, even religious (the brotherhoods) and political differences. Pan-Islam, pan-religiosity or the umma as a basis of a narrative of belonging to a global Muslim community, which is reinterpreted in such a way as to reframe all the internal diversity into an “imagined transnational community”, or an imagined global community, or even an imagined global nation that defines itself as a cultural nation, gives rise to a form of nationalism which can be viewed more as cultural nationalism than as ideological or state nationalism (Gans 2003).⁵ Such nationalism would be based upon a sense of belonging to a culture that sees itself as being “uprooted”, which leads to a re-defining of itself in a new environment. Its adaptation or resistance as well as its radicalisation lends it a new scope and a new content in which nationalities, ethnicities and religion are blended, thereby cultivating a culture which presents itself as “different” from both the environment and the developing unifying discourses about the experience of “being Muslim in Europe”.

Thus, for Muslim populations fragmented from within by various home and host national identities and denominations, Islam represents a unifying identity, a way of asserting a collective interest and a way of structuring a transnational community which transcends the boundaries of the EU member states. The internal diversity of the Muslim population in Europe is “re-centred” in two ways: (1) around norms and values diffused by European supranational institutions and their normativity in terms of the fight against racism and discrimination, via an inclusive discourse elaborated by transnational activists founded on human rights and equal citizenship.⁶ The same internal diversity is also “re-centred”

(2) around a common identity element, to wit, religion, which is transnational both in essence and de facto. The process is promoted by international organisations which re-activate the religious loyalty of Muslim populations residing in different European countries. Their strategies seem contradictory with the strategy of countries of origin, which hope to re-nationalise or re-territorialise the identification of the Muslims. Emphasising and diffusing the debate about the current issues involving Muslims, such as the Rushdie affair or the headscarf affair, or, more broadly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Islam has become a “refuge”, a source of identification with causes “agitating the world” both at local and at transnational levels, even at global level, all the more so since mobilisation around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has rallied not only Islamist and religious associations but also the most secular Muslim organisations, as well as other political groups that have been won over to their cause. This opening up to the “universal” lends greater legitimacy to the “identity-based re-centralisation” around Islam.

Such an “identity-based re-centralisation process” is expressed both on an everyday basis and in long-term political goals; it is developed in different domains and territories—real or symbolic—trying to re-establish social relations and a common identification. It is a more abstract identification with an “imagined global community”, fuelled by outside events such as wars, conflicts that take place “elsewhere”, actions that convert old grievances into new aspirations, colonial relations yielding to a quest for, and an expression of, local and transnational autonomy. This identification can be seen in the violence perpetrated in the name of a cause that directly or indirectly affects an Islam which is perceived as a “global victim”, an image that is reinforced by the rhetoric of humiliation and domination by the West propounded by its militants. The spiralling of violence in the Middle East, 9/11 (11 September 2001) attacks, and the war in Iraq all serve as many international events that have contributed to producing both heroes and victims among the young, influencing their way of dressing, their speech and their action as a sort of de-territorialised revenge that is nevertheless localised in urban areas. Violence also allows a form of territorialised and ethicised collective expression to develop, re-centring the diversity of the de-localised population around new subjectivities nourished by unifying discourses that seek to re-define

solidarity and build a coherent whole.⁷ These references produce an identity that is not linked to the immediate space but to a non-territorial community, which becomes a refuge for a young generation that is looking for a cause and identification in action. The process gives rise to the formation of a transnational identity as an inspiration for political action and as an instrument for cultural and religious purposes beyond national borders.

I have argued elsewhere that cultural, ethnic and religious communities recognised as such by states that increasingly rely on transnational solidarity have sparked new upsurges of nationalism, a transnational nationalism (Kastoryano 2007). This translates as the transnationalisation of community sentiment (whatever its content may be) or the communitarianisation of networks of transnational solidarity accompanied by new forms of subjectivity. The territorial boundaries of these communities are not disputed; on the contrary, their non-territorial boundaries follow formal and/or informal network connections that transcend the territorial limits of states and nations, thus creating a new form of territorialisation—invisible and unbounded—and, consequently, a form of political community within which individual actions become the basis for a form of non-territorial nationalism that seeks to strengthen itself through speeches, symbols, images and objects. These communities are guided by a de-territorialised “imagined geography”, in which the rhetoric of the *umma*, or global Muslim community, nourishes and gives rise to a form of transnational nationalism, or a type of nationalism without territory that should be conceived as a new historical stage in nationalism, by developing, in particular, a unifying narrative around current issues. As a matter of fact, they are drawn into a single narrative of belonging to the “reimagined” worldwide Muslim community in which national, religious and worldly attachments are all jumbled together. The narrative that combines ideology and tradition serves to generate identification among young Muslim populations with a re-constructed history and a contemporary experience (Kastoryano *forthcoming*).

It is not only via immigration that Islam contributes local and non-local elements of identification. And it is not only Islam that develops non-territorial modes of belonging. Non-territoriality is part of a globalisation process which, more generally, affects religions on the whole,

perhaps Islam more particularly. This may be the result of the politicisation of Islam since the 1980s, expressed in various ways throughout the world. In fact, even in countries where Islam is the majority religion, where attachments are highly territorialised, discourses exceeding national limits are developed in a similar fashion. The rhetoric surrounding both territorialised and non-territorialised Islam seems to be the basis for a liberation movement or a new national emancipation movement, with a semblance of an identification with a new entity. A form of nationalism arises when they mobilise beyond national borders, and this phenomenon reinforces the interdependency between internal political developments and the involvement of transnational actors in the international political system.

A transnational nationalism—a non-territorial nationalism—differs from “long-distance nationalism” as elaborated by Benedict Anderson and from diaspora nationalism that Ernest Gellner qualifies as “historical fact” and considers as a subspecies of nationalism. Long-distance nationalism is analysed as a new type of nationalism generated by the development of capitalism.⁸ Gellner sees diaspora nationalism as the result of a social transformation, a cultural renaissance and a desire of this minority to acquire a territory (Gellner 1983, pp. 88–110). For Anderson, the development of emigration, the evolution of means of communication, the new industrial civilisation and the ensuing social and geographical mobility have all raised consciousnesses and led to an identity-based withdrawal which has fuelled nationalist claims to the effect that repressed ethnic identities should take the form of ethnicity-based nation-states (Anderson 1998).⁹ In their own definition of a similar concept, Nina Glick-Schiller and Georges Eugen Fouron suggest that long-distance nationalism is re-configuring the way in which many people understand the relationship between populations and the states that claim to represent them. According to these authors, the political agenda associated with this type of nationalism relates to “the vision of the nation as extending beyond the territorial boundaries of the state frequently springs from the life experiences of migrants of different classes, whose lives stretch across borders to connect homeland and new land” (Glick Schiller and Eugen Fouron 2001). This is reminiscent of the projects of re-construction of nation-states elaborated in exile that Benedict Anderson also mentions.

Both are projects that are territory-based with self-determination or the re-definition of the nationalist foundation for the building of the state. Transnational nationalism, or nationalism without territory, I argue, appears to be the result of a historical evolution a priori linked to what has become a global market, to the emergence of a so-called global space and the rising influence of supranational institutions, in short, to changes related to what is known as the process of globalisation.

3 Transnational Politics: “Bringing the State Back in”¹⁰

Transnational solidarity and a non-territorial sense of nationhood finds an echo among states paradoxical as this may seem. Home states rely on transnational solidarities—territorial as well as non-territorial—in order to foster what is called “diaspora politics”—an extension of *sovereignty* and loyalty. An important number of transnational actors collaborate with them in these perspectives. In some cases, they have become “private ambassadors”, in charge of rebuilding a link between statehood, nationhood and peoplehood, with regard to both countries. Some leaders of voluntary associations are “ethnic entrepreneurs” or elected representatives in the parliaments in the country of settlement and of citizenship. By acting in two political spaces, they also contribute to the development of a new diplomacy and to the re-configuration of a new diplomatic space. Many cases show processes established by different countries such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico. They all participate in the social, cultural, political and economic life of their countries of settlement, simultaneously express a permanent loyalty to the home country, and manifest their integration in their country of settlement. Their involvement in “diaspora politics” becomes a way of maintaining a citizenship that is nevertheless extra-territorial and a nationhood that is de-territorialised.

Europe is facing the identification with “globalised Islam” of a small fragment of the Muslim population, categorised by Robert Leikin as “Angry Muslims” (Leiken 2012). Turkey and Morocco, where national and religious identities are combined, are the most active in such

transnational politics with regard to Muslims in Europe. The main objective is to oppose the strategy of international organisations that promote “global Islam” by re-territorialising and re-nationalising their belonging, expressed in terms of religion and in control of their citizenry and loyalty abroad as a resource for the transnationalisation of their state. Dual citizenship applied almost in all states institutionalises transnationalism, where the country of origin becomes a source of identity, and the country of settlement a source of right, leading to a confusion between rights and identity, culture and politics, states and nations.

Morocco and Turkey have the most important numbers of migrants, the most diffused throughout Europe.¹¹ Turkey, a country with no colonial ties with any European country, has its citizens settled in almost all the countries of Europe. Morocco’s historical ties with France brought migrants first to France and to Belgium (based upon linguistic affinity), and thereafter its migrants followed the economic opportunities that opened the way to their migration throughout Europe.

Both countries, Turkey and Morocco, have special relationships with the European Union. Turkey is officially a candidate country, and Morocco has been associated to the Union since the year 2000, as part of the neighbouring policy of the Union with an “advanced status”, that is, with a high level of cooperation. Turkey’s relationship with the European Union is a long and tumultuous story that goes back to 1961, when Turkey asked to be associated with the European Community, which was accepted in 1964. Morocco and the EU have intensified their relationship since 2013, establishing a partnership for migrant flows. An agreement was also signed with Turkey in 2016 to stop the flow of refugees.

Both Turkey and Morocco have created specific ministries for immigration and integration for their “citizens abroad”. Their objective is to bring their citizens abroad “back” to their national identity, that is, to “a national Islam”, as opposed to the “global Islam” promoted by international organisations (Tozy 2009). For Morocco, for example, events like the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, in which five out of the seven jihadists who blew themselves up were Moroccans, and the assassination of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch film director, by a Moroccan young man in Amsterdam the same year, shook the state authorities. Such actions have been interpreted as the result of the difficulties that the

young generations of immigrants experience in integrating into different European countries. Thus, all initiatives coming from the home state had the objective of insuring the integration of their migrants in their countries of settlement, in order to prevent the younger generation from being drawn to radicalisation spread by the Internet. What is at stake is the image of Morocco in international public opinion. It has thus become important for the Moroccan authorities to stress the difference between the understanding of Islam that migrants are developing abroad, which is leading them to violence—because of the influence of international organisations and their influence in the promotion of a “global Islam”—and the traditional, nationalist Islam promoted by home states and nations (Mohsen-Finan 2005). From national Islam to transnational Islam, Morocco has recently opened Koranic schools in Morocco for all European Muslims in order to counter radical mosques active in the countries of settlement.

Turkey’s motivations, on the other hand, were to combine a national identity abroad with “global Islam”, with Turkey wanting to be its protector. The strategy accompanies Turkey’s ambition to become a regional power and to control “global Islam” as a sign of the globalisation of the state. With regard to migration from Turkey as such, the extension of nationalism beyond borders arose, in the 1970s, from the Turkish state’s intervention in immigration by means of bilateral agreements. In the 1980s, the then secular Turkish state explicitly introduced religion as an element of national identification and institutionalised it under the auspices of the consular network abroad (Kastoryano 2013). This development contributes to re-defining Turkish nationalism both outside and inside its borders, since, for Turkey, it is “impossible to dissociate the Turks in Germany from Turkey”.

The new political actors emerging from migration, most of the time leaders of voluntary associations, have replaced left-wing or right-wing, military or revolutionary, religious or ethnic organisations rooted in Turkey and conveyed into “exile”, which were oriented towards Turkey. They have organised their interests and their identities, be they social, cultural, ethnic or political, around associations created, in most cases, with the support of the host country in the name of a democracy that was by now anxious to recognise difference(s). With the AKP

(*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—the Justice and Development Party) in power, the religious leaders (imams) who were officially sent to Europe within the framework of religious affairs, once they had established themselves in a European country, united the brotherhoods, which were illegal in Turkey, but active in Europe, with a power of conviction and strength of mobilisation greater than in Turkey, creating a convergence in which to frame the “Turkish Islam abroad”, albeit in collaboration with Muslim organisations established in Europe as religious representations of the country. Their modes of organisation, mobilisation and participation reflect multiple belongings, both as migrants in Europe and at home in Turkey. The refinement of the commercial, familial and organisational (based upon regional identities and/or political ideologies) networks by introducing Turkey into Europe draws the subtle borders of a transnational community. Islam has gained a foundation of legitimacy in politics within political frameworks for identity enforced in the countries of immigration which have been the basis of a solidarity that reaches from the local to the transnational.

What is at stake here is the importance of an electorate resource in which religious identification freed from the perceived oppression of secularism has always been expressed abroad. Secularism, for example, as a part of nationalism, which, until recently, was considered “natural”, is being replaced by the growing influence of Islamic streams of thought or factions on political life abroad and home. This is woven into the political projects and shows how the very understanding of nationalism undergoes changes in Germany. Islam has gained a legitimacy in politics within the framework of “identity politics” enforced in countries of settlement, which has provided the basis for a solidarity beyond borders, relating the home country to that of the host. Once transposed into the country of origin, such identities, which, in most cases, arose out of the relationship with the state of the country of immigration, give a new meaning to nationalism by drawing the state of origin into the same process of transnationalising nationalism.

In the last decade, Turkey’s aspirations in the Middle East and the Muslim world have led its president to develop a rhetoric for the protection of all Muslims as “minorities” in Europe, justified by the fight against exclusion and “Islamophobia”. In this way, the Turkish president is

linking a nationalistic perspective and Islam, a de-territorialised Turkish Islam and a non-territorial “global Islam” that coexist in the fight against exclusion, discrimination and Islamophobia. This has led its president to declare “integration” a sin, on the one hand, while supporting dual citizenship for better integration, on the other. The latest tensions between the Turkish political class and European countries caused by the importance of votes abroad for the Turkish constitutional referendum of 2017 is the best example that illustrates the use of national interest and the rhetoric of the “protection of Islam from increasing populism that targets Islam”, in the words of President Erdoğan.

Countries of settlement, on the other hand, try to integrate Islam into their existing institutional structures for equal representation along with other religions. In France, for example, Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy succeeded in creating a French Council of the Muslim Faith (*Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*) in 2003 which elected its first national representative. This process clearly aims to organise a transition from Islam *in* France to an Islam *of* France, from the simple presence of Muslims and their visible practices on French space, to an Islam which will express itself and grow within the framework of national institutions. The latter assumes its liberation from foreign influences, especially those of the homeland, with the idea of “nationalising” Islam and making it a “French Islam”. Belgium and the Netherlands integrated Islam into the religious “pillarisation” of their respective countries very early on. Germany created the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz* in 2006, involving federal, regional and local authorities along with the slogan of “German Muslims” as a way of considering Islam as a part of the religious pluralism in Germany and of controlling extremist activities. Spain launched a petition for Islam to be officially recognised alongside Protestantism and Judaism in 1989.

Each country assumed that, by institutionalising Islam in order to nationalise the new religion established on their territory, it would liberate it from foreign influences as well as those of their homeland. Despite their strategy, the new trend for states is now to be jointly involved in the process of the integration of migrants, in both home and host countries. Whatever the ideology and objective in the understanding of integration, states, however, are confronted with the transnational actions of the activists who try to bypass both home and host states in order to reach a global

perspective of their mobilisation. For transnational actors, any action beyond borders becomes a political tool which leads them to act from “outside”. For states, transnationalism is a way of including identity issues developed in a minority situation into their political strategy and thus of “re-territorialising” them in the home or/and host country. In both cases, it is a matter of maintaining or even of encouraging the multiple loyalties of transnational actors on their respective national territories.

For the country of origin, the extension of state action beyond boundaries makes the question of integration a transnational issue of having its “citizens abroad” integrated both here and there. It becomes a way for states to integrate their politics on identity and influence into the process of globalisation by transnationalising, in ways that combine national—territorial references—and “global Islam”. This involves states behaving as transnational actors in permanent interaction within a global de-territorialised space or encountering the cultural and political specifics of national associations with multinational activities. It entails a mode of integration performed by states in the process of globalisation.

After the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001, states changed their transnational strategies of integration. From the perspective of nation-states, transnational means cooperation in the domain of security, in the form of border controls, common politics of immigration and visa politics. The objective then is to counter non-territorial solidarity expressed in global religious terms, which often follow any extremist interpretation of Islam diffused by the Internet, which attracts the young generation, urging them to reject any or all national identification, to develop a new “ethnic” pride, a sense of community whose attributes are drawn out of a radical interpretation of Islam, its values and power to mobilise, essentially creating the foundations of a “moral identity”, as a basis of a global identification.

4 Territory, Identity and Globalisation

The transnational activities of states and non-state actors reveal competitions between the territorial and the non-territorial forces in globalisation. The extension of state nationalism along with an extra-territorial

citizenship as translated by diaspora politics confronts a non-territorial, transnational nationalism. Such a confrontation that opposes the global community—imagined as *umma* in the case of Muslims—that rejects citizenship and territorial attachment and the diaspora politics of their home states with their strategies of transnational politics of integration create confusion in the use of space and power in globalisation. However, they try to develop solidarity, to influence identity expression and mobilisation beyond national boundaries and respond to a nationalism that is extra-territorial as a reaction to a nationalism that is de-territorialised.

But while the diaspora politics of states aims at re-territorialising allegiances, identities and citizenship, transnational actors promoting loyalty to an “imagined global diaspora” use discourses, speeches and symbols to create a new territorialisation, one that is unbound. Thus, the reality of the diaspora politics confronts the strength of discourses about a global identification. They both refer to dispersion and solidarity beyond the borders of groups and individuals who share common references. But they have a different understanding of geography, of the state and of nationhood: territorially bounded spaces for diasporas and an “imagined geography” that is de-territorialised and de-nationalised for a global diaspora imagined as a global nation.

Indeed, diasporas refer to territories that are ancestral, mythical. At the source of the concept of diaspora lies the dispersion of a people (Stéphane Dufoix).¹² Initially used in reference to the ethno-religious-motivated departure of Jews “in exile”,¹³ the concept of diaspora has been applied to all “victim” populations who have suffered expulsion, persecution and forced migration for religious, political and economic reasons. For William Safran, the dispersion originates in a centre—an ancestral land or place or origin, a *homeland*. Diasporisation operates when the population in question feels excluded from their surrounding society. Retaining the memory of the centre—now idealised and mythologised—it makes plans to return there (William Safran 1991). Its goal is to construct a state on the ancestral land as a “retrieval” of its history and the “restoration” of its territory before its exodus. The plan is thus a re-territorialisation of the reunified nation after dispersion.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the same phenomenon gave way to the concept of “diaspora nationalism” which Ernest Gellner qualifies as a “historical event” and considers a subspecies of nationalism, as mentioned above. Here, a group that has been perceived as a minority due to its religion or language is as a consequence, excluded from state nationalism and bureaucracy. This is the group of urban, educated “foreigners” who have no political power, but who nonetheless enjoy an economic power and mobility which they use to fund nationalist activities (Gellner 1983). The classical examples refer to the experience of Central European Jews and Zionism, a mobilisation by Jews in various countries, their organisation and cross-border activities to create a territorialised state and endow it with legitimacy in the international system. This has led J.A. Armstrong to develop the concept of “mobilised diaspora” supporting the example of Jews as the “archetype” of diasporas. The literature attributes to Armenians, Chinese and Indians living outside their national territories, a status of diaspora historically comparable to that of the Jews. For Armstrong, however, this constitutes a “diaspora of situation” (Armstrong 1976). Indians in Africa and other places overseas and Chinese dispersed throughout Asia were also mobilised to protest for the rights which they were denied, but their mobilisation had no nationalist perspective; instead, these situations involved interest groups trying to pressure the local authorities (Seton-Watson 1977).¹⁴ In the case of the Armenian diaspora, as in the Jewish case, a “long-distance” nationalist mobilisation targeted a re-territorialisation based upon a return to the “sacred land”. This had limited results, due to internal splits in the nationalist movement and the fact that diaspora nationalism had taken the historical “recognition” of their exile as a demand. Diaspora nationalism is thus interpreted as a territorialisation or a re-territorialisation.

Diaspora politics aims to re-territorialise the imagined de-territorialised nation, bringing the territorial and state nationalism back in. Diaspora politics becomes transnational when states of origin interact not only with its emigrated population through its consular networks and other institutions and organisations in order to propagate the nation’s official nationalism but also with receiving states in order to re-territorialise transnational nations.¹⁵ The home state appoints official state-to-state

interlocutors and attributes the role of intermediary to political actors of immigrant stock. These actors provide the link between public and private spaces, as well as economic, social, cultural and political spaces through the various familial, commercial and organisational networks in both Europe and the country of origin. The state of origin thus takes part in defining or creating a diaspora, even in identifying its citizens with a diasporic identity.

If diasporas generate “long-distance nationalism”, the idea of belonging to a global community that goes beyond any territorial reference creates new senses of identity based upon discourses on a unified global community that refer to a new “imagined geography that is de-territorialised and de-nationalised”. It defines itself as a movement seeking a “new centre”, where solidarity follows the networks which create a new understanding of a political community that is invisible and unbound, one which tries to consolidate through discourses, symbols, images and objects that circulate along the real and virtual networks, that is to say, those on the Internet which have become the new space for power, influence and mobilisation.

States are brought in to re-territorialise their diaspora that has joined a broader imagined global diaspora based upon the identification of individuals with multiple identity references to a unified nation justified by common experiences—of immigration, of exile—and a discourse on generalised “humiliation”, generating a “we” that is de-nationalised and de-territorialised, and finds a basis not only in diasporas but in Muslim national societies as well. Therein lies all the ambiguity of the rhetoric, a “strategic ambiguity”¹⁶ that expresses a global vision and leaves the field open to local interpretations. Here, too, the interdependency between territorial and non-territorial issues is clear in these wars now fed by globalising rhetoric and transnational forms of solidarity.

Diasporas reflect a conception of the nation as a group unified from the start around a single ideal, drawing on symbols of the same past and projecting itself into the future with the same myths. With an imagined global nation—that is, transnational—the idea of nation is caught up in the dynamics of the interactions between the states of emigration and immigration that reveal all the heterogeneity of the population that composes it. In other words, the desire for reunification around a common

project in diaspora is replaced by the quest for recognition and legitimacy by states and supranational institutions in the transnational community. This evolution, it is true, is the result of mobilisation and participation in several different national spaces and denser relations between the country of origin and the host country, but it is also the result of the emergence of organisations that are themselves transnational or formed around an identity that seeks to define itself through action, by circulating ideas, norms and demands for recognition in different political spaces. Such is the work of the new actors born of immigration, transnationals themselves, demonstrating their integration in their new country and able to deal with the codes of both political spaces.

Diasporas refer to a minority situation—sometimes to a minority status according to the recognition of differences and their legalisation on the part of states. Minorities rely on dual paradoxical, yet complementary, logics: fights for equality take place within national institutions and the assertion of a collective identity expresses a loyalty to the ancestral homeland. A political community imagined as an *umma* does not recognise itself as a minority, but re-centres all national diversities that characterise such a community, to develop an active identity according to a single exclusivist narrative based upon resistance. Such a community is sustained by the desire to belong to a “people” through a process of nominal appropriation of its actions and discourses, a sense of participation in its “destiny”. This gives birth to new subjectivities along with the imagined geography in which territorial frontiers are not disputed. On the contrary, its non-territorial borders follow the web of networks—formal and/or informal—which transcend the boundaries of state and national territories, engendering a new means of territorialisation—invisible and unenclosed.

Diasporas refer to multiple loyalties: to the homeland, to the country of settlement of citizenship and to the dispersed community (Brubaker 1996). The loyalty to the homeland ethnicises the diasporic identity and provides the emotional element of identification, and the country of citizenship provides the rights and the territorial basis for action. The *umma*, however, relies on a narrative that claims a single identification and loyalty to an “imagined community” constructed out of speeches and images that attract the young generation born in *diaspora*, for whom

the country of origin of their parents does not have the same meaning as for the first generation; on the contrary, it is an imaginary and abstract reference. The homeland does not produce an identification neither does it constitute a basis for loyalty and belonging. In the same way, religious traditions—often related to a national identity—do not have the same strength and meaning as for their parents. They affirm to develop a new “modern” Islam, based upon knowledge, away from their parents’ soft, traditional Islam, based, according to them, upon “ignorance”. The experience of the diaspora along with mobilisation around a more radical Islam for some young generations brings new dynamics in the representation of the self, the representation of traditions, that mark the passage from the religion of a majority to a religion of a migrant minority. As Pnina Werbner underlines with regard to the British Muslims:

a part of British diaspora found its ‘cause’, and has appropriated a politicised Muslim identity, elaborated around justice and equality have developed a sense of ‘co-responsibility’ with the Muslim world in general in order to consolidate their diasporic solidarity. (Werbner 1996)

The representation of umma is not specific to dispersed population. National territories like diasporic spaces are part of the imagined political/moral community that umma represents. New actors, not necessarily born in a diaspora, present themselves as protectors of such a global identity and act in countries of immigration as well as in their countries of origin or other sites recognised as “the land of Islam” preaching radicalism. The discourses on the umma, where territorial and non-territorial Islam coexist, draw new boundaries based upon resistance, and radicalisation, where nationalities, ethnicities and religion are all mingled, and constitute a new source for mobilisation in the name of *jihad*. Reflecting to the states their “deficiency” in human rights, or citizenship as a foundation of democratic equality, the actors seek to channel the loyalty of individuals in the territorialised political community towards a non-territorialised political community, thus re-defining the terms of belonging and allegiance to a “global nation”. This global nation finds a basis in the rhetoric of unity diffused on the web producing a single

langage—images—or a single *langue*—English as a language of participation of Internet sites and email exchange (Roy 2002).

5 Conclusions

Territory is at the core of transnational politics. It is also a source of ambiguity in the representation of the umma. So is the question of sovereignty and power. Diasporas acknowledge the territorial sovereignty of states—home and host—as *diaspora* politics shows. Discourses and narratives on belonging to the umma preach the re-establishment of the Khalifat in order to define a space ruled by the Shariat—the Islamic rule. When a faction of *al-Qaeda* took control of an area the size of the UK on the border between Syria and Iraq, and proclaimed itself to be the “Islamic State” (IS) and named a caliph, it had no legitimacy in the eyes of international law or the nations concerned. Yet, it confirmed the essential role of territory within the tactics of war and an expansionist strategy. As paradoxical as it is, an imagined geography without borders looks for legitimacy upon a territorial basis that gives it the power of agency. The areas seized serve to attract not only the young Muslim diaspora but also others from Europe, the Caucasus and Asia, coming together with local tribes to form an “army”. These young people, regardless of their national origin, see themselves as mobilising for the caliphate. They have made it their “homeland”, the homeland of an “imagined global diaspora”. Irrespective of whether they are organised in groups or networks, local or global, regardless of whether they act individually or in a collectively organised way, their identification—be it individual and/or collective—with the umma seems to find grounds in this “global diasporic” dispersion.

Hence, a paradox again: diasporas often raise the vision of a re-territorialisation, “restoration” or “recovery” of a real or mythical territory, yet still sovereign. The discourse that underlies the idea of transforming the umma into an “imagined global diaspora” relies on its members finding unity based upon overlapping identities (national, regional, religious, linguistic). It also relies on shared experiences (colonisation, exile or emigration). Furthermore, it relies on constant references

to a denationalised and de-territorialised “we” that establishes itself within the conceptions of the diaspora and the nation.

If diasporas encourage a sort of “nationalism” that is abstract yet anchored in a physical territory, the umma generates new impulses based upon the transnational communities and networks that seek to consolidate themselves through the strength of a single narrative fed by symbols, images and objects.

These reflect the paradox of globalisation. If space replaces territory, it re-localises extra-territorial references and re-defines identity boundaries with new inclusions and exclusions. The expansion of state sovereignty beyond its borders generates a new power relationship between the mobility of individuals and the capacity of states to control individuals in movement within and without their borders.

Notes

1. See John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 52.
2. Yen Le Espiritu, *Asian-American Panethnicity. Bridging Institutions and Identities* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992).
3. Ibid.
4. The same goes for people linked by the Spanish language, but of different nationalities and “races”. They have defined a Latino identity in reaction to so-called ethnic policies but also according to their own cultural and political motivations, that is, resistance to assimilation, affective ties with the country of origin and a new conception of “political community” that ties together several spaces. See, in particular, Michael Jones-Correa, *Between Two Nations, The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
5. Typology drawn up by C. Gans in *The Limits of Nationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chap. 1.
6. The fight against racism and the exclusion was originally the official motivation of the European Parliament which, in 1986, had formed the Immigrants’ Forum. Dissolved in 2001, the Forum sought out “a place of expression for the non-community populations established in Europe, through which they could establish their claims and disseminate

information from European authorities”. Exception and complementarity in Europe, in: (1994) 10 *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, pp. 95–109. According to the Forum’s attaché to the Commission of the European Community, the goal was to provide third-world country nationals with “the same opportunities and the same rights as natives, thereby compensating for the absence of democracy”.

7. It is important to note, however, that identification with the Muslim world does not necessarily imply identification with the Arab world. Attitudes towards conflicts often constitute the dividing line between national Muslim communities. In Great Britain, for instance, the majority of the Muslim population of Indian and Pakistani stock does not identify with Arab nationalism. In Germany, the Turks felt mainly concerned by the war in Kosovo which sparked identification with the Bosnian Muslims because of their historic and cultural ties. But it is, above all, the Israeli-Palestinian war that, without a doubt, provides elements by which to analyse territorial and non-territorial attachments, local and global conflict, state nationalism and transnational nationalism and their complex interrelations.
8. Benedict Anderson, “Long-distance Nationalism”, in: *Spectres of Comparisons: Nationalism in Southeastern Asia and the World* (London: Verso Books, 1998), pp. 58–74.
9. In reference to Benedict Anderson’s article, “Long-distance Nationalism”, note above.
10. The title of the book by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back in* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
11. More than four million people who migrated from Turkey presently live in Europe. Having arrived in great numbers since the 1960s following agreements between Turkey and European countries, in particular Germany, their migration was mainly economic. Their dispersion in different West European countries sets them apart from postcolonial migration. In contrast to the North African migrants in France and the populations from the Indian subcontinent in Great Britain, the Turkish migrants have settled across Europe, although the majority lives in Germany.
12. For a complete analysis of the concept, see the work of S. Dufoix, especially *Notion, concept ou slogan: qu’y a-t-il sous le terme de diaspora?* Communication au Colloque “2000 ans de diaspora”, Poitiers, February 2002. See, also, *Diasporas*, Paris: Presse Universitaires France, 2003 (Que sais-je? collection).

13. The usage of the Hebrew term specifically rejects the concept of exile (Hebrew: *Galut*, גלות).
14. See H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States. An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977); see, especially, Chap. 10, "Diaspora Nations", pp. 383–417.
15. See P. Levitt and R. de La Dehesa, "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanation" (2003) 26 *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, pp. 587–611.
16. Bud Goodall, Angela Trethewey and Kelly McDonald, *Strategic Ambiguity, Communication and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World. Principles and Practices*, report presented to the Consortium for Strategic Communication, Phoenix, Arizona State University, 21 June 2006.

References

- Anderson, B. (1998). Long-distance Nationalism. In *Spectres of Comparisons: Nationalism in Southeastern Asia and the World* (pp. 58–74). London: Verso Books.
- Armstrong, J. A. (1976). Mobilized and Proletarian Diaspora. *American Political Science Review*, 70(2), 393–408.
- Breuilly, J. (1982). *Nationalism and the State*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (p. 60). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Espiritu, Y. L. (1992). *Asian-American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (Eds.). (1988). *Bringing the State Back in*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gans, C. (2003). *The Limits of Nationalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Glick Schiller, N., & Eugen Fouron, G. (2001). *George Woke up Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, (especially Chapter 2).
- Goodall, B., Trethewey, A., & McDonald, K. (2006). *Strategic Ambiguity, Communication and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World. Principles and Practices*. Report presented to the Consortium for Strategic Communication, Phoenix, Arizona State University, 21 June.

- Jones-Correa, M. (1998). *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kastoryano, R. (1994). Réseaux d'immigrés en Europe. *Esprit*, March.
- Kastoryano, R. (2007). Transnational Nationalism. Redefining Nation and Territory. In S. Benhabib & I. Shapiro (Eds.), *Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances* (pp. 159–181). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kastoryano, R. (2013). ‘Turks Abroad’ Redefining Turkish Nationalism. In S. Eckstein & A. Najam (Eds.), *How Immigrants Impact Their Homeland*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kastoryano, R. (2017, forthcoming). *Burying Jihadis: Bodies Between State, Territory and Identity*. London: Hurst.
- Kearney, M. (1995). The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24(1), 547–565.
- Leiken, R. (2012). *Europe’s Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Levitt, P., & de La Dehesa, R. (2003). Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 26(4), 587–611.
- Mohsen-Finan, K. (2005). Maroc: l’émergence de l’islamisme sur la scène politique. *Politique étrangère*, 1 Spring, 73–84.
- Roy, O. (2002). *L’islam mondialisé*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Safra, W. (1991). Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return. *Diaspora*, 1(1), 83–99.
- Seton-Watson, H. (1977). *Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; see, especially, Chapter 10, “Diaspora Nations”, 383–417.
- Tozy, M. (2009). L’évolution du champ religieux marocain au défi de la mondialisation. *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, 16(1), 63–81.
- Werbner, P. (1996). Stamping the Earth with the Name of Allah: Zikr and the Sacralizing of Space Among British Muslims. *Cultural Anthropology*, 11(3), 309–338.
- Werbner, P. (2002). *Imagined Diasporas among Manchester Muslims: The Public Performance and Pakistani Transnational Identity Politics* (p. 2). Oxford-Santa Fe, NM: Oxford University Press & School of American Research Press.
- Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks. A Journal of Transnational Affairs*, 2(4), 301–334.



4

Transnationalism and Interculturalism: Overlapping Affinities

Ricard Zapata-Barrero

1 Introduction

The fact that migratory dynamics provoke new ways of thinking about national identities and territorial settlement has been at the core of the transnational field of research and, from the very beginning, was associated with the globalisation of cross-state human mobility.¹ The nuclear definition of transnationalism describes the reality that people can simultaneously have different national ties. This framework of thought, as it is defined in terms of transcending traditional national-state boundaries, has logically been the first to detect the national iron cage governing migration studies. As Stephen Castles (2003: 20–21) rightly asserted a decade ago, the logic of multiple national identities “questions the dominance of the nation-state as the focus of social belonging”. The argument that the national-state is not necessarily the unique reference framework for assessing migration dynamics will allow us to define this post-national-state era. This shows us that there is a logical link between transnationalism

R. Zapata-Barrero (✉)
Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain

and complex diversity, as stated in the Introduction to this volume, which recognises that people can live with multiple co-existing national identities. In fact, at the heart of the concept of diversity as expressed today, there is always an assumption that people maintain some ties with their national origin, either through permanent social relations with families and friends living in their home countries or through other social, political, economical and cultural ties (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). If strict assimilation were the norm, diversity would be considered as a transitory process, rather than a new permanent feature of our societies. “Complex diversity” will be considered here as a by-product of transnationalism.

The recent entrance of interculturalism into migration and ethnic studies, on the other hand, has also provoked some initial signs of disconformity against the master narrative that has dominated diversity management, namely, multiculturalism. The simplest way to define an intercultural policy is that it focuses on the commonalities between people with different national backgrounds, instead of the differences, as the multicultural policy does, and that these common bonds among people are the basic ways to bridge them. This basically means that interculturalism tries to present itself as a policy that fills what multiculturalism has set aside: contact between people from different backgrounds, including national citizens (Zapata-Barrero 2015a).² One statement that signals the difference of emphasis involved in interculturalism is to be found in the European Union’s seventh principle in the list of “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration” (European Commission 2004):

Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration.

In most EU and Council of Europe documents, interculturalism is always linked to European values such as human rights, democracy and a culture of peace and dialogue.³ In this policy approach to diversity management, there is a trend of research that links interculturalism with integration strategies, asserting that bringing people together through different ties is a successful strategy of inclusion (Guidikova 2015) and even a new unexplored path of focusing on citizenship, as a strategy of socialisation into a diversity culture and a policy seeking to foster intercultural citizenship (Zapata-Barrero 2016b).

The pressing contextual situation today that is directly challenging the core agenda of migration studies is also clear: there is a lack of support for diversity management in the current climate of the backlash against multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). The new context of complex diversity and transnationalism, together with the securitisation framework that has penetrated most diversity-management thinking, preventing more open, cosmopolitan and humanistic policies towards both newcomers and those who have already been living in host countries for some time, highlights the very volatile situation in which Europe finds itself. On the other hand, the revival of the nationalistic narrative takes the form of an offence against what it considers to be an attack against its integrity and the only form of legitimising the state: protective nationalistic discourses against the new external “threatening” factor called migration-related diversity. The last European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report, for instance, signals a growing anti-immigrant sentiment and Islamophobia as being among the key trends in 2015 (ECRI 2016). The recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Copenhagen, Nice, Berlin, Manchester, London and Barcelona further add to the Islamophobic sentiment being misused by populist political parties to stir up prejudice and hatred against Muslims in general. Likewise, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union in June 2016 (Brexit) is also connected to anti-immigrant sentiments, allegiances and feelings of “Englishness” and national welfare protectionism. Key questions arise today that cannot be answered with old-style policy paradigms: can the policy narrative of multiculturalism counter the extremist narrative and/or the nationalist narrative invading most mainstreaming political ideologies? Can multiculturalism today be a marker for policies without creating more political cleavages? Are the “nationals-first” narratives of most countries (American-first, French-first, English-first) the last signals of a past governed by the idea that nationalism is the only resource to legitimise state power? Today, most states are complex-diverse, and any claim to speak on behalf of an ideal national-state becomes more and more difficult to sustain. Transnational migrants are the key example that these national narratives are somehow disconnected from the growing reality, which says that people can have two or more national affiliations and can construct their social spaces at the crossroads where they find themselves, creating some sort of, what

Riva Kastoryano in her chapter calls, a “new imagined community”, in which national identities are de-territorialised. The analytical framework contrasting unity and diversity that has dominated migration-related diversity studies from the very beginning is certainly being challenged by these transnational patterns.

It is within this current post-national-state (post-NS) and post-multicultural (post-M) scholarly debate on the best way to accommodate complex-diverse societies, and within this contextual pressing scenario, that I will frame my contribution. What interests me in trying to link the already consolidated transnationalism literature and the most recent interculturalism literature in migration studies is to identify their overlapping affinities in two ways: first, in the way in which they deal with multiple national identities (or complex diversity) and the value that they agree to regarding the importance of relations among identities to promote social cohesion and even trust; second, in the way in which they both share a broader view of diversity that is not necessarily separated from the so-called unity concept. In other words, what both transnationalism and interculturalism share today is that they take on the function of counter-forces against the hegemonic theoretical frameworks governing migration studies, namely, national-state-based and multicultural-based approaches to diversity.

Given this background debate, the main purpose of this chapter is to assess theoretically the relation between transnationalism (announcing the post-NS period) and interculturalism (announcing the post-M era). The seminal idea that I would like to articulate is that if the rough notion of transnationalism is to live with at least two national identities, to have a binational or multinational mind, then the intrapersonal dialogue of transnational people about how to deal with their own complex identities is, in itself, an intercultural dialogue. The embeddedness in more than one national culture fosters the development of intercultural skills, namely the capacity to enter into contact with other people with different backgrounds on equality terms. This dimension of complex diversity has already been noted in the Introduction to this volume, when the editors signalled that one of the markers of complex identity is that it is inclusive and imbued with a strong norm of tolerance. That is to say, the notion of transnationalism necessarily contains intercultural practice,

and interculturalism is a way to understand transnational behaviour. These premises bridging transnational minds and intercultural minds need to be examined theoretically as a first step to conducting empirical studies. Formulating the argument in terms of a hypothesis, what I want to assess theoretically is *whether transnational people have a predisposition to be more intercultural*, and whether the growing importance of people with multiple national identity affiliations (the basis of transnationalism) is a favourable context for promoting contact between people of different backgrounds, including national citizens (the basis of interculturalism). In order to enter this discussion framework, the rationale of this chapter will follow two steps: first, I will show how transnationalism can be understood as a new context that helps us to illustrate our complex-diverse societies and, second, that this transnational context is the appropriate condition that can help the widespread expansion of the intercultural policy paradigm, given that interculturalism and transnationalism present some “overlapping affinities”. By this last notion, and in the absence of a better notion, I want to emphasise that there is not just a juxtaposition between transnationalism and interculturalism, but that each one necessarily contains the other in order to define its main conceptual dimensions and functional characteristics. But let me first contextualise this interface in the current post-NS and post-M debates.

2 The Post-national-State and Post-multicultural Emerging Period: Rebooting the Unity and Diversity Framework

The argument that I would like to put forward recognises the strengths of both the national-state-based framework of thinking about diverse societies and the multicultural policy paradigm in setting equality, power sharing and inclusion. There is nothing that I have said until now that suggests the disappearance of nationalism, since I am fully aware that, in the very deep notion of transnationalism, we assume the meaningfulness of the category of national identity as the unique founder of states, which is also the case for interculturalism, which cannot promote contact among

people from different backgrounds if it does not assume the pre-existence of different nationalities and cultures, and not just one. Instead, we are emphasising that, in both cases, the original function of national identity in legitimating the state and most of the by-products of the state's legitimacy (stability, use of power, protection, security, cohesion, etc.) is becoming weak, and even the link between the nation and the territory is somehow less solid today, as Riva Kastoryano (2007, 2016) has tried to warn us in her latest works.

This post-NS and post-M period also illustrates an increasing academic awareness that casts doubts about the way the debate has been conducted in the past in terms of the unity and diversity nexus. This reference framework, which tends to separate immigrants from national citizens in the process of formulating diversity policies is, in some way, old-fashioned in contexts of increasing complex diversity. This leads us to argue, given their intrinsic counter-force nature, that both transnationalism and interculturalism endorse the need to reassess the "immigrant/citizenship divide" that has dominated the diversity debate in migration studies (Zapata-Barrero 2017a: 179–180). What interests me in this divide is the consequence of always reproducing a certain discourse where an assumed "we-citizens" are not the subjects of diversity policies: "Diversity is the others" seems to be the defining focus. In the policy-making process of diversity management, this presumed division of the population has the effect of reproducing a certain power relation between a majority-citizen and a minority-ethnic individual, which fails to create bridges among these two sets of people. Behind this divide, there is a prenotation of diversity that shows that the concept is *not* set in stone and that it is *not* politically neutral. I have already written that there is something magical that happens when those who define diversity never include themselves inside the category (Zapata-Barrero 2013). That is to say, those who claim to have the monopoly on the definition of diversity never incorporate their own differential features within the semantics of diversity. There is, then, some sort of epistemological barrier that establishes the difficulty to be the *in* and *definers* of diversity at the same time. This epistemology propriety of the diversity concept was already assumed, for instance, by Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren (1998), when they stated that "the discourse on diversity is an instrument for the reproduction of social

problems, forms of inequality and majority power” (1998: 4), and that there is an ideological construction of a problem of diversity, since it seems that the definition is dominated and controlled by the majority and that even a tendency to “abnormalize the other” (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998: 19–20) can be observed.

Taking this epistemological perspective, the unity and diversity framework reinforces the idea of separate categories of people, just as diversity policies have been mainly destined towards one part of the population, be they immigrants, non-nationals, ethnic minorities or a range of other conceptualisations in different countries and contexts. Today, in a complex diversity context, in a scenario in which second and third generations of migrants live in Europe, in which the only attachment to their society of origin comes from their parents (see, for instance, Crul et al. 2012), most so-called legal citizens have an immigrant background, and, consequently, this division of the population that probably made sense in earlier stages of the migration process is now very difficult to sustain. This assumption, therefore, needs to be revised. There is, moreover, a new trend of debate that analyses the process of mainstreaming most migration policies (Scholten and Van Breugel 2018), which is one legitimating feature of the growing importance of the intercultural policy paradigm (Zapata-Barrero 2018), which places diversity *within* the unity and not against it.

This taken-for-granted separation between an assumed majority-unity-us and a minority-diversity-others analytical framework of conducting research has caused serious limits in developing knowledge in migration studies. Today, it becomes clear that two master national-state and multicultural paradigms have been on the ground for legitimating such a separation. I would even say more: these old-style policy paradigms, instead of solving issues, belong to the very problems that need to be solved today. New recognitions that we are in a complex-diverse society, governed by increasing transnationalism in all its facets—with complex multiple national (and de-territorialised) identities becoming more and more the norm—make it harder to encapsulate migration issues in such one-dimensional views of diversity.

The multicultural paradigm has dominated recent decades, essentially following the equality and human rights principles on diversity

management, with a normative conception of justice in the background. However, we know that there are different perspectives on how each scholar focuses on the diversity, equality and human rights interface (Kivisto 2005; Laden and Owen 2007; Bloemraad 2007, 2015; Triandafyllidou et al. 2011; Crowder 2013; Mansouri and Ebanda de B'beri 2014; Song 2016). To summarise its nuclear core, the main multicultural project has been the inclusion of immigrants into the mainstream by respecting their differences and recognising their distinctive cultural practices, religions and languages. Stephen Castles (2000: 5) correctly said that multiculturalism recognises “rights to cultural maintenance and community formation, and linking these to social equality and protection from discrimination”. Recently, some scholars have focused on the multicultural paradigm in terms of indicators, rather than principles (Levy 2000; Murphy 2012; Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Bloemraad and Wright 2014; and even Vertovec 2010), providing additional specific evidence-based structural and legal arrangements to ensure the non-alienation of specific groups. In such studies, multiculturalism has deployed most of its tools for the protection of rights, for the containment of exceptional cases within the mainstream public policy system, and has legitimated specific policies basically in terms of funding, recognition and affirmative action. In addition, a certain group-based approach has been dominant in the application of these principles, without incorporating a more critical view of what kinds of culture deserve recognition and under what terms.

Fully aware that times have changed, that multiculturalism has been theorised in a context where security was assumed, Will Kymlicka signals that some of the conditions of multiculturalism are eroding:

Liberal multiculturalism, I would argue, was theorized for situations in which immigrants were seen as legally authorized, permanently settled, and presumptively loyal. In an age of securitization and super-diversity, these assumptions are put into question. Early theories of multiculturalism now seem at best incomplete, and at worst out-dated, resting on assumptions and preconditions that may no longer apply. (Kymlicka 2015: 244)

As Will Kymlicka (2010) foresaw, the new historical phase in which we find ourselves now is characterised by the fact that most of the multicultural criticism comes not from a far-right, anti-immigrant and nationalist discourse, but from inside multiculturalism. I consider myself to be part of this trend.

The growing conviction that, in settings of complex diversity, tolerance needs to be limited also belongs to this pattern (Zapata-Barrero and Triandafyllidou 2012; Dobbernack and Modood 2013). Today, there is a growing awareness that multicultural policies have fuelled far-right xenophobic political parties. In Germany in October 2010, and in the United Kingdom in February 2011, political leaders also promoted this argument of state multicultural failure, a backlash against the multicultural paradigm, provoking deep public discussion across Europe (*Daily Mail Reporter* 2011).

This growing concern in Europe over the rise of populist anti-immigrant parties and anti-Islamification narratives cannot be disconnected from the disenchantment with multiculturalism. The recent general elections in France (in May 2017) also demonstrated that these parties, after an initial period of conquest, seem to have established themselves in the mainstream political system. This has even meant that governments have changed their courses of action, incorporating anti-immigration measures into their strategies for managing diversity (Ferruh 2012), a situation that has been aggravated by contradictions within the immigration politics of the liberal states forced by these contextual restraints (Hampshire 2013). What is specific to the debate on growing radicalism against diversity is that it uses most of the basic normative premises that legitimate the multicultural paradigm, and, in this sense, it is a scholarly forum that must be taken seriously by strong defenders of liberal democratic principles and human rights. It would be lacking in historical insight and academically irresponsible to misinterpret the elite discourses that have framed most of the public debate in Europe in recent years. The “muscular” defence of liberal democratic principles, to borrow the words of former British Prime Minister David Cameron, has provoked a vast amount of criticism; however, there is a clear purpose to address the multicultural question in terms of limits:

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values. (Cameron 5 February 2011)

This means that immigrants must, at the very minimum, acquire the language of the host country and learn about its history, norms and institutions. And it entails the introduction of written citizenship tests and loyalty oaths. Implicitly, if not explicitly, civic national integration is presented as the only tool to limit what we may call *boundless multiculturalism* (Zapata-Barrero 2017b).

This national civic turn belongs to this post-NS and post-M era.⁴ Why does this framework emphasise the view of considering national identity as a friend, rather than a foe? Because there is a certain shared view that the multicultural paradigm has exaggerated the rights-based approach to the detriment of duties. And these duties towards immigrants must also be placed at the same level of policy consideration, because they can help to regulate the excessive recognition of certain cultures and thereby limit illiberal practices which contravene human rights. In practical terms, the duty-based approach calls for the development of the means to ensure civic practices and citizenship, as well as a minimum level of competence in the national language and a minimum level of knowledge about the country's history and society. In normative terms, it seeks to ensure a minimum threshold for living together in a common public culture. It is true that this national civic turn can have many readings, depending on how one sets this minimum threshold, and whether one makes it voluntary or compulsory. In the conceptual terms in which we have framed the debate, this means taking care not to erode the national unity by being "too diverse", to use David Goodhart's (2004) expression, to re-evaluate national identity, language and democratic liberal values as the limiters—rather than the promoters—of multiculturalism. There is, however, a problem in this new civic national-state narrative, which was already visible in the multicultural approach: they both still consider diversity as "the other" that is separated from the mainstream, instead of placing

diversity *within* the mainstream. The question today is no longer how to live *with* diversity, but how to live *in* diversity (Antonsich 2016: 470). The growing diversity scenarios compounding our societies today are new for everybody, whether their origins are Filipino, Pakistani, Moroccan, Chinese, Ecuadorian, French, German, Hungarian or Italian. There is a general desire to build an alternative to the extremist narrative, and neither the multicultural nor the national-state civic narratives that have dominated this new period can provide us with sufficiently convincing arguments to reboot the unity and diversity framework.

This post-M and post-NS era also means that we are entering a post-racial period, as those who oppose multiculturalism see it as having ethicised social and economical problems under the auspices of having prioritised demands for cultural and national recognition over all other concerns. The unease surrounding multiculturalism, which has led governments across Europe not only to ban *hijabs* and *burkas* but also to install citizenship testing and to promote “national-state values” (Lentin 2014: 1272), has less to do with multicultural policies and more to do with fragmentation and the loss of a common public culture. It is a kind of fusing of the unity and diversity agendas or, as Desmond King described, a wide acknowledgement of group distinctions combined with a state struggle to ensure that government policies do not accentuate hierarchical divisions between groups based upon race, ethnicity and national background, a struggle rich in historical connotations that can no longer presume a teleological narrative towards melting-pot individualism (King 2005: 122). This claim that unity also needs to be respected and recognised within diversity is gaining support from a number of scholars.

The added value of this post-NS and post-M framework is that it not only officialises the need to limit the former *boundless multiculturalism* narrative, but it tries to disentangle the assumed interface of liberal/democratic values with national-state values, as if those espousing the national civic paradigm were assuming that people coming from other nationalities do not embrace democratic and liberal values. They build their narrative under the assumption that national-state values equal democratic and liberal state values, and then non-national people became suspicious as they were also seen as non-liberal and non-democratic. This national-state civic paradigm may be said to have the mythical dual faces of Janus,

since it cannot be interpreted solely as part of a more or less hidden nationalistic assimilation agenda, but must also be seen as a policy narrative ensuring equal opportunities and a minimum of cultural capital for the development of social capacities in the host society. It can also be seen as an instrument to facilitate a sense of mutual belonging, contact and interaction. My view is that, in spite of some multiculturalists claiming compatibility, the questions posed by one of the most constant critics of multiculturalism (Joppke 2004) remain unanswered. This is why the debate cannot dismiss the most radical approach of the civic turn, which fundamentally places duties as a condition for allocating rights. This argument exists in many policy-makers' and politicians' minds, and, in its radical form (i.e., "no rights without duties"), it not only attracts right-wing and populist anti-immigrant political parties but also social-democrat political parties which see that these policy narratives, together with the "welfare chauvinism" narratives, may help them to win over more of the electorate.

3 Transnationalism as a Context in Complex-Diverse Societies

As Alejandro Portes recently reminded us "the concept of transnationalism was coined to give theoretical form to the empirical observation that international migrants seldom leave their communities of origin behind, but instead engage in 'multi-stranded' activities and linkages with them" (2015: 7). Transnational studies then primarily invited researchers to transcend the current national-state paradigm that has dominated migration studies until now (Basch et al. 1992). This devaluation of the nation-state as the proper unit of social analysis is shared with globalisation studies (Breton and Reitz 2003; Sørensen and Guarnizo 2007; Hudson and Slaughter 2007; Adesina and Adebayo 2009) and a recent "local turn" debate, where cities are considered to be the central entities in which to analyse diversity policies (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2017). In terms of re-thinking the very notion of society, transnational studies contributed with the disarticulation of the taken-for-granted relation between

territorially bounded units and social analysis entities (Lazăr 2011), and have also been analysed in terms of the impact on countries of reception or how the fact that people co-exist with two national identities affects their lives wherever they presently reside (Levitt 2001). Transnational migrants are at least bilingual, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries and also pursue economic, political and cultural interests with both their countries.

These patterns are becoming more and more the norm in our diverse societies, in part determined also by the facilities of communication, through skype, whatsapp and other social technological means, including low-cost travel. What both national methodology and multiculturalism share is that they have a view of culture in national homogeneous terms and place it in a power relationship within the basket of majority-nationals citizens. Kevin Robins and Asu Aksoy (2016: 13) reminded us recently when Will Kymlicka (1995: 118, 94) recognised that he was “using ‘a culture’ as synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’”, claiming that “political life has an inescapably national dimension”. We know perfectly well that Will Kymlicka defines national community as “societal culture”, which includes the history, traditions and conventions that go along with the host society (Kymlicka 1995, Chap. 5), and then assume people’s national affiliations to one set of traditions and national values, including language, religion, and so on.

This illustrates the epistemological problem of most multiculturalists. They have a reading of diversity only in national-state terms. What is ultimately problematical is the conception of culture that is being mobilised within this research agenda, in which the apparently neutral term actually turns out to be national-state based. Thus, a culture is conceived as a unitary and a bounded state entity, as the property of a particular national group, as distinct from the cultures of other groups, and as fixed and constant through time. As is stressed in the Introduction of this volume, this reinforces the notion that the authentic way of conducting one’s life can only be assured through the national experience, that is, living within state-controlled and nationally defined and national-delineated borders.

To my knowledge, the multicultural policy narrative and the current national-statist civic narrative (a societal-cultural reading of migrant-related diversity management) have never formulated a critical interpretative framework regarding the way homogeneous cultural and national-states categorise the dynamics of diversity. This is partly because both paradigms formulated their arguments within the same national-state homogenous way of thinking about cultural and national identities. Even if there is still no serious multicultural theory of transnationalism (Faist 2016, has tried to link both recently), we can say that transnational theorists have criticised multicultural theories for maintaining the expectation of exclusive attachments, belonging to one society and loyalty to the receiving state. Multiculturalism still thinks of nationality in statist and territorial terms. Transnational integration, therefore, involves contact among different national affiliations and identities. Immigrants become part of the receiving country and its institutions, and transform them, while simultaneously maintaining and strengthening their ties with their countries of origin (Levitt 2001; Morawska 2003). In this sense, transnational integration is quite different from multicultural integration. The latter acknowledges the presence of immigrants (and minorities) and tries to accommodate their specific cultural needs and differences in a largely ad hoc manner (Favell 2001); transnational integration means that migrants and citizens with migrant origin can only be included by having their multiple national affiliations (complex-diverse identities) recognised by the host society.

Thus, transnationalism challenges traditional theories of assimilation which assume that immigrants who are more fully integrated into their host societies are less likely to continue to involve themselves in the economic, social and political spheres of their countries of origin. If traditional assimilation theories treat transnationalism and integration as opposing processes, contemporary transnational theorists understand these processes in terms of multiple combinations (Morawska 2014). The fact that transnationalism becomes the norm and the new context of our complex-diverse societies necessarily forces migration studies to re-think assimilationist theories, which have been grounded, together with multiculturalism, in a framework of thought separating unity and diversity, while still linking national identity, territory and the state.

New understandings of assimilation recognise that complex diversity is here to stay.

There are many studies that have already demonstrated how transnational actions can foster the integration process in the places where migrants live (recent studies linking transnationalism and integration include Marini 2014, and Mügge 2016). That is to say, transnationalism and integration are simultaneous processes in which immigrants forge relationships with both the sending and the receiving countries, with integration reinforcing transnationalism and, transnationalism, thereby creating a basis for successful integration. It facilitates and is part of the process of integration; it is not a step prior to integration or total “assimilation”. In this context, we may assume that transnational people would have a tendency to be more open to having contact with other people from different backgrounds than people that have been socialised with a one-dimensional view of national culture.

Transnationalism is, therefore, a contextual framework that perfectly defines one of the main features of our diverse societies, and creates a social space in which many people with multiple national identities can relate to one another. The exception to this pattern is the idealistic view of national citizens, who still think of their country as though it were a territorial reality separated from the category of diversity. If romanticism can be characterised by its emphasis on emotion and individualism, as well as a glorification of all things past, then to continue to evaluate the state in national terms, as the container of a given majority that defines what is the unity necessary to insure cohesion, and what is diverse and what is not, is unquestionably a renovated version of romanticism. The process of re-nationalisation of societies, within given political discourses which claim to recover and/or restore the essence of Frenchness, Germanness or Englishness, for instance, are, in this transnational dynamic, a clear, updated signal of a new romanticism, in which an homogeneous “better past” is proclaimed in the face of the new diverse and transnational scenario in which we are living, surrounded, they believe, by “uncertainties”, “instability” and “conflict”. For what is now made more and more apparent is that “the notion of primary loyalty to one place is therefore misleading: it was an icon of old-style nationalism that has little relevance for migrants in a mobile world” (Castles 2017: 290).

This is how we consider transnationalism, as a given reality in complex-diverse societies, giving shape to new forms of social spaces in which people from different origins live, including national citizens. The fact that most of the cultural festivities in cities incorporate the national days of immigrants, the celebration of *iftar* (the evening meal when Muslims end their daily Ramadan fast at sunset), the Chinese New Year, and so on are evidence that cultural policies are beginning to incorporate in their programmes an understanding that diversity and transnationalism can be expressed through cultural festivities and are factors of inclusion, rather than exclusion (Zapata-Barrero 2016a). These transnational cultural activities in host countries promote encounters with others, and with different societies, and create what I have called elsewhere a *culture of diversity* (Zapata-Barrero 2014), which essentially means going beyond the simple fact that the current social contexts are diverse, in order to discuss *how* diversity is being incorporated into public and civic culture, at the level of both institutional structures and routines. This basically also means the emergence of a new public culture in which diversity becomes the norm, and thus declares the senselessness of framing the debate according to the “old-fashioned” unity/diversity framework, in which there is an assumed territorial national territory which legitimates the existence of the state and in which diversity is always considered as an external factor contravening the traditional ways of thinking about the state, the nation and the territory. The complex diversity we are now living, in which transnationalism becomes the norm, is one where unity is imbued with diversity. This *culture of diversity* can be seen as a by-product of what, in the recent work of Tatiana Matejskova and Marco Antonsich (2015), is called governance *through* diversity rather than governance *of* diversity. In this new context, this duty-based view of unity, as it has been approached by the national-state civic paradigm, needs to be de-nationalised, if I may use this term. Transnationalism de-nationalises the territory in which the state exercises its legitimate use of violence, to use Weberian terms. This basically means that the need to keep a common language and the democratic and liberal values may be right if these duty-based approaches also incorporate diversity as a value to be considered, and treat national symbols in the same way as those of other nations, in a more complex view of diversity. Unity is, of course, necessary to

ensure stability and cohesion, but it needs to be free from all national-state-based homogeneous views of culture.

In general terms, we can also say that the current transnational context considers the old assimilationist or the renovated national civic policy paradigms to be senseless, if these approaches assume the need to maintain nationalism as the main reference point to define the majority in a power relation with the so-called minority. However, if we withdraw the national dimension of the civic policy paradigm and keep the function of maintaining cohesion in diverse societies, then we need to re-think what cohesion could mean in complex diverse societies in which national citizens are no longer the sole guardians of liberal democratic values. This mixture between liberal democratic values, which we need to keep, and national values, which we need to conceive of as an additional category of diversity, is what we need to separate. This is a first way of identifying the overlapping affinities between transnationalism and interculturalism.

4 Transnationalism and Interculturalism: Overlapping Affinities in Diverse Societies

Transnationalism and interculturalism are concepts that inherently present overlapping affinities. In migration studies, both try to encapsulate new realities and policy practices, given the growing cross-state mobility of people and the consequent diversity dynamics that it entails in receiving countries. Both have been defined from the outset as being by nature counter-hegemonic forces. Transnationalism is a reaction against the essentialist view of the “one person/one national identity” assumption which has dominated migration studies and has been famously labelled as “national methodology”; and interculturalism has grown against the dominance of the multicultural approach and the renovated version of assimilationism (the national-state civic approach), which still juxtaposes duties with national-territorial identities, with historical national narratives. Given the main framework of this book, what I would like to assess theoretically is that the complex diversity contexts that we have drawn in

the above section is a favourable condition of interculturalism. Formulated at hypothetical and individual level, *transnational people are more prone to be intercultural*. So, the fact that transnational contexts in our societies are becoming the norm also means there is a growing favourable context for implementing intercultural policies.

It is true that this theory-driven hypothesis would need to be empirically tested and contrasted, since we also know that some national communities still keep their “transnational way of life” in a rather closed social space, in isolation from out-groups, and then the theoretical assumption which I am formulating could also be contradicted theoretically. I am fully aware of this potential counter-argument. It is only through empirical studies that we can test this hypothesis. But, theoretically speaking, I would underline that I am not formulating a direct relationship between transnational people, complex-diversity settings and intercultural practices (viz that all transnational people are intercultural), but rather that there is a predisposition of transnational people to be more intercultural, only, and only, if there is a policy that promotes contact. Contact between people from diverse national backgrounds is not self-evident. It is, in fact, the nuclear concept of interculturalism, directly related to the contact theory formulated by Gordon W. Allport (1954) half a century ago. The permanent premise of interculturalism is that contact between people can help to establish positive intergroup feelings when they take place in a cooperative environment among equals. In other words, the transnational context by itself does not necessarily promote contact between, let me say, a Chinese group and a Moroccan group. But if there is a policy that looks for common bonds and interests between these two groups, and uses this to bridge them into common views and projects, probably these groups, because they already have an intercultural logic of living their own transnational mind, would have a tendency to be more easily intercultural. It is here that we can justify intercultural policies as a strategy to promote positive contact among people that have different backgrounds, but many common bonds and interests which we simply need to identify. My theoretical assessment tries, then, not to demonstrate an empirical hypothesis which needs, of course, to be tested. My concrete theory-driven focus is to defend that there are conceptual grounds to believe

there are some overlapping affinities between transnationalism and interculturalism. This interlink needs to be explored from a policy point of view, that is, that interculturalism could work easily with people who have transnational minds.

I am aware that one may say that transnationalism and interculturalism are incomparable since one designates a fact and a practice, the reality of most migrants who live with at least two national allegiances and identities, while the other designates a policy strategy which promotes contact among people from different national origins, including national citizens. But the way I would like to compare them, is not only in descriptive terms but also in normative terms, that is, when one asks why the promotion of contact is important in diverse societies and what differentiated forms of social behaviour develop transnational minds. In both cases, there are some overlapping affinities, in the sense that both promote trust and social cohesion, community building and a sense of belonging, and even, a new public culture, a *culture of diversity*, where unity is no longer linked to the former national majority in a power relationship with the so-called minorities and representatives of diversity.

Following the preliminary ways to compare transnationalism and interculturalism, both share the idea that identity is one of the key concepts that defines their respective approaches to diversity and by which they describe their respective areas of action.⁵ The notion of identity is key to understanding the personal and social behaviour that transnationalism and interculturalism seek to de-limit as a research field in migration studies. Clearly, national identity is taken in its non-essentialist form, as a driver helping people to frame their lives and give meaning to their allegiances towards institutions. When this identity is transnational, this basically means that cross-national spaces are being shared (Faist 2015), that people are living with both virtual (home country) and real spaces, in an imagined community, as Riva Kastoryano argues in her chapter, thinking of their lives in two countries, or, as Peggy Levitt (2004) rightly assessed, “when ‘home’ means more than one country”. On the other hand, an intercultural identity is one that already has the predisposed attitude to enter into contact with people of other origins and cultural backgrounds, without being influenced by stereotypes and falsehoods relating to origin, racism and other feelings which restrict

contact, on equal terms, and trying to disconnect the diversity and power relationship.

The “overlapping affinities” between transnationalism and interculturalism can be examined when we focus on the notion of contact between multiple national identities. To begin with, conceptually, we have already stressed that, within the same notion of transnationalism, there is an assumed concept of interculturalism that needs to be uncovered: the fact that a transnational mind necessarily involves entering into contact with two national identities, first, personally (transnationalism is a form of dialogue with oneself, and requires one to rank, if necessary, personal national allegiances according to different contexts), and then as a form of behaviour, since this involves openly sharing different social spaces coming from different national frameworks. The large amount of literature about transnationalism points to the behavioural fact that transnational minds become evident only when people begin to enter into contact between two national spaces and build their expectations and life projects in two countries. Then, transnational action involves interculturalism, as a transnational space is, by definition, an intercultural space. It is at this juxtaposition that the overlapping affinity becomes obvious. It is this evidence that allows me to argue that transnational people are favourable candidates to become also intercultural minds, and then they are likely to be more open to intercultural contacts than those who only have a single national identity and live their sociability in a closed national-self context. This also involves a much more individualistic view of the category of diversity, in the sense that one decides what his or her identity actually is, without having it imposed from outside, be it socially or institutionally. This perspective is important. The intercultural argument is that we cannot impose the majoritarian understanding of diversity categories upon others. The intercultural policy narrative reacts against the process of ethnicisation of people, of what Roger Brubaker calls “groupism”, namely, “the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed” (Brubaker 2002: 164).

To summarise these arguments: the transnational realities in which most people live today, tells us that birthplace and/or nationality do not

determine most public identities, and that this de-territorialisation of national identity⁶ is what allows people to be more open to others and be favourable to intercultural contact and dialogue. To ask someone where he or she was born with the purpose of having an initial idea of what public identity he or she holds is not more self-evident than it was in the past. Some so-called second generations would have real difficulties in answering this question with a simplistic answer.⁷ Today, transnationalism appears to be a reality to most second generations of migrants, and the growing mobility of people is pluralising identities and self-national and culture ascriptions (Favell 2014). It is now the rule which needs to be incorporated into the current theoretical policy frameworks on migration studies.

If we look at transcultural activities in residence countries, such as the celebration of a national day, religious-cultural activities that keep people with their national and cultural home identities, we can say that these practices are transnational in the sense that people enter in relation with their home countries in the same territory in which they live. This can be an example of transnational nationalism or of the de-territorialisation of the national identity, as we have mentioned above. These activities are, by themselves, intercultural, since they promote encounters between people from different backgrounds in the public space, the main space of intercultural practices (Wood 2015). So, here, this overlapping affinity between transnationalism and interculturalism is again obvious.

For us, these transnational activities in the receiving or host countries, and the transnational character of a person entering into these practices, have some overlapping affinities with interculturalism in two ways: first, it involves intrapersonal dialogue with two national identities. Second, this binational identity gives rise to determinate practices under the form of maintaining regular contacts with relatives and friends, and the different social spaces left behind during the migratory process, or with the nationality of their own families, if they are second generation. This again involves interculturalism.

So, conceptually speaking, the very notion of transnationalism involves some sort of intercultural behaviour with oneself. And we may assume

that this premise can lead the person to be much more open to the idea of entering into intercultural contact, thereby establishing social ties with people from different national backgrounds. Transnational migrants inform us, then, that their interests cannot be served by any single nation-state, and so there is no longer a positive incentive to invest their interests and attachments in any one national community (Robins 2007). This bridge from the personal to the social has been the centre of attention of some leading social psychology studies and even some studies coming from business studies on multiple identities or complex identities. Here, again, the overlapping affinity between transnationalism and interculturalism can be normatively assessed at the level of what both are, socially speaking, able to produce.

The fact that people with more than one national identity are more prone to have social ties is at the core of most recent empirical research. For instance, the work of Lakshmi Ramarajan (2014) shows how multiple identities shape the action of people. Multiple identities foster intrapersonal identity networks, in which the nodes of the network are identities (which can vary in aspects such as number and importance) and in which the ties of the network are relationships, such as those of conflict, enhancement and integration. Scholars can then examine the various structures or patterns of relationships among multiple identities. Drawing on ideas of associative networks in psychology, as well as on networks of relations in sociology and social theory, Lakshmi Ramarajan (2014) makes the case that a network conceptualisation of multiple identities combines attention to specific identity content with a focus on the relationships between different identities. Such integration provides us with ways of understanding how identities operate as entire systems in which parts (identities) are connected (via relationships) to form a whole (a network of identities). Other researches coming from business studies also show how multiple identities shape important outcomes in organisations, such as intergroup tolerance (Roccas and Brewer 2002). Multiple intrapersonal identities also seem to influence interpersonal and intergroup relationships, although this research also suggests the potential for both positive and negative consequences. In the same line of analysis, some other empirical studies show that multiple identities are

positively related to intergroup cooperation (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Richter et al. 2006). Sonia Roccas and Marilynn B. Brewer (2002) have also predicted that social identity complexity is related to personal value priorities and to tolerance of out-group members. One thing that has not been previously taken into account in trying to explain these variations in the perceptions of others is the way in which the perceiver represents his or her own multiple category identities. For instance, how a person who is both white and Christian responds to another individual who is black and Christian may well depend on how the perceiver self-defines his or her own racial and religious identities. This also confirms one of the key features of interculturalism in contrast to multiculturalism. The latter focuses policies into preserving differences and protecting them through rights, as a way of implementing the principle of equality. In contrast, the intercultural approach focuses on commonalities (in the previous example, the fact that both are Christians facilitates communication between a black and a white person, for instance). The premise is obvious: you can only promote contact if there is something in common between two people in their multiple identities. This commonality does not necessarily need to be a category of diversity, as I have shown in the above example, but a common interest (cooking, for instance) or work (both are doctors, for instance). This is also the basis of the bridging principle driving interculturalism. For these studies, understanding the structure of multiple social identities is important because representations of one's in-groups have effects not only on the concept of self, but also on the nature of the relationships between the self and others (Roccas and Brewer 2002: 88). Social identity complexity is based upon chronic awareness of cross-categorisation in one's own social group memberships and in those of others. A simple social identity is likely to be accompanied by the perception that any individual who is an out-group member on one dimension is also an out-group member on all others. In sum, social psychology studies have shown that both cognitive and motivational factors lead us to predict that complex social identities will be associated with increased tolerance and positivity towards out-groups in general. Here, again, the connection between transnationalism and interculturalism is very clear. Transnational people, because they have

complex identities, will tend to be more prone to having social ties and contact with other people. The premise is always that transnational practices develop social networks, which is the basis of relations and interculturalism. People who embody transnationalism weave their multiple identities to multiple ties and attachments (Vertovec 2001).

Some of the key findings of the “Diversity and Contact” (DivCon) Project (Schönwälder et al. 2016)⁸ are of particular interest to us, strengthening the overlapping affinities between transnationalism and interculturalism. In particular, the argument that has been put forward is, in the context of diversities, only those who have social ties are less influenced by racism and other factors which threaten social cohesion. This is a strong argument for interculturalism, when we know these ties are among people from different backgrounds. Social ties, it appears, can effectively overcome the feeling of being threatened by diversity. Within this trend of research, there is also a similar argument which we have already highlighted from social psychology: namely, those people who have multiple and complex identities, such as those of transnationalism, have more propensity to maintain social ties with people of different backgrounds. The assumption that empirical studies have demonstrated is that such positive feelings might contribute to the development of generalised trust (Stolle et al. 2011), especially when strong ties occur in neighbourhood settings (Stolle et al. 2008). Clearly, there are also patterns of social interaction that are not necessarily linked to ethnicity and “race”, such as social status, age or education (Petermann and Schönwälder 2014), but this goes beyond the scope of our theoretical assessment.

5 Conclusions

Transnational spaces and activities occur in residence countries (home comes here), when people develop their national affiliations through cultural and national practices (e.g., religious, cultural, national celebrations and festivities). National and ethnic minority identities have been changing in response to more intense globalisation, and the proliferation of multiple identities has now been widely researched. The first and fore-

most reason why transnationalism deserves attention today is its sheer growth in recent years. Its existence is highly relevant to the modern workings of cities (Glick Schiller 2011), an area where interculturalism also develops its main policies (Zapata-Barrero 2015b). Thus, a transnational framework gives policy-makers a new lens through which to develop innovative public intercultural programmes inside their local communities and even beyond, promoting intercultural relations with the home cities of their proper transnational inhabitants.

This chapter also shows that there is a need for further empirical research to develop more specific links between transnationalism and interculturalism. Qualitative research interviewing transnational migrants is needed in order to know how migrants view and develop their own intercultural practices and social ties, and to show how transnational people are also more prone to developing a new public culture (a *culture of diversity*), in which diversity becomes the mainstream framework of their lives. In this case, the necessary “unity” to keep people together is not national-based but multinational-based, leaving aside the idealistic view of “one people/one nation/one territory”, mixed with a romantic view of a better homogeneous past that we need to recover. This follows the need to abandon this old-fashioned universalist view of diversity policies, as a uniquely comprehensive and integral way of managing the unity and diversity nexus. This link is also grounding old-style narratives that need to be reduced, probably in making explicit the overlapping affinities between transnationalism and interculturalism. This would certainly make evident that most arguments about these nationalistic narratives, these processes of re-nationalisation of our public spaces and institutions, are just the last movements of a past that will never come back.

Notes

1. Most of the literature on transnationalism will be mentioned in the text. But, for this matter, see some of the latest review literature and compelling works on transnationalism (Lazăr 2011; Boccagni 2012; Faist et al. 2013; Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2015; Mügge 2016).

2. For the emerging multicultural and intercultural debate, see, among others, Levrau and Loobuyck (2013), Meer et al. (2016), and Mansouri (2017).
3. See Eurobarometer on Intercultural Dialogue in the EU (European Commission 2007) and the White Paper on interculturalism of the Council of Europe, 2008.
4. For national civic turn debate, a renovated and more integrative version of assimilation, see Joppke (2004, 2007), Zapata-Barrero (2009), Bauböck and Joppke (2010), Meer et al. (2015), and Mouritsen (2008, 2011).
5. See, for instance, the influent article of Vertovec (2001), linking transnationalism and identity, and many focusing the intercultural and multicultural divide in terms of different understandings of identity (openness versus closeness, respectively). See Wood (2004), and several contributions in Zapata-Barrero (2015b), and certainly Cattle (2012) and the critical note of Meer and Modood (2012), or the last publication of Mansouri (2017).
6. The idea of “deterritorialisation” has been from the very beginning a premise of the transnational literature; see, for instance, Basch et al. (1994). It has also been restated by R. Kastoryano, when she defines transnational nationalism as a type of nationalism without territory. She has recently emphasised that: “The transnational nation fits within the global space which does not *reflect* but *produces* an identity and generates a mode of participation beyond borders, as can be seen in the involvement of actors in strengthening transnational solidarities” (Kastoryano 2016).
7. See a recent report, based upon young second-generation biographical notes, pointing out this fact (Gebhardt et al. 2017).
8. See, also, website at: <http://www.mmg.mpg.de/research/all-projects/diversity-and-contact-divcon>

References

- Adesina, O. C. A., & Adebayo, A. G. (2009). Introduction: Globalization and Transnational Migrations: An Overview. In A. G. Adebayo & O. C. Adesina (Eds.), *Globalization and Transnational Migrations* (pp. 2–13). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge: Addison Wesley.

