UNIVERSITIES IN THE NEOLIBERAL ERA

Academic Cultures and Critical Perspectives

Edited by Hakan Ergül
and Simten Coşar

Palgrave Critical University Studies

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Universities everywhere are experiencing unprecedented changes and most of the changes being inflicted upon universities are being imposed by political and policy elites without any debate or discussion, and little understanding of what is being lost, jettisoned, damaged or destroyed. The over-arching intent of this series is to foster, encourage, and publish scholarship relating to academia that is troubled by the direction of these reforms occurring around the world. The series provides a much-needed forum for the intensive and extensive discussion of the consequences of ill-conceived and inappropriate university reforms and will do this with particular emphasis on those perspectives and groups whose views have hitherto been ignored, disparaged or silenced. The series explores the effects of the sechanges across a number of domains including: the nature of academic work, the process of knowledge production for social and public good, along with students' experiences of learning, leadership and institutional politics research. The defining hallmark of this series, and what makes it markedly different from any other series with a focus on universities and higher education, is its 'criticalist agenda'.

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Hakan Ergül • Simten Coşar
Editors

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To all the academics aspiring for peace that would allow Gaia, Evin, Duru, and all the children of this planet to live in a peaceful present and future.

Acknowledgments

Contents

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Editorial Introduction

Hakan Ergül and Simten Coşar

> There must be something rotten in the very core of a social system
> which increases its wealth without diminishing its misery.
> Karl Marx
>
> *New York Daily Tribune*,
> 16 September 1859

Something has happened to the university—something that has been reso-
nating through the corridors of academic institutions across the globe
for several decades and something that introduced new ideals, a new
mind-set, and a mode of knowledge production and exchange to the *old*
academia. This *thing*, however defined, is epitomized in the increase in
the individualization of academics as actors; in the increase in demands
to open campuses to the free-market sphere; and in the seemingly con-
tradictory increase in the need for the state's hand to ensure that these
demands are followed by academics themselves. As Alvin Burstein warns:
'The danger today is not just the erosion of academic freedom and tenure,
but the fate of general education, increasingly eroded by the pressure to
produce job-ready graduates' (Burstein 2016). He highlights the increas-
ing free marketization of universities in the United States, alongside calls

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for authoritarian measures to adjust the established structures of academic freedom to fit the requirements of neoliberal times.

It is true that there has been much academic and intellectual debate going on in the First World on the neoliberal turn in higher education, including a complex of issues from academic job insecurity to graduate job guarantees, from academic research as a matter of inquiry for the sake of knowledge production to academic research as an endeavor that brings in its own funding to create its market value. The new pervasiveness of free-market dynamics in the realm of universities can be observed in various instances across the North American context, as exemplified in the rather top-down budget cuts imposed on universities by the state.[1]

In her field research[2] on feminist-academics' state(s) of being and their encounters in neoliberal campuses across the United States and Canada, Simten Coşar (2016) has persistently grappled with the rather difficult task of simultaneously acknowledging the indispensability of feminist solidarity among academics on the one hand and the unavoidable acceptance on the other of the call for individual competition through publications, courses taught, networks entered, and affinities formed on an individual basis. Despite all the differences across distant geographical contexts, the upsurge of individual competition, job insecurity, and authoritarian policies are among the common denominators regarding the state of universities globally. In the United States and/or Canada for instance, it might manifest itself as the rather disappointing developments regarding cuts in tenure positions, increasing job insecurity through the growth of the adjunct professor (in the United States) and contract instructor (Canada) positions, the widening gap between research and teaching through recruitment and employment policies, and boundary setting between teaching and scholarship (Bilgrami and Cole 2015; Berry 2009; Clausen and Swidler 2013; Coşar 2016; Horn 2000). In the United States, there are accounts of professors who have risked losing their jobs due to their critical stance toward Israel's policies on Palestine (Berry 2009; Coşar 2016). In India, the throttling of academic freedom takes the form of direct state oppression of leftist students and academics on campuses (Akgöz 2016; Dutta 2016). Somewhere in between the two, in Turkey, the government has acted unlawfully against academics merely on the grounds that they signed a peace declaration. This latest episode demonstrates dramatic deterioration in Turkey's human rights situation, which has cast an ominous shadow over fundamental academic rights and freedoms, which may or may not prove to be just temporary or trivial.[3]

While these examples have taken place in different socio-political contexts, with different academic traditions and university systems, they converge on the seemingly contradictory coexistence of and harmony between free-market demands directly related to academic life and authoritarian recipes to ensure that these demands are met as much as possible. As summarized by Berry (2009), regarding a case where vulnerability in terms of academic hierarchy—adjunct faculty—met fragile political stances—*vis-à-vis* Israel's policies on Palestine:

> …the post-9/11 world where all references to Islam, Judaism, the Middle East, the Holocaust, Israel, and Palestine are especially contentious and dangerous to breach. This is both new and not new for contingent faculty [read as adjunct faculty]. Of course, there have always been periods where open discussion of some issue became inflamed and provided the incentive to restrict academic freedom and public discussion, generally. Here we are reminded of McCarthy-era anticommunism, the backlash to the Black Freedom Movement or the Vietnam War, as examples. However, added to these historic periods of political fragmentation is the new reality that the majority of today's faculty lack basic job securities necessary to stand and defend their rights to enact or protect their academic freedom. It is this present condition that we all must confront, and better together than separately. (p. 10)

Although there is an ongoing and heated debate in the literature about the defining the characteristics of this shift and its potential impacts on higher education, there is almost a tacit agreement—at least in the fields of social sciences and humanities—that it is a global phenomenon with local particularities and that it comes or is even borrowed from somewhere that does not necessarily belong to the homeland of scientific knowledge. Neither does it appear to adhere to the funding principles traditionally applied to academia. The question of whether the shift represents a powerful panacea for long-lasting problems in higher education or an absolute deviation from the very values that define the academic world depends on one's understanding of the university and its role in society—yet, few would deny that the level of one's office in the academic hierarchy might also inform that understanding.

The change is obvious and did not happen overnight. On the contrary, it first gained a strong foothold in advanced capitalist societies in the 1970s before spreading across the world in recent decades, creating significant commonalities among higher education institutions and hidden injuries

for academics (Gill 2010). The current situation makes some of us feel we are 'at the wrong place in [our] old academic habitus' (Münch 2014, p. 65), in some others' home or merely indifferent.[4] Nonetheless, today, we have reached a point where we, students and academics from different environments, come across a sarcastic joke in a British daily, telling that '[t]here are no more ivory towers, though vice-chancellors may dream of buying one for themselves' (Power 2016); we recognize *our own* academic habitus in it; our past and present. Whatever it is that has been happening to the university, for many of us in academia, it is bringing (or perhaps has already brought) the university to its end; at least, the university as we have been accustomed to know it.

This book is about that global change we identify as the neoliberal restructuring of higher education and individual academics' responses. The emphasis is on both the structural forces that underlie similar tendencies in different academic environments and also the particularities that occur at local, cultural, and individual levels.

Drawing from the authors' diverse backgrounds (e.g. sociology, anthropology, political science, feminist studies, media, and cultural studies) and profound experience in the field, the chapters[5] in this collection explore the question of how and to what extent the ongoing neoliberal transformation of higher education influences everyday university and academic life. The question is not new and, on the surface, may remind the reader of previous interventions (some of which will be mentioned later). Nevertheless, this collection is significant for its micro- and *emic* nature: listening to, observing, and comparing the critical voices from below, without excluding the authors' own. Focusing on the academics' and students' own perspectives *vis-à-vis* the neoliberalization of their academic habitus, the authors review first-hand experiences from different university cultures located within the European and Mediterranean landscape, notably Britain, the Czech Republic, Morocco, and Turkey. The aim is to expose readers to different aspects of the phenomenon from a diverse range of approaches, academic cultures, and experiences.

The Ground We Stand On

Over more than two decades, the role of the university—particularly in terms of social sciences and humanities—has been questioned in various forums in capitalist societies. A considerable number of studies have tracked structural changes toward the neoliberalization of higher educa-

tion and their consequences. Some have focused on the implementation of corporate style management in higher education and the marketization-cum-privatization of universities and the commodification of knowledge; others have analyzed the social movements staged against these developments in various countries, including Britain, Canada, Chile, France, Greece, Italy, the United States, Russia, Spain, and Turkey.

Many authors have already set off alarms, pointing out that the essential concepts of the Humboldtian model of university—such as academic freedom, self-governance, social responsibility, and knowledge as a public good—and its *raison d'être* have been hijacked by the global neoliberal shift touched on above.[6] Today, a number of researchers from different geographies demonstrate that academic communities across the world are experiencing a new setting, often referred to as 'academic capitalism' (Cantwell and Kauppinen 2014; Münch 2014; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) or alternatively the 'enterprise university' (Marginson and Considine 2000), modeled by a new, more utilitarian set of parameters: academic performance, self-monitoring, accountability, auditability, flexibility, rankings, profitability, privatization, competitive funding schemes, and so on. Needless to say, this new paradigm, deeply embedded into a market-driven managerial logic (e.g. see Evans 2005; Graham 2002), would have not been implemented so effectively without a new generation of dedicated university leaders, who, for the first time, define their institution's mandate as maximizing 'entrepreneurial return' from academic production (Washburn 2003, p. 70).