- Antonsich, M. (2016). Interculturalism Versus Multiculturalism: The Cattle-Modood Debate. *Ethnicities*, 16(3), 470–493.
- Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (2013). Is There Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index. *Comparative European Politics*, 11(5), 577–598.
- Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1992). Transnationalism: A New Analytical Framework for Understanding Migration. In L. Basch, N. Glick Schiller, & C. Szanton Blanc (Eds.), *Toward a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered* (pp. 1–24). New York: New York Academy of Sciences.
- Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1994). *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.
- Bauböck, R., & Joppke, C. (Eds.). (2010). *How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?* (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/41). Florence, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, European University Institute.
- Bloemraad, I. (2007). Unity in Diversity? Bridging Models of Multiculturalism and Immigrant Integration. *Du Bois Review*, 4(2), 317–336.
- Bloemraad, I. (2015). Theorizing and Analyzing Citizenship in Multicultural Societies. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 56(4), 591–606.
- Bloemraad, I., & Wright, M. (2014). Utter Failure or Unity out of Diversity? Debating and Evaluating Policies of Multiculturalism. *International Migration Review*, 48(Issue Supplement s1), 292–334.
- Blommaert, J., & Verschueren, J. (1998). *Debating Diversity: Analyzing the Discourse of Tolerance*. London: Routledge.
- Boccagni, P. (2012). Rethinking Transnational Studies: Transnational Ties and the Transnationalism of Everyday Life. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 15(1), 117–132.
- Breton, R., & Reitz, J. G. (2003). *Globalization and Society: Processes of Differentiation Examined*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Brewer, M. B., & Pierce, K. P. (2005). Social Identity Complexity and Outgroup Tolerance. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(3), 428–437.
- Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity Without Groups. *European Journal of Sociology*, 43(2), 163–189.
- Cameron, D. (2011). Full Transcript: David Cameron Speech on Radicalisation and Islamic Extremism, Munich, 5 February. *New Statesman*. Retrieved from <http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/02/terrorism-islam-ideology>

- Cantle, T. (2012). *Interculturalism: The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Castles, S. (2000). *Ethnicity and Globalisation: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen*. London: Sage Publications.
- Castles, S. (2003). Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation. *Sociology*, 37(1), 13–34.
- Castles, S. (2017). Migration and Community Formation Under Conditions of Globalisation. In S. Castles (Ed.), *Migration, Citizenship and Identity: Selected Essays* (pp. 335–351). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Council of Europe. (2008). *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together As Equals in Dignity”*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Crowder, G. (2013). *Theories of Multiculturalism: An Introduction*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Crul, M., Schneider, J., & Lelie, F. (2012). *The European Second Generation Compared Does the Integration Context Matter?* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Dobbernack, J., & Modood, T. (Eds.). (2013). *Tolerance, Intolerance and Respect: Hard to Accept?* London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- European Commission. (2004). The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU. *Justice and Home Affairs Council*, November. Retrieved from http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/common-basic-principles_en.pdf
- European Commission. (2007). *Intercultural Dialogue in Europe*. Analytical Report, Flash Eurobarometer 217, November. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_217_en.pdf
- European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). (2016). Annual Report 2015, 28. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Library/PressReleases/217-26_05_2016_AnnualReport2015_en.asp
- Faist, T. (2015). *Making and Remaking the Transnational: Of Boundaries, Social Spaces and Social Mechanisms*. Bielefeld: COMCAD, Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development, No. 132. Retrieved from http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/tdrc/ag_comcad/downloads/WP_132.pdf
- Faist, T. (2016). *Both Class and Culture? Multiculturalism in Light of the Transnational Social Question*. Bielefeld: COMCAD, Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development, No. 145. Retrieved from <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-50665-4>
- Faist, T., Fauser, M., & Reisenauer, E. (2013). *Transnational Migration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Favell, A. (2001). Multicultural Nation-Building: 'Integration' as Public Philosophy and Research Paradigm in Western Europe. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 7(2), 116–124.
- Favell, A. (2014). *Immigration, Integration and Mobility: New Agendas in Migration Studies*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Ferruh, Y. (2012). Right-Wing Hegemony and Immigration: How the Populist Far-Right Achieved Hegemony Through the Immigration Debate in Europe. *Current Sociology*, 60(3), 368–381.
- Gebhardt, D., Zapata-Barrero, R., & Bria, V. (2017). *Trayectorias de jóvenes de origen diverso en Barcelona. Explorando tendencias y patrones*. GRITIM-UPF Policy Series, No. 5. Retrieved from http://www.upf.edu/gritim/_pdf/ps5.pdf
- Glick Schiller, N. (2011). Transnationality and the City. In G. Bridge & S. Watson (Eds.), *The New Blackwell Companion to the City* (pp. 179–192). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Goodhart, D. (2004, February 20). Too Diverse. *Prospects Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk>
- Guidikova, I. (2015). Intercultural Integration: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity as an Advantage, Chapter 8. In R. Zapata-Barrero (Ed.), *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation* (pp. 136–151). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Hampshire, J. (2013). *The Politics of Immigration: Contradictions of the Liberal State*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hudson, W., & Slaughter, S. (Eds.). (2007). *Globalisation and Citizenship: The Transnational Challenge*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Joppke, C. (2004). The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *British Journal of Sociology*, 55(2), 237–257.
- Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 30(1), 1–22.
- Kastoryano, R. (2007). Transnational Nationalism: Redefining Nation and Territory. In S. Benhabib & I. Shapiro (Eds.), *Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances* (pp. 159–181). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kastoryano, R. (2016). Toward a Transnational Nationalism: Nation, Nationalism, and Territory Redefined. *Revue française de science politique*, 56(4), 533–553.
- King, D. (2005). Facing the Future: America's Post-multiculturalist Trajectory. *Social Policy and Administration*, 39(2), 116–129.
- Kivisto, P. (2005). Social Spaces, Transnational Immigrant Communities, and the Politics of Incorporation. In P. Kivisto (Ed.), *Incorporating Diversity:*

- Rethinking Assimilation in a Multicultural Age* (pp. 299–319). Boulder, CO and London: Paradigm.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (2010). The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies. *International Social Science Journal*, 61(199), 97–112.
- Kymlicka, W. (2015). The Essentialist Critique of Multiculturalism: Theories, Policies, Ethos. In V. Uberoi & T. Modood (Eds.), *Multiculturalism Rethought: Interpretations, Dilemmas and New Directions* (pp. 209–249). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Laden, A., & Owen, D. (Eds.). (2007). *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lazăr, A. (2011). Transnational Migration Studies: Reframing Sociological Imagination and Research. *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology*, 2, 69–83.
- Lentin, A. (2014). Post-race, Post Politics: The Paradoxical Rise of Culture After Multiculturalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(8), 1268–1285.
- Levitt, P. (2001). *The Transnational Villagers*. London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Levitt, P. (2004). Transnational Migrants: When ‘Home’ Means More Than One Country. *Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute on-line Journal*, 1 October. Retrieved from <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/transnational-migrants-when-home-means-more-one-country>
- Levitt, P., & Jaworsky, B. N. (2007). Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33(1), 129–156.
- Levrau, F., & Loobuyck, P. (2013). Should Interculturalism Replace Multiculturalism? *Ethical Perspectives*, 20(4), 605–630.
- Levy, J. T. (2000). *The Multiculturalism of Fear*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mansouri, F. (Ed.). (2017). *Interculturalism at Crossroads: Comparative Perspectives on Concepts, Policies and Practices*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
- Mansouri, F., & Ebanda de B’beri, B. (Eds.). (2014). *Global Perspectives on the Politics of Multiculturalism in the 21st Century: A Case Study Analysis* (pp. 230–240). Abingdon: Taylor & Francis.
- Marini, F. (2014). Transnationalism and Integration: What Kind of Relationship? Empirical Evidence from the Analysis of Co-development’s Dynamics. *Migration and Development*, 3(2), 306–320.

- Matejskova, T., & Antonsich, M. (Eds.). (2015). *Governing Through Diversity: Migration Societies in the Post-multiculturalist Age*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2012). How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism? *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 33(2), 175–196.
- Meer, N., Mouritsen, P., Faas, D., & de Witte, N. (2015). Examining ‘Postmulticultural’ and Civic Turns in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and Denmark. *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 59(6), 702–726.
- Meer, N., Modood, T., & Zapata-Barrero, R. (Eds.). (2016). *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Morawska, E. (2003). Disciplinary Agenda and Analytic Strategies of Research on Immigrant Transnationalism. *International Migration Review*, 37(3), 611–140.
- Morawska, E. (2014). Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the Analytic Strategy It Suggests, Chapter 6. In C. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Migration, Minorities and Citizenship* (pp. 133–176). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mouritsen, P. (2008). Political Responses to Cultural Conflict: Reflections on the Ambiguities of the Civic Turn. In P. Mouritsen & K. E. Jørgensen (Eds.), *Constituting Communities: Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict* (pp. 1–30). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mouritsen, P. (2011). Beyond Post-national Citizenship: Access, Consequence, Conditionality. In A. Triandafyllidou, T. Modood, & N. Meer (Eds.), *European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges* (pp. 88–115). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Mügge, L. (2016). Transnationalism as a Research Paradigm and Its Relevance for Integration. In B. Garcés-Masareñas & R. Penninx (Eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors* (pp. 109–125). London: Springer (IMISCOE Research Series).
- Murphy, M. (2012). *Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Petermann, S., & Schönwälder, K. (2014). European Social Contexts Immigration and Social Interaction. Do Diverse Environments Matter? *European Societies*, 16(4), 500–521.
- Portes, A. (2015). Introduction: Immigration, Transnationalism, and Development: The State of the Question. In A. Portes & P. Fernández-Kelly (Eds.), *The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents* (pp. 1–24). New York: Berghahn Books.

- Portes, A., & Fernández-Kelly, P. (Eds.). (2015). *The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Ramarajan, L. (2014). Past, Present and Future Research on Multiple Identities: Toward an Intrapersonal Network Approach. *Academy of Management Annals*, 8(1), 589–659.
- Richter, A. W., West, M. A., Van Dick, R., & Dawson, J. F. (2006). Boundary Spanners' Identification, Intergroup Contact, and Effective Intergroup Relations. *Academy of Management Journal*, 49(6), 1252–1269.
- Robins, K. (2007). Transnational Cultural Policy and European Cosmopolitanism. *Cultural Politics*, 3(2), 147–174.
- Robins, K., & Aksoy, A. (2016). *Transnationalism, Migration and the Challenge to Europe: The Enlargement of Meaning*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social Identity Complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6(2), 88–109.
- Scholten, P., & Van Breugel, I. (Eds.). (2018). *Mainstreaming in Integration Governance: New Trends in Migration Integration Policies in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schönwälder, K., Petermann, S., Hüttermann, J., Vertovec, S., Hewstone, M., Stolle, D., et al. (2016). *Diversity and Contact: Immigration and Social Interaction in German Cities*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Song, S. (2016). Multiculturalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition). Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/multiculturalism>
- Sørensen, N. N., & Guarnizo, L. E. (2007). Transnational Family Life Across the Atlantic: The Experience of Colombian and Dominican Migrants in Europe. In N. N. Sørensen (Ed.), *Living Across Worlds: Diaspora, Development and Transnational Engagement* (pp. 151–176). Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- Stolle, D., Soroka, S., & Johnston, R. (2008). When Does Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions. *Political Studies*, 56(1), 57–75.
- Stolle, D., Petermann, S., Schoenwaelder, K., Schmitt, T., & Heywood, J. (2011). *Consequences of Immigration-Related Diversity on Social Integration and Social Cohesion – Bringing Contact Back*. In Paper prepared for the General ECPR Conferences in Reykjavik 2011 for Section 45 – The Civic Culture Revisited: Challenges, Changes and Innovations in Studies of Participation and Trust; Panel 504: Immigration-Related Diversity, Social

- Cohesion and the Civic Culture. Retrieved from <https://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/943eb53c-0241-4ebd-8e6d-aeadb65e918f.pdf>
- Triandafyllidou, A., Modood, T., & Meer, N. (Eds.). (2011). *European Multiculturalisms*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Vertovec, S. (2001). Transnationalism and Identity. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 27(4), 573–582.
- Vertovec, S. (2010). Towards Post-multiculturalism? Changing Communities, Conditions and Contexts of Diversity. *International Social Science Journal*, 61(199), 83–95.
- Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (2010). *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. London: Routledge.
- Wood, P. (2004). *The Intercultural City Reader*. Stroud: Comedia.
- Wood, P. (2015). Meet Me on the Corner? Shaping the Conditions for Cross-cultural Interaction in Urban Public Space. In R. Zapata-Barrero (Ed.), *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation* (pp. 53–75). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (Ed.). (2009). *Citizenship Policies in the Age of Diversity: Europe at the Crossroads*. Barcelona: CIDOB Edicions.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2013). *Diversity Management in Spain*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2014). The Limits to Shaping Diversity as Public Culture: Permanent Festivities in Barcelona. *Cities*, 37, 66–72.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2015a). Interculturalism: Main Hypothesis, Theories and Strands. In R. Zapata-Barrero (Ed.), *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation* (pp. 3–19). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (Ed.). (2015b). *Interculturalism in Cities: Concept, Policy and Implementation*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2016a). Diversity and Cultural Policy: Cultural Citizenship as a Tool for Inclusion. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 22(4), 534–552.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2016b). Theorising Intercultural Citizenship, Chapter 3. In N. Meer, T. Modood, & R. Zapata-Barrero (Eds.), *Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating the Dividing Lines* (pp. 53–76). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2017a). The Intercultural Turn in Europe: Process of Policy Paradigm Change and Formation, Chapter 4. In F. Mansouri (Ed.), *The Promise and Challenge of Intercultural Dialogue: From Theory to Policy and Practice* (pp. 169–193). Paris: Unesco Publishers.

- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2017b). Interculturalism in the Post-multicultural Debate: A Defence. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 5(14). Key article of a Special Issue on Multiculturalism and Interculturalism, Guest Editors: Patrick Loobuyck and François Levrau.
- Zapata-Barrero, R. (2018). Mainstreaming and Interculturalism's Elective Affinities. In P. Scholten & I. Van Breugel (Eds.), *Mainstreaming in Integration Governance: New Trends in Migration Integration Policies in Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. chap. 9, 191–214.
- Zapata-Barrero, R., & Triandafyllidou, A. (Eds.). (2012). *Addressing Tolerance and Diversity Discourses in Europe: A Comparative Overview of 16 European Countries*. Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB.
- Zapata-Barrero, R., Caponio, T., & Scholten, P. (Eds.). (2017). Symposium on Theorizing 'The Local Turn' in the Governance of Immigrant Policies: A Multi-level Approach, Special Issue. *International Review of Administrative Sciences (IRAS)*, 83(2).



5

Political Engagement Among Young Adults with Minority Backgrounds: Between Identity and Interest

Mette Andersson and Jon Rogstad

1 Introduction

There is still very little literature on how young adults in the category variously named “second-generation immigrants”, “descendants” or “first-generation nationals” in Europe become engaged politically. For young adults, whose parents migrated to Europe, local, national, European and various global spaces interact in different ways. Their orientation is substantially shaped by the fact that they within European nation-state spaces are, to various degrees, ascribed identities as “different from” their white counterparts in the same age groups. This is one among other reasons why their sense of belonging and search for identification, solidarity and political heroes often has a global or transnational character.

Fafo (*Fafo Institutt for arbeidsliv- og velferdsforskning*), the Institute for Labour and Social Research, Oslo.

M. Andersson (✉)
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

J. Rogstad
Fafo, Oslo, Norway

The main question in this chapter is: what are the sources to political engagement among young adults with ethnic minority backgrounds? Although the question appears to be straightforward, the answers that we will reveal in this chapter prove to be rather complex. By political engagement, we are not simply, or even mostly, referring to conventional forms of participation, such as in elections or membership in political parties. We are more concerned with political engagement in the making. Based upon the results from an empirical research project on this theme from Norway (Andersson et al. 2012), we will here discuss the theoretical challenges of understanding such political engagement in the making. Brief case examples from our research project will be used to illustrate our theoretical conclusions.

We draw upon the transnational turn in migration studies (from the 1990s) and its critique of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Moreover, we are motivated by research on the directions of social engagement in social movement studies and studies of transnational mobilisation from below (della Porta et al. 2006; Pleyers 2010; Smith and Guarnizo 2007). Through a theoretical review of various strands of the existing research literature, the aim of this chapter is to obtain an empirically based theoretical understanding on how the political engagement of young people from ethnic minorities is shaped within a broader transnational framework.

There are several general theories of political engagement and social movements in the social sciences, and the level of complexity is high. One central focus, used to explain the growth of the labour movement in the USA and Europe, is to understand political engagement as related to the distribution of power and social inequality between groups and classes with common *interests*. Another focus, central in some earlier American theories and newer subject-focused perspectives, is to stress political engagement that draws upon shared grievances related to feelings of exclusion or misrecognition and/or on identification with specific groups and *identity* categories (Dubet and Thaler 2004; McDonald 2004; Thaler 2004). At first, collective identity and common interest(s) appear as two distinct and different reservoirs for political engagement. What they have in common is that they might lead to political engagement within social spaces at different scales, for instance, within a city, a nation-state and a

transnational field. Some scholars, among them Craig Calhoun (2000), have challenged clear distinctions between “interest” and “identity” as categories of social movement analysis. According to Calhoun, a historical analysis of traits characterising the labour movement in the nineteenth century shows that identity in the meaning of collective ideas, symbols and discourses was significant also then.

Taking Calhoun’s insights as a point of departure, the puzzle in this chapter is not to prove the appropriateness of stating that this distinction is blurred in Norway as well but rather to discuss and reveal ways and processes in which collective identities and common interest(s) are intertwined and mutually constitute a source to political engagement. In order to fulfil this goal, we illustrate our argument by the use of data from an empirical study on how “critical events” (Das 1995; Sökefeld 2006; Espeland and Rogstad 2013) influenced the political and social engagement of descendants of immigrants in Norway. By critical events, we mean events which, through the construction of collective action frames, transform “personal troubles” to “public issues”, frames that reveal a conflict and the implicit power relations in such a way as to generate new modes of imagination and frames of interpretation (Espeland and Rogstad 2013). With regard to the question posed, critical events are relevant in terms of their capacity to initiate political engagement in which it is possible to detect in what way interest and identity become significant. Inspired by the perspective of critical events, we decided to see whether seemingly isolated events in Norway and abroad could initiate awareness and political awakening.

The question raised in this chapter is foremost of a theoretical nature, but we use empirical data to illustrate and prove the usefulness of the theoretical perspective. The data were collected from persons in various politically engaged networks in Norway in 2008 and 2009. We used a mixed methods approach, consisting of individual interviews with 50 young persons in the age group 18–30, one group interview, web ethnography on two websites designed both by and for ethnic minorities and participant observation. The informants that we recruited belonged to three different networks, all with their main location in Oslo: (1) *an antiracist network* mobilised after the death of an African man in the hands of the police in 2006; (2) a group of *Muslims active in a mosque*,

which is a section of a larger transnational Muslim movement; and (3) a *rap musician* network. In addition, we studied web forum debates on social media sites for Muslims and Desi.

The three networks from which we collected interview data shared a movement-like character, in the sense that there were linkages between one network and other networks, individuals and organisations. Moreover, the three networks can be understood within a frame of a broader history of antiracism, religious engagement and rap music both in Norway and globally.

The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical premises in the existing literature focusing on transnational mobilisation and on identity and interest as analytical categories for analysing political engagement. In this discussion, we engage with transnational theories and research on the political mobilisation of migrant and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, we explore various uses of, and theories on, interest and identity as bases for political mobilisation, both in regard to social movement research and research on political involvement from migration and ethnic minority research. In addition, we will present an understanding of critical events. In the last part of the chapter, we use empirical data from the project described above to illustrate the directions of political engagement among descendants of immigrants in Norway.

2 The Transnational Turn and Its Relevance for Political Engagement

The transnational turn in migration studies, made explicit in theory from the early 1990s, criticises earlier migration research for being based upon methodological nationalism—seeing the nation-state as a container space and separating transnational migration into *im*-migration and *e*-migration (Basch et al. 2003 [1994]; Khagram and Levitt 2008; Smith and Guarnizo 2007; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Today, an increasing amount of research on migrants makes use of a concept of society which is not bound to the space of the nation-state. The use of space-sensitive sociological theories such as Bourdieu's field

theory and different network-theoretical approaches, along with newer theorising on mobility (Urry 2010) and cosmopolitanisation (Beck and Sznaider 2006), facilitates for empirical studies that show more complex patterns than earlier.

The transnational perspective in migration studies and its debates about definitions of transmigrants, transmigration and transnational space (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2008; Portes et al. 1999) have tended to define transnational relations in terms of relations between migrants, groups and states in their homelands and in the countries of migrants' present residence. Such studies have managed to show how emigration countries stretch their definitions of citizenship to migrants abroad and how economic and social remittances across transnational space changes social and political relations in many countries and localities. With a main empirical focus on first-generation migrants in transnational spaces, including emigration countries in the south and immigration countries in the West, especially in North America, these studies have focused mainly on economic, cultural and political relations crossing two or more national boundaries but clearly anchored within specific national and local political belongings. Other aspects of transnational belongings and imaginings, such as ideas of universal humanhood, cosmopolitanism, adherence to post-colonial and/or regional identities and religious world views, have been less focused in this tradition, albeit with some exceptions (Levitt 2007; Olesen 2007; Sökefeld 2006).

Transnational identity may be a driver for local political engagement. Consequently, it is relevant to understand the way in which transnational orientations are translated into local *praxis*. In the theoretical debate concerning definitions in transnational migration studies, Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick-Schiller have suggested a dichotomy stressing the difference between what they call "transnational being" and "transnational belonging" (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2008). "Transnational being" is defined as everyday social practice in a field marked by transnational cultural and social influences. Transnational being, as they define it, can thus be understood as a category that one can use to describe most people (probably also many ethnic majority citizens) who have social networks and/or use cultural resources stretching beyond the frame of

one nation-state space. What both concepts have in common is that the situation experienced in the country in which they live does not appear as the only frame of reference. On the contrary, migrants and descendants' experiences and identities are seen as filtered through a transnational context. Within such a transnational context, various experiences and identity communities may come afore as central references. One option, for instance, is a post-colonial referential frame, a frame which otherwise may have little resonance in public debate in the country in which they presently live (as in Norway), but broad resonance in many countries in the South.

Given that this interpretation is correct, all of our informants in the age span of 18–30 from the empirical project in Norway will probably be characterised as being marked by transnational being. The notion of “transnational belonging”, on the other hand, describes the conscious choice of specific transnational identities and loyalties. It is specifically this notion that we find helpful in analysing the political engagement among antiracist activists, politically engaged Muslims in one of Oslo's mosques, moderators and initiative takers of Muslim and Desi web forums and rap artists in Oslo. Another empirical-oriented theoretical contribution, signalling a similar perspective as we hold in this chapter, is given by Therese O'Toole and Richard Gale (2010) in their analysis of the political engagement of young Muslims in Birmingham and Bradford. They interviewed 12 focus groups paying special attention to specific organisations and individuals. Their main conclusion is that earlier research on ethnic minorities lacks a much needed sensitivity on the transnational political engagement of young people from ethnic minorities. According to them, new kinds of glocal political engagement and identity shifts in the shaping of the politics of ethnic minority young people are taking place. These politics, they argue, are often fluid and ad hoc, but they have distinctive global connections. With regard to this chapter, we are particularly concerned with the call by these authors for a perspective which grasps both the importance of a shared collective identity *and* some kind of orientation or interest. To be more specific, we need a perspective on how religious identities alongside ethnic and regional identities may work as bases for mobilisation in response to media-driven negative representations and racialised exclusions.

3 Identity *and* Interest as engagement drivers

One central focus, used to explain the growth of the labour movement in the USA and Europe, is to understand political engagement as related to the distribution of power and social inequality between groups and classes with common *interests*. Another focus, central in some earlier American theories and newer subject-focused perspectives, is to stress political engagement that draws upon shared grievances related to feelings of exclusion or misrecognition and/or upon identification with specific groups and *identity* categories (Dubet and Thaler 2004; McDonald 2004; Thaler 2004). The main question put forward in this chapter is whether and, if so, eventually, how a division between “identity-based engagement” and “interest-based engagement” reveals different paths to political involvement and to continued engagement.

In social movement studies, the distinction between “identity” and “interest” has been closely associated with the temporal distinction between the European labour movement as *the* social movement and the so-called new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Crossley 2002; Johnston et al. 1994). The notion of interest is further associated with Marxism and utilitarianism, with the idea of the rational man acting to fulfil his interest. With regard to the labour movement, which the main figures of social movement theory in Europe considered the main social movement (Crossley 2002; Touraine 2004) until the 1960s, interest is attached to the economic and social improvement of the working class. While the main antagonists of the labour movement were capitalists and workers, the development of the nation-state into (the various types of) the welfare state became the guarantee for improved rights and economic conditions for the European working class. The notion of “identity” within this temporal movement scheme has been associated with the new middle-class-based social movements of the 1960s and 1970s: environmentalism, feminism, sexual movements and—albeit to a much lesser degree—ethnic minority movements (Melucci 1996). In the USA, the Civil Rights Movement and the more radical Black Panthers and Black

Power movements among African Americans were among the most centred in the emerging research on new social movements in this era and after.

In a forceful attack on the temporal scheme in which the interest movement(s) were thought to precede identity movements, Craig Calhoun (2000) argued that “interest” and “identity” are not to be understood as fully separate categories within social movement analysis. A careful historical analysis of the traits which characterised the labour movement in the nineteenth century shows, according to Calhoun, that identity in the meaning of collective ideas, symbols and discourses was significant even then. Apart from pointing to the centrality of identity issues within a movement characterised in the literature as the star case of an interest movement, Calhoun also draws attention to significant movements of the nineteenth century which resemble the central social movements in the second half of the twentieth century. The temperance movement, the abolitionist movement, religious movements and other communal political movements are mentioned as movements in which cultural issues and particular identities were central. Calhoun’s argument against a dichotomous category of movements according to interest *versus* identity, then, is twofold. First, the priority of the interest category in analyses of labour movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth century has suppressed analysis of culture, symbols and identities in these movements. Second, earlier movements resembling the “cultural” new social movements in the 1960s have been overlooked in the research literature. Consequently, a clear temporal distinction between interest and identity movements does not fit the empirical landscape over time.

Calhoun’s rejection of the relevance of a clear distinction between interest and identity is, as already mentioned, a point of departure in this chapter. There is no aim to provide empirical support for his view simply because the opposite is not likely to be found. In demonstrating the relevance of these categories through empirical examples, as we aim for here, we wish to pay attention to how Calhoun’s point plays out when critical events are acted upon and become frames of orientation among Norwegian people of ethnic minority background.

According to Rogstad and Vestel (2011), the link between critical events and political mobilisation can be understood in a three-step

process: consciousness, articulation and political mobilisation. The first step, *consciousness*, implies that a person becomes aware of his or her position within a given structural system of distribution of power and inequality. The second step, *articulation*, occurs when the person gives voice to this consciousness. Different forms of media might be used, such as music, pictures, public speeches and, of course, social media. What these platforms all have in common is that, through them, the relationship between the majority and the minorities is discussed. It is of the utmost importance that articulation presupposes a public, as listeners or readers. The third and final step, *collective mobilisation*, is important as it is necessary in order to transform engagement from being private to becoming significant at societal level. Such a transformation depends on participants working towards a common goal. Collective action can take place within an organisation, through a social movement, or be manifest as subculture or ad hoc and loose organised networks.

4 Identity Politics and Interest Politics

In order to understand the link between identity and interest, on the one hand, and more general traits of political engagement, on the other, it is necessary to focus on definitions of social movements. Mario Diani (2000) develops a synthetic definition of the concept of a social movement based upon different theoretical perspectives. Diani focuses on three aspects:

A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations (1), engaged in political or cultural conflict (2), on the basis of a shared collective identity (3). (ibid.: 165)

Diani's definition is minimalist, dismissing dimensions stressed in many earlier definitions of social movements. For instance, a definitional criterion demanding a clear antagonist is not stressed here, as it is in many earlier definitions of social movements. Further, this definition

aims to distinguish more clearly between social movement organisations (SMOs) and social movements which may contain specific SMOs but which are defined primarily as networks of informal interactions. Another notable aspect of Diani's definition is that both cultural and political conflicts are included. Thus, both what were earlier called typical interest movements *and* identity movements are included in the definition.

Research on contemporary social movements in both the USA and Europe after the year 2000 shows how collective action today differs from the new social movement era in the 1960s and 1970s (della Porta 2005; della Porta et al. 2006; Dubet 2004; Dubet and Thaler 2004; Pleyers 2010; Wieviorka 2005). General traits of present social movements, it is argued, are that they are more subject-centred, that alliances with different movements and networks criss-cross at the level of the subject, that social movements (to a larger degree) are marked by tolerance towards other identity categories and that they make use of Internet technology to sustain networks of activists and to coordinate transnational demonstrations. These characteristics may make it more difficult to define present-day collective action as social movements, especially when relating to the more strict definitions of the term. The shared identity, taken as a basic element in most definitions of social movements, seems to have become more of a puzzle in contemporary struggles.

Most contemporary definitions of social movements do, however, still operate with shared identity as one of several definitional criterions. Diani's minimalist definition above shares this trait. When social movement scholars refer to shared identity, they most often seem to think of identity in terms of the shared collective frames, meanings and solidarity that activists learn to adapt to through their involvement in social movements over time—and not to the motivations for becoming engaged in struggle as such. The line between shared identity as a *reason for* and as a *consequence of* collective action, thus, is often blurred in the social movement literature. Some, however, most notably European scholars associated with the Touraine school and American scholars associated with the collective behaviour school (Gusfield 1994) may see shared identity in terms of a prefigured structure of grievances and thus as constitutive of the movement as such. In this case, there may be an overlap between the central cultural conflict and the shared identity of participants.

A central distinction here, thus, is whether shared identity is thought of as a prerequisite for, or as a consequence of, participation in specific collective action contexts. This distinction is, we argue, specifically relevant when it comes to the case of second-generation immigrants and their various political engagements, as it touches upon the question of identity in groups charged with negative identity ascriptions in the media and in mainstream politics more generally. Qualitative research on everyday identity work of young urban people born in Norway with both parents or one of the parents coming from Asia, Africa or Latin America tends to find that such young people live their lives marked by criss-crossing loyalties and identifications. But one finding in general stands out—that they are aware that media discourse and everyday interaction in public spaces may or actually does reduce their multiplicity to one (often negatively described) identity category (Andersson 2005; Jacobsen 2006; Vestel 2004).

The term “identity politics” explicitly links questions of culture and political conflict, and the term is typically associated with political mobilisation in the name of particular identities based upon categories such as nationality, race, gender, ethnicity and/or religion (Calhoun 1994; Sicakkan and Lithman 2005). The term can, however, also be applied to account for mobilisation focusing on critique of, or unwillingness to identify with, categorical identities such as race, gender and others. Here we can think of identity politics in the name of cosmopolitanism, immigrants (in general), liberal antiracism and human rights. The term “identity politics”, just like the term “shared identity” in definitions of social movements, thus, does not exhaust the reference to identity in the name of one particular difference category. It does, however, more clearly than the notion of shared identity, signal that identity and thus cultural questions are the basis of political conflict and mobilisation.

Whereas the term “interest politics” has typically been used to refer to political mobilisation with regard to issues such as economic redistribution, social rights and access to education and work, “identity politics” is usually associated with normative and cultural issues and often also with less clear-cut boundaries between members and non-members. Victoria Johnson’s historical analysis of racial inclusion and exclusion in North-American labour unions (Johnson 2009), for example, employs such a

two-dimensional distinction between interest and identity. In her analysis, interest equals economic interest, whereas she points at various forms of identity practices in the unions. By utilising Manuel Castells' threefold category of identity, legitimating identities, resistance identities and project identities (Castells 1996), Johnson shows that the inclusion of racial minorities came easier when identity practices in the unions exhibited dominant class, religious or age identities, rather than race-centred identity practices.

Another way to distinguish between interest and identity politics is to link the terms to politics stressing *individual* goals versus *collective* goals. The various *foci* for different theoretical schools of social movement research partly reflect the relative focus on individual *versus* collective goals in empirical research. For example, the American resource mobilisation and political opportunity schools are, in general, seen as more informed by utilitarianism and the idea of rational individual interests, than the European research tradition on the new social movements (Crossley 2002; Joas and Knöbl 2009). Another example of such a distinction, which has clear action-theoretical references, is the debate between liberals and communitarians in political philosophy with a specific focus on multiculturalism (Goldberg 1994). Here, different models for how ethnic minority individuals can gain recognition in democratic societies are based upon different models of the relationship between agency, culture and social structure. A third example can be found in different versions of antiracism; one stresses that individuals should not be reduced to biological and/or cultural difference categories, while another stresses that minority cultural traditions should be included in school *curricula* and in politics more generally in line with the cultural traditions of the ethnic majority (Memmi 2009).

Yet another way, albeit related to the previous, is to distinguish between interest and identity politics upon the basis of the degree of *instrumentality* in movements and mobilisations more generally. Stephen Walgrave and Joris Verhulst (2006), for example, depict two sub-types of what they call "new emotional movements": one instrumental variant with clear-cut aims and demands and one identity variant with displays of solidarity and compassion as its main constitutive elements. Where compassion (with victims) prevails, they see self-support groups and identity movements. When emotional movements have political and societal

goals, however, they are labelled as interest movements. Walgrave and Verhulst argue, in line with Calhoun's critique, that the dichotomy of identity *versus* instrumental movements is an ideal-typical distinction and that all identity movements have instrumental elements in them and *vice versa*. They still argue that the dichotomy is useful because the distinction points to a crucial dimension for discriminating between different kinds of movements (Walgrave and Verhulst 2006: 280). Associated with such a distinction based upon the degree of instrumentality is Joseph R. Gusfield's (1994) urge to social movement scholars to clarify the distinction between movements seen as *associations* and movements seen as *ideas or meanings*.

In the case of mobilisation among descendants of immigrants, questions related to themes such as racism, multiculturalism, homelands, recognition and religion are of major concern. Yet, just as Walgrave and Verhulst argue, we believe there is a need for a distinction between different types of motivations, as well as characteristics, for collective action and political engagement. Although a central characteristic of all social movements is a shared identity among the members as a consequence of participation, we maintain that different types of identity projects are central in that they are constitutive for mobilisation among this group. Identity politics are marked by different *foci* on temporality (focusing on past-present-future), through the various weights ascribed to the priority of subjectivity *versus* collectivity and upon national *versus* transnational belongings.

5 Our Cases

In the following we will use our cases from the project described in the introduction to illustrate the complexities of political engagement among descendants. The first is an *antiracist network*. The participants in this network can be sorted into three main subgroups: (1) locally anchored immigrant organisations, where young adults in their 20s are dominant and which, in practice, organise specific regional and/or ethnic minority groups; (2) one nationwide immigrant organisation, the Organisation Against Public Discrimination (*Organisasjon mot offentlig diskriminering*) (OMOD); and (3) finally politically active young people from the majority, belonging to the political left.¹ We will argue that similarities and differences between

these subgroups are significant in order to understand the processes of articulation of frames and mobilisation. A more holistic understanding requires that the analysis show how the different networks partly co-operate and partly compete in terms of attention and basis for legitimacy.

The second network is a youth organisation that we have termed *Youth for Islam* (*Ungdom for Islam*) aimed at young people, between 13 and 25. The organisation—which has around 200 members—is closely connected to a central mosque, whose overall profile is held to cover a wide range of theological positions, from the severe, represented by some “bearded” elderly men, via the moderates, to the more liberal views among its youth work leaders. The mosque is relatively multiethnic, with a slight dominance of members with backgrounds from North Africa and the Middle East. The leaders of *Youth for Islam* have put much weight upon creating a climate with appeal to young people.

The third network consists of *rappers*. They attempt to create an alternative space of belonging by stressing both exclusion and cultural hybridity and—like some of their forerunners in the American hip-hop movement—address social problems specific for immigrants and ethnic/racial minorities in their texts. Several artists of immigrant background have explicitly focused upon a range of immigrant-related issues in Norway (Andersson 2010). Along these lines, the Norwegian hip-hop *milieu* obviously connects to the larger, transnational youth cultural tradition that emerged from the multicultural areas of the Bronx, New York, in the 1970s (Basu and Lemelle 2006). Our research documents that hip-hop was absorbed by youth in troubled suburban areas in Oslo to counteract a negative stigma, not unlike the early practices of hip-hop in the American inner cities (see, also, Vestel 2004).

6 Interest and Identity as Drivers for Engagement

In the theoretical discussion, we focused on interest and identity which, understood as ideal-typical tools, can be used to reveal the dimensions of importance for political involvement. Moreover, we underlined the importance of transnational frames of reference among many

second-generation immigrants. Our understanding of interest *versus* identity as bases for political involvement stresses four dimensions: (1) the degree of instrumentality, where interest signals instrumental and identity non-instrumental; (2) temporal framework, future *versus* past orientation; (3) focus on individual issues *versus* community issues; and (4) the direction of transnational belonging, particularism *versus* universalism.

However, as already pointed out, empirically, there is a liquid distinction between mobilisation based upon common interest and mobilisation based upon common identity. The recruitment of supporters and members will probably be based upon common identity, such as gender, ethnicity and religion. More fundamentally, any social movement will try to create a common identity among its followers. Common identity is a premise for a community, which is essential to recruit new members and gain support.

Another question of interest is what it actually takes or requires to become “common”. One difference, for example, is between ad hoc campaigns, membership in official organisations, and situations in which members can identify so strongly with activism that they virtually live their activist identity. When we still will argue for the empirical benefit of operating with a theoretical distinction between mobilisation based upon common interests and mobilisation based upon shared identity, this is because this distinction—as an analytical tool—also reveals different types of challenges in following a common goal in political engagement. The analysis of our data suggests it is possible to arrange the networks along a continuum, in which interest-based networks are located at one extreme and identity-based networks are located at the other. Since the purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical perspective for analysing political engagement in the making among the second generation of immigrants, we will here only give short descriptions of our three cases.

7 Interest-Based Engagement

Antiracism was the common agenda in the first of the three networks we investigated. This network consisted of activists from minority origins, as well as people with a majority background from the political

left. Two types of events can be identified as starting points for mobilisation, which, in many ways, was critical, in the sense that they challenged major social institutions. The first critical event was the death of Eugene Ejike Obiora, a black naturalised Norwegian citizen who had lived in Norway for more than 20 years. He died outside a social security office in 2006. He visited the office to complain about being denied financial aid welfare. The staff perceived him as a threat. Consequently, the police were called. After he refused the police request to leave the premises, they attempted to arrest him, which he resisted. A scuffle ensued in which one of the officers used a stranglehold which led to his death. The other critical event involved a different person from a minority background, a Somali Norwegian man called Ali Farah. While having a picnic with his family in a park, he asked some people nearby to behave less rowdily and was attacked and hit in the head by one of them, a man from Ghana, and knocked to the ground. An ambulance was called, but the paramedics decided not to take him to hospital as he seemed to be intoxicated and urinated on one of them. Taken to hospital in a taxi, it was determined that the injury to his head was life-threatening and he had to undergo an operation for an intracranial haemorrhage.

Both events challenged established social institutions—the police and the health service. The debate that followed questioned the significance of structural racism in the very heart of Norwegian welfare institutions. The immediate consequence was that both the police and the health service were accused of racism. Moreover, the events became a prelude to a broader discussion about general practices in the public sector when it comes to dealing with ethnic minorities. In this sense, the events challenged a collective notion that racism and discrimination were not to be found in public social institutions in Norway.

The two events started as interest mobilisation in which the participants had a common interest in criticising the police officers and paramedics. The activists had instrumental goals, that is, that the police officers and paramedics involved should be held accountable for their actions. On the other hand, the special unit for investigation of internal police matters, the Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs, claimed that the officers were innocent.

The activist network, called “*Respekt*”, consisted of several different groups: firstly, the experienced left-wing activists who argued that racism should be understood in a broader perspective of capitalism and class and, secondly, members of the African community in Trondheim and Oslo, some of whom were concerned about ethnic identity, while others were concerned about a broader African identity. Others again were concerned about human rights issues and discrimination, which was understood as violation of universal human rights, rather than a threat directed towards a particular group.

In spite of clear common interests with regard to mobilisation, the individual participants had different motivations and justifications for their involvement. The main distinction here was between established ethnic majority activists on the left and ethnic minority activists who felt that the critical events engaged them more directly. The common front—the fight against discrimination—was in danger of being split, due to different identities that could be played off against each other.

8 Identity-Based Engagement

On the other side of the continuum, *identity* serves as the basis for political involvement. Used as an illustration, it is tempting to argue that the youngsters, who shared a common faith and were organised within a religious sphere, a mosque, formed an identity-based network. Their community was based upon a particular identity, collective, more than individual oriented, and not initially directed towards a desire beyond itself. A vision of future political change based upon religion was less stressed than continuity with past religious traditions and fellow Muslims of different national backgrounds in this network. As with the previous case, the empirical support for this ideal-typical understanding is mixed. The interviews show that this network also included a mix of typical identity engagement and interest engagement. The impact of both of these types of engagement was highlighted in one specific case, the demonstrations in connection with the Israeli attack on Gaza in the winter of 2009.

A great number of young people with minority backgrounds went onto the street to express their opinion. Some of our informants argued

that these demonstrations were a religious duty, showing sympathy with the oppressed Muslims in Palestine. In the public debate, these demonstrations came to be interpreted as riots, mainly due to a few demonstrators who smashed windows and overturned rubbish bins in the centre of Oslo after one of the demonstrations. However, in a dialogue meeting, where the young people demonstrating against the war came to the hearing, there were many who argued that they had taken to the streets because for a long time they had felt that they were not heard in the Norwegian public arena. Here, instrumental motives (obtaining a voice in the Norwegian public arena) as well as identity issues (protesting in sympathy with fellow Muslims abroad) come up. In other words, this mobilisation is to be understood as a mixture of interest and identity political involvement directed towards a national as well as a transnational space (Jacobsen and Andersson 2012).

To put it simplistically: I have both Norway and Morocco in my blood, but I am Palestinian at heart. And it is the heart that pumps blood.

There are major differences between different theological directions (particularly connected to the country of origin) in the Muslim community in Oslo. Despite this, the common identity as Muslims and as representatives of the *Umma*, as exemplified in the quotation above (“Palestinian at heart”), was central for young people from diverse national backgrounds. Furthermore, they related their struggle to a wider range of what they saw as Western invasions of Muslim countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the Gaza demonstration, like the demonstrations against the police and ambulance service in connection with Obiora and Farah, was basically a mobilisation based upon common interests, there was also an identity-based protest visible in this demonstration. As in the case of the antiracist network, new alliances between protesters were visible also among the participants in the street demonstrations against the Israeli invasion of Gaza. Some of those we interviewed expressed, among other things, the view that it was hard to make alliances with activists on the left.

What about rap and music that makes a political statement? In recent times, young people from immigrant families grew up in multicultural areas in many parts of Europe. Among the growing number of artists

who have a multicultural background, rap and hip-hop have brought these “new voices” to the public’s attention (see, e.g. Mitchell 2001; Sernhede 2011; Rogstad and Vestel 2011; Vestel 2004). Hip-hop has given the actors an experience of recognition, implying that there are links of importance between one’s own self-perception and the understanding of situations and experiences that hip-hoppers in other parts of the world are communicating in text and music. In other words, for many, it seems as though belonging to the hip-hop community should be understood in the light of shared experiences within a transnational community (Rogstad and Vestel 2011).

9 Concluding Discussion: Interest Versus Identity as Motivation for Engagement

The three networks that were used as illustrations for the theoretical discussion can be located as follows: on the one side, there is the antiracist network, where the members have a clearly defined goal, which in the course of the campaign creates a common collective identity between the activists—both those with minority backgrounds and those with majority backgrounds. The activism started out as an interest-based mobilisation against racism, but underway the common identity as antiracist activists came to be threatened by different identity-based engagements. Activists with African backgrounds had different views on what mattered than many of the white Norwegian activists on the left. On the other side, there is the religious network, which was constituted by a common belief in God, and thereby a shared identity. When members from this network took to the streets to protest against the Israeli invasion of Gaza, they engaged in a broader interest-based demonstration against Israel and urging Norwegian authorities to protest. In the course of the continuing street demonstrations, they collaborated with other groups, and young Norwegian Muslims were depicted as the worst “villains” in the mass media. Here, the transnational engagement mixed with the engagement relating to being seen as worthy Norwegian citizens, divided this group of demonstrators from the broader aggregate.

In the middle, there are the rappers. They ought to rap (sing/chant/talk) about their lives, which is obviously related to identity, but at the same time, a part of the rap identity is that of protest. In between interest and identity as the outer points for political engagement, the rap network seems to be a possible empirical illustration. Rap is a music style from the USA, in which identity and interest explicitly merge with each other. On the one hand, rappers should “rap about their lives”, where the word “lives”, except for the lives of a few rappers such as Eminem, most often refer to the lives of people with racial/ethnic minority backgrounds. The broader North American rap community is thus clearly linked to identity-based markers. In addition, they often rap on themes such as racism and the release from institutional barriers of all kinds, pointing towards the exclusion and stigmatisation of individuals. The political significance of this may be illustrated with an example from Norway. The Norwegian rap group *Samvirkelaget* was involved in the antiracist case of Obiora, mentioned above, and wrote a rap about the policeman who had killed Obiora. This contribution had a huge impact and focused the media and the population’s attention on the event.

By introducing three networks, and paying attention to specific forms of political engagement, we have illustrated that the distinction between interest and identity does not distinguish between cases but cuts across. All networks, as it becomes clearer when we look at their involvement in the concrete forms of mobilisation, have elements of both interest and identity, albeit in different ways and in various combinations. Accordingly, it is relevant to discuss further the conditions that must be present to create transitions between interest and identity.

One of our previous assumptions is the importance of *time*. In the empirical analysis only indicated above, we show how the engagement sometimes starts out as an ad hoc form of mobilisation, but one which, over time, may become institutionalised. This process involves a certain redefinition and expansion related to the politics of interest. Regarding the antiracist mobilisation, the institutionalisation partly happened as a result of another event which was framed in terms of racism, partly by the fact that the network changed its argument from the single event, in order to frame the very same event within a broad understanding of the relationship between the majority and the public institutions and the

minority population, especially the ones with African origins. Along the way, the mobilisation moved from being mainly related to interest (anti-racism) to reflect, to a greater extent, a collective identity (being a minority). In this context, it was probably less decisive whether identity was attributed or took form within an imagined community. The deciding factor was that, by raising a specific event to a collective level, it became a symbol or a marker of systemic bias and thus led to a discussion of public racism.

The analysis indicated here, and presented in more detail elsewhere (Andersson et al. 2012), also showed an example of transformation in the other direction. The religious network was in the beginning mainly to be understood as a network based upon shared identity and faith. When the event in Gaza took place, shared identity, as Muslims in solidarity with fellow Muslims in Gaza, first served as a common ground for mobilisation. The demonstrations were instrumentally oriented, aimed at persuading Israel to withdraw from Gaza. The activists' instrumental engagement in the Gaza cause was hardly sufficient to challenge the importance of religious identity among the people involved in the network. Our interviews illustrate, however, that the activists' perception of their own position in Norwegian society became a central theme when the public debate came to be centred on the so-called villains of ethnic minority background. The tense public climate which focused on "violent youth" brought up the more general theme of the marginalisation of ethnic minority youth in Norway. Here, activists' perceptions of themselves as belonging to a politically, culturally and socially marginalised group(s) in Norway, both as Muslim youth and as ethnic minority youth, came to the fore (Jacobsen and Andersson 2012). Thus, in the course of this process, various frames for political engagement, including national and transnational frames, were engaged.

In conclusion, the degree of instrumentality and transnational orientation as well as the relevance of specific identities and temporal horizons change in complex patterns when second-generation immigrants engage in political contention. Using our cases as an illustration of a more general argument, we argue for a more complex theoretical approach in studies of political engagement in the making among second-generation immigrants in Europe. Here, focus on identities and political engagements

at different spatial scales is necessary. We also recommend more theorising on the relevance of critical events in engaging young people in political articulation and activism.

Notes

1. OMOD is one out of ten national immigrant organisations which receives public funding from the Norwegian Government. The organisation was established in 1992. They have no members and are not oriented especially towards youngsters. On the other hand, by name, their main focus is on discrimination, a theme highly relevant for young people.

References

- Andersson, M. (2005). *Urban Multi-culture in Norway: Identity Formation Among Immigrant Youth*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Andersson, M. (2010). The Social Imaginary of First Generation Europeans. *Social Identities*, 16(1), 3–21.
- Andersson, M., Jacobsen, C. M., Rogstad, J., & Vestel, V. (2012). *Kritiske hendelser. Nye stemmer. Rasisme, hip hop, kultur og religiøsitet i det flerkulturelle Norge*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., & Blanck Szanton, C. (2003 [1994]). *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. London: Routledge.
- Basu, D., & Lemelle, S. J. (2006). *The Vinyl Ain't the Final. Hip Hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture*. London: Plute Press.
- Beck, U., & Sznaider, N. (2006). Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 57(1), 1–23.
- Calhoun, C. (1994). Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Calhoun, C. (2000). 'New Social Movements' of the Early Nineteenth Century. In K. Nash (Ed.), *Readings in Contemporary Political Sociology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The Power of Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Crossley, N. (2002). *Making Sense of Social Movements*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Das, V. (1995). *Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- della Porta, D. (2005). Multiple Belongings, Tolerant Identities, and the Construction of 'Another Politics': Between the European Social Forum and the Local Social Fora. In D. della Porta & S. Tarrow (Eds.), *Transnational Protest & Global Activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- della Porta, D., Andretta, M., Mosca, L., & Reiter, H. (2006). *Globalization from Below. Transnational Activists and Protest Networks*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Diani, M. (2000). The Concept of Social Movement. In K. Nash (Ed.), *Readings in Contemporary Political Sociology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Dubet, F. (2004). Between a Defence of Society and a Politics of the Subject: The Specificity of Today's Social Movements. *Current Sociology*, 52(4), 693–716.
- Dubet, F., & Thaler, H. L. (2004). Introduction: The Sociology of Collective Action Reconsidered. *Current Sociology*, 52(4), 557–574.
- Espeland, C. E., & Rogstad, J. (2013). Antiracism and Social Movements in Norway: The Importance of Critical Events. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39(1), 125–142.
- Goldberg, D. T. (1994). *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gusfield, J. R. (1994). The Reflexivity of Social Movements: Collective Behaviour and Mass Society Theory Revisited. In E. Laraña, H. Johnston, & J. R. Gusfield (Eds.), *New Social Movements. From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Jacobsen, C. (2006). *Staying on the Straight Path: Religious Identities and Practices Among Young Muslims in Norway*. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Social Anthropology. Bergen: University of Bergen.
- Jacobsen, C., & Andersson, M. (2012). Gaza in Oslo': Social Imaginaries in the Political Engagement of Norwegian Minority Youth. *Ethnicities*, 12(6), 821–842.
- Joas, H., & Knöbl, W. (2009). *Social Theory: Twenty Introductory Lectures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnson, V. (2009). The Status of Identities: Racial Inclusion and Exclusion at West Coast Ports. *Social Movement Studies*, 8(2), 167–183.
- Johnston, H., Laraña, E., & Gusfield, J. R. (1994). Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements. In E. Laraña, H. Johnston, & J. R. Gusfield (Eds.),

- New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Khagram, S., & Levitt, P. (2008). Constructing Transnational Studies. In S. Khagram & P. Levitt (Eds.), *The Transnational Studies Reader. Intersections & Innovations*. New York: Routledge.
- Levitt, P. (2007). *God Needs no Passport. Immigrants and the Changing American Religious Landscape*. New York: The New Press.
- Levitt, P., & Glick Schiller, N. (2008). Conceptualising Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society. *International Migration Review*, 38(3), 1002–1039.
- McDonald, K. (2004). Oneself as Another: From Social Movement to Experience Movement. *Current Sociology*, 52(4), 575–594.
- Melucci, A. (1996). *Challenging Codes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Memmi, A. (2009). Racism and Difference. In L. Back & J. Solomos (Eds.), *Theories of Race and Racism. A Reader* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
- Mitchell, T. (Ed.). (2001). *Global Noise. Rap and Hip Hop Outside the USA*. Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- O'Toole, T., & Gale, R. (2010). Contemporary Grammars of Political Action Among Ethnic Minority Young Activists. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33(1), 126–143.
- Olesen, T. (2007). The Porous Public and the Transnational Dialectic. The Muhammed Cartoons Conflict. *Acta Sociologica*, 50(3), 295–308.
- Pleyers, G. (2010). *Alter-Globalization. Becoming Actors in the Global Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Portes, A., Guarnizo, L. E., & Landolt, P. (1999). The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2), 217–237.
- Rogstad, J., & Vestel, V. (2011). The Art of Articulation: Political Engagement in the Making Among Young Adults in Multicultural Settings in Norway. *Social Movement Studies*, 10(3), 243–264.
- Sernhede, O. (2011). School, Youth Culture and Territorial Stigmatization in Swedish Metropolitan Districts. *Young—Nordic Journal of Youth Research*, 19(2), 159–180.
- Sicakkan, H. G., & Lithman, Y. (2005). Politics of Identity and Modes of Belonging: Conceptual Challenges. In H. G. Sicakkan & Y. Lithman (Eds.), *Changing the Basis of Citizenship in the Modern State: Political Theory and the Politics of Diversity*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.

- Smith, M. P., & Guarnizo, L. E. (2007). Transnationalism from Below. In M. P. Smith (Ed.), *Comparative Urban and Community Research*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Sökefeld, M. (2006). Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora. *Global Networks*, 6(3), 265–284.
- Thaler, H. L. (2004). The Rift in the Subject: A Late Global Modernist Dilemma. *Current Sociology*, 52(4), 615–632.
- Touraine, A. (2004). On the Frontier of Social Movements. *Current Sociology*, 52(4), 717–726.
- Urry, J. (2010). Mobile Sociology. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61, 347–366.
- Vestel, V. (2004). *A Community of Differences*. Oslo: Norwegian Social Research (NOVA) Rapport 15/04.
- Walgrave, S., & Verhulst, J. (2006). Towards ‘New Emotional Movements’? A Comparative Exploration into a Specific Movement Type. *Social Movement Studies*, 5(3), 275–304.
- Wieviorka, M. (2005). After New Social Movements. *Social Movement Studies*, 4(1), 1–19.
- Wimmer, A., & Schiller, N. G. (2003). Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology. *International Migration Review*, 37(3), 576–610.

Part II

The European Union and Canada as Vanguards?

1 Introduction to Part II

There is a curious paradox: the European Union has been frequently lauded as a major exponent of “normative power Europe”, its cosmopolitan orientation enabling it to project a different image onto the world, one compatible with peaceful co-existence and legal regulation of interstate relations. Law is supposed to tame power, and the EU is presented as a stepping stone to a global cosmopolitan order. At the same time, the EU is deeply contested, and its critics not only question its ability to propound a global-humanitarian agenda but also its very existential rationale. In a similar vein, Canada has often been propounded as a vanguard in promoting cultural inclusivity, tolerance and a global context marked by legally regulated relations. However, Canada is also deeply contested. Whereas Canada is an established state that has existed for 150 years, it has still not found lasting agreement on the specifics of its federal-communal co-existence. Both the EU and Canada have been grappling with the question of how to reconcile competing nation-building and sustaining processes within their territories, and how to relate this challenge to other less territorially based forms of difference/distinctness. The fact that both the EU and Canada have sought to address this challenge in line with basic constitutional-democratic precepts makes them both in their own way vanguards of complex diversity. In different ways, they

fulfil a number of the criteria of complex diversity that we presented in the Introduction to this volume. One of the issues that the chapters in this part will address is precisely how complementary *versus* competing these forms of difference and/or diversity are.

In both the EU and Canada, the notion that the entity is culturally, linguistically, religiously and ethnically diverse figures centrally in the entity's self-conception and self-expression. We find explicit recognition of the entity's complex diversity in constitutional documents, in cross-partisan statements by leaders, in institutional and legal arrangements, in actual policies, in public discourse and in how the public assesses the requisite system's legitimacy. The preoccupation with diversity stems not least from the fact that neither the EU nor Canada has obtained agreement on a substantive sense of identity and community. Both Canada and the EU are variously referred to as multinational, multicultural and multilingual. Diversity abounds. The EU in the aftermath of the financial crisis (2008–) appears to move towards permanent status differences even among states that are nominally member states. In both cases, there has long been a search for appropriate labels and theoretical conceptions to capture their distinct features. In Canada, the debate has centred around nationalism, multiculturalism, federalism and, to some extent, cosmopolitanism. Canada has given rise to a school of thought on multinational federalism and the multicultural debates. In the EU, the debate has centred on a broad set of concepts such as transnationalism, (post-) nationalism (notably the works of Jürgen Habermas), cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism and federalism and a distinct notion of multilevel governance.

In both cases, then, there is contestation *within* nationalism, and this is coupled with contestation *about* nationalism. A distinctive feature and a fact that is of great relevance to this book is that the alternatives to nationalism are not only articulated and discussed in theoretical and normative terms but also with reference to concrete features and developments in each of the two entities.

Is Canada a matter of turning historical failure into success? Historical failure refers to the fact that Canada could never be easily included in the master narrative of the nation-state from which methodological nationalism draws its sustenance, because Canadians have been ethnically and

linguistically divided and have, therefore, never agreed upon a common nationalism. Further, Canada has instituted a number of measures to deal with its diversity, measures which are today being discussed in terms of policy successes. Of notable import are the multiculturalism policy and a particular constellation of recognition and re-distribution (social solidarity). In sum, we see that Canada represents both a case of theoretical and empirical contestation over nationalism—and this covers both contestation within and about nationalism—and a whole spectrum of alternative frames and positions, including cosmopolitanism. But what is the prevailing trend here?

The European Union is touted as a vehicle for Europe to turn its back on its historical past and the notion of Europe as a composite of unified nation-states. The EU's objective has been to transform the nation-state through supranational integration and some form of transformative ideology. When states enter the EU, they are re-configured as states, as communities, and the same applies to their identities and normative justifications. Precisely what it is that re-configures the states has been debated since the EU's very inception. It remains at least as contested today as it was then. This question has, in recent decades, also been elevated to the top of the intellectual agenda.

The European Union represents a case of theoretical-normative and empirical contestation over nationalism—with struggles being conducted both within the terms set by nationalism and by terms that extend nationalism—and refers to alternative conceptions of community and identity. The EU, at least prior to the financial crisis which struck in 2008, has also been widely lauded as a policy success in terms of how it has dealt with diversity.

The question is whether contestation over nationalism can give rise to a more inclusive-than-nationalism mode of co-existence. John Erik Fossum (Chap. 6) takes, as his point of departure, the fact that some political entities exhibit cosmopolitan traits in how they operate, even if—as is the case with the EU and Canada—they have not developed explicit cosmopolitan doctrines. The EU and Canada espouse the importance of openness and inclusion, and the need for both respecting and valuing difference and diversity, but, rather than propagating an explicit cosmopolitan doctrine, they stress their *multinational* character, which

raises the issue of whether cosmopolitanism and nationalism are reconcilable. In considering the EU and Canada as possible cosmopolitan vanguards, we must look for concrete manifestations of cosmopolitanism in principles, procedures, structural arrangements and actual behaviour. The focus is then—naturally—on the *process of cosmopolitanisation*.

When neither Canada nor the EU can rely on a substantive sense of national identity and community, they must seek socially integrative factors elsewhere, for instance, in welfare arrangements. In other words, the idea is that struggles over recognition can foster inclusiveness in so far as they unfold in a context that contains viable means of political representation and social welfare (re-distribution). The EU is the most explicit attempt at discussing these issues *beyond* the nation-state framework. Canada discusses them in a context of a contested state, and therefore some of the issues and framings adopted in the EU resonate with discussions in Canada.

The next chapter by Birte Siim and Monika Mokre (Chap. 7) shows how the European transnational context contributes to re-frame social divisions but not necessarily in a post-national or cosmopolitan direction. They note that the intersectionality approach has highlighted that, in many European countries, gender equality has become a national value, which is often used by both women and men on the Left and the Right as a national demarcation, which constructs a borderline between “us and them”, the “white” majority and minority groups, especially Muslim immigrants from non-European countries. The chapter seeks to develop the intersectionality approach further by analysing the role of actors in democratic politics from the multilevel European context.

In the next chapter Patti Tamara Lenard (Chap. 8) takes, as her point of departure, the fact that Canada’s success has depended on good public-policy decisions along three dimensions: inclusive nationalism, multicultural accommodation and selective admission procedures. Historically, the story that has been told about Canada is this: Canadian *nationalism* is thin and therefore inclusive, that is, it welcomes migrants from around the world and accommodates their practices under the banner of *multiculturalism*. Together with a government-controlled *immigration* system, the Canadian “model” is offered as a blueprint for other societies aiming to foster the conditions under which diverse societies can thrive. Lenard’s

focus is on the strategies recently adopted by the Canadian government to thicken the content of Canadian nationalism, by focusing on traditional dimensions of nationalist pride, thereby encouraging Canadians to adopt an “ethnic communitarian” outlook for the first time in its history. These moves are accompanied by at least two significant shifts in Canadian immigration policy: a willingness to highlight as questionable certain cultural practices as possibly incompatible with Canadian identity and an increase in the number of temporary labour migrants alongside overt attempts to distinguish between migrants that are good for the Canadian economy and those that threaten Canadian security.

In the final chapter of this part, Yasmeen Abu-Laban (Chap. 9) seeks to shed further empirical light on how support for the welfare state/economic solidarity, population diversity and support for multiculturalism/pluralism have been closely inter-related in its post-World War II evolution in Canada. While all of these dimensions are in flux in an era of neo-liberalism, and, more recently, austerity, it is argued that the Canadian case has much to tell us theoretically about the possible relationships between mobilisation, claims-making and recognition, as well as economic and other forms of solidarity and re-distribution.



6

Can We (Still) Think About the European Union and Canada as “Cosmopolitan Vanguard”?

John Erik Fossum

1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) and Canada have—each in its own way—been depicted as cosmopolitan vanguards.¹ How credible is this? The EU is presently facing its worst-ever existential crisis² and is grappling with significant nationalist-populist reactions that are anti-EU as well as anti-cosmopolitan (directed against moral universalism and footloose élites and companies). Has this reaction already washed away, or is it, indeed, likely to wash away whatever cosmopolitan traits and aspirations have been attributed to the EU? In a similar vein, Canada, long held up as a paragon of open and inclusive multiculturalism, experienced a nationalist backlash under the Harper regime, which may have lain to rest the cosmopolitan aspirations attributed to it.

The term “cosmopolitan vanguard” refers to a political system with a cosmopolitan vocation, one that actively seeks to entrench cosmopolitanism in its structure and operations, and one that considers itself as a

J. E. Fossum (✉)
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

model to emulate. The cosmopolitan vocation may be more or less explicitly articulated. In its clearest form, it will manifest itself in an explicit *political-cosmopolitan doctrine* that stakes out a clear direction and programme of action.

A vanguard is typically at the forefront of developments and thus is no stranger to experimentation. Since no political system was ever designed in accordance with cosmopolitan tenets, we have no reliable knowledge of how a fully fledged cosmopolitan polity would work in practice; nor do we know precisely where and/or how to travel to make up the distance between what a doctrine would prescribe and actual practice. The problem is compounded by the fact that there are very different versions of cosmopolitanism³ and that much of the work on cosmopolitanism has focused on moral, not political, issues and dimensions.

Nevertheless, some political entities exhibit cosmopolitan traits in how they operate, even if—as is the case with the EU and Canada—they have not developed explicit cosmopolitan doctrines. The EU and Canada espouse the importance of openness and inclusion, and the need for both respecting and valuing difference and diversity, but rather than propagating an explicit cosmopolitan doctrine, they stress their *multinational* character,⁴ which brings up the issue of whether cosmopolitanism and nationalism are reconcilable.

In considering the EU and Canada as possible cosmopolitan vanguards, we must look for concrete manifestations of cosmopolitanism in principles, procedures, structural arrangements and actual behaviour. The focus is then naturally on the *process of cosmopolitanisation*. One aspect is whether a political system is “written into existence as cosmopolitan” (along the same lines as we have seen with the nation). This is important, but it is not the concern of this chapter, which, instead, focuses on whether political systems in their institutional make-up exhibit cosmopolitan traits. Identifying such traits as cosmopolitan requires proper translation: we have to go from principles to arrangements and back, in order to establish their cosmopolitan credentials, and the main purpose of this chapter is to present an analytical framework that aids this process of going back and forth.

Today’s world is made up of (nation) states, and a critical question here is whether cosmopolitanisation mainly takes place in political entities

that diverge from or transcend states or whether states may also play a role. This might sound counter-intuitive, given that the nation-state is not very hospitable to cosmopolitanism and that the world system of nation-states has built-in constraints against cosmopolitanism. Many analysts have therefore considered the transnational EU to be a more promising site for cosmopolitanism. Juxtaposing the EU as a non-state multinational entity with Canada as a multinational federal state can address this question in a manner that is useful. The assessment must, however, take heed of the present situation of crisis, especially in Europe, and the issue of *resilience*, or a political entity's ability to withstand crises and upsets.

In the next section, I define cosmopolitanism, and, from this definition, I discern a set of analytical dimensions that capture the process of cosmopolitanisation. The subsequent sections apply the framework to the EU and Canada. Unfortunately, lack of space permits only brief illustrations and conclusions which are, as a consequence, invitations to further research.

2 Cosmopolitanism Defined

Moral universalism is cosmopolitanism's structuring normative intuition (Habermas 1997, 2006). This, in turn, has sparked a comprehensive discussion of whether cosmopolitanism is footloose, denies normative significance to groups and is obsessively focused on universalism. Most analysts would, however, stress that cosmopolitanism is not about rejecting particularist commitments and attachments, but is, instead, about establishing a different vantage point for assessing the normative salience of such. Rather than starting from a context-specific vantage point and assessing the moral salience of various specific forms of community and belonging, the cosmopolitan perspective injects moral universalism as a regulatory norm and weighs the various contextually specific positions against that. A complementary, albeit, perhaps more context-sensitive, approach would be that of "rooted cosmopolitanism" (see the contributions in Kymlicka and Walker 2012). Lenard and Moore (2012) talk about the different reconciliation strategies which are used to reconcile

universalism and particularism under a cosmopolitan frame. I would argue that a key underlying feature of cosmopolitanism which all the versions share is that of a general openness both to the world and to the other. This orientation ties the moral, cultural and political orientations of cosmopolitanism together, and the *onus* on openness stems from understanding cosmopolitanism as an ethical stance, a sense of obligation to the world as a whole, as well as seeing cosmopolitanism as a way of life (Holton 2009).

Cosmopolitanism, with its ancient Roman roots (the stoics), was about moral universalism; there was no concern with democracy. Today, in contrast, cosmopolitanism is intrinsically linked with democracy, and an important issue here is how cosmopolitanism may deal with democracy's built-in conundrum, namely, that democracy has no *democratic* procedure for establishing who the authors of the law or the democratic *demos* should be (Offe 1998). The nation-state provides its own distinct answer to this question, with reference to such markers as national belonging, national community and national identity, all of which represent forms of communal closure and exclusion. Thus, cosmopolitanism is seen as furnishing an alternative—more open and inclusive—answer to this question.

Applying these remarks to the cases in hand, I propose that the cosmopolitan thrust will hinge on compliance with the requirements of inclusion (or openness) and reflexivity. By the term “inclusion”, I refer both to the physical inclusion of others (non-nationals, members of other cultures, *etc.*) and to the taking into account of the ideas, values, interests and concerns of non-nationals. Furthermore, the institutional and cultural setting must leave space for, or be compatible with, reflexivity, which is closely connected with moral universalism.

An important challenge here is how to translate these cosmopolitan principles and tenets into criteria for assessing cosmopolitanisation. The state is an organisation that exerts sovereign control of a territory. Through regulating entry and exit (of persons, groups and territorial systems of rule), it facilitates the political system's ability to ensure the type of loyalty that is considered necessary for the sustenance of the national community over time. The nation-state erects high barriers against territorial exit and places clear restrictions on, or conditions for,

entry. Authoritarian and totalitarian states have, at various instances, instituted measures to prevent their citizens from leaving (e.g., the Soviet Union) or have comprehensive systems of censorship to prevent the entry of “alien” or critical ideas, facts or ideologies (e.g., China’s censorship of the Internet).

Taken together, these constraints permit the nation-state to instil a strong sense of attachment among the members of the community, an attachment that is considered essential to the community’s sustenance over time. Communal attachment sustains a sense of distinctness, serves as an effective means of exclusion and helps to ensure acceptance of the use of coercion when the national community is under threat.

Entry and exit regulation is thus about establishing scope conditions for communal sustenance over time. These scope conditions are important for the political system’s ability to instil loyalty and allegiance over time. The important point is that cosmopolitanism operates with scope conditions for entry and exit that differ greatly from those of the nation-state; barriers to exit and entry are lower, hence there is less scope for loyalty. Cosmopolitanism is therefore based upon a *different configuration* of entry, exit, loyalty and voice,⁵ values and thresholds that have not been spelled out in the cosmopolitanism literature. A close examination would reveal that different conceptions of cosmopolitanism would place them at different levels. Nevertheless, all conceptions of cosmopolitanism would operate with considerably lower barriers to exit and entry (for individuals, groups/collectives and territorial systems of rule) than those which we generally associate with the nation-state. And even if nation-states vary, they would, as noted above, justify barriers from a context-specific vantage point and hence with arguments that would be different from those of cosmopolitanism.

In the following, I unpack the dimensions of exit, entry, voice and loyalty and explain in further detail how that constellation manifests itself in the nation-state. This, in turn, forms the point of departure for discerning cosmopolitanisation. Each case—the EU and Canada—is subsequently assessed in terms of whether it exhibits traits that systematically condition it to inclusiveness and reflexivity. Given the challenges that the EU, in particular, is facing, it is important to establish how resilient such traits may be.

3 Unpacking the Nation-State and the Cosmopolitan Constellation with the Aid of the Categories Exit-Entry-Voice-Loyalty

The idea that the nation-state is not very conducive to cosmopolitanism stems from its ability to *exclude*, in contrast to cosmopolitanism's *onus* on *the need to include*, and to be open to the world. It also stems from the nation-state's ability to instill *loyalty* (national identity and sense of attachment), in contrast to cosmopolitanism's *onus* on reflexivity and respect for difference and diversity. The nation-state is a *distinct territorially based organisational-communal configuration*. In specifying these features, I treat the nation-state as a model, since nation-states vary considerably. Some states may be more amenable to cosmopolitanisation than other, and I select Canada here as an apposite case to contrast with the transnational EU.

The nation-state excludes by retaining high barriers to the entry of individuals, groups, communities and territories. The latter—territory—stems from the fact that the world is made up of states. It is a state systemic feature in which each state jealously guards its own space and is therefore unwilling to cede that territory to any other state. Thresholds for the temporary entry of persons to a territory vary, as do those for acquiring citizenship, but the latter tend to be much higher—often with numerous conditions attached (length of stay, citizenship oaths, language requirements, etc.). Some states have historically excluded specific groups from access to their territories.

In a similar manner, with regard to exit, the nation-state constellation operates with high barriers against territorial exit. This is codified through international law which sets high barriers against territorial exit. Secession as exit is only available under a set of special—narrow—circumstances under international law (Buchanan 1997). In modern democracies, individuals face few formal constraints, even if exit is complicated by the available scope of entry options, which varies with location, training, connections, personal resources and so on. In this circumstance, the individual's propensity for exit is related to the scope of entry options. In

some states, persons accrue welfare rights and other entitlements. Exit, then, often means forfeiting such entitlements and may therefore come with significant costs. In cultural terms, it should be added that the nation-state has quite high barriers against exit from the past, since nationalism is very much about remembering the past and developing a sense of loyalty and fidelity to both the nation and the nation builders. Nationalism “makes us one with our past and thus fully accountable for it” (Booth 1999: 252).

The nation-state constellation is marked by a range of mechanisms for the regulation of the physical exit and entry of persons, groups and communities. We cannot, of course, discern specific forms of loyalty from the procedures regulating exit and entry. These are scope conditions that condition behaviour in certain directions. What we *can* say is that it is *easier to instil loyalty* (consensually or not) when a national society’s social composition is stable or even static (marked by little exit and entry).⁶ The critical issue is how the regulation of exit and entry and the mechanisms for instilling in citizens a sense of loyalty and attachment are related. The higher the entry/exit thresholds, the easier it is for various formal and informal arrangements to regulate (*i.e.*, curtail) critical voice and place constraints on the political system’s reflexivity. Strongly homogeneous and communitarian societies contain numerous formal and informal mechanisms by means of which to control both the voice and the shaping of how difference and diversity are expressed.

We need to unpack loyalty by spelling out the mechanisms that help to foster and sustain it. To what are people supposed to be loyal, and what sense of allegiance and loyalty is to be propounded? Broadly speaking, the nation-state has three main sources for instilling loyalty: high barriers against entry/exit bent on ensuring cultural homogeneity; forms of social protection; and a broad range of mechanisms for socialisation and control (for a small sample, consider such aspects as schooling; military conscription; legal provisions which spell out what is appropriate conduct for all types of state officials; the various forms of requirements for civil society actors and others receiving public support⁷; and the legal provisions regulating party organisations).

Another important source of loyalty and attachment pertains to social rights and entitlements; the welfare state is often construed as an

important nationalising vehicle, an important issue of which is whether social rights only support efforts at communal closure or whether they can furnish a type of solidarity that is inclusive and compatible with cosmopolitan tenets (see Table 6.1).

The table shows that exit and entry are important scope conditions: when a political system institutes changes by, for instance, lowering the barriers for *entry* and *exit*, it alters the relationship between loyalty and voice, through reducing the scope for the mechanisms for instilling loyalty and thereby creating more space for voice. It is not a matter of doing away with attachment, which every political system seeks to foster, it is a matter of instituting a form of attachment that is more compatible with reflexivity and openness, such as constitutional patriotism that seeks to reconcile a sense of attachment with those universal principles that underpin constitutional democracy (Fossum 2003; Müller 2006).

Openness and reflexivity are critical elements of the cosmopolitan *ethos*. A reflexive polity is open to deliberative challenge and is marked by ongoing processes of critical self-examination on who we are, who we should be and how we think others see us. Rights that ensure individual autonomy—private and public—are critical institutional pre-conditions for reflexivity. Reflexivity depends on *voice*: the opportunity to express one's views and to be heard. A cosmopolitan system fosters openness and compels those seeking homogeneity and closure to justify their stances.

With regard to entry, cosmopolitanisation entails reducing barriers to access to a territory and reducing barriers to membership in a community. Cosmopolitanism is about openness to the world. This does not rule out borders or bordering; the issue is how *permeable* borders are. Actual openness is one important aspect; the other is whether the openness is tailored to reflexivity, and the autonomy of the individual is a necessary requirement for systemic reflexivity. We should therefore expect a

Table 6.1 Unpacking cosmopolitanisation—core components

Scope conditions	Mechanisms for instilling loyalty	Cosmopolitan <i>ethos</i> and <i>onus</i> on voice
Exit	Socialisation	Reflexivity
Entry	Disciplining Control	Openness

cosmopolitan system to be open to both individual and territorial entry (through incorporating new member states or through taking over additional territories).

Lowering barriers to entry pertains to the requirements for obtaining citizenship and other rights, as well as in terms of accepting linguistic and other forms of cultural diversity. In terms of political culture, it would manifest itself in a community's willingness to recognise outsiders as part of "us"—through sustaining an inclusive culture. The latter is intrinsic to reflexivity: a community's willingness to adapt reflexively its sense of self to the incorporation of other cultures and experiences, as an ongoing and dynamic process. This implies that the *conditions for entry* must be in compliance with cosmopolitan tenets. If a political system opens itself up to a significant contingent of undemocratic persons, the effect might be to undermine democracy. The political system must be able to ensure that those included will not undermine cosmopolitanism; and this concerns *proper* incorporation and the long-term *effects* of entry.

As noted, cosmopolitanisation involves an explicit democratic dimension. Since it is not clear what a process of cosmopolitanisation will actually result in, we need to pay attention to both those that enter and to the procedures under which they enter and *how the system accepting entry is configured*. Is it configured according to cosmopolitan tenets, and is it capable of treating those entering fairly and equally? Entry can therefore be said to be a two-stage process, in which the first stage is access and the second refers to the degree and terms of incorporation and participation.

In today's world, where individuals, groups and communities vary greatly in terms of their democratic training and exposure, there is the practical issue of "absorption capacity", which pertains to the number of persons, the number of new member states, and the range of diversity that any political system can absorb without forfeiting its cosmopolitan principles. There might, therefore, in many instances (depending on entrants and system), be a trade-off between the scope and magnitude of entry, on the one hand, and the system's ability to absorb the entrants as cosmopolitan consociates, on the other. What is meant by the term "absorption" is the system's ability to ensure that the new entrants are treated fairly and justly, on the one hand, and its ability to ensure that

they do not subvert the core cosmopolitan norms and principles, on the other.

Exit has two dimensions: the first pertains to the physical removal of persons, organisations and territories, while the other pertains to the effects that exit will have for the political system that exits and for the system that loses a member state or province or sub-unit. For individuals, in a cosmopolitan context, exit will be easier because entry requirements will be lower. At the same time, cosmopolitan systems must be structured so as to prevent the distortions which we see when states drive out dissidents or those deemed as “others”, as has happened in many places and on many occasions throughout history.

In contrast to nationalism, cosmopolitanism pre-supposes that exit (as secession) is an available option to any political system but that this option is subject to explicit cosmopolitan provisions. There will be conditions pertaining to *when* exit can be triggered and *how* exit is supposed to unfold. Cosmopolitanism’s *onus* on reflexivity naturally directs us to *reciprocity* as a key condition: those seeking exit must justify why, while those seeking to hold the system together must also justify why, and the two sides must be attentive to each other’s important concerns. This includes procedures in which the parties can come to an understanding of how the process should unfold. This is subject to two core requirements: they have to commit themselves to respect each other’s integrity; and the process has to unfold in full compliance with the core cosmopolitan tenets of openness, reflexivity and individual autonomy. With regard to the dynamics of exit, a cosmopolitan approach would underline that the different parties have mutual responsibilities for both the process and the result.