Existing work on the neoliberalization of higher education ranges in terms of topics, core questions, and problematizations from a critical political economy approach (Giroux 2014; Brown and Carasso 2013; Karl et al. 2004; Cooper et al. 2002; Tudiver 1999; Slaughter and Leslie 1997) to a policy-oriented approach—mainly produced as articles and/or working papers for specific policy recommendations—and finally to discussions on the state of science on the axis of proper knowledge accumulation and knowledge dissemination, which essentially stands for the idealized university (e.g. see Crosier et al. 2007; Readings 1999). While the literature that falls into the first two categories generally tends to elaborate on country-specific cases, the third sphere relies on a universalistic argument about theorization, methodology, and practice.

The common ground in all these spheres of problematization is that the research conducted rarely takes issue with the everyday practices in academic life, which is itself being neoliberalized, and the way that

academia in general has been interacting—negotiating, mediating, and dissenting—individually and/or collectively with the neoliberal state of things. Among the exceptions[7] is work by Gill (2010) that focuses on individuals' everyday experiences in neoliberal academia. Drawing on qualitative and 'unscientific'[8] data, the author shows that, despite the profound impact of recent transformations on academics' 'precarious lives' within the neoliberal university, 'these things are rarely spoken of within the Academy, and, if they are, they tend to be treated as individual, personal experiences rather than structural features of the contemporary University' (ibid., p. 233). Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) also look at academia in the United States in the midst of neoliberalization. Their inspiring work presents accounts of both academics in key positions in the commercialization of the universities and academics placed at risk in this process. Similarly, Vatansever and Gezici-Yalçın (2015) elaborate on the accounts of academics working in Turkey's foundation[9] universities. Based on their ethnographic fieldwork, they critically analyze the precarization of academics due to the neoliberal state of affairs in the universities. Their findings also hint at a transformation in the way academics themselves relate to knowledge production and dissemination. As with Slaughter and Rhoades' work, this work too concentrates on one country. Newson and Polster's (2010) contribution follows a similar line by offering critical accounts from Canadian academics themselves. Currie and Newson's (1998) contribution, on the other hand, stands as an exception for taking a cross-country comparative perspective in order to show that the market-oriented transformation of higher education is not a unidirectional process with similar consequences across different academic environments. Focusing on countries from the advanced capitalist world, the volume develops a macro-approach to neoliberalization, without integrating an ethnographic, *emic* perspective into its general discussion.

We have attempted to do the same in this volume by offering a multi-dimensional analysis; however we go beyond this and merge comparative historical approach with ethnographic insights. We think that the volume will encourage further studies on the neoliberalization of higher education that do not merely consider the institutional, legal, or structural aspects of the process but which deepen the analysis by bringing in the subjects into the functioning of the structural dynamics. We believe that the diversity of the countries included make it possible to trace not only differences in the process of neoliberalization across socio-economic, religious-ethnic, and

cultural specificities, which generate shifts and relocations in the meanings attributed to the university and its role in society, but also parallels across diverse cases.

The Story Unfolds Itself

This edited volume comprises three parts, each exploring different yet strongly interrelated aspects of recent neoliberal transformations of higher education. Part I, *Emerging Cultures: Between Neoliberal Know-How and Academic Universals*, includes a collection of chapters looking at the complex challenges and present-day concerns that are deeply rooted in the neoliberal restructuring of higher education. Drawing on *emic* insights, the authors address the dramatic shifts and transformations that have occurred at both individual and structural levels in higher education during the last three decades: changes that reflect serious concerns and give rise to a number of critical questions:

- How and to what extent have the meaning and nature of academia, academic knowledge production, and public engagement shifted during recent decades in the European and Mediterranean higher education landscapes?
- How do academic actors make sense of their (changing) social role, (transforming) self-image, and professional identity in the new context of neoliberal academia? What are the major challenges that they encounter in their everyday life and how do they cope with them?
- What dramatic departures from historically accepted norms, values (e.g. the university's social role, academic collaboration, knowledge as a public good, academic autonomy, and social impact), and ethics have been introduced to higher education under the pressure of neoliberal policies and reformations?

In the first chapter of this section, *Beyond the Third Mission: Towards an actor-based account of universities' relationship with society*, Jana Bacevic invites us to discuss—and challenge—the prevailing political narratives seeking to develop universities' links with society, predicated on the idea