There is an interesting link between exit and voice: the *option* of territorial exit may be considered a reflexivity-enhancing device. Provisions for territorial exit (by a member state or province) could have reflexivity-enhancing effects insofar as the availability of exit—someone expressing a wish to secede—will prompt efforts by the system to justify *why* it should hold itself together. At the same time, those wishing to secede would be under an obligation to justify their choice and if successful they would be under a moral obligation to act responsibly when they were effectuating their choice.

To sum up thus far, cosmopolitanisation in a world of nation-states is a matter of altering the elements that make up the distinct features of the nation-state constellation towards greater inclusiveness and reflexivity.

This is about lowering barriers to exit and entry, about toning down formal and informal mechanisms of socialisation, disciplining and control and about ensuring that there are proper procedures for voice and democratic participation.

What kind of constellations of exit, entry, voice and loyalty can we identify in the EU and Canada, how compatible are they with cosmopolitan tenets and how resilient do they appear to be?

4 The European Union

The EU does not have an explicitly articulated cosmopolitan vocation. But the basic principles to which the EU appeals are universal, and the EU attempts to foster an inclusive community. The credibility of the cosmopolitan claim hinges on proper translation, which is effectively a two-way process. On the one hand, it is a matter of establishing which concepts, polity designations, procedural arrangements, identities and conceptions of *the self* and *the other* are compatible with cosmopolitanism. On the other, it is a matter of clarifying whether the EU—both as it is depicted *and* in terms of how it functions—coheres to cosmopolitan tenets. In the following, I outline the elements that we need to consider with emphasis on the EU's internal make-up (I do not discuss the EU's role in the world).

Even if we are hard pressed to typecast the EU (it is often presented as a type unto itself), there is no doubt that the EU transforms state sovereignty, both as doctrine and as practice. The EU is a political system in which states have come together to undertake a broad range of tasks. The EU is not a state, even though it is moving into core state powers (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014). When entering the EU, states undergo a distinct form of transformation in the transition from nation-states to member states. Formally speaking, they do not renege on their sovereignty; they share and pool it in a set of common EU-level institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2015; Fabbrini 2015). The EU's regulations and directives have direct effect and preponderance in those issue areas where the EU has competence.

4.1 Cosmopolitan-Type Entry Requirements and Actual Provisions and Practice

With regard to entry, the relevant categories refer to: (a) the inclusion of new members/territories, groups/collectives and individuals and (b) the terms under which such inclusion is to take place. The first is about access to the polity, whereas the second is about incorporation in the polity and the entrants' and the population's abilities to influence the decisions that the polity takes, that is, democratic self-governing.

In the EU, (a) the inclusion of new members/territories is generally referred to as EU enlargement. The EU has steadily accepted new members from the initial six to today's 28 member states (to be reduced to 27 as a consequence of Brexit). All European states can, in principle, apply, but the EU requires that all new entrants are democracies and that they adopt the *acquis communautaire*. There is a comprehensive vetting procedure, before an applicant state can be included. The general approach has clear cosmopolitan overtones, even though there are obvious limitations. One limitation pertains to the fact that the EU has a democratic deficit, which weakens its credibility in the vetting process. In addition, the EU has very weak sanctioning means, which is particularly relevant after formal accession. We see grave instances of democratic backsliding, in particular in Hungary and Poland, but elsewhere as well.

A further issue pertains to how difference-blind the EU is when it comes to applicant countries in practice. Thus, whereas the EU does not consider religion to be a relevant issue in terms of enlargement, the issue *has* been raised in the current debate on Turkish membership. There is a strong religious-cultural opposition in many member states. At present, it could be said that the issue is on hold, given that the Turkish government's recent human rights violations are of such a scale as to raise justified concerns about its suitability for EU membership.

A second aspect of entry pertains to the system's openness to individuals and groups. There are no EU provisions that exclude persons upon the basis of their group affiliation, be it in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, language, nationality, gender and so on. For the terms of

entry of individuals, we have to consider access to territory, membership and citizenship (including the rights and obligations associated with membership and citizenship), as well as what these provisions amount to in terms of ensuring democratic self-government. We therefore cannot assess physical entry in isolation from political access, or how amenable the political system is to the new entrants, or to political access and participation *in general*. There is thus a need for additional categories that enable us to combine the two steps to entry: access/inclusion to the polity and access/inclusion in decision-making. A very useful set of such categories can be found under the heading of *citizenship regime* (Jenson 2007). The term refers to both the *types* and the *compositions* of the rights and duties that the citizens have; the scope that they have for translating their rights into effective actions through having channels available for political participation; the scope of state or public action; and the sense of identity that these arrangements will engender.

While one characteristic feature of the EU is that it has established a distinct EU-level citizenship regime, another is that each member state has its own distinct citizenship regime (in the case of federal and quasi-federal states, we may talk of several). These vary considerably in their conduciveness to cosmopolitan principles, which shows how difficult it is to get a clear sense of the overall cosmopolitan thrust of the EU.

If, somehow, we disentangle the components of the distinctive EU-level citizenship regime, the EU has instituted new categories of membership. Some analysts have argued that EU law for migrants could “be construed as an endeavour to replace traditional notions of alienage with constitutional rules with a cosmopolitan outlook” (Thym 2016: 296). Even if migrants have rights, there are significant limitations. These manifest themselves particularly strongly in relation to refugees and asylum-seekers. In this connection, it is notable that:

the creation of a European ‘area without internal borders’ was rendered possible by the ‘nationalisation’ of refugees. At the very same time that national citizens were being turned into European citizens, refugees were expected to be subject to one, and only one, national law, making them the very last of national subjects. (Menéndez 2016: 393)

Another is that actual practice, as the refugee crisis has very clearly shown, is, in many places, incompatible with law and basic constitutional principles. This includes, not least, the EU-Turkey Agreement.

With regard to citizenship, EU citizens have civil, economic, political, social and cultural rights. EU citizenship is different from national citizenship, in that it is transnational and reflects the central role of freedom of movement within the EU. It is particularly directed at what Rainer Bauböck (2007) terms second-country nationals, that is, EU nationals living in another member state.

From a cosmopolitan perspective, as Jo Shaw has noted, a critical issue pertains to where to set the benchmark for electoral rights: should it be set with reference to residence requirements or with reference to acquisition of citizenship proper? (Shaw 2007: 4). We might say that the EU has chosen a solution that falls in between the two. Third-country nationals (persons who live in a member state but come from outside the EU) do not have voting rights for the European Parliament (EP). All EU citizens have the right to vote in EP elections and in municipal or local elections in the country in which they reside. But EU citizenship does not translate into the right to vote in the national elections in the country where they reside when that is not their country of citizenship. There is no common procedure in the EU for *when* they may vote in the national elections in their country of residence. Furthermore, the EU does not directly confer European citizenship on the persons living in the EU. Persons obtain EU citizenship from their being citizens of a member state. Thus, it is the collective of member states that determines who the EU citizens are, not the institutions at the EU level. The EU is therefore based upon what we may term as a form of “bottom-up” citizen incorporation—in contrast to all federations, which admit citizens through federal incorporation provisions. Citizenship incorporation procedures vary considerably across the member states, and thus the terms of entry as citizen inclusion vary considerably. Democratic participation also varies considerably because the member states vary considerably.

The EU’s remit of action being foremost a regulatory entity is clearly based upon a different and considerably narrower responsibility mix than what we generally associate with federations. This stems from the EU’s inordinately weak fiscal capacity and the failure to give any material

substance to the social rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Even if EU integration interferes with basically all realms of member state action, the strong *onus* on regulation and marketisation that afflicts the integration process has a strong framing effect also on the manner in which flanking areas are brought into the EU's remit of action. This has negative implications both for what citizens can decide in common and for the range of policy instruments that they can bring to bear on joint action.

The EU has a democratic deficit. This refers to executive dominance, technocracy and weak parliamentary oversight and control. The European Parliament, even though directly elected by the EU's citizens, has a weak ability to hold the executive to account in fiscal policy and in those issue areas that were grouped under the so-called Pillars II and III of the Treaty of Maastricht (foreign and defence policy and those aspects of justice and home affairs that have not been communitarised).

The Eurozone crisis and the manner in which it has been handled have further weakened the democratic systems of monitoring and control of the EU. National parliaments have seen their fiscal sovereignty severely constrained, and the EP has not been given powers to fill the gap (Fasone 2014). Indeed, the EP, which was, at least partly, sidelined in the crisis response, has been one of the main losers. The crisis response has reinforced technocracy, in the sense that experts have obtained a freer role and are less encumbered by legal and democratic controls. These developments spur de-constitutionalisation (Menéndez 2013), amidst profound concerns about a general weakening of the legal basis for integration (Joerges 2014).

The basic arrangements that the EU has established for entry have cosmopolitan features in terms of the provisions for the incorporation of new members and in terms of the establishment of transnational and supranational institutions subject to democratic controls. At the same time, there are clear limits and constraints. Some stem, ironically, from the EU's inability to enforce democratic norms, partly due to its institutional defects and partly due to its weak sanctioning means. A number of EU member states have actively constrained and delimited the EU on these counts. Others stem from an inadequately developed polity whose responsibility mix is quite lopsided (a monetary union without a

supporting fiscal union as one important dimension) and does not ensure autonomy to citizens. Finally, there is the fact that the EU is very fragile and susceptible to upsets, and it has gone through a significant institutional-constitutional mutation in trying to grapple with the challenges that are currently facing it. This mutation has brought with it a de-democratisation and a de-constitutionalisation.

4.2 Cosmopolitan-Type Exit Requirements and Actual Provisions and Practice

The EU has provisions for territorial exit (Article 50 TEU). Their cosmopolitan contents and impact are currently being tested in connection with the impending Brexit. The procedures are quite state centric, in the sense that the issues are determined in the European Council by the heads of states and governments, and thus are one step removed from parliamentary supervision and control.

With regard to access to decision-making, EU citizens resident in the UK (except those from Ireland, Malta and Cyprus) were *not* given the right to vote in the Brexit referendum, whereas Commonwealth citizens resident in the UK were. UK citizens living abroad for more than 15 years were not allowed to vote. This included UK citizens living in another EU member state. The question is how incompatible is this with the cosmopolitan norm of reciprocity? The interesting point is that there is a certain cosmopolitan element, given the shadow of the British Empire on voting rights, which were, therefore, not strictly national. At the same time, the fact that they were not amenable to EU citizens violates the norm of reciprocity. This is especially so since UK citizens stand to lose EU citizenship.

If we look at the Brexit process thus far, the UK Brexit debate has been remarkably introverted and self-centred, with some UK politicians even seeking to prevent any form of intervention in the debate on the part of the EU. In this sense, there was no resonance of the reflexivity that we would expect an exit provision to furnish: if the availability of exit is supposed to trigger justifying discourses, those seeking exit

should be expected to be willing to listen to the arguments of those wanting them to stay. The post-referendum debate on the UK's future relationship with the EU has been equally insensitive to the EU, in particular when it is assumed that the UK can retain internal market access but without, at the same time, accepting free movement. After a long and protracted debate, the UK has in the Withdrawal Agreement of December 2017 finally basically conceded to the EU's position: "The core principles of the common understanding between negotiators, which is built entirely on the negotiating directives given by the Council and reflects the priorities established by the European Parliament in its resolutions of 5 April and 3 October 2017, enable both Union citizens and United Kingdom nationals, as well as their respective family members, for the rest of their lives, to continue to exercise their rights derived from Union law in each other's territories, where those rights are based on life choices made before ... the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the Union..."⁸

4.3 Voice and Loyalty

The EU is a deeply contested polity. There are widely divergent views of what it actually is and what, indeed, it should be. For a long time, there was a so-called permissive consensus which, to some extent, related to the fact that the EU was focused on regulatory policy. Over time, the distributive and political effects of these policies have become more apparent. In today's world of "constraining dissensus" (Hooghe and Marks 2009), it is not only the EU's policies but also its rationale that are contested.

The scope of critical voice has greatly increased. When we consider the relationship between voice and loyalty in the EU context, we find that the EU has inordinately weak socialisation mechanisms and has not developed its own socialisation mechanisms to challenge those in the member states. This is compounded by the fact that the EU has an inordinately weak fiscal capacity, and very limited scope for effecting re-distribution, and this limited capacity to offset distributive biases

has legitimacy implications. We see this very clearly in the EU's responses to crises, where vast amounts of taxpayers' money have been spent on rescuing banks, while member states in debt-laden countries have cut back dramatically on public health, welfare and pension systems.

The fact that the EU has inordinately weak own socialisation mechanisms does not mean that it is without effects on the socialisation patterns in Europe. Through its strong *onus* on free movement, it alters the conditions under which the member states' socialisation systems operate. But the effects are indirect. And even if many citizens benefit greatly from free movement, this does not necessarily translate into increased EU legitimacy. Structurally speaking, the EU's policy profile and its weak socialisation mechanisms suggest that its legitimacy is more directly tied to output than is the case in most states.

The EU was established as a means of reconciling former enemies, in order for Europe to escape from the violence of its past. In this sense, the EU's relationship to the past is more clearly cosmopolitan than that which we see in most nations because the EU has focused more on forgetting (through moving beyond) than on remembering the past.

In sum, the EU operates with lower barriers to entry and exit than any state does. Prior to the Eurozone crisis, the EU had developed a range of cosmopolitan-inspired mechanisms for regulating entry and exit, and its means for fostering loyalty were very weak. In relation to the scheme provided here, the EU has been structurally disposed towards voice. This is the case with the *proviso* that its structure and remit of action predispose it towards expert-based voice, albeit without sufficiently developed connections to popular voice. The EU is too weak in certain important respects, especially in terms of enforcing cosmopolitan democratic norms in recalcitrant member states. In addition, the member states saddle it with tasks, but not with the requisite resources to address them adequately. At the same time, we have seen, during the years of crises, how the EU has been used by strong member states to impose quite arduous conditions on weaker member states. The overall conclusion is that the EU is a frail construct, whose cosmopolitan traits are not well-protected or sheltered from recalcitrant member states.

5 Canada

There is no cosmopolitan doctrine for Canada. Today's Canada is often referred to as a multinational federation. In earlier times, the failure to agree on a common cultural nationality prompted researchers to question whether Canada was destined to fail. But, rather than fail, Canada has been among the forefront of the states that have dealt with difference and diversity in manners that are systematically more inclusive than those that we normally associate with nationalism. Canada has officially embraced both multiculturalism and multilingualism, and there are also specific provisions for aboriginal self-government. Prior to the Harper government (2006–2015), Canada was committed to a cosmopolitan-oriented notion of human security and to doctrines and policy stances that highlight inclusiveness and tolerance.

5.1 Cosmopolitan-Type Entry Requirements and Actual Provisions and Practice

For Canada, issues of entry do not have a territorial dimension, since there is no more territory available for inclusion. The main issue of entry pertains to individuals. Canada is, historically speaking, an immigrant society and has, over a long period, welcomed immigrants, who, especially in the last decades, come from all over the world. Canada's proportion of foreign-born persons (in 2013) was 20 per cent,⁹ which places Canada among the most inclusive nations in the world. Access is mainly regulated according to a points system which is tailored to qualifications and definitions of Canadian needs. There is, therefore, a strong element of selection involved. We may say that immigrant incorporation, in terms of who enters, is very much based upon considerations of suitability and adaptiveness and tailored to the needs and concerns of the receiving country. Canada's ability to regulate entry is greatly aided by its geographical location. This location gives Canada far more scope to decide on both who and how many immigrants and asylum-seekers it wants, than, for instance, is the case in Europe.

There is a low threshold for obtaining citizenship in terms of the number of years, since a permanent resident can apply for Canadian citizenship after three years.¹⁰ The conception of citizenship is similar to that of any state, even though Canada is among those states that value immigration and see it as an important objective to ensure rapid incorporation through citizenship acquisition. There is, however, a significant problem associated with the conditions for temporary workers (see, for instance, Lenard and Straehle 2012).

When discussing Canada as a cosmopolitan vanguard, the main reference is less the formal provisions for entry and more the political cultural conditions associated with immigrant reception and incorporation. These are among the main cosmopolitan features that set Canada apart from many other countries in the world, and many of these features relate to Canada's distinctive historical experience, of being formed on the backs of two global empires (British and French). Many British-Canadians felt a strong tension between imperial and national belonging:

The unending debate over the appropriateness of any particular boundary between imperial and domestic always had one set of protagonists arguing, in effect, for a transnational definition of community that encompassed United Kingdom kin. (Cairns 1995: 104)

In addition, Quebec's claims to distinct community status (language and religion) effectively prevented the majority from forming a unified English-speaking nation. The historical experience in dealing with these and other claims for cultural and linguistic difference and distinctness has made the Canadian society, culturally speaking, quite reflexive. Will Kymlicka has noted that:

Canada is a world leader in three of the most important areas of ethnocultural relations: immigration, indigenous peoples, and the accommodation of minority nationalisms. Many other countries have one or more of these forms of diversity, but very few have all three, and none has the same wealth of historical experience in dealing with them. (Kymlicka 1998: 1, 2–3)

The question is whether this is a conscious policy or the result of fortuitous circumstances.

There is some historical evidence to suggest a clear link to Canada's distinctive understanding of *federalism*—as a distinct mode of allegiance and not just a governing arrangement. Samuel LaSelva attributes the principal logic to one of Canada's founders, George-Étienne Cartier, who saw federalism as a way of life:

For Cartier, the justification of federalism was ... that it accommodated distinct identities within the political framework of a great nation. The very divisions of federalism, when correctly drawn and coupled with a suitable scheme of minority rights, were for him what sustained the Canadian nation. (LaSelva 1996: 189)

The Canadian experiment has been that of creating an inclusive political community through federalism. The existence of a French-Canadian (mainly Catholic) and an English-Canadian (majority Protestant) community meant that the essential challenge was to create a sense of common allegiance while also respecting the uniqueness of each group.

Canadian nationalism presupposes Canadian federalism, which in turn rests on a complex form of fraternity that can promote a just society characterized by a humanistic liberalism and democratic dialogue. (LaSelva 1996: xiii)

The requisite sense of attachment is not nationalism but *fraternity*. Nationalists appeal to the value of fraternity but confine it to one group, or culture or language community, whereas federalists *expand* it:

The idea of fraternity looks two ways. It looks to those who share a way of life; it also looks to those who have adopted alternative ways of life. (LaSelva 1996: 27)

Intrinsic to this idea of fraternity are a reflexivity and regard for the other that break down the distinction between “us and them” that is so intrinsic to nationalism.

Part of this inclusive and accommodationist mindset was transferred to the much more recent multiculturalism policy,¹¹ which reflects a similar aspect of societal reflectivity. Multiculturalism as a doctrine is about

the just integration of immigrants—without eliminating their characteristics. The Canadian version is about *integration*, understood as qualitatively different from assimilation and ethnic separation/ghettoisation. Its core values are interethnic tolerance and the benefits that accrue to society from its diversity (Norman 2001). It understands integration or the incorporation of people from different backgrounds as a two-way process. Those that integrate are subject to requirements, but the process of incorporating the newcomers also places requirements on those who are already there. The idea is for the process of inclusion to spur self-reflection both on the part of the arriving minority(ies) and on the receiving majority. Thus, the process is one of mutual accommodation and change.

Somewhat ironically, Canadian inclusiveness relates to its history of *contested nationhood*. In this sense, Canada shows that contestations over community and identity can have significant cosmopolitanising merits. But Canada also testifies to the integrative value of a publically funded system of social protection. Canada's experience deviates from the general tendency to see large-scale immigration as a significant threat to social security and re-distribution, because greatly increased diversity through immigration has not undermined the solidarity required to sustain the welfare state.¹²

But even if Canada's historical handling of difference and diversity has been quite reflexive, the Canadian political system has not been particularly attentive to civil society or voice. Politically speaking, Canada has been marked by a strong element of executive dominance in which governmental executives have negotiated among themselves at one remove from the parliaments that they control (Canada is based upon the British system of parliamentary government superimposed on a federal structure). In connection with the patriation of the Constitution in 1982 and the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada has experienced a Charter revolution. As part of this, Courts have empowered previously marginalised groups (women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians and aboriginals), thus helping to increase their political incorporation.

These features have produced a distinct constellation of voice and loyalty in Canada, in which it is widely recognised and acknowledged that there are clear limits to the latter. Through extensive efforts at forging

constitutional change during the 1980s and 1990s, Canadians have discussed more extensively than almost anywhere what it means to be a Canadian, and Canada's population has become accustomed to "deep diversity", namely, that different portions of society understand their relations to the overarching community in different ways (Taylor 1993). The Harper government represented an attempt to move Canada towards a more conventional understanding of nationalism, as is documented in Patti Lenard's chapter in this volume.¹³ The Trudeau government that replaced Harper in late 2015 has vowed to return to the inclusive approach of the pre-Harper era, although it is too early to tell how significant this will be.

5.2 Cosmopolitan-Type Exit Requirements and Actual Provisions and Practice

With regard to exit, Canada is open to the exit of individuals, groups and *territories/provinces*. Among states, Canada is quite exceptional, because it has provisions for the democratic exit of a province. As noted above, the nation-state is based upon high barriers to territorial exit, because such barriers make it much easier to instil loyalty and allegiance. The question is whether the lowering of territorial exit barriers may be conducive to cosmopolitanisation. There are two dimensions here: one pertains to the physical removal of a territory or province from the federation; the other to the implications for the political system that leaves and the system that loses a sub-unit. These are, as noted, the considerations that are presently being discussed in Europe in connection with Brexit. None of these applies to Canada, however, since the territorial exit option has never been used thus far, even if Quebec has held two secession referenda. In the 1995 referendum, 49.4 per cent voted Yes, and a mere 50.58 per cent voted No (the No side won by a mere 54,288 votes).

Legally speaking, the Canadian Supreme Court handed down its advisory opinion on the secession of a province from Canada in 1998¹⁴ and stated that Quebec has no legal right—under Canadian or international law—to secede from Canada unilaterally. But it went on to note that:

Our democratic institutions accommodate a continuous process of discussion and evolution, which is reflected in the constitutional right of each participant in the federation to initiate constitutional change. This implies a reciprocal duty on the other participants to engage in discussions to address any legitimate initiative to change the constitutional order. A clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other participants in Confederation would have to recognise. (ibid.)

Specific federal government provisions were established in the so-called Clarity Act (an Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, 1999). In the, by now, famous 1998 Supreme Court Reference, the Canadian Supreme Court stressed the important principle of reciprocity. Similarly to Europe, where exit is dealt with in the European Council, in Canada, actual negotiations with a province would be conducted among *all* the governments of the provinces *and* the federal government.¹⁵

The Canadian situation is different from its European counterpart in the sense that, as stated, the exit provision has never been triggered. From a cosmopolitan perspective, the issue is then whether the existence of an exit provision, as such, has a cosmopolitanising potential. This was referred to above as a distinctive combination of exit and voice.

The interesting issue that the juxtaposition of the EU and Canadian cases raises is as follows: does the very existence of a provision for territorial exit alter the scope conditions (by lowering the exit threshold), or is it the activation of the exit provision that lowers the threshold? Since the provisions for territorial exit are so circumscribed in international law, it is natural to think that the very option of exit matters. With exit as an available option, the political system's ability to instil loyalty is subject to procedural constraints that do not exist in a political system that does not have any such exit options available. With the exit option available, a different dynamic of voice and loyalty unfolds: those who are dissatisfied with the overarching polity can threaten to exit. Thus, the availability of exit gives much more bite to voice. With exit as an available option, those seeking to hold the system together cannot simply pursue policies bent

on loyalty but must be more attentive to voice because, if they do not, exit may ensue. The linking of exit to voice raises the issue of communal co-existence in a direct way and makes the terms of community co-existence an intrinsic part of the polity's legal-political deliberations.

Thus, there are grounds for asserting that the very presence of provisions for territorial exit can spur reflexivity, because they greatly increase the political salience of voice and because they make the overall system far more attentive to the need to justify why they should stay together in the first place. It should be added here that the Canadian Supreme Court secession reference included an external impartial reference which is likely to improve reciprocity. It stated that:

The ultimate success of [an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a *de facto* secession] ... would be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession, having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold recognition. (Supreme Court of Canada 1998)

The international community is presented here as some form of external third party to help uphold the norm of reciprocity.

In sum, we can see that, even though Canada is a well-entrenched federal state with all the features that we associate with a modern democratic state, it still holds distinctive features that are quite conducive to cosmopolitanisation. These features are a function of a historical background of openness to (parts of) the world, a contemporary situation of large-scale immigration and the fact of fundamental contestation and lack of agreement on a substantive sense of community and identity. All of these features have made it socially and culturally very reflexive. Moreover, there are important institutional arrangements that help to foster social co-existence, since Canada is a welfare state. With territorial exit (and the possible subsequent unravelling as a prospect), it has generally been discussed as a very frail construct. Nevertheless, the very fact that it has already existed for 150 years testifies to its considerable resilience.

6 Conclusion

This chapter's point of departure was that the EU and Canada were cosmopolitan vanguards. Neither system has an explicitly articulated cosmopolitan doctrine, but both are marked, on the one hand, by strong official support for the protection and promotion of difference and diversity and, on the other, by a lack of agreement on a substantive sense of community. The research challenge was to establish how far these elements cohere with cosmopolitan tenets. There was a need for proper translation and for an analytical scheme that would allow us to discern the cosmopolitan features from the EU's and Canada's structural and procedural arrangements. The basic scheme was composed of four elements: entry, exit, voice and loyalty. It was noted that the nation-state exhibited a distinct exit-entry-voice-loyalty constellation and that we should expect the cosmopolitan constellation to operate with a different configuration characterised by lower barriers to entry and exit and therefore a different constellation of voice and loyalty.

The assessment of the EU has shown that it had a number of cosmopolitan-type features, which were evident in lower barriers to entry and exit combined with very weak mechanisms for instilling loyalty. The EU has also been more of an attempt at forgetting the past than remembering it; hence, it has little recourse to the past as a source of common belonging and identification, which plays such an important role to nationalists. At the same time, the chapter has shown that there are clear limits to the EU's cosmopolitan tenets, limits which have been reinforced and made far more readily apparent through the crises that the EU has met with and how it has handled them. Several of the panoply of crises currently facing the EU are existential crises, which raise questions about the EU's overall viability as a political construct. The EU is a frail construct, and reversing the negative trends hinges almost entirely on the EU's ability both to survive and to consolidate.

Canada shows that the state is not hostile to cosmopolitanisation. An important proviso here is that the mutually reinforcing relationship between the state as a means of retaining high barriers to entry and exit and the nation as the communal justification and guarantor of such

boundary maintenance is significantly weakened. In Canada, it was the national component that exhibited the greatest variation from the standard pattern: the Canadian state is very decentralised, but no less equipped with statist functions than any other state. In the case of Canada, it has been a matter of turning historical disadvantage—the inability to forge an unambiguous, substantively robust and shared sense of national community—to advantage in terms of dealing with difference and diversity. The Harper era showed that there are strong forces bent on “national normalising”, which, in effect, also speaks to Canadian frailty.

In sum, then, both the EU and Canada hold important cosmopolitan traits which are related to their historical experiences and developments, as well as to their general orientations towards the world. Canada is far less frail than the EU, and, consequently, we should not discount the state as the possible bearer of cosmopolitan norms, especially when it has well-developed social rights.

Notes

1. With regard to the EU, see, for instance, Beck and Grande (2007), Delanty and Rumford (2005), Eriksen (2009a, 2009b) and Eriksen and Fossum (2012). With regard to Canada, see, for instance, Kymlicka and Walker (2012) and Fossum (2012).
2. See Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union speech 2016, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/state-union-2016_en
3. There are quite different readings of what precisely cosmopolitanism is. For a brief selection of recent sources, consider Archibugi (2008), Delanty (2009), Holton (2009), Kendall et al. (2009), Turner (2008).
4. For the EU, see, in particular, Article 4 TEU. The Harper government recognised Québec as a nation.
5. I have adapted (Fossum 2008) and extended (with entry) Hirschman’s (1970) three categories of exit, voice and loyalty in order to capture core dimensions of polity transformation. Other efforts to use Hirschman’s categories are found in Bartolini (2005) and Rokkan (1975).

6. The argument is particularly relevant in a national context because nationalism is a doctrine bent on instilling national identity and converting persons to national consociates.
7. See Marianne Takle, Chap. 14, in this volume.
8. European Commission (2017) “Communication from the Commission to the European Council (Article 50) on the state of progress of the negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union”, COM (2017) 784 final. The Brexit process basically operates according to a statist (not cosmopolitan) logic, but the Withdrawal Agreement suggests that the EU’s onus on inclusivity prevailed.
9. <https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm>
10. <http://www.canadaimmigrationvisa.com/visatype.htm>
11. The Canadian multiculturalism policy was introduced in 1971, and in 1988 it became officially enshrined in the Multiculturalism Act. The policy had four objectives: “to support the cultural development of ethnocultural groups; to help members of ethnocultural groups overcome barriers to full participation in Canadian society; to promote creative encounters and interchange among all ethnocultural groups; and to assist new Canadians in acquiring at least one of Canada’s official languages” (Kymlicka 1998: 15).
12. Canada does not face the progressive dilemma which refers to the tension between diversity and solidarity: “Public attitudes in Canada reveal remarkably little tension between ethnic diversity and support for social programs, and the trajectory of attitudinal change does not raise red flags” (Banting 2010: 798–99).
13. Patti Tamara Lenard, “Wither the Canadian Model? Evaluating the New Canadian Nationalism”, Chap. 8 in this volume.
14. Supreme Court of Canada (1998) *Reference Re Secession of Quebec*, 2 S.C.R. 217, 20 August 1998, available at: <http://www.sfu.ca/~ahheard/827/SCC-Que-Secession.html>
15. S.C. 2000, c. 26:3.1., available at: <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-31.8/FullText.html>

References

Archibugi, D. (2008). *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towards Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Banting, K. G. (2010). Is there a Progressive's Dilemma in Canada? Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 43(4), 797–820.
- Bartolini, S. (2005). *Re-Structuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring Between the Nation State and the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bauböck, R. (2007). Why European Citizenship? Normative Approaches to Supranational Union. *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, 8(2), 452–488.
- Beck, U., & Grande, E. (2007). *Cosmopolitan Europe*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Booth, W. J. (1999). Communities of Memory: On Identity, Memory, and Debt. *American Political Science Review*, 93(2), 249–263.
- Buchanan, A. (1997). Theories of Secession. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 26(1), 31–61.
- Cairns, A. C. (1995). *Reconfigurations: Canadian Citizenship and Constitutional Change*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc.
- Delanty, G. (2009). *The Cosmopolitan Imagination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Delanty, G., & Rumford, C. (2005). *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization*. London: Routledge.
- Eriksen, E. O. (2009a). *The Unfinished Democratization of Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eriksen, E. O. (2009b). The EU: A Cosmopolitan Vanguard? *Global Jurist*, 9(1), Article 6.
- Eriksen, E. O., & Fossum, J. E. (Eds.). (2012). *Rethinking Democracy and the European Union*. London: Routledge.
- Fabbrini, S. (2015). *Which European Union? Europe After the Euro Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fasone, C. (2014). European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What Place for the European Parliament? *European Law Journal*, 20(2), 164–185.
- Fossum, J. E. (2003). The European Union in Search of an Identity. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 2(3), 319–340.
- Fossum, J. E. (2008). Constitutional Patriotism: Canada and the European Union. In P. Mouritsen & K. E. Jørgensen (Eds.), *Constituting Communities—Political Solutions to Cultural Difference* (pp. 138–161). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Fossum, J. E. (2012). Cosmopolitanisation in Europe and Beyond. In E. O. Eriksen & J. E. Fossum (Eds.), *Rethinking Democracy and the European Union* (pp. 159–178). London: Routledge.

- Genschel, P., & Jachtenfuchs, M. (2014). *Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1997). Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years' Hindsight. In J. Bohman & M. Lutz-Bachmann (Eds.), *Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (2006). *The Divided West*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Holton, R. (2009). *Cosmopolitanism: New Thinking and New Directions*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Sciences*, 39(1), 1–23.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2015). Delegation and Pooling in International Organisations. *Review of International Organizations*, 10(3), 305–328.
- Jenson, J. (2007). The European Union's Citizenship Regime. Creating Norms and Building Practices. *Comparative European Politics*, 5(1), 53–69.
- Joerges, C. (2014). Law and Politics in Europe's Crisis: On the History of the Impact of an Unfortunate Configuration. *Constellations*, 21(2), 249–261.
- Kendall, G., Woodward, I., & Skrbis, Z. (2009). *The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism: Globalization, Identity, Culture and Government*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Kymlicka, W. (1998). *Finding Our Way*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W., & Walker, K. (Eds.). (2012). *Rooted Cosmopolitanism—Canada and the World*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- LaSelva, S. V. (1996). *The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes, Achievements, and Tragedies of Nationhood*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Lenard, P. T., & Moore, M. (2012). A Defence of Moderate Cosmopolitanism and/or Moderate Liberal Nationalism. In W. Kymlicka & K. Walker (Eds.), *Rooted Cosmopolitanism—Canada and the World* (pp. 47–68). Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Lenard, P. T., & Straehle, C. (Eds.). (2012). *Legislated Inequality—Temporary Labour Migration in Canada*. Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Menéndez, A. J. (2013). The Existential Crisis of the European Union. *German Law Journal*, 14(5), 453–525.

- Menéndez, A. J. (2016). The Refugee Crisis: Between Human Tragedy and Symptom of the Structural Crisis of European Integration. *European Law Journal*, 22(4), 388–416.
- Müller, J.-W. (2006). On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 5(3), 278–296.
- Norman, W. (2001). Justice and Stability in Multination States. In J. Tully & A.-G. Gagnon (Eds.), *Struggles for Recognition in Multinational Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Offe, C. (1998). Homogeneity' and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with Identity Conflicts through Group Rights. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 6(2), 113–141.
- Rokkan, S. (1975). Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe. In C. Tilly (Ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Shaw, J. (2007). *The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, C. (1993). *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism*. Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Thym, D. (2016). 'Citizens' and 'Foreigners' in EU Law. Migration Law and Its Cosmopolitan Outlook. *European Law Journal*, 22(3), 296–316.
- Turner, B. (2008). *Rights and Virtues*. Oxford: Bardwell Press.



7

Negotiating Equality and Diversity: Transnational Challenges to European Citizenship

Monika Mokre and Birte Siim

1 Introduction

European integration and increased migration have challenged theories of the equality, diversity and rights attached to the nation state, and research demonstrates that European nation states face similar problems with regard to issues of migration, in spite of differences in national histories, institutions and culture. In their efforts to address these challenges, scholars have proposed post-national and transnational frames, which attempt to expand citizenship, democracy and social justice beyond the nation state and beyond the supranational EU level.

European integration and the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht have also put relations between gender and other inequality-creating categories on the agenda within the member states and the EU. This chapter addresses the intersections of gender equality and ethno-national diversity

M. Mokre (✉)

Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Austria

B. Siim (✉)

Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

© The Author(s) 2018

J. E. Fossum et al. (eds.), *Diversity and Contestations over Nationalism in Europe and Canada*, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58987-3_7

across Europe, focusing on the interactions of actors in democratic politics in the national and supranational EU arena. It thus proposes to apply the intersectionality approach to the European situation as a methodological way of dealing with diversity, above all, class, race and gender. The method also allows us to include additional differences, such as religion, nationality and sexual orientation (cf. Siim and Mokre 2013). This concerns issues of national and EU citizenship as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the European Public Sphere (EPS). EPS is here understood both as an arena to negotiate national and supranational politics and a space for political articulations of those who are legally excluded from many other political rights. Intersectionality is employed as a methodological way of dealing with diversity, above all, class, race and gender, but the method also allows us to include additional differences, such as religion, nationality and sexual orientation.

The first part outlines how the intersectionality approach is conceptualised as a way to address multi-dimensional inequalities, differences and discriminations. The second part addresses the challenges from migration to citizenship and equality, by introducing selected approaches to the reframing of theories of citizenship, equality and social justice beyond the nation state. The third part integrates the intersectionality approach and the citizenship perspective with concepts of the European Public Sphere in order to understand the tensions between equality and diversity within the EU.

The fourth part presents the empirical results from the Eurosphere gender project (Siim and Mokre 2013) concerning the framings of political actors within national and the European Public Sphere. Here, the key questions are who is included/excluded in the (European) public sphere, and what conceptions of intersectionality do the actors articulate? How might this analysis contribute to a better political understanding and theorising of the role of intersectionality in national and transnational political life?

The conclusion discusses the research findings in the light of the growing nationalist/nativist challenges to EU citizenship, democracy and social justice, following the European migration and refugee crisis ongoing since 2015. We propose that the intersectionality approach can contribute to understand the contestations by political actors about (gender)

equality, ethno-national diversity and religion, both within the nation states and within European political institutions. These contestations can be interpreted as a sign of a vibrant public sphere with potentials to evolve into solidarity movements between social and political groups within the European Public Sphere, as well as a dangerous sign of the growth of right-wing anti-migration forces exacerbated by the economic crisis. The migration and refugee crisis has challenged democracy, equal rights and social justice, but, at the same time, the transnational arena is potentially the only feasible alternative to solve the migration and refugee crisis and to develop timely concepts of democracy.

2 The Concept of Intersectionality

The chapter proposes to develop the intersectionality approach further departing from the specific European context. The intersectionality approach was developed by black feminist scholars in the USA as a way to articulate intersections between gender and race/ethnicity, between capitalism, racism and patriarchy, between multiple identities and group politics (Crenshaw 1991). The term was first coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991) whose influential work focused on race and gender as the major social categories since contemporary feminist and anti-racist discourses in the USA failed to consider the intersections of racism and patriarchy (Crenshaw 1991). Crenshaw's original intersectional approach explored structural and political dimensions of intersectionality focusing on the intersections of race and gender and on the situation and rights of black women within the Civil Rights movement.

In Europe, however, the dimension of race has been prevalently related to anti-Semitism and colonialism, and, due to the abuse of the term *Rasse* by National Socialism, the term "race" has not been used in German-speaking countries or France since the Second World War (Ferree 2008, 2009). Hence, distinctive European power structures exist which are different from the slavery and segregation in the USA. Class struggles between the Left and the Right have been prevalent in Europe since the First World War, and relations between class and gender have been a key issue for feminist scholarship, although they are not framed as

intersectionality (Yuval-Davis 2011). Another significant factor is that struggles between native majorities and national minorities and religious struggles between Catholics and Protestants are part of Europe's historical legacies.

Thus, European feminist approaches to intersectionality have different conceptualisations which do not focus mainly on race and gender and marginal social groups but on the interactions of the social differences for all members of society. Here, scholars propose that social divisions express different axes of power to be explored at organisational, structural and individual levels, often combining inter-categorical with intra-categorical approaches (Yuval-Davis 2011: 6–8), for example, the differences between groups of women, by addressing the intersections of gender and multiple differences and inequalities in political institutions and civil society organisations, especially race/ethnicity, class and other categories of difference (Phoenix 2006; EJWS 2006). Political intersectionality has also been applied to analyses of how national equality structures and policies deal with the complexity of multiple intersecting inequalities (Krizsan et al. 2012: 21) and the differences within the EU diversity and mainstreaming agenda (Squires 2007; Verloo 2006).

Myra Marx Ferree's (2008, 2012) comparative approach highlights the differences in the framings of equality and the politics of race, class and gender in the USA, Germany and the expanding European Union. Comparing institutional frameworks for gender equality in the USA and Europe, she argues that the US academic discourse and historical legacy privileges a metaphor of gender "being like race", since both represent a form of second-class citizenship. This contrasts with Western Europe, where the analogy "gender being like class" has been employed both in academic discourse and by women making claims as a collective group. She also notes that, in the post-socialist states of Eastern Europe, the gender-class analogy is problematical because socialism and class struggles are associated with an authoritarian state (Ferree 2008: 244).

This chapter develops the structural and political forms of intersectionality further by combining the intersectionality approach with citizenship concepts and considerations on the specificities of the European Public Sphere. The focus is thus on analysing how the diverse forms of

multiple discrimination are linked to questions of political alliances or controversies between different subordinate groups within the specific political, institutional and structural European contexts.

3 Transnational Challenges of Migration to European Citizenship

Globalisation and migration have resulted in a differentiation in rights within and beyond the nation state, thereby increasing inequalities of citizens and non-citizens within nation states. T.H. Marshall's classical text *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950, reprinted in Marshall and Bottomore 1992) differentiates between civil rights, political rights of participation and social citizenship attached to the nation state. While citizenship as a legal concept is a bipolar structure (one is either a citizen of a state or one is not), these rights can be differentiated in multiple ways, thereby enhancing or decreasing the fundamental problem of the necessary limitation of political rights. The concept of EU citizenship has created a new layer which has created equal rights of movement between nationals of EU member states without solving the fundamental problem of the exclusion of *sans papiers* and third-country nationals. In this vein, everybody in a certain territory, including *sans papiers*, that is, people without rights of residence, must enjoy human rights and, arguably, also some social rights. These rights are constantly endangered as deportation and expulsion are part of the discretionary powers of the state. With regard to third-country nationals the EU acts in the same way as the nation states: Non-citizens are by definition excluded from many rights and are in this way discriminated against at both the national and the transnational EU levels.

These problems are based upon the legal concept of citizenship attached to the nation state which excluded many groups from any rights attached to citizenship, for example, stateless and colonised people who were deprived of any rights (Arendt 1966). Historically, citizenship is mostly defined as "a status of membership in a self-governing political community" (Bauböck 2006: 15). This community is usually based upon

a common nationality within a common territory. Thus, it poses problems to transnational communities (such as the *Roma* but also, e.g., the Turkish diaspora) and to migration societies (cf. Creutz-Kämppi et al. 2011).

In migration societies, full membership is only warranted to parts of the population, namely, those possessing national citizenship of their country of residence. Thus, citizenship presents (1) a means of internal inclusion and exclusion within a nation state and (2) a means of mobility control at national borders. These two or (in the case of the EU) three class structures of populations pose serious problems for democracy, which are frequently overlooked in liberal democratic theory. Liberal democratic theory has primarily been attached to the nation state premised on the belief that you need an *ethnos* before you can create a *demos* (Schmitter 2000). This approach has been challenged by several scholars, such as Michael Walzer, Rainer Bauböck, Engin Isin and Étienne Balibar, who argue in favour of the inclusion of immigrants in citizenship: excluding settled immigrants from access to full citizenship amounts to political tyranny (Walzer 1983: 62), since it subjects a part of the permanent population to legislation without representation (Bauböck 2006: 20).

A further decisive difference concerns the acquisition of citizenship.

What justification is there for distinguishing between automatic acquisition at birth and naturalisation regarded as a contract based on active consent by both the immigrant and the receiving polity? Why should immigrants have to apply for naturalisation rather than being granted automatic access to this status after some time of residence? (Bauböck 2006: 21)

With regard to the EU, it is a question of what different naturalisation laws mean for this polity. Naturalisation on the base of ethnic, cultural or religious bonds (as, e.g., applied by Hungary and Bulgaria with regard to “their” minorities abroad) plays a major role here (cf. Creutz-Kämppi et al. 2011: 14). How do strongly national approaches towards ethnic-national diversity affect immigration and naturalisation politics in the European Union?

Against the background of intersectionality, it furthermore becomes of paramount importance that, in many countries, naturalisation depends, *inter alia*, on economic factors. Intersections between ethnicity and class play a role here as well as gender—given the gender-specific income differentials in most European countries. A similar argument can be brought up with regard to criminal records which, in most cases, make naturalisation impossible. Punishment for criminal activities is empirically clearly related to class, while, on the other hand, women have statistically less frequently a criminal record than men.

Citizenship is not only linked to rights but also to duties. Here, we can observe a further differentiation between citizens and non-citizens, as the exclusion from citizenship rights does not mean the exclusion of major citizenship duties such as paying taxes or participation in general education. Other duties, such as military service or participation on juries, are usually reserved to citizens, while, on the other hand, specific—and increasingly more and more precise—duties are imposed on non-citizens, generally subsumed under the duty of integration. Here, an intersectional perspective can also prove fruitful. In this vein, some integration duties imposed by the state, such as obligatory language courses, can be advantageous for women coming from ethnic or religious groups which traditionally exclude them from education.

Scholars such as Engin Isin have drawn attention to contemporary changes in citizenship which distinguish between different citizen's rights “blurring the boundaries between human and civil, political and social rights and the articulation of rights by (and to) cities, regions and across states” (Isin 2009: 367). Isin has conceptualised citizenship as an institution in flux embedded in the very social and political struggles that constitute it, and has provided a new vocabulary of citizenship reframing actors, sites, scales and acts (270). This approach proposes a fluid and dynamic conception of citizenship, one which is geographically responsive and historically grounded and premised on a new vocabulary of citizenship and a new figure of citizenship. According to Isin, “how subjects act to become citizens and claim citizenship has substantially changed”, and the effects of these changes are a new figure of citizenship.

This reframing of citizenship has radical implications: first, it is not possible to define in advance who the actors are, because citizenship as

subjectivity enacts the conception of the political. Second, the “sites” and “scales” of citizenship are fluid and dynamic, and boundaries become a question of empirical determination. “Sites” are defined as “fields of contestation around which certain issues, interests, stakes as well as themes, concepts and objects assemble”, and “scales” “as scopes of applicability which are appropriate to these fields of contestation”. The critical concept is “acts”, specifically “acts of citizenship”, which become the binding thread of the investigation of these struggles. According to Isin, acts of citizenship that produce new actors, sites and scales of citizenship are vital for understanding how citizenship has changed in an age of migration and movement (371). Citizenship is “a dynamic (political, legal, social and cultural but perhaps also sexual, aesthetic and ethical) institution of domination and empowerment that governs who citizens (insiders), subjects (strangers, outsiders) and objects (aliens) are and how these actors are to govern themselves and each other in a given body politics” (371). Arguably, the focus on struggles and contestation and on the ability to link local, national, global sites and scales is a strength of this vocabulary of citizenship, which links it closely to considerations on the public sphere.

This point becomes even more visible in Étienne Balibar’s (2004) arguments which radicalise Bauböck’s and Isin’s approaches by explicitly focusing on non-citizens.

Paradoxically the struggles of the *sans papiers*, perceived by the government as disturbances of the public order, desperate forms of blackmail or products of a conspiracy whose manipulators should be sought among ‘criminal networks’, have been and are privileged moments in the development of *active citizenship* (or, if you prefer, direct participation in public affairs) without which there exists no polity (*cité*) but only a state form cut off from society and petrified in its own abstraction. (Balibar 2004: 48)

By this emphasis on the impact of the public acting of the *sans papiers*, Balibar succinctly describes the democratic necessity of political public spheres as both a complement and a critique of the polity, as well as the space in which to negotiate inclusion and exclusion.

4 The European Public Sphere

Critiques of national models of democracy and citizenship have inspired alternative approaches to reframe theoretical approaches to democracy and social justice in a globalising world. One example can be found in Nancy Fraser,¹ who claims that, in order to re-construct democratic theory in the current “post-national constellation”, it is necessary to question the national frame and reflect upon the notion of “transnational public spheres” (2007). Crucial questions for the public sphere include (1) for participation—who participates and on what terms—and (2) for its dual function, the creation of legitimacy for decisions and the empowering of citizens vis-à-vis the state. According to Fraser, decisions affecting “the fate of all” are increasingly taken or not taken at the global level, thereby changing the character of public spheres with respect to the constitutive elements of public opinion: the “who” of communication, the “what” of communication, the “where” of communication, the “how” of communication and, finally, the “addressee” of communication who is no longer the Westphalia state power but a mix of public and private transnational powers.

The European Union is perceived as a special case in the globalised and transnationalised world, due to its supranational character. Thus, the question of transnational democracy, civil society and public spheres has played an important role for studies of European integration. It is useful to distinguish between the different approaches, some mainly concerned with the impact of multilevel political institutions, that is, Europeanisation “from above” (cf. Lombardo and Forest 2012: 1–22), and others focusing on the role of citizens, that is, Europeanisation “from below” (Risse 2003; Donatella and Caiani 2010). Arguably, a re-conceptualising of European democracy from a transnational frame should keep both aspects in mind and focus on how political institutions interact with the activities of diverse groups of citizens of the EPS (Rolandsen Agustín and Siim 2013).

Most scholars of democracy and European integration see a European Public Sphere (EPS) as normatively desirable and necessary to allow citizens to identify with the political system and to enable

their responsiveness of the system. To permit representatives and policy-makers to be responsive to people's concerns, the latter have to be articulated within the public sphere. The lack of an EPS is, therefore, often understood as part of the EU's democratic deficit and legitimacy gap (see, e.g., Eriksen and Fossum 2001). According to Ulrike Liebert, the European citizenship paradox is the result of European legal integration, with political integration through democratic deliberation lagging behind. She argues that, in order to negotiate equality with diversity, both the liberal market and republican and cosmopolitan conceptions of a European citizenship need to be adapted and deliberative procedures and public spaces for citizens be established in order for them to voice and negotiate different preferences as to how universal claims for equality can be reconciled with identities shaped by gender, ethnicity, nationality and other forms of identifications (Liebert 2007: 435).

The evolution of EU governance and democracy has thus inspired fundamental questions about the public sphere in democracy: How can European public spheres arise to which transnational powers can be made accountable? Are such European publics feasible and identifiable, and, if so, how can they deal with different forms of diversity and inequality? Craig Calhoun (2004: 7) argues that participation in the public sphere shows a form of solidarity even if this participation does not lead to harmony. And Thomas Risse (2003: 5) as well as Donatella della Porta and Manuela Caiani (2010) maintain that contestation is a crucial precondition for the emergence of an EPS, rather than an indication of its absence, that is, Europeanisation by contestation. Emanuela Lombardo and Maxine Forest have recently presented a discursive and sociological approach to "the gendering of Europe", which aims to develop a pluralistic and inclusive framework for the studying of Europeanisation processes in the area(s) of gender and other inequalities, by focusing on the variations of gender regimes across Europe, including the role of actors (Forest and Lombardo 2012: 2–4). The Eurosphere project² which focused on articulations of diversity and gender in the EPS (cf. Siim and Mokre 2013) added a further component to this strand of thought by including the question of migration and the role of non-citizens in the EPS.

5 Intersectionality and Citizenship in the European Public Sphere: Empirical Results

The gender work package of the Eurosphere project focused on “politics of intersectionality”,³ defined as the particular ways in which the inter-relations between ethno-national diversity and gender are understood and framed as discourses and public policies by major social and political actors, influenced by national histories, institutions and belongings. The empirical study was limited to two groups, political parties and social movements and NGOs. In this vein, Birte Siim and Monika Mokre (2013) proposed that the European Public Sphere could be understood as a *locus*/space for conflicts and struggles about the inclusion/exclusion of women and marginalised social groups in society (see also Brüll et al. 2012). The EPS is thus understood as a place for both contestation and negotiations of political discourses, policies and visions for equality and justice. The empirical questions included: What contestations and negotiations of gender equality and diversity take place in the EPS? Who are the actors, how do they communicate, what is the extent to which we can observe an empowerment of political actors in European civil society, and what is the extent to which transnational powers can be made accountable to civil society actors and, thus, gain legitimacy?

The EPS was understood as consisting of different public spheres (PSs) with a further differentiation between various public arenas. The analytical framework of these different PSs was divided into four dimensions (cf. Ferree et al. 2002): the “who”, that is, the participation of citizens; the “what”, that is, the format and issues of the public discourse; the “where” of communication; and the outcome of the process. Intersectionality was used as a transversal analytical approach to study relations between gender and ethno-national diversity in discourses, policies and democratic practice. Here, the focus is on the participation of citizens in the public sphere and the framings of gender and ethno-national diversity by major actors representing selected political parties and social movements, NGOs and SMOs⁴ across Europe. The project used the intersectionality approach to address relations between equality

and diversity. The empirical analysis analysed which forms of public spheres include/exclude what groups, to what degree and on which issues (Siim and Mokre 2013: 3–21). This approach is useful since it is able to identify elements of openness in various kinds of public spaces towards the idea of an EPS.

The methodological design encompassed multiple approaches, multiple sites/arenas, and was based upon a combination of élite interviews, institutional data/written documents, media content diversity and for and against EU integration. This chapter draws mainly on the evaluation of the interviews and document analyses for all the organisations in the Eurosphere sample. These asked for interrelations between gender and ethno-national diversity and, only to a limited extent, for the socio-economic differences (cf. Siim and Mokre 2013). Data also included several case studies of national and transnational civil society organisations, selected political parties as well as the European Parliament (Pristed Nielsen 2013; Pristed Nielsen and Agustín 2013).

One of the key findings was that major political actors both across Europe and within the European Public Sphere (EPS) show diverse understandings of intersectionality (Siim and Mokre 2013). In general, the empirical evidence suggests that intersections between ethnicity/nation and gender play an important role in most discourses on diversity in the EPS. The findings illustrate that European social and political actors formulate conflicting understandings of the interactions between gender and ethnicity/nation, which we identified as *exclusionary and inclusionary intersectionality*.⁵

Exclusionary intersectionality refers to a position that perceives tensions between diversity and equality as irresolvable, and thus proposes a radical, one-dimensional solution—either to reduce or abolish diversity or to abandon claims for equality. This discourse is mainly articulated by right-wing parties and NGOs and is almost always mentioned with regard to Muslim minorities, but it was also found among gender NGOs. Nearly 20 per cent of the interviewed respondents from gender NGOs understood ethnic/national diversity as a threat to gender equality. Thus, in many European countries as well as at the EU level, gender equality seems to have become the primary national and European value, which constructs a borderline between “us and them”, the “white” majority and

minority groups, especially Muslim immigrants, from non-European countries. It is, however, important to note that these positions were not unequivocal, not even in the same organisation (see Brüll et al. 2012).

Inclusionary intersectionality refers to a position that perceives both equality and diversity as positive values and does not understand them as being irreconcilable. Within this discourse, we identified two sub-discourses: (1) the multiple discrimination approach, which emphasises the intersection between different inequality-creating mechanisms and the potential negative implications for strengthening inequality (in diversity), and (2) the mutual learning process, which acknowledged the tensions between equality and diversity, with a focus on overcoming these tensions through learning (Mokre and Siim 2013).

We propose that these findings have political and theoretical implications. The case studies of two transnational organisations, the European Women's Lobby (EWL) and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), confirm that a "democratic learning process" can be observed with regard to the relation between gender and diversity (Rolandsen Agustín 2013; Pristed Nielsen 2013). However, case studies of national women's organisations indicate that this is not always the case (Arribas Lozano et al. 2013).

Gender equality and anti-discrimination are both fundamental European principles inscribed in EU gender and anti-discrimination legislation, as well as in the Treaty of Lisbon (Mokre and Borchorst 2013). From a comparative perspective, one key issue concerns the priority that ought to be given either to the norms of gender equality or to ethnic diversity. Here, the findings point towards a strong acceptance of gender equality by major social and political actors, compared with a relatively weak acceptance of ethnic diversity, for example, in national women's organisations (Arribas Lozano et al. 2013).

More research is needed to understand and explain these differences. One interpretation could be that, in many European countries, gender equality has become firmly embedded in national value systems that are articulated by political actors across both the Left and the Right. This contrasts with the more recent and still contested principle of accommodation of ethnic diversity. Case studies further indicate that gender equality is used by mainstream political organisations and right-wing

anti-migration forces as a demarcation to construct a borderline between “us and them”, the gender equal majority and the women in the oppressed Muslim minority (Rolandsen Agustín and Sato 2013; Meret and Siim 2013; Bangstad, Chap. 11 in the volume).

With regard to civil society organisations, the findings point towards differences between women’s organisations/networks and organisations/networks combating racism. Members of the six selected women’s organisations, who were all collective members of the EWL,⁶ did not articulate concerns for ethnic diversity and the equal rights of ethnic minorities (Arribas Lozano et al. 2013). A comparison of two transnational organisations, the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), led to similar results: the respondents from the EWL mainly articulated concerns for gender equality and women’s rights, whereas the respondents from the ENAR not only articulated concerns for anti-racist policies but also for gender equality (Pristed Nielsen 2013).

The case studies included elite interviews from 2008 that were later supplemented by studies of the homepages and institutional data of the EWL and ENAR organisations from 2010. These findings point towards discursive changes within the EWL and indicate that ongoing democratic learning processes took place within as well as between these organisations (cf., Rolandsen Agustín 2013). Probably, the evolution within and co-operation between two organisations is influenced by the EU gender model as well as by the internal dynamic of the two organisations, including the interactions between national and transnational actors.

These findings concerning issues relating to the democratic learning processes in the two civil society organisations, the EWL and the ENAR, need to be explored in greater detail by further research: one question that needs to be answered is to what extent this learning process is influenced by the specific EU gender model addressing multiple discriminations and inequalities and to what extent it is influenced by European feminist debates and activism around the intersecting inequalities. Further research should also clarify the dynamic interactions between the transnational actors and organisations in the EPS and the European Commission.

6 Concluding Reflections: Democratic Politics and Political Intersectionality

The chapter has argued that the intersectionality approach needs to evolve through empirical and theoretical research: more empirical research is needed of democratic politics from diverse national contexts, sites and arenas, and further conceptualising is needed about the interactions of the diverse political actors in national, transnational and supranational politics. One proposal for further studies would be to develop a contextual and situated approach to political intersectionality, which would carefully identify what kind of diversity is being articulated and conceptualised, who is speaking about what issues, who the excluded minorities are and what is left unspoken, and what the effects of the articulations are with regard to particular intersections by specific political actors in particular locations. The Eurosphere gender project has started to explore these questions, but more detailed case studies are needed to understand intersectionality in multilevel democratic politics. Further studies should explore how this particular problematisation of gender and ethno-national diversity came about, and how it can be changed by political actors in (trans)national politics.⁷

Arguably, the exclusionary articulation of intersectionality which is directed primarily, but not exclusively, towards Muslim minorities must be understood from the particular European context. All across Europe and in the EU, the principle of gender equality is firmly embedded in politics and political institutions, whereas ethnic diversity is often associated with excluded immigrant minorities. Here, we have witnessed acute political struggles about migration policies, and the integration of third-country nationals and refugees has become a contested issue across the Left-Right divide. In the particular context of the increased migration of third-country nationals and refugees, exacerbated by the economic crisis, the tensions between (gender) equality and the (complex) diversity represented by Muslim minorities have also become a contested political issue for mainstream political actors, the media, and for civil society organisations, including women's and immigrant organisations.

We have suggested that the transnational participation and articulations of political actors are of particular interest from the perspective of political intersectionality and democratic politics. The transnational approach can contribute to question methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller 2002) in the social sciences and to theorise the intersectionality approach from the particular multilevel EU perspective. The results from the Eurosphere gender project have illuminated the potentials of transnational democratic politics. A transnational concern with gender issues can be discerned, for example, in the German Green Party, which defines gender questions as key to its transnational activities. Similarly, a Turkish NGO collaborates transnationally on these issues (cf. Creutz-Kämpfi et al. 2011: 35). Diversity is not explicitly mentioned by these organisations, but international similarities and differences play a role for their activities. Further research should look more concretely at what forms of intersectionality are articulated by diverse organisations.

In addition the results suggest that transnational organisations, for example, the European Women's Lobby, can experience a democratic learning process (Siim 2014a, 2014b). As a result, the EWL has gradually become concerned with the organisation and claims of ethnic minority women, inspired by activities by the *Black European Women's Council*, the *Network of Migrant Women in Europe* and the *European Network Against Racism* (Rolandsen Agustín 2013). The findings also suggest that, up to now, the selected women's organisations are still searching for a common language on this issue (Mokre and Siim 2013).

The empirical analysis can contribute to refine the theory of intersectionality in democratic politics by suggesting that citizens are engaged in a dynamic learning process within and across civil society organisations. A number of issues need to be explored further from the transnational European context. From the perspective of citizens, it is a question of how the multilevel European gender model can contribute to the empowerment of citizens and to the development of transversal solidarity across diverse women's organisations as well as across women's and anti-racist organisations. From the perspective of democracy, it is a question of how to interpret the present conflicts about immigration and ethno-national diversity across Europe. Public debates about gender and ethno-national diversity can be interpreted as a sign of a vibrant public sphere with

potential to evolve into the European public spheres. At the same time, conflicts about the acceptance of ethno-national diversity can also be interpreted as a dangerous sign of the growth of right-wing anti-migration forces both within and across national borders. Finally, the issue of the legitimacy and the accountability of EU multilevel governance by EU public spheres remains to be solved.

The empirical material of the Eurosphere project was mainly collected before the economic and financial crisis. The question thus remains with regard to what impact this crisis and contemporary discourses on refugees and migration has had on the participation and articulation of the major political actors. Recent developments relating to the economic and financial crisis can illuminate these concerns. Large groups of European citizens feel disempowered by EU austerity politics, and the responses illustrate that European civil society is fragile and may be re-nationalised as soon as problems appear. This holds especially true for debates in the mass media, but, at the same time, it is possible to find the beginning of transnational and intersectional forms of solidarity emerging within both national and the European Public Sphere. On the one hand, the economic and refugee crisis have placed issues of transnational governance democracy, equality and social justice on the political agenda. On the other hand, the handling of the crisis within the framework of multilevel EU governance has, until now, confirmed the lack of the inclusiveness and the accountability of the EU's supranational public powers.

The different theoretical approaches presented all agree about the critique of the national bias of hitherto held concepts of citizenship, democracy and the public sphere but have different alternatives. We find that Fraser's approach supported by analytical claims for the possibility of transnational public spheres making transnational public powers accountable is promising. It proposes a paradigm shift from "a theory of social justice" to a view on justice as participatory parity focused not only on the "what" of justice but also on the "who" and "how" (2005: 8–9). According to Nancy Fraser, a critical theory in a post-national world faces the dual challenge "to create new, transnational public powers and to make them accountable to new transnational public spheres" (cf. Fraser 2007: 23). We add that an intersectional approach has proved to be fruitful for analysing democratic politics not only within the national but also

within the specific European public spheres. Our empirical results indicate that it is possible to identify the emerging transnational public spheres around (gender) equality and complex diversity. However, these spaces remain weak and fragmented, and it is, therefore, a huge challenge to make multilevel EU governance accountable to them. Furthermore, multilevel EU governance has recently been increasingly challenged by nationalism and Euro-scepticism in the member states.

Notes

1. Fraser's previous social justice model was premised on three universal principles linking social equality, cultural diversity and participatory democracy within the nation state (Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy" (1990) 25/26 *Social Text*, pp. 56–80, at 77). It criticised the exclusive nature of Habermas' model and the universal ideal of the public sphere, premised on the public/private divide and proposed a public sphere model premised on heterogeneity and diversity, which expand democracy and decentred politics from parliament to civil society.
2. The overall focus of the Eurosphere project was to examine how four sets of social and political actors (political parties, social movements/NGOs, think tanks and media) envision European diversity and the EU polity and how they participate in public debates. Data were derived from semi-structured elite interviews, institutional datasets (web-based and printed documents and materials), surveys and media content analyses. Close to 200 organisations were included in the analysis and approximately 1300 elite interviews were conducted. The interviews covered (1) views on diversity in general; (2) views on ethno-national diversity; (3) perceptions of the EU and its development; (4) preferred political strategies within the policy fields of citizenship, migration and enlargement; and (5) perceptions of European public spheres.
3. This conceptualisation of intersectionality in the Eurosphere gender project is thus somewhat different from Crenshaw's understanding of intersectionality, mainly limited to experiences of racism and sexism, on two key points: First, ethno-national diversity is broader than race, since it can refer both to national minorities and to immigrant and refugee groups. Secondly and more importantly, it does not only refer to the

agendas of marginal groups but also to agendas of mainstream political actors.

4. The analysis of selected political parties and social movement organisations (SMOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) included comparisons of political parties in Denmark and Hungary; of right-wing populist parties in Austria, Denmark and Norway; of six national women's organisations; of transnational activism organised in the European Women's Lobby (EWL) and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR); as well as a case study of women in the European Parliament, The Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) (Siim and Mokre 2013).
5. A refined analysis of discourses in selected political parties and civil society organisations shows that in addition to exclusionary and inclusionary intersectionality, there are statements, which cannot be clearly assigned to one or the other form of this intersectionality (ambiguous intersectionality), and also a few statements with an explicit rejection of intersections between gender and ethnicity/nation (no relation) (Brüll et al. 2012).
6. The selected women's organisations were from five European countries: the French organisation, Ni Putes Ni Soumises, NPNS; the Danish Women's Council; The Bulgarian Women's Alliance for Development, WAD; the two Turkish organisations, KA-DAR, the organisation to support women candidates in political parties, and Kamer, the Women's Centre; and the Hungarian women's organisation, NaNe (see Arribas Lozano et al. 2013).
7. The questions are inspired by Carol Bacchi's formulation "what is the problem represented to be" (WPR) (Carol Bacchi, *Analysing Policy: What's the Problem Represented to Be?* (Frenchs Forest NSW: Pearson Education, 2009).

References

- Arendt, H. (1966). *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Arribas Lozano, A., Aurora Álvarez, V., & García-González, N. (2013). Intersectionality and the Discourses of Women's Social Movement Organizations Across Europe. In B. Siim & M. Mokre (Eds.), *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (pp. 43–59). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Bacchi, C. (2009). *Analysing Policy. What Is the Problem Represented to Be?* Pearson: Education.
- Balibar, É. (2004). *Droit de cité* or Apartheid? In É. Balibar (Ed.), *We, the People of Europe? Reflection on Transnational Citizenship* (pp. 31–50). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bauböck, R. (2006). Citizenship and Migration—Concepts and Controversies. In R. Bauböck (Ed.), *Migration and Citizenship. Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation* (pp. 15–32). IMISCOE Reports. Amsterdam University Press.
- Brüll, C., Mokre, M., & Siim, B. (2012). Inclusion and Exclusion in the European Public Sphere: Intersections of Gender and Race. *Javnost—The Public, Journal of European Institute for Communication and Culture*, 19(1), 35–50.
- Calhoun, C. (2004). The Democratic Integration of Europe Interests, Identity, and the Public Sphere. *EUROZINE*, 1–22.
- Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, 1989, 139–167.
- Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color. *Stanford Law Review*, 43(6), 1242–1299.
- Creutz-Kämpfi, K., Holley, P., Kraus, P. A., Laine, P., & Warius, J. (2011). Assessing Transnational Spaces. *Eurosphere Online Working Paper Series*, WP 6.3.
- Donatella, d. P., & Caiani, M. (2010). *Social Movements & Europeanisation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- EJWS (European Journal of Women's Studies). (2006). Special Issue, vol. 13, No 3: Ann Phoenix and Pamela Pattynama. *Intersectionality*, 187–192.
- Eriksen, E. O., & Fossum, J.-E. (2001). *Democracy Through Strong Publics in the European Union?* ARENA Working Paper 01/16.
- Farree, M. M. (2008). Framing Equality. The Politics of Class, Gender and Race in the US, Germany and the Expanding European Union. In S. Roth (Ed.), *Gender Politics in the Expanding European Union. Mobilization, Exclusion, Inclusion*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Farree, M. M. (2009). Inequality, Intersectionality and the Politics of Discourse: Framing Feminist Alliances. In E. Lombardo, P. Meier, & M. Verloo (Eds.), *The Discursive Politics of Gender Equality: Stretching, Bending and Policymaking* (pp. 86–104). London: Routledge.

- Ferree, M. M. (2012). *Varieties of Feminism: German Gender Politics in Global Context*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ferree, M. M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (2002). Four Models of the Public Sphere in Modern Democracies. *Theory and Society*, 31(3), 289–324.
- Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. *Social Text*, 25/26, 56–80.
- Fraser, N. (2005, November–December). Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World. *New Left Review*, 36.
- Fraser, N. (2007). Transnationalizing the Public Sphere. On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World. *Theory and Society*, 24(4), 7–30.
- Isin, E. (2009). Citizenship in the Flux. *Subjectivity*, 19, 367–381.
- Krizsan, A., Skjeie, H., & Squires, J. (2012). *Institutionalizing Intersectionality. The Changing Nature of EU Equality Regimes*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Liebert, U. (2007). The European Citizenship Paradox: Renegotiating Equality and Diversity in the New Europe. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 10(4), 417–441.
- Lombardo, E., & Forest, M. (Eds.). (2012). *The Europeanization of Gender Equality Policies. A Discursive-Sociological Approach*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marshall, T. H., & Bottomore, T. (1992). *Citizenship and Social Class*. London: Pluto Press.
- Meret, S., & Siim, B. (2013). Gender, Populism and Politics of Belonging: Discourses of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Denmark. In B. Siim & M. Mokre (Eds.), *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (pp. 78–96). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mokre, M., & Borchorst, A. (2013). The EU's Gender and Diversity Policies and the European Public Spheres. In B. Siim & M. Mokre (Eds.), *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (pp. 141–160). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mokre, M., & Siim, B. (2013). European Public Spheres and Intersectionality. In B. Siim & M. Mokre (Eds.), *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (pp. 22–41). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Phoenix, A. (2006). Interrogating Intersectionality: Productive Ways of Theorising Multiple Positioning. *Kvinder, Køn og Forskning*, 2–3.

- Pristed Nielsen, H. (2013). Collaborating on Combating Discrimination? Anti-Racist and Gender Equality Organisations in Europe. In B. Siim & M. Mokre (Eds.), *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (pp. 179–200). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pristed Nielsen, H., & Agustín, L. R. (2013). Women, Participation and the European Parliament. In B. Siim & M. Mokre (Eds.), *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (pp. 201–222). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Risse, T. (2003). *An Emergent European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and Empirical Indicators*. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the European Studies' Association, Nashville TN, March 27–30, 2003.
- Rolandsen Agustín, L. (2013). Transnational Collective Mobilisation: Challenges for Women's Movements in Europe. In B. Siim & M. Mokre (Eds.), *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (pp. 161–178). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rolandsen Agustín, L., & Sato, R. (2013). Gendered Identity Constructions in Political Discourse. The Cases of Denmark and Hungary. In B. Siim & M. Mokre (Eds.), *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere* (pp. 60–77). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rolandsen Agustín, L., & Siim, B. (2013). Democracy, Diversity and Contestation: A Transnational European Perspective. In J. Tripathy & S. Padmanabhan (Eds.), *The Democratic Predicament: Cultural Diversity in Europe and India*. New Delhi: Routledge.
- Schmitter, P. C. (2000). *How to Democratize the European Union. And Why Bother?* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Siim, B. (2014a). Conflicts and Negotiations about Framings of Gender Equality and Diversity by Political Actors Within the European Public Sphere. *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy*, 30(1), 17–27.
- Siim, B. (2014b). Political Intersectionality and Democratic Politics in the European Public Sphere. *Politics and Gender*, 10(1), 117–124.
- Siim, B., & Mokre, M. (Eds.). (2013). *Negotiating Gender and Diversity in an Emergent European Public Sphere*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Squires, J. (2007). *The New Politics of Gender Equality*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Verloo, M. (2006). Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 13(3), 211–228.
- Walzer, M. (1983). *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.

- Wimmer, A., & Schiller, N. G. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation Building, Migration and Social Sciences. *Global Networks*, 2(4), 301–334.
- Yuval-Davis, N. (2011). *The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations*. London: Sage Publications.



8

Wither the Canadian Model? Evaluating the New Canadian Nationalism (2006–2015)

Patti Tamara Lenard

1 Introduction

It is conventional in Canada to be self-congratulatory with respect to our approach to managing immigration and the attendant challenges posed by cultural, religious and ethnic difference. The Canadian Multicultural Act (1971), alongside our constitutional recognition of the multicultural character of the Canadian state (1982), as well as the adoption of an official Multiculturalism Act (1988), has served well to underpin public support for large-scale immigration as well as for adopting policies that facilitate the accommodation of cultural practices in the public sphere. For many states around the world, Canada's approach to multiculturalism has been taken as an example of "best practice", a model to be followed by states attempting to manage ethnic and cultural diversity of all kinds. It is the starting premise of this chapter that Canada's success has depended on good public policy decisions along three dimensions:

P. T. Lenard (✉)

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa,
Ottawa, ON, Canada

© The Author(s) 2018

J. E. Fossum et al. (eds.), *Diversity and Contestations over Nationalism in Europe and Canada*, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58987-3_8

211

inclusive nationalism, multicultural accommodation and selective admission procedures.

Historically, the story that has been told about Canada is this: Canadian *nationalism* is thin. It has been celebrated as a possible example of “rooted cosmopolitanism”, that is, a nationalism that is able to marry a commitment to the universal ideals that characterise cosmopolitanism with a rootedness that captures the particularly Canadian way of instantiating these ideals.¹ Canadian nationalism has typically been described in terms of a commitment to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and to universal health care, coupled with a vibrant, smug, anti-Americanism.² It is, therefore, able to be inclusive, that is, it can welcome migrants from around the world, and does so, in part, by accommodating distinctive cultural and religious practices under the banner of *multiculturalism*. Together with a government-controlled *immigration* system, the Canadian “model” has been offered as a blueprint for other societies aiming to foster the conditions under which diverse societies can thrive.

Yet, in Canada, it did not escape notice that, among the priorities of the Conservative government during its nine years of rule (2006–2015), there was an attempt to significantly reshape the content of Canadian national identity. This chapter assesses the strategies adopted by the Conservative government to thicken the content of Canadian nationalism, by focusing on traditional dimensions of nationalist pride, thereby encouraging Canadians to abandon a relatively thin identity in favour of adopting a relatively thicker “ethnic-communitarian” outlook. These moves to fill in Canadian identity are accompanied by two marked shifts in Canadian “multicultural” policy and immigration policy. First, rather than welcome and celebrate cultural difference, the Conservative government instead chose to present certain forms of diversity as incompatible with Canadian values. Second, immigration policy shifted in two major ways: (1) it made overt its focus on identifying desirable immigrants as those that are of economic benefit to Canada (and excluding others as much as possible); and (2) it elevated “security” to a central concern in determining admissions and exclusions to Canadian territory and citizenship. My purpose in this chapter is to offer a holistic analysis of the changes introduced by the Conservative government during its tenure. The Conservatives were defeated in October 2015 and replaced by the Liberal

Party, and, in conclusion, I offer a preliminary account of how the Liberal government has responded to the changes (or the gestures they have made with respect to future, intended, changes) made by Conservatives.

I begin with a brief account of Canadian public opinion with respect to large-scale immigration and the state's multicultural heritage. In separate sections, I then consider the government's attempts to shift the content of Canadian nationalism, the shifts in Canadian multicultural policy and the shifts in Canadian immigration policy. These shifts, I argue, do not seem to stem from a desire to pander to a public opinion that has turned away from its traditional support for immigration and integration, as has been the case in Europe; I refrain, however, from speculating on the motivations for these significant policy shifts. Rather, I simply observe that public opinion in favour of immigration and the associated multicultural policies in Canada is strong, and perhaps stronger than ever. Yet, the danger remains that these policies, which are significantly less welcoming of both immigration and the diversity that attends it, do nonetheless threaten to erode the Canadian population's support for multicultural accommodation, in particular, and, for this reason, I argue that we should be critical of these changes. Whether the erosion will transpire is, in large part, in the hands of the Liberal Party, which took over governing Canada in October 2015, with a language of inclusivity.

2 Canadian Public Support for Immigration and Multiculturalism

Since 1971, the Canadian state has indicated its public support for, and recognition of, the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity of its population. The purpose of doing so was to enable immigrant minorities to retain their cultural and ethnic practices, but to do so only to the extent that it would facilitate their successful integration into the Canadian public sphere. The intent was to acknowledge that cultural practices are often central to immigrants' identity, and that many, if not most, of them are entirely compatible with the liberal and democratic norms that characterise the Canadian state. Standard examples include the abandonment of Sunday closing laws, the permitting of uniform modifications, and so

on. In 1982, Canada repatriated its constitution and adopted the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in which the multicultural character of the Canadian state was formally acknowledged. According to Section 27 of the Charter, policies and court decisions are constitutionally required to make their decisions “in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada”. In 1988, Brian Mulroney’s Conservative government passed the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, which again formally confirmed the public recognition of the contribution made by immigrant minorities to the Canadian state and, in turn, the states’ formal acknowledgment of its diverse and multicultural character.

All of these efforts have produced a Canadian population that displays deep and abiding support for large-scale migration and multicultural accommodation: Canada admits nearly one per cent of its population (i.e., nearly 300,000) in permanent immigrants every year and almost the same number in temporary labour migrants. When surveyed, Canadians by and large display an enduring commitment to multiculturalism and firmly believe that immigration to Canada is essential to its ongoing political and economic well-being. In 2006, a full 75 per cent of Canadians reported that immigration was good for the country (Adams 2009). In nearly every year between 1975 and 2005, Canadians were asked whether immigration to Canada should hold steady, or increase, or decrease, and in every year but one (1982), Canadians responded that the numbers should remain steady or increase (Reitz 2011). As late as April 2010, 63 per cent of Canadians remained committed to holding steady or increasing the number of immigrants to Canada (Ibid., p. 9). In November 2010, 82 per cent of Canadians reported that they believed that immigration had a positive effect on the economy (Ibid., p. 13). Of multiculturalism, in 2010, 55 per cent of Canadians stated that multiculturalism was either good or very good for Canada and the number is 65 per cent among Canadians aged between 18 and 35 (Angus). It is worth pointing out that these numbers have remained stable throughout the global economic downturn. When asked what makes them proud of their country, in 2006, Canadians ranked multiculturalism second (Adams 2009, p. 5).³ Canadians “increasingly see their country as being defined and enriched by its diversity and by

the official response to that diversity: multiculturalism” (Ibid.). The support for immigration, and multiculturalism, has been and still remains strong in Canada.

3 Canada’s “Thin” Nationalism

This support for immigration and multiculturalism is, at least in part, attributed to the relatively thin content of Canadian nationalism. The stereotype of Canadians abroad is that they are “polite” and “boring”. Internally, the complaint is sometimes that Canadians lack a robust sense of identity which would be better able to provide a kind of unifying glue among citizens from diverse backgrounds (Gwyn 1996). Yet, the thinness of Canada’s national identity has proved a boon to integrating migrants from around the world. To describe a state’s nationalism as thin is to emphasise its foundation in political principles—typically liberal and democratic principles—to which anyone can (and should) subscribe. Thin accounts of nationalism are sometimes criticised by those who observe that liberal and democratic principles, while universal, do not necessarily inspire commitment to a *particular* polity, *that is*, a state’s nationalism must do more to answer why a specific set of citizens should be committed to *this* nation rather than another. So, thin nationalism contrasts, typically, with thicker nationalisms—what the editors of this volume have termed “ethno-nationalism”—forms of nationalism that emphasise their foundation in the shared ethnic background of their members, as well as robust shared histories, languages and territory. The virtue of the former, thinner, nationalism is its apparent inclusivity—since the values that define it are standard liberal democratic values, they can be adopted by all who accept these principles as the right ones by which to organise a political community. Norway’s citizenship oath is, perhaps, one of the best examples of an oath that requires agreeing only to a set of widely accepted principles:

As a citizen of Norway I pledge loyalty to my country Norway and to the Norwegian society, and I support democracy and human rights and will respect the laws of the country.

In political theory, it has been conventional to distinguish between a thinner, or civic, nationalism, which emphasises political principles and democratic institutions, and a thicker, more ethnically infused nationalism, which emphasises the shared history and ancestry among its members (Brubaker 1992). As many commentators note, no actual national identity is fully civic or fully ethnic; the extent to which an identity is civic or ethnic in its content is a matter of degree (and, additionally, the emphasis on shared ethnic background as a marker of membership has diminished considerably across democratic nations in particular) (e.g., Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder 2006; Triadafilopoulos 2004).

Yet, a distinction remains between nations that emphasise political principles which are available to all those who reside within a set of shared boundaries and nations that attempt more aggressively to fill their nationalism with community-specific content. During its time in office, the Conservative government, led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, determined that it was important to add specific content to Canadian nationalism, rather than to rely on civic or thin political principles as adequate to bind members of the political community. The prime minister's parliamentary secretary explicitly acknowledged that the government's goal was to restore an apparently "lost" Canadian identity. Canada, he said, is about more than what it is traditionally known for—hockey, Tim Horton's coffee, and saying "eh" and "aboot" rather than "about" (Taber 2011). An op-ed in the Canadian *The Globe and Mail* describes the shift as follows:

The Harper government seeks to supplement, or even supplant, those [traditionally liberal] symbols with new ones, and old ones revived. These new symbols are rooted in a robust, even aggressive nationalism. (Ibbitson and Anderssen 2012)

There are two main features of this shift, which are described below: (1) an emphasis on Canadian military achievement and associated moments of "greatness" (alongside an abandonment and de-emphasis of Canadian peacekeeping missions) and (2) an emphasis on Canada's historical

connection to the British monarchy. Both of these shifts are reflected in recent revisions to the Canadian citizenship test and associated guide, which are described in the following section.

Perhaps the most public attempt to give concrete content to Canadian national identity was the focused attempt to direct Canadian attention, and indeed Canadian pride, towards its alleged military victory in the War of 1812. In 2012, Canada “celebrated” the 200th anniversary of this war—a war about which Canadians know very little (Canada was formally founded in 1867, so the war was, in fact, fought by Upper Canada, which is now the province of Ontario). The government declared well in advance that the war would be commemorated in October 2012, and followed up its declarations by a public, educational campaign to heighten Canadian pride in its military achievements. Canadian Heritage Minister James Moore declared that “We don’t do enough in this country to protect our past, to teach our past, to get kids involved and to learn about this country’s brilliant history and the important moments of our past”, and further that “there is no greater example of that than the War of 1812. Not enough Canadians know about the importance of the War of 1812. It was the fight for Canada” (Fitzpatrick 2011). The government committed 28 million Canadian dollars over a four-year period to highlight the importance of the “fight for Canada”; “without the War of 1812, Canada as we know it would not exist”, said Moore, in justifying the decision to spend this money, even as the government engaged in spending cuts across the board in an effort to eliminate a budget deficit.

More generally, the Canadian government made efforts to improve Canadians’ awareness of, and pride in, their military achievements (Beeby 2012). Since 2006, Canada Day events include more and more overt celebration of Canada’s historical military achievements. It is traditional that the Canadian prime minister speaks at the Ottawa Canada Day celebrations, and Mr. Harper repeatedly took this opportunity to highlight (among many other things) Canada’s military involvement and achievements. To give only the two most recent of examples, in 2015, he offered his respects to the Canadians deployed in Iraq and Kuwait (Ditchburn 2015). In 2014, Mr. Harper commented on Canada’s status as a “courageous warrior”,⁴ noting that:

[L]et us never forget the sacrifices made by the members of our military across our history. During the First World War, the Second World War, in Korea and, even more recently, in Afghanistan. This year, the Canadian military marks many significant milestones: the 200th anniversary of the end of the Canadian campaign of the War of 1812; the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the First World War; the 75th anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War; the 70th anniversary of D-Day and the end of Canada's military mission in Afghanistan. We will always call these men and women who have served in these actions over the years, over the decades over the centuries, what they are, Canada's finest heroes! (Dufay 2014)

The focus on the role of the military in shaping the content of a new Canadian identity was reflected, additionally, in the re-design of the 20-dollar bill (the most commonly used bill in Canada), which was re-designed to display the Vimy Ridge Memorial, which commemorates members of the Canadian military who were killed during the First World War (the image of the Memorial replaces an image of Aboriginal artist Bill Reid's sculpture entitled *Spirit of Haida Gwaii*).⁵ In introducing the new bill, the then finance minister stated that, "The Canadian Corps' victory at Vimy is often described as Canada's 'coming of age' as a nation".⁶

A second way in which the Conservative government worked to thicken Canadian identity focused on emphasising and valorising Canada's historical connections to the British monarchy. These decisions are confusing to many Canadians, who, of course, know that Canada is a member of the British Commonwealth and thus that our official head of state is the British Queen. It is the *emphasis* on the ties with Britain, ties which have largely been a matter of disinterest to most Canadians, that is new (Pauls 2015). In his first address to the Canadian parliament, upon taking office, Prime Minister Harper began by acknowledging "our head of state, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, whose lifelong dedication to duty and self-sacrifice have been a source of inspiration and encouragement to the many countries that make up the commonwealth and to the people of Canada".⁷

In addition to adding the Queen of England's image to the 20-dollar bill described above, Canadian embassies around the world were ordered to display the Queen's portrait.⁸ Canada's navy—the Maritime

Command—was renamed the Royal Canadian Navy, and its air force, the Air Command, was renamed the Royal Canadian Armed Force. These name changes *restored* names that had been in place prior to 1968. The Conservative government encouraged visits by members of the royal family to Canada and led enthusiastic efforts to welcome them when they did (McQuigge 2012). The attempts to make the ties with the British monarchy central to Canadian national identity were rooted in a more general attempt to foster recognition of, and pride in, “a nation deeply tied to its colonial past with Britain” (Anderson 2013). On the one hand, this kind of effort to connect Canadian identity to Canada’s historical roots in British colonialism might be presented as evidence that its identity—and its history—contains an essentially transnational element. On the other, however, it can just as plausibly be understood, as one commentator expressed it, in these terms:

Harper’s pro-monarchy stance is only one of his many endeavors to define Canada as part of the Anglosphere. The effort is strikingly in contrast to other recent approaches that situate Canada more ‘progressively’, as part of an amorphous, UN-led ‘international community’. (Smith 2012)

In other words, paradoxically, the re-assertion of Canada’s historical connections to Britain is a move away from the cosmopolitan stance that had been taken by previous administrations.

4 The Decline of Multicultural Accommodation

One way in which the new Canadian identity is being promulgated is via the recently revised citizenship test and associated study materials. More generally and as parts of its stance towards emphasising the importance of integrating migrants, the government refurbished the Canadian citizenship test and its associated handbook. More than their predecessors, the test and the study guide emphasise Canadian history (in particular, its connection to the British monarchy) and Canada’s military achievements (Winter 2014). In accounting for the decision to modify

the content of the citizenship test and handbook, the then Minister of Immigration and Citizenship Jason Kenney explained that:

We expect people who want to become Canadians to have a good understanding of their rights and responsibilities, and the values and institutions that are rooted in Canada's history ... This study guide has strengthened the value of Canadian citizenship.⁹

An emphasis on citizenship and the attendant values also appears to be at the heart of the Canadian government's concern with the direction of Canadian multicultural accommodation.

In making these changes—in emphasising the importance of integrating migrants by requiring them to adopt Canadian values and norms—Canada has joined many European states in emphasising the work that migrants must do in order to integrate (Kymlicka 2010; Bertossi 2010). In Canada in particular, this move represents a shift away from an understanding of integration as a “two-way” street which requires that both migrants and host societies make accommodations, towards the view that integration is a job that by and large belongs solely to migrants (Kymlicka 1998). It is accompanied by a decline in the willingness to adopt the sorts of accommodations that facilitate the integration of migrants into the public sphere.

Above, I noted Canada's historical commitment to multiculturalism as enshrined in both legislation and its constitutional provisions. As a result of these constitutional and legislative commitments to multiculturalism, Canada has been viewed as a leader in extending multicultural accommodations to its many cultural and religious minority groups. Many minority groups have practices that appear, on the surface, to challenge or conflict with those that are practised by the majority. They celebrate holidays on non-standard days, they dress in ways that are distinctive, they speak languages other than the dominant one (Kymlicka 1996; Parekh 2002). To offer specifically multicultural accommodations to these groups is, in some cases, to exempt them from existing law—for example, to permit them to keep shops open on Sundays, where Sunday closing laws exist (Quong 2006). In other cases, these accommodations entail uniform modifications—for example, where Sikh members of the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police are permitted to wear turbans rather than the traditional Stetson. And in others again, these accommodations entail offering financial support—for example, to minority groups to fund linguistic education for their children in their native language. Although this is not exclusively so, multicultural accommodations are generally requested by minority groups in order to reduce the barriers to their ability to participate in the public sphere. According to their advocates, these kinds of demands “strengthen citizenship by ensuring that no one is left outside of it, or marginalized by it” (Moore 2001). Canada’s status as a leader in multiculturalism is reflected in the diversity of the accommodations granted to cultural and religious minorities, and (as reported above) these accommodations are the product of a welcoming and tolerant Canadian society that, in general, welcomes immigrants as full members.

Across Europe, however, multiculturalism is widely perceived to be under threat (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010)—many European political leaders, David Cameron and Angela Merkel, among them, have declared the failure of multiculturalism and, at least rhetorically, are moving away from accommodating minority groups towards emphasising the importance of their integrating and thereby adopting the values and norms of the host society (Lenard 2012). Canada has not been immune to these calls to move away from multiculturalism—for example, Canada’s national newspaper called for striking the term from our national vocabulary (Globe and Mail 2010).

Indeed, from at least some directions, the demands imposed by multiculturalism are being questioned. This questioning is, perhaps, most evident in Quebec, where, for example, public controversies have erupted over whether Muslim girls and women should be permitted to wear head coverings while playing soccer, while participating in martial arts competitions, while attending language classes or while testifying in court against an accuser.¹⁰ These civic level controversies have spurred additional debates at multiple levels of government. Several towns have, controversially, adopted “codes of conduct”, which explicitly outline the norms and values to which newcomers are expected to adhere: Herouxville most famously did so, and banned stoning and throwing acid in the faces of women among other practices associated with fundamentalist forms of

Islam. Gatineau followed suit in December 2011, banning honour killings and the cooking of “smelly food”. The anxieties expressed across Quebec with respect to the challenges of accommodating newcomers were highlighted over the course of the public consultations led by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, which ultimately produced the *Report on Reasonable Accommodations* (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). And, most recently, extensive public debate over a possible Charter of Values in Quebec focused attention on the supposed integration challenges generated by Muslim newcomers (Iacovino 2015). For some, these public controversies are a manifestation of the special circumstances in Quebec, which desires to protect a distinctive public culture but which do not reflect broader trends in Canadian society.

Yet, English Canada has not been immune to these sorts of controversies, both among citizens and at multiple levels of government. For example, many Canadians mobilised to protest against a school that has allowed its cafeteria to be used, during the lunch break, for Muslim prayer.¹¹ Students in some schools in Winnipeg have been excused from both music and physical education classes, on religious and cultural grounds (Martin 2011).¹² These controversies have spilled over into the political sphere as well. Ontario’s former premier Dalton McGinty (2003–2013) declared several years ago that there would be “no sharia law” in Ontario, in response to the perfectly legal and legitimate use of an arbitration law to adjudicate familial disputes outside of the courts (Korteweg 2008). The Canadian government proposed—but then quietly abandoned—a proposal to require women to uncover their faces in order to vote.¹³ The Canadian Supreme Court heard, in December 2011, arguments in a case in which a Muslim woman requested the right to face her accuser (in a rape case) while veiled, stating that the requirement that she unveil violated her religious freedom.

To considerable public controversy, the Canadian government announced that potential citizens are not permitted to wear face coverings during their citizenship ceremony. In defending the decision, Kenney suggested that “most Canadians find that disquieting to say the least”, and went on to say that “Most Muslim Canadian women I know find the practice of face covering in our society disturbing, indicative of an approach to women that is not consistent with our democratic values”

(Gillies 2011).¹⁴ He continued: “I’m not saying that wearing a niqab is barbaric. I am saying that the whole citizenship process is an opportunity for us to instill in people a sense of Canadian—read broadly, western liberal democratic—values, including the equality of men and women”, he said. “And I think most of us would regard a ... tribal practice forcing women to cover their faces illiberal” (Paperny 2012).¹⁵ In making these claims, Kenney claimed to be protecting women who are unable to make autonomous decisions with respect to veiling, while reifying stereotypes of Islamic practice as barbaric and illiberal.¹⁶ He continued:

Effective today, everyone will be required to show their face when swearing the oath ... This is not simply a technical or practical measure—far from it. It is a matter of deep principle that goes to the heart of our identity and our values of openness and equality. The citizenship oath is a quintessentially public act. It is a public declaration that you are joining the Canadian family, and it must be taken freely and openly—not with faces hidden. To segregate one group of Canadians or allow them to hide their faces, to hide their identity from us precisely when they are joining our community is contrary to Canada’s commitment to openness and to social cohesion. All I ask of new Canadians is that, when you take the oath, you stand before your fellow citizens openly and on an equal footing.¹⁷

In making these statements—that face coverings represent a rejection of gender equality and are adopted only by those who reject Canadian values—Kenney repeated the now unfortunately familiar but misleading claims that are being made across states which are unused to (accommodating) Muslim migrants, that Muslim religious practices are somehow contrary to liberal and democratic values.¹⁸ Over the same timeframe, and using the same rhetoric, the Conservative government adopted the so-called Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act.¹⁹ This controversial Act singled out a set of practices—honour killings, forced marriages (in particular, of underage girls) and polygamy—and declared them illegal in Canada. As multiple commentators noted critically, the specified practices were already illegal in Canada. In adopting this Bill as law, the government claimed an interest in protecting the rights of girls and women in the face of harms perpetrated against them, justified by their perpetrators with reference to “culture”.

These acts—they claimed—required emphasis for the particular harms that they inflicted on vulnerable girls and women in Canada (Blanchfield 2014). During the 2015 election campaign, the Conservative government promised (if they won) to open a “tip line”, so that citizens who suspected others of such barbaric practices could report their suspicions by phone.

To many critics of these policies, including Zunera Ishaq, who challenged the legality of requiring face covers to be removed during the oath ceremony (and won), the language used to defend them represents an abandonment of the Canadian historical commitment to accommodating cultural and religious practices that are, in matter of fact, compatible with Canadian values and norms. Moreover, doing so publicly and without deliberation suggests that the desire to showcase the Canadian (historical) willingness to recognise the compatibility of diverse cultural practices in one state is being quashed, at least for now. It is not lost on anyone that the practices that are under the microscope are, uniquely, those practised by Muslim migrants to Canada.²⁰

5 Shifting Canadian Immigration Policy

Admissions to Canada have historically been guided by what is colloquially termed the “points system”. Potential immigrants to Canada are evaluated along various dimensions—ability to speak one of the two national languages, education, familial connections to Canada and so on—and are assigned “points” for each of these. If potential migrants amass sufficient points, they are considered (favourably) for admission to Canada as permanent residents.²¹ The intended outcome of this strategy for admissions is twofold: first, migrants to Canada are, in general, well-situated to integrate into Canadian society in a short period of time, and second, Canadians generally support large-scale immigration, as I outlined above, since migrants are perceived to contribute in positive and necessary ways to the Canadian economy. This story is not all positive, however—there is some recent evidence that migrants are not integrating as well as they have done in the past (Reitz and Banerjee 2007). Yet, in general, Canada’s admissions strategy has produced an environment in which migrants

integrate effectively and are perceived to be essential contributors to the economy.

At least historically, the Canadian approach to admissions contrasts with that taken in many European countries, in which temporary rather than permanent migration has been the norm (Castles 1986, 2006a, 2006b). Across European nations (Germany is just the most well-known case), temporary labour migrants were admitted in the 1960s and 1970s, and, for a variety of reasons, many of them chose to remain, either in contracts that were repeatedly renewed, or as members of an undocumented workforce. Even as it became clear that these migrants were permanent residents, these nations resisted taking steps to integrate them, and instead chose to adopt policies that served to ensure their political and economic marginalisation over time. Finally, in the mid-1990s, public opinion, and, in response, policy, began to shift—in large part because of political activism on behalf of these migrants and their supporters—towards recognising that these migrants were *de facto* permanent, and therefore required state resources in order to prosper as full members of society (Chin 2007; Barbieri 1998). Although public policy and citizenship law in many European countries have shifted, in the last ten years, towards including migrants who were initially admitted upon a temporary basis—the challenges that they continue to face in effecting their full integration continue to be significant. For many observers, therefore, the lesson to be learned from these temporary labour migration programmes is that they should, if at all possible, be avoided. Whereas they may offer short-term economic benefits, and may seem to offer short-term fixes to acute labour shortages, they pose long-term challenges (Lenard and Straehle 2012b; Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). And whereas European nations of the 1960s can be forgiven for failing to foresee these challenges, the Canadian state in the 2010s cannot.

Rather than heed these lessons, however, the Canadian government's immigration strategy has shifted dramatically over the past ten years, towards increasing the numbers of temporary foreign labour migrants admitted as a ratio of the total number of admitted migrants. While the number of migrants admitted to permanent residency has remained steady—at nearly 300,000 per year—the number of temporary migrants has grown significantly in the last decade. Canada has hosted temporary

migrants since the mid-1960s, when it opened a bilateral Seasonal Agricultural Workers' Program with Jamaica (Basok 2007). Jamaican agricultural workers—266 in the first year—migrated to Canada to work Canadian fields during the planting and harvesting seasons. But, until recently, the number of admitted temporary migrants has remained low both in absolute numbers and in relation to the number of permanent migrants admitted.

Of late, the government has shifted its immigration priorities to respond to employer complaints about labour shortages, and has adopted policies to admit greater numbers of temporary migrants (Lenard and Straehle 2012a). These include an expansion of the occupations designated as “under stress” and therefore open to temporary labour migrants; an increase in the speed with which temporary visas are issued; an expansion of visa lengths granted to migrants admitted as temporary (from 12 to 24 months); the adoption of a new programme—the Provincial/Territorial Nominee Program (PTNP)—which allows provinces and territories considerably greater say in admission decisions; and, most recently and albeit only briefly, a willingness to permit employers to pay foreign labourers up to 15 per cent less than the prevailing wage. Whereas, historically, it was the Canadian government that was responsible for selecting and admitting migrants, the PTNP hands this power to the provinces and territories (Nakache and Kinoshita 2010). The purpose of doing this, according to the Canadian government, is to allow for closer matching of the job vacancies that require filling in the Canadian provinces and the skills that potential labour migrants possess, that is, to ensure that they possess the skills needed in specific provinces. As a result of these shifts, as of 2008, the number of temporary migrants on Canadian territory in any one year (i.e., 250,000—and this number continues to rise) exceeds the number of admitted permanent residents per year.

In justifying the shift, Kenney explained that “employers are going to do a much better job at selection than a passive bureaucracy” (Paperny 2012). Employers who are responsible for ensuring that a job is available for migrants upon entry, said Kenney, will only select those whom they can afford to hire. In so doing, Canada would be able to ensure that all admitted migrants were employed. A chronic problem in Canada is

certainly the disconnect between an immigration admission system that prizes highly skilled workers who, when they are admitted, cannot find work in their chosen profession because they are believed not to possess the appropriate credentials and therefore are not competitive in the job market. Although moves are being made to standardise the mechanisms by which foreign credentials can be recognised, in the interim, allowing employers to select migrants avoids admitting migrants whom we can know in advance will not find employment. Since labour market integration is a key element of integration more generally, there is a certain logic to this approach.

Yet, there are multiple dangers here that the Canadian government appears to be wilfully ignoring. First, Canadian immigration has historically been successful for its emphasis on a holistic reading of the capacity of migrants to integrate.²² It is therefore dangerous to move towards an emphasis on skills alone—migrants have integrated in the past as a result of multiple factors beyond their skill set. The reason for entrusting a central authority with the power to admit migrants is precisely because it will be able to look beyond self-interest (which migrants possess the skills required) in order to identify migrants with a broad range of features that enable and foster integration. Second, in most cases, employers, in addition to selecting migrants based only upon their possession of a specific skill set, are selecting *temporary* migrants exclusively. These migrants are therefore not permitted to access the settlement services that are intended to facilitate the integration of migrants. Yet, as experience with temporary labour migration programmes suggests, many of these temporary migrants are likely to remain in Canada on a permanent basis. Since they are initially admitted *only* for a specific skill set, and since they are admitted without being granted access to the settlement services that facilitate integration, the danger that Canada is creating a second-class citizenry that occupies a marginalised status in Canadian society is high.²³ Third, even where employers are selecting temporary migrants, many of these individuals become entitled to stay after an extended period of time. But the procedures by which temporary migrants can transition their status are difficult to identify and disentangle, complicated by a distinct set of transition rules associated with each temporary labour migration scheme (Nakache and Kinoshita 2010).²⁴

Alongside the willingness to ease labour market access to temporary labour migrants is a focus on the (alleged) security concerns raised by other categories of migrants, in particular, refugee claimants. Citing terrorist threats on Canadian soil, the “Toronto 18”—and the movement of terrorists from Canada to the United States—the Canadian government adopted a partially “securitised” approach to migration policy, in ways that primarily affect refugee admissions to Canada. Canada shares an international border only with the United States and, as such, does not receive many requests for refugee status at the border. Two incidents have, however, highlighted the willingness of the Canadian government to identify “security” as a concern with respect to refugee admissions and to translate these concerns into fodder for raising objections to admitting refugees more generally. In 2009 and again in 2010, large vessels bringing Sri Lankan refugee claimants arrived on Canadian shores. In response to the first boatload, then Public Safety Minister Vic Toews maintained that, among the claimants, there were “suspected human smugglers and terrorists”. Then Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper concurred, noting that “Canadians are pretty concerned when a whole boat of people comes ... obviously this leads to significant security concerns”. During the 2011 Federal Election, the Conservative party capitalised on Canadian security fears in a now infamous campaign advertisement, in which the Tamils who arrived were portrayed as terrorists or criminals seeking refugee status in Canada and in which competing political parties were portrayed as being unable and unwilling to protect Canadian borders from dangerous immigrants.

The Conservative government put its money where its mouth was, and the number of asylum seekers whose claims were accepted dropped significantly while it was in power.²⁵ It equally composed and approved legislation signalling its concern with the security risks posed by migration, including the “Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act” and the “Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act”. The refugee system, said Kenney, was deeply flawed—it enabled too many “bogus refugee claims” to be made, and the cost for the Canadian taxpayer was high.²⁶ In defending these and other complementary legislation, Kenney argued that it was imperative that the government protect the “value of Canadian citizenship”; immigration fraud, he

argued, “remains a widespread threat to the integrity of our citizenship and immigration programs and costs us all”.²⁷ The danger posed by fraudulent refugee claims is presented as a threat to Canadian *identity*.

6 Conclusion: The Post-conservative Years?

Canada has been heralded around the world for its success in welcoming and integrating immigrants from diverse cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds. This success has historically been founded on three principles: a thin nationalism, a commitment to multicultural accommodation and an immigration regime that selects immigrants for their general capacity to integrate. Despite this, shifts in government policy adopted by the Conservative government of 2006–2015 have threatened to undermine Canada’s success along all three of these dimensions. As this chapter has outlined, the Canadian government spent ten years attempting to “thicken” the content of Canadian nationalism, renegeing on commitments to a wide range of multicultural accommodations and selecting immigrants only for their capacity to contribute to the Canadian labour market, all the while citing the security threats posed by other forms of migration. These were worrying trends. The consequences of these shifts in immigration policy, of the partial retrenchment from multicultural accommodation and of the move to a more conservative nationalism are difficult to measure at present.

The Conservative era is over for now. The election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government in October 2015 was widely interpreted as a resounding rejection of (among other things) the politics of fear and insecurity that the Conservatives had sown for nearly more than a decade. The new government’s discourse is uplifting—Prime Minister Trudeau has recently stated publicly that, “We need societies that recognise diversity as a source of strength, not a source of weakness”.²⁸ And, indeed, early signs are reasons for optimism: Trudeau immediately added the word “refugees” to the renamed Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada); he almost immediately carried through his promise to admit 25,000 Syrian refugees (and thousands more continue to arrive); and he

almost immediately dropped the pending court appeal which would have asked the Supreme Court of Canada to pronounce on the constitutionality of the Conservative's ban of face coverings during Canadian citizenship ceremonies. However, we must wait and see whether this language (and, ideally, further concomitant policy change) will create the climate of welcome and tolerance that is needed to rebuild trust relations among Canadian citizens and residents from their diverse backgrounds.

Notes

1. Patti Tamara Lenard and Margaret Moore, "Rooted Cosmopolitanism: A Defence of Moderate Cosmopolitanism and/or Moderate Liberal Nationalism", in Will Kymlicka and Kathryn Walker (eds), *Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012), pp. 47–68. See the essays in this volume more generally, as well.
2. There is an internal-to-Canada debate about whether this way of delineating Canadian national identity is specifically Liberal (as in, constructed by the Liberal Party of Canada) or whether it is more general.
3. "Democracy" ranked first as a source of pride.
4. A comment for which he was mocked, in Andrew Coyne, "Stephen Harper's Canada Day speech the latest volley in pointless history wars", *National Post*, 2 July 2014, available at <http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/andrew-coyne-stephen-harpers-canada-day-speech-the-latest-volley-in-pointless-history-wars>, last accessed 8 July 2016.
5. The turning away from Aboriginal iconography has been taken by many as a more general disregard for the injustices perpetrated against Aboriginal communities on an ongoing basis and as a lack of respect for these communities.
6. Bank of Canada Press Release, "Bank of Canada Unveils New \$20 Note", 2 May 2012, available at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2012/05/bank-canada-unveils-new-20-note-design>, last accessed 8 July 2016.
7. Cited in Jordan Michael Smith, "Reinventing Canada: Stephen Harper's Conservative Revolution", *World Affairs*, no. March/April (2012), available online at <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/reinventing-canada-stephen-harper%E2%80%99s-conservative-revolution>, last accessed 8 July 2016.

8. *CBC News*, “Embassies Ordered to Display Queen’s Portrait”, 9 September 2011, available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/embassies-ordered-to-display-queen-s-portrait-1.1054848>, last accessed 8 July 2016.
9. “News Release—Updated *Discover Canada* citizenship study guide now available” (14 March 2011), available at <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2011/2011-03-14a.asp>.
10. Many commentators blame the media, for fanning the flames of controversy and insist that the challenges posed by migrants’ distinctive cultural practices are more or less manufactured.
11. *CTV News*, “Groups to Protest Over Muslim Prayers in School”, 25 July 2011, available at <http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20110725/religious-groups-protest-toronto-prayer-school-110725/20110725/?hub=TorontoNewHome>, last accessed 8 July 2016. Here, the premier of Ontario is insisting that whether to allow Muslim prayers is a decision that schools are permitted to make on their own.
12. Nick Martin, “Muslim Families in Winnipeg Want Children Excused from Certain Classes”, 5 February 2011, available at <http://news.nationalpost.com/holy-post/muslim-families-in-winnipeg-want-children-excused-from-certain-classes>, last accessed 8 July 2016.
13. This is a particularly odd requirement given that Canada already permits absentee voting, which does not require that the voter show his or her face in order to vote.
14. Rob Gillies, “Canada Bans Burqa at Citizenship Swearing in”, 12 December 2011, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/canada/articles/2011/12/12/canada_bans_burqa_at_citizenship_swearing_in, last accessed 8 July 2016.
15. Anna Mehler Paperny, “Jason Kenney Wants to Stop ‘the Madness’ in Immigration System”, *The Globe and Mail*, 4 April 2012, available at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/jason-kenney-wants-to-stop-the-madness-in-immigration-system/article2392588>, last accessed 8 July 2016.
16. These are both common strategies in objecting to face coverings. For more, see Christian Joppke, *The Veil: Mirror of Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009).
17. Speaking notes for The Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P. Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, “On the value of Canadian citizenship”, Montreal, Quebec, 12 December 2011.

18. The same claim has been famously made in France, where a covered woman was denied citizenship on the grounds that she clearly indicated, by her dress, that she did not accept French values. See Katrin Bennhold, “A Veil Closes France’s Door to Citizenship”, *The New York Times*, 19 July 2008.
19. See the full text of Bill S-7, formally titled, “An act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Civil Marriage Act and the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other Acts”, which passed in to law on 16 June 2015, available at <https://openparliament.ca/bills/41-2/S-7>.
20. For an analysis of the challenges faced by Muslim migrants, see Patti Tamara Lenard, “What can Multicultural Theory Tell us about Integrating Muslims in Europe?” (2010) 8 *Political Studies Review*, pp. 308–21.
21. For a historical of Canadian immigration, see Peter S. Li, *Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
22. There is a question about the ethics of a migration policy that admits only the wealthiest or most educated of migrants, which I do not elaborate upon here.
23. This is the danger that worries the contributors to Patti Tamara Lenard and Christine Straehle (eds), *Legislated Inequality: Temporary Labour Migration in Canada* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012).
24. These challenges are outlined in Nakache and Kinoshita (2010).
25. Steven Chase, “New fast-track rules see big drop in refugee asylum claims”, *The Globe and Mail*, 21 February 2013, available at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/new-fast-track-rules-see-big-drop-in-refugee-asylum-claims/article8961268>, last accessed 8 July 2016.
26. Speaking notes for The Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P. Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, at a news conference following the tabling of Bill C-31, Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, Ottawa, 16 February 2012.
27. Speaking notes for The Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P. Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Cracking Down on Crooked Consultants. Performed by Jason Kenney. Ottawa, 8 June 2010.
28. Justin Trudeau, “Prepared Remarks: Justin Trudeau’s Speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos”, 20 January 2016 available at <http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/justin-trudeau-there-has-never-been-a-better-time-to-look-to-canada>, last accessed 8 July 2016.

References

- Adams, M. (2009). Multiculturalism Ain't Broke. *Canada Watch, Fall*(1), 4–6.
- Anderson, M. (2013). Does a Modern Canada Need Britain's Royals Anymore? *Chronicle Herald*, February 17. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from <http://thechronicleherald.ca/thenovascotian/703549-monarchy-matters>
- Barbieri, W. A. (1998). *Ethics of Citizenship: Immigration and Group Rights in Germany*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Basok, T. (2007). Canada's Temporary Migration Program: A Model Despite Flaws. *Migration Information Source*.
- Beeby, D. (2012). Canada Day: Harper Government Hires Consultant to Highlight War of 1812. *Huffington Post Canada*, January 1. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/01/08/canada-day-war-of-1812_n_1192452.html
- Bennhold, K. (2008). A Veil Closes France's Door to Citizenship. *The New York Times*, July 19.
- Bertossi, C. (2010). Mistaken Models of Integration? A Critical Perspective on the Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe. In A. Silj (Ed.), *European Multiculturalism Revisited* (pp. 235–251). New York: Zed Books.
- Blanchfield, M. (2014). Chris Alexander Cracking Down on 'Barbaric' Cultural Practices, Immigrant Polygamy. *Huffington Post Canada*, November 5. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/11/05/chris-alexander-immigration-polygamy_n_6107218.html
- Bouchard, G., & Taylor, C. (2008). *Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation*. Commission de Consultation sur les Pratiques d'Accommodement Reliées aux Différences Culture.
- Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Castles, S. (1986). The Guest-Worker in Western Europe—An Obituary. *International Migration Review*, 20(4), 761–778.
- Castles, S. (2006a). *Back to the Future? Can Europe Meet Its Labour Needs through Temporary Migration?* International Migration Institute Working Paper 01/2006. University of Oxford.
- Castles, S. (2006b). Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection? *International Migration Review*, 40(4), 741–766.
- Chin, R. (2007). *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Ditchburn, J. (2015). Harper Pays Tribute to Military on Canada Day. *Huffington Post Canada*, July 1. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/07/01/canadians-blessed-to-live_n_7703044.html
- Dufay, C. (2014). *Canada Day in Harperland: Militarism, Militarism, Militarism*, July 16. Retrieved July 16, 2016, from <http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/views-expressed/2014/07/canada-day-harperland-militarism-militarism-militarism>
- Fitzpatrick, M. (2011). *Feds Launch War of 1812 Anniversary Plans*, October 11. Retrieved July 9, 2016, from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2011/10/11/pol-war-anniversary.html>
- Gillies, R. (2011). *Canada Bans Burqa at Citizenship Swearing in*, December 12. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from http://www.boston.com/news/world/canada/articles/2011/12/12/canada_bans_burqa_at_citizenship_swearing_in
- Globe and Mail. (2010). Strike Multiculturalism from the National Vocabulary. *Globe and Mail*, October 8.
- Gwyn, R. (1996). *Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Iacovino, R. (2015). Contextualizing the Quebec Charter of Values: Belonging Without Citizenship in Quebec. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 47(1), 41–60.
- Ibbitson, J., & Anderssen, E. (2012). How Stephen Harper Is Remaking the Canadian Myth. *Globe and Mail*, May 1. Retrieved July 9, 2016, from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/how-stephen-harper-is-remaking-the-canadian-myth/article2419732>
- Joppke, C. (2009). *The Veil: Mirror of Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Korteweg, A. C. (2008). The Sharia Debate in Ontario: Gender, Islam, and Representations of Muslim Women's Agency. *Gender Society*, 22(4), 434–454.
- Kymlicka, W. (1996). *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (1998). *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (2010). The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies. In S. Vertovec & S. Wessendorf (Eds.), *The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices* (pp. 32–49). London: Routledge.
- Lenard, P. T. (2010). What Can Multicultural Theory Tell Us About Integrating Muslims in Europe? *Political Studies Review*, 8(3), 308–321.
- Lenard, P. T. (2012). The Reports of Multiculturalism's Deaths Are Greatly Exaggerated. *Politics*, 32(3), 186–196.

- Lenard, P. T., & Moore, M. (2012). Rooted Cosmopolitanism: A Defence of Moderate Cosmopolitanism and/or Moderate Liberal Nationalism. In W. Kymlicka & K. Walker (Eds.), *Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World* (p. 1). Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Lenard, P. T., & Straehle, C. (Eds.). (2012a). *Legislated Inequality: Temporary Labour Migration in Canada*. Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Lenard, P. T., & Straehle, C. (2012b). Temporary Labour Migration, Global Redistribution and Democratic Justice. *Philosophy, Politics and Economics*, 11(2), 206–230.
- Li, P. S. (2003). *Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martin, N. (2011). *Muslim Families in Winnipeg Want Children Excused from Certain Classes*, February 5. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from <http://news.nationalpost.com/holy-post/muslim-families-in-winnipeg-want-children-excused-from-certain-classes>
- McQuigge, M. (2012). Does Monarchy Policy Signal Harper's Cultural Agenda. *CTV News*, January 1. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from <http://www.ctvnews.ca/does-monarchy-policy-signal-harper-s-cultural-agenda-1.747676>
- Moore, M. (2001). Liberal Nationalism and Multiculturalism. In R. Beiner & W. Norman (Eds.), *Canadian Political Philosophy* (pp. 177–193). Toronto: University of Oxford Press.
- Nakache, D., & Kinoshita, P. J. (2010). *The Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Do Short-Term Economic Needs Prevail over Human Rights Concerns?* IRPP Study 5.
- Ottoneilli, V., & Torresi, T. (2012). Inclusivist Egalitarian Liberalism and Temporary Migration: A Dilemma. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 20(2), 202–224.
- Paperny, A. M. (2012). Jason Kenney Wants to Stop 'the Madness' in Immigration System. *Globe and Mail*, April 4. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/jason-kenney-wants-to-stop-the-madness-in-immigration-system/article2392588>
- Parekh, B. (2002). *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Pauls, K. (2015). Royal Family Support by Canadians Waning, Poll Indicates. *CBC News*, May 18. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/royal-family-support-by-canadians-waning-poll-indicates-1.3072469>

- Quong, J. (2006). Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes, and Equal Opportunities. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 23(1), 53–71.
- Reitz, J. (2011). Pro-Immigration Canada: Social and Economic Roots of Popular Views. *IRPP Study*, 20, 1–32.
- Reitz, J. G., & Banerjee, R. (2007). Racial Inequality, Social Cohesion, and Policy Issues in Canada. In K. Banting, T. J. Courchene, & F. Leslie Seidle (Eds.), *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.
- Smith, J. M. (2012, March/April). Reinventing Canada: Stephen Harper's Conservative Revolution. *World Affairs*.
- Taber, J. (2011). Harper Spins a New Brand of Patriotism. *Globe and Mail*, August 19. Retrieved July 8, 2016, from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/harper-spins-a-new-brand-of-patriotism/article2135876>
- Triadafilopoulos, T. (2004). Building Walls, Bounding Nations: Migration and Exclusion in Canada and Germany: 1870–1939. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 17(4), 385–427.
- Triadafilopoulos, T., & Schönwälder, K. (2006). How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany's Guest Worker System. *German Politics and Society*, 24(3), 1–19.
- Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (Eds.). (2010). *The Multicultural Backlash: European Discourses, Policies, Practices*. London: Routledge.
- Winter, E. (2014, January 16). Becoming Canadian: Making Sense of Recent Changes to Citizenship Rules. *Institute for Research on Public Policy*.



9

Recognition, Re-distribution and Solidarity: The Case of Multicultural Canada

Yasmeen Abu-Laban

1 Introduction

Newly elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau garnered international attention for campaign promises, as well as, ultimately, for a 2016 federal budget which decisively broke with the “austerity” agenda of the previous Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, as well as many other governments globally (Krugman 2016; BBC News 2016). Indeed, in contrasting Canada with the governments of Europe, particularly Britain, one Canadian policy analyst also went as far as to claim that “after years of austerity, Canada now plans to spend like a drunken stimulus sailor, with a \$29.4 billion [Canadian] deficit this year, and no immediate plan to return to balance” (MacDougall 2016). While it is by no means clear whether the 2016 budget is anything other than a one-time fix (Jackson 2016), the attention to Trudeau’s approach serves as a reminder that there is debate about austerity policies. In Canada, as in the countries of the Eurozone and others around the globe, austerity has

Y. Abu-Laban (✉)
University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada

raised anew very basic questions about the relationship between taxation, spending and borrowing (Ruf 2013). Like the neo-liberal policy prescriptions of the 1990s, what former British Prime Minister David Cameron dubbed the “new age of austerity” (Summers 2009) may therefore be seen to profoundly challenge the policies and understandings underpinning the post-World War II Keynesian welfare state.

It has been in this context of a challenge to the Keynesian consensus that the implications of population diversity for the welfare state have attracted ever-growing partisan, as well as scholarly attention over the course of the twenty-first century (Abu-Laban 2009; Salter 2004; Van Parijs 2004; Betz 2002; Wolfe and Klausen 2000). Stated simply, the literature addressing these debates variously seeks to uncover whether immigrants contribute to (or take from) the welfare state, and/or whether policies such as multiculturalism or demographic heterogeneity—particularly along lines of race and ethnicity—weaken the solidarity necessary to support generous welfare spending (Abu-Laban 2009). The very existence of a debate over the implications of immigration, diversity and/or multiculturalism for the continued support for the welfare state is especially notable for dramatically underscoring how potentially easy it is to blame immigrants and minorities (either explicitly or implicitly) for social insecurity (Abu-Laban 2009).

Weighing into the larger international debate, the important comparative work of Banting and Kymlicka (2004, 2006) empirically shows that there is little systematic evidence of the erosion of the welfare state due to the existence of a range of policies which might be labelled “multicultural” (multiculturalism, dual citizenship, affirmative action, etc.). More specifically for Canada, there is no evidence that immigration, ethnic diversity and/or multiculturalism weaken the welfare state (Banting 2005; Banting and Kymlicka 2006). At the same time, in the Canadian case, it appears a “highly multicultural form of nationalism (or, if you prefer, a highly national form of multiculturalism) helps mitigate the toxic effects that anti-immigrant sentiments might otherwise have for the welfare state” (Johnston et al. 2010: 369). When combined with the fact that much evidence supports the fact that immigrants contribute to the Canadian economy and the welfare state (Abu-Laban 2009; Li 2003), the case of Canada is particularly interesting from a comparative angle, not

least because the reality of “complex diversity” is one that has a deep resonance in the countries of North America, and one could go as far as to say a foundational relevance. This is because Canada, the United States and Mexico were formed as settler colonies with pre-existing Indigenous communities. An enduring reminder of their settler-colonial foundation is that, until now, many Indigenous people refer to all of North America as Turtle Island—just as they did traditionally before their first contact with Europeans.

This chapter examines the Canada component of Turtle Island, seeking to shed further light on how support for the welfare state/economic solidarity and population diversity and support for multiculturalism/pluralism have been closely inter-related in its post-World War II evolution. While all of these dimensions are in flux in an era of neo-liberalism, and, more recently, austerity, it is argued that the Canadian case has much to tell us theoretically about the possible relationships between mobilisation, claims-making, recognition as well as economic and other forms of solidarity and re-distribution. In this way, the case of Canada is important for theory building, a focus central to the comparative method.

In what follows, I forward three major claims based upon historical and contemporary evidence. First, by situating Canada as a settler colony, I underscore the complexity of unequal social power relations, national identity and the corresponding complexity of claims, especially of less powerful groups. In particular, the claims of less powerful groups typically combine recognition and re-distribution. That is to say, for minorities, the quest for recognition is not traded with re-distribution, but rather it is fused. Relatedly, these claims are not only group-specific but may also reflect economic/social and other forms of solidarity for other collectivities and for all citizens.

Second, I will address the responses of the Canadian state to the major claims of minority groups since the 1960s, in order to highlight how these responses have been shaped by the consolidation and evolution of the welfare state, as well as the evolution and understanding of citizenship and national identity. These features stand out in sharp relief when considering the decade 2006–2016. Under the leadership of the “austerity-embracing” Conservative government of Prime Minister

Harper (2006–2015), a patriotic neo-liberal citizenship emerged in which a historical narrative of military victories and Canadian's colonial ties with Britain assumed a renewed place in the symbolic order. This form of citizenship posed distinct challenges to how groups advanced claims for social justice in the light of racialised and feminised forms of precarity and inequality. In contrast, the first year of leadership of the “austerity challenging” Liberals of Prime Minister Trudeau has been characterised by a pluralistic citizenship typical of previous Canadian governments of the 1990s. However, while the return to a pluralistic citizenship re-opens space for marginalised groups to pursue claims, these groups face challenges as a result of the deep nature of cuts in the past decade, as well as the tenacity of neo-liberalism.

Finally, based upon the preceding discussion, I will posit the theoretical value of explicitly framing recognition, solidarity and re-distribution as processes that are mutually reinforce (as opposed to conflicting) and as processes also involving ongoing struggles in which the state is implicated.

2 Canada's Settler Colonial Foundation and the Fusion of Recognition/ Re-distribution in Claims

Settler colonies, as Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis (1995) have argued, are places where social relations defined by race, ethnicity, gender and class can take on highly variegated complicated forms because of pre-existing Indigenous communities and repeated waves of immigration. This is certainly the case in Canada. While most countries of the world are diverse, contemporary Canada is marked by a number of points of differentiation, not necessarily seen in the same combination in other polities. These include the division between an Indigenous population and a settler population; the division between European groups (of French and British origin or French speakers and English speakers); a racialised division between “white” and “non-white”; as well as a division between immigrants and native-born. Combined, this means that Canada

is not only a “country of immigration” but also contains “stateless nations” within its borders (hence, the contemporary attention to Indigenous “First Nations”, or the “Québécois”, in the predominantly French-speaking province of Québec) (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009).

In addition, this has meant that a range of social movements—including the labour movement and the women’s movement—have been confronted with and shaped by these divisions. For example, during attempts at constitutional reform in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s, the organisation representing the women of Quebec (*Fédération des femmes du Québec*) split from the self-defined national Canadian body representing all women of Canada (the National Action Committee on the Status of Women) because of disagreements relating to constitutional change. In addition, the women’s movement has, in many ways, been at the forefront of attempts to grapple with difference (based upon race, ethnicity, language, class, etc.). The advance of a feminist anti-racism was symbolised when the first woman of colour, or non-white woman, Sunera Thobani, served as president of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women between 1993 and 1996 (see also Dobrowolsky 2000).

Because of their internal heterogeneity, as Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis also note, national myths in settler colonies do not, in fact cannot, rely on memories of common origin as they might in other polities. Instead, they typically invoke a common destiny (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 1995). To take a known example, we see this “looking towards a common destiny” in the enduring metaphor of the United States as a “melting pot”. This metaphor was popularised as a result of British playwright Israel Zangwill’s play “The Melting Pot”, which premiered in 1908 in a period of American history in which there was a lot of anxiety about the so-called new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe (Abu-Laban and Lamont 1997). Notably, the play drew very mixed reviews, which was indicative of the anxiety surrounding the new immigration (Abu-Laban and Lamont 1997).

In Canada, the chosen metaphor, still in wide circulation today, has been that of “the mosaic”. Notably, the idea of the Canadian mosaic had popular purchase well before official or state multiculturalism was enacted by the Canadian federal state in 1971. The mosaic metaphor gained prominence and circulation through the work of John Murray Gibbon

(1875–1952), when he served as the European Advertising Agent for the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR). Gibbon began his work at CPR in 1913, which was also a period in which Canada was taking in large numbers of “new immigrants” from Southern and Eastern Europe. The CPR was, of course, critical in transporting immigrants to “settle” the area of western Canada.

Under Gibbon, the CPR, amongst other things, sponsored folk festivals in the Canadian prairies, which featured songs and handicrafts from European groups composed of what he termed old-timers (i.e., Canadians of British and French origin) who started the proceedings, as well as a range of so-called racial groups, from diverse countries of Europe, who joined later (Henderson 2005). It was typical for a Gibbon pageant to end with the various races coming together to sing *O Canada* and *God Save the King*. Clearly, and not to put too fine a point on it, these were sung in English (Henderson 2005: 158–159). In other words, the nature and ordering of the presentations, as well as the culminating anthems, left little doubt that those who were white, of British origin, and English speaking were, and would remain, hegemonic.

In 1938, John Murray Gibbon (1938) wrote the book entitled *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation*. Graphically in the title is the idea of the nation in process—in being wilfully made and in the act of “becoming”—which is so characteristic of settler colonies. Gibbon also used the idea of the mosaic to express what he saw as a point of positive differentiation with the American “melting pot”, so the mosaic (not unlike Canada’s contemporary policy of multiculturalism) served to re-inforce national identity and even pride.

Gibbon’s mosaic was focused exclusively on European groups, and therefore little reference was ever made to Indigenous peoples (who were also largely written off the landscape of the western Canadian pageants just as they were literally written off the land). Likewise, in Gibbon’s mosaic, no reference is ever made to African-Canadians or Asian-Canadians (Henderson: 165).

By the 1960s, the mosaic idea found its way into scholarly studies of the social stratification in Canada. In particular, the classic 1965 book of sociologist John Porter entitled *The Vertical Mosaic* illustrated how ethnicity and social class overlapped in Canada. Porter’s work showed that

those of British origin had higher incomes, and higher levels of education, and were over-represented in decision-making spheres in comparison to those of French origin, Southern and Eastern Europeans and particularly Indigenous people. Incoming immigrant groups assumed a kind of “entrance status” at, or near, the bottom of the pecking order (Porter 1965).

On the ground, the period of the 1960s was to mark a major transition with the rise of new social movements. Important movements that formed, or resurged, in the 1960s drew inspiration from the human-rights revolution and de-colonisation movements in the developing world, essentially to challenge the vertical mosaic and pressures for Anglo-conformity (i.e., for the dominant group to be the norm against which all others are to conform). As a result, there were different types of assertions of what might be termed “de-colonisation”.

The first de-colonising impulse was to be a general assertion of Canadian independence from Britain through, for example, the adoption of a national flag of Canada in 1965 in place of variants containing the Union Jack, or eventually constitutional changes in 1982 which allowed for the constitution to be amended without approval from Britain (indeed, prior to 1982, Canada’s constitution was even called the *British North America Act*).

A second de-colonising effort came from francophones, who resisted what they experienced as colonial domination—economically, politically and linguistically—by English speakers of British origin. French Quebecers, in particular, found inspiration in the 1962 provincial slogan *maître chez nous* (Masters in our Own House) used by Premier Jean Lesage. The philosophy behind this slogan marked a period in which greater provincial powers were sought and used to create a Ministry of Education, reform healthcare, nationalise hydroelectricity, create a Quebec Pension Plan and seek constitutional recognition and a veto power on amendments (these constitutional ambitions never came to pass, accounting for why Quebec still has not formally signed on to the constitutional changes introduced in 1982). However, the general point that needs to be taken from this overview is that it would be difficult to disentangle concerns with recognition from concerns with re-distribution in the case of the *Québécois*, or expressions of economic solidarity. In fact,

the very development of the Quebec welfare state itself may be seen as an expression of identity. The relevance of provincial social programmes for minority national expression may re-inforce other aspects of (sub-) state national expression¹ as well as the relatively greater support that Quebecers give to provincial social spending compared to others in Canada, including areas such as early childhood education and care (Adkin and Abu-Laban 2008).

A third form of de-colonisation emerged from Indigenous (Aboriginal or First Nations) groups. Indigenous people in Canada have consistently been and remain amongst the worst off in terms of socio-economic indicators, and many will very explicitly maintain that the contemporary Canadian state is a colonial state (Alfred 2005; Coulthard 2014a), and this perspective remains current even in a context in which certain past practices, such as residential schools, have been acknowledged as harmful by Canadian state officials (Abu-Laban 2016). Since the 1960s and 1970s, Indigenous people have sought an end to assimilative policies, as well as land claims and forms of self-government. The Dene scholar Glen Coulthard (2014b) argues that identity claims for recognition by Indigenous peoples are, in fact, always connected with demands for a more equitable distribution of land, political power and economic resources. As such, he critiques the left position inspired by Nancy Fraser that posits recognition and re-distribution to be in tension. Although the later work of Nancy Fraser acknowledges the thorny question of (mis-)representation in the context of globalisation and the post-Westphalian state, raising issues of justice that go beyond recognition and re-distribution (Fraser 2005), she is especially known for suggesting that recognition comes at the expense of re-distribution (see, e.g., Fraser 2000). Coulthard specifically draws on Fraser (2003: 22) when she observed that, rather than enriching re-distribution struggles, recognition struggles serve to “marginalize, eclipse and displace them” (ibid.). In contradistinction, Coulthard argues that this position is actually “misguided when applied to settler-colonial contexts” (2014b: 149). Coulthard also makes the point that there is far greater transformative potential (in the terms articulated by Nancy Fraser) when Indigenous groups make claims for self-determination (rather than recognition), and in those claims that are

informed by the land “as a system of reciprocal relations and obligations”, rather than by treating the land as a material resource to be exploited (Coulthard 2014b: 170).

In Canada, there are also distinctive legal and constitutional bases for the claims of Indigenous peoples and francophones both in and outside Quebec. In contrast, what is sometimes referred to as “the third force” (i.e., non-British, non-French and non-Aboriginal groups) did not have these bases. But they, too, reacted and mobilised against Anglo-conformity in the context of the political opportunities afforded. Thus, in 1963, when the federal government formed *The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism* in response to renewed nationalism in Quebec, “the third force” challenged the depiction of Canada as comprised of only two cultures (English and French). In addressing the findings of this commission, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual (English and French) framework in 1971.

Although, in its first decade of existence, the multiculturalism policy gave support to folkloric elements of culture (not unlike the pageants sponsored by the CPR and Gibbon in the 1930s), multiculturalism provided a framework to pursue other demands for state resources and recognition. By the early 1980s, in response to demands from growing numbers of racialised minorities, the policy shifted to deal with anti-racism, and, in addition, provided a basis to successfully pursue legislated affirmative measures (employment equity) by 1986 (Stasiulis 1988: 90–92). As a result of minority mobilisation, multiculturalism was also constitutionally entrenched in the 1982 *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

It is instructive to look closely at the claims of ethnic minorities in pushing for the constitutional recognition of multiculturalism in the Charter, as well as subsequent proposed constitutional amendments in the 1980s and 1990s. Although some media and academic accounts posit that those focusing on multiculturalism were narrow and focused on their “particular” group, rather than on all Canadian citizens, this understanding is not substantiated by a close reading of the actual claims that were forwarded (Abu-Laban and Nieguth 2000). These

actual claims reveal that, in pursuing constitutional recognition of multiculturalism, minorities did so from the perspective of also asserting the need to recognize many other collectivities, thereby advancing justice and recognition claims outside of the framework of multiculturalism. Thus, they also stressed the need to support the claims of Aboriginal people, francophones both in and outside Quebec, women and persons with disabilities (Abu-Laban and Nieguth 2000). Although they were not successful, minorities also pursued constitutional recognition of affordable (higher) education and social programmes designed for all Canadian citizens, such as universal healthcare and old age security (Abu-Laban and Nieguth 2000).

Put differently, the history of the multicultural movement, and the advance of claims, was done through solidarity—including both political solidarity for other disempowered groups seeking constitutional recognition, and also economic solidarity underpinning the programmes associated with the social dimensions of Canadian citizenship. More broadly, Matt James, in his book *Misrecognized Materialists*, shows how women, workers and ethnic minorities who made identity claims for recognition in the context of constitutional debates in Canada between the 1930s and the 1990s were often primarily concerned with economic security and re-distribution (James 2006). These claims illustrate the manner in which the three elements of recognition, forms of solidarity and re-distribution are inter-related in claims-making.

To summarise, unequal social relations have characterised Canada's foundation and evolution, and historically full citizenship rights were also denied to marginalised groups (e.g., women, racialised minorities and, until 1961, status Indians). The evidence across many social groups in Canada over several decades suggests that they were, and still are, concerned with economic inequality, that recognition claims are often re-distributive claims and express solidarity, and that solidarity itself takes economic and non-economic dimensions. In this regard, it is also helpful to recognise how the Canadian (welfare) state also plays a role in these dynamics and the shifting terrain of what social citizenship means.

3 The Consolidation and Evolution of the Canadian Welfare State and the Tensions Between Patriotic and Pluralist Citizenship

With the development of the welfare state, the federal Canadian state has not only been involved in managing relationships between the state, the market and the family (as well as the voluntary/not-for-profit sector), but it has also been involved in what Raymond Breton (1984: 127) calls the management of the symbolic order. More specifically, responses to the claims of social movements emerging from the 1960s paired the Keynesian welfare state with a culturally pluralist ethos of citizenship and national identity (Abu-Laban 2009: 149).

The consolidation of programmes associated with the Canadian welfare state came in the late 1960s—that is, later than in many European countries (Harder 2003) and, in the terms of Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990), the Canadian welfare state might be seen as liberal due to the relatively weaker emphasis on universal programmes and stronger emphasis on needs and means-tested programmes in comparison with Northern European countries. However, by the late 1960s, Canada's welfare state came to include, in terms of legislation, the Unemployment Insurance Act, the Family Allowance Act, the Medical Care Act, the Canada Pension Plan, the Quebec Pension Plan and last, but not least, the Canada Assistance Plan, which facilitated joint, equivalent and uncapped federal and provincial funding of programmes.

Notably, however, the post-war Canadian welfare state was not only about these programmes but also symbolised that there was a role for the state as a champion of social justice (Jenson 1997: 634) and in responding to the desire of different collectivities to see themselves in public institutions (Breton 1984).

It is difficult to think of a more symbolic policy than multiculturalism. It has never, in comparative terms with other areas of cultural spending, received much funding. It was never designed to ameliorate class- or gender-based inequalities. Moreover, it encouraged all kinds of

platitudes—especially in election campaigns. However, multiculturalism has served as an important and inclusionary discourse, as well as providing a framework for the advancement of claims by ethnic minorities (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992). In other words, it provided a means for more Canadians to see themselves in public institutions and to make claims in relation to these institutions.

Claims-making was enhanced by federal spending. Thus, in addition to the funding of women's groups and Indigenous groups, from the 1970s, new public policies such as multiculturalism and official bilingualism entailed the funding of ethnic and linguistic minorities to enable them to engage in the policy process better, simultaneously legitimising the recognition and claims of less powerful groups in the name of citizen equality (Breton 1986; Jenson and Phillips 1996).

However, under successive Liberal governments in the 1990s, the situation changed when key programmes that marked the consolidation of the welfare state were dismantled (such as the Family Allowance Act and the Canada Assistance Plan). As the recent academic literature attests, a spate of labels—lean, competitive, liberal, neo-liberal, post-Keynesian, post-neo-liberal—have emerged to distinguish the current state configurations from the post-war welfare state (Abu-Laban 2009: 150). The term “neo-liberal”, arguably, captures certain assumptions that have framed much of the public debate and the policy environment, both in Canada and internationally since the 1980s and 1990s (even if neo-liberalism might lack coherence due to crises of its own creation—see Brodie 2012: 13–14). These assumptions include a more limited role for the state, and, consequently, an emphasis on cutting back social spending, a greater stress on individual self-sufficiency, and a belief that free markets are efficient allocators of goods and services (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002: 21).

Since the 1990s, neo-liberal policy rationales have transformed the nature of Canadian social citizenship. Moreover, neo-liberal policy changes also served to limit support to, as well as the claims-making abilities of, disadvantaged groups. This is because of the cuts to funding as well as the new terms for funding. As Jenson and Phillips (1996) show, the re-making of social policy in the mid-1990s clearly also lent support

to an ideological attack on groups such as women, racial minorities and the poor, for these groups came to be depicted as “special interests” whose demands and issues contrasted with those of “ordinary Canadians”.

As a consequence, the equity agenda was dealt a severe blow, and the national presence of women’s groups and minority groups (amongst others) was weakened (Abu-Laban 2013). Moreover, the disappearance of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women from the federal scene has consequences for minority women as well as men. This is because the women’s movement has been at the forefront of articulating a politics of anti-racist feminism. Indeed, such a politics is actually especially needed in the post-9/11 period,² where gender equality has been appropriated into clash of civilisations discourses, also by the Harper Conservatives (Abu-Laban 2013; Razack 2008).³

Not least, neo-liberalism has gone hand in hand with a deepening feminisation and racialisation of poverty amongst Canadian citizens (Brodie 2008; Galabuzi 2011). This broader racialisation of inequality may be seen to have been further aggravated by the increasing use of temporary migrant workers who are denied Canadian citizenship. In fact, between 2006 and 2012, the number of temporary entrants to Canada has actually exceeded the number of those that are selected for permanent residence (Rajkumar et al. 2012: 484).

The growing diversity and array of programmes to facilitate temporary entry has led to a plethora of rules and practices governing issues relating to security, employment for spouses as well as social services, including settlement services, which suggests that Canada produces inequality through policy (Rajkumar et al. 2012). This inequality is not only between citizens and non-citizens who reside in Canada but also amongst non-citizens who reside in Canada. This is where it becomes compelling to consider Diane Sainsbury’s call⁴ (2012) to attend to the welfare state in relation to immigrant rights and refugee rights. In the Canadian case, funding was cut (e.g., cuts in 2012 for the healthcare of refugees which doctors argued compromised the care and safety of pregnant women, amongst others—see Ubelacker 2012). Moreover, the multiple forms of precarity in relation to legal and social citizenship require new conceptual thinking (Goldring et al. 2009).

Not least, between 2006 and 2015, under the Harper Conservatives, a form of “patriotic citizenship” was superimposed over neo-liberal citizenship. This “patriotic neo-liberal citizenship” had all the features of neo-liberalism described above but further entailed a qualitative shift in the symbolic order. Specifically, the hallmark features of patriotic citizenship featured a valorisation of military history over social history in official national narratives; a valorisation of military victory over peacekeeping; and a valorisation of the crown and British ties to Canada over pluralism and multiculturalism. In the words of Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, Canada was re-branded as a “warrior nation” (2012).

Patriotic citizenship is clearly illustrated in a citizenship guide released in 2009 (and still in effect) which was explicitly aimed not only at immigrants seeking Canadian citizenship but also at the national memory of all Canadians, in numerous statements by the former Conservative Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney and former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, as well as in the new forms of public spending (such as the Canadian \$28 million committed by the federal government to commemorate in 2012, the bicentennial of the War of 1812) (Abu-Laban 2013; Canada 2012; McKay and Swift 2012).

It is also illustrated in lexicon—hence, the move in August 2011 to re-institute the word “royal” into the titles given to branches of the Canadian military, transforming the “Air Command” to “Royal Canadian Air Force”, and the “Maritime Command” to the “Royal Canadian Navy”. Military historian Jack Granatstein, who headed the Canadian War Museum between 1998 and 2001, called the re-naming “abject colonialism”, arguing that it was “odd in the 21st century to be reverting to royal titles for the navy and air force” (quoted in Yelaja 2011). However, it is actually not “odd” when placed as a plank in the attempted transformation of Canadian citizenship and national memory from pluralist to patriotic, with its emphasis on Canada’s ties to Britain. It also suggests that the politically controversial agreement worked out between Canada and the United Kingdom in September 2012 to share some embassies and consulates abroad was not only about cutting costs but also symbolic; this may account for some of the controversy that this move generated in Canada (Radio Canada 2012).

It is true that the Harper Conservatives went further than any other government previously in entertaining claims for historic redress and had, in some instances, issued apologies (e.g., for residential schools in the case of Aboriginal people, and the head tax which historically limited the migration of spouses and family members of Chinese-Canadians). A now defunct 2008 programme under the rubric of multiculturalism (the Community Historical Recognition Programme) allowed for educational/commemorative projects for groups recognised to have been affected by wartime measures or immigration restrictions. While this may be seen as positive, it should not preclude attention being given to the larger dynamics of this programme. As Matt James argues, the overall approach was one of “neo-liberal heritage redress” (James 2013). For James, neo-liberal heritage redress involved placing restrictive conditions on both the possibility and use of state funding, allowing the government to pick select groups that will be rewarded, as well as severely limiting contemporary claims for social justice, equity and anti-racism (James 2013). It could therefore be critiqued for failing to deal with contemporary inequities stemming from race, gender, class and citizenship status.

More to the point, under the Harper Conservatives, the larger symbolic order ignored the history of social groups, favouring military history, militarised patriotism and Canada’s colonial ties with Britain. In short, under the Harper Conservatives, there was an attempted return to the status quo ante of the 1930s Gibbon era of the Canadian mosaic, when there was no doubt about who really held power. The patriotic shift in the symbolic order also bore implications for the welfare state, in so far as it combines a retrenchment of a “multicultural form of nationalism” (Johnston et al. 2010: 369) along with a retrenchment of social citizenship.

Given the many developments over nearly ten years of the Harper government, it is notable that, within the first year of office, the Trudeau Liberals decisively moved to challenge many of these changes while also critiquing austerity. For example, discussions of fighting racism and economic disparities are in greater evidence in statements on multiculturalism (Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage 2016: 26). Likewise, rather than the monarchy and war being presented as the

“ties that bind”, the focus has instead been on diversity. In the words of the Canadian Heritage Minister Mélanie Joly, “we are made stronger because of our diversity, not in spite of it” (Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage 2016: 5). Four discrete annual day-long celebrations featuring Canada, Indigenous peoples, Quebec and multiculturalism have now been re-branded and packaged as a new “Celebrate Canada” four-day event (Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage 2016: 5). Not least, planned celebrations of the 150th anniversary of Confederation (the founding of the modern Canadian state) were slated to focus on Canada’s regional, linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversity—as opposed to Britain, the Queen, and the military (Canada, Government of Canada 2016). This return to a more pluralistic citizenship has potentially provided greater discursive space to pursue claims, and—for now anyway—was accompanied by a rejection of austerity policies, as seen in the most recent budget. However, as noted, it is unclear what future budgets might hold, and because neo-liberalism has been so deeply embedded, it remains to be seen whether contemporary inequities can be mitigated.

To recap this section, the consolidation and early development of the Canadian welfare state supported the advancement of a culturally pluralist nation and social citizenship. With the neo-liberal turn, this ethos has been strained, especially as disadvantaged groups had a weakened national presence, and socio-economic inequalities were exacerbated. The Harper-era “patriotic citizenship” further crowded the discursive space for minorities to advance claims to deal with contemporary inequities. Underscoring the mutually re-inforcing relationship between recognition, re-distribution and solidarity, it is notable that, since the Trudeau Liberals came to power, there has been greater emphasis on both recognition (pluralist citizenship) and solidaristic re-distributive schemes (in the form of rejecting austerity policies). However, it remains to be seen whether the Trudeau Liberals will be able to maintain (let alone, enhance) the challenge to neo-liberalism and austerity. Nonetheless, the current moment indicates that recognition, solidarity and re-distribution tend to be mutually re-inforcing in Canada.

4 Towards Theorising Recognition, Re-distribution and Solidarity as Processes

By way of conclusion, we should ask ourselves what might be gleaned from the Canadian case in broader theoretical terms. First, the Canadian case suggests that the claims of disadvantaged groups typically fuse recognition and re-distribution claims. Second, and flowing from this, it shows that the claims of minority collectivities can reflect political solidarity with other minoritised groups, as well as the economic solidarity associated with the welfare state. This suggests the need for a broader conception of solidarity that links both economic and non-economic dimensions. Third, the Canadian case highlights that the welfare state has taken different forms, which may advance or limit claims-making, and that nation-state symbolism may take different forms (from the culturally pluralist form before Prime Minister Harper, to the militarised patriotic form under Prime Minister Harper, and then back to the culturally pluralistic former under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau).

In the light of these three points, I would put forward that there is theoretical value in re-framing *recognition*, *re-distribution* and *solidarity* as ongoing mutually re-inforcing processes involving both social and state actors.

Aboriginal artist Bill Reid's sculpture *The Spirit of Haida Gwaii* depicts a boat crammed with human and non-human figures drawn from the mythology of the Haida people. This image was also on the Canadian 20-dollar bill, until it was replaced in 2012 by an image commemorating the Battle of Vimy Ridge in World War II. The Canadian Museum of Civilization describes the sculpture as follows:

The sculpture encompasses mythical creatures, animals, men and women, who together represent not just a single culture but the entire family of living beings. The canoe is filled to overflowing with creatures who bite and claw one another as they doggedly paddle along. (Canadian Museum of Civilization [n.d.](#))

Picking up on artist Bill Reid's observation that "the boat moves on, forever anchored in the same place" (Canadian Museum of Civilization n.d.), Canadian philosopher Jocelyn Maclure (2003) draws parallels with the politics of recognition. For Maclure, there is no end point to recognition, not least because there is always internal heterogeneity within groups (the issue of "minorities within minorities" is also a concern long raised by feminists and other theorists; see, e.g., Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005). In other words, because there are asymmetrical power relations both between and within groups, conversations and claims will continue (2003: 3–4). Maclure helpfully posits that we need a shift in language from "recognition", to "*struggling for* recognition". This, he suggests, re-frames our thinking away from some kind of "end-state of recognition", and invites us, instead, to consider struggles for recognition as part of democratic politics, and re-imagining justice (2003: 4).

A similar point could also be made about re-distribution and economic and non-economic forms of solidarity. Beginning with T.H. Marshall (1965) in his classic work on the development of the British citizenship, the social citizenship afforded by the welfare state was presented in evolutionary terms.⁵ In essence, re-distribution was presented as an end point. Arguably, the presentation of an end-state of re-distribution may also be seen in other common expressions such as "post-war settlement"—as if everything was "settled" when we know that, at least since the 1980s, there has been a lot of debate as well as dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state. Contemporary debates over the appropriateness of austerity measures in the advanced economies today (Krugman 2012), not to mention the vibrant politics on the streets of Greece, Cyprus and elsewhere in 2012 and 2013, are suggestive that there are ongoing struggles for re-distribution and social, political and economic solidarity.

Struggles for re-distribution and solidarity have been evident in Canada. On the one hand, there are opinion surveys/polls which suggest that many Canadians may perceive the economic situation positively. For example, a Bank of Montreal Labour Day survey in 2012 found nearly two-thirds (64%) felt they had job security (Freeman 2012). Moreover, Canada's Conservative finance minister had routinely stressed Canada's economic growth, and that its GDP recovery was the best of the G7 countries (Robinson and O'Kane 2012). Headlines such as "Canada's

Economy Outperforming U.S.” are also in abundance (CBC News 2012). On the other hand, the lived experience of many Canadians and the reality of globalisation would suggest that Canada is not some sheltered oasis. As Janine Brodie noted in 2012:

... in an increasingly complex and interdependent global economy, Canada is neither protected nor immune from trouble. In fact, Canada has many of the precarious markers of this era. Income inequality is growing more quickly here than in the US and surpasses levels set in the 1920s; personal debt has never been higher; savings have never been lower; and un- and under-employment are stubbornly high, especially in former manufacturing hubs and among the young, the racialized, and newcomers. This says nothing about those who, at the stroke of a government or corporate pen, find themselves without a paycheck. (Brodie 2012: 4)

The reverberating impact of the Occupy Wall Street movement across Canadian cities in 2011, as well as the many month-long student strike in Quebec over tuition fees in 2012, is indicative of support for democracy, for social policies and for social and economic solidarity (Bherer and Dufour 2012; Smith 2012). They are also suggestive of the ongoing challenge to neo-liberal globalisation and capitalism since the onset of the financial crisis of 2007/2008.

In the final analysis, the Canadian case is one that draws attention to how diversity has coincided with support for the welfare state (Banting 2005; Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Johnston et al. 2010). The Canadian case also shows that claims for recognition, re-distribution and solidarity are part and parcel of the expression of diversity politics. This may be seen to be a feature of the “complex diversity” that characterises Canadian liberal democracy today and was set in place in its settler-colonial foundation. In the light of the fact that recognition, re-distribution and solidarity may be seen as ongoing processes in democratic politics, the neo-liberal patriotic citizenship advanced by the Harper Conservatives was subject to contestation. Not only did historians counter the military and imperial narrative of the Harper Conservatives, by stressing the importance of social movement politics in shaping the nature and rights associated with Canadian citizenship (Jones and Perry 2012), but the

Liberals of Justin Trudeau also challenged austerity and have re-worked the symbolic order.

It is evident that Canadian social groups and movements face challenges in advancing a social justice agenda in an era of patriotic citizenship underpinned by neo-liberalism and austerity. This is also a reminder that it is important to consider how the (welfare) state impacts upon minorities, citizens and non-citizens, by enabling or constraining citizenship, rights and claims (see, also, Sainsbury 2012). Given the salience of the ongoing debate over diversity and the welfare state, especially in European polities, this is a relevant question to be asking in comparative research, all the more so, given that there is little consensus about the appropriateness of austerity measures, even if such measures may be defining a new age.

Notes

1. For example, it is interesting to note that the sovereignist *Parti Québécois* government removed the Canadian flag from the Quebec National Assembly when being sworn into power in September 2012, and incoming Premier Pauline Marois had it removed from the Office of the Premier in favour of having just the Quebec flag (Rhéal Séguin, “Canadian Flag back in Quebec Assembly—For Now”, *The Globe and Mail*, 18 September 2012, available at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadian-flag-back-in-quebec-assembly-for-now/article4551306>, last accessed 2 October 2012).
2. The period following the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.
3. One example of this might be found in the 2009 Conservative changes to the citizenship guide which introduced the language of “barbarism” and posited violence against women as the sole practice of cultural “Others”, by implicitly drawing on stereotypes about Muslims. See Yasmeen Abu-Laban, “Reform by Stealth: The Harper Conservatives and Canadian Multiculturalism”, in Jack Jedwab (ed), *The Multicultural Question: Debating Identity in 21st Century Canada* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), pp. 149–172; see, also, Sherene Razack, *Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and*

Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), on the construction of the barbaric Muslim male and oppressed Muslim female). This is contained in the following statement: “In Canada, men and women are equal under the law. Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, ‘honour killings’, female genital mutilation or other gender-based violence. Those guilty of these crimes are severely punished under Canada’s criminal laws” (Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship*. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Represented by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2012, p. 10).

4. Diane Sainsbury, *Welfare, Ethnicity and Altruism: New Findings and Evolutionary Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
5. T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1965).

References

- Abu-Laban, Y. (2009). The Welfare State Under Siege?: Neoliberalism, Immigration and Multiculturalism. In A. Dobrowolsky (Ed.), *Women and Public Policy in Canada: Neo-liberalism and After* (pp. 146–165). Don Mills: Oxford University Press.
- Abu-Laban, Y. (2013). On the Borderlines of Human and Citizen: The Liminal State of Arab Canadians. In B. Momani & J. Hennebray (Eds.), *Targeted Transnationals: The State, the Media, and Arab Canadians* (pp. 68–88). Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Abu-Laban, Y. (2014). Reform by Stealth: The Harper Conservatives and Canadian Multiculturalism. In J. Jedwab (Ed.), *The Multiculturalism Question: Debating Identity in 21st Century Canada* (pp. 149–172). Montreal-Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University and McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- Abu-Laban, Y. (2016). Representing a Diverse Canada in Political Science: Power, Ideas and the Emergent Challenge of Reconciliation. *European Political Science*. Online First.
- Abu-Laban, Y., & Gabriel, C. (2002). *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalization*. Peterborough: Broadview Press.

- Abu-Laban, Y., & Lamont, V. (1997). Crossing Borders: Interdisciplinarity, Immigration and the Melting Pot in the American Cultural Imaginary. *The Canadian Review of American Studies*, 27(2), 23–43.
- Abu-Laban, Y., & Nieguth, T. (2000). Reconsidering the Constitution, Minorities and Politics in Canada. *The Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXXIII(3), 465–497.
- Abu-Laban, Y., & Stasiulis, D. (1992). Ethnic Pluralism Under Siege: Popular and Partisan Opposition to Multiculturalism. *Canadian Public Policy*, XVIII(4), 365–386.
- Adkin, L., & Abu-Laban, Y. (2008). The Challenge of Care: Early Childhood Education and Care in Canada and Quebec. *Studies in Political Economy*, 81(1), 49–76.
- Alfred, T. (2005). *Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom*. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
- Banting, K. (2005). The Multicultural Welfare State: International Experience and North American Narratives. *Social Policy and Administration*, 39(2), 98–115.
- Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (2004). Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State? In P. van Parijs (Ed.), *Cultural Diversity Versus Economic Solidarity* (pp. 227–284). Brussels: Deboeck University Press.
- Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (Eds.). (2006). *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BBC News. (2016). *Trudeau Seeks Increased Spending to Boost Canadian Economy*, March 23. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35877830>
- Betz, H.-G. (2002). Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe. In L. Panitch & C. Leys (Eds.), *Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism (Socialist Register 2003)* (pp. 193–210). London: Merlin Press.
- Bherer, L., & Dufour, P. (2012). Our Not-So-Friendly Northern Neighbor. *The New York Times*. Retrieved October 2, 2012, from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/opinion/our-not-so-friendly-northern-neighbor.html?_r=2&
- Breton, R. (1984). The Production and Allocation of Symbolic Resources: An Analysis of the Linguistic and Ethnocultural Fields in Canada. *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 21(2), 123–144.
- Breton, R. (1986). Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building. In A. Cairns & C. Williams (Eds.), *The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Language*

- in Canada* (pp. 27–66). Toronto: University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada.
- Brodie, J. (2008). Putting Gender Back in: Women and Social Policy Reform in Canada. In Y. Abu-Laban (Ed.), *Gendering the Nation-State: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives* (pp. 165–184). Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Brodie, J. (2012). *Social Literacy and Social Justice in Times of Crisis*. Trudeau 'Big Thinking' Lecture, Congress 2012. Wilfred Laurier University, Waterloo, May 30.
- Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2012). *Discover Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship*. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Represented by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.
- Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage. (2016). *Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act: Building a Diverse and Inclusive Society*. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship. Retrieved July 3, 2016, from <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/multi-ar-en-2015.pdf>
- Canada, Government of Canada. (2016). *Backgrounder: The 150th Anniversary of Confederation in 2017*, May 25. Retrieved July 3, 2016, from <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=index&crtr.page=2&nid=1072209>
- Canadian Museum of Civilization. (n.d.). *Grand Hall Tour*. Retrieved September 21, 2012, from <http://www.civilization.ca/cmcc/exhibitions/aborig/grand/gh04eng.shtml>
- CBC News. (2012). *Canada's Economy Outperforming U.S.: Flaherty Says Modest Growth Reinforces Canada Is on the 'Right Track'*, August 31. Retrieved September 1, 2012, from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2012/08/31/economy-gdp-canada.html>
- Coulthard, G. (2014a). *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Coulthard, G. (2014b). Place Against Empire: The Dene Nation, Land Claims and the Politics of Recognition in the North. In A. Eisenberg, J. Webber, G. Coulthard, & A. Boisselle (Eds.), *Recognition Versus Self-Determination: Dilemmas of Emancipatory Politics* (pp. 147–173). Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Dhamoon, R., & Abu-Laban, Y. (2009). Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and Nation-Building: The Case of Canada. *International Political Science Review*, 30(2), 163–183.
- Dobrowolsky, A. (2000). *The Politics of Pragmatism: Women, Representation and Constitutionalism in Canada*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Eisenberg, A., & Spinner-Halev, J. (2005). *Minorities Within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University of Press.

- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fraser, N. (2000). Rethinking Recognition. *New Left Review*, 3(May–June), 107–120.
- Fraser, N. (2003). Rethinking Recognition: Overcoming Displacement and Reification in Cultural Politics. In B. Hobson (Ed.), *Recognition Struggles and Social Movements: Identities, Agency and Power* (pp. 21–32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fraser, N. (2005). Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World. *New Left Review*, 36(November/December), 69–88.
- Freeman, S. (2012). Labour Day: BMO Survey. *The Calgary Herald*, August 29. Retrieved September 1, 2012, from <http://www.calgaryherald.com/business/economy/Canadians+more+optimistic+about+security+this+Labour/7160806/story.html>
- Galabuzi, G.-E. (2011). Hegemonies, Continuities, and Discontinuities of Multiculturalism and the Anglo-Franco Conformity Order. In M. Chazan, L. Helps, A. Stanley, & S. Thakkar (Eds.), *Home and Native Land: Unsettling Multiculturalism in Canada* (pp. 58–82). Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Gibbon, J. M. (1938). *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation*. Toronto: McClelland.
- Goldring, L., Berinstein, C., & Bernhard, J. K. (2009). Institutionalizing Precarious Migratory Status in Canada. *Citizenship Studies*, 13(3), 239–265.
- Harder, L. (2003). Whither the Social Citizen? In J. Brodie & L. Trimble (Eds.), *Reinventing Canada: Politics of the 21st Century* (pp. 175–188). Toronto: Pearson.
- Henderson, S. (2005). ‘While There Is Still Time ...’ J. Murray Gibbon and the Spectacle of Difference in Three CPR Festivals, 1928–1931. *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 39(1), 139–174.
- Jackson, A. (2016). Federal Budget 2016: A One Time Fix? *National News Watch*, March 22. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://www.nationalnews-watch.com/2016/03/22/federal-budget-2016-a-one-time-fix/#.WBJj3Dt6pSW>
- James, M. (2006). *Misrecognized Materialists: Social Movements in Canadian Politics*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- James, M. (2013). Neoliberal Heritage Redress. In J. Henderson & P. Wakeham (Eds.), *Reconciling Canada: Critical Perspectives on the Culture of Redress* (pp. 31–46). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Jenson, J. (1997). Fated to Live in Interesting Times: Canada’s Changing Citizenship Regimes. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 30(4), 627–644.

- Jenson, J., & Phillips, S. D. (1996). Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada. *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, 14(Fall), 111–135.
- Johnston, R., Banting, K., Kymlicka, W., & Soroka, S. (2010). National Identity and Support for the Welfare State. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 43(2), 349–377.
- Jones, E., & Perry, A. (2012). *People's Citizenship Guide: A Response to Conservative Canada*. Winnipeg: Arbiter Publishing.
- Krugman, P. (2012). *End This Depression Now*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P. (2016). Paul Krugman: Canada Can Show That Ending Austerity Makes Sense. *The Irish Times*, October 27.
- Labour Day: BMO Survey. (2012). *The Calgary Herald*, August 29. Retrieved September 1, 2012, from <http://www.calgaryherald.com/business/economy/Canadians+more+optimistic+about+security+this+Labour/7160806/story.html>
- Li, P. S. (2003). *Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.
- MacClure, J. (2003). The Politics of Recognition at an Impasse? Identity Politics and Democratic Citizenship. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 26(1), 3–21.
- MacDougall, A. (2016). Two Budgets on Either Side of the Atlantic Suggest That Austerity Is No Longer a Surefire Political Winner. *Policy Options*, March 28. Retrieved October 24, 2016, from <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2016/03/28/budgets>
- Marshall, T. H. (1965). *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- McKay, I., & Swift, J. (2012). *Warrior Nation: Rebranding Canada in an Age of Anxiety*. Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Porter, J. (1965). *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Radio Canada. (2012). *Britain and Canada to Share Some Embassies, Consulates*, September 24. Retrieved October 3, 2012, from http://www.rcinet.ca/english/daily/interviews-2012/13-41_2012-09-24-britain-and-canada-to-share-some-embassies-consulates
- Rajkumar, D., Berkowitz, L., Vosko, L. F., Preston, V., & Latham, R. (2012). At the Temporary-Permanent Divide: How Canada Produces Temporariness and Makes Citizens Through Its Security, Work and Settlement Policies. *Citizenship Studies*, 16(3–4), 483–510.
- Razack, S. (2008). *Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- Robinson, M., & O’Kane, J. (2012). Corporate ‘Dead Money’ Rises to Buoy GDP. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved September 1, 2012, from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy-grows-18-on-business-investment/article4511631/?cmpid=rss1>
- Ruf, C. (2013). Hamiltonians Give New Federal Budget Mixed Reviews. *CBC News*, March 22. Retrieved April 12, 2013, from <http://www.cbc.ca/hamilton/news/story/2013/03/22/hamilton-federal-budget-reaction.html>
- Sainsbury, D. (2012). *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Salter, F. (Ed.). (2004). *Welfare, Ethnicity and Altruism: New Findings and Evolutionary Theory*. London: Frank Cass.
- Séguin, R. (2012). Canadian Flag Back in Quebec Assembly—For Now. *The Globe and Mail*, September 18. Retrieved October 2, 2012, from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadian-flag-back-in-quebec-assembly-for-now/article4551306>
- Smith, M. (2012). The Quebec Protests: The Big Picture. *iPolitics*, May 24. Retrieved October 2, 2012, from <http://www.ipolitics.ca/2012/05/24/miriam-smith-the-quebec-protests-the-big-picture>
- Stasiulis, D. K. (1988). The Symbolic Mosaic Reaffirmed: Multiculturalism Policy. In K. A. Graham (Ed.), *How Ottawa Spends: 1988–89* (pp. 81–112). Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
- Stasiulis, D., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1995). Introduction: Beyond Dichotomies—Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class in Settler Societies. In D. Stasiulis & N. Yuval-Davis (Eds.), *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class* (pp. 1–38). London: Sage Publications.
- Summers, D. (2009). David Cameron Warns of ‘New Age of Austerity’. *The Guardian*, April 26. Retrieved April 14, 2013, from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/apr/26/david-cameron-conservative-economic-policy1>
- Ubelacker, S. (2012). Doctors Group Calls on Ottawa to Rethink Cuts to Refugee Health Program. *The Vancouver Sun*, September 28. Retrieved October 4, 2012, from <http://www.vancouversun.com/health/Doctors+group+calls+Ottawa+rethink+cuts+refugee+health+program/7310620/story.html>
- van Parijs, P. (Ed.). (2004). *Cultural Diversity Versus Economic Solidarity*. Brussels: De Boeck University Press.
- Wolfe, A., & Klausen, J. (2000). Other Peoples. *Prospect*, December, 28–33.
- Yelaja, P. (2011). Military Renaming Slammed as Colonial Throwback. *CBC News*, August 17. Retrieved from <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/08/16/royal-army-navy.html>

Part III

Contestations over Nationalism

1 Introduction to Part III

In Part II, we discussed the EU and Canada as the possible harbingers of identitarian changes. One question asked was whether the EU and Canada, that actively endorsed and valued difference and diversity, did so in ways which were largely compatible with cosmopolitanism. The other question pertained to what these complex entities would tell us in terms of how identities could be reconciled, for instance, in terms of intersectionality and in terms of the relationship between recognition and redistribution.

In this part, we focus on what may be termed the national and populist reactions. Already in Part II, Patti Tamara Lenard discussed the Harper-led Canadian nationalist reaction. She showed that Canada's ideals and policies were quite robust, but that there were also some alarming tendencies. The collection of chapters that make up this part focuses on national and populist reactions across Europe. When we contrast the European case with that of Canada, the immediate impression is that the European reactions are much stronger than the Canadian ones and also that the European reactions are far more deeply entrenched. The EU and its policies figure prominently in the nationalist reactions across Europe. A common trait that basically all right-wing populist movements and parties in Europe share is that they are hostile to the European Union.

There is a growing body of literature on Euroscepticism. It is worth mentioning that almost all of the extreme right-wing parties in Europe are not merely Eurosceptics, they are Europhobes. For instance, we could say that the UK Conservative Party has traditionally had a strong Eurosceptic contingent, whereas the UKIP has been marked by prominent Europhobes, such as Nigel Farage. The same applies to the *Front National* in France. Both sets of actors make active use of the EU institutions in their efforts to abolish or at least radically downscale the EU.

We need a better understanding of what these right-wing populist reactions are, in national and identitarian terms. This is not just a matter of studying parties and movements; equally important, in terms of overall impact, is to obtain a better understanding of how society around them both reacts to and adapts to them. To different degrees, the chapters in Part III focus on both of these aspects.

One important question pertains to whether what we are seeing is a reaction to European integration with relatively minor changes in the underlying conception of nationalism or whether what we are seeing represents a new or somehow transformed notion of nationalism. The question is, therefore, whether their opposition to the EU and pleas for rolling back the EU entail that their respective states: (a) sustain the national identities and orientations that they have at present, (b) alter these to undo undesirable traits inflicted by European integration, or (c) revert back to some more desirable situation and form of nationalism that existed in the past. These scenarios are based upon different conceptions of nationalism and upon different readings of the effects of European integration. With regard to (a), the implicit assumption is that European integration has not significantly affected the member states' national identities and that the EU's influence can therefore be rolled back with relative ease. The credibility of this scenario hinges on a reading of the EU as a form of international organisation in which the member states also have delegated powers, but this has not transformed the member states otherwise. This is not a reading of the EU to which right-wing populist parties and movements would subscribe. It would also be a reading of the EU that would stand in opposition to the findings in Part I and Part II of this book. Such a line of argument ignores the fact that the states that have joined the EU and that function as EU member states have changed,

because of the weight and impact of Europeanisation (along vertical and horizontal lines).

Right-wing populists would stress that the EU intervenes greatly or heavily in the internal affairs of the member states and that this has significant implications for identities and communities. One obvious example is the right-wing populist propensity to label national élites or established governing élites as part of “them”, an international political class that no longer serves the national societies that it is set to serve, and instead serves forces and factors outside the nation, notably global capital. The right-wing populists posit themselves as the defenders of their respective nations.

The far right is growing across Europe, driven by the economic and financial crisis, and targeting primarily Islam, and anti-Muslim sentiment. Right-wing populism is also growing, albeit with different profiles and different success in various parts of Europe. Scandinavia presents an interesting case for studies of right-wing populism, which, since the 1990s, has been extremely successful in Denmark and Norway, where the two populist right-wing parties, the Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) and the Norwegian Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*), have received popular support and electoral success by combining culturalism and welfarism with anti-immigration policies. France represents another interesting case, where Marine Le Pen is trying to transform the *Front National* to a “normal” party and rebrand it as a populist party that claims to defend ordinary citizens against globalisation, European integration, and Islam (in which Islam is construed as a threat to secularism and radical Islam as a threat to security).

These developments serve to underline that Western democracies face grave challenges in sustaining their commitments to human and minority rights, on the one hand, and populist pressures for less inclusive and humane asylum, immigration and integration policies, on the other. At the same time, there are tensions and contradictions within neo-nationalist and nativist parties concerning human rights, women’s rights and minority rights. These parties are, as the broader societies within which they operate, torn with tensions over how to work out the relationship between culture and democracy within nationalism.

This section provides a range of examples of how right-wing populist and its extreme versions of nationalist reactions manifest themselves in

various countries across Europe, including their construction of Muslim “otherness” in contemporary Europe. Particular emphasis is placed on the main drivers of these reactions, namely, right-wing populists and their efforts at configuring states and public institutions along exclusivist lines. This, in turn, highlights the implications that new nationalism and right-wing populism have on liberalism, democracy, and human rights. What is of interest here is not just to understand how those driving the reactions think and operate; equally important is how the established political forces and institutions deal with the issues at stake. Since immigration figures so centrally, it is important to consider whether states and societies develop immigration and integration policies that are sensitive to multiple identities and how the latter deal with human rights, citizenship and minority rights.

Thomas Hylland Eriksen (Chap. 10) provides a case study of an extreme instance of nationalist reaction, as manifested in Anders Behring Breivik’s terrorist acts. The focus is on Norwegian society’s attempts to grapple with these heinous acts, with emphasis on the self-reflections that it sparked. Breivik’s vision, as laid out in his written manifesto, entitled *2083—A European Declaration of Independence*, was to offer a recipe for saving the white, Christian identity of European society. Breivik’s manifesto represents an extreme example of “protecting Europe” against the Muslim threat. His aim was to stimulate transnational action. Norway’s overall response is either nationalised or individualised, and no effort was really made to foster any pan-European mobilisation or opposition to such forces. Eriksen discusses the reasons for why the Norwegian reactions were so exclusively focused on Norway and were, from a European perspective, parochial and inward looking. An important implication of the lack of attention to what role structural aspects of Norwegian society may have played deflected attention away from “the fundamental contradictions within Norwegian nationalism, between a republican and an ethnocultural view of the nation, can be avoided. As a result, the contradiction may continue to grow, still only partly on the radar, and draconian policies on immigration and integration may continue to flourish without being associated with Breivik’s ideology” (p. 244).

Sindre Bangstad (Chap. 11) focuses on how the “new nationalism” in Norway contributes to set or alter national and nationalist boundaries

through actively “othering” Muslims, who have come to feature as threats “to everything and anything, including the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state, relative Norwegian gender equality, LGBT rights, liberalism and secularism, and freedom of expression” (p. 247). Bangstad explores this “politics of fear” through a detailed analysis of the discourse of the Norwegian Progress Party, which has been a junior government partner since October 2013. This type of rhetoric on Islam and Muslims is not distinctive to Norway but figures centrally in the manner in which, for instance, the Danish People’s Party also pursues a politics of exclusion through fearmongering.

Hans-Georg Betz (Chap. 12) focuses on efforts by right-wing populist parties at political mainstreaming through the analysis of the *Front National* under the leadership of Marine Le Pen. What the French case shows is that a policy of mainstreaming is not a one-way affair; it is a matter of right-wing populists making themselves more acceptable so as to increase the likelihood that the other parties will accept their somewhat “de-caffeinated” or watered down issue stances. Le Pen’s project was, on the one hand, to rid the party of its extremist tendencies and its most odious elements, “without, however, substantially breaking with the spirit informing the FN’s historical discursive legacy. In Marine Le Pen’s view, only a radical ideological and programmatic re-orientation would put the FN in a position to play a pivotal role in French politics” (p. 272). Betz analysis of the structurally favourable conditions for this type of policy stance in France serves as an important caution against pinning overly strong hopes on Macron’s election victory as an instance of rolling back right-wing populism in France.

The next chapter by Martin Bak Jørgensen and Trine Lund Thomsen (Chap. 13) focuses on what Hollifield has termed “the liberal paradox”, which refers to the need to balance immigration control with humanitarian obligations. That in turn has bearings on the relationship between recognition and redistribution. The authors discuss how this relationship is unfolding in Denmark, which is marked by a strong new nationalism influence on government policy. Denmark is interesting also in the sense that it fits into a broader picture: many of the countries that harbour strong traits of new nationalism are at the same time established welfare states with well-developed systems of democratic participation and socialisation.

We see this tension between culture and democracy, for instance, in the realm of immigrant incorporation and integration, where it manifests itself in a question of how majority societies relate to immigrant organisations: as sites of cultural recognition or as schools in democracy and political participation.

In the final chapter (Chap. 14), Marianne Takle focuses on public policies on immigrant incorporation and integration in Norwegian society and queries whether immigrant organisations are imbued with the same norms and arrangements that have historically marked the voluntary sector in Norway. She finds that it is possible to discern at least two different theoretical models. One model sees immigrant organisations as instruments of national integration, and the aim is assimilationist in the sense that this should serve to reduce the political salience of cultural diversity. The other model posits immigrant organisations as elements in a multicultural policy and as important sites of cultural recognition. Takle finds that the main policy template is the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation. The main justification is democratic: foster participation and political socialisation and training. But the reality on the ground is not always aligned with these ideals.



10

Lessons Learned or a Missed Opportunity? Norway After the 22 July Terrorist Attack

Thomas Hylland Eriksen

1 Introduction

On 22 July 2011, Norway experienced its largest humanitarian disaster since the Second World War, when a right-wing terrorist killed 77 people and wounded dozens in a bid to purify Norwegian culture and cleanse the country of Muslims. Somewhat counter-intuitively, he did not target Muslims directly but, instead, attacked government buildings in the centre of Oslo and, a few hours later, a summer camp organised by the youth wing of the Labour Party (*Arbeidernes ungdomsfylking*—AUF (Norwegian Labour Youth)), in the apparent belief that killing the aspiring future leaders of the country would reduce the number of immigrants in the future.

The author acknowledges some overlap between parts of this chapter and my earlier articles entitled “A Darker Shade of Pale: Cultural Intimacy in an Age of Terrorism”, (2011) 27 *Anthropology Today*, pp. 1–2 and “Who or What to Blame: Competing Interpretations of the Norwegian Terrorist Attack”, (2014) 55 *European Journal of Sociology*, pp. 275–294.

T. H. Eriksen (✉)
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

It took several hours after the initial blast in central Oslo to ascertain the identity of the terrorist, but when the news was initially broadcast about the bomb explosion in the city centre, suspicion was immediately directed at militant Islamists. I was in my garden pruning some shrubs when I heard a distant rumble, believing it to be thunder until a friend called me and told me to go online immediately. “We’ll have to get our skates on quick”, he said, adding that “we’re going to have to think fast about how to respond”, as, for years, we had both been publicly known as defenders of minority rights. He implicitly assumed, like almost everybody else, that the attack had, indeed, been carried out by Muslim terrorists. The immediate reports indicated that the blast was a bomb explosion, although one commentator in the panel hastily assembled at the *Norsk Rikskringkasting* (NRK) (the state channel) TV studio, to wit, a liberal political philosopher and frequent commentator on Islam and human rights, Dr Lars Gule, suggested that it could have been an explosion in a gas pipe, as there were currently roadworks in the immediate vicinity. Suspicion was nonetheless promptly directed at Muslim groups. Libya was mentioned, as was—naturally—the almost mythical al-Qaeda network of Islamic terrorists. The leader of the right-wing populist Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*), Siv Jensen, commented, ashen-faced, that “this is an attack on Norway”, loyal to the logic of the “war on terror” introduced by President George W. Bush after the 9/11 attack on the USA.¹ (When it was later disclosed that the terrorist was a former member of her own party, she did not repeat that particular sentence.) During the afternoon, reports came through of ordinary Muslims being harassed throughout the country and blamed for the explosion in central Oslo. Sharing a religion with the suspected terrorists was, as is so often the case with Muslims in Europe, considered to be sufficient for attributing guilt by association (see Andersson 2012 on Muslim responses to the terrorist attack). However, by nightfall, news reports about the massacre of AUF (Norwegian Labour Youth) delegates at Utøya, a proverbially idyllic and somewhat dull island on a lake less than an hour’s drive from the city, suggested that militant Islamism might have little to do with this assault on Norwegian society. The perpetrator of both acts of terrorism would soon turn out to be Anders Behring Breivik, a hitherto unknown right-wing extremist convinced that multiculturalism in general and Muslims

in particular were inimical to Norwegian nationhood and destructive of the fabric of Norwegian society.

Breivik's vision, as laid out in his written manifesto, was nevertheless more ambitious than the Norwegian reactions would suggest. Entitled *2083—A European Declaration of Independence* (Breivik 2011), it purported to offer a recipe for saving the white, Christian identity of European society. The year 2083, when Europe should, according to the plan, be cleansed of Muslims, is the 400th anniversary of the stalling of the Ottoman advances into Europe, near Vienna.² A far-right blog website to which Breivik's ideological mentor Peder "Fjordman" Jensen frequently contributed is called, accordingly, the *Gates of Vienna*.

Why, then, were the Norwegian reactions to the attack so exclusively focused on Norway—some might indeed say parochial and inward-looking? One explanation is that Norway's European identity is weak, ambiguous and contestable. The country is not a full member of the European Union, and its media report news from Germany and Italy as relatively remote foreign places. An additional explanation may be the widespread perception of Norwegian exceptionalism. Small in population, vulnerable to foreign invasions, egalitarian and consensual, Norwegian society was affected by this attack by a homegrown terrorist in a particularly painful way, as the attack revealed a hitherto undercommunicated rift within Norwegian society concerning the nature of the national identity, whether it was mainly about origins and ethnicity or about citizenship and place of residence. To these themes I will return, but first allow me briefly to outline the main reactions to the attack in the Norwegian public sphere.

2 Norwegian Nationhood and Islamophobia

The public displays of compassion and grief that took place across Norway in the days and weeks following Breivik's attacks soon caught the attention of the international media. Having spent the first days contrasting stereotypes of a serene, slightly boring Norway with the brutality of the attacks, the foreign media now began to focus on the Norwegian reactions.

Rather than stirring up aggression and calling for revenge, Norway's leaders and its public were performing rituals which affirmed the openness and democratic nature of Norwegian society, the compassion and solidarity uniting its population. It was almost as if Norway had been struck by a tsunami, not a terrorist attack. Journalists from around the world asked domestic experts for an explanation, usually opening by declaring that, in their own country, the public reaction would have been angrier and more vengeful.³

Since, to many Norwegians, Norway signifies inherent goodness (Witoszek 2011), many were tempted to view the blond terrorist from Oslo's west end as an isolated madman. Yet, it was difficult to deny that he had developed his Manichean worldview in an ideological universe shared by many Norwegians (and other Europeans), according to which there is an irreconcilable conflict between the West and Islam. The powerful displays of solidarity after 22 July must be viewed against the background of the fact that this was a homegrown kind of terrorism.

On the face of it, Breivik was an utterly unremarkable man from the leafy western suburbs of Oslo. However, he never completed his education, failed in his business ventures, and must have been perceived as something of a failure in his middle-class surroundings. Studies of right-wing extremism and militant identity politics tend to show that recruits often have a background in the lower middle class and a strong sense of injustice and de facto disenfranchisement, usually tinged with conspiratorial leanings (Holmes 2000). Yet, of course, many find themselves in a structurally identical position to Breivik without becoming violent.

Whatever Breivik's personal motivations, his actions remind us of the importance of recognising the presence of Islamophobic tendencies in Norwegian society. Anthropologists have been writing about European Islamophobia for years (Bangstad 2014; Bangstad and Bunzl 2010; Bowen 2011; Bunzl 2007; Gingrich 2005), but rarely as a security threat from within. Recruitment to contemporary far-right militant circles follows a very different logic to that of old-fashioned extremist movements. This partly explains why the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) had not viewed the new extreme right as a security threat until the 22 July attack. These militants do not have organisations and membership lists; indeed they do not even share a coherent ideology. What they do have in

common is a conviction that their government is betraying the nation by allowing Muslims to settle in Norway, since, in their view, Islam is incompatible with democracy and modernity. The logical implication of this view, propagated via a host of websites, both domestic and European (Strømme 2011), is that the blight on Europe that it identifies cannot be set right through democratic means.

There are degrees and nuances in the Islamophobic discourse. While it is likely that only a hardcore minority believes the paranoid conspiracy theories that circulate on such sites, high-ranking members of Norway's second-largest party, *Fremskrittspartiet* (the Progress Party), have, both before and after the terrorist attack, repeatedly spoken in generalising and pejorative terms about Muslims. Interestingly, some of them have subsequently entered government. In December 2016, the outspoken Islamophobe Per-Willy Amundsen became Norway's Minister of Justice.

Some of those who actively pursue an anti-Muslim agenda in Norwegian public life, on the other hand, see themselves as disillusioned social democrats, others as feminists or defenders of the legacy of the European Enlightenment, with its emphasis on individual rights. Islamophobia cannot, therefore, be identified with a particular social group or political party. To some extent, it permeates the fabric of society.

The very ordinariness of the new right signals that it cannot be written off as marginal. The view that Islam is incompatible with democracy, and that Norway has made a serious mistake in allowing Muslims to settle in the country, is propagated in election campaigns, online debates, Op-Ed articles and books on contemporary politics. In his manifesto, largely a cut-and-paste job, Breivik includes 39 articles written by his intellectual hero, Peder "Fjordman" Jensen, who has been active on Islamophobic websites for years. Jensen believes in conspiracy theories of the "Eurabia" kind (Ye'Or 2005), according to which European governments made secret arrangements with Arab leaders in the 1970s permitting de facto Muslim dominance in Europe in exchange for Gulf oil. Although it is by no means clear how widespread such views and their permutations are, they are encountered, largely online, sufficiently often to justify the view that extreme Islamophobia constitutes a security threat to be taken seriously (see Bangstad 2014).

3 Who or What to Blame?

When the facts of the terrorist attack had been established, a lively and prolonged discussion began in the media and its extensions in cyberspace concerning the future of trust and the question of blame. Interestingly, no single hegemonic blaming discourse could be discerned. Anders B. Breivik was an anomaly in a society in which dramatic events were rare, and there existed no established narrative, which could have been drawn upon, about this kind of attack. The Norwegian public sphere has at its disposal a range of standard narratives blaming foreigners for the ills suffered by the country, with those of the German Nazis and of Islamic terrorists at the forefront (although no Muslim terrorist act has to date been committed on Norwegian soil). There was no readily available narrative about a homegrown anti-jihadist turned violent; indeed, the police admitted that they had not kept right-wing groups under surveillance at all, concentrating their efforts on Islamists.

One blaming narrative that emerged very shortly after the attack individualised the event and pathologised the terrorist. His ideological affiliations were played down, and many considered him mainly a psychiatric case (Borchgrevink 2012 is an acclaimed, book-length exploration sympathetic to this view). Indeed, the first forensic psychiatrists to examine Breivik concluded along these lines. This structure of blaming dodges a critical interrogation of aspects of Norwegian society through its incessant focus on the terrorist's mental state, his unhealthy relationship with his parents and his difficult adolescence. It also implies that similar attacks could—in principle—happen again, and that they could take place anywhere, like natural disasters. This perspective implies no specific course of action.

Another narrative, which surfaced in the summer of 2013 as part of the Conservative Party's ultimately successful election campaign, targeted the erstwhile Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. The prime minister was not blamed directly for the attack, but supporters of the Conservative candidate for the premiership, Erna Solberg (prime minister since September 2013), claimed that the tragedy might have been avoided with a stronger general political leadership (*Aftenposten* 2013).

What these two accounts have in common is the way in which they deflect attention from any societal or cultural causes of the terrorist attack, the first explicitly by locating the cause of the attack to Breivik's childhood, the second by shifting the floodlights to the person of Jens Stoltenberg. Both share the properties of the lightning conductor in deflecting the potential overheating produced by lightning to a destination where it would rapidly cool down.

A third blaming narrative focused on the inadequacies of the police. They should have been able to identify Breivik as a security risk before it was too late, some said, while others added that the police were far too slow and inefficient in reacting when they learned about the shootings at Utøya. The government-appointed 22 July Commission confirmed this view in criticising the efficiency and co-ordination of the police (NOU 2012). According to this narrative, technical solutions—an improvement in the organisational infrastructure of the state—could make a decisive difference in the future. Within this structure of blaming, the concept of trust was essential: trust in the protective capacities of the police, the critics said, must be re-established. The lack of a political or ideological dimension is equally pronounced in this narrative: terrorism is made to appear like the Lisbon Earthquake or the Asian Tsunami; it may emerge suddenly and out of nowhere, and it can therefore best be prevented through a technical solution, similar to keeping Mexicans out of the USA, or Palestinians out of Israel, by building a wall along the border.

A fourth blaming structure places the blame mainly on violent online computer games. It was often pointed out in the weeks and months after the terrorist attack that Breivik had, in fact, spent a year doing little else than playing *World of Warcraft* and that his behaviour while shooting teenagers at Utøya—wearing a home-made uniform solemnly decorated with insignia purchased on *eBay*—resembled that of an avatar in a computer game. Like the previous blaming structure considered, the solution here seems to be largely technical, namely, banning certain violent computer games.

So far, I have mentioned four competing modes of blaming; one which individualised the attack, one which used the prime minister and his style of leadership as a lightning conductor, one which saw the cause in a general feature of contemporary mass culture, and finally, one that blamed

the success of the attack on shortcomings and weaknesses in the police force. The fact that Breivik was motivated by hatred of Muslims and multiculturalists, and that his targeting of the future leaders of the social democratic movement in Norway was not coincidental, was not made relevant for any of these stories of blame which predominated not only in the press but also in the aforementioned 22 July Commission, led by the legal scholar Alexandra Bech Gjørvi. Its report, submitted on 13 August 2012 (NOU 2012), focused mainly on the technical and operational responses to the event, and its recommendations concerned security, surveillance, and the efficiency of the police. In summer 2014, Raymond Johansen, the party secretary of the Labour Party, publicly criticised the 22 July Commission, also commenting on the general debate, for not dealing with what he saw as the main issue, namely, the rise of Islamophobia and racism, talking about the “depoliticisation of the Fascist Breivik” (Strand 2014).

However, a structural understanding of the terrorist attack, emphasising not merely the “proximate” causes but also “ultimate” causes (to use the terms favoured by evolutionary psychologists), was also discernable in the public sphere. The two remaining modes of blaming to be considered here both attributed the terrorist attack to political causes, but were based upon opposing world views and, accordingly, contrasting analyses. On anti-immigrant and counter-jihadist websites, a common view was that multiculturalism and the Labour Party were indirectly to blame themselves (Eide et al. 2013). Had the political élite of the country not opened its doors to mass immigration from Muslim countries, they argued, this would never have happened. Some—mostly anonymous bloggers—expressed agreement with Breivik’s analysis, but not with his methods (Hervik and Meret 2013). According to this view, the government and the victims of the shootings, as young members of the ruling party, were ultimately to blame, along with the Muslims, whose very presence in the country is an unbearable provocation to any right-thinking patriot. In a certain sense, this is tantamount to saying that the precariat are themselves responsible for their precarious situation, or, to put it as might be argued in a traditional African society (Douglas 1992): the victim has sinned, offended the gods and the ancestors, and is therefore responsible for his or her own downfall. According to this narrative, the social

democrats were appropriate targets, even if the attack itself was almost universally disapproved of, since the steep growth of the minority population in Norway (from 200,000 in 1995 to 850,000 in 2016) had taken place during a period when Labour has been in government most of the time. It is fair to add, though, that Labour's policy on immigration and integration has not been especially radical, neither in a European context nor in comparison to other political parties in Norway, with the exception of the anti-immigration Progress Party.

The sixth and final mode of blaming identified anti-jihadism and a purity-seeking ethnic nationalism as the underlying causes of the terrorist attack. It was well documented that Breivik had voraciously perused blogs and websites devoted to the demonisation of Islam and Muslims (Titley 2013), some of them squarely within the "Eurabia" framework. The subtext of this world view, which exists in both weak and strong versions, is that the politicians are deliberately hiding the truth about immigration, Islam and multiculturalism from the voters. These views, which have many thousand adherents in Norway, are regularly propagated through oft-visited interactive websites, on Facebook and through the occasional book or Op-Ed article in a national or regional newspaper (Eriksen 2011; Bangstad 2014). The flourishing of this world view, seen as conspiratorial and paranoid by its detractors, was thus seen as a decisive factor. Breivik found his historical mission in the narratives of the vehement anti-jihadists, which defended the view that Muslims and Europeans could never share the same territory peacefully.

Although all the modes of blaming mentioned, except the first two, emphasise societal causes, only the two last ones focus on contradictions or conflicts within Norwegian society as underlying causes of the terrorist attack. While the anti-multiculturalist perspective sees the openness of Norway to immigration as the cause of violence, the anti-anti-jihadist perspective sees the unwillingness to accept immigrants as equals as being the main problem. The former sees a possible solution in the installation of a "truly national government", while the latter appears to see no other alternative than meeting hatred with knowledge, good intentions and more efficient methods for combating racism and exclusionist identity politics. What these modes of blaming have in common, however, is the conviction that the terrorist attack was ultimately caused by a simmering

conflict in society between a cosmopolitan or multiculturalist élite and the patriotic or nationalistic masses—or between a majority committed to decency and human rights, and an angry and potentially dangerous minority which refuses to respect the principles and practices of democracy.

The election results in 2011 (local elections) and 2013 (general elections) suggest that Breivik's world view has vivid, but limited, support in the Norwegian population. The party of which he had been a member for many years, the populist Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*), saw a reduction in their support on both occasions, but was still capable of forming a coalition government with the Conservatives (*Høyre*) in 2013, despite receiving only 16.4 per cent of the votes (compared to 22.9 per cent in 2009). In other words, a comfortable majority of Norwegians voted for parties which did not ascribe societal problems chiefly to immigration. At the same time, an opinion poll from autumn 2011 suggested that a quarter of the Norwegian population saw Islam as a threat to Norwegian culture and felt that there were too many Muslims in the country (NORSTAT 2011). Moreover, another survey, from 2012, indicates that 40 per cent were negative to the building of mosques in the country, and roughly the same percentage were negative to persons with Muslim beliefs (IMDI 2012). It is, thus, possible to conclude that a substantial minority of the Norwegian population is dissatisfied with Norwegian policy on immigration and integration. The terrorist attack did, in other words, highlight—in a grotesque way—a real ideological division within Norwegian society, which only the final two structures of blame correctly identify.

4 Conclusion: Conflicting Political Ontologies

The ideological divide in Norwegian society evident in the difference between these structures of blaming raises questions not only about blame but also about its dialectical opposite, trust. In the weeks immediately following the terrorist attack, the international press strongly emphasised the informality and openness of Norwegian society, where trust in both people and institutions had been very high for generations.

They, and many locals, now asked whether Norwegians would become less trusting of both each other and of abstract institutions, in the awareness that they had encountered evil, that it was homegrown and that something similar might happen again unless steps were taken to prevent it. The only problem was that, although the domestic concern about the loss of trust was—and is—widespread in the aftermath of the attack, there is no general agreement regarding its causes, effects and possible remedies. For who, or what, should be blamed for the loss of trust? Was it the inefficiency of the police, the unchecked rise of right-wing xenophobic movements, the gullibility of multiculturalist politicians or even the prevalence of online computer games? Accordingly, there has been no general agreement concerning the appropriate course of action necessary to re-establish the kind of generalised trust for which the Scandinavian societies are famous.

Some call for more openness and inclusion, while others call for more closure and exclusion—and both sides are convinced that their analyses of the deeper causes of the terrorist attack, and their recipes for reinstating a cohesive society based upon generalised trust, are superior. It is worth emphasising that, unlike the attempts to divert attention to the inefficiency of the police, the allegedly poor leadership of the government and the unhappy childhood of the terrorist, these perspectives, opposing as they are, concur in assigning blame to structural properties of Norwegian society and are, accordingly, commensurable.

This opposition between the conflicting attributions of blame shows that the ideological divide in Norway shares important features with similar divisions in other European countries. Some blame social ills—including the assumed loss of trust—on irresponsible immigration policy and gullible multiculturalism, if not on the immigrants themselves, while others argue that the terrorist attack and the motivation behind it demonstrate, in a grotesque way, that the dream of ethnic and cultural purity is not only futile and unrealistic but extremely dangerous at a historical juncture when “we are all on the move” (Bauman 1999: 77).

The contrasting social ontologies upon which these positions are based emphasise, respectively, closure and openness as pre-requisites for trust and security. On the one hand, there is a positive evaluation of values such as security and tradition, the historically rooted group as the main

basis of social solidarity, boundedness and continuity as guarantors for autonomy and trust. On the other hand, values such as freedom and innovation are valued, just as the future-oriented individual or project-based social movement is seen as the fabric of social life, openness to change as a necessity and a virtue, mixing and diversity as enriching, not as fragmenting (Fig. 10.1).

These social ontologies function as templates of interpretation in a wide range of situations across the world where societal vulnerability becomes apparent through some form of crisis, and where there is disagreement with regard to whom or what to blame. Perhaps this kind of contradiction chiefly emerges in situations of accelerated change where there is no established pre-existing narrative into which a particular event can be integrated. This is one way in which the Norwegian experience of the 2011 terrorist attack can fruitfully be generalised in order to shed light on more widespread structures of trust and blame in today's world: since this event was unprecedented and unexpected, in addition to being tragic, shocking and collectively traumatising, it brought out, in an unfiltered and often unreflexive way, some very basic modes of blaming and trusting. The nationalistic "traitor discourse" alleges that the Norwegian

• Freedom	Security
• Future	Past
• Impulses	Traditions
• Individual	Group
• Choice	Destiny
• Change	Continuity
• Mixing	Purity
• Openness	Boundaries
• Boots	Roots

Fig. 10.1 Two social ontologies

élite are in cahoots with the enemy, notably the Muslims, both inside and outside of the country. The élite, accordingly, must be attacked, and the Muslims assimilated, deported or exterminated. In contrast, the cosmopolitan discourse which blames paranoid Islamophobia and ethnic nationalism sees the growth of nativism and resistance to change and globalisation as a main source of conflict.

Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, the ethno-nationalist narrative has gained credibility in the wake of the terrorist attack. In January 2017, the Conservative Minister of Education, Torbjørn Røe Isaksen, announced a call for a “canon of Norwegian culture”, to seek to strengthen a particular version of the Norwegian identity. Within the Conservative-Progress coalition, the Progress Party has been charged with responsibility for immigration and integration policy, with the charismatic and severe Sylvi Listhaug as minister of integration. Her policies have consistently focused not on facilitating integration and a sense of belonging among new Norwegians but on deporting so-called fake asylum-seekers, strengthening border controls and emphasising a particular version of Norwegian values; in autumn 2016, for example, she pointed out that eating pork and drinking alcohol were part and parcel of the Norwegian cultural repertoire. Needless to say, this kind of statement does not immediately lead to a stronger feeling of loyalty among the 200,000-plus Muslims who consider themselves Norwegian. In 2016, Norway received only a negligible number of Syrian refugees, while many Afghans were deported. Norway’s recent policies on asylum and immigration have repeatedly been criticised by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), but to no avail. Domestic opposition to the draconian policies has been vocal, outspoken, often with a hint of shock at the complete transformation of Norway’s historical position as a champion of human rights. Yet, in the years following the terrorist attack, the Norwegian policy on immigration has gradually become stricter and more severe, much in line with Breivik’s hopes.

The last two perspectives on the terrorist attack that I have presented share the recognition that underlying societal conflicts are the cause of crises, rather than evil or incompetent individuals, technically inefficient institutions or cultural surface phenomena such as computer

games. When faced with a crisis, people will typically ask who is to blame and what they can do. In the case of the 22 July attack on Norway, the underlying cause was a mounting tension between openness and closure, mixing and purity, diversity and homogeneity. By individualising the attack or calling for technical solutions as preventive measures, attention is deflected from structural issues that need to be addressed critically. No direct course of action which would deal with this conflict in society results. Similarly to situations in which blame is placed on the victim, such as when Caribbean politicians blame the effects of neo-liberal trade policies on the alleged laziness of local farmers or European leaders blame the precariat for its chronic vulnerability, the mainstream public debates after the Norwegian terrorist attack have dodged a very substantial elephant in the room by failing to ask whether there is a connection between Breivik's Islamophobic ethno-nationalism and the roots of Norwegian nationalism in nineteenth-century romanticism, or—more generally—discussing the terrorist attack as an act of political violence, rather than that of a demented individual. In this way, addressing the fundamental contradictions within Norwegian nationalism, between a republican and an ethno-cultural view of the nation, can be avoided. As a result, the contradiction may continue to grow, still only partly on the radar, and draconian policies on immigration and integration may continue to flourish without being associated with Breivik's ideology.

Notes

1. The attacks in the USA on the 11 September 2001.
2. The Battle of Vienna took place on 12 September 1683 following the besieging of the city for two months by the Ottoman Empire. It is often seen as a turning point in history, after which “the Ottoman Turks ceased to be a menace to the Christian world”. (Walter Leitsch, “1683: The Siege of Vienna”, (1983) 33 *History Today*.)
3. The response would almost certainly have been different if the perpetrator had been revealed to be a militant Muslim group.

References

- Aftenposten*. (2013). Malplassert snillisme om 22. juli-rapporten. (Misplaced Kindness about the 22 July Report). *Aftenposten*, August 16.
- Andersson, M. (2012). The Debate About Multicultural Norway Before and After 22 July 2011. *Identities*, 19(4), 418–427.
- Bangstad, S. (2014). *Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia*. London: Zed Books.
- Bangstad, S., & Bunzl, M. (2010). Anthropologists Are Talking About Islamophobia and Anti-semitism in the New Europe. *Ethnos*, 75(2), 213–228.
- Bauman, Z. (1999). *Globalization—The Human Consequences*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Borchgrevink, A. S. (2012). *En norsk tragedie: Anders Behring Breivik og veiene til Utøya (A Norwegian Tragedy: Anders Behring Breivik and the Roads to Utøya)*. Oslo: Gyldendal.
- Bowen, J. (2011). Europeans Against Multiculturalism. *Boston Review*, July/August.
- Breivik, A. B. (Ed.). (2011). *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*. Retrieved from <https://publicintelligence.net/anders-behring-breiviks-complete-manifesto-2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence>
- Bunzl, M. (2007). *Anti-semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe*. Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm-University of Chicago Press.
- Douglas, M. (1992). *Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Eide, E., Kjølstad, M., & Naper, A. (2013). After the 22 July Terror in Norway: Media Debates on Freedom of Expression and Multiculturalism. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 3(4), 187–196.
- Eriksen, T. H. (2011). A Darker Shade of Pale: Cultural Intimacy in an Age of Terrorism. *Anthropology Today*, 27(5), 1–2.
- Gingrich, A. (2005). Anthropological Analyses of Islamophobia and Anti-semitism in Europe. *American Ethnologist*, 32(4), 513–515.
- Hervik, P., & Meret, S. (2013). Erostratus Unbound: Norway's 22/7 Converging Frames of War. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 3(4), 179–186.
- Holmes, D. (2000). *Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- IMDI. (2012). *Integreringsbarometeret 2012 (The Integration Barometer 2012)*. Oslo: IMDI. Retrieved July 15, 2014, from http://www.imdi.no/Documents/Rapporter/Integreringsbarometeret_2012.pdf

- NORSTAT. (2011). *Islam er en trussel mot norsk kultur (Islam Is a Threat Against Norwegian Culture)*. Retrieved July 15, 2014, from <http://www.nrk.no/norge/ser-pa-islam-som-en-trussel-1.7847186>
- NOU. (2012). *Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen (Report from the 22 July Commission)*. Government of Norway: White Paper.
- Strand, N. (2014). Partisekretærens ukjente 22.juli-historie. (The Party Secretary's Unknown 22 July Story). *Tidsskrift for norsk psykologforening*, 51(7), 546–558.
- Strømmen, Ø. (2011). *Det mørke nettet: Om høyreekstremisme, kontra jihadisme og terror i Europa (The Dark Web: On Right-Wing Extremism, Counterjihadism and Terror in Europe)*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm.
- Titley, G. (2013). They Called a War, and Someone Came: The Communicative Politics of Breivik's Ideospace. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 3(4), 216–224.
- Ye'or, B. (2005). *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*. Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
- Witoszek, N. (2011). *The Origins of the "Regime of Goodness": Remapping the Cultural History of Norway*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.



11

The New Nationalism and its Relationship to Islam

Sindre Bangstad

1 Introduction

Nationalism is premised on simultaneous processes of social and political exclusion and inclusion, whereby certain groups are included in national imaginaries, while others are excluded. In the Norwegian context, national and nationalist boundary making has featured Muslims in a central role. In this “new nationalism”, Islam and Muslims are seen as the main threats to everything and anything, including the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state, relative Norwegian gender equality, LGBT rights, liberalism and secularism and freedom of expression. This new nationalism is also, but not only, the result of long-term political rhetoric around immigration, Islam and Muslims in Norway, in which the Norwegian far right and populist right has, since the 1980s, invested a lot of time and energy. With reference to the work of Ruth Wodak (2015), I will, in this chapter, explore the construction of a “politics of fear” through

S. Bangstad (✉)

KIFO – Institute for Church, Religion, and Worldview Research,
Oslo, Norway

© The Author(s) 2018

J. E. Fossum et al. (eds.), *Diversity and Contestations over Nationalism in Europe and Canada*, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58987-3_11

285

right-wing populist discourse in Norway since 1987, its mainstreaming in Norwegian politics and the ways in which right-populist rhetoric in Norway incorporates and assimilates right-wing extremist ideas and sentiments about Islam and Muslims. I do this through a detailed study of the discourse of the Norwegian Progress Party, which has been in government in Norway since October 2013.

2 The New Nationalism

There is little that is original in asserting that nationalism is bound up with the construction of symbolic boundaries between people perceived as rightly belonging to the nation and those who are perceived as strangers to it. Nor is there anything original in noting that the very populations perceived as strangers to the nation may shift over time. Yet, as the sociologist Christopher A. Bail has remarked, “the macro-level forces by which certain symbolic boundaries become more salient than others remain poorly understood” (Bail 2008: 37). Furthermore, Bail has argued that “the symbolic boundaries deployed by the general public do not correspond to the official ‘philosophies of integration’ emphasized in the literature” (ibid.). And so, “thin” *republican* notions of citizenship, to which many Western European political and intellectual élites have adhered in the post-World War II era, are, at a popular level, increasingly contested and challenged by “thick” *populist-nationalist* notions of citizenship. It has been clear for quite some time now that anti-Muslim ideas and sentiments—in particular in our time—serve as the “great unifiers” among right-wing political formations throughout Western Europe (Hafez 2014). And this is especially so in the populist right-wing formations which, in recent years, have emerged as strong and influential political factors in many Western European countries. The targeting of immigrant and Muslim minorities (which are often conflated) in far-right political discourse is not an accident of history, but rather a willed development enabled by various aspects of contemporary social and political opportunity structures in Europe, and alterations in what Christopher Bail has referred to as the “cultural environment” in which various political actors are “competing to shape shared understandings of

Islam—both within and outside the public sphere” (Bail 2015: 7). “Muslims have been targeted most consistently and vehemently in the propaganda of the populist radical right parties” in Europe, Cas Mudde has asserted (Mudde 2007: 71). For his part, José Pedro Zúquete has noted “the omnipresence of the theme of Islam” in the “worldview of the extreme right” in Europe (Zúquete 2008: 339). In contemporary far-right discursive universes throughout Europe then, what David Theo Goldberg (2006) has referred to as the “idea of the Muslim” features prominently: this idea often mobilises “hard-wired connotations” (Lakoff 2008) in which Islam is seen as determining any given and actually existing Muslim’s mode of thinking and being in the world and in which the practice of Islam is linked through association to its most radical and violent contemporary expressions.

It is then, I have long since argued (see Bangstad 2014), the far-right discourses about and representations of Islam and Muslims that bring the co-imbrication of right-extremist and populist right-wing rhetoric and ideas (see Bangstad 2016a) and the mainstreaming of the forms of right-wing extremism in contemporary Western Europe most closely into analytical focus. If we need a reminder of this in the present, let it be noted that modern state nationalisms have, of course, always been as much about the terms of exclusion as about the terms of inclusion (Eriksen 2002) and that, in the context of Norway, the present exclusion of Muslims from the social and political imaginaries of the nation as a political community of potentially, but never really equal citizens (see Taylor 2004), finds its analogies in the historical exclusion of minorities such as Jews, Catholics, the *Saami* as well as *Roma*- and *Romani*-speaking peoples in modern Norwegian history. In the words of Ruth Wodak, “the ‘nation’ as defined by right-wing populist parties is a limited and sovereign community that exists and persists through time and is tied to a specific territory (space), inherently and essentially constructed through an in/out (member/non-member) opposition and its out-groups” (Wodak 2015: 77). It is, as we learned from the seminal literature on the development of modern nationalism in the 1980s, the “nation” as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) and an “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) which must stand at the centre of any analysis of the “nation” as constituted both in and through populist right-wing

discourses. But “imagined” does not mean *imaginary*, and *invented* does not mean *arbitrary* (Ranger 1993). Nationalist populism, as Anton Pelinka notes, starts with the assumption that the category of “the people” exists and that it exists in a homogeneous way (Pelinka 2013: 5).

And so, anthropologists such as Marianne Gullestad (2006) have noted that, in Norwegian social imaginaries until relatively recently, the “nation” has been conceived as having been ethnically and culturally homogeneous. The dominant Lutheran Church of Norway was a late-comer to the embracing of religious and ethnic pluralism in Norway, and, even though it has played a central role in inter-religious dialogue, inter-faith initiatives and ecumenical work over the past 30 years, it has not, historically, represented much of an alternative to the notions of homogeneity identified by Gullestad. Enabled by the globalising circuits of information flows of the, now, not so “new” social media, far-right ideas and sentiments “travel” fast and wide, making it all the more important, but also challenging, to analyse both the developments at nation-state level (Scott 2007) and at supra-state level, for, though primarily nativist and nationalist, the discourse of the populist right-wing political formations is also, in a profound sense, supra-national, and pan-European, in that it often posits “Europe”, alongside the various nation states which constitute their primary frame of reference, as a geo-political entity which is supposedly under existential threat from Muslims (see Bangstad and Bunzl 2010 for this) in the form of both immigration and terrorism.

Though there are certainly continuities with past varieties of representations of stigmatised minorities in European right-wing nationalism, as expressed in historical anti-Semitism, it is also important to register the ways in which the central rhetorical *topoi* in the current right-wing nationalist *Islamophobia*¹ differ from the past varieties (Klug 2014). And not only this: the recent electoral successes of populist right-wing parties in many Western European countries—and not least in Scandinavia—cannot be understood without also taking into account their relatively recent and strategic re-positioning as defenders of forms of what Sune Laegaard has insightfully described as a “liberal nationalism” (Laegaard 2007). In populist right-wing political formations, this has taken the form of presenting themselves to the public, the media and the electorate as defenders of the “liberal values” relating to freedom of expression,

secularity, women's and LGBT rights, as against Muslim minorities popularly (and sometimes, rightly) held to be opposed to such values (Betz and Meret 2009; Bangstad 2011). Joseph Massad has instructively referred to “the very naming of that which resists liberalism’s universalisation as ‘Islam’” (Massad 2015: 4) in contemporary liberal discourses. The “Islam” of liberal nationalism is, of course, a mediated representation of what “Islam” is or is not, and what “Islam” may or may not be, which is often only tangentially related to what ordinary Muslims may take their own faith to be (Morey and Yaqin 2011: 2–4), but there can be little doubt as to its social and political usefulness and efficacy in saturating and altering the cultural and intellectual environment. What we are faced with, then, is not merely a simple recurrence of European historical nationalism but rather its recoding (Bangstad 2016b).

Liberal nationalism, in this contemporary guise, is fundamentally premised on what Wendy Brown has referred to as a *culturalisation of politics* “which reduces non-liberal political life ... [...] ... to something called culture at the same time that it divests liberal democratic institutions of any association with culture” (Brown 2006: 23). It would be an analytical mistake to think, however, that the new nationalism’s hostility to Islam and Muslims is limited to the far right (which includes both the extreme and the populist right). Part of the rhetorical and mobilisational appeal of the far right in contemporary Western Europe resides precisely in its seeming ability to transcend traditional left/right divides. And it often does so on the very discursive terrain constituted by nationalism—a terrain which, in a country like Norway, often unites, rather than divides, right-wing and left-wing nationalists. This, along with a propensity towards the conspiratorial modes of thinking often found among social and political actors who conceive both themselves and their power as marginal (Sunstein 2014), goes some way towards explaining why some of the most central adherents and proponents of the far-right “Eurabia”-conspiracy theories in Norway over the past ten to 15 years should have a background on the far left (see Bangstad 2013a). As trust in the mainstream politicians and established political parties has fallen throughout Western Europe (see Wodak and KhosraviNik 2013: xviii), and social democratic political formations have increasingly become dominated by highly educated middle-class professionals, the anti-élitism traditionally

associated with left-wing political formations has been successfully adopted by the populist right (Pelinka 2013: 7).

An important preliminary *caveat* is in order, however. Though the increasing popularity and political influence of populist right-wing political formations in a small, but advanced, Scandinavian welfare state such as Norway (population 5 million) has taken place in the context of the emergence of a late-modern nationalist and nativist “politics of fear” (Wodak 2015), and the central factor in this process has been the Norwegian Progress Party’s channelling of popular opposition to immigration in general, and Muslim immigration in particular, since circa 1987, and a channelling of popular resentment relating to the presence of a significant minority of Muslims in Norway since the 1970s (currently estimated at 4.5 per cent of the population (see Bangstad and Elgvin 2015)), here we are faced with attempting to understand complex and multi-factored social and political processes. Pierre Rosanvallon has argued that the rise of nationalism, xenophobia and processes of social and political exclusion and stigmatisation in contemporary Europe is linked to recurrent “crises of equality” under conditions of neo-liberal governance (Rosanvallon 2012: 9). Rosanvallon asserts that, under these conditions, “political citizenship has progressed, whilst social citizenship has regressed”. This, according to Rosanvallon, constitutes nothing short of a “rending of democracy” in which “the growth of inequality is at once an index of distress and its driving force” and “the stealthy blade that is silently severing the social bond and simultaneously undermining social solidarity” (Rosanvallon *ibid.*: 1–2). Nor can the rise of populist right-wing formations in a country such as Norway be understood exclusively in economic terms (it is not only a function of economics and/or class dynamics but also of cultural dispositions, and Norway has weathered the European financial crises since 2008 comparatively well, with comparatively low levels of unemployment and socio-economic inequality). Central to the attraction of populist right-wing formations in Norway, then, is also what one may refer to as a *welfare state nationalism* (Suszycki 2011; Brochmann and Hagelund 2012), with immigrants and Muslims cast as fundamental threats to the future sustainability of the welfare state, anti-élitism, in which the existing political and bureaucratic élites are seen as increasingly distant from the concerns of “ordinary people”,

usually understood to be white, male and lowly educated. Welfare state nationalism and its targeting of Muslims in particular as alleged present and future threats to its sustainability are, of course, not limited to populist right-wing formations in Norway, but the populist right wing represents the embodiment of its exclusionary “radicalisation” (see Meret and Siim 2016, for this point).

In this chapter, I will use the rhetoric about immigrants and Muslims of the now governing populist right-wing Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*) in Norway since circa 1987 as my case for analysing the role and function of representations of Islam and Muslims in contemporary Norwegian nationalism. One should bear in mind here, however, that I have not attempted to provide a complete record of the public statements on Islam and Muslims made by Progress Party politicians in the period in question, and that this survey—as any such survey would—therefore offers a partial view of these representations. It should also be noted that such a survey cannot possibly enable definite conclusions as to the ways in which these representations are assimilated by Progress Party voters and sympathisers, and by the population at large, and what material consequences these representations have for individuals belonging to the Muslim minority in Norway. Some *caveats* are in order with regard to the methodology used for this study. I have chosen to focus on representations of Islam and Muslims in the discourse of leading Progress Party politicians both past and present. There is, of course, a distinction to be made between Progress Party politicians’ discourse on Islam and Muslims in opposition and in government.² In government with the Norwegian Conservative Party [*Høyre*] as its coalition partner since the September 2013 parliamentary elections in Norway, the Progress Party has, in fact, developed an elaborate strategy of double communication on these issues. This means that Progress Party cabinet ministers, with the exception of the Progress Party cabinet minister for migration and integration, Mrs Sylvi Listhaug, appointed following a cabinet reshuffle in December 2015, have, to a large extent, toned down their anti-Muslim rhetoric. However, Progress Party MPs have by no means toned down their rhetoric, and there is every reason to believe that they have the support of the party’s central leadership and administration in not doing so. Furthermore, even though hardly a week goes by without some lower-level Progress Party politician

engaging in racist speech against Muslims on social media, no Progress Party politician appears to have been sanctioned by the party for so doing since 2011. To conclude from this that it is only rhetoric, and has no material consequences for the lives and opportunities for ordinary Muslims in Norway, would be wilfully naïve. This study does not and cannot cover the role of countervailing forces in civil society, local communities, municipalities and in the media. But there is substantial evidence from, for example, studies of the labour-market and housing-market discrimination of minorities in Norway (Midtbøen and Rogstad 2012; Tronstad 2008) as well as hate crimes surveys, which suggest that individuals with Muslim backgrounds in contemporary Norway are, in fact, adversely affected by the general cultural and intellectual environment in which they find themselves,³ an environment which the populist right-wing nationalist discourse in recent years has played a pivotal role in shaping.

3 Muslims and Perceptions of Muslims in Norway

The Muslim population in Norway is heterogeneous. The first Muslims to settle permanently in Norway were, in all probability, Ahmadi proselytisers (*muballighs*) who arrived from the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent in the 1940s. Muslim mass immigration to Norway dates from the late 1960s, when young male labour migrants, often from a landless, but socially aspiring and educated, lower middle class, started arriving in Norway from Muslim-dominated countries such as Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey. In Norway, which was in the midst of a petroleum-revenue boom which started with the discovery of oil fields in the North Sea in 1968, these migrants often found employment as manual labourers in the Norwegian manufacturing industry which was then at its height. Though the Norwegian authorities, by cross-political consent in the Norwegian Parliament, the *Storting*, attempted to curb non-Western immigration to Norway in the form of declaring an Immigration Stop/Ban in 1975, Muslim immigration to Norway continued in the form of family re-unification and the resettlement of refugees arriving

as asylum-seekers in the 1970s and onwards. Since the Norwegian population census takers are forbidden by law from asking for information regarding the faith/religion of individual citizens, Statistics Norway's figures concerning the number of Muslims in Norway are based upon estimates rather than real numbers. According to the estimates, there may be up to 220,000 Muslims in Norway, or 4.5 per cent of the total population as in 2014. Muslims in Norway are a largely urban population, with the largest concentration in and around the capital, Oslo, in Drammen and in the Western Norwegian town of Stavanger and in Kristiansand in Southern Norway.

Until the late 1980s, Norwegians of Muslim background were generally understood to be immigrants of highly variegated national backgrounds, and were described with reference to their country of origin, rather than their faith in public and media discourses (see Yilmaz 2016, for similar processes in Denmark). This changed rapidly in the course of the late 1980s, and the populist right-wing Progress Party's discovery of the electoral appeal of "immigrant and Muslim-bashing" in the 1987 municipal election campaign, and the Salman Rushdie affair of 1988 and its repercussions in Norway seem to have been instrumental in affecting this change.⁴ This was not necessarily a one-sided affair, though, as an increasing number of young Norwegians of Muslim background at around the same time started identifying themselves publicly as "Muslim" rather than "Pakistani", "Moroccan" or "Turk". In so doing, they were echoing a global Islamic resurgence translated into localised Muslim identity politics in many parts of the world.

We have limited empirical research upon which to base assessments of the extent and ubiquity of Islamophobia in Norwegian society in general, but national representative surveys from recent years may provide some useful indicators. Such surveys have generally found that people of Muslim background in Norway are, on social distance surveys, among the least desired and most resented co-citizens. In a national representative survey from 2012, a full 66 per cent of those surveyed reported that they would "strongly dislike" (38 per cent) or "dislike" (28 per cent) a Muslim to be married into their family (HL-Center 2012). This percentage was higher than in the case of any other minority group, including the *Roma*. In a national representative survey from 2009, 56 per cent of

those surveyed reported that they felt negative towards the construction of mosques in the area in which they lived, while 59 per cent were opposed to Muslim women wearing the *hijab* at work, 60 per cent at school and 37 per cent in the streets (IMDI 2010). In a national representative survey from 2014, 48 per cent of those surveyed reported that they were sceptical about people of the Muslim faith, and five out of ten respondents reported that they considered the “values of Islam” to be “partly” or “completely” incompatible with the “values of Norwegian society” (IMDI 2014: 11). In a representative national survey published in December 2010, 61 per cent of those surveyed declared “conflicts with Muslims” to be their greatest concern for the future. This was over and above any other fear for the future, including that of the effects of climate change (Dagens Perspektiv 2010). And finally, in a representative national survey published in October 2011, 25 per cent held that there were “too many Muslims” in Norway, while 24 per cent declared that Islam was a “threat to Norwegian culture” (Sandvik and Liestøl 2011). Given that the latter survey was conducted a few months after Anders Behring Breivik’s extreme right-wing terrorist attacks and in the context of a period lasting some months which would, in hindsight, later stand out as a period of grace with regard to anti-Muslim ideas and sentiments in public, political and media discourses in Norway, the figure is probably an under-estimate.⁵

Norway has, like many other Western European countries in recent years, seen an increasing “securitisation of Islam” (Kundnani 2014) on the back of the rise of the Islamic State or Daesh (IS-ISIL-ISIS-شعاع) in the context of the polarisation and the horrors and devastation of the civil war in Syria since 2011 and the failed state-building in Iraq after 2003 and the fact that an estimated 80 Norwegians of Muslim background have travelled to Syria and Iraq as “foreign fighters” for *Salafi-jihadi* terror organisations such as *Jabhat an-Nusra* and IS. This has, if anything, been extended and extenuated as a consequence of the large-scale *Salafi-jihadi* terrorist attacks in France in January and November 2015, and in Belgium in March 2016, and the widespread media coverage in Norway of these attacks. Populist right-wing politicians and cabinet ministers in Norway have, as one would have expected, wasted no time in linking debates about “radicalisation” among Muslims in France and Belgium to debates

on immigration and integration in Norway. The optics of surveillance and monitoring that the legitimate concerns over this development in Norway have generated clearly have consequences for the prisms through which both state actors and non-Muslim Norwegians perceive Norwegian Muslim citizens, even though we have—as yet—little empirical data about the concrete effects of all of this.

4 Born Racists?

“Racists are made, not born”, goes the saying. And so it is, arguably, with Islamophobes. This is because central to the ubiquity and mainstreaming of Islamophobia in Norway since the late 1980s has been the “polarisation entrepreneurs” (Sunstein 2009) in the far-right to populist right-wing political spectrum. It is obvious that the “Muslim” of Islamophobia is an altogether different creature than the “Muslim” of Islam—and thus the notion of a *homo islamicus* (Lyons 2014), whose very life, being, attitudes and modes of behaviour are seen as being over-determined by Islam, has been fundamental to Islamophobia in Norway. Unfortunately, the space available here does not permit the provision of more than a cursory view of the genealogies and development of far-right to populist right-wing Islamophobia, so I will limit myself here to some central episodes.

5 The Progress Party and Anti-Muslim Rhetoric

It was in the run-up to the 1987 municipal elections that the Progress Party, under its legendary Chairman Carl I. Hagen (1944–), first discovered the popular appeal of anti-Muslim and anti-immigration rhetoric in Norway. At an election rally in September 1987, he read out a letter that he alleged to have received from a Norwegian Muslim citizen by the name of Muhammad Mustafa. In the letter, Mustafa was cited as having written the following:

Allah is Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet! You are fighting in vain, Mr. Hagen! Islam, the only true faith, will conquer Norway too. One day, mosques will be as common in Norway as churches are today, and the children of my great-grandchildren will live to see this. I know, and all Muslims in Norway know, that one day the Norwegian population will come to the [Islamic] faith, and that this country will be Muslim! We give birth to more children than you, and many a true-believing Muslims come to Norway each year, men in productive age. One day, the infidel cross in the flag will be gone too!⁶

The letter was a complete fabrication. The real Muhammad Mustafa, a pizza baker from Tøyen in Oslo, was paid a substantial sum by the Progress Party when he threatened Hagen with a lawsuit for defamation. Nonetheless, in the parliamentary elections of 1987, the Progress Party obtained its hitherto best electoral result, gaining 12.1 per cent of the national vote. The background to its success in channelling anti-immigrant sentiment lays in a significant rise in the number of people applying for asylum in Norway from 1986 to 1987, after Denmark had implemented new restrictions on asylum in 1986 (Jupskås 2009). A pattern had been set, and the Progress Party's anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric would hereafter become a regular staple of the party's political platform.

In May 2005, the Progress Party's then spokesperson on immigration, the MP Per Sandberg, in an interview in the tabloid newspaper *Verdens Gang* (VG), stated that the Progress Party parliamentary caucus had received "information" from "sources in the Pakistani *milieu* in Oslo" about a secretive extremist Muslim network in Oslo with "30,000 members of Pakistani origin" (VG 23 May 2005). These 30,000 members, Sandberg declared, had sworn an "oath of loyalty" to the network, which was said to be "fundamentalist, anti-democratic and potentially violent". Members of the network, Sandberg alleged, had been looking for properties around Oslo with the intention of building mosques and facilities to be used for "training in violence". Sandberg duly informed the media that he was meeting the PST (*Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste*—Norwegian police security agency) in order to report on the information that he had obtained. Hege Storhaug's *Human Rights Service* (HRS), an NGO dedicated to opposition to Islam, Muslims and immigration, had

also obtained the same “information” and contacted the PST about it. The PST, however, never made any statement on the case to the Norwegian media. The fabricated nature of the “information” that the Progress Party and the HRS had generously shared with the Norwegian public through the tabloid VG⁷ would be demonstrated through the fact that there were, as of 2004, only 26,286 individuals of Pakistani origin in the whole of Norway—women and children included (Østby 2008: 18). The VG reporters who covered this news story appear not to have asked any critical questions whatsoever of Sandberg or Storhaug regarding their sources or figures.

6 “Islamisation by Stealth”

Ahead of the parliamentary election in September 2009, the Progress Party leader, Siv Jensen (1969–), who had succeeded Carl I. Hagen after he had resigned as party leader in 2006, in a speech to the party congress, warned against what she referred to as the “Islamisation by stealth” (*sni-kislamisering*) of Norwegian society. “The reality is that we are at the point of allowing an Islamisation of this society [*i.e.*, Norway] by stealth, and we have to put a stop to it”, she asserted. “We cannot allow particular groups to decide the direction of societal development in Norway”, she stated, averring that, “We [*i.e.*, in the Progress Party] will not allow special demands [*særkrav*] from particular groups”. Jensen listed as evidence of “Islamisation by stealth” demands by Muslim women to wear the *hijab* as part of the police uniform, that Muslim inmates in Norwegian prisons be provided with *halal* food and that some schools in Oslo were allegedly practising gender-segregated education. These demands had, of course, not been put forward in any “stealthy” way, but very openly, and as a normal part of interest-group politics in any liberal and secular democracy. The Islamic Council of Norway (*Islamsk Råd Norge*), the largest umbrella organisation for Muslims in Norway, was, in fact, strikingly absent from public debates about the *hijab* in Norway at the time, and has, by and large, remained so ever since, largely as a result of precisely not wanting to present controversial political demands on behalf of Muslim interest groups. The concept of “Islamisation by stealth”, which

had been used by the discussants on the web debate platform of the tabloid VG as early as 2003 (Strømmen 2011: 191), is, regardless of its actual etymological origins, a rhetorical concept which is strikingly similar to that found among the counter-jihadists and “Eurabia” fantasists who inspired Anders Behring Breivik in the years leading up to 2011 (Strømmen *ibid.*: 152). The prominent US Islamophobic author Robert Spencer’s book on “jihad by stealth”, which seems to have popularised the term in “counter-jihadist” circles on the web, dates from 2008 (Spencer 2008). References to Spencer’s work appear no less than 162 times in Breivik’s cut-and-paste tract or manifesto entitled *2083: A European Declaration of Independence* (Lean 2012: 167), making Spencer, arguably, the most central ideological influence on Breivik (*The Guardian* 7 September 2011), apart from the Norwegian blogger Peder Are “Fjordman” Nøstvold Jensen. Spencer’s concept of what “stealth jihad” entails is, in many respects, strikingly similar to that of Siv Jensen—namely, a quiet subversion of “our values” by Muslims using various non-violent and democratic means to further their purported agenda of “Islamising” Western societies. The Progress Party’s usage of this term provides a clear example of how political terms with a provenance in extreme right-wing and Islamophobic *milieus* online become part of mainstream political discourse (Døving 2012: 88).

7 The Rhetoric Intensifies: 2010 and 2011

The years 2010 and 2011 saw an intensification of Islamophobic rhetoric emanating from Progress Party MPs. In May 2011, Christian Tybring-Gjedde, a Progress Party MP for Oslo and also the chairman of the Oslo Progress Party, addressed the party’s national congress. In his October 2010 speech to the “Friends of *Document.no*”,⁸ a speech later made available on the Internet by *Document.no*, Tybring-Gjedde alleged that “90 per cent of all immigration to Europe after 1990 had been from Muslim countries” and that there would be “an estimated 52 million Muslims in Europe by 2025” (see VG.no 1 September 2011). Both claims are grossly inaccurate and are based upon the fabricated demographic scenarios found in the “Eurabia” literature (see Larsson 2012; Pilbeam 2011).

In an opinion piece published by *Aftenposten* in August 2010, Tybring-Gjedde and his Progress Party colleague Kent Andersen had accused the governing Norwegian Labour Party of “wanting to tear the country apart” by allowing “thousands of immigrants” with their “un-culture” [*ukultur*] into the country every year: “What is wrong with Norwegian culture, since the Labour Party wants to replace it with multiculturalism?” thundered Tybring-Gjedde. Indeed, Tybring-Gjedde and Andersen stated that multiculturalism “represents structured rootlessness, and will tear our country apart” (*Aftenposten* 25 August 2010). In January 2011, Andersen wrote, on his personal blog, that there were “striking similarities between the three great ideologies of humankind: Nazism, Communism and Islam”. Andersen and Tybring-Gjedde represent the most extreme far right wing of the Progress Party in Norway which is centred upon the Oslo branch of the party. But their rhetoric was far from being an outlier, Tybring-Gjedde being both a central MP for the party and a central figure in the Oslo Progress Party branch. Furthermore, their view was endorsed by Per-Willy Amundsen, the Progress Party MP who, in 2011, was the party’s spokesperson on immigration and integration, and who went on to become minister of Justice and Public Security in Norway in December 2016, following a cabinet reshuffle. One notes in Andersen and Tybring-Gjedde’s opinion piece how Islam is deliberately construed as a political ideology rather than a religion. This construct has been central to much Islamophobic and “Eurabia” literature from recent years, and can also be found in Breivik’s 2083 manifesto as well as in the rhetoric of the far-right and government-supporting organisation “Stop the Islamisation of Norway” or SIAN (Bangstad 2016c). The analogy between Islam and Nazism and/or Communism, a rhetorical trope used by Islamophobic right-wing European politicians from Geert Wilders of the Dutch *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV—the Dutch Freedom Party) to Marine Le Pen of the French *Front National* (FN), does, of course, also suggest that Islam will have to be fought by non-Muslim Europeans in ways that are similar to those that were used to fight Nazism and Communism. And this “fighting”, in Andersen’s conceptualisation, would seem *not* to exclude violence.

Andersen also raised the question, on his blog, as to whether “moderate Muslims” actually exist—“as if there was something like ‘moderate

Nazis” (*Dagsavisen* 1 February 2011). There was no comment from the central leadership of the Progress Party on these statements, but the then party spokesperson on immigration and integration, Per-Willy Amundsen, declared that he considered Andersen’s statements to be “interesting” and “completely unproblematic” (VG 1 February 2010). The rhetorical trope used by Andersen here also stands in debt to the Islamophobic and “Eurabia” literature, in which a central tenet is that, to the extent that Muslims publicly abhor violence, terrorism and so forth, they are being disingenuous about “real Islam”, that is, the Islam of violence and terrorism, and, in fact, practise dissimulation, or *taqiyya*. But, in the work of the *Eurabia*, by author Bat Ye’or, and in the understandings of her followers, including Anders Behring Breivik, *taqiyya* is instead understood as “lies” or “deceptions” through which Muslims everywhere in the world “conceal” their “real” intentions of Islamic dominance over non-Muslim peoples. Accordingly, Muslims, whatever their orientation or beliefs, are never to be trusted. All Muslims and Islamists (whether radical or moderate) are all part of the same plot. The term *taqiyya* had, in fact, been known and used in Progress Party circles for quite some time before 2011. When, in August 2004, the then leader, Carl Hagen, protested against the Norwegian Conservative Party-dominated government’s granting permission to the Pakistani politician MP Qazi Hussein Ahmed of the Islamist *Jamaat e-Islami* to visit Norway and Oslo for Pakistani national day celebrations, he alleged to the liberal tabloid VG that, “according to the Qur’an, it is perfectly acceptable to lie to and deceive the infidels, including us Christians” (VG 10 August 2004). In two successive letters to the editor at VG, Hagen, referring to a book in Danish by Lars Hedegaard published in 2002 on the alleged, impending Islamic colonisation of the West cited the “so-called tactic of *taqiyya*”, which “permits fanatical Islamists to walk around in Western attire, drink alcohol, behave like well-integrated immigrants, in short, to conceal their real aims from their surroundings and Western police” (VG 23 August 2004).

The significance of this concept for Islamophobes is that it raises the prospect that there are no people of Muslim background that are to be trusted under any circumstances, since the practice of *taqiyya*, to their minds, gives licence to dissimulating even the absence of Islamic faith. There are, consequently, no such things as “good” and “bad” Muslims

(Mamdani 2004). The division between these two categories is, according to this logic, by and large a product of fiction. Andersen was unapologetic when contacted about these postings by a Norwegian newspaper in February 2011, Tybring-Gjedde refused to make any exceptions to Andersen's statements about Islam, Progress Party Chairman Siv Jensen refused to be drawn for comments, and the party's then Spokesperson on Immigration and Integration, MP Per-Willy Amundsen, characterised Andersen's statements as "interesting" and "completely unproblematical" (*Dagsavisen* 1 February 2011). Tybring-Gjedde's address to the Progress Party congress in May 2011 was to take this one step further. Here, with reference to Groruddalen, the Grorud Valley, a suburb in Oslo East, he went on to argue that immigrant young men were *hissigere* (*angrier*) than their Norwegian counterparts. In Norwegian, *hissig* is a term which connotes anger and resentment, as well as a lack of self-control and self-restraint which potentially leads to violence (VG 13 May 2011). It was Muslim residents of Groruddalen in particular that Tybring-Gjedde had in mind. This much was also evident from the assertion later in his speech to the effect that "Islam cannot stand values of freedom, and the power of Islam [in Norway] increases day by day. Therefore, immigration from Muslim countries must be substantially reduced". Returning to his charge that the social democratic and governing Labour Party had turned Norway into a "multicultural Disneyland", Tybring-Gjedde concluded by listing a series of political demands for the Labour Party as well as the Conservative Party (*Høyre*). These included the demand that new immigrants display "unconditional love (*ubetinget kjærlighet*) for Norway and *our* [my emphasis] Christian cultural heritage".

8 The Progress Party in Government, 2013–2014⁹

The Progress Party came to power as a junior partner in government with the Conservative Party for the first time in its 40-year history after the parliamentary elections of September 2013. This led to cabinet ministers and the central party leadership—which is drawn from the party's educated technocratic élite—adopting a more civil discourse on Islam,

Muslims and immigration than had been the case in opposition. Notwithstanding this, this faction of the party continued to display a high level of tolerance for MPs who persisted in engaging in Islamophobic rhetoric, as well as for municipal and regional politicians affiliated with the party who did so. For cases in point, one could point to the party's Vice-Chairman Per Sandberg MP,¹⁰ who, as we have already seen, has a long-standing record of problems in sorting empirical facts from personal fantasies. In his autobiography published in 2013, Sandberg (Sandberg 2013) fabricated claims to the effect that a small local municipality on the West Coast of Norway had been forced to build an entire new school to accommodate the biological offspring of one Norwegian-Somalian man who had allegedly "tricked" the Norwegian immigration authorities into allowing him to settle with his polygynous wives in Norway in breach of Norwegian law (which only permits a man to have one wife at a time) and fathering no less than 22 children. When a local newspaper reporter documented that the story was a complete fabrication (*Firdaposten* 12 December 2013), Sandberg responded with a shrug of the shoulders and alleged that "my readers would understand—for it *could* have happened" (*Firdaposten* 12 December 2013). There was no reaction from the Progress Party's central leadership. A further case in point is provided by the case of the Vice-Chairman of the party's parliamentary caucus and spokesperson on Justice, Ulf Leirstein MP (1973–), whose September 2014 endorsement of doctored YouTube videos on Facebook which suggested that his fellow MP Mrs Hadia Tajik (Labour Party) (1983–) on the Justice Committee,¹¹ who is a Muslim, was practising *taqiyya*, and that, in reality, she expressed support for the beheadings and other human rights violations perpetrated by the Islamic State,¹² went completely unsanctioned and was even tacitly supported in the name of a purported defence of "freedom of expression" by the party's central leadership. Political scientists specialising on the Progress Party have, upon the basis of interviews with party representatives at various levels since the party came to power in October 2013, demonstrated that there is a growing disconnection between grassroots representatives of the party at the municipal level and the cabinet ministers—and this is especially so on matters relating to Islam, Muslims, immigration and integration (Jupskås 2015). Progress Party cabinet ministers, the central party leadership and

the party's parliamentary caucus have, in reality, had to compromise over matters pertaining to Norwegian immigration and integration policies as a result of negotiations with the senior partner in government, the Conservative Party, as well as the two minor parties, the Christian Democratic *KrF* and the social liberal *Venstre*, which support the government's parliamentary platform. These compromises have led to the party experiencing a bit of a roller-coaster ride in the opinion polls and a significant number of extreme right-wing supporters abandoning the party due to the perception that the party has not really delivered on its long-standing electoral promises to curb immigration in general and Muslim immigration in particular. And so, in order to retain as much of the party's support among extreme and far-right sections of the electorate as possible, the party has, in reality, with the tacit approval of the party's central leadership, developed considerable skills at double communication, whereby non-cabinet MPs from the party engage in both Islamophobic and discriminatory speech from the sidelines, while cabinet ministers by and large refrain from it. The policy remains by and large unchanged, however: in December 2015, the party's new minister of migration and integration, Mrs Sylvi Listhaug (Progress Party), proposed 40 extraordinary measures to curb the flow of asylum-seekers to Norway in the wake of the world's largest refugee crisis since 1945 by billing them as a means of achieving the "strictest immigration policy in Europe". The measures have been widely and roundly condemned by leading experts on international law, human rights and refugee rights, as well as numerous national and international human rights organisations and refugee protection agencies. The party has also ensured that the civil society activist Hege Storhaug and her NGO *Human Rights Service* (HRS), which first entered the state budget on the initiative of Progress Party MPs in 2001 (see Razack 2008; Fekete 2009) and which has long engaged in similar activities and has used the same means as the far-right and anti-Muslim fringe organisations in the USA described in Bail's (2015) study in order to promote a societal climate of Islamophobia, racism and discrimination against Norwegian Muslims, receive ample state budget allocations for their activities. Storhaug and the NGO have a long-standing and sustained record of promoting far-right and Islamophobic literature of the "Eurabia" genre (see Helland 2014; Bangstad 2013a), as well as

republishing racist and discriminatory hate speech on their website. The HRS has recently gone to the extent of publicly harassing a Somali refugee family living in a small municipality in Norway with their small children who were identified with full names and pictures on their website. With reference to the work of, for example, Corey Brettschneider (2012), this raises the question as to whether it is appropriate and defensible for an ostensibly liberal and secular state to fund the activities of a NGO which so clearly and explicitly promotes racism, discrimination and hate against specific targeted minorities. Storhaug's publication of a self-authored and bestselling popular title on Islam and Muslims entitled *Islam—The Eleventh Plague of the Nation* in November 2015, replete with the usual fabrications of the genre, has further cemented and radicalised the mainstreaming of the far-right discourses on Islam that Norway has seen since 2001.

9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the role and function of the representations of Islam and Muslims in the new or recoded nationalism in contemporary Norway, as articulated in far-right and populist right-wing discourses. I have argued that this case demonstrates some of the ways in which the mainstreaming of extreme right-wing ideas and sentiments concerning Islam and Muslims in Norway has occurred, and how these ideas and sentiments are co-imbricated. The populist right-wing Progress Party has long been the central vehicle in this mainstreaming, which has also had a significant impact on the rhetoric and policies in various policy domains of other parties both left and right in Norway. The Progress Party's rhetoric on Islam and Muslims in Norway is certainly not unique to Norway, and though, on numerous points, it is less extreme than the rhetoric of its populist right-wing sister parties in Sweden and Denmark, it remains central to the politics of exclusion through fearmongering which has long affected Norwegian Muslims (Bangstad 2013b). It is clear that Muslims are among the most excluded and "othered" in contemporary nationalist, social and political imaginaries in Norway and that this exclusion and "othering" comes at a significant cost in terms of the

material consequences for Muslims living in Norway. Whether this spell can be broken in the foreseeable future is, at present, anyone's guess.

Notes

1. By Islamophobia, I mean to refer to what Mattias Gardell has defined as “socially reproduced practices and aversions against Islam and Muslims which attack, exclude and discriminate against Muslims upon the basis that they are, or are assumed by others to be, Muslims, and associated with Islam” (Gardell 2011: 17, my translation). The first recorded academic usage of the term has been traced back to two French West Africanists, Maurice Delafosse and Alain Quillien, in 1910. The first academic usage in English is found in Edward Said’s article “Orientalism Reconsidered”, first published in 1985. The term was popularised and entered into common usage through the UK Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia: “A Challenge for us All” in 1997 (López 2011).
2. The, to date, most extensive study of this is Fangen and Vaage (2014). See, also, Bangstad (2016a) for an updated study of Progress Party anti-Muslim rhetoric since 2011.
3. A survey from 2005/06 found that Norwegian-Somalis reported more discrimination with regard to employment and housing than any other group of non-Western immigrants to Norway (Tronstad 2008). A survey from 2012 demonstrated that applicants with Norwegian-Pakistani sounding surnames were 25 per cent less likely to get called in for employment interviews by Norwegian employers when their qualifications and employment were the same as that of “ethnic” Norwegian applicants (Midtbøen and Rogstad 2012). A report from the Oslo Police on hate crimes reported to the police in the Oslo Police District, which has Norway’s only Hate Crimes Unit to date, found that, out of 40 reported hate crimes in 2015 where a victim’s real or ascribed “religion” was the reported bias motive, 35 of the hate crimes involved Muslims as victims (Oslopolitiet 2016).
4. The Rushdie affair refers to the global crisis unleashed by the publication of the Indian-born novelist Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* in 1988. Islamists in Britain and elsewhere rushed to declare the novel “blasphemous” and to demand its banning in numerous countries. In February 1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamist regime in

- Iran, issued a *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie and called for his assassination. Rushdie was forced to go into hiding for many years; the novel's Japanese and Italian translators were assassinated; and Rushdie's Norwegian publisher William Nygaard, the first in the world to bring out a translation of the novel and central to the international campaign in support of Rushdie, narrowly survived an assassination attempt in 1994. A good early overview of the Rushdie affair is provided by Ruthven (1990), whereas Rushdie's own account is provided in Rushdie (2012).
5. A survey commissioned by researchers at the University of Oslo under the CoMRel Research Group funded by the Norwegian Research Council (NRC)'s SAMKUL Programme and conducted by TNS Gallup in 2015 found close to 50 per cent of respondents agreeing that Islam "in part" or "fully" represents a threat to Norwegian culture. Professor Knut Lundby, personal correspondence, 25 June 2015.
 6. A copy of the letter that Hagen alleged to have received is available at http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/05/25/nyheter/politikk/frp/siv_jensen/carl_i_hagen/27336391.
 7. *Verdens Gang* (VG) is Norway's second biggest print newspaper in terms of circulation and the most widely read newspaper among Progress Party voters.
 8. *Document.no* is a Norwegian online magazine, which proclaims itself to be Christian conservative and critical of Islam.
 9. For a more extensive study of the Progress Party's rhetoric on immigration in recent years, see Fangen and Vaage (2014).
 10. In a cabinet reshuffle in December 2015, MP Sandberg was designated as the new Minister of Fisheries. As a function of Sandberg being allocated to this post, he hardly makes any public statements on immigration, Muslims and Islam anymore, but limits himself to verbal attacks on Norwegian academic marine biologists who do not adhere to the strictures of the billion dollar marine aquaculture industry in Norway.
 11. Tajik is a former Minister of Culture for the Labour Party 2012–2013, the first ever cabinet minister of Muslim background in Norway and the current chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice. She is the second child of a Pakistani-Afghan migrant labour migrating couple who arrived in Norway in the 1970s, and is known for her vocal opposition to Salafi-jihadism. For more on Tajik, see Bangstad (2015).
 12. See http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/08/23/nyheter/politikk/innenriks/samfunn/ulf_leirstein/34934708 for this. Hadia Tajik describes herself as a Muslim, albeit not a "Muslim politician".

References

- Aftenposten. (2010). Drøm fra Disneyland [Dream from Disneyland]. Op-ed., August 25.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso Books.
- Bail, C. A. (2008). The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries Against Immigrants in Europe. *American Sociological Review*, 73(1), 37–59.
- Bail, C. A. (2015). *Terrified: How Anti-Muslim Fringe Organizations Became Mainstream*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bangstad, S. (2011). The Morality Police Are Coming! Muslims in Norway's Media Discourses. *Anthropology Today*, 27(5), 3–7.
- Bangstad, S. (2013a). Eurabia Comes to Norway. *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 24(3), 369–391.
- Bangstad, S. (2013b). Inclusion and Exclusion in the Mediated Public Sphere: The Case of Norway and Its Muslims. *Social Anthropology*, 21(3), 356–370.
- Bangstad, S. (2014). *Anders Brevik and the Rise of Islamophobia*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- Bangstad, S. (2015). *The Politics of Mediated Presence: Exploring the Voices of Muslims in Mediated Public Spheres in Contemporary Norway*. Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press.
- Bangstad, S. (2016a). Norwegian Right-Wing Discourses: Extremism Post-Utøya. In D. Pratt & R. Woodlock (Eds.), *Fear of Muslims?* Berlin and New York: Springer.
- Bangstad, S. (2016b). Recoding Nationalism: Islam, Muslims and Islamophobia in Norway Before and After July 22 2011. In F. Hafez (Ed.), *Islamophobia Studies Yearbook* (Vol. 7, pp. 44–65). Vienna: New Academic Press.
- Bangstad, S. (2016c). Islamophobia: What's in a Name? Analysing the Discourses of StoppIslamisingenav Norge (Stop the Islamisation of Norway, SIAN). *Journal of Muslims in Europe*, 5(2), 145–169.
- Bangstad, S., & Bunzl, M. (2010). Anthropologists Are Talking About Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism in the New Europe. *Ethnos*, 75(2), 213–228.
- Bangstad, S., & Elgvin, O. (2015). Norway. In O. Scharbrodt et al. (Eds.), *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe* (Vol. 7, pp. 436–449). Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill.
- Betz, H.-G., & Meret, S. (2009). Revisiting Lepanto: The Political Mobilization Against Islam in Contemporary Europe. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43(3–4), 313–334.

- Brettschneider, C. (2012). *When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Brochmann, G., & Hagelund, A. (Eds.). (2012). *Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945–2010*. New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brown, W. (2006). *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire*. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Dagens Perspektiv. (2010, December 5). Mest redd for konflikt med muslimer. [Most Concerned About Conflict with Muslims], *Dagens Perspektiv*. Retrieved June 26, 2015, from <http://www.dagensperspektiv.no/mest-redd-konflikt-med-muslimer>
- Dagsavisen. (2011, February 1). Likestiller islam og nazisme [Analogies Islam and Nazism]. *Dagsavisen*.
- Døving, C. A. (2012). Norge snikislamiseres. In S. Indregard (Ed.), *Motgift: Akademisk respons på den nye høyreekstremismen* (pp. 87–97). Oslo: Flamme Forlag.
- Eriksen, T. H. (2002). *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (2nd ed.). London and New York: Pluto Press.
- Fangen, K., & Vaage, M. (2014). Frp-politikerens innvandringsretorikk i posisjon og opposisjon. *Agora: Journal for Metafysisk Spekulasjon*, 3(4), 30–64.
- Fekete, L. (2009). *A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe*. London and New York: Pluto Press.
- Firdaposten. (2013, December 12). Per Sandbergs bok: Fri diktning om Svelgen [Per Sandberg's Book: Free Association About Svelgen]. *Firdaposten*.
- Gardell, M. (2011). *Islamofobi*. Translated from Swedish to Norwegian by Alexander Leborg. Oslo: Spartacus.
- Goldberg, D. T. (2006). Racial Europeanization. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29(2), 331–364.
- Gullestad, M. (2006). *Plausible Prejudice: Everyday Experiences and Social Images of Nation, Culture and Race*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Hafez, F. (2014). Shifting Borders: Islamophobia as Common Ground for Building Pan-European Right-Wing Unity. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 48(5), 479–499.
- Helland, F. (2014). Rasisme uten rasister i Norge. *Agora: Tidsskrift For Metafysisk Spekulasjon*, 14(3–4), 108–143.
- HL-Center. (2012). *Antisemitism in Norway? The Attitudes of the Norwegian Population Towards Jews and Other Minorities*. Oslo: HL-Center. Retrieved

- June 26, 2015, from <http://www.hlsenteret.no/publikasjoner/antisemitism-in-norway-web.pdf>
- Hobsbawn, E., & Ranger, T. (Eds.). (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- IMDI. (2010). [The Directorate of Integration and Diversity]. *Integreringsbarometeret 2010*. Oslo: IMDI. Retrieved June 26, 2015, from http://www.imdi.no/Documents/Rapporter/Integreringsbarometeret_2010.pdf
- IMDI. (2014). [The Directorate of Integration and Diversity]. *Integreringsbarometeret 2013–14 [The Integration Barometer 2013–2014]*. Oslo: IMDI. Retrieved June 26, 2015, from http://www.imdi.no/Documents/Rapporter/2014/Integreringsbarometeret_2013-2014.pdf
- Jupskås, A. R. (2009). Høyrepopulismepånorsk. Historien om Anders Langes Parti og Fremskrittspartiet [Right-Wing Populism in Norwegian. The Story of Anders Lange's Party and the Progress Party]. In T. E. Simonsen et al. (Eds.), *Høyrepopulisme i Europa (Right-Wing Populism in Europe)* (pp. 27–79). Oslo: Unipub.
- Jupskås, A. R. (2015). The Persistence of Populism: The Norwegian Progress Party 1973–2009. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.
- Klug, B. (2014). The Limits of Analogy: Comparing Islamophobia and Antisemitism. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 48(5), 442–459.
- Kundnani, A. (2014). *The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the War on Terror*. London and New York: Verso Books.
- Laegaard, S. (2007). Liberal Nationalism and the Nationalisation of Liberal Values. *Nations and Nationalism*, 13(1), 37–55.
- Lakoff, G. M. (2008). *The Political Mind: Why You Can't Understand 21st Century American Politics with an 18th Century Brain*. New York: Viking Books.
- Larsson, G. (2012). The Fear of Small Numbers: Eurabia Literature and Censuses on National Belonging. *Journal of Muslims in Europe*, 1, 142–165.
- Lean, N. (2012). *The Islamophobia Industry: How the Far-Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims*. London and New York: Pluto Press.
- López, F. B. (2011). Towards a Definition of Islamophobia: Approximations of the Early Twentieth Century. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(4), 556–573.
- Lyons, J. (2014). *Islam Through Western Eyes: From the Crusades to the War on Terrorism*. New York and London: Columbia University Press.
- Mamdani, M. (2004). *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Massad, J. (2015). *Islam in Liberalism*. New York and London: Columbia University Press.

- Meret, S., & Siim, B. (2016). Right-Wing Populism in Denmark: People, Nation and Welfare in the Construction of the 'Other'. In G. Lazaridis, G. Campani, & A. Benveniste (Eds.), *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populist Shifts and 'Othering'* (pp. 109–136). London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Midtbøen, A. H., & Rogstad, J. (2012). *Diskrimineringsens omfang og årsaker: Etniske minoriteters tilgang til norsk arbeidsliv*. Report 1: 2012. Oslo: Institutt for Samfunnsforskning.
- Morey, P., & Yaqin, A. (2011). *Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation After 9/11*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Oslopolitiet. (2016). *Anmeldt hatkriminalitet—Oslo politidistrikt 2015*. Oslo: Oslopolitiet. Retrieved from https://www.politi.no/vedlegg/lokale_vedlegg/oslo/Vedlegg_3571.pdf
- Østby, L. (2008). Levekårsundersøkelse blant innvandrere—hvordan og hvorfor. In S. Blom & K. Henriksen (Eds.), *Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005/2006* (pp. 15–26). Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrå.
- Pelinka, A. (2013). Right-Wing Populism: Concept and Typology. In R. Wodak, M. KhosraviNik, & B. Mral (Eds.), *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse* (pp. 3–23). London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Pilbeam, B. (2011). Eurabian Nightmares: American Conservative Discourses and the Islamisation of Europe. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 9(2), 151–171.
- Ranger, T. (1993). The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa. In T. Ranger & O. Vaughan (Eds.), *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene* (pp. 62–111). London: Macmillan.
- Razack, S. (2008). *Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics*. Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press.
- Rosanvallon, P. (2012). *The Society of Equals* (Arthur Goldhammer, Trans.). Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Rushdie, S. (2012). *Joseph Anton: A Memoir*. New York: Random House.
- Ruthven, M. (1990). *A Satanic Affair*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Sandberg, P. (2013). *Mot min vilje*. Oslo: Juritzen.
- Sandvik, S., & Liestøl, A-K. (2011). En av fire nordmenn ser på islam som en trussel. [One Out of four Norwegians Regard Islam as a Threat], Nr.k.no 27.10.2011. Retrieved June 26, 2015, from <http://www.nrk.no/norge/ser-pa-islam-som-en-trussel-1.7847186>

- Scott, J. W. (2007). *The Politics of the Veil. Oppklaring av et politisk liv*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Spencer, R. (2008). *Stealth Jihad: How Radical Islam Is Subverting America Without Guns or Bombs*. Washington, DC: Regency Publishing.
- Strømme, Ø. (2011). *Det mørkenettet. Om høyreekstremisme, kontrajihadisme og terror i Europa*. Oslo: CappelenDamm.
- Sunstein, C. (2009). *Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sunstein, C. (2014). *Conspiracy Theories and Other Dangerous Ideas*. London and New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Suszycki, A. M. (Ed.). (2011). *Welfare Citizenship and Welfare Nationalism*. Helsinki: NordWel.
- Taylor, C. (2004). *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.
- The Guardian. (2011). Anders Breivik's Spider Web of Hate. September 7.
- Tronstad, K. (2008). Diskriminering. In S. Blom & K. Henriksen (Eds.), *Levekårblantinnvandrerene i Norge 2005/06*. Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrå.
- VG. (2010). Frp-politiker: Islam er en samfunnsfiendtlig ideologi [Progress Party Politician: Islam is an Ideology Hostile to Society]. VG, February 1.
- Wodak, R. (2015). *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Wodak, R., & KhosraviNik, M. (2013). Dynamics of Discourse and Politics in Right-Wing Populism in Europe and Beyond: An Introduction. In R. Wodak & M. KhosraviNik (Eds.), *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse* (pp. xvii–xxviii). London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Yilmaz, F. (2016). *How the Workers Became Muslims: Immigration, Culture and Hegemonic Transformation in Europe*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Zúquete, J. P. (2008). The European Extreme Right and Islam: New Directions? *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 13(3), 321–344.



12

The New *Front National*: Still a Master Case?

Hans-Georg Betz

1 Introduction

On the Western European radical right, the *Front National* (FN) has traditionally held a prominent position. Until recently, this was because of Jean-Marie Le Pen's stature as a model of an authoritarian, uncompromising, and charismatic leader of a successful political movement, which he controlled with an iron fist, and because of its programme, which combined authoritarian positions with economic neo-liberalism—a “winning formula”, which seemed to make the FN a “master case” of a new type of right-wing extremist party (Kitschelt 1997). In reality, the FN was, to a large extent, a rallying point for the various strands of the French traditional, far, and extreme right, ranging from anti-Semitic racists, monarchists, nostalgists of Vichy and *l'Algérie française*, and anti-Gaullists to Catholic fundamentalists, *nouvelle-droite*-inspired neo-pagans, and held together by the authority of Jean-Marie Le Pen.

H.-G. Betz (✉)

University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

© The Author(s) 2018

J. E. Fossum et al. (eds.), *Diversity and Contestations over Nationalism in Europe and Canada*, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58987-3_12

As a result of the growing tensions in the top echelon of the party, which began at the beginning of the new century, intra-party cohesion eroded and the FN started to disintegrate. In response to Marine Le Pen's ascent, a number of leading cadres left the party after clashing with her over programmatic and organisational questions. By the end of the decade, the FN, in its original form, had largely ceased to exist—to the great relief of Marine Le Pen. Never again, she affirmed, would the FN serve as a “sounding board” for the obsessions of anachronistic, radical Catholics, admirers of Marshal Pétain, and those obsessed by the Holocaust.¹ With the FN no longer sympathetic to their cause, the various currents of the extreme right broke up into competing groupuscules, each one seeking to re-unite the extreme right under its own banner, while launching vitriolic attacks on Marine Le Pen.

Those who remained in the party but objected to Marine Le Pen's new course or refused to follow it unconditionally were marginalised, internally isolated (as was the case with Bruno Gollnisch, considered for a long time to be the heir apparent of Jean-Marie Le Pen), or purged. Thus, soon after she assumed the presidency of the party in early 2012, Marine Le Pen stated her determination to root out anti-Semitic currents within the FN (as was the case with Yvan Benedetti, a member of Bruno Gollnisch's inner circle, expelled from the FN in early 2012)—and thus break with her father's legacy.²

This was part of a deliberate calculation on the part of the new FN president who had devised a comprehensive strategy of *dédiabolisation* (de-demonisation) designed to convert the FN into a presentable catch-all party of protest. Besides ridding the party of its traditional right-wing extremist tendencies and its most offensive ideological baggage, the new strategy aimed at developing a comprehensive, coherent populist programme without, however, substantially breaking with the spirit informing the FN's historical discursive legacy (as convincingly illustrated by Alduy and Wahnsich 2015). In Marine Le Pen's view, only a radical ideological and programmatic re-orientation would put the FN in a position to play a pivotal role in French politics. Keenly aware of the Western European populist right's recent political gains, Marine Le Pen took her inspiration from modern populist politicians, unencumbered by the disreputable legacy of the past, such as the flamboyant Oskar Freysinger

(German, *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP)—Swiss People’s Party; Romansh, *Partida populara Svizra* (PPS); French, *Union démocratique du centre* (UDC); Italian, *Unione Democratica di Centro* (UDC)) and the no less flamboyant Dutch anti-Islam agitator, Geert Wilders (*Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV)—Party for Freedom) (Dubouloz 2011).

The ensuing project represents an ambitious effort of programmatic re-construction, which draws its strength from its appeal to fundamental philosophical and ideological underpinnings of French society and the French polity, allegedly betrayed by the cultural, economic, and political establishment. It relies on the appropriation of major ideological traditions, such as republicanism and socialism, and their integration into a nationalist programme of exclusion. With the new programme, Marine Le Pen hoped to mobilise lower-class voters and thus put her in a position to present herself as a serious candidate for France’s highest political office. The results of the first round of the presidential election of 2012, the European election of 2014, and, particularly, the regional election of 2015 have all shown that the new programmatic course has borne fruit.

2 The *Front National*’s Republican Turn

In France, the extreme right has traditionally rejected republican ideas in favour of an integral nationalism, which extolled the virtues of French history, cultural heritage, and a sense of common destiny, transmitted and passed on through the bloodline from one generation to the next (Holmes 2000; Davies 1999: 19). The FN, under Jean-Marie Le Pen, was but the most recent manifestation of an intransigent “adversarial nationalism”, united in its rejection of the republic (Hazareesingh 1994: 144–149). In stark contrast, Marine Le Pen promotes the new FN as the only genuine defender of the ideals reflected in French republicanism, such as *laïcité*, which have been betrayed by the political establishment. The new FN leader asserted as much in January 2011 when she vowed that she and her movement would raise, restore, and defend “the traditional values of the French Republic” which the *classe politique* had betrayed (Fourest and Venner 2011: 144–149). A few months later, Marine Le Pen even claimed that she shared common ground with

Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the leading point of reference of the republican left (de Montvalon and Denis 2011). Chevènement vehemently objected to Marine Le Pen's contention, rejecting any ideological proximity between himself and Marine Le Pen's project, which he characterised as a "form of 'ideological hold-up' of the discourse of the republican left" (Chevènement 2011).

A few weeks later, Bertrand Duthéil de la Rochère, Chevènement's former *directeur des cabinets*, announced that he had joined Marine Le Pen's presidential campaign, where he was put in charge of questions regarding the republic and *laïcité* (Mestre 2011). De la Rochère justified his decision by arguing that, "under the present circumstances", Marine Le Pen was the only candidate with whom a "republican restoration" was realistically conceivable. Republican restoration, de la Rochère noted, meant, above all, for France to regain her sovereignty, which it had lost to the banks, the international financial markets and speculators, and, in particular, to the project of a common currency. France could only reclaim her sovereignty if the country regained monetary control by abandoning the euro. This would allow her to embark on a course of "re-industrialisation" via "the re-constitution of a public sector", which would act as a "sovereign base" for assuring national independence and the promotion of "equality between citizens and territorial entities".

At the same time, de la Rochère claimed that the party's position on immigration was compatible with republicanism. To limit the influx of foreign workers at a time when the country was suffering from mass unemployment, de la Rochère maintained, was a sign of common sense and contributed to protecting wages and the country's social cohesion. And to stand firm against any attempts on the part of Muslim fundamentalists "to introduce their religious practices into the public sphere and to force those they consider their co-religionists to conform to them", meant to come out in defence of *laïcité* (Duthéil de la Rochère 2011).

The defection of a relatively significant exponent of left republicanism not only boosted Marine Le Pen's strategy of normalisation, it also provided conceptual substance for her programmatic re-orientation, largely based upon a "hostile takeover" of republican ideas. Behind this lay the hope that the adoption of a substantial republican programme would allow her to attract a part of Chevènement's former supporters and thus

broaden her base (Fourest and Venner 2011: 225–338; Crépon 2012: Chap. 4). One of the driving forces behind the new FN's programmatic re-orientation was Florian Philippot, a young technocrat, whose political trajectory had also started with *chevènementisme* in 2002. After serving as an economic advisor to Marine Le Pen in late 2011, Philippot was appointed to the post of strategic director for Marine Le Pen's presidential campaign in early 2012, and, a few months later, was promoted to vice-president in charge of strategy and communication (Mestre 2012: Le Blevenec 2011).

3 Socio-populism

In April 2008, Chevènement wrote a programmatic article, which posited that the left would only regain power if it managed to unite behind a political project that lived up to the challenges posed by globalisation and managed to re-conquer the “popular electorate” which it had largely lost when it embraced economic liberalism (Chevènement 2008). The left largely failed to follow Chevènement's proposition. Instead, it was Marine Le Pen who heeded his advice and made economic and social issues central to her new programme. This represented a marked departure from what the FN had promoted during her father's tenure (Ivaldi 2012). The intention was to present a comprehensive, coherent electoral programme that went beyond the party's traditional bread and butter issues, such as security and immigration, and which would allow Marine Le Pen to present herself as a serious presidential candidate in 2012 and beyond.

The central theme informing the new socio-economic programme was the question of national sovereignty. Accusing those in power for the past several decades with having completely hollowed out French sovereignty while handing over the remaining “levers of the free people” to Brussels, Marine Le Pen vowed that she would do everything in her power to restore national independence to the French people.³ If elected, she would return to the French people their country and their pride, and, as she put it in her programmatic book *Pour que vive la France*, rebuild “the pillars of a republican nation” (Le Pen 2012c: 17). This entailed nothing less

than a complete reversal of the direction that politics had taken during the past few decades. It meant, above all, a complete break with the dominant “globalist ideology” (*idéologie mondialiste*), which, in her view, obsessed France’s political, cultural, and financial establishment, and only served “the interests of an oligarchy” (Le Pen 2012c: 12).

Accusing the established political class of caring more for the financial markets than ordinary French citizens, Marine Le Pen promoted herself as the advocate of the “invisible majority” and “the forgotten” (Føessel 2012: 20–31). In her appeal to these voters, she used a language borrowed from the traditional left. In the current economic and financial crisis, she noted, not everyone was affected equally. “For the silent majority”, there was unemployment, a declining standard of living, insecurity, and fear of the future; for a small minority, astronomical salaries, scandalous bonuses, untaxed capital gains, and the limitless accumulation of power and riches (Le Pen 2012c: 9–10). To meet these challenges, Marine Le Pen’s advisors put together a comprehensive economic programme, which constituted a fundamental reversal of the party’s traditional, rather market-friendly position. For her (extreme) right-wing detractors, the new programme represented a fundamental betrayal of the FN’s ideological heritage. In their view, the new FN president was embracing Jacobin traditions, which turned her into a neo-Marxist, *Marine la rouge* (Blot 2012; Letty 2011: 36–37). What provoked particular outrage was the fact that Marine Le Pen cited a number of left-wing critics of capitalism, such as Serge Halimi, the director of *Le Monde diplomatique*, and, in particular, Jean-Claude Michéa, an ex-Communist philosopher known for his heterodox positions (Blot 2012: 2–3).

The new economic programme represented a synthesis of traditional republican/nationalist and traditional left-wing/socialist positions.⁴ On the nationalist side, the emphasis was on regaining national sovereignty as the most effective way of protecting ordinary French citizens against the economic and social ravages caused by globalisation. To achieve full national sovereignty, Marine Le Pen propagated the notion of “economic patriotism”. This included a call for “intelligent” protectionism against “disloyal competition” and the economic dislocations associated with it, and the demand that the French state be legally required to award

procurement contracts exclusively to French companies (Le Pen 2012a: 3). To regain sovereignty entailed liberating the French state from the financial markets, by abrogating the law of 1973 forbidding the Treasury to borrow directly from the Bank of France (Le Pen 2012a: 3, 2012c: 62). But, above all, it meant leaving the Eurozone and re-introducing a national French currency, which would allow France to regain the freedom to devalue its currency and thus regain competitiveness.

With respect to social policy, Marine Le Pen maintained that the protection of ordinary citizens from the vicissitudes of the economy depended on the re-establishment of a strong state, capable of exercising its regulative and protective functions. This was a clear call for the revival of the traditional French policies of *dirigisme* and *étatisme*, listed at the end of Marine Le Pen's book and ranging from *L'État protecteur* to *L'État stratège* (Le Pen 2012c: 193). It also entailed a strong public sector, which fulfilled its central role as a provider of services guaranteeing "the equality of the citizens", as Marine Le Pen put it in early 2011 when she launched her "social wave" (Le Pen 2011a). Equality also meant social justice, particularly with respect to taxation, and, thus, re-distribution. Whereas the FN had traditionally supported lowering taxes, Marine Le Pen called for making taxes more progressive and reversing the law which favoured capital gains over income derived from work. The justification of these measures was that the lower and middle classes would only truly benefit from growth if "the financial sector and the stockholders" saw their share of the value-added proportionately diminished. Lower profit rates would result in increased equality (Le Pen 2012c: p. 41).

The positions adopted by Marine Le Pen after assuming the presidency of the FN reveal a strong dose of left-wing republicanism (Dupin 2012). By evoking key principles of French republicanism, such as equality, sovereignty, a strong state, and, as discussed below, *laïcité*, while denouncing that these principles were constantly being betrayed and debased by those in power, Marine Le Pen adopted a central mechanism of populist mobilisation. This was also reflected in her appeal to "the invisible" and "forgotten", who, she denounced, had been abandoned by the traditional left. In the face of rapidly growing inequality, which, in early 2012, provoked a heated debate about the distribution of wealth in French society, the

evocation of the principle of equality together with a broad attack against the political class, the financial markets (and their alleged collusion) and the super-rich was guaranteed to resonate among ordinary citizens.

4 National Preference, *Laïcité*, and the Mobilisation of Identitarian Panic

In December 2010, during a speech promoting her presidential campaign, Marine Le Pen committed one of these outrages for which her father was famous. In Lyon, a bastion of right-wing extremism and the stronghold of Bruno Gollnisch, she compared Muslims praying in the streets of the major French cities to the time of German occupation—“without tanks, without soldiers, but an occupation all the same” (Le Pen 2012b). The provocation was calculated and intentional.⁵ Not only was it supposed to convince the undecided of her toughness, it was also supposed to promote her as the defender of liberty and *laïcité* against a new enemy—Islam (Crépon 2012: 167–171). As could be expected, her inflammatory remarks caused a considerable uproar among the political establishment and various human rights organisations. This gave Marine Le Pen the opportunity to re-affirm her position. Projecting herself as the only “genuine defender of the republic”, she urged the French to resist all “offences against *la laïcité*” and by so doing re-conquer lost ground (Cabrou 2010).

Unlike other right-wing populist leaders in Western Europe, Marine Le Pen largely avoided the hyperbolic, aggressive language characteristic of much of contemporary anti-Islamic “discourse” on the populist right—much to the disappointment of her far-right critics. While acknowledging that Marine Le Pen was right to stress “the immense danger” that Islam posed to France, they accused her of failing to understand that Islam was a “totalitarian ideology” which demanded complete submission and which, unlike Christianity, refused to acknowledge the “fundamental distinction” between the spiritual and the worldly order. Given these fundamental differences between Christianity and Islam, Marine Le

Pen's call on Islam "to submit and be controlled" (*soumettre et contrôler*) (probably a play on the word "Islam", which means "submission") within the framework of the *laïcité républicaine* which aims to regulate all religions in an equal way was prone to failure (Antony 2012).

A review of Marine Le Pen's interventions against Islam largely confirms this assessment. To be sure, Marine Le Pen affirmed France's Christian roots, pointing out that, in her opinion, it was Christianity's recognition of the separation of the temporary ("rendering unto Caesar") and the divine, which was the basis for *laïcité*—a distinction unknown to Islam (Pruvot 2012). She also repeatedly noted that Islam was a relative newcomer to France, whereas Christianity had informed French history for centuries. It was therefore up to Islam to adapt to France, and not the other way around.⁶ At the same time, Marine Le Pen, in an interview with a Moroccan news magazine, maintained that, in her opinion, Islam was generally compatible with *laïcité*; it was *sharia* law which she considered to be fundamentally incompatible with the republic (Le Pen 2011b). What she wanted, as she put it in an interview with a North-African magazine, was an *islam laïcisé*, which "accepts that the 'mosque' is separate from the state".⁷

As a result, with respect to *laïcité*, Marine Le Pen rejected any kind of discrimination, be it positive or negative.⁸ Instead, her strategy regarding the question of Islam in France consisted in evoking concrete examples where, in her opinion, the Muslim community in France infringed on the boundaries set by *laïcité*. The reference to public prayers during her speech in Lyon was one instance of this. A second instance was her campaign against the introduction of *halal* meat in school cafeterias and canteens, which she framed in terms of an intrusion of the religious into the secular realm (Le Bars 2012; Roger 2012; Politi 2012). A third example regards the construction of mosques. Although Marine Le Pen, unlike right-wing populist leaders in other countries, did not call for resisting plans to build new mosques in France, she vehemently opposed any public financial support for their construction, since this would constitute a severe violation of the law of 1905, which had codified and set the terms of *laïcité* in France. It was up to the faithful to finance their mosques, which, she maintained, should be "modest and not ostentatious", unlike

some of the minarets that had recently been constructed in major French cities (*L'Express* 2012b).

Marine Le Pen's strategy consisted not only of appropriating *laïcité* for the new FN but also of pushing the logic of *laïcité* beyond its most extreme limits. This was particularly pronounced in the call for a public ban on "ostentatious" religious symbols in public (including the streets), such as the Muslim headscarf (*hijab*) and the Jewish *kippa*. Marine Le Pen justified her position by arguing that one could not ban the Muslim headscarf while exempting other religious symbols, implying that this would run counter to the fundamental principle of neutrality essential to *laïcité*. The remark provoked a prompt response from the political establishment and the media, culminating in the accusation that Marine Le Pen had become a "fundamentalist" of *laïcité*" (*L'Express* 2012a).

For experts on the question of *laïcité*, Marine Le Pen represented a radical interpretation of the spirit of *laïcité*, which no longer sought to keep religion and the state separate, but to expel religion completely from public life, force it into the private sphere, and thus render it invisible (*La Croix* 2012). As Marine Le Pen put it in 2011, "faith must remain a strictly private matter".⁹ Her interpretation was far from original. As early as 2003, the centre-right, in response to Jean-Marie Le Pen's success in the 2002 presidential election, had embarked on a radical ideological reconstruction of the spirit of *laïcité*. The objective was to transform the notion of *laïcité* into a repressive instrument of control, directed against Islam, while, at the same time, turning it into a justification of, and vehicle for, a new politics of identity (Baubérot 2012: 29–43 and 63–84). In the years that followed, the propagation and promotion of this new, restrictive, identitarian model of *laïcité* became central to Nicolas Sarkozy's increasingly desperate attempt to retain the FN voters who had voted for him in 2007 but who, in the meantime, had become increasingly disenchanted with his person and policies. From the centre-right, the re-interpretation of *laïcité* quickly diffused among the far right. For, as one far-right commentator noted, "*laïcité* understood as an identitarian principle allows us to preserve our liberties and to fight not only against fundamentalist Islam (*l'islamisme*) but also against Islamisation" (Gouillon 2010).

Marine Le Pen's focus on *laïcité*—as well as the party's formal and informal ties with anti-Islamic groups—has to be understood in the context of a growing “cultural insecurity” within contemporary French society (Lebourg 2012: 19; de Lisle 2012). Within the FN's identitarian framework, Islam—and, implicitly, France's growing Muslim population—represents the “other” (Roy 2012). In this context, *laïcité* attains its significance as a fundamental element of French identity that can be used as a political weapon against those suspected of seeking to promote the implantation of Islam in France. These cultural anxieties are particularly pronounced among less educated, lower-class individuals, the main targets of Marine Le Pen's populist mobilisation (Margalit 2012: 490). At the same time, however, the new FN has not followed other right-wing populist parties, which have made the “fight against the Islamisation of Western Europe” central to their mobilisation. As Marine Le Pen herself put it in an interview with an Arab magazine, the problem was not that there were too many North Africans in France; the problem was that there were too many immigrants in France.¹⁰

Immigration, of course, has always been central to the FN's political discourse. And the party's position on immigration has, in turn, always largely accounted for its success at the polls. The strategic changes adopted by Marine Le Pen on economics and social politics certainly did not diminish the significance of the question of immigration in the party's programme. On the contrary, what did change, however, was the rationale behind the party's position on immigration. If, in the past, the FN associated immigration primarily with unemployment and insecurity, with Marine Le Pen, there was a shift towards a concept central to republicanism—solidarity. This is hardly a coincidence. There has been a lively debate among social scientists, about whether or not immigration undermines solidarity and trust, which, in turn, are essential for the modern welfare state. The fear was that people might “disengage from willingly contributing funds” if they believed they were “going disproportionately to ‘foreigners’” (Kymlicka and Bantlin 2006: 283; Crepez 2008). At the same time, it has been suggested that the lower classes are particularly concerned “about the constraints on welfare benefits” resulting from immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010: 61). Marine Le Pen's strategic appeal to the lower classes logically implied that she would connect

the question of solidarity with the question of immigration. As she put it a few weeks before the 2012 presidential election:

Stopping immigration is of urgent social necessity. Solidarity does not come by itself. Solidarity is a sentiment that can only exist as long as there is a community of values, a common cultural base, within which everyone recognises him or herself. And ever since our societies are organised in nations, the nation is *the* natural framework for the exercise of solidarity. (...) The only reason we accept to pay for each other, to insure each other against the risks of life, to protect each other is that we recognise each other as belonging to the same family, which is France (...). [M]ass immigration carries with it the seeds of the destruction of our national solidarity. One cannot defend our social model while wanting to continue immigration, that's impossible. One cannot welcome one million foreigners in five years and naturalise 160,000 without jeopardising the equilibrium of our public finances.¹¹

Those who still defended immigration condemned those at the bottom of French society to compete for meagre resources with those even poorer (Le Pen 2012c: 88). It was unacceptable that immigrants received services free of charge, paid for by ordinary French taxpayers, that they lived off “the solidarity of the national community” (de Montvalon and Denis 2011: 2). In order to reverse these trends, Marine Le Pen advanced a programme of social protectionism, centred around two policy proposals. The first was a slightly revamped version of an old FN notion—*préférence nationale*. Under Marine Le Pen, *préférence nationale* was transformed into *priorité nationale*, that is, the notion that French nationals, including naturalised citizens, should be given priority with respect to employment (given equal levels of competence), social services, and social housing.¹² Family allowances should only be paid to those families in which at least one parent was a French citizen or of European origins. By shutting down the various incentives that had made France attractive to migrants in the past, France would regain control over the flux of migration. The goal was to reduce the number of immigrants radically from the current annual rate of about 200,000 to a mere 10,000.

The second proposal focused on social welfare fraud, which, according to official figures, cost the French state 2–3 billion euro a year. For Marine Le Pen, social fraud was primarily a result of the “explosion in immigration”. If elected, she promised to make the fight against social fraud a top priority of her administration. She advanced a panoply of anti-fraud measures which would not only save the French state billions in expenditure but also restore and strengthen the public sense of solidarity and social justice, seriously compromised by the previous government’s failure to combat social fraud effectively.¹³

5 The Pay-Offs of *Dédiabolisation*

In the first round of the 2012 presidential election, Marine Le Pen won more than 6.4 million votes, a historic success, which established her as a major factor in French politics. At the same time, the result seemed to imply that the strategy of *dédiabolisation* was working. Post-election analyses showed that Marine Le Pen had attracted a broad range of the French electorate. Perhaps most notably, she had managed to raise her support among women, a group traditionally under-represented among FN voters, and had thus succeeded in closing the gender gap. The combination of the party’s new, less aggressive image, a policy of zero tolerance with respect to anti-Semitism, and the pronounced programmatic turn on socio-economic questions appeared to go a long way to explain Marine Le Pen’s success. In part, it was also due to her ability to cultivate an image of integrity and competence, combined with a certain degree of affability and charm, which made her a welcome guest on the radio and television. This was also reflected in the opinion polls. A survey from late 2012, for instance, found some 40 per cent of respondents agreeing with the statement that President François Hollande should take the proposals advanced by Marine Le Pen during her presidential campaign into account.¹⁴ In early 2014, 40 per cent of respondents thought that she offered new ideas on how to solve the country’s problems. The poll also showed that Marine Le Pen had managed to improve the image of her party. Between 2002 (when Jean-Marie Le Pen advanced to the second round of the presidential election) and 2014, the number of respondents

who considered the FN a threat to French democracy fell from 50 to 20 per cent.¹⁵

Subsequent elections confirmed this trend. In the European elections of 2014, the FN obtained roughly 25 per cent of the vote, four times more than in 2009, and arrived ahead of its competitors in 71 of France's 101 *départements*. In the municipal elections held the same year, the FN made significant electoral gains, but managed to elect fewer officials than it had expected. This did not mean, however, that the party's progress had come to a halt. On the contrary, in the regional election of 2015, the FN came out ahead in six of France's 13 metropolitan regions. In two regions (*Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie*, with Marine Le Pen heading the FN list, and *Provence Alpes-Côte d'Azur*, with Marion Marechal-Le Pen heading the list), the party won more than 40 per cent of the votes. The decision of the socialists not to compete in the run-off in these regions, together with a strong voter mobilisation against the FN, prevented the two top FN candidates from winning in their respective regions.

These setbacks notwithstanding, Marine Le Pen's strategy and programmatic course appeared to be a winning formula. With more than 6.8 million votes in the second round of the regional election, the FN attained a historic score. Even though it failed to win a single region, it elected scores of councillors, a virtual guarantee that Marine Le Pen would collect the 500 signatures of elected representatives necessary to qualify as a presidential candidate in 2017. Last, but not least, the reaction of the political establishment as well as the media attention in response to the upsurge of the FN affirmed Marine Le Pen's image as a pivotal figure in French politics, and infused the party and its leader with important psychological momentum as they headed into the presidential campaign of 2017.

At the same time, Marine Le Pen's record as a political leader, her adoption of a populist strategy and programme, which successfully appealed to broad range of disaffected voters, and her public image of a smart, articulate modern woman provoked growing alarm, particularly given the clear lack of an effective strategy to discredit the FN leader and thus stop, if not reverse, the party's advance. Among the most striking expressions of this alarmism was a series of fictitious accounts of Marine Le Pen, which imagined what would happen if she were to win the presidential

election of 2017. The, arguably, most curious example was a comic book, which developed a frightening dystopia, enhanced by the fact that it was made entirely in black and white complete with the didactic warning, “You will not be able to say that you did not know...” (Durpaire and Boudjellal 2015; Wieviorka 2016). Among other things, the authors imagined a return of Jean-Marie Pen to the fold of his party, following a reconciliation with his daughter prior to the election.

Given the deep animosities between Jean-Marie Pen and his daughter, this was highly unlikely, for a number of reasons. One of the central aspects of Marine Le Pen’s strategy of *dédiabolisation* was to distance herself from the legacy of her father and emancipate herself from him. Jean-Marie Le Pen, for his part, became increasingly disenchanted with the programmatic and organisational direction that the FN took during her leadership of the party—from the choice of her closest advisors (starting with Florian Philippot, whom he accused of seeking to take over the party) to the fact that Marine Le Pen was considering changing the name of the party.¹⁶

As his daughter rose in the polls, Jean-Marie Le Pen increasingly used his remaining position as honorary party president to derail the process of normalisation, by publicly embarrassing his daughter. This ranged from his citing Robert Brasillach (executed as a collaborator after the Liberation of France) at a party convention immediately before the presidential election of 2012 to his unwelcome appearance at the traditional FN celebration of Jeanne d’Arc/Joan of Arc in 2015, a few weeks after he had re-affirmed during a radio interview that, in his opinion, the gas chambers were a mere “detail of history”. The provocations culminated in a lengthy interview in early 2015 with the weekly *Rivarol*, notorious for its crude anti-Semitism and white supremacy racism (Le Pen 2015). In the interview, Le Pen re-visited all the major ideological building-blocks of the old FN: from the “detail of history” to the defence of Pétain and the Vichy regime. They were meant as a deliberate affront to his daughter and intended to sabotage her whole strategy, and, with it, her ascent in the polls. The end was predictable. After all attempts to marginalise and sideline her father had failed, Marine Le Pen had him expelled from the very party that he had once helped to found.

6 Populist Nationalist Socialism: The New Winning Formula?

The expulsion of the historical leader of the FN was an almost logical and perhaps even inevitable conclusion of Marine Le Pen's populist project, designed to break the strategic *impasse* and reverse the decline which had characterised the last decade of Jean-Marie Le Pen's leadership. With Marine Le Pen, the FN developed a new dynamic that responded to the new socio-economic and socio-structural realities of present-day France, such as the growing social and geographical inequality and the growing disparities between urban and rural areas. These changes are reflected in the evolution of the FN's electorate. Under Marine Le Pen, the FN increasingly became "the party of the poor, of the excluded" and abandoned by the major parties. Its constituencies expanded considerably in peri-urban and rural France as well as in structurally weak areas (such as the formerly Communist bastions in the de-industrialised north) while it significantly declined in the big metropolitan zones (Le Bras and Todd 2013: 285; Le Bras 2015; Guillois 2014: 71).

The FN's populist turn, under Marine Le Pen, represented a programmatic response to, and an alignment with, these new socio-structural realities, coupling an appeal to the "invisible" and "forgotten" who had allegedly been abandoned and betrayed by the political and cultural elite with a newly constructed brand image, which portrayed her as the defender of the lower classes' threatened "standard of living and way of life" (Birnbaum 2010: 39). The resulting combination of an "ethno-socialist" programme and a strong call for the defence of a traditional cultural identity has aptly been characterised as "patrimonial populism" (*populisme patrimonial*) (Reynié 2011). The FN's electoral gains since Marine Le Pen took over the party suggest that this project resonated among a significant part of the French electorate.

Socio-structural factors, however, explain the success of the FN's populist appeal only to a certain degree. Its resonance has also been seen within the larger socio-cultural and socio-political climate prevailing in France since the financial crisis of 2008 and perhaps even before. Among its most important features are a profound general political *malaise*

underpinning what some observers have characterised as a “crisis of political representation” reflected in a number of opinion polls during the past several years (Mathieu 2015); an expanding climate of “cultural insecurity” which has made the question of identity a prominent topic of public debate, animated by Alain Finkielkraut’s 2013 essay, *L’identité malheureuse*, and particularly by the prominent polemicist Éric Zemmour’s 2014 bestseller, *Le suicide français* (Bouvet 2015; Finkielkraut 2013; Zemmour 2014); and the emergence of a populist mood fed by accusations, most prominently made by the highly visible (heterodox left-wing) philosopher and bestselling author, Michel Onfray, that the élite, and particularly the left-wing élite, had nothing but contempt for ordinary French people, which explains why it had abandoned them to their own devices (Onfray 2015: 8–15; 2016; Bouvet 2012; Dion 2015; Maurin 2015). To this, one might add prominent right-wing media, such as the weekly *Valeurs actuelles* and the monthly *Causeur*, which have made the fight against political correctness a main priority (Hanne 2013; Chemin 2013).

The confluence of these socio-structural, socio-cultural, and socio-political developments and tendencies has been instrumental in provoking diffuse sentiments of anger and resentment, which provided fertile ground for Marine Le Pen’s populist mobilisation (Lecœur 2016). Marine Le Pen, in turn, marketed herself as the spokeswoman of ordinary people, who understands their psychological injuries and is capable of giving voice to their righteous indignation and anger. A shrewd political entrepreneur, Marine Le Pen took advantage of a favourable opportunity structure to strengthen her position inside the FN while broadening the political appeal of her party upon the basis of an ideologically heterogeneous populist project meant to seduce as wide a range of the electorate as possible.

This project has sometimes been characterised as “neo-populism” (Taguieff 2002, 2015). In fact, the fusion of populism, nationalism, and socialism has a long tradition in France, going back to the aftermath of the *Boulangier affair* in the late 1880s, which, animated by strong currents of anti-parliamentarianism, for a few years posed a series political challenge to the Third Republic. One of the most prominent Boulangist theoreticians cum politicians was Maurice Barrès, a prominent novelist

and journalist who was instrumental in developing a political doctrine that combined organic nationalism, radical populism, Proudhonian socialism, virulent anti-Semitism, statist protectionism, and xenophobia (halt the “invasion of foreigners”) (Sternhell 1973). The intention was to rally the lower classes around the nation, create a sense of national community transcending class lines, and thus re-establish a strong national identity (Barrès 1893). When, in 1898, Barrès ran for election in Nancy, his programme consisted of “nationalism, protectionism, and socialism” (Barrès 1902: 429–440). The candidate was supported by the Republican Socialist Nationalist Committee (Weber 1962: 275).

Marine Le Pen’s populist project contains many elements of Barrès’ political doctrine—except his inflammatory anti-Semitism. It was critically influenced by her one-time advisor, the ex-Communist activist, and rabidly anti-Semitic polemicist, Alain Soral, who, in 2007, tried to infuse Jean-Marie Le Pen’s presidential campaign with a strong dose of socialism designed to appeal to lower-class voters. However, Alain Soral left the FN two years later, after falling out with Marine Le Pen (Igounet 2014: 389–391). But the Barrèsian notion that only a true nationalist could be a genuine socialist continued to inspire Marine Le Pen’s populist project.

Barrès’ attempt at a nationalist socialist synthesis proved to be a losing proposition in 1898. Given the depth and extent of the socio-economic, socio-cultural, and socio-political crisis informing present-day France, its revival in modernised form under Marine Le Pen might, this time, could very well have turned out to be a winning formula for successful populist mobilisation.

Notes

1. “2012: Marine Le Pen ira pour ‘gagner’ à la présidentielle”, *20 minutes.fr*, 4 December 2010, available at <http://www.20minutes.fr/politique/633823-politique-2012-marine-pen-ira-pour-gagnera-presidentielle>.
2. See, for instance, her interview with *Israel Magazine*, French edition, no. 123, May 2011, p. 10.

3. Speech given at Metz, 11 December 2011, available at: <http://www.frontnational.com/videos/meeting-a-metz-discours-de-cloture-de-marine-le-pen>.
4. The party presented a first 37-page draft of its “economic project” in April 2011. It is available at: <http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/projet-eco-fn-orientations.pdf>.
5. At the same time, it could also be read as a thinly veiled dig at her father who, in 2005, had characterised the German occupation during World War II as “not particularly inhumane”, which earned him a three-month suspended prison sentence and fine for having trivialised war crimes. See “Propos sur l’Occupation: Jean-Marie Le Pen condamné en appel à trois mois de prison avec sursis”, *Le Monde*, 16 February 2012, available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2012/02/16/apres-ses-propos-sur-l-occupation-le-pen-condamne-en-appel-a-trois-mois-de-prison-avec-sursis_1644570_823448.html.
6. See, for instance, her interview with BFM-RMC tv, 14 February 2008, reproduced in part on the Internet site Observatoire de l’islamisation, 23 February 2008, available at: <http://www.islamisation.fr/archive/2008/02/23/marine-le-pen-clarifie-sa-position-sur-l-islamisation-sur-rm.html>; see, also, “Le projet de Marine Le Pen: Laïcité”, available at: <http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/refondation-republicaine/laicite>, and her speech given in Strasbourg, 12 February 2012, available at: <http://www.frontnational.com/videos/grand-meeting-de-marine-le-pen-a-strasbourg>.
7. Interview with Marine Le Pen, *Le courrier de l’Atlas*, no. 55, January 2012, p. 25.
8. See *Christianisme aujourd’hui*, special Internet edition, April 2012, p. 5, available at: http://www.cpdh.info/-cpdhpdf/Election2012/Dossier_Complet_Presidentielles2012.pdf.
9. Discours d’investiture, Tours, 16 January 2011, available at: <http://www.nationspresse.info/?p=121433>.
10. Interview with Marine Le Pen, 2012, 55 *Le courrier de l’Atlas*, p. 24.
11. Le Pen, speech given in Strasbourg, note above, <http://www.frontnational.com/videos/grand-meeting-de-marine-le-pen-a-strasbourg>.
12. See Marine Le Pen 2012, “Le Projet: Immigration”, available at: <http://www.marinelepen2012.fr/le-projet/autorite-de-letat/immigration>.
13. See “Discours de Marine Le Pen à l’issue du colloque ‘Idées Nation’ sur la Santé”, 11 November 2011, available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-XXMLxFDGs>.

14. Harris Interactive, “Retour des Français sur le résultat et les conséquences de l’élection présidentielle”, September 2012, available at: http://www.harrisinteractive.fr/news/2012/CP_HIFR_LCP_17092012.pdf.
15. TNS-Sofres, “Baromètre d’image du Front national”, February 2014, available at: <http://www.tns-sofres.com/sites/default/files/2014.02.12-baro-fn.pdf>.
16. In 2014, it was revealed that Philippot was gay, which led extreme right circles around *Rivarol* and *Minute* to repeat charges that Philippot was the head of a “gay lobby” surrounding Marine Le Pen and influencing her strategic course. See “‘Lobby gay’ au FN: Philippot accuse Minute de propager des rumeurs”, *Le Parisien*, 8 January 2013, available at: <http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/lobby-gay-au-fn-philippot-accuse-minute-de-propager-des-rumeurs-08-01-2013-2463145.php#xtref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.ch%2F>; Jerome Bourbon, “Le néo-FN est. une vraie cage aux folles!”, *Rivarol*, 18 December 2014, pp. 1–2.

References

- Alduy, C., & Wahnsich, S. (2015). *Marine Le Pen prise aux mots: Décryptage du nouveau discours frontiste*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Antony, B. (2012, May 8). Islam: en quoi Marine Le Pen a raison, en quoi elle a tort. *Nouvelle Jerusalem*. Retrieved from <http://nouvellejerusalem.forumactif.com/t7628-islam-en-quoi-marine-le-pen-a-raison-en-quoi-elle-a-tort>
- Barrès, M. (1893). *Contre les étrangers: Étude pour la protection des ouvriers français*. Paris: Grande imprimerie parisienne.
- Barrès, M. (1902). *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme*. Paris: Felix Juven.
- Baubérot, J. (2012). *La laïcité falsifiée*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Birnbaum, P. (2010). *Genèse du populisme: Le peuple et les gros* (Rev. ed.). Paris: Arthème/Fayard.
- Blot, Y. (2012, March 4). Un livre néo-Marxiste? Quand Marine Le Pen devient Marine la rouge. *atlantico.fr*. Retrieved from <http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/marine-pen-pour-que-vive-france-livre-marxisme-rouge-yvan-blot-301601.html>
- Bouvet, L. (2012). *Le sens du peuple. La gauche, la démocratie, le populisme*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Bouvet, L. (2015). *L’insécurité culturelle: Sortir du malaise identitaire française*. Paris: Fayard.

- Cabrou, J. (2010, December 13). Marine Le Pen persiste. *L'Express*. Retrieved from http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/marine-le-pen-persiste_944871.html
- Chemin, A. (2013, December 12). Elisabeth Lévy, causeuses des troubles. *M le magazine du Monde*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/m-actu/article/2013/12/12/elisabeth-levy-causeuse-de-troubles_4332861_4497186.html
- Chevènement, J.-P. (2008, April 24). Un grand parti de gauche pour un New Deal. *Le Monde*.
- Chevènement, J.-P. (2011, March 25). Contre Marine Le Pen, la République, la vraie! *Chevenement.fr; blog*. Retrieved from http://www.chevenement.fr/Contre-Marine-Le-Pen-la-Republique-la-vraie-_a1104.html
- Crepaz, M. M. L. (2008). *Trust Beyond Borders: Immigration, the Welfare State, and Identity in Modern Societies* (p. 7). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Crépon, S. (2012). *Enquête au cœur du nouveau Front National*. Paris: Nouveau Monde éditions.
- La Croix*. (2012, February 10). Interview with Jean Baubérot. Retrieved from http://www.la-croix.com/Debats/Opinions/Debats/Jean-Bauberot-N-utilisons-pas-la-laicite-contre-l-islam-_NP_-2012-02-10-767265
- Davies, P. (1999). *The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse and Power*. London: Routledge.
- de Lisle, J. P. (pseudonym). (2012, March 5). La laïcité selon Marine Le Pen: Un principe perverti au service de l'islamophobie. *terra nova*. Retrieved from <http://www.tnova.fr/note/la-la-cit-selon-marine-le-pen-un-principe-perverti-au-service-de-lislamophobie>
- de Montvalon, D., & Denis, T. (2011, July 11). Marine Le Pen: 'Dix millions de fausses cartes Vitale circulent!' Interview with Marine Le Pen, *France Soir*. <http://www.francesoir.fr/actualite/politique/marine-pen-dix-millions-fausses-cartes-vitales-circulent-117496.html>
- Dion, J. (2015). *Le mépris du peuple: Comment l'oligarchie a pris la société en otage*. Paris: Éditions les liens qui libèrent.
- Dubouloz, C. (2011, January 7). Marine Le Pen envie le 'bon sens' helvétique. *Le Temps* (Geneva). Retrieved from http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/052b520e-19dd-11e0-a565-8959e08567fa/Marine_Le_Pen_envie_le_bon_sens_helv%C3%A9tique#.UGGo164yBOg
- Dupin, E. (2012, April 13). Die rote Marine Le Pen. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, deutsche Ausgabe. Retrieved from <http://www.monde-diplomatique.de/pm/2012/04/13.mondeText.artikel,a0053.idx,18>

- Durpaire, F., & Boudjellal, F. (2015). *La Présidente: Maintenant vous ne pourrez plus dire que vous ne saviez pas...* Paris: Éditions des Arènes and Demopolis.
- Durtheil de la Rochère, Bertrand. (2011, September 27). Lettre ouverte aux républicains de gauche. Retrieved from <http://www.nationspresse.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Lettre-ouverte-BDLR.pdf>
- L'Express*. (2012a, September 21). Marine Le Pen veut interdire voile et kippa dans la rue: 'La laïcité n'est pas la négation du fait religieux' pour Boutin. Retrieved from http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/marine-le-pen-veut-interdire-le-voile-et-la-kippa-dans-la-rue_1164264.html
- L'Express*. (2012b, December 20). Marine Le Pen s'attaque au financement des mosques. Retrieved from http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/marine-le-pen-s-attaque-au-financement-des-mosques_946648.html
- Finkelkraut, A. (2013). *L'identité malheureuse*. Paris: Éditions Stock.
- Foessel, M. (2012, February). Marine Le Pen ou la captation des 'invisibles'. *Esprit*, 20–31.
- Fourest, C., & Venner, F. (2011). *Marine Le Pen*. Paris: Bernard Grasset.
- Gouillon, A. (2010, December 21). La laïcité: valeur universelle ou identitaire? [bloc-identitaire.com](http://www.bloc-identitaire.com). Retrieved from <http://www.bloc-identitaire.com/actualite/1661/laicite-valeur-universelle-ou-identitaire>
- Guilloy, C. (2014). *La France périphérique: Comment on a sacrifié les classes populaires*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2010). Attitudes Toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1), 61–84.
- Hanne, I. (2013, October 1). Valeurs actuelles. le rance qui gagne, *Liberation*. Retrieved from http://www.liberation.fr/ecrans/2013/10/01/valeurs-actuelles-le-rance-qui-gagne_936247
- Hazareesingh, S. (1994). *Political Traditions in Modern France*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Holmes, D. R. (2000). *Integral Europe—Fast Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Igounet, V. (2014). *Le Front national de 1972 à nos jours: Le parti, les hommes, les idées*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
- Ivaldi, G. (2012). Permanences et évolutions de l'idéologie frontiste. In P. Delwit (Ed.), *Le Front national: Mutations de l'extrême droite française* (pp. 95–112). Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- Kitschelt, H., with A. J. McGann. (1997). *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan University Press.

- Kymlicka, W., & Bantin, K. (2006). Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State. *Ethics and International Affairs*, 20(3), 281–304.
- Le Bars, S. (2012, March 10). Le halal à la cantine, un fantasme loin de la réalité. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/03/10/le-halal-a-la-cantine-un-fantasme-loin-de-la-realite_1655942_3224.html
- Le Blevenec, N. (2011, October 5). FN: Philippot, ‘l’homme qui sait tout’, rejoint Marine Le Pen, *Rue89*. Retrieved from <http://www.rue89.com/2011/10/05/fn-philippot-lhomme-qui-sait-tout-rejoint-marine-le-pen-224754>
- Le Bras, H. (2015). *Le pari du FN*. Paris: Éditions Autrement.
- Le Bras, H., & Todd, E. (2013). *Le mystère français*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil and La République des Idées.
- Le Pen, J.-M. (2015, April 9). On n’est trahi que par les siens, *Rivarol*, 4–5.
- Le Pen, M. (2011a, March 11). Discours social. *Bompas*. Retrieved from <http://www.nationspresse.info/?p=126839>. The national press site published the speech under the title, “Marine Le Pen lance la vague sociale”.
- Le Pen, M. (2011b, March 18). L’islam, les Arabes et moi. *Actuel*, (86). Retrieved from http://www.actuel.ma/Dossier/Marine_Le_Pen_Lislam_les_Arabes_et_moi/401.html
- Le Pen, M. (2012a). Mon projet pour la France et les Français. Retrieved from http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/projet_mlp2012.pdf
- Le Pen, M. (2012b, December 13). Marine Le Pen compare les ‘prières de rue’ des musulmans à une ‘occupation’. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/12/11/marine-le-pen-compare-les-prieres-de-rue-des-musulmans-a-une-occupation_1452359_823448.html
- Le Pen, M. (2012c). *Pour que vive la France*. Paris: Éditions Grancher.
- Lebourg, N. (2012, November 30). La droitisation saisie par la rhétorique de ‘l’insécurité culturelle’. *Le Monde*.
- Lecœur, E. (2016, March/April). Le parti des mécontents. *Esprit*, 56–63.
- Letty, E. (2011, May). Le virage à gauche du Front national. *Le choc du mois*, 36–37.
- Margalit, Y. (2012). Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(3), 484–500.
- Mathieu, B. (2015, December 17). Rendons la parole au peuple pour sauver la démocratie. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/12/17/rendre-la-parole-au-peuple-pour-sauver-la-democratie_4833992_3232.html

- Maurin, L. (2015, December 9). La gauche abandonné les classes populaires. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from http://www.inegalites.fr/spip.php?page=analyse&id_article=2118&id_rubrique=64&id_mot=28
- Mestre, A. (2011, September 27). Un ancien proche de Chevènement rallie Marine Le Pen. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/09/27/un-ancien-proche-de-chevenement-rallie-marine-le-pen_1578279_823448.html
- Mestre, A. (2012, January 11). Florian Philippot, technocrate passé de Chevènement à Le Pen. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from <http://www.rue89.com/2011/10/05/fn-philippot-lhomme-qui-sait-tout-rejoint-marine-le-pen-224754>
- Onfray, M. (2015, October/December). Dire la vérité, toute la vérité, rien que la vérité. Interview in *Éléments*, pp. 8–15.
- Onfray, M. (2016). *Le miroir aux alouettes: Principes d'athéisme social*. Paris: Éditions Plon.
- Politi, C. (2012, February 20). Marine Le Pen a-t-elle raison sur le halal? *L'Express*. Retrieved from http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/marine-le-pen-a-t-elle-raison-sur-le-halal_1084490.html
- Pruvot, S. (2012, April 18). Marine Le Pen: L'État doit distinguer entre les religions. *Famille chrétienne*. Retrieved from http://www.famillechretienne.fr/societe/politique/marine-le-pen-letat-doit-distinguer-entre-les-religions_t7_s37_d64876.html
- Reynié, D. (2011, November). Le tournant ethno-socialiste du Front national. *Études*, 463–472.
- Roger, B. (2012, February 21). Marine Le Pen en croisade contre la viande halal. *Le Nouvel Observateur*. Retrieved from <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/election-presidentielle-2012/20120221.OBS1951/marine-le-pen-en-croisade-contre-la-viande-halal.html>
- Roy, O. (2012, January/February). Carte blanche à l'identité. *Critique*, 96–109.
- Sternhell, Z. (1973). National Socialism and Antisemitism: The Case of Maurice Barrès. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 8(4), 47–66.
- Taguieff, P.-A. (2002). *Le nouveau national-populisme*. Paris: CNRS Éditions.
- Taguieff, P.-A. (2015). *La revanche du nationalisme: Néopopulistes et xénophobes à l'assaut de l'Europe*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Weber, E. (1962). Nationalism, Socialism and National-Socialism in France. *French Historical Studies*, 2(3), 273–307.
- Wieviorka, M. (2016). *Le séisme: Marine Le Pen Présidente*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Zemmour, E. (2014). *Le suicide français*. Paris: Albin Michel.



13

“Needed but Undeserving”: Contestations of Entitlement in the Danish Policy Framework on Migration and Integration

Martin Bak Jørgensen and Trine Lund Thomsen

1 Introduction

The nation-states of today are faced with many challenges pertaining to immigration. Attempts to control and manage migration have been problematical, and there are growing tensions in many countries in relation to the immigration issue. Many countries have sought refuge in restrictive policy frameworks in attempts to appease immigrant-sceptical voters. Increased heterogeneity in these countries has been regarded as a threat to national and social cohesion, and ultimately as a threat to national identity and the social contract of the country. Such perceptions have fuelled mechanisms of welfare retrenchment and chauvinism. Immigrants, moreover, have been regarded as a security problem and have been linked to issues such as terrorism. All in all, these challenges, if not new then intensified, have, in many places, led to a political backlash against immigration. At the same time, global processes and transnational

M. B. Jørgensen (✉) • T. L. Thomsen
Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

businesses and markets have made it necessary to remain open and stay in competition for the “best and brightest” workers. Indeed, most countries are dependent on a migrant labour force, both skilled and un-skilled, and this need will only grow in the future due to demographic developments. In this sense, the year 2010 was a negative turning point for European demography, and estimates show that, by 2050, the European population will have decreased by 60 million people.

In this chapter, we investigate how entitlement is being narratively framed through contestations and negotiations in the policy regimes on labour immigration. In particular, we focus on the case of Denmark. It has been argued that the Nordic welfare states can be characterised as expressions of a universal welfare state. However, when it comes to the Nordic immigration regimes, there is less similarity (e.g., Brochmann and Hagelund 2011; Jørgensen and Meret 2010, 2012). The universal welfare state is generous in its entitlements; “rights are costly” as Christian Joppke has argued (1999: 6), and, for this reason, we identify increased contestations of access to the welfare state for newcomers. In this chapter, we look at how these contestations take place in Denmark. In particular, we look at the government and the opposition in the following periods:

- 2001–2005
- VK-Government (*Venstre* and *Konservative Folkeparti*): Liberal and Conservative parties. Parliamentary support from the Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*);
- 2005–2007
- VK-Government: Liberal and Conservative parties. Parliamentary support from the Danish People’s Party;
- 2007–2011
- VK-Government: Liberal and Conservative parties. Parliamentary support from the Danish People’s Party;
- 2011–2014
- Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party (*Radikale Venstre*), Socialist People’s Party (*Socialistisk Folkeparti*). Parliamentary support from the Red/Green Alliance (*Enhedslisten*);

- 2014–2015
- Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party (*Radikale Venstre*). Parliamentary support from the Red/Green Alliance and Socialist People’s Party.

Contrary to studies emphasising the role of right-wing populist parties (here, the Danish People’s Party), our claim is that we find a decreasing level of contestation among the political parties and increasing support for what we have termed elsewhere as “welfare chauvinism” (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016). This evokes a parallel to what Tariq Ali has termed elsewhere as “the extreme centre” (2015)—a party political situation with no “real” political opposition. This tendency has become more prominent in the period that we investigate in this chapter. The crisis spurred the construction of deserving and undeserving groups, and has been contextualised in both discursive and material retrenchments of rights and new forms of exclusion and inequalities. The policy developments since the turn of the millennium give a clear indication of this tendency (Jørgensen and Meret 2010; Jørgensen and Thomsen 2013a). Access to the labour market has been made far more flexible for some groups than for others, and specialised migrant labourers meet fewer barriers than family-reunified migrants or asylum-seekers. However, also in terms of access to residence permits, to citizenship, to social benefits and to political rights, we find both the development of liberal policies and restrictive policies showing a systematic bias towards specific migrant groups—those who are wanted and those who are less wanted or even unwanted. Policy outputs include issues of re-distribution and recognition, and the social construction of target groups and the outcomes of public policy favour groups presented to be “deserving and entitled” (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 2005).

Our argument is that while, on the one hand, we find a larger degree of convergence for restricting access to the benefits of the welfare state, on the other, we find an increasing trend towards legitimising restrictive measures through cultural criteria among the right-wing parties. In this sense, the contestations of entitlement to welfare benefits can be framed as a negation of a complex diversity which constitutes the analytical framework of this chapter. In the Danish case, we do not find evidence

of attempts to accommodate diversity, but rather attempts to exclude specifically targeted groups based upon cultural criteria. Public policies not only serve to deliver services or implement goals—they carry messages and underline values. Policies constitute and consolidate particular ways of thinking about social problems and social groups (Stone 2002). In this sense, the construction of migrant target groups becomes a way of managing immigration. They are constructed as dichotomies between those who are entitled/not entitled and deserving/undeserving (in terms of civic, political and economic rights). Such policy designs make it possible to claim to represent the population (political gains in hard-line policies) and to remain open to particular types of migrants (financial/market gains in openness) through distinctions between wanted/unwanted migrants. Target-group constructions carry messages of who is beneficial to the state and society, and who is believed to be a weight or burden. Consequently, they prompt action and legitimise particular policy designs. We combine this understanding of target-group constructions with an emphasis on policy narratives. We understand target groups to be constructed, legitimised and/or contested through particular narratives containing a setting, a plot and characters, which are disseminated towards a preferred policy outcome (Jones and McBeth 2010; Shanahan et al. 2011). Combining the focus on target-group constructions with a narrative policy analysis makes it possible to detect the more subtle dynamics between the political actors. Studies on migration policy have often focused on the impact of right-winged populist parties in order to explain restrictivist policies, but our approach makes it possible to identify convergence and divergence between left and right, and to show how loaded concepts such as social dumping are used differently in different policy narratives to construct different target groups. In the analysis, we work with different types of empirical data. When analysing policy narratives, we understand policy output in a broad sense, and include legislative documents, action plans, regulations, political agreements and declarations, as well as parliamentary proposals for policies and laws. This is our primary material. Moreover, we draw on texts from the media and outputs from civil society actors such as trade union journals, web pages, political party programmes and other material. The narratives are exemplified through key examples, which illustrate how a

given narrative is created. The narratives were identified through an initial reading of the aforementioned material. We have concentrated here only on narratives pertaining to labour migration and have tried to identify the different positions of EU citizens versus third-country nationals in these narratives. Consequently, we have deliberately omitted narratives on refugees and asylum-seekers, although there are clear overlaps to the narratives, which we have identified in this chapter (see Jørgensen and Thomsen 2013b, 2016). The analysis of the legal framework and policy development focuses on the period from 2001 to 2015, and thereby covers the different government constellations within this period.

This chapter first provides an elaborated understanding of our analytical framework. The following part looks at the contextual background of the case and discusses the developments in the policy framework. This is followed by an analysis of the dominant policy narratives in the period. This allows us to look firstly at contestations over access, entitlement and opinion, and how these influence policy designs, and secondly to investigate how these are legitimised through policy narratives.

2 Narrative Policy Analysis and the Social Construction of Target Groups

Narrative policy analysis locates the role of policy narratives in the policy process (Shanahan et al. 2011). Although there are different approaches, narrative policy analysis in general draws on a post-structural (e.g., Fischer 2003; Stone 2002) and social constructivist ontology seeking to examine “the social construction of facts and the primacy of values in the policy process” (Jones and McBeth 2010: 331). What the different approaches share in common is that they understand narratives as containing specific elements: a story with a sequence of events (McComas and Shanahan 1999; Stone 2002), a plot and actors (heroes, villains, victims), and consequently they induce calls for action and preferred policy outcomes (Jones and McBeth 2010). In the present analysis, we are interested in a particular set of narratives: narratives which deal with labour immigration in relation to the nation-state and the welfare state. We have

analysed the texts across the political parties and focus on the construction of narratives, rather than on the given political actors. The narrative comes first, and afterwards we reflect on how it is supported, challenged or refuted by specific political actors. The narratives are not only generated by party political actors but also by trade unions and think tanks. However, in this chapter, we only focus on the party political actors. Through the analysis of the narratives, we also investigate the development of convergence and divergence between the government and the oppositions during the different government constellations in the period 2001–2015. The narratives thereby constitute our “constructed texts”. We are interested in narratives, which outline stories that contain explanations for migration, the facilitation of migration and the consequences of migration. We look at the “naming” and “blaming” of particular characters (migrants, politicians, labour unions, the EU and contextual circumstances such as the recession) and how the naming and blaming is used to legitimise specific policies and prompt political action. Furthermore, we will argue that policy narratives pertaining to migration, besides always being contextualised, can also—and at the same time—be analysed in relation to the social construction of target groups. The storylines of the policy narratives serve to identify and delineate particular target populations. They serve to legitimise, support or contest the given policy solutions. Combining the narrative policy framework with Ingram and Schneider’s understanding of policy designs provides us with an analytical grid and makes it possible to show how the different target populations become the subjects for different goals, tools, rules and rationales which legitimate problem definitions, the allocation of resources, the benefits and/or sanctions and political action. The policy narratives serve to legitimise the target-group constructions. *Goals* to be solved are stated in both objective and technical terms. They are nevertheless the social constructions of a perceived problem. Defining a particular goal—based upon a specific representation of the problem—will result in benefit to some and burdens to others. *Tools* are the elements/instruments in a policy which causes agents or targets to behave in a certain way in order to solve the problem and reach the defined goal. *Rules* are procedural aspects of policy design which indicate who is to do what, where and when (Schneider and Ingram 1997). Eligibility rules define who the

recipients of a policy are intended to be and establish demarcations regarding who are entitled and who are not. Rules can be flexible or they can be strict, depending again on the target group that they address. They can be universal or they can be targeting selected groups. *Rationales* provide the explanation, justification and/or legitimation for the policy design.

In the following, we first present a short overview of the situation of the Danish economy and welfare policy developments. This serves as the necessary background for the second analysis, which analyses the development of Danish immigration and integration policies within the framework of the welfare state. There is an important interplay between the immigration policy of a state and its welfare regime. As we show, the Danish approach to integration is the process of gaining access to the welfare state and full social benefits rather than integration through the welfare system.

3 The Danish Context

The Danish economy was, from the mid-1990s to the economic crisis of 2008, characterised by an economic boom with low unemployment rates and high growth rates. Although the economy took a slight downturn in the early 2000s, it quickly recovered with even higher growth rates. In early 2008, the unemployment rate reached its lowest level. It was 2.3 per cent in 2009, and in 2010 it increased to 5.7 per cent and six per cent (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016). The crisis led to a fall in GNP, which spurred a number of economic reforms aimed at reducing the costs of the public sector (state workers) by lowering public expense and by changing the system for retirement. In 2010, the unemployment rate of immigrants from non-Western countries increased from 9.8 per cent to 16 per cent (Ugebrevet A4 2012). This situation has had consequences for the contestations regarding access to the welfare state model—who should be entitled to what and when? The Danish welfare state has the characteristics of a social democratic/Scandinavian welfare state model with a high level of tax-based re-distribution organised by the state. Re-distribution targets all citizens. The model presumes a high employment rate, which

succeeding governments have tried to foster through an active labour market policy. Migrants therefore become a test for the limits and sustainability of the welfare state if they face difficulties in entering the labour market.

3.1 The Development of Danish Immigration and Integration Policies

The development of the Danish immigration and integration policy resembles that of other West European countries. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of labour migrants arrived in the country to fill gaps in the labour market. The assumption was that the labour migrants would leave again one day, but, as happened elsewhere, the migrants to a large degree stayed and made use of the possibilities for family reunification. The oil crisis of 1973 led to a stop in migration which still stands. No new comprehensive labour market programme has ever been officially introduced, only special and targeted programmes. In 1983, Denmark adopted a new Foreigners Law which introduced the so-called *de facto* protection category for refugees, thereby broadening the basis for asylum, which, at the time, gave Denmark the status of having one of the most liberal refugee policies in Europe.¹ This access to asylum was changed in 2002 when the *de facto* category was removed and restrictions were introduced in both the immigration and integration policies. The change was caused by the change of government in 2001. The Conservative-Liberal government had the parliamentary support of the Danish People's Party. The Danish immigration and integration policy framework following the change in 2001 was characterised as restrictive, and, in several ways, served as an inspiration for “new style integration” which was pursued by other European countries during the 2000s (Hedetoft 2006; Jønsson and Petersen 2012; Jørgensen 2012; Jørgensen and Emerék 2014; Jørgensen and Thomsen 2013a). It was characterised as “an ethnic model of civic integration” (Jørgensen 2009) and as a philosophy of integration situated between “liberalism and nationalism” (Mouritzen and Olsen 2013). Diane Sainsbury depicts the development as a move from

“reluctant inclusiveness to exclusion” (Sainsbury 2012: 228). While the overall development in our reading shows more continuities (and more path dependency regardless of the institutional re-configuration, e.g., the launching and closure of an independent Ministry of Integration) than is often depicted, and, moreover, with fewer ruptures, we find three dominant contestations between the changing governments and oppositions. These contestations revolve around: access to nation-state, entitlement to welfare benefits and responding to public opinion.

3.1.1 Contestation #1 Access to Rights

In brief, the main goal of the immigration and integration policy of the 2000s was to change the composition of the immigrant population, implying a “managed migration”, making it difficult to obtain family reunification and asylum (abolishing the *de facto* protection category), but making it less difficult to enter as a labour migrant and/or as a student, for instance. Making access easier for some groups does not imply that these immigrants are included fully. As Sainsbury captures with her above-cited catchphrase, there is an underlying reluctance towards accepting immigrants as such. Since the 1980s and especially in the 2000s, both access to citizenship and even permanent residency have become more restrictive. For instance, Denmark has multiplied the requirements for naturalisation and increased stringency. The result has been that the Danish naturalisation rate in the mid-2000s was only half of that of Sweden (Sainsbury 2012). In Denmark, naturalisation is regarded as a “crowning achievement”—a token of successful integration, whereas in Sweden, in contrast, naturalisation has been regarded as instrumental for integration. In Denmark, at least nine years of residence are required in order to apply for naturalisation. The requirements include that an applicant must not have received social benefits for more than six months within the five-year period preceding the application. Voting rights for non-citizens have been tightened, and now a person must have had legal residence for a minimum of four years, instead of three. These examples all point to the fact that Denmark has never really fully acknowledged the

permanent character of immigration. The labour market arrangements in force today all seem to have the same baseline, which is that immigrants can enter the country and contribute to the economy for a number of years but are not necessarily expected to stay forever. Another implicit aim of the above requirements goes not only beyond protecting the welfare state but also aims at preserving society as it is today. A recurring narrative found in relation to asylum-seekers, family migrants and labour migrants alike is the idea that if everyone in the world could decide freely, they would want to live in Denmark, hence the need to decide who to accept and who to reject.

While it is easy to identify the changes made by the Social Democrat/Social Liberal government in relation to the immigration policy, an assessment of the integration policy shows more continuation and path dependency. Parts of the integration framework continue the approach taken with the Act of Integration of 1998. The rationale in the revised approach was that, to be able to deal with the serious problems related to (the lack of) integration, firstly, Denmark had to restrict access to newcomers. Secondly, the main goal was to promote self-sufficiency, hence, making labour market participation both the means and the goal of integration. Thirdly, more responsibility was placed on the immigrants, who were perceived to be responsible for their own integration (which was spurred through incentives and sanctions formalised in the integration contract). One incentive was that extra effort would be rewarded and lack of effort “punished”, for instance, in the granting of access to permanent residency and naturalisation (Regeringen 2002; Ministergruppen for bedre integration [*Ministerial Group for Better Integration*] 2003; Regeringen 2005). Alongside these goals, there was an implicit (and, to some degree, explicit) demand for assimilation to be found in discussions on cultural values and cultural struggles in order to maintain social cohesion. These policy goals (and the embedded rationality) set the path for the main developments in the last decade (2000–2010) (Regeringen 2010a, 2010b). In 2011, the government changed again, and the Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party and the Social Liberal Party held power. This led to a number of changes (e.g., the removal of the so-called poverty benefits) and a new strategy, but the overall path is one of continuation of the goals for

integration and managed migration (Regeringen 2012). In 2014, the Socialist People’s Party left the government, and the other two parties held power until June 2015, when it was replaced by the Liberal Party minority government.

3.1.2 Contestation #2 Entitlement to Welfare Benefits

The contestation over poverty benefits illustrates one of the dividing lines which we can identify in the different government constellations. Even though they have been abolished, they provide a very illustrative example of how the categories of deserving and undeserving are coupled with categories of wanted and unwanted (desirable/undesirable) and situated in the policy framework. The “introduction benefit”, believed to strengthen incentives for finding regular jobs by lowering the social benefit available, was in place from 1999 to 2000, after which it was removed for being discriminatory. It targeted only newly arrived foreigners and basically implied that the newly arrived were entitled to a lower level of social security assistance than regular citizens (Ejrnæs 2001). The lower benefit (the policy tool) was believed to create an incentive for finding a paid job and hence attaining the policy goal of becoming self-sufficient. However, the policy tool also served the implicit purpose of not making it “too attractive” to come to Denmark, that is, of attracting welfare scroungers. Similar rationales had previously informed policy tools, for example, raising the number of years of stay required in Denmark in order to be eligible for a pension (put in force in 1973) (Jørgensen and Emerek 2014; see, also, Goul Andersen 2007). However, the criticism which led to the abolition of the introductory benefit resulted in non-targeted approaches with biased effects (i.e., in reality affecting immigrant target groups) in future policy-making (Bach and Larsen 2008). The Start-Help, for instance, can be regarded as picking up the policy goals of the introduction benefit. It stipulated that all citizens had to have lived seven out of the last eight years in the country in order to be eligible for full benefits. This would also include Danish citizens who had spent years abroad, but, in practice, it mainly affected immigrants.

3.1.3 Contestation #3 How to Respond to Public Opinion

The link between social policies in general and issues of immigration in terms of attitudes has changed over the years, as have the actions taken by both the governments and the opposition as a response to public opinion. Table 13.1 shows the attitudes towards items related to immigration in the Danish Electoral Surveys:

Looking back at the election data since 1994 shows that the PDI (percentage difference) (percentage of strongly agree/agree—strongly disagree/disagree) at all election years has been negative (albeit to different degrees), or, in other words, there has been support for distinguishing between welfare rights for immigrants and for natives (see van Oorschoot and Uunk 2007 for an international perspective on attitudes to immigrants' access to welfare rights). In 1994, the gap was 42 per cent (as in 2011), 31 per cent in 1998, 28 per cent in 2001, 20 per cent in 2005 and ten per cent in 2007 (Danish Electoral Studies 1994–2011). It is also worth noticing the increase in the gap between 2007 and 2011, which were the years of the global financial crisis. The negative reactions to immigrants do not relate to access to welfare rights but instead reflect a broader hostility to immigrants. The media had been reproducing derogative stories about immigrants (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008) and such attitudes can also be found towards labour migrants. When we compare the attitudes with the changes in the policy development, we find that restrictions have been introduced regardless of the government in power. This includes the Social Democratic government; however, we also find that policies have become increasingly targeted and offer benefits to some citizens but not to others, based upon the logic of who is believed to contribute to society and who is not. This logic of entitlement cannot only be attributed simply to pressure from the populist Danish People's Party but is also legitimised through competing narratives among the political parties of which we find convergence with the Danish People's Party for some narratives and divergence over others. The contestations revolve around an understanding of who is entitled to what based upon national and cultural criteria, and thereby refers back to the complex diversity.

Table 13.1 Attitudes to immigrants in electoral surveys from 2001 to 2011

	Immigration is a threat to national culture	Refugees and immigrants should have the same right to welfare services as natives	Government formation
1994	n/a	-42	Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, Centrum-Democrats government. Parliamentary support from the Red/Green Alliance, Socialist People’s Party and Christian Democrats
1998	n/a	-31	Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, government Parliamentary support from the Red/Green Alliance and Socialist People’s Party
2001	-5	-28	VK-Government: Liberal and Conservative parties. Parliamentary support from the Danish People’s Party
2005	-3	-20	VK-Government: Liberal and Conservative parties. Parliamentary support from the Danish People’s Party
2007	-9	-10	VK-Government: Liberal and Conservative parties. Parliamentary support from the Danish People’s Party
2011	-4	-42	Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party, Socialist People’s Party government. Parliamentary support from the Red/Green Alliance

Source: Danske valgstudier 1994–2011 (PDI: % of strong agreement/agreement—strong disagreement/disagreement)

4 Social Target Groups and Policy Narratives in the Danish Context

4.1 Labour Markets and Managed Migration

The mechanisms for managing labour migration as well as the policy narratives supporting, legitimising or contesting the present arrangements are essential for understanding the balance between openness and closure. On the one hand, labour migrants come to work and in this way

contribute to the welfare state and could, in principle, become part of the broader citizenry. On the other hand, they are contenders on the national job market. As Bridget Anderson argues in a recent book:

labour markets are key sites for the construction of us and them, and foreigners taking jobs has been a trope of concerns about aliens and immigrants for generations. (2013: 10)

Their presence on the labour market makes it visible that there are national citizens who cannot live up to the ideal of being the “flexible neoliberal subject” (ibid.: 7) in constant development and instead end up as the waste of modernity (to paraphrase the late Zygmunt Bauman). Politicians and policy-makers respond to this challenge in different ways. In Denmark, the response has been a selective framework of schemes targeting different types of foreign labourers.²

The balance between benefits (incentives) and burdens (sanctions) is visible in the immigration and integration policies in general and is also mainstreamed into the labour market policies (see Breidahl 2012). The Act on Active Employment Efforts, for instance, stipulates how the municipalities should enforce the National Integration Programme and the Introduction Programme. The Integration Programme targets refugees and family-reunified foreigners and consists of education in the Danish language, courses on Danish society, culture and history, and—what is important for the discussion on harmonisation—employment-directed offers in the form of supervision, the upgrading of skills, apprenticeship, employment with salary support and mentor support. The Integration Programme is compulsory and stipulated in the integration contract. If the contract is breached, the person may lose—partly or fully—whatever social benefits they receive as such. This contract is in force until the immigrant receives permanent residency. The Introduction Programme is directed at foreigners coming to Denmark to work, accompanying spouses, students, au pairs and EU citizens coming to the country to work and live. It consists of the same elements as the Integration Programme, but the crucial difference is that the person has the right to participate (partly or fully) in the programme but is not obliged to do so.

The regulatory framework is both legitimised and contested in different policy narratives. Policy narratives use different tropes and far more explicit diagnoses than is found in the policy framework. Most of the narratives which we identified either explicitly or implicitly relate to the labour market. In the following sections, we describe the three main narratives that we have identified in our material.

4.1.1 Economic Contribution Narratives

This narrative emerges from the construction of the contributing versus the burdening migrants’ narrative as presented by political parties and other political agenda-setting agents. It is articulated both by pro-migration actors and actors who are critical or downright against immigration. This leads to different plots. Besides leading to the constructing of particular target groups, it also draws out distinctions between those who are entitled and those who are unentitled. If people are allowed to enter the country, it will at the same time be a threat for native groups, for instance, as competitors for the same jobs or in relation to redistribution and access to welfare rights. If newcomers are allowed the same welfare rights, there will not be sufficient money for deserving and dependent native groups, such as pensioners, one part of this narrative claims. An example of this logic is given by Peter Skaarup of the Danish People’s Party when he was a member of the opposition in 2012:

The paradox is reinforced by the fact that the government cannot afford, for example, to extend the benefit period for unemployed Danes, while apparently there is more than enough money to pull more refugees here, who, for the most part, are never going to be properly integrated or to contribute to the welfare state recovery—on the contrary. (Jyllands Posten 2012)

The rational of attracting foreign labour is not merely based upon an economic logic but also upon the logic of consequentiality regarding cultural and ethnic differentiation. Education, for example, is not only measured in terms of level attained but is also seen in the national context, as is evident from Table 13.2. Having a university degree does not therefore

Table 13.2 Narratives and tools targeting labour migrants

Policy narrative	Target group	Narrative portrayal	Anticipated policy tool	Policy tools supported through narratives
Economic contribution narrative	Highly skilled and specialised labour migrants	Diversity and innovation. Increasing competitiveness. Recognition/re-distribution	Selective migration control Point system	Special schemes (labour market access) Attracting talent
Welfare scrounger	Low-skilled labour	Abuses welfare services Economic burden to society		Open borders, closed coffers (welfare services)
Social dumping	Low-skilled labour	Pressing wages down Increases unemployment for Danes	Minimum wage	Restricting labour market regulations

necessarily qualify the applicant for a position. The Danish Green Card Agreement states that a master's degree from a university in Pakistan is often assessed as a two-year study or a bachelor degree at a Danish university. The agreement favours educations from universities in Western countries and does not equally recognise education qualifications from, for example, Arabic or African countries, which makes the re-distribution of permits dependent on the recognition of various national education systems. The cultural logic behind this seems to be that the structural discrimination of non-Western education was supported by the opposition in 2012: "the large proportion of immigrants from Western countries (2/3) is a result of the policy of the VK government (former Danish government). For me, it is not important where you are from. But the statistics show that Western immigrants contribute more to society than non-Western immigrants", claimed Inger Støjberg of the Liberal Party (Politikken 2012). She added: "The Government's policy makes it easier for the wrong people to come to Denmark and allows an increase in the immigration of people who cannot contribute to society". The narrative

elements expressed by Støjberg are similar to that of the previous example but represent another narrative that distinguishes between Western and non-Western immigrants, rather than between high- and low-skilled immigrants. This integrates a cultural logic and an economic logic in which arguments based upon the contribution to the national economy are linked with national origin and a division between Western and non-Western countries. In 2014, Lars Løkke Rasmussen while in opposition likewise drew on this culturalised version of the narrative. At a convention held by Danish Industry (DI) in September 2014, he stated that “If a Christian Somali educated at the Sorbonne would like to move to Denmark, it should obviously be possible” (quoted from Bengtsson 2014). This repeats the main content of his party’s proposal entitled *One Denmark—For those who can and will* (*Et Danmark—For demsomkanogvil*), in which the party proposes that the migration system should be re-thought so that it is open to those who can contribute and integrate easily and closed to those who cannot (Venstre 2014).

This narrative also represents the positions of wanted and unwanted migrants, reflecting the deserving and the undeserving construction. It furthermore represents a version in which the distinction is between potential foreign labourers, which, in this case, is regarded as beneficial, and wanted vis-à-vis foreigners already living in Denmark with formal skills not recognised by the Danish state.³ Immigrants from Turkey, Pakistan and Iran living in Denmark have difficulties in gaining recognition of their university degrees from their home countries and are required to take courses in the Danish educational system (Politiken, 15-02-2012). This changes the roles in the narrative plot, and immigrants living here are portrayed negatively as incompetent, whereas skilled foreign labour is regarded as a solution to economic stagnation. This plot leaves few solutions as the immigrants cannot be expelled and are categorised as only a burden. A further distinction in the narrative is that of religion, in which being Christian is linked to being positively valued as wanted.

The economic contribution narrative has included different migrant groups and not just newly arrived migrant workers. The question of costs was very much in focus under the Liberal/Conservative government (2007–2011). In 2010, the government supported by Danish People’s Party established a task group to calculate the cost of non-Western

immigrants and their children to the Danish state. The Social Democratic-led government (2011–2015) terminated this work in 2013, however, stating that the calculation was irrelevant (Information, 17-01-2013). Likewise there has been a stronger focus not only on recruitment but also on retention, for example, symbolised in a new agency, the *Danish Agency for Labour Retention and International Recruitment* formed in early 2012. One implication of this development is that the economic contribution narrative is being contested and re-configured. The contestation shows a dividing line between Liberal-led and Social Democratic-led governments. Calculating costs has been a priority for the Danish People's Party in order to de-legitimise the category of "wanted" migrants through explicating the alleged financial burden. Although we find convergence on many other issues, we have not found any examples of Social Democrats drawing on this narrative.

4.1.2 Welfare Scroungers Narrative

Low-skilled migrant workers and asylum-seekers are over-represented in the narrative of welfare scroungers. This narrative emerges from an increasing focus on particular migrant groups being a welfare burden, followed by a demand for restrictive immigration control. Eastern European workers have also been denominated as scroungers by various politicians, including Villy Søvndal from the centre-left party, the Socialistic People's Party (SF), who stated: "they don't have the right to scrounge just because they are from Eastern Europe" (Søvndal 2008). This construction of the target group implies they "abuse" their right as EU citizens to welfare services. The welfare scrounger narrative is used in particular in relation to the debates on changing the social welfare system from a universalistic model based upon equal rights to a system based upon differentiated rights that have to be earned. The policy actions called for have already been introduced over the years (i.e., the accumulation principle for pensions, as mentioned above). The plot of this narrative connects to the idea already suggested that most people around the world would choose to live in Denmark if they had the chance due to the inclusive and generous welfare system. It is not the welfare system as such

which is problematised, but how to protect it from the “villains”—the welfare scroungers. The real deserving *and* dependent target group in this narrative is needy Danes, such as pensioners and hard-working labourers. The right-wing parties have tended to somehow make scrounging “a capture all” or “catch-all” characteristic which thereby undermines the narrative representing migrants in positive terms. The centre-left parties have deliberately sought to maintain a distinction between the deserving and the undeserving within the narrative, as is illustrated here by the Social Democrats:

We will demand that unemployed foreigners who have only been on the Danish labour market for a short time or have poor Danish language skills should participate in Danish language courses and meet up frequently at the job centre. And we will strengthen the control of the residence requirement so that we ensure that the unemployed who receive benefits in Denmark actually reside in Denmark and are staying here. (Socialdemokraterne 2015)

The “proposal” is slightly odd, as the party was in government at the time and we therefore have to connect the proposal to public opinion.

4.1.3 Social Dumping Narrative

The welfare scrounger narrative connects to a narrative of social dumping most often articulated by labour unions, interest organisations and political parties to both the left and the right. The attitude towards low-skilled migrant workers has changed more dramatically than towards high-skilled workers since the global financial crisis in 2008/2009 (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2013a). The discourse has hardened further towards low-skilled workers who are increasingly accused of social dumping and stealing jobs from Danish workers. The trade union 3F magazine has, since the enlargement of the EU in 2004, published numerous articles about labour migrants from Eastern Europe. At the end of 2012, the magazine published an article with the title “Companies fire Danes and hire Eastern Europeans”, which addresses the extent of replacing Danish workers with cheaper Eastern European workers, using the crisis as an excuse. The trade

union states: “The reality is that many workplaces replace Danes with Eastern Europeans under the cover of the crisis” (Fagbladet 3F 2012). An example of this narrative came from the former prime minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, of the Liberal Party, when he was in opposition:

And can we pressure the government for a cash benefit reform that does away with the painful dilemma that we let tens of thousands of unskilled Eastern Europeans into the country, while a similar number of Danes on social benefit with unemployment as the main problem is available, so we do that too. There’s perspective in that. It is constructive. (Børsen 2012)

This example reflects how the economic rationale used in relation to low-skilled workers is negatively characterised. On the other hand, however, when it comes to highly skilled workers, the attitude is more positively constructed as job competition is believed to keep wages down, which strengthens the competitiveness of Danish companies. This sentiment does not seem to apply for low-skilled workers where keeping wages down is referred to as social dumping. Even though migrant workers are not directly criticised, their position and contribution to the national economy and to Danish society is not recognised. The political left also draws on this narrative. The leftist *Enhedslisten* strongly denounces social dumping and argues that the welfare state will be undermined (Enhedslisten 2013). They are not against labour migration as such but stress that work must be undertaken under equal conditions. Both the Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party have made similar claims. They have also used culturalised versions presenting a narrative which claims that regardless of the pay-level, labour immigration will lead to deterioration in working conditions and will impede technological development—a narrative which had already been articulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Jørgensen and Thomsen 2013a). The villains in this narrative are “capitalists”, companies and private employers seeking to increase their turnover, while the victims are the Danish (especially blue-collar) labour force and ultimately the Danish welfare state model.

The social dumping narrative has been fuelled by the accelerated migration from the Eastern European EU countries as well as the

economic crisis which caused increased unemployment. Eastern European workers are often viewed as contenders who are mainly in it for their own personal ends and who do not contribute to Danish society as a whole. The current debates regarding restrictions on the rights to social welfare services and benefits will challenge both the motivation and the possibilities of integration for the many newly arrived immigrants. EU citizens have the right to the social services and insurance schemes in Denmark as long as they legally reside and meet the same general requirements as those of national citizens. This means that Eastern European workers no longer need a work permit in order to work legally in Denmark. However, Eastern European labour migrants are stigmatised in various ways through the way in which they have been portrayed in the media and through the political discourse. In this way, they are being constructed as a specific target population (cf. Scheider and Ingram) requiring specific policy actions. The trade unions are concerned both with illegal activities such as black labour and with unacceptable behaviour, such as when Eastern European workers are accused of social dumping in terms of pushing wages downwards to the absolute minimum and thereby going below the norm agreed in the collective agreements in the sector. Headlines in the media such as “The invasion from the East” and “Indecent to dump wages” are examples of this discourse.

How Policy Narratives Legitimise Specific Policies

We claim the policy narratives hold an important function in legitimising particular policy designs, as shown in Table 13.2.

The narratives used by the political actors in reference to high- or low-skilled labour migrants and refugees/asylum-seekers not only influence the policy frames but also have an impact on the public discourse as they produce and reproduce the construction of meaning and values in various areas of society and social life. We have argued that focusing on narratives provides a chance for us to understand the dynamics of policy-making. Regulations and laws don't just appear but are produced in an ongoing process of negotiation, support and contestation. In this process, we find the policy narratives which support, stabilise, legitimise or contest

specific policy problems and solutions. They call for action, and it is possible to investigate why a particular tool is being used by looking back at the target group that it is supposed to affect and the narrative portrayal of this group. We argue that the overall development is one of convergence. The responsabilisation of the individual migrant, for instance, was introduced by the Social Democrats, strengthened and reified by the three Liberal/Conservative governments, but maintained by the most recent Social Democratic government. In this sense, we find the development expressing the characteristic of the “extreme centre” (cf. Ali). It is important to underline that this does not necessarily designate that policies are developed from the political centre but mainly that there is little opposition. We find contestations over the selection of who are qualified to be included in the welfare state. Here we detect a tendency to introduce cultural (or masked ethnic and/or religious) criteria. This is perhaps somewhat surprisingly not only an objective of the Danish People’s Party but also narratively articulated by the Liberal Party in particular. Diversity matters we could say. The challenge of the last governments has been to re-design the welfare institutions and policy framework to encompass a hierarchised system of immigrant target groups within a universalist welfare system (see also Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016).

5 Concluding Reflections

Although it is often taken as a key premise that policies should be responsive to public preferences (e.g., Dahl 1989)—as can be assumed from survey data and actual policy development—it is possible to argue here that this does not imply that policies become more democratic. On the contrary, we will argue that the policies have increasingly become targeted and now offer benefits to some but not to others based upon the logic of who is believed to contribute to society and who is not. This distinction likewise becomes the rationale for managing future migration.

Social inclusion of newcomers can combat the emergence of persistent social and political divisions in society which weaken the functioning of democracy (Sainsbury 2012: 3). If this argument is accepted, we can ask

why the Danish policy framework apparently seeks the opposite solution. The analysis of the policy framework and the regulations shows that migration is managed through a selective and exclusionary strategy which seemingly affects the most vulnerable group the hardest, to wit, refugees. Denmark’s immigration policies do not strive for social inclusion, but to identify and attract the “best and brightest”. As Diane Sainsbury argues in her book based upon her comparative analysis of welfare rights in Denmark and Sweden, “an inclusive welfare state regime does not necessarily lead to an inclusive incorporation regime” (Sainsbury 2012: 111). Issues of re-distribution are constructed through policy narratives on who is entitled to what and who is truly deserving of assistance. Offering too much assistance or too many benefits to non-citizens causes debates on the fairness of the re-distribution and leads to claims that “Danes are deprioritised compared to refugees” (e.g., *Jyllands Posten* 2012). This, of course, is not an exceptional, Danish dilemma, but one that can be recognised all over Europe, in the USA and elsewhere (e.g., Anderson 2013). The policy responses have been different attempts to manage migration. To make sure that the country is attractive outside the borders for selected groups and having “firm but fair” approaches inside the country (e.g., the rhetoric of Blair, Cameron and Miliband in the UK and as shown in the analysis of Denmark).

The distinction between wanted and unwanted immigration is evident throughout our selected policy dimensions. Different Danish governments have sought to solve this problem by designing and implementing targeted policies which simultaneously both attract and reject. As an example the former Conservative-Liberal government (2007–2011) and the Danish People’s Party in 2011 agreed to give municipalities a €3350 bonus for each immigrant they repatriated via the repatriation programme. The agreement stipulated that the municipalities were obliged to offer repatriation to all immigrants who contacted the local authorities regarding employment, education and other issues. For some, repatriation could offer new life perspectives, but the symbolic value of the proposal sent a powerful signal that you may stay, but you do not necessarily belong here. This incentive was, indeed, abolished by the Social Democratic government (2011–2015) but shows how policy messages are embedded in the regulations. On the other hand, as already

mentioned, we find increased attention on how to attract and facilitate skilled migration, of which the Danish Agency for Labour Retention and International Recruitment is an example. It is not necessarily easy to reject unwanted groups, however, as a consequence of international conventions, for instance, so the policy framework is based upon different tools and rules which strive towards the goal of attracting the “good” migrants. Revisions, such as removing the exemption of the accumulation principle for pensions for refugees, save little money but send a strong policy message. It is symbolic politics which emphasises that this specific group of newcomers should not expect a welfare haven. It is questionable how many refugees are studying pension plans before deciding to escape from their home countries and whether such studies have been decisive for where they end up, so the revisions have other purposes, such as appeals to immigrant-sceptical voters. Yet, there *is* a belief among some political parties, for example, the Liberal Party and the Danish People’s Party that less stringency will serve as a magnet for unwanted immigrants (recent example DR 2013). These convictions, again, depart from national interests and concerns, and not from the structural causes of migration.

The politics of immigration reveal that categories are not stable or fixed—they are volatile as Anderson argues (2013: 2). Categories send out policy messages and judgements on who is needed for the economy, what count as skilled labour, who will be or become a burden, who should be given residency and citizenship and so on. Demarcating who is entitled excludes those who are perceived as not being entitled and, at the same time, defines the “good” citizen and the privileges of membership. In this chapter, we have shown how this distinction is increasingly being framed as having to do with “problematic” diversity. Focusing on the construction of target groups and policy narratives can thereby open up aspects which aid our understanding of how “complex diversities” can be a contested issue and have an impact on policy designs. Consequently, diversity matters. So does the institutional context, we should add. This particular version of welfare chauvinistic policy practice underpinning the policy framework is shaped by the context of the Scandinavian welfare state. Generous social benefits have initiated debates about the sustainability of the welfare state—in its present

form—under increased immigration. The culturalisation or racialisation of this discussion (see Keskinen et al. 2016) arguably shows that the framework of the universalist welfare state cannot explain everything, though. It is no longer simply a matter of how a migrant can become self-sufficient and contribute on the labour market; now, it is also a question of whether the migrant should be allowed to do so at all, whether he or she has a different cultural, ethnic and/or religious background than the majority.

Notes

1. It should be mentioned that the Aliens Law also introduced a number of restrictions, for example, the tightening of citizenship requirements. A main aim of the revision was also to curb the number of asylum-seekers, despite broadening the category of protection (see also Sainsbury 2012).
2. In Denmark, there are a larger number of specialised schemes which provide easier access to the labour market. These schemes include the Green Card scheme, the Positive List, the Pay Limit scheme, the Fast-track arrangement, Start-up Denmark to mention some (see the full list at <https://www.nyidanmark.dk/da-dk/Ophold/arbejde/arbejdsophold.htm>). Common to these schemes is that they offer easier access to residence, labour market, family reunification and so on (see Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016 for a longer discussion).
3. Educational backgrounds are assessed by Danish Agency for Universities and Internationalisation.

References

- Ali, T. (2015). *The Extreme Centre: A Warning*. London: Verso Books.
- Anderson, B. (2013). *Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Controls*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bach, H. B., & Larsen, B. (2008). *300-timers-reglen. Betydningen af 300-timers-reglen for gifte kontanthjælpsmodtagere*. København: SFI.
- Bengtsson, N. M. (2014, October 20). Fremmedhadet er blevet så almindeligt, at vi ikke bemærker det. *Information*.

- Breidahl, K. N. (2012). Når staten lærer—En historisk og komparativ analyse af statslig policy læring og betydningen heraf for udviklingen i den arbejdsmarkedsrettede del af indvandrerpolitikken i Sverige, Norge og Danmark fra 1970 til 2011. Ph.d.-afhandling, maj 2012 CCWS, Institut for Statskundskab, Aalborg Universitet.
- Brochmann, G., & Hagelund, A. (2011). Migrants in the Scandinavian Welfare State. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 1(1), 13–24.
- Børsen. (2012). Retrieved from http://borsen.dk/nyheder/politik/artikel/1/246103/fakta_lars_loekkes_tale_fra_landsmoedet.html
- Dahl, R. A. (1989). *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Danish Electoral Studies. (1994–2011). <http://www.valgprojektet.dk/default.asp?l=eng>
- DR. (2013, May 5). Flere asylansøgere end de sidste 10 år.
- Ejrnæs, M. (2001). Integrationsloven—en case der illustrerer etniske minoriteters usikre medborgerskab. *AMID Working Paper Series* 1/2001.
- Enhedslisten. (2013). Stop Social Dumping. Retrieved from <http://enhedslisten.dk/valg-socialdumping>
- Fagbladet 3F. (2012, December 20). Firmaer fyrer danskere og hyrer østarbejdere.
- Fischer, F. (2003). *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Policies and Deliberative Practices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Andersen, J. G. (2007). Restricting Access to Social Protection for Immigrants in the Danish Welfare State. *Benefits*, 15(3), 257–269.
- Green-Pedersen, C., & Krogstrup, J. (2008). Immigration as a Political Issue in Denmark and Sweden. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(5), 610–634.
- Hedetoft, U. (2006). More Than Kin, Less than Kind: The Danish Politics of Ethnic Consensus and the Pluricultural Challenge. In J. L. Campbell, J. A. Hall, & O. K. Pedersen (Eds.), *National Identity and the Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience* (pp. 398–430). Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Information. (2013). Nu får vi alligevel ikke at vide, hvad indvandringen koster, 17 January 2013: 6.
- Jones, M. D., & McBeth, M. K. (2010). A Narrative Policy Framework: Clear Enough to be Wrong? *Policy Studies Journal*, 37(1), 37–58.
- Joppke, C. (1999). *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Jyllands Posten. (2012, December 12). Debat: Flygtningene strømmer til.
- Jønsson, H. V., & Petersen, K. (2012). Denmark: A National Welfare State Meets the World. In G. Brochmann & A. Hagelund (Eds.), *Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945–2010* (pp. 97–148). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Jørgensen, M. B. (2009). *National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany*. Ph.D. Dissertation. 434 p. AMID/SPIRIT: Aalborg University.
- Jørgensen, M. B. (2012). The Institutional Dynamics of Integration Policy-Making on City Level. *International Migration Review*, 46(1), 244–278.
- Jørgensen, M. B., & Emerek, R. (2014). Ethnic Minorities Among Other Minorities: A Disfavoured Group in Danish Society? In P. Van Aerscht & P. Daenzer (Eds.), *The Integration and Protection of Immigrants: Canadian and Scandinavian Critiques*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.
- Jørgensen, M. B., & Meret, S. (2010). Irregular Migration from a Comparative Scandinavian Migration Policy Perspective. In T. L. Thomsen, M. B. Jørgensen, & S. Meret (Eds.), *Irregular Migration in a Scandinavian Perspective* (pp. 121–152). Maastricht: Shaker Publishers.
- Jørgensen, M. B., & Meret, S. (2012). Framing Scandinavian Conceptualizations of Irregular Migration. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research*, 2(4), 289–297.
- Jørgensen, M. B., & Thomsen, T. L. (2013a). Crises Now and Then—Comparing Integration Policy Frameworks and Immigrant Target Groups in Denmark in the 1970s and 2000s. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 14(2), 245–262.
- Jørgensen, M. B., & Thomsen, T. L. (2013b). Needed but Undeserving—Revisiting the Liberal Paradox. *Recode*. Retrieved from http://www.recode.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Final-RECODE-32-j%C3%B8rgensen-and-thomsen_Final_fin.pdf
- Jørgensen, M. B., & Thomsen, T. L. (2016). Deservingness in the Danish Context: Welfare Chauvinism in Times of Crisis. *Critical Social Policy*, 36(3), 330–351.
- Keskinen, S., Norocel, O. C., & Jørgensen, M. B. (2016). The Politics and Policies of Welfare Chauvinism Under the Economic Crisis. *Critical Social Policy*, 36(3), 321–329.
- McComas, K., & Shanahan, J. (1999). Telling Stories About Global Climate Change: Measuring the Impact of Narratives on Issue Cycle. *Communication Research*, 26(1), 30.
- Ministergruppen for bedre integration. (2003). Regeringens vision og strategi for bedre integration.
- Mouritzen, P., & Olsen, T. V. (2013). Denmark Between Liberalism and Nationalism. Kloge udlændinge bliver overset. *Politiken*. Retrieved February 15, 2012, from <http://politiken.dk/indland/ECE1540501/kloge-udlaendinge-bliver-overset>

- Politiken. (2012, February 15). Kløge udlændinge bliver overset. Retrieved from <http://politiken.dk/indland/art5056004/Kloge-udl%C3%A6ndinge-bliver-overset>
- Regeringen. (2002). *En ny udlændingepolitik*. København: Statsministeriet.
- Regeringen. (2005). En ny chance til alle—regeringens integrationsplan.
- Regeringen. (2010a). Aftale mellem regeringen og Dansk Folkeparti, 15. marts 2010: Nye regler for at få permanent opholdstilladelse og serviceeftersyn af udlændinge- og integrationspolitikken. København.
- Regeringen. (2010b). Nye tider. Nye krav. København.
- Regeringen. (2012). En styrket integrationspolitik.
- Sainsbury, D. (2012). *Welfare States and Immigrant Rights: The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. (2005). Introduction: Public Policy and the Social Construction of Deservedness. In A. Schneider & H. Ingram (Eds.), *Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy* (pp. 1–28). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. (1997). *Policy Design for Democracy*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Shanahan, E. A., Jones, M. D., & McBeth, M. K. (2011). Policy Narratives and Policy Processes. *Policy Studies Journal*, 39(3), 535–561.
- Socialdemokraterne. (2015). Socialdemokraternes forslag til et bredt samarbejde om Danmarks udlændingepolitik. Vi skal kunne følge med.
- Stone, D. (2002). *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Søvndal, V. (2008, July 30). Retrieved from <http://modkraft.dk/blogs/john-ekebjærg-jakobsen/article/de-osteuropaeiske-nasserove>
- Ugebrevet A4. (2012, May 25). Hver sjette indvanderer arbejdsløs efter krisen. Ugebrevet A4.
- Van Oorschoot, W., & Uunk, W. (2007). Welfare Spending and the Public's Concern for Immigrants: Multilevel Evidence from Eighteen European Countries. *Comparative Politics*, 40(1), 63–92.
- Venstre. (2014). Et Danmark—For dem som kan og vil. København.



14

Cultural Recognition and Democratic Participation: Immigrant Organisations in Oslo

Marianne Takle

1 Introduction

To what extent can people from immigrant backgrounds preserve cultures and traditions from their countries of origin and still be able to consider themselves as fully fledged participants in a national democracy?

This question reveals a central dilemma in multi-ethnic democracies, namely, that all members of a liberal democracy are—in principle—entitled to have the same rights and opportunities, but they also have the right to be different. A crucial challenge is to recognise cultural differences without violating common politically defined rights. How this challenge is to be solved is a contested matter within a nationalist framework. Historical nationalism is based upon the idea that national states ought to be culturally homogenous as basis for democratic decisions (Anderson 1991; Smith 2009). While new nationalist and populist

M. Takle (✉)

NOVA, Norwegian Social Research, Oslo, Norway

© The Author(s) 2018

J. E. Fossum et al. (eds.), *Diversity and Contestations over Nationalism in Europe and Canada*, Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology,

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58987-3_14

parties in Europe often defend this idea, we can observe more complex tendencies across Europe. European countries have introduced new civic requirements for immigrants based upon the view that newcomers must learn how to be or to become democratic citizens, but, in most countries, immigrants have also increasingly gained the right both to maintain and to promote their culture (Eriksen 2009: 11; Joppke 2010; Mouritsen 2012a).

This tension between cultural recognition and democratic participation can be exemplified by looking at the City of Oslo. The city encourages immigrant groups to establish immigrant organisations, and, as a consequence, around 270 immigrant organisations are registered in public registers in Oslo. Over 85 per cent of them are registered upon the basis of their members' cultural or ethnic bonds to countries outside the Nordic region, Switzerland, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. However, the local authorities place distinct requirements on the organisations when offering support for their daily operation. It expects the organisations to have internal democracy with an elected leadership, and they must be membership-based—and all members must have voting rights.

The requirements that the immigrant organisations have internal democracy are in line with Norway's distinct tradition of voluntary organisation and citizen participation. The central characteristics of the voluntary sector in the Nordic countries are that the organisations have a broad membership base and that they are internally democratically structured (Trägårdh and Vamstad 2009; Wollebæk and Sivesind 2010). The support for immigrant organisations has elements of the normative ideal inherent in this traditional way of organising the voluntary sector in Norway.

The basic research question raised in this chapter is, in so far as immigrant organisations are imbued with the same norms and arrangements that have historically marked the voluntary sector in Norway, what are the main integration models that are applied? By analysing the policy on immigrant organisations from the perspective of governments bent on integrating immigrants, we can discern at least two different theoretical models:

1. One is that immigrant organisations are instruments of national integration and should operate to reduce the political salience of cultural diversity. If this model is applied by the government and the City of Oslo, we would expect to find that the placing of requirements on immigrant organisations is motivated by a national integrationist objective, which is mainly concerned with ensuring cultural homogeneity in political institutions.
2. Conversely, the policy could be that immigrant organisations are elements in a multicultural policy and are thus seen as important sites of cultural recognition (Modood 2007; Kymlicka 2010). Accordingly, if this model is applied in Oslo, we would expect to find that minority rights are adopted with the intention of recognising and accommodating the identities of national or ethnic groups.

The research question will be examined at three administrative levels: in the objectives, as reflected in policy statements from the government, the process of policy-making and in policy practice conducted by street-level bureaucrats. Is there a systematic pattern emerging or are the models applied differently at the three administrative levels? There are good grounds for arguing that the support to immigrant organisations as sites for democratic schooling based upon the Norwegian tradition is the prominent policy. Is this policy mainly oriented towards an aim to reduce the political salience of cultural diversity, or is there a scope for multicultural policy? To what extent and how can the Norwegian tradition of voluntary organisation be combined with a multicultural policy?

The chapter is divided into eight sections. The first two sections discuss the theoretical models of immigrant integration, respectively, the national integration model and the multicultural model. While the third section presents the empirically based Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation, the fourth describes the ethnic and national diversity in Oslo and presents the methodology applied in the empirical analyses. The following three sections analyse the policy, policy statements, policy-making and policy practice. The final section concludes with discussions on the relations between the recognition of cultural identities and democratic procedures.

2 Immigrant Integration Models

A country's policy on immigrant integration combines different forms of integration. One distinction can be made between cultural, social and political integration (Eriksen 2010: 69–109). The cultural form of integration refers to understandings of implicit and explicit communication, and this requires common language, codes and symbols. These are often based upon common historical experiences. The social form of integration refers to a person's network, employment and feelings of belonging. This implies interactions between friends and colleagues and is often based upon face-to-face contact. The political form of integration refers to the relations of individuals to the system, including bureaucratic and democratic institutions. This mainly implies relations between individuals or groups and public institutions. Such relations can both include civic engagement in public institutions and political participation such as voting in elections or running for election (Takle and Ødegård 2016).

Although these forms of integration overlap in practice, it is crucial to use this analytical distinction to be able to concentrate on one form at a time. We can imagine situations in which individuals understand the world in a similar way, and understand each other, without having any social interactions. This has often been the case within abstract national frameworks, in which people who have never met feel they belong to the same cultural and political community (Anderson 1991). In addition, an ethnic nationalist framework would emphasise the historical, necessary connection between cultural values and the state (Smith 2009). The argument is that the ethnic and cultural homogeneity within the nation state framework laid the foundation for the democratisation of government. In contrast, a civic understanding of nationalism challenges the connection between ethnic cultural homogeneity and a democratic political order. Habermas (1997: 632–661) argues, for example, that—even though nationalism functioned as a catalyst when the nation states historically evolved—the democratic order is based upon a political culture in which constitutional principles can take root without requiring that all citizens share the same language or ethnic and cultural origins. Accordingly, immigrants are expected to enter into the political culture of the country in which they live, without having to abandon their cultural form of life (Habermas 2015).

The new requirements for immigrants, as several European countries have introduced since the late 1990s, appear to be based upon the distinction between cultural and political integration. In general, the civic requirements are that migrants should have a basic knowledge about the country's culture, history, administration, politics and language, and that they must swear an oath of loyalty to the constitution or the country. Simultaneously, people from immigrant backgrounds can preserve cultures and traditions from their countries of origin. This means European countries only require that newcomers adapt to formal requirements as citizens, as is required for them to be able to participate in the decisions and administrative structure of the host country (Take 2015a). While there seems to be a relatively broad agreement both inside and among European countries' public policies about these civic requirements, the way in which they are interpreted differently is crucial for this chapter's analysis of integration models within the framework of nationalism.

One interesting disagreement in the scholarly debate is whether such requirements can be understood in terms of nationalism and historically evolved national traditions or whether they include elements of complex diversity. According to Joppke (2007, 2009, 2010), such civic integration requirements represent a convergence on a liberal paradigm for integration among European countries. In a study of the Netherlands, France and Germany, he finds various interpretations and implementations of civic integration, but concludes that these do not confirm the national models because they run counter to what the national models would predict (Joppke 2007). Joppke (2007: 14) believes it would be misleading to interpret civic integration towards immigrants as a rebirth of nationalism or racism, as it leaves the ethical orientation of the migrant intact. In contrast, Mouritsen (2012b: 847) argues that these requirements represent not only liberalism as a way of marking identity but also a form of nationalism. In a comparison of civic integration in Germany, Great Britain and Denmark, Mouritsen (2012a) finds a variety of responses to fairly similar challenges. Although occurring in liberal and civic terminology, he concludes that their integration and citizenship policies still reflect the path-dependent reactions of culturally bounded nation states. His argument is that national identity is still relevant for European countries, but consists of different elements today than the

previous ethnocultural form (Mouritsen 2012a, 2012b). With these arguments, Mouritsen applies a broad concept of culture, which not only covers the citizens' cultural form of life but also the administration of common public institutions.

This case study, within a Nordic context, can be seen in the light of how European countries place obligations on newcomers to learn how to be democratic citizens. Accordingly, the chapter questions whether the government's and the City of Oslo's integration policy is based upon a view of immigrant organisations as instruments to reduce the political salience of cultural diversity.

3 Multiculturalism: Cultural Recognition

The term multiculturalism is both used as a description of a society composed of many different cultures and religions and as a normative ideal that minorities should be granted special rights in order to strengthen their social participation. This analysis concentrates on the normative use of the concept, and, more specifically, on the diverging arguments used to underpin these ideals. One of the advocates of multiculturalism, Kymlicka (1995, 2010) starts from the point that political life has an inescapably national dimension, which gives a profound advantage to majority nations. A central argument in Kymlicka's (1995: 84) justification for group-differentiated rights is that it is only through having access to one's own societal culture that one has access to a range of meaningful options. Although Kymlicka (1995: 26, 2010) argues that group-differentiated rights for immigrants are usually intended to promote integration into the larger society, he does not see these rights as temporary because the cultural differences which they protect are not something he wants to eliminate.

While Kymlicka sees cultural group membership as essential for meaning and choice, Modood's (2007) approach to multicultural politics starts out from the politics of recognition of difference or respect for identities that are important to people (Taylor 1994). The differences at issue refer to race, ethnicity, cultural heritage or religious community, and, typically, the differences that overlap these categories, as they do not have singular, fixed meanings. Modood (2007: 38) argues

that multicultural accommodation of minorities is different from integration because it recognises the social reality of groups and not just individuals at the levels of identities, associations, belonging, including dispersion, behaviour, culture, religious practice and so on, and political mobilisation. This form of accommodation should also allow group-based cultural and religious practice to be fitted into the existing, established, majority ways of doing things (Modood 2007: 48–50). In contrast to Modood's focus on post-immigrant groups that are open to changes and in which individuals can leave, Parekh (2006) argues that individuals are born into their cultural communities and they will always retain some of their community's culture. According to Parekh (2006: 162), whereas an individual might leave the community, this can never be the same as leaving a voluntary organisation. Parekh's understanding is based upon a broad and deep understanding of culture as something that defines a person's identity.

While the advocates of multicultural policies base their arguments upon different normative ideals for minority rights, they share two important features which are especially important in a democratic perspective. Firstly, minority rights go beyond the civil and political rights of individual citizenship. Secondly, minority rights are adopted with the intention of recognising and accommodating the identities and needs of ethnocultural and religious groups (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 2). In a democratic perspective, it is crucial to distinguish the multicultural accommodation of minorities from integration, because it recognises the groups, and not just individuals, at the levels of identities, associations, belonging, including dispersion, behaviour, culture, religious practice and so on (Modood 2007: 38). While individuals have rights, mediating institutions such as immigrant organisations may also be encouraged to be active public players and may even have a formal representative or administrative role to play in the state (Meer and Modood 2012: 178). In accordance with multiculturalism as a normative ideal, policy measures that recognise and accommodate immigrant organisations mean that the identities and cultures of these groups are not left to the private sphere. The cultural, social and political forms of integration are seen as intertwined.

In recent decades, politicians and researchers across Europe have criticised multiculturalism. They have attempted to develop new ways to

approach increasingly diverse ethnic and religious societies (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004; Asari et al. 2008; Koopmans 2010). One main form of critique is that multiculturalism encourages groups to focus on their differences, rather than on what they have in common, and thereby cements the differences. This may, according to this criticism, lead to cultural and ethnic segregation and can be a hindrance to the development of a common political culture (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

If such recognition of differences is combined with group membership—as is analysed in this chapter—the drawing of group boundaries is a question that must be solved in practice. It requires an identification of group members and the drawing of boundaries based upon ethnic, national or religious criteria. There is the problem of identifying group members relating to various kinds of cultural overlap and the increased fluid identities common to individuals in contemporary liberal democracies (Eriksen 2010, 2015: 9). There is a fuzziness of all kinds of group boundaries and attempts to institutionalise membership will inevitably exclude some who should be included and include some who should be excluded (Tilly 1999; Lamont and Molnár 2002). When a group-differentiated policy is institutionalised in practice, there may be internal suppression within the group, and it can be problematical to define a representative leadership and determine who should be entitled to speak on behalf of the group (Killmister 2011). The multicultural accommodation of cultural and religious diversity and feminist claims to overcome gender inequality are often presented as competing equality principles, which need to be balanced (Siim 2015). In the context of multiculturalism, this chapter analyses whether the government's and the City of Oslo's policy on immigrant integration could be interpreted as a means of recognising differences as a form of transformation towards complex diversity.

4 The Nordic Tradition of Voluntary Organisation

Central contributions to studies of immigrant integration emphasise that national models of integration are the consequences of specific national histories and institutional legacies (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans et al.

2005; Bommes and Thränhardt 2010). Bommes and Thränhardt (2010: 10) emphasise, for example, that the way in which states deal with migration is dependent on different courses of state-building, how the population is constituted as a national community of citizens and the related design of welfare systems. In line with a neo-institutionalist approach (March and Olsen 1995, 1998), the Norwegian policy is analysed as the result of the country's history, national self-understanding and its view of the role of the state. At the institutional level, this means changes are often incremental and based upon historical path-dependencies.

Upon the basis of the similarities in the way civil society is organised in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, it is common to speak of a Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation (Wollebæk and Sivesind 2010). The central characteristics of the voluntary sector in these countries are that the organisations have a broad membership base, participation in voluntary work is seen as an integral part of being a member of an organisation, and they are democratically structured (Bengtsson 2004; Trägårdh and Vamstad 2009). Such a combination of voluntary work and membership ensures the democratic rights of the participants and the ownership of the organisation. Membership of organisations provides opportunities to influence the organisations' internal actions and their opinions in the public arena. According to this organisation of voluntary sector, it is a normative ideal that organisations should be democratically organised in such a way that the actions reflect their members' preferences, and that the members have the opportunity to speak and to be heard (Lorentzen 2004: 31).

The Norwegian emphasis on democracy can partly be explained by the fact that civil organisations were established in the same period as in which national liberation occurred. Nineteenth-century mainstream popular movements followed the same organisational structure as the political parties. They have been characterised by their hierarchical organisation, in which local organisations are linked together in regional and national organisations (Østerud et al. 2003). People's movements provided local interests in the political centre, and, in many cases, acted as countercultures (Rokkan 1966). The aim was to create political weight and legitimacy through mass membership, built on a broad social mobilisation. Participation in these movements socialised members into

democratic values and gave them training in practical democracy. The hierarchical structures were strengthened after the Second World War. The welfare state emphasised that voluntary organisations should be seen as communities of interest, mediated from the grassroots to central government through democratic processes. The counterculture organisations in Norway have received recognition of their standpoints and accommodation of their cultural differences in the common national institutions. People's movements have focused on issues such as disagreements about language, resistance to alcohol, religious questions and opposition to EU membership in 1972 and 1994.

In contrast, the legitimacy of voluntary organisations in many European countries rests on their moral foundation and their ability to turn fundamental ideological ideas into practice (Lorentzen 2004). The British charity tradition is, for example, based upon the moral commitment of each individual and the doing of good deeds to help the needy. The Catholic subsidiary tradition also has a foundation that points to individual practice rooted in moral responsibility (Stjernø 2005). These traditions of personal commitment reduce the importance of formal membership of organisations. Organisations without membership often have a centralised decision-making authority, in which there are employees in the organisation who hold both the real and the formal leadership responsibility. Contributions to the organisation are often simply in the form of financial support. This is common in the Anglo-American model of voluntary work, in which individuals are associated with non-profit-making organisations as donors and volunteers, rather than as members (Trägårdh and Vamstad 2009; Enjolras and Wollebæk 2010).

Although the positions of membership-based organisations in Norwegian civil society are being weakened, many researchers emphasise that it still has vitality as a normative ideal (Wollebæk and Sivesind 2010; Folkestad et al. 2015). The perception that voluntary organisations serve as schools of democracy is widespread (Brockmann and Rogstad 2004; Hagelund and Loga 2009; Bay et al. 2010; Takle 2015a). In line with this tradition, the idea is that participation in organisations socialises members into democratic values and gives them training in practical democracy. Members develop skills and commitments that are important both for the organisations and for the wider democracy. Within the context of

how the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation sees groups as a collection of individuals, and emphasises democratic procedures within groups, this chapter analyses whether the combination of recognising ethnic and national groups and democratic procedures can be understood in line with the traditional way of organising the voluntary sector.

5 Immigrant Organisations in Oslo: Methodology

There are 699,000 immigrants in Norway, and, in addition, 150,000 people were born in Norway to immigrant parents. These two groups represent around 16 per cent of the total Norwegian population. As most immigrants choose to settle in cities, the proportion of immigrants in Oslo is much higher than in other Norwegian municipalities. Around 32.5 per cent of the people living in Oslo are immigrants or were born in Norway to immigrant parents. Immigrants who have come to Norway as migrant workers account for 43 per cent, through family re-unification 33 per cent, as refugees 14 per cent or for education ten per cent (Statistics Norway 2016).

There are various ways of defining immigrant organisations: in relation to membership, issue or interest. Some common traits of immigrant organisations in Norway include that they can be characterised by grass-roots involvement and local organisations that are mainly established upon the basis of social purpose, and to protect ethnic and religious identities (Predelli 2008). There are around ten nationally based immigrant organisations in Norway, which, in various ways, concentrate on ethnic minorities' interests, and they receive support from the state. These organisations are not membership-based and are therefore not seen as being representative of the immigrant population in democratic terms (Nødland et al. 2007; Rogstad 2007).

This chapter concentrates on the around 300 registered local immigrant organisations in Oslo. In 2015, 146 organisations received financial support within the framework of various support schemes. The immigrant organisations are mainly nationally or ethnically based. The largest amount of immigrant organisations originating from a single national

group comes from Somalia (23 organisations), the second largest group originates from Pakistan (22), followed by groups from Turkey (11) and Sri Lanka (8). The two largest groups are among the largest immigrant groups in Norway, which come from Poland, Lithuania, Somalia, Sweden and Pakistan (Statistics Norway 2016).

The methodologies applied in the empirical studies are archive studies, interviews, fieldwork and presentation of cases from the Unit for Diversity and Integration (EMI) in Oslo. The analysis of *policy statements* concentrates on how the Norwegian government articulates normative ideas for membership-based immigrant organisations in White Papers and on the government's websites. The examination of *policy-making* is concerned with how the authorities facilitate the voluntary organisations of minorities by defining the criteria which the immigrant organisations must fulfil to receive support through the schemes. This covers three support schemes administered by the City of Oslo, two of which are from the state and one from the City of Oslo. Finally, the study of *policy practices* concentrates on how the street levels the decisions of bureaucrats regarding the amount of financial support, which actors they support and which actors and activities they do not find worthy of support (Lipsky 1980). As the main aim of this analysis is to examine how the Norwegian government's and the City of Oslo's policies are implemented in practice, it will neither cover the migrants' perceptions of this policy nor how they try to adapt to the national terms set by the Norwegian state institutions. The perceptions and identities of migrants associated with transnationalism and cosmopolitanism have been studied elsewhere (Takle 2012, 2015a, 2015b).

6 Policy Statements: Ambiguity

Analysis of the government's policy statements regarding the immigrant organisations reveals an ambiguous policy. White Paper no 39 (2006–2007) defines the current fundament for the government's policy on the voluntary sector (White Paper no 6 (2012–2013): 123). According to these White Papers, the government perceives membership-based organisations as having a stronger democratic function than non-membership-based organisations. It emphasises that membership-based

organisations have both internal and external democratic functions. In terms of internal democracy, the government's ideal is in line with the Nordic tradition in so far as the organisations' missions, activities and priorities should reflect their members' preferences. To achieve this, the government stresses that the organisations must have a democratic decision-making structure which ensures the members can influence their organisations (White Paper no 39 (2006–2007)).

Furthermore, the government concludes that voluntary organisations and networks that are not membership-based have a more limited democratic function. The authorities, nevertheless, believe that these organisations or networks can contribute to democratic decisions by setting the agenda, by contributions to the public debate and by influencing stakeholders in relation to public policy. This ranking of the various forms of voluntary organisations in relation to their democratic function puts the Nordic tradition for voluntary work at the top of the ranking list (White Paper no 39 (2006–2007)). The government formulates the democratic ideal by referring explicitly to this tradition:

Meanwhile, the government is concerned that the voluntary organisations, including immigrant organisations, follow democratic principles. By allocating support to organisations it has traditionally been emphasised that the organisations must have a democratically elected leadership and an elected board. This also applies to immigrant organisations. (White Paper No. 39 (2006–2007): 62)

Studies from the Nordic countries show that central elements of the Nordic tradition of organising the voluntary sector are applied to ethnic community-based organisations (Borevi 2004; Pyykkönen 2007; Predelli 2008; Hagelund and Loga 2009; Bay et al. 2010; Ødegård 2010; Kugelberg 2011; Myrberg and Rogstad 2011). However, none of these scholars explicitly links this tradition to their studies of immigrant organisations (Takle 2015a, 2015b). The Nordic tradition is also the basis for the policy statements which support the inclusion of immigrants in civil society. According to the government, the goal of providing support to local immigrant organisations is to promote more civil and political participation:

The grant does not support the organisations' identity building and activities that promote a common identity as immigrant or as member of an ethnic or national group. When the government supports local immigrant organisations that are built around a sense of belonging to an ethnic or national group, it is because it is important to have a position and a community that supports the participation in the civil and political life. Voluntary organisations are also important meeting places, where social participation is an intrinsic value beyond the organisations' primary purpose. Organisations provide identity, belonging and self-confidence. These are often important preconditions for a person's participation in social life. Not least for newly arrived immigrants, such organisations can act as supporters and door openers to the Norwegian society. (White Paper No. 39 (2006–2007): Chap. 19.3)

The normative ideal is clearly that immigrant organisations should be both internal schools of democracy for immigrants *and* represent the ethnic or national group's mutual interests externally in local democratic processes. The main aim of facilitating increased democratic participation seems to reflect a path-dependency in which the government follows the traditional Norwegian way of organising the voluntary sector. Moreover, with this policy statement, the government combines the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation with that of minority rights. A similar mediating role of immigrant organisations can be seen in Sweden and Finland (Bengtsson 2004; Borevi 2004; Kugelberg 2011; Pyykkönen 2007).

Regarding minority rights, there is ambiguity in both the Swedish and the Norwegian policy. In Norway, the government does not perceive the strengthening of a common identity as an immigrant or as member of an ethnic or national group as an end in itself in the way that scholars such as Kymlicka (1995, 2010) and Modood (2007) emphasise but rather as a useful means of integration in the majority society. It thus appears that the policy is based upon the belief that identities are important but that identities linked to other ethnic or national groups are not to influence majority institutions. The policy cannot be interpreted as a form of multicultural policy.

Analysing White Papers from the early 2000s, Gressgård (2005) finds a general recognition of cultural differences, but, in practice, these policies are tied to the individual. The Norwegian government's respect for

both immigrants' and their descendants' culture as groups is, however, limited to some areas and is rather instrumental (Seeberg 2004; Engebrigtsen and Fuglerud 2009). The government sees the ethnic and national groups as places for cultural and social integration in small communities. The idea is that such integration will lead to increased participation in the wider society:

Immigrant organisations can function as a stepping-stone for contact with other inhabitants and participation in other arenas, and in this way strengthen immigrants' belonging to the larger society. (White Paper No. 6, 2012–2013: 126)

In accordance with the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation, the idea is that ethnic community-based organisations engaged in cultural and social activities can be places where members learn democratic values in practice. The government's rationale for seeing immigrant organisations as a stepping stone to wider civic and political engagement is the belief in this Nordic tradition in which the voluntary organisations are expected to contribute to democratic education (White Paper No. 6 2012–2013: 123). However, the ambiguity in this policy is reflected in how the aim of supporting ethnic and national community-based organisations is not to strengthen the group as such, in line with a multicultural model of integration, but rather to use the organisations as an arena to nudge individual immigrants towards civic and political participation in mainstream Norwegian society. Such integration of individuals will reduce the political salience of cultural diversity among groups and can, therefore, be interpreted in terms of a national integrationist objective, which is mainly concerned with ensuring cultural homogeneity in political institutions.

7 Policy-Making: Conflicting Political Strategies

The ambiguity found in the policy statements is reflected in the policy-making in Oslo, and especially in conflicting political strategies towards immigrant organisations. The City of Oslo administers three types of

support schemes for immigrant organisations and networks. The state provides two of them, and, for these two, the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi) defines the guidelines for support. One is the *state basic support* for the operation of local immigrant organisations, and the other is the *state activity support* for voluntary activities in local communities. The third form of support scheme is *municipal integration support*, and, for this, the Department of Cultural Affairs and Education in the City of Oslo defines the guidelines. In Oslo, all of the three support schemes are administered by the Unit for Diversity and Integration (EMI), which is responsible for distributing the financial support according to applications and to ensure that this support is used for its intended purpose.

The three types of support schemes have different objectives, target groups and criteria for support. Consequently, they provide diverse guidelines for the democratic participation of immigrants. The main distinction is between the *state basic support*, on the one hand, and the *state activity support* and the *municipal integration support*, on the other. The differences between the support schemes reflect two conflicting political strategies: (1) the requirement of membership-based and democratically structured ethnic or national organisations and (2) the requirement of co-operation between several ethnic or national groups. While the first strategy includes incentives to establish ethnically and nationally based voluntary organisations, the second has incentives to prevent segregation and increase co-operation among such groups.

7.1 Membership-Based Organisations

The target group for the state basic support scheme is membership-based immigrant organisations in local communities. Government subsidies are distributed across the country, calculated according to the counties' share of the country's immigrant population. The government defines the immigrant population as the number of foreign-born persons who are permanently resident in Norway, and who were born outside the Nordic countries, Switzerland, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—and their children (IMDi 2016). Given that one in three immigrants in

Norway lives in Oslo, the city manages large parts of the state support scheme for local immigrant organisations.

A precondition to receive the state basic support in Oslo is that the immigrant organisation has a democratically elected leadership and that all members who have paid membership fees are eligible to vote (EMI 2016). While the requirement of democratic procedures is emphasised in general terms by the government in White Papers and specified as a criteria for support by the local authorities in Oslo, this is not mentioned in the guidelines from the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi).

The allocation of support is based upon the number of “eligible members”. Because some organisations have cheated with their membership lists, the state requires information about exactly how many members there are in each organisation. Since 2010, this means all members who have paid the annual membership fees the previous year by bank transfer from their own bank accounts to the organisation’s account and who permanently live in Oslo. The state also requires a membership list attached to the application. The list has to include each member’s name, date of birth and address, and they have to document that the payment is transferred from each member’s bank account. Whereas child and youth organisations must have at least 20 eligible members to receive support, adult organisations must have at least 100 eligible members.

All organisations receiving state basic support should be able to document that they have been in operation for a minimum of two years, and they have to be registered in public records. The organisations have to submit annual reports, which give a brief summary of all the activities that the organisation has conducted during the previous year, such as the annual meeting, board meetings, member meetings or other activities for members as well as externally oriented activities that are not exclusively directed towards its own members (EMI 2016; Takle 2015a).

With this support scheme, the authorities combine the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation and minority rights not only in policy statements but also at the policy-making level. In line with the Nordic tradition, the organisations receive support in relation to the number of members, and the local authorities emphasise the importance of internal democracy. One can find the same pattern in Sweden, although there seems to be a gradual change towards an emphasis on how well the

activities are found to facilitate integration (Borevi 2004; Kugelberg 2011: 273). Since these immigrant organisations in Oslo give ethnic or national groups the possibility of maintaining their culture, this policy is also a form of multicultural policy.

Although the normative ideal for this policy is that immigrant organisations should be internal schools of democracy and represent the ethnic or national group's mutual interests externally, this is not always the way that it turns out in practice. However, many researchers document that the authorities relatively rarely bring immigrant organisations into the formal decision-making processes through discussions, dialogues and consultations (Predelli 2008; Nødland et al. 2007). It thus appears that the authorities do not follow their own ideals regarding the inclusion of immigrants. Moreover, studies of local immigrant organisations in Norway conclude that the majority of organisations are concerned with caring for their own identity, and that they have little contact with other organisations or with the public authorities (Rogstad 2007: 113; Hagelund and Loga 2009; Takle 2015a, 2015b). This could mean that membership is important within the organisations but does not have the external democratic function that the authorities desire.

7.2 Co-operation Between Ethnic or National Groups

Since 2009, the purpose of the *state activity support* scheme has been to create meeting places for people with different ethnic and national origins. Although this has been central to the criteria for this support scheme, the previous criteria were more vague on this point. While the target group for the *state basic support* comprises exclusively immigrant organisations in local communities, other voluntary organisations, immigrant networks and private and semi-public bodies can also apply for the *state activity support*. As the purpose of the state's activity support is to facilitate the creation of meeting places in local communities, this support is only granted to activities in which two or more ethnic or national groups work together. There are no requirements for membership (EMI 2016).

The City of Oslo's *municipal integration support* also prioritises applicants who have an inter-cultural profile, involving contacts and activities among several ethnic or national groups. This means that the municipality supports cross-cultural co-operation, rather than just one single membership-based immigrant organisation or one ethnic group. The support is allocated in accordance with priority areas in Oslo's integration and diversity policies. The contemporary priorities are measures that can help to strengthen the position of children and young people with minority backgrounds in schools, measures that can increase participation in both the workplace and in society, and measures that promote inter-cultural relationships and activities (EMI 2016). The target groups for this support scheme are voluntary organisations in Oslo and enterprises arranging activities with an approved social purpose.

The creation of meeting places for people with different ethnic and national backgrounds is also central to the City of Oslo's integration and diversity policies. This applies especially to the initiatives in the eastern parts of the city, where the proportion of immigrants is high. One central aim is to establish physical spaces where people can meet. In a study of diverse ethnic networks in a city district in the eastern part of Oslo, Ødegård (2010) concludes that meeting places may contribute to lowering the threshold for participation in a traditional Norwegian context. This emphasis on co-operation can also be found in cities like Berlin, where several immigrant organisations co-operate with organisations in the majority society (Hunger et al. 2011), and several of these organisations do not have a register of their members (Yardakul 2009).

Similarly to the reaction in several European countries (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), the fear of how a multicultural policy can lead to segregation seems to have influenced Oslo's policy on immigrant organisations. Both the state's activity support and the municipal integration and diversity policy facilitate a form of participation in civil society that must be distinguished from membership-based organisations. This is a type of activity in civil society which we have seen that the government perceives to have a weaker democratic function than membership-based organisations. As these schemes neither encourage democratic schooling inside organisations nor democratic representation, they are not in line with the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation. In contrast, the aim

of these two support schemes can be interpreted in terms of a national integrationist model of immigrant integration. The aim to integrate immigrants into the larger society and the creation of meeting places are seen as more important than including organisations in democratic structures.

8 Policy Practices: Local Diversities

While national models of integration might structure policy statements and policy-making, practices at local level tend to be far more diverse than most policy models would suggest. The City of Oslo's practice for these three support schemes is reflected in (1) economic priorities, (2) actors who receive support and (3) what kind of actors and activities the authorities choose not to support.

8.1 Economic Priorities

Over the last seven years, there has been a gradual reduction in the financial support which the state and the City of Oslo have allocated to immigrant organisations. The *state basic support* was reduced from Norwegian Kroner (NOK) 1.5 in 2008 to NOK 0.9 million in 2015.¹ The funding of about NOK 2.7 million to the *state activity support* in Oslo was, however, fixed throughout the period. The *municipal integration support* scheme shows a reduction in funding from NOK 4.9 million in 2008 to NOK 0.7 million in 2015. The municipal also supports other types of project, which are not tendered but granted directly.

The reduction in support shows at least two things. Firstly, the state and the municipality of Oslo have gradually reduced their funding for this type of measure to integrate immigrants in the city. Secondly, the reduction shows that the City of Oslo gives priority to maintaining funding for activities in which several ethnic groups work together rather than to supporting the operation of a membership-based immigrant organisation. This is not in line with the government's policy statements that membership-based voluntary organisations have a stronger democratic

function than organisations that are not membership-based. The economic priorities in the support schemes suggest that the Norwegian authorities consider it more important to enable groups with members of different ethnic and national backgrounds to work together. This policy can neither be interpreted as multiculturalism, nor is it in line with how the Nordic tradition emphasises the aim of strengthening the participation of immigrants in local democracy. According to a national integrationist model, the aim is rather to prevent segregation among groups.

8.2 Actors Who Receive Support

As shown above, the three support schemes have different target groups. The *state basic support* goes exclusively to membership-based organisations, and the number of organisations that have received grants fell from 39 recipients in 2008 to 24 recipients in 2015. This must be seen within the context of an overall reduction in the number of applicants from 56 to 30 over the same period. As the number of immigrants in the city increased in this period, the reduction in the number of applicants may reflect the stricter requirements to document the members' details and a reduction in the immigrant organisations' beliefs in the possibility of receiving support. Nevertheless, the gradual reduction in the number of organisations that receive support suggests this membership-based way of supporting immigrant integration is not prioritised in practice.

The target groups for the *state activity support* are the voluntary organisations in local communities (including immigrant organisations and immigrant councils), individuals and public or semi-public units. Of the 77 actors who received the *state activity support* in 2015, around 50 were membership-based immigrant organisations. The remaining recipients were various forms of immigrant-based networks, some recipients of which represent the majority society. The support was mainly given to membership-based immigrant organisations and might be understood within the framework of the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation. However, in order to receive the *state activity support*, the immigrant organisations had to co-operate with other ethnic or national groups. This practice is in line with government's normative ideals not to support

the identity of immigrants as a group, but rather their participation in Norwegian civil society and co-operation with other ethnic groups, and in line with a national integrationist model. The same pattern can be observed in the 45 actors who received funding from the *municipal integration support* scheme.

8.3 Actors and Activities That Are Not Supported

An investigation into the actors and activities that the City of Oslo chooses *not* to support may shed light on the priorities from another angle. The guidelines show some priorities. One is that religious groups cannot receive support. They have a separate support scheme, which is intertwined with the support to the Norwegian church. According to the Norwegian constitution (§16), the Norwegian church is an Evangelical Lutheran Church, which receives support from the state, and all religious and belief communities in Norway are to be funded equally. The support is calculated upon the basis of the number of members. While members must be documented, there are no requirements regarding internal democratic structures. In 2016, the support per member was around NOK 500 from the state, while, in Oslo, they received an additional similar amount from the municipal authority (Norwegian Government 2016). As this amount is much higher than any other voluntary organisation receives, this policy will, in practice, encourage immigrants to organise themselves as religious groups.

We have also seen that the immigrants have to have come from areas outside the Nordic countries, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Since 2009, an exception has been made for immigrants from other countries in Europe, but the main target group for these support schemes is still immigrants and their children from outside the Western liberal democracies. An important restriction on the applications for the state basic support is that it does not grant support to more than one ethnic or national group in each local community. In practice, the City of Oslo does not follow this guideline strictly, as there are several groups from the same country that receive support.

It is also interesting to note the kinds of applications that are rejected. Some of the reasons for the rejections are that the applications do not meet the requirements defined in the guidelines for support. For example, organisations that are not membership-based will not receive basic support, while activities that do not involve several ethnic or national groups do not receive state activity support. In such cases, the refusals are justified by referring to the failure to fulfil the criteria for support. The main reason for rejection is, however, lack of documentation. A review of the case files for applications to EMI shows that the administration tries to collect the required information. These efforts may indicate that support schemes—in practice—have an important function not simply as “schools in democracy” but rather as schooling in Norwegian bureaucracy (Takle 2015a).

This schooling is not the same as the socialising of individuals into the democratic values emphasised in the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation. In the Norwegian context, this is based upon hierarchical organisation in which local organisations are linked together in regional and national organisations. These links between levels may create political weight and influence from the grassroots to the central government through democratic processes. In contrast to the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation, the government only supports membership-based immigrant organisations at local level, and not at regional or national levels. While the local immigrant organisations are membership-based, the national immigrant organisations are expert groups that are neither related to the local organisations nor membership-based (Nødland et al. 2007).

This shows that immigrants are recognised as ethnic and national groups at local level, but not at regional and national levels. Even though the government’s support to local membership-based immigrant organisations could be understood within the framework of the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation, not all aspects of this historical tradition are followed in practice. The practice is rather in accordance with the national integrationist model, which is mainly concerned with ensuring cultural homogeneity in political institutions. The outcome of the support to local immigrant organisations is a fragmented landscape of small,

local membership-based immigrant organisations with internal democracy but with little or no political influence in the larger society.

9 Conclusion

The policy to support membership-based immigrant organisations in Oslo with internal democracy can mainly be understood within the framework of the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation. The combination of cultural recognition and democratic participation follow a path-dependency based upon the historical strength of this tradition within the nation state context. However, while this tradition is emphasised as crucial in policy statements, it is not followed up in policy-making and policy practice. Ethnic and national groups are only supported at local level, while in the Nordic tradition—and especially in Norway—voluntary organisations gather in regional and national organisations in order to gain influence in national political institutions. We can thus conclude that the authorities' support to immigrant organisations are not motivated by the aim to organise political institutions along ethnic or national lines.

The policy is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is no evidence to suggest that the support schemes are based upon a multicultural model, in the sense that the government and the City of Oslo have the intention of recognising the identity of ethnic or national groups. It cannot be understood as politics of difference or a shift towards complex diversity. On the other hand, financial support for the local organisation of ethnic and national groups is a form of recognition of cultural difference in practice, since such support facilitates the groups' maintenance of their cultural identity with bonds to other countries and regions. The support can be interpreted as an instrumental multiculturalism—with schooling in democracy as the goal. While the authorities perceive these organisations as arenas for schooling, the organisations' activities are preparations that do not—in practice—lead to political influence for the group in the wider society.

The democratic and bureaucratic knowledge achieved through participation in immigrant organisations is instead seen as a means for individual

incorporation in the mainstream society. The requirement to establish internal democratic procedures in ethnic and national groups is based upon the perception that participation in the mainstream political institutions basically takes place through individuals. This policy corresponds with a national integration model, and its aim to reduce the political salience of cultural diversity in mainstream political institutions. When this model is combined with recognition of ethnic and national groups, the autonomy of these groups is reduced. Formal democratic procedures replace other forms of decision-making, and leave less room for the special cultural practices of ethnic and national groups. Democratic procedures can reduce internal suppression within groups and determine who should be entitled to speak on behalf of the group.

We can thus conclude that the empirically based Nordic tradition of voluntary organisation is combined with both theoretically defined immigrant integration models but in various forms at different policy levels. While the only model that can be found at all three policy levels is the national integrationist model, both the ambiguous policy and the variations between the policy levels indicate that this is not the outcome of an explicitly defined policy strategy. The intention of accepting cultural diversity in civil society, and simultaneously reducing the political salience of cultural diversity, can be understood in terms of the dilemma in liberal multi-ethnic democracies. All members are entitled to have the same rights and opportunities, but they also have the right to be different. This policy is also in line with the increasing civic requirements being placed on immigrant populations across Europe, and the growing acceptance of minorities maintaining and promoting their culture. These tendencies are based upon a narrow concept of culture, which is analytically distinguished from social and political integration.

While the acceptance of cultural differences is contested, the civic requirements are seldom a part of the contestation of nationalism within the nation state. They are rather seen as what immigrants have to learn in order to be a citizen and to be able to take part in national democracy. Nevertheless, this democratic and bureaucratic schooling of individuals is not only a question of formal procedures but also has an element of national identity politics. In these processes, the bureaucrats convey the state categories and understandings, which are crucial for

the self-understanding of the majority society. Political administration is a crucial part of a country's national tradition and culture. When the Norwegian authorities require immigrants to have a knowledge of the country's democratic and administrative culture, this is a way of marking national identity rather than urging a shift towards complex diversity.

Notes

1. On 2 January 2017 the value of Norwegian Kroner (NOK) 100 is around GBP 9.5 and EUR 11 <https://www.dnb.no/bedrift/markets/valuta-renter/kalkulator/valutakalkulator.html>.

References

- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso Books.
- Asari, E.-M., et al. (2008). British National Identity and the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 14(1), 1–28.
- Bay, A. H., et al. (2010). Civil Society and Political Integration of Immigrants in Norway. In B. Bengtson et al. (Eds.), *Diversity, Inclusion and Citizenship in Scandinavia* (pp. 295–323). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Bengtsson, B. (Ed.) (2004). *Föreningsliv, makt och integration*. Rapport från Integrationspolitiska maktutredningens forskningsprogram. Rapport 2004: 49. Stockholm: Erlanders Gotab AB.
- Bommes, M., & Thränhardt, D. (Eds.). (2010). *National Paradigms of Migration Research*. Universität Osnabrück: Imis-Schriften 13.
- Borevi, K. (2004). Den svenske diskursen om staten, integrationen och föreningslivet. In B. Bengtsson (Ed.), *Föreningsliv, makt och integration*. Rapport från Integrationspolitiska maktutredningens forskningsprogram. Rapport (2004: 49, pp. 31–65). Stockholm: Erlanders Gotab AB.
- Brockmann, G., & Rogstad, J. (2004). På sidelinjen? Vilkår for deltakelse i politikk og organisasjonsliv i Norge. In B. Bengtsson (Ed.), *Föreningsliv, makt och integration*. Rapport från Integrationspolitiska maktutredningens forskningsprogram. Rapport (2004: 49, pp. 315–341). Stockholm: Erlanders Gotab AB.

- Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Brubaker, R. (2001). The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24(4), 531–548.
- EMI. (2016). The Unit for Diversity and Integration. The City of Oslo, City District Grünerløkka Enhet for Mangfold og Integreering. Retrieved March 8, 2016, from <https://www.oslo.kommune.no/politikk-og-administrasjon/etater-og-foretak/enhet-for-mangfold-og-integreering>
- Engebretsen, A., & Fuglerud, Ø. (2009). *Kultur og Generasjon. Tilpasningsprosesser blant somaliere og tamiler i Norge*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Enjolras, B., & Wollebæk, D. (2010). *Frivillige organisasjoner, sosial utjevning og inkludering*. Rapport 2010–2. Oslo: Senter for forskning på sivilsamfunn og frivillig sektor.
- Eriksen, T. H. (2009). What Is Cultural Complexity? In H. Moxnes, W. Blanton, & J. G. Crossley (Eds.), *Jesus Beyond Nationalism Constructing the Historical Jesus in a Period of Cultural Complexity* (pp. 9–24). London: Equinox.
- Eriksen, T. H. (2010). *Samfunn*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Eriksen, T. H. (2015). The Meaning of ‘We’. In P. Kraus & P. Kivisto (Eds.), *The Challenge of Minority Integration. Politics and Policies in the Nordic Nations* (pp. 2–22). Warsaw and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Folkestad, B., et al. (2015). *Frivillig innsats i Norge 1998–2014. Kva kjenneteikner dei frivillig og kva har endra seg?* Oslo: Senter for forskning på sivilsamfunn og frivillig sektor.
- Gressgård, R. (2005). Hva mener regjeringen med flerkulturelt mangfold? *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, 22(1), 72–79.
- Habermas, J. (1997). *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Habermas, J. (2015). *The Lure of Technocracy*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hagelund, A., & Loga, J. (2009). *Frivillighet, innvandring, integrasjon. En kunnskapsoversikt*. Oslo: ISF Rapport 1.
- Hunger, U., et al. (2011). *Kooperation mit Migrantenorganisationen—Studie im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Migration und Flüchtlinge*. Nürnberg: BAMF.
- IMDi. (2016). Integreering og Mangfoldsdirektoratet. Directorat of Immigration and Diversity. Rundskriv 11/2016. Retrieved March 9, 2016, from <http://www.imdi.no/tilskudd/tilskudd-frivillig-virksomhet>
- Joppke, C. (2004). The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *British Journal of Sociology*, 55(2), 235–257.

- Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 30(1), 1–22.
- Joppke, C. (2009). *Veil Mirror of Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Joppke, C. (2010). *Citizenship and Immigration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Killmister, S. (2011). Group-Differentiated Rights and the Problem of Membership. *Social Theory and Practice*, 37(2), 227–255.
- Koopmans, R. (2010). Trade-Offs Between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(1), 1–26.
- Koopmans, R., et al. (2005). *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics in Europe*. Minnesota, MN: Minnesota University Press.
- Kugelberg, C. (2011). Integration Policy and Ethnic Minority Associations. In C. Shore et al. (Eds.), *Policy Worlds: Anthropology and Analysis of Contemporary Power* (pp. 264–282). New York: Berghahn Books.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (2010). The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism?: New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies. In S. Vertovec & S. Wessendorf (Eds.), *The Multiculturalism Backlash—European Discourses, Policies and Practices* (pp. 32–50). New York: Routledge.
- Kymlicka, W., & Norman, W. (2000). *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford: University Press.
- Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28, 167–195.
- Lipsky, M. (1980, 2010). *Street Level Bureaucracy—Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation.
- Lorentzen, H. (2004). *Felleskapets fundament—sivilsamfunnet og individualismen*. Oslo: Pax.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1995). *Democratic Governance*. New York: The Free Press.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organization*, 52(4), 943–969.
- Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2012). How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism? *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 33(2), 175–196.
- Modood, T. (2007). *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mouritsen, P. (2012a). The Resilience of Citizenship Traditions: Civic Integration in Germany, Great Britain and Denmark. *Ethnicities*, 13(1), 86–109.
- Mouritsen, P. (2012b). The Dialectics of Liberal Citizenship in Europe. *Ethnicities*, 12(6), 844–863.

- Myrberg, G., & Rogstad, J. (2011). Patterns of Participation: Engagement Among Ethnic Minorities and the Native Population in Oslo and Stockholm. In L. Morales & M. Giugni (Eds.), *Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe: Making Multicultural Democracy Work?* (pp. 172–198). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nødland, S. I., et al. (2007). Organisasjoner for identitet og integrering. Evaluering av tilskuddsordning for lokale innvandrersorganisasjoner og lokalt frivillig virke. Stavanger: Rapport IRIS 064.
- Norwegian Government. (2016). Retrieved December 29, 2016, from <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/kud/tilskudd/tilskudd-til-tros--og-livssynsamfunn-20/id455417>
- Ødegård, G. (2010). *Forningsliv i et flerkulturelt lokalsamfunn. En studie om integrasjon og sosial kapital*. Oslo: ISF Rapport 6.
- Østerud, Ø., et al. (2003). *Makten og demokratiet. En sluttbok fra Makt- og demokratiutredningen*. Oslo: Gyldendal.
- Parekh, B. (2006). *Rethinking Multiculturalism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Predelli, L. N. (2008). Political and Cultural Ethnic Mobilisation: The Role of Immigrant Associations in Norway. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(6), 935–954.
- Pyykkönen, M. (2007). Integrating Governmentality: Administrative Expectations for Immigrant Associations in Finland. *Alternatives*, 32(1), 197–224.
- Rogstad, J. (2007). *Demokratisk fellesskap. Politisk inkludering og etnisk mobilisering*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Rokkan, S. (1966). Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism. In R. A. Dahl (Ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Seeberg, M. L. (2004). Antropologer og multikulturalisme i Norge og andre steder. *Norsk antropologisk tidsskrift*, 15(4), 2015–2226.
- Siim, B. (2015). Migration, Multiculturalism and Gender—A Nordic Perspective. In P. Kraus & P. Kivisto (Eds.), *The Challenge of Minority Integration: Politics and Policies in the Nordic Nations* (pp. 71–90). Warsaw and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Smith, A. (2009). *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*. London: Routledge.
- Statistics Norway. (2016). Retrieved December 29, 2016, from <https://www.ssb.no/innvandring-og-innvandrere/nokkeltall>

- Stjernø, S. (2005). *Solidarity in Europe. The History of an Idea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Takle, M. (2012). National, Transnational or Cosmopolitan? Local Immigrant Organisations. *Irish Journal of Sociology*, 20(2), 175–190.
- Takle, M. (2015a). Immigrant Organisations as Schools of Bureaucracy. *Ethnicities*, 15(1), 92–111.
- Takle, M. (2015b). Institutional Design and Political Representation: The Council of Immigrant Organisations in Oslo. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 16(4), 1195–1211.
- Takle, M., & Ødegård, G. (2016). When Policy Meets Practice: A Study of Ethnic Community-Based Organisations for Children and Youth. In M. L. Seeberg & E. Goździak (Eds.), *Contested Childhoods—Growing Up in Migrancy*. Frankfurt am Main: Springer Verlag.
- Taylor, C. (1994). The Politics of Recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), *Multiculturalism* (pp. 25–75). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1999). *Durable Inequality*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Trägårdh, L., & Vamstad, J. (2009). Att ge eller att beskattas. Avdragsrätt för gåvor till ideell verksamhet i Sverige och andra länder. Stockholm: Sektor 3—Tankesmedjan för det civila samhället.
- Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (Eds.). (2010). *The Multiculturalism Backlash—European Discourses, Policies and Practices*. New York: Routledge.
- White Paper No. 39. (2006–2007). The Norwegian Government, published 10 August 2007. Retrieved March 9, 2016, from <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2006-2007/Stmeld-nr-39-2007-.html?id=477331>
- White Paper No. 6. (2012–2013). The Norwegian Government, published 26 October 2012. Retrieved March 9, 2016, from <https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/ae2661f20cfe4899b303a5951334a9c1/no/pdfs/stm201220130006000dddpdfs.pdf>
- Wollebæk, D., & Sivesind, K. H. (2010). *Fra folkebevegelse til filantropi? Frivillig innsats i Norge 1997–2009*. Rapport 2010–3. Oslo: Senter for forskning på sivilsamfunn og frivillig sektor.
- Yardakul, G. (2009). *From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press.



15

Conclusion: Contestations Within, Rather Than About, Nationalism

John Erik Fossum, Riva Kastoryano, and Birte Siim

1 Introduction

The leitmotif of this book has been to explore how nationalism is contested. The overarching concern was to establish whether the main contestations that we find today are occurring *within* the ambit of nationalism, or whether they are, on balance, instead, contestations *about* nationalism. In order to examine this, the book has outlined three sets of developments, reflected under the headings of transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and nationalist resurgence (mainly through right-wing populism). The first two, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, offered the greatest prospects for a transition away from nationalism. Out of these two, it was

J. E. Fossum (✉)
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

R. Kastoryano
Sciences Po, Paris, France

B. Siim
Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

cosmopolitanism that could be expected to come with the clearest affront to nationalism, the one most likely to instantiate contestations about nationalism, because it is the more explicitly articulated doctrine and because its ethos of inclusiveness and orientation towards universality differs from the ethos of nationalism. The assumption, then, was that the more cosmopolitanised a given society, and/or the more prominent the cosmopolitan discourse, the more the terms of contestation would revolve around the very relevance and salience of nationalism.

The first main observation that we discern from the contributions in this volume is that there is not much support for an explicit transition. The relevant issue is not how different the *cosmopolitan ethos* (or, for that matter, the *transnational ethos*, if such a thing could be developed) is from the *national ethos*, or whether the orientations and ensuing actions of the actors would unfold along different trajectories if they were motivated by a *cosmopolitan ethos* rather than a *nationalist ethos*; instead, the issue is *who* and *what* sets the terms of debate. The European Union has strong cosmopolitan and transnational traits, and Canada, as the chapters by John Erik Fossum and Patti Tamara Lenard show, also has strong cosmopolitan traits. Nevertheless, the terms of the debate are still very much set by nationalism in both cases. We do not find any apparent transition to cosmopolitanism, either in the mainstream political discourses or in how policies and policy instruments are depicted and justified. That does not rule out that these polities have cosmopolitan traits, however. The cosmopolitan traits that these entities exhibit contribute to expand the terms of the discourse, rendering the accounts of nationalism and its practice more inclusive and difference-sensitive, but these traits have emerged through practice (with private and public sources alike), not through explicit cosmopolitan governing doctrines. The fact that both the EU and Canada depict themselves as multinational in character leaves little space for cosmopolitanism to serve as an explicit action-directing device.

The second main observation that we can discern from the contributions in this book is that the so-called nationalist reaction that we have discussed with reference to the rise of right-wing populism across Europe and North America draws on a version of nationalism that distinguishes itself from mainstream civic or liberal nationalism. The right-wing populists instrumentalise nationalism (as they also often do with the Christian

religion, which they subsume under their national populism), in the sense that they use it as a central vehicle in their struggle for power. The right-wing populist ethno-nationalist purpose is clearly to weaken or undercut the mainstream civic nationalism associated with rights-based constitutional protections of difference and diversity along individual- and group-based lines.

The third observation builds on the two former observations, in the sense that it underlines that, even if the terms of debate are set within the ambit of nationalism, so to speak, the three developments (transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and nationalist resurgence [mainly through right-wing populism]) that the book addresses reside in different renditions of nationalism. As Riva Kastoryano shows in her chapter, transnational nationalism emerges as a de-territorialised form of nationalism, a distinct configuration of identity, community, territory, and an underpinning or underlying political structure. The embedded cosmopolitan features of both the EU and Canada are reflected in a highly inclusive form of nationalism. Finally, right-wing populist or “new” nationalism is an exclusivist, ethnic form of nationalism. The EU in particular but Canada, too, are arenas in which these different forms of nationalism contest one another and vie for space. The terms of contestation are not confined to the *form* of nationalism but extend to the relationship between nationalism and the state. The three developments, as they are presented here, rely on very different combinations of nationalism and the state. As will be spelled out further below, transnational nationalism exhibits a distinctive configuration of how nationalism and the state are related; cosmopolitanism presents a different one; and the new (right-wing populist) nationalism offers up yet another version. As we will also show, these differences expose the fact that each development has its own distinctive vantage point and centre of gravity and that these differ considerably from each other. Thus, when we discuss these developments and the challenges that they represent, we need to keep in mind that these developments are steeped in interpretations of what is happening and that each of them is steeped in a distinctive way of seeing the world. We need to understand these differences if we are to understand the challenges confronting such complex political entities as the EU and Canada.

2 The Transnational Challenge

The question of ways of seeing and the importance of the nature of the interpretive lenses that we adopt is readily apparent when we consider the transnational challenge. This perspective was itself explicitly forged as a challenge or affront to methodological nationalism. It challenged methodological nationalism's powerful assumption of contiguity between polity and community, an assumption that had infused social science with a form of trained incapacity: the inability to conceptualise transnational processes as intrinsic elements of the building of nation-states.

Much of social science has woken up to "methodological nationalism" (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), but the general propensity is to attribute the impetus to wake up to globalisation. In some contrast, transnationalism, with its sources in migration studies, traces this back in time, to the manner in which the historical process of nation-state-building tended to exclude the transnational dimension. The transnational dimension provides us with an important historical corrective, because it shows us how the states' role in managing borders and flows of people has changed over time. But as Nina Glick Schiller notes in her chapter, states had far weaker or less developed systems of border controls a century ago. The paradox is that today's hyper-globalisation is the period in history when states have the most extensive systems of border controls.

Another important aspect of the transnational perspective is the manner in which it allows us to question the deeply embedded notions of how space and location shape the politics and political action that methodological nationalism has instilled in us. Glick Schiller introduces "simultaneity" as a notion whereby "people can live in more than one locality at the same time and be connected to the political processes of more than one state... [What that entails is that] their connections elsewhere may continue to shape their activities, structure their consumption, and organise their activities". This has direct bearings on how we understand immigrant incorporation. The notion of simultaneity "sets aside the argument, which has become common sense in Europe, that differing 'political opportunity structures of particular countries' shape the degree to which migrants become integrated into the political life of the receiving society or maintain transnational connections" (Glick

Schiller, pp. 38–39). This example shows how the taken-for-granted nation-state perspective shapes the manner in which immigrant integration is widely understood and analysed. Further, it suggests that if we take the transnational dimension explicitly into account, then that will have bearings on how we think about immigrant integration, as well as how we should devise immigrant integration policies.

Transnationalism's outlook and centre of gravity resides in migration. That is its natural vantage point and the angle through which states, societies, and communities are analysed. The general literature on transnationalism is mainly concerned with diversity, but, as Riva Kastoryano underlines in her chapter, this need not exclude nationalism. She introduces the notion of transnational nationalism, which refers to the distinctive manners in which nationalism enters into transnational *ways of being*, and especially how it enters into transnational *ways of belonging*. The upshot is a distinctive version of de-territorialised cultural nationalism, a form of nationalism that very often has a significant religious component built into it.

In the transnational circumstance, immigrant populations are able to bypass their national societies, and the transnational political space is a new space of socialisation. Nevertheless, much of the raw material of this socialisation still stems from the immigrants' nation-state-lived experiences, in both the home and the host countries. This is one important reason for why, even when transnational politics and networks "go global", they may retain a nationalist orientation, a kind of underlying transnational nationalism. Another explanation is that both home and host states continue to vie for "their" citizens' allegiance, whether they are located in the territory or not.

Thus, we see how complex the interaction of state and nationalism is in the transnational context. It reminds us that the issue of immigration is bound up with issues of identity and state control and that these issues cannot be confined to the host countries but must include the home countries, as well. The de-territorialised form of nationalism that transnationalism engenders comes with a distinctive constellation of state strategies for retaining control. At the same time, there are grounds for questioning how sustainable the national orientation is within the transnational context. What are the drivers and the factors sustaining the

national orientation? Incongruity between nationalism and territory is a defining trait of the transnational experience, and it is this incongruity that raises questions as to the sustainability over time of the transnational experience as a form of nationalism. We need more research in order to understand what stabilises transnational nationalism as a distinct form of nationalism.

Transnationalism breeds its own distinctive form of nationalism that is highly attentive to diversity. We are reminded of how different this form of immigrant integration is when we contrast transnational integration with multicultural integration. Several of the contributors to this book are concerned with using the transnational perspective to expose the limits in multiculturalism's approach to living with diversity in today's multinational contexts. There is no doubt that the pioneering work of notably Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka effectively addressed the lack of serious engagement with cultural diversity in the prevailing liberal accounts of society. Nevertheless, their perspectives on difference management focused mainly on how the receiving countries responded to increased difference and diversity, and did not pay much attention to the transnational dimension involved, namely, that immigrants do not only settle in the host country but also retain links with their home countries. One consequence of this orientation has been that multiculturalism's approach to diversity management remained steeped in the nation-state framework, and was therefore infused with some of those very same limits to diversity management. The challenge in today's increasingly transnationalised world is different. Ricard Zapata-Barrero puts it succinctly in his chapter when he states: "The question today is no longer how to live *with* diversity, but how to live *in* diversity" (p. 83). Multiculturalism does not escape from the prevailing view embedded in the nation-state master narrative, namely, that "diversity is the others". The implication is that "those who claim to have the monopoly on the definition of diversity never incorporate their own differential features within the semantics of diversity" (Zapata-Barrero, p. 80). The other limit in the multiculturalism perspective is that it focuses overly strongly on rights, to the detriment of duties (Zapata-Barrero, p. 83). Zapata-Barrero presents the interculturalism perspective as a certain corrective to multiculturalism, in the sense that the former—far more than the latter—focuses on what binds diverse

identities and communities together, and explores points of contact and compatibility between interculturalism and transnationalism. Zapata-Barrero's argument is that transnationalism has an intercultural perspective built into it, so to speak.

Transnationalists underline that transnational ways of *being* and *belonging* are not confined to those that travel or traverse boundaries; these forms span far wider in today's societies and encompass a much greater number of people. An important problem, then, is to establish the political salience of this dimension when it can no longer be directly associated with immigration. In asking what the sources of political engagement are, Mette Andersson and Jon Rogstad bring insights from the social movement literature to bear on the transnational situation. They thus provide intellectual tools for addressing the methodological issue that, given that transnational is not simply about networks, but about a type of action frame, and even a frame of mind, it is therefore difficult to establish when an action has transnational sources. When should it be linked to transnationalism, and when should it not? Furthermore, what drives the engagement? It is quite apparent that transnational identity can serve as a driver for political engagement, but so can interest. At the same time, it makes little sense to consider the sources of action as either driven by interests or by identities; the two often interact, making it important to understand the various configurations and combinations through which they occur. The transnational paradigm is useful for detecting changes in patterns of human interaction and political and cultural organising over time and for drawing the necessary distinctions between the various forms of cross-border activity. Riva Kastoryano underlines in her chapter that transnationalism is different from diaspora (in terms of how they understand geography, the state, and nationhood (Kastoryano, p. 62ff., p. 63 ff.)). At the same time, she also notes that we see a certain transnationalisation of the diasporic situation today, as both host and home countries become involved in the immigration experience and as transnational networks engender de-territorialised identities.

Finally, the contributions in the book have shown that the transnational perspective should not be confined to the immigration experience, even in the wide trappings that we see here. There are actually two quite

different manners in which the transnational dimension plays itself out: one is for national communities to extend beyond the bounds of a single state, through the complex negotiations of identity that mark immigrant societies and diasporas across the world but which nevertheless develop their own distinct senses of nationalism, and the other is how the transnational dimension plays itself out through the development of supranational and global institutions, which foster cosmopolitan attitudes and mentalities that at least have the potential to extend beyond state-based forms of nationalism. Both of these manners are visibly present in the European Union. In the context of Canada, we are reminded of the important theoretical distinction between transnationalism and multiculturalism. Transnationalism can be seen as a challenge to multiculturalism, in the sense that multiculturalism is a policy that concerns national societies and the locus of the recognition of diversity in a society, whereas transnationalism focuses on politicised identities that are claimed beyond borders. The challenge to states is to re-nationalise their internal diversity.

Systematic analyses of the multilevel dynamics of transnational politics in the EU in relation to how these dynamics unfold in Canada and the USA, for instance, would be highly instructive and would help to explicate the type of distinctive imprint that the EU has on such relations.

3 The Cosmopolitan Challenge

The transnational paradigm reminds us of the important activities that are taking place between states, which show that the relationship between territory, political order/system, and community is complex and contingent. Methodological nationalism has inundated us with a belief in contiguity; one set of blinders that has resulted has been for analysts to pay insufficient attention to the transnational roots of statehood and nationality. The other set of blinders passed on to us by methodological nationalism is to ignore the important cosmopolitan imprint that marks our societies and political systems. There is a certain parallel here to the transnational story. We find that, since the end of the Cold War, especially, many academic analysts have associated globalisation

with cosmopolitanisation. They have sought to substantiate the claim with reference to developments in international law that have challenged and/or transformed state sovereignty in the post-war period. In the extension of this, they argue that the altered global setting creates more space for the emergence of entities such as the EU (which is composed of member states, has elements of stateness, but falls well short of qualifying as a fully fledged sovereign state), which are particularly conducive to cosmopolitanism. In this body of literature, there is a clear propensity to think that there is an inverse relationship between cosmopolitanism and sovereign statehood. The basic assumption, as spelled out in Fossum's chapter, is that the sovereign state is able to regulate exit and entry which makes it easier to instil and sustain loyalty; hence, it is less inclusive and less susceptible to external correction than a non-state entity such as the EU, which has limited ability to regulate exit and entry and lacks the core means of instilling loyalty, would be. But, as the book has shown, this is only part of the reality: Canada, as a contested state with strong transatlantic historical bonds coupled with large-scale immigration, can generate conditions that are highly conducive to cosmopolitanisation. We have therefore discussed both the EU and Canada as "cosmopolitan vanguards". The methodological problem that we confront in designating these two entities as cosmopolitan vanguards is that neither entity has developed and propagated an explicit cosmopolitan doctrine. In this context, it is worth noting that no political entity has ever functioned along explicit cosmopolitan tenets and that no ready-made template or yardstick therefore exists that we can use to assess these entities. In order to establish how cosmopolitanised they are, we therefore need a different approach, one which tries to discern the cosmopolitan imprint from the principles that they actually espouse, the procedures they follow, the structural arrangements of which they are composed, and the actual behaviour that they exhibit. In his chapter, John Erik Fossum devised a scheme for articulating features that would only become apparent as cosmopolitan through careful scrutiny. Important cosmopolitan criteria included inclusion and reflexivity. Political entities that would be compatible with these tenets required considerably lower barriers in their provisions for regulating entry and exit than would be the case in nation-states. Both the EU and Canada contain important cosmopolitan traits,

related to their historical experiences and developments, as well as to their general orientations to the world at large. In some contrast to what many Europeans assume, Canada's experience shows that we should not discount the state as a possible bearer of cosmopolitan norms. An interesting point with relevance to the many crises currently afflicting the EU is that, since Canada is far less frail than the EU, the state form may serve as a more resilient carrier of cosmopolitan norms than the EU as a transnational association of states.

An important reason for the propensity of analysts to discuss the EU as a cosmopolitan vanguard is because the EU opens up and transforms the member states that compose it. This provides cosmopolitan openings; the problem is that what appears at the outset as an opening may not end up as such. A case in point is EU citizenship. EU citizenship is more inclusive than its national counterpart. At the same time, it is a complex construct and engenders challenges that may subvert its cosmopolitan potentials. The development of EU citizenship entails that there are, legally speaking, at least four main categories of persons in Europe (first country nationals, FCNs; second country nationals, SCNs; third country nationals, TCNs; and non-resident citizens living permanently abroad). This complex constellation serves to fragment national citizenship. It also engenders new relations and new challenges pertaining to how to reconcile equality and diversity in circumstances in which the challenge is not merely "how to live *with* diversity, but how to live *in* diversity" (Zapata-Barrero, p. 83). One such which, on the one hand, can be tailored to reconciling equality and diversity, and which, on the other, is attentive to the fragmentation of rights and contending identities and modes of belonging, is intersectionality. According to Siim and Mokre, this notion provides a methodological means for dealing with class-based, race-based, and gendered diversities and for dealing with the growing incongruence between rights and duties across Europe (non-citizens often lack rights but may still be saddled with duties). The sites wherein these tensions and, at times, conflicting considerations are worked out are typically public spheres. In the European setting, the weakness or underdeveloped nature of the European Public Sphere renders all attempts at working out the various tensions very difficult. An important consideration is to avoid exclusive intersectionality, which refers to tensions between diversity and

equality and sees them as largely irresolvable (Siim and Mokre, p. 171). In contrast, inclusive intersectionality is where equality and diversity are considered as positive values, and hence can provide a way out of the morass. It is also the way in which the forms that make diversity complex can nevertheless become compatible.

Canada's cosmopolitan orientation is not something that has emerged through contemporary globalisation; it is deeply rooted in its distinctive historical background and is, as Patti Tamara Lenard underlines in her chapter, "founded on three principles: a thin nationalism, a commitment to multicultural accommodation, and an immigration regime that selects immigrants for their general capacity to integrate" (p. 194). Canadian nationalism has successfully managed to entrench a commitment to universality with a distinct Canadian approach to propounding these ideals. But, as Lenard also shows, despite this historical tradition, Canada has far from been proven immune from nationalist backlashes, as she documents in a detailed assessment of the changes wrought by the Conservative governments of Stephen Harper (2006–2015). But, in contrast to Europe, where support for immigration has dwindled, support for immigration in Canada remains strong. The election of Justin Trudeau in 2015 signalled a return to the pre-Harper era.

Underlying Canada's historical success in handling diversity is precisely the distinctive manner in which it has dealt with a range of tensions that make up the challenges associated with intersectionality. Historically speaking, Canada has had policies in place that have enabled it to reconcile issues of re-distribution with issues of recognition. Yasmeen Abu-Laban, in her chapter, shows, through a detailed historical account, how claims-making by less powerful groups have pursued a combination of claims for recognition and re-distribution, which has produced a broader, more encompassing notion of solidarity, which is not confined to economic issues but includes cultural ones as well. Another important feature is the Canadian state's responses to claims from social movements, especially the manner in which, from the 1960s, it "paired the Keynesian welfare state with a culturally pluralist ethos of citizenship and national identity" (p. 207). It was precisely this combination, amplified by the multiculturalism programme and other sources of funding that empowered social groups, which rendered the state apparent as an agent of social

justice and as a source of identification even in the context of cultural diversity. The introduction, by successive governments since the 1990s, of neo-liberal policies has weakened this system and transformed the nature of Canadian social citizenship, making it less attuned to, or capable of handling, issues of re-distribution. Nevertheless, Canada's distinct history of blending issues of recognition and re-distribution at both the upstream (social movements) and the downstream (governments) has theoretical implications and is an important reason for its inclusive political culture.

4 The New Nationalist Challenge

The final section of the book contrasts the two previous sections marked by national transformation with significant nationalist opposition or resistance by populists, as well as by extreme right-wing movements and parties, especially against immigration, multiculturalism, and even globalisation more generally. What several of the contributors to the book refer to as “new nationalism” is an ethnic form of nationalism that explicitly avails itself of the “us-them” opposition, but which now draws on lines of opposition that do not necessarily conform with national bounds to exclude those not deemed to belong to the national community as the right-wing populists define it. This “exclusionary” form of nationalism draws on the “us-them” distinction in order to discern clear differences between *them*, the enemies within or the treasonous political class that has abandoned its national allegiance and instead serves the forces of globalisation (be it based domestically, at the EU level, or in international organisations) and *us*, or “we, the authentic people”. The populist forces posit themselves as the authentic expressions or emanations of such a pre-political people.

The strong state-internal aspect of the “us-them” distinction that marks the right-wing populist thrust has bearings on, and is itself shaped by, how the relationship between nationalism and the state figures in the story of right-wing populism. Initially, an anti-system movement that was satisfied with carving out a space for itself as an effective political opposition, in recent years, as several of the contributions in the book

underline, right-wing populists have entered governments or supported governing parties and/or coalitions.

This development has bearings on right-wing populism's centre of gravity, which, historically, was typically in political parties in opposition and in movements organised around charismatic figures. However, the gradual move from opposition to governmental position shows that they have come to recognise the power and potential of the state and that they can use the state apparatus to further their political causes. In addition, they fully recognise the role of the state as a vehicle of socialisation and inculcation, as we see in the insistence on citizenship tests and other ways of instilling allegiance in immigrants. In so far as this trend continues, we will see a further entrenchment of their world-views and a further onslaught on civic nationalism from within, so to speak. Somewhat ironically, this form of onslaught, it may be noted, also emanates from the fact that transnational organisations such as the EU have furnished them with platforms or launching pads for pursuing their political programmes. Thus, we see that institutional developments bent on reducing ethnic tensions and, for instance, Islamophobia, can nevertheless paradoxically aid the forces bent on spreading such fears. There is thus, curiously enough, given their narrow ethnic nationalism, an important transnational dimension to the ethnic nationalist resurgence that we can see across Europe (albeit less so in Canada).

The most pronounced pattern is to be found in Europe, even though Canada's decade-long Harper regime also represented a clear effort at entrenching a more traditional, culturally embedded, uniform nationalism, but one that never confronted immigration in such a manner as we see in Europe. Canadian resilience against this effort manifested itself in the election of Justin Trudeau on a programme of "return to the past", where diversity was explicitly recognised as a distinguishing—and beneficial—feature of Canada.

The complex multilevel dynamics of the new nationalist response are also far more pronounced in Europe than in Canada. The nationalist reactions that we can observe in European countries are clearly about national closure but this does not necessarily confine it to a specific national territory. Even the nationalist reactions have significant transnational aspects built into them. As Bangstad notes, "For, though primarily

nativist and nationalist, the discourse of the populist right-wing political formations is also in a profound sense supra-national, and pan-European in that it often posits ‘Europe’ alongside the various nation-states which constitute their primary frame of reference, as a geo-political entity which is supposedly under existential threat from Muslims in the form of both immigration and terrorism” (see Bangstad’s chapter—and reference to Bangstad and Bunzl 2010) (p. 241).

European societies exhibit, albeit to different degrees and in different ways, contending conceptions of nationalism that the contributions in this book have exhibited. The basic tension is one of openness versus closure. This tension was exhibited in the Norwegian society in the wake of the heinous acts committed by the terrorist and mass-murderer Anders Behring Breivik in 2011. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, in his chapter, looks at the Norwegian societal reactions. One important observation is that, whereas Breivik’s actions were oriented at the European level, as an effort to “salvage” or save Europe, the Norwegian reactions were national, casting it as a national tragedy and not as an intrinsic European phenomenon. The reactions further exhibited deep tensions running through the Norwegian society—tensions that were echoed across Europe—between those that see immigration as hollowing out trust and undercutting social welfare and those that espouse the need for openness and underline that the calls for closure and cultural purity will, unto itself, engender conflict. Further, the Norwegian reactions typically individualised Breivik’s onslaughts and therefore shirked away from looking for the structural causes of these acts and the mind frames and mentalities that spurred them. The absence of an adequate response bodes ill for the society’s further ability to address the underlying issues.

An important aspect that informs and gives impetus to the new nationalism that right-wing populists espouse is the notion of “the politics of fear”, a term which Sindre Bangstad borrows from Ruth Wodak. Bangstad traces its historical development and ideational basis in an analysis of the Norwegian Progress Party’s rhetoric on immigration, Islam and Muslims in Norway. He notes that “(i)n this ‘new nationalism’, Islam and Muslims feature as the main threats to everything and anything including the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state, relative Norwegian gender equality, LGBT rights, liberalism and secularism, and freedom of

expression. This new nationalism is also, but not only, the result of long-term political rhetoric around immigration, Islam and Muslims in Norway, in which the Norwegian far- and populist right has since the 1980s invested a lot of time and energy” (p. 239). An important development is the manner in which these stances have become part of the mainstream, as a result of long-term and systematic efforts at re-framing debates and the conceptions of “us-them”. The important point is to underline that this rhetoric on Islam that the Norwegian Progress Party espouses is far from unique to Norway. Bangstad refers to important points of contact with Denmark and Sweden where the rhetoric is often more extreme than in Norway.

The story of mainstreaming of populist stances and world-views that we see in Scandinavia is readily apparent elsewhere, as Hans-Georg Betz shows in his case study of the French *Front National* (FN). With the telling sub-title “Still a Master Case?”, Betz analyses the party’s comprehensive strategy of *de-diabolisation* (de-demonisation), which is explicitly designed “to convert the FN into a presentable catch-all party of protest. Besides ridding the party of its traditional right-wing extremist tendencies and its most offensive ideological baggage, the new strategy aimed at developing a comprehensive, coherent populist programme without, however, substantially breaking with the spirit informing the FN’s historical discursive legacy ... It relies on the appropriation of major ideological traditions, such as republicanism and socialism, and their integration into a nationalist program of exclusion” (p. 272). In addition to socio-structural factors, pertaining to issues of re-distribution and recognition alike, Betz additionally traces its support to a “crisis of political representation” (p. 285).

The broader story that underpins the development of right-wing populism must therefore be traced to the distinct manner in which these parties and the political entrepreneurs that drive them are able to conjure up a sense of political *malaise* through rhetorically and substantively drawing on combinations of issues of mal-recognition, flaws in society’s structural patterns of distribution and re-distribution, and misrepresentation. These combinations that vary across societies but nevertheless all contain mixes of the three are very hard to withstand for the mainstream parties. As several of the contributions in the book show,

future research needs to study how the mainstream parties and the political system in general respond to the new nationalism.

One result is a degree of political convergence for restricting access to the benefits of the welfare state, coupled with, as Martin Bak Jørgensen and Trine Lund Thomsen note in their chapter, “an increasing trend towards legitimising restrictive measures through cultural criteria among the right-wing parties” (p. 295). These efforts that we see in Denmark to undercut the universalist nature of the welfare state by excluding groups based upon cultural criteria represent effective means of building internal distinctions between deserving and non-deserving persons and other forms of binary constructions based upon inclusion and exclusion. The efforts are part of the broader political efforts that the so-called new nationalism undertakes to distinguish between “us-them” by drawing distinctions that do not follow citizenship but more narrow ethnic lines.

An important question in view of these forms of exclusionary nationalism is how the traditionally participation-encouraging elements of Nordic societies are handling increased ethnic diversity. In her chapter, Marianne Takle looks at how governments bent on integrating immigrants seek to reconcile the traditional *omus* on civil society organisations as schools in democracy, on the one hand, and as vehicles for ensuring recognition of cultural diversity, on the other. This is an important issue that warrants more systematic theoretical and empirical attention. Theoretically, it may be an important difference-sensitive means of political empowerment, which can reconcile issues of recognition, re-distribution, and representation. Empirically, it is important to understand how extensive such arrangements are and how they work in practice.

* * *

This book has examined contestations on nationalism in two complex and contested political entities, the European Union and Canada. It has shown that both are marked by complex and composite notions of diversity, whose various dimensions do not sum up to a distinct constellation of “complex diversity” as the term was presented in the introductory chapter. What we find instead is that the various notions of difference and diversity have spurred a broad tapestry of reactions and debates that

“pull” nationalism in different directions simultaneously—towards greater inclusion and towards greater exclusion—coupled with the fact that the political systems are becoming increasingly transnationalised. One of the merits of the RECODE project from which this volume emanated was the *onus* on comparing the EU and Canada. We believe that this is a very rewarding comparison, whose overall merits will become more apparent the more it is conducted.

References

- Bangstad, S., & Bunzl, M. (2010). Anthropologists Are Talking About Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism in the New Europe. *Ethnos*, 75(2), 213–228.
- Wimmer, A., & Schiller, N. G. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences. *Global Networks*, 2(4), 301–334.

Index¹

A

- Aboriginal people, 246, 251
Absorption capacity, 163
Access
 contestation over access, 338, 343, 345–347
 inclusion in decision-making, 167, 170
 inclusion to the polity, 166, 167
 to welfare, 343, 345, 348, 351
Accommodation, 1, 6, 152, 174, 176, 199, 211–214, 219–224, 229, 371, 372, 374, 405
Acquis communautaire, 166
Admission procedures, 152, 212
AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* - The Justice and Development Party) (TR), *see* Turkey
Ali, Tariq, 339, 358
Allport, Gordon W., 106
Al-Qaeda, 83, 270
Amundsen, Per-Willy, 273, 299–301
Andersen, Kent, 299–301
Anderson, Benedict, 4, 52, 66, 71, 85n8, 85n9, 287, 350, 365, 368
Anderson, Bridget, 219, 359, 360
Anti-élitism, 290
Anti-immigration forces/parties, 277
Anti-jihadism, 274, 277
Anti-Muslim rhetoric, 291, 295–297, 305n2
Anti-Muslim sentiment, 19, 265
Anti-racism, 189, 200, 202, 241, 245, 251
Anti-racist feminism, 249

¹Note: Page number followed by “n” refer to notes

- Anti-Semitism, 189, 288, 325, 327, 330
- Armstrong, J.A., 79
- Articulation, 43, 131, 136, 188, 193, 196, 201–203
- Assimilation, 39–41, 56n5, 56n6, 84n4, 90, 100, 102, 103, 176, 346
 assimilation, return of, 39–41
- Asylum, 228, 232n25, 265, 281, 296, 344, 345
 Immigration and asylum policy, 15
- Asylum-seekers, 2, 167, 173, 281, 293, 303, 339, 341, 346, 354, 357
- Austerity, 153, 203, 237–240, 251, 252, 254, 256
- Authoritarian/totalitarian states, 159, 190, 313
- Authorities, 27, 73, 74, 85n6, 141, 292, 302, 376, 377, 381, 382, 384, 385, 388, 390
 local authorities, 76, 79, 359, 366, 381
- B**
- Bail, Christopher A., 286, 287, 303
- Balibar, Étienne, 192, 194
- Banting, Keith, 96, 182n12, 238, 255
- Barrès, Maurice, 329, 330
- Bauböck, Rainer, 114n4, 168, 191, 192, 194
- Beck, Ulrich, 9–11, 20n6, 127, 181n1
- Belonging, 1, 13, 15, 20n3, 29, 49–53, 66, 68, 70, 73, 75, 80, 82, 83, 89, 100, 102, 107, 123, 127, 128, 135–137, 141, 143, 157, 158, 174, 180, 197, 281, 286, 291, 324, 368, 371, 378, 379, 404
- Benedetti, Yvan, 314
- Benefits/burdens, 176, 225, 323, 339, 340, 342, 343, 345–348, 350, 353–355, 357–360, 410
- Black European Women's Council, 202
- Black labour/work, 357
- Black Panthers, 129
- Black Power, 129–130
- Boulangier affair*, 329
- Bourdieu, Pierre, 126
- Bourne, Randolph, 34
- Brasillach, Robert, 327
- Breivik, Anders Behring, 266, 270–278, 281, 282, 294, 298–300, 408
 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, 266, 271, 298
- Brettschneider, Corey, 304
- Brexit, 1, 91, 166, 170, 177
- British colonialism, 219
- British Empire, the, 170, 174
- British monarchy, 217–219
- Brodie, Janine, 248, 249, 255
- Brown, Wendy, 289
- Brubaker, Roger, 56n6, 81, 108, 216, 372
- Bush, George W., 270
- C**
- Calhoun, Craig, 125, 130, 133, 135, 196
- Cameron, David, 97, 98, 221, 238, 359

- Canada
- Canada day, 217, 230n4
 - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms/*La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* (1982), 176, 212, 214, 245
 - Canadian identity, 212, 216, 218, 219, 229
 - Canadian immigration policy, 153, 213, 224–229
 - Canadian military achievements, 216
 - Canadian Multicultural Act (1971), 211
 - Canadian nationalism, 152, 153, 175, 211–230, 263, 405
 - Canadian public sphere, 213
 - Clarity Act, 178
 - collective agreements, 357
 - Community Historical Recognition Programme, 251
 - Fédération des femmes du Québec, 241
 - Harper government/ regime, 18, 173, 177, 251, 407
 - Liberal Party, 213, 230n2
 - military achievements, 216, 217, 219
 - multiculturalism Act (1988), 182n11, 211, 214
 - National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 241
 - national identity, 152, 212, 215–217, 219, 230n2
 - Preventing Human Smugglers from Abusing Canada's Immigration System Act, 228
 - Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act, 228, 232n26
 - Provincial/Territorial Nominee Program, 226
 - Seasonal Agricultural Worker's Program, 226
 - Trudeau government, 177
 - War of 1812, 217, 218, 250
 - Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act (2015), 223
- Capital accumulation, 42, 55
- flexible accumulation, 42
- Capitalism, 33–35, 39, 41, 42, 55, 71, 129, 139, 189, 255, 318, 356
- Caribbean
- Caribbean culture, 35
 - Caribbean ethnographies, 35
 - Caribbean identity, 52, 53
 - Caribbean life, 35
 - Caribbean scholarship, 32, 35, 44, 56n8
- Cartier, George-Étienne, 175
- Castells, Manuel, 134
- Castle, Stephen, 89, 96, 103, 225
- Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, *see* European Union
- Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CA), *see* Canada
- Chevènement, Jean-Pierre, 316, 317
- Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 56n3
- Citizen incorporation, 168
- Citizen participation, 366
- Citizenship
- citizenship acquisition, 168, 174, 192

- Citizenship (*cont.*)
 citizenship, concepts of, 49, 203
 citizenship oaths, 160, 215, 223
 citizenship regime, 167
 citizenship tests, 98, 99, 217, 219,
 220, 407
 dual citizenship, 64, 73, 76, 238
 patriotic citizenship, 250, 252,
 255, 256
 social citizenship, 191, 246, 248,
 249, 251, 252, 254, 290, 406
 thick/thin notions of citizenship,
 286
- Civic engagement, 368
- Civic nationalism, 11, 216, 397, 407
- Civil Rights movement, 129, 189
- Civil society, 19, 25, 161, 176, 190,
 197, 198, 200, 202, 203,
 204n1, 205n5, 292, 303, 340,
 373, 374, 377, 383, 386, 389,
 410
 civil society organisations, 19,
 190, 198, 200–202, 205n5,
 410
- Clarity Act (CA), *see* Canada
- Class, 13, 55, 71, 76, 124, 129, 134,
 139, 188–190, 192, 193, 221,
 222, 240–242, 247, 251, 265,
 290, 292, 318–320, 330, 406
- Coercion, 159
- Cold War, 2, 8, 37, 402
- Collective action, 125, 131–133,
 135
- Collective identity, *see* Identity
- Collective mobilisation, 131
- Collectivity, 135, 239, 246, 247, 253
- Colonialism
 colonialism and capitalism, 34
 de-colonisation, 243, 244
- Communism, 299, 328
- Community
 cultural and political community,
 3, 6, 28, 64, 70, 80–82, 84n4,
 175, 191, 215, 216, 287, 368
 national community, 5, 6, 101,
 110, 158, 159, 181, 324, 330,
 373, 379, 406
- Compartmentalisation, 9
- Complex diversity, 12, 13, 90–92,
 94, 95, 97, 103–106, 149,
 150, 201, 204, 239, 255, 339,
 360, 369, 372, 388, 390, 410
- Consciousness, 5, 48, 50, 71, 128,
 131, 174
- Constitutional democracy, 162
- Constitutional patriotism, 162
- Contestation, 12, 14, 16–20, 150,
 151, 176, 179, 188, 189, 194,
 196, 197, 255, 263–268,
 395–411
 contestations of entitlement,
 337–361
- Controlled immigration, 152, 212
- Coolie, Charles H., 54
- Cosmopolitanism
 process of cosmopolitanisation,
 156, 157, 163
 rooted cosmopolitanism, 10, 157,
 212, 230n1
- Coulthard, Glen, 244, 245
- Counter-jihadism, 298
- Crenshaw, Kimberley, 189, 204n3
- Culturalisation, 289, 361
- Culture
 concepts of culture and society,
 32–37
 cultural and ethnic persistence,
 41

- cultural criteria, 339, 340, 348, 410
- cultural difference/diversity, 1, 11, 14, 19, 27, 41, 134, 163, 204n1, 211, 212, 268, 365, 367, 370, 374, 378, 379, 388, 389, 400, 406, 410
- cultural/culture flows, 32, 34, 35, 42, 46–48, 56
- cultural homogeneity, 161, 367, 368, 379, 387
- cultural insecurity, 323, 329
- cultural pluralist theory, 41
- cultural recognition, 19, 268, 365–390
- cultural representation, 50, 51
- cultural resources, 127
- cultural transformations, 42
- culture of diversity, 104, 107, 113
- democratic and administrative culture, 390
- global culture, 10
- homogenous cultures, 45
- inclusive culture, 163
- mainstream culture, 39
- political culture, 6, 11, 163, 368, 372, 406
- preservation of, 15
- D**
- De-colonisation, *see* Colonialism
- De-constitutionalisation, 169, 170
- De-democratisation, 170
- De-demonisation/*dediabolisation*, 314, 409
- de la Rochère, Bertrand Dutheil, 316
- Democracy
- democratic deficit, 166, 169, 196
- democratic participation, 165, 168, 267, 365–390
- democratic values, 99, 105, 215, 222, 223, 374, 379, 387
- Demographic developments, 338
- Denmark
- Act of Integration (1998), 346
- Act on Active Employment Efforts, 350
- Danish economy, 343
- Danish Green Card Agreement, 352
- Danish immigration and integration policy, 343–345
- Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*), 265, 267, 338, 339, 344, 348, 349, 351, 353, 354, 358–360
- Danish welfare state model, 356
- Foreigners Law (1983), 344
- Immigration Stop/Ban (1975), 292
- introduction programme, 350
- introductory benefit system, 347
- poverty benefits, 346, 347
- recognition of other educational standards, 251
- repatriation programme, 359
- Socialistic People's Party, 354
- Start-Help, 347
- Deserving/undeserving, 337–361, 410
- Desi, 126, 128
- De-territorialisation, 64, 109
- Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, 76
- Diani, Mario, 131, 132

Diaspora

- Armenian diaspora, 79
- black diaspora identities, 43
- diaspora politics, 64, 72, 78, 79, 83
- imagined global diaspora, 63–84
- Turkish diaspora, 192

- Difference, 2, 6, 11–13, 15, 19, 27, 39, 41, 46–48, 55, 64, 67, 68, 74, 81, 90, 96, 102, 111, 127, 133–135, 137, 140, 149–151, 156, 160, 161, 166, 173, 174, 176, 180, 181, 187, 188, 190, 192, 198–200, 202, 211, 212, 241, 263, 275, 278, 320, 348, 350, 365, 370, 372, 374, 378, 380, 388, 389, 396, 397, 400, 406, 410
- racially and culturally different, 39

Diffusionists, 34

Dirigisme, 319

Disenfranchisement, 272

Diversity

- complex diversity, 12, 13, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, 103, 104, 106, 149, 201, 204, 239, 255, 339, 348, 369, 372, 388, 390, 410
- diversity, concept of, 11, 90
- diversity management, 90, 91, 94, 95, 102, 400
- diversity politics, 255
- ethnic and national, 367

“Diversity and Contact” Project, 112

Dominican Republic, 52

Dual citizenship, 64, 76, 238

Durkheim, Émile, 54

E

Economic liberalism, 317

Élitism, 15, 21n13, 97, 155, 198, 200, 204n2, 265, 276, 278, 281, 286, 290, 301, 328, 329

Entitlement, 64, 161, 337–361

- contestations of entitlement, 337–361

Entry, 33, 63, 158–170, 172–177, 180, 181n5, 226, 249, 403

- conditions for entry, 158, 159, 163

Equality, 81, 82, 92, 93, 95, 96, 111, 152, 187–204, 223, 248, 249, 267, 285, 290, 316, 319, 320, 372, 404, 405, 408

Equity, 245, 249, 251

Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, *see* Turkey

Étatisme, 319

Ethnic identity, 53, 71, 139

Ethnicity, 4, 11, 13, 15, 32, 39, 50, 51, 67, 68, 71, 82, 99, 112, 133, 137, 166, 189, 190, 193, 196, 198, 205n5, 238, 240–242, 257n4, 271, 370

Ethnic minorities, 17, 29, 95, 112, 124–126, 128–130, 134, 135, 138, 139, 142, 143, 176, 200, 202, 245, 246, 248, 375

Ethnic nationalism, 1, 277, 281, 407

Ethnic pluralism, 27, 67, 288

Ethno-nationalism, 215, 282

EU citizens, 168, 170, 341, 350, 357

Eurabia, 273, 277, 289, 298–300, 303

European Union

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 169

- European civil society, 25, 197, 203
- European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), 91
- European Network against Racism (ENAR), 25, 199, 200, 205n4
- European Network on Migrant Women (ENoMW), 25
- European Parliament (EP), 16, 84n6, 168, 169, 198, 205n4
- European Public Sphere (EPS), 188–190, 195–200, 203, 204, 404
- European Women's Lobby (EWL), 25, 199, 200, 202, 205n4
- EU-Turkey Agreement, 168
- free movement of persons, 172
- Network of Migrant Women in Europe, 202
- Treaty of Lisbon, 199
- Treaty of Maastricht, 187
- Europeanisation, 6, 195, 196, 265
- Euro-scepticism, 204
- Eurosphere Project, the, 196, 197, 203, 204n2
- Eurozone, 169, 172, 237, 319
- Eurozone crisis, 169, 172
- Exclusion, 26, 56n3, 75, 76, 84, 84n6, 104, 124, 128, 129, 133, 136, 142, 158, 159, 191–194, 197, 212, 267, 279, 285, 287, 290, 304, 315, 339, 345, 409–411
- Exit, 158–162, 164, 165, 170–172, 177, 180, 181n5, 403
- territorial exit, 158, 160, 164, 170, 177–179
- Exit and entry barriers, 33, 159–163, 165, 172, 177, 180, 403
- Exit, entry, voice and loyalty, 159, 165, 180
- Expressionism, 15
- F
- Face covering (Muslim), 69, 99, 222, 223, 230, 231n16, 294, 297, 322
- Faist, Thomas, 47, 54, 56n6, 57n9, 102, 107, 113n1
- Family re-unification, 292, 375
- Farage, Nigel, 264
- Farah, Ali, 138, 140
- Federalism, 150, 175
- Fernández, Leonel, 52
- Ferree, Myra Marx, 189, 190, 197
- Financial crisis (2007/8), 255
- Finkelkraut, Alain, 329
- Fiscal union, 170
- Fitzpatrick, Father Joseph, 35
- France
- French Council of the Muslim Faith, 76
- Front National*, 264, 265, 267, 299, 313–330, 409
- National Front (*see Front National* (FN))
- sans papiers*, 191, 194
- secularism in France, 75, 265, 267, 285, 409
- Fraser, Nancy, 5, 7, 14, 195, 203, 204n1, 244
- Fraternity, 175

- Free movement of persons (EU), *see*
European Union
- Freedom of movement, 168
- French Council of the Muslim Faith,
see France
- Freysinger, Oskar, 314
- Front National* (FN), 264, 265, 267,
299, 313–330, 409
- G**
- Gaza, 140, 141, 143
- Geertz, Clifford, 34
- Gellner, Ernest, 71, 79
- Gender, 4, 11, 13, 133, 137, 152, 166,
187–190, 193, 196–202, 204,
204n3, 205n4, 205n5, 223,
240, 247, 249, 251, 257n3,
267, 285, 297, 325, 372, 408
- Gender equality, 152, 187, 189, 190,
197–201, 204, 205n4, 223,
249, 267, 285, 408
- German Green Party, 202
- Gibbon, John Murray, 241, 242,
245, 251
- Gjørsv, Alexandra Bech, 276
- Glazer, Nathan, 40
- Glick Schiller, Nina, 8, 9, 17, 27,
57n9, 64, 71, 113, 124, 126,
127, 398
- Global culture, 10
global cultural processes, 39
- Globalisation
globalisation studies, 32, 42, 100
process of globalisation, 64, 66,
72, 77
- Gluckman, Max, 36
- GNP, 343
- Goldberg, David Theo, 134, 287
- Gollnisch, Bruno, 314, 320
- Goodhart, David, 98
- Granatstein, Jack, 250
- Gullestad, Marianne, 288
- Gusfield, Joseph R., 132, 135
- H**
- Habermas, Jürgen, 2, 4, 7, 20n1, 25,
150, 157, 204n1, 368
- Hagen, Carl I., 295–297, 300,
306n6
- Halimi, Serge, 318
- Handlin, Oscar, 40
- Hannerz, Ulf, 7
- Harper regime/government, *see*
Canada
- Harper, Stephen, 18, 155, 177, 181,
181n4, 216–219, 228, 230n4,
230n7, 237, 240, 249–253,
255, 256n3, 405
- Harvey, David, 42
- Headscarves, hijabs, niqabs, burkas,
see Face covering
- Hedegaard, Lars, 300
- Heritage redress, 251
- Hip-hop, 136, 141
- Hollande, François, 325
- Holocaust, 314
holocaust denial, 314
- Home states, 64, 74, 78, 79
- Homo Islamicus*, 295
- Host states, 76, 399
- Human rights, 68, 82, 90, 95–98,
133, 139, 166, 191, 215, 243,
265, 266, 270, 278, 281, 302,
303, 320

Human Rights Service (NGO), *see*
Norway

Hybridity, 9, 35, 45, 136

I

Identification, 4, 12, 17, 26, 27, 43,
51, 52, 64, 65, 69–72, 74, 75,
77, 78, 80–83, 85n7, 123,
124, 129, 133, 180, 196, 372,
406

religious identification, 65, 75

Identitarian constellation, 13

Identity

Caribbean identity, 52, 53

collective identity, 29, 81, 124,

125, 128, 131, 141, 143

diasporic identity, 43, 44, 50, 80,
81

globalised identity, 28, 65

home identity, 109

identity categories, 124, 129, 132,
133

identity politics, 13, 27, 43, 50,
67, 75, 131–135, 272, 277,
293, 389

identity processes, 45

national identity, 3–5, 27, 45, 68,
73, 74, 82, 89, 90, 92–94, 98,
101–103, 105, 107–109, 212,
215–217, 219, 230n2, 239,
242, 247, 264, 271, 330, 337,
369, 389, 390, 405

of national and ethnic groups,
378, 388

religious identity, 72, 111, 128,
143, 375

shared collective identity, 128,
131

unity and identity, 39

Imagined geography, 28, 70, 78, 80,
81, 83

Imagined global community, 68, 69

Immigrant organisations, 19, 135,
144n1, 201, 268, 365–390

Immigration

immigrant integration, 90,
367–370, 372, 384, 385, 389,
399, 400

immigrant reception and
incorporation, 174

immigration admission system,
227

immigration and asylum policy,
15

Immigration Stop/Ban (1975) (DK),
see Denmark

Imperialism, 32, 38, 56

Inclusion, 19, 84, 90, 93, 96, 104,
133, 134, 151, 156, 158,
166–168, 173, 176, 192, 194,
197, 279, 285, 287, 358, 359,
377, 382, 403, 410, 411

Inclusiveness, 152, 159, 164, 173,
176, 203, 345, 396

Incorporation, 18, 45, 55, 64, 65,
163, 166, 168, 169, 173, 174,
176, 268, 359, 389, 398

Indigenous people, 174, 239,
242–245, 252

Inequalities, 13, 31, 95, 124, 129, 131,
187, 188, 190, 191, 196, 199,
200, 240, 246, 247, 249, 252,
255, 290, 319, 328, 339, 372

- Influences, 11, 19, 34, 44, 48, 53, 64, 66, 72, 74–78, 80, 110, 127, 166, 264, 267, 290, 298, 341, 357, 373, 377, 378, 387, 388
 traditional influences, 74
- Injustice, 14, 230n5, 272
- Institutions
 international institutions, 67
 supranational institutions, 68, 72, 81, 169
- Integralism, 15, 21n12
- Integration
 civic integration, 344, 369
 economic and cultural integration, 42
 EU integration, 169, 198
 integration of states, 64
 national integration, 98, 268, 350, 367, 389
- Intercultural interaction, 9
- Intercultural policies, 17, 28, 90, 93, 95, 106, 108
- Interculturalism, 27, 28, 109, 114n3, 400, 401
- Interest, 3, 8, 13, 16, 19, 25–27, 29, 37, 39, 40, 42, 52, 53, 63, 66, 68, 74, 76, 79, 92, 94, 101, 106, 108, 110–112, 123–144, 158, 164, 170, 178, 194, 202, 223, 238, 249, 265–267, 273, 274, 297, 300, 301, 318, 341, 342, 355, 360, 369, 373–375, 378, 382, 387, 401, 404
 common interests, 29, 66, 111, 124, 125, 129, 137–140
- Internal market access, 171
- Intersectionality
 exclusionary intersectionality, 198, 201, 205n5
 inclusionary intersectionality, 198, 199, 205n5
- Iraq war (2003), 69, 294
- Isaksen, Torbjørn Røe, 281
- Ishaq, Zunera, 224
- Isin, Engin, 192–194
- Islam
 anti-Islamification narratives, 97
 globalised/global Islam, 65, 72–74, 76, 77, 293
 global Islamic resurgence, 293
 Islamic Council of Norway, 297
 Islamisation by stealth, 297–298
 national Islam, 73, 74
 Turkish Islam, 75, 76
- Islamic State (IS)(ISIS), 83, 294, 302
- Islamic terrorism, 270, 274
- Islamophobia, 16, 19, 75, 76, 91, 271–273, 276, 281, 288, 293, 295, 303, 305n1
- Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 69, 85n7
- J**
- James, Matt, 246, 251
- Jensen, Peder Are “Fjordman”
 Nøstvold, 271, 273, 298
- Jensen, Siv, 270, 297, 298, 301
- Jews, 78, 79, 287
- Johansen, Raymond, 276
- Johnson, Victoria, 133, 134
- Joly, Mélanie, 252
- K**
- Karakasidou, Anastasia, 38
- Kastoryano, Riva, 1–20, 27, 63–84, 92, 94, 107, 114n6, 397, 399, 401

- Kenney, Jason, 220, 222, 223, 226, 228, 231n15, 231n17, 232n26, 232n27, 250
- Keynesian welfare state, *see* Welfare state
- King, Desmond, 99
- Kymlicka, Will, 11, 21n9, 96, 97, 101, 157, 174, 181n1, 182n11, 220, 230n1, 238, 255, 323, 367, 370, 371, 378, 400
- L**
- Labour
- labour market access, 228, 339, 361n2
 - labour market integration, 227
 - labour migrants, 33, 36, 153, 214, 225, 226, 228, 292, 344–346, 348, 349, 355, 357
 - Labour migration programmes, 225, 227
 - labour movements, 124, 125, 129, 130, 241
 - labour shortages, 33, 225, 226
- Laegaard, Sune, 288
- Laïcité*, *see* Secularism
- LaSelva, Samuel, 175
- Legitimacy, 7, 67–69, 75, 79, 81, 83, 94, 136, 150, 172, 178, 179, 195–197, 203, 373, 374
- Leiken, Robert, 72
- Leirstein, Ulf, 302
- Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 313–315, 322, 325, 327, 328, 330
- Le Pen, Marine, 265, 267, 299, 314–330, 331n5, 331n10, 331n11, 331n12
- Lesage, Jean, 243
- Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender (LGBT), 21n11, 267, 285, 289, 408
- Levitt, Peggy, 48, 54, 86n15, 90, 101, 102, 107, 126, 127
- Liberal democracy, 365
- Liberalism, 27, 67, 175, 267, 285, 289, 317, 344, 369, 408
- economic liberalism, 317
- Liebert, Ulrike, 196
- Linares, Guillermo, 52
- Listhaug, Sylvi, 281, 291, 303
- Loyalty, 64, 65, 69, 72, 73, 78, 81, 82, 98, 102, 103, 158–165, 171, 172, 176–180, 215, 281, 296, 369, 403
- loyalty oaths (*see* Citizenship)
- M**
- Maclure, Jocelyn, 254
- Mainstream culture, *see* Culture
- Managed migration, 345, 347, 349–351
- Marechal-Le Pen, Marion, 326
- Marginalisation, 143, 225
- Marois, Pauline, 256n1
- Marshall, T.H., 191, 254, 257n5
- Massad, Joseph, 289
- McGinty, Dalton, 222
- Media forms, 131
- Melting Pot *versus* the Mosaic, *see* Mosaic, the
- Merkel, Angela, 221
- Methodological nationalism, 8–14, 32, 37–41, 47, 54, 64, 124, 126, 150, 202, 398, 402
- Michéa, Jean-Claude, 318

- Migration
 labour migration, 33, 225, 227, 341, 349, 356
 migration dynamics/patterns, 89
 migration policy, 228, 232n22, 340
 migration studies, 17, 29, 31, 32, 39–41, 44, 46, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 100, 102, 105, 107, 109, 124, 126, 127, 398
 return migration, 35, 40
- Minority groups/collectivities, 135, 152, 199, 220, 221, 239, 249, 253
- Minority rights, 175, 265, 266, 270, 367, 371, 378, 381
- Mobilisation, 29, 63, 64, 66, 69, 75, 77–82, 124, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133–143, 153, 239, 245, 266, 289, 319–325, 371, 373
 political mobilisation, 66, 126, 130, 131, 133, 371
- Mobility, 4, 26, 66, 71, 79, 84, 89, 105, 109, 127, 192
- Monetary union, 169
- Moore, James, 217
- Moral universality, 155, 157, 158
- Morawska, Eva, 41, 54, 102
- Morocco, 72–74, 140, 292
- Mosaic, the, 241
 the Mosaic *versus* the Melting Pot, 242
- Mudde, Cas, 15, 287
- Mulroney, Brian, 214
- Multiculturalism
 multicultural accommodation, 1, 152, 212–214, 219–224, 229, 371, 372, 405
 multicultural paradigms, 32, 95–98
 multicultural policy, 90, 93, 102, 212, 213, 268, 367, 378, 382, 383
 multicultural theory, 41, 102
 multiculturalist turn, 41
- Multilingualism, 173
- Muslims
 integration of Muslims, 65
 Muslim identity politics, 293
 Muslims in Palestine, 140
 Worldwide Muslim community, 70
- Mustafa, Muhammad, 295, 296
- N**
- Nation
Front National (F) (*see* France)
 national belonging, 158, 174
 national borders, 8, 27, 29, 37, 47, 51, 63, 67, 70, 71, 192
 national community, 6, 101, 110, 324, 330, 373, 379, 406
 national culture, 35, 38, 39, 92, 103
 national identity, 3–5, 27, 45, 73, 74, 82, 93, 94, 98, 102, 105, 107–110, 158, 160, 182n6, 239, 242, 247, 271, 330, 337, 369, 389, 390, 405
 national sovereignty, 317, 318
 national traditions, 32, 369, 390
 nation-building, 2, 4–6, 9, 149
 nation, concept of, 9
 nation-state building, 8, 37–39, 41, 398

- nation states, 3–5, 26, 27, 34–38, 41, 49, 54, 64, 71, 77, 151, 157, 159, 160, 164, 165, 189, 191, 288, 337, 368, 369, 398, 403, 408
- post-national-state era, 89
- National identity, 3–5, 27, 68, 73, 74, 77, 82, 89, 90, 92–94, 98, 101–103, 105, 107–110, 158, 160, 182n6, 239, 242, 247, 264, 271, 330, 337, 369, 389, 390, 405
- Nationalism
- Canadian nationalism (*see* Canada)
 - civic nationalism, 11, 216, 397, 407
 - historical, 28, 70–72, 79, 99, 289, 365, 369
 - Home-country nationalism, 40
 - inclusive nationalism, 12, 16, 151, 152, 173, 212, 397
 - integral nationalism, 315
 - long-distance nationalism, 52, 71, 79, 80
 - methodological nationalism, 8–14, 32, 37–41, 47, 54, 64, 124, 126, 150, 202, 398, 402
 - nationalism without territory, 28, 70, 72, 114n6
 - non-territorial nationalism, 28, 70, 71
 - thin nationalism, 215–219, 229, 405
 - transnational nationalism, 2, 3, 16, 17, 28, 70–72, 78, 85n7, 109, 114n6, 397, 399, 400
 - Turkish nationalism (*see* Turkey)
 - Welfare state nationalism, 290, 291
- Nationality, 67, 102, 108, 109, 133, 166, 173, 188, 192, 196, 402
- Naturalisation, 192, 193, 324, 345, 346
- Nazism, 299
- Neo-liberalism, 239, 248–250, 252, 256, 313
- Neo-nationalism, 19
- Neo-populism, 329
- Network of Migrant Women in Europe, *see* European Union
- Niqab, *see* Face covering
- Non-citizens, 191, 193, 194, 249, 256, 345, 359, 404
- Norway
- 22 July Commission, 276
 - Conservative Party (*Høyre*), 291, 301
 - EMI, Unit for Diversity and Integration, 376, 380
 - Human Rights Service* (HRS), 296, 303
 - identity, 123–144
 - Islamic Council of Norway, 297
 - Islamophobia in Norway, 295
 - municipal integration support scheme, 384, 386
 - Norwegian civil society, 374, 386
 - Norwegian culture, 269, 278, 281, 294, 299
 - Norwegian identity, 281
 - Norwegian Labour Youth (*Arbeidernes ungdomsfylking*), 269, 270
 - Norwegian nationalism, 266, 282, 291

- Norway (*cont.*)
 Norwegian values, 281
 Organisation against Public Discrimination, 135
 Progress Party
 (Fremskrittspartiet), 265, 267, 270, 273, 277, 278, 281, 286, 290, 291, 293, 295–297, 299–301, 409
 Stop the Islamisation of Norway, 299
 Terror attacks 22 July 2011 (NO), 19
- O
- Obiora, Eugene Ejike, 138, 140, 142
 Occupy Wall Street movement, 255
 Onfray, Michel, 329
 Openness, 151, 156, 158, 162, 164, 166, 179, 198, 223, 257n3, 272, 277–280, 282, 340, 349, 408
 Organisation against Public Discrimination (NO), *see* Norway
 “Other”, the, 256n3, 266
- P
- Pan-ethnicity, 68
 Parsons, Talcott, 54
Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party) (NL), 299, 315
 Paternalism, 13
 Patrimonial populism, 328
 Patriotic citizenship, 250, 252, 255, 256
 Peltka, Anton, 288, 290
 Pétain, Marshal, 314, 327
 Philippot, Florian, 317, 327
 Pluralism, 11, 15, 18, 27, 67, 76, 153, 239, 250, 288
 Political engagement, 29, 40, 123–144, 379, 401
 Political incorporation, 18, 176
 Political mobilisation, 66, 126, 130, 131, 133, 371
 Political participation, 19, 25, 26, 64, 66, 167, 268, 368, 377, 379
 Politics of fear, 229, 285, 290, 408
 Populism
 European populism, 16
 right-wing populism, 14, 16, 21n11, 21n13, 265, 266, 395–397, 406, 407, 409
 Populist parties, 1, 21n11, 205n4, 264, 267, 287, 323, 339, 340, 365
 Porter, John, 242, 243
 Portes, Alejandro, 36, 100, 113n1, 127
 Postmodernism, 42
 Post-national constellation, 2, 7, 195
 Post-national-state era, *see* Nation
 Precarity, 240, 249
 Principles of justice, 5
 Protectionism, 75, 76, 91, 94, 96, 176, 180, 303, 318, 319, 324, 330, 344, 345, 397
 Public sphere (PS), 6, 11, 189, 194–198, 202–204, 204n1, 211, 213, 220, 221, 276, 316, 404
 Canadian public sphere (*see* Canada)

- Q**
 Quebec, 174, 177–179, 221, 222,
 241, 243, 245–247, 252, 255,
 256n1
- R**
 Race, 13, 15, 68, 84n4, 99, 108, 112,
 133, 166, 188–190, 204n3,
 238, 240–242, 251, 370
 Racialisation, 249, 361
 Racism, 15, 26, 55, 68, 84n6, 107,
 112, 135, 138, 139, 141–143,
 189, 200, 204n3, 251, 276,
 277, 303, 304, 327, 369
 structural racism, 138
 Radicalisation, 68, 74, 82, 291, 294
 Radicalism, 82, 97
 Ramarajan, Lakshmi, 110
 Rap music - rapping, 126
 Rasmussen, Lars Løkke, 353, 356
 Recognition, 5, 12–14, 19, 63, 67,
 79, 81, 95, 96, 98, 99, 134,
 135, 141, 150–153, 179, 211,
 213, 214, 219, 237–256, 263,
 267, 268, 281, 321, 339, 352,
 353, 365–390, 402, 405, 406,
 409, 410
 recognition of other educational
 standards (DK) (*see* Denmark)
 Re-distribution, 5, 14, 133,
 151–153, 171, 176, 237–256,
 263, 267, 319, 339, 343, 351,
 352, 359, 405, 406, 409, 410
 Reflexivity, 158–164, 170, 174–176,
 179, 403
 Refugee crisis, 168, 188, 189, 203,
 303
 Refugees, 73, 167, 168, 188, 189,
 201, 203, 204n3, 228, 229,
 249, 281, 292, 303, 304, 341,
 344, 350, 351, 357, 359, 360,
 375
 Reid, Bill, 218, 253, 254
 Religion
 religious dogmatism, 13
 religious engagement, 126
 religious groups, 193, 371, 386
 religious networks, 141, 143
 Re-nationalisation, 103, 113
 Repatriation programmes, 359
 Representation, 5, 14, 50, 51, 63,
 75, 76, 82, 83, 111, 128, 152,
 192, 287–289, 291, 304, 342,
 383, 410
 Republicanism, 315, 316, 319, 323,
 409
 French republicanism, 315, 319
 Residence, 64, 109, 112, 127, 168,
 191, 192, 249, 271, 339, 345,
 355
 permanent residency, 225, 249,
 345, 346, 350
 Resilience, 157, 179, 407
Respekt (NO), 139
 Re-territorialisation, *see* Territory
 Re-unification, familial, 292, 375
 Right-wing forces/parties, 2, 15,
 21n10, 21n11, 189, 198, 199,
 203, 205n4, 264, 287, 288,
 313, 323, 339, 340, 355, 406
 right-wing extremism, 270, 272,
 286, 287, 313, 314, 409
Roma, 192, 287, 293
 Romanticism, 21n12, 103,
 282

- Rosanvallon, Pierre, 290
 Rushdie, Salman, 69, 293,
 305–306n4
- S**
- Saami*, 287
 Saffran, William, 78
 Sainsbury, Diane, 249, 256, 257n4,
 344, 345, 358, 359, 361n1
 Sandberg, Per, 296, 297, 302,
 306n10
Sans papiers, *see* France
 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 76, 322
 Schermerhorn, R. A., 40
 Secularism, 75, 265, 267, 285, 321,
 408
 secularism in France (*see* France)
 Securitisation, 91
 Security, 65, 77, 94, 96, 138, 173,
 176, 212, 228, 229, 246, 249,
 254, 265, 272, 273, 275, 276,
 279, 317, 337
 Segregation, 189, 372, 380, 383,
 385
 “Self”, the, 82, 111, 165
 Self-determination, 5, 9, 68, 72, 244
 Self-reflection, 176, 266
 Settlement services, 227, 249
 Sexuality, 50, 129, 188, 194
Shariat, the, 83
 Shaw, Jo, 168
 Skaarup, Peter, 351
 Slave trade, 35
 Social behaviour, 107
 Social citizenship, *see* Citizenship
 Social cohesion, 92, 107, 112, 223,
 316, 337, 346
 Social democratic movement, 276
 Social dumping, 340, 355–357
 Social inclusion, 19, 358, 359
 Social interaction, 112, 368
 Social justice, 13, 187–189, 195,
 203, 204n1, 240, 247, 251,
 256, 319, 325, 405, 406
 Social movements/organisations,
 132, 197, 205n4
 Social networks, 50, 112, 127
 Social protection, 161, 176
 Social protectionism, 324
 Social rights, 133, 161, 162, 169,
 181, 191, 193
 Social security assistance, 347
 Social solidarity, 5, 151, 280, 290
 Social welfare fraud, 325
 Socialisation, 4, 12, 67, 90, 161,
 165, 171, 172, 267, 268, 399,
 407
 Socialisation mechanisms, 171, 172
 Socialism, 189, 190, 315, 328–330,
 409
 Societal culture, 101, 370
 Solberg, Erna, 274
 Solidarity, 4, 5, 18, 25–28, 63–67,
 70, 72, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82,
 123, 132, 134, 143, 151, 153,
 162, 176, 182n12, 189, 196,
 202, 203, 237–256, 272, 280,
 290, 323–325, 405
 social solidarity, 5, 151, 280, 290
 Soral, Alain, 330
 Soviet Union, 159
 Søvndal, Villy, 354
 Spencer, Herbert, 54
 Spencer, Robert, 298
 State
 post-Westphalian turn, 7, 244
 Westphalian state, 4, 13

- State formation/state building, 4, 5
- Stereotypes, 107, 215, 223, 256n3, 271
- Støjberg, Inger, 352, 353
- Stoltenberg, Jens, 274, 275
- Stop the Islamisation of Norway, *see* Norway
- Storhaug, Hege, 296, 297, 303, 304
- Subjectivity, 28, 65, 69, 70, 81, 135, 194
- Sweden, 304, 345, 359, 373, 376, 378, 381, 409
- Swiss People's Party, 315
- Symbolic order, 240, 247, 250, 251, 256
- Symbolism, 253
- T
- Tajik, Hadia, 302, 306n11, 306n12
- Tamils, 228
- Taqiyya*, 300, 302
- Temporary migrants, 225–227, 249
- Territoriality, 1–20, 64
non-territoriality, 70
- Territory
historic territory, 4
re-territorialisation, 78, 79, 83
- Terrorism
9/11 attacks (2001) (US), 270
Islamic terrorism, 270, 274
Madrid (2004), 73
risks of, 337
Terror attacks 22 July 2011 (NO)
(*see* Norway)
- Third-country nationals (TCN), 168, 191, 201, 341, 404
- Thistlewaite, Frank, 38
- Thobani, Sunera, 241
- Toews, Vic, 228
- Tolerance, 12, 92, 97, 110, 111, 132, 149, 173, 176, 223, 230, 302, 325
- Touraine school, 132
- Trade unions, 340, 342, 355, 357
- Transnationalism
transnational actors, 7, 26, 66, 71, 72, 77, 78, 200
transnational being, 127, 128
transnational belonging, 50, 52, 127, 128, 135, 137
transnational community, 25, 27, 48, 52, 63–68, 75, 81, 84, 192
transnational cultural and social influences, 127
transnational cultural processes, 41
transnational cultural studies, 42, 43, 46
transnational family networks, 43, 48
transnational migration, 41, 44, 46, 56n8, 126, 127
transnational migration studies, 41, 44, 46, 127
transnational mobilisation, 29, 124, 126
transnational nationalism, 2, 3, 16, 17, 28, 70–72, 78, 85n7, 109, 114n6, 397, 399, 400
transnational networks, 25, 26, 46, 48, 50, 66, 401
transnational organisation, 64, 199, 200, 202, 407
transnational participation, 202

- Transnationalism (*cont.*)
 transnational people, 28, 92, 93,
 103, 106, 108, 111, 113
 transnational politics, 40, 43,
 63–84, 128, 188, 399, 402
 transnational processes, 9, 17,
 31–56, 398
 transnational social fields, 41, 43,
 46–56
 transnational social flows, 46–48
 transnational social space, 47, 54
 transnational strategies, 55, 77
 transnational studies, 26, 27,
 31–39, 41–48, 55, 64, 100
 transnational ties, 40
 transnational *ways of being*, 46,
 49–53, 399, 401
 transnational ways of belonging,
 50, 399
 transnationalisation, 6, 11, 70,
 73, 401
 Treaty of Lisbon, *see* European
 Union
 Treaty of Maastricht, *see* European
 Union
 Trudeau, Justin, 229, 232n28, 237,
 240, 253, 256, 405, 407
 Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, 245, 251, 252
 Trump, Donald, 1
 Trust, 92, 107, 112, 230, 274, 275,
 278–280, 289, 323, 408
 Turkey
 AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* -
 The Justice and Development
 Party), 74
 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 76
 Turkish diaspora, 192
 Turkish nationalism, 74
 Turtle Island, 239
 Tybring-Gjedde, Christian, 298,
 299, 301
- U**
 UK Independence Party (UKIP),
 264
Umma, the, 68, 70, 78, 81–84, 140
 Unions, *see* Trade unions
 United Nations High Commissioner
 for Refugees (UNHCR), 281
 Unity and Diversity framework,
 93–100
 Utilitarianism, 129, 134
- V**
 Veiling, *see* Face covering
 Vichy regime, 327
 Vimy Ridge Memorial, 218
 Voice, 43, 131, 140, 141, 159, 161,
 162, 164, 165, 171, 172, 176,
 178–180, 181n5, 196, 329
 Voluntary organisations, 268, 366,
 367, 371–389
- W**
 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 38
 Weber, Max, 4
 Welfare chauvinism, 100, 339
 Welfare policy development, 343
 Welfare retrenchment, 337
 Welfare rights, 161, 348, 351, 359
 Welfare scroungers/fraud, 325, 347,
 354, 355
 Welfare spending, 238

- Welfare state, 5, 18, 21n11, 129,
 153, 161, 176, 179, 238, 239,
 244, 246–256, 267, 285, 290,
 291, 323, 338, 339, 341, 343,
 344, 346, 350, 351, 356,
 358–361, 374, 405, 408, 410
- Werbner, Pnina, 65, 82
- Western invasions, 140
- Westphalian state, 4, 13
 post-Westphalian turn, 244
- Wilders, Geert, 299, 315
- Wodak, Ruth, 285, 287, 289, 290,
 408
- Wolf, Eric, 38
- Women's movement, 241, 249
- Women's rights, 265
- Worker skill level, 227, 355, 356
- World War I, 8, 37, 189, 218
- World War II, 34, 40, 189, 218,
 253, 269, 331n5, 374
- X
- Xenophobia, 290, 330
- Y
- Ye'or, Bat, 273, 300
- Youth for Islam (*Ungdom for Islam*),
 136
- Z
- Zangwill, Israel, 241
- Zemmour, Éric, 329
- Zúquete, José Pedro, 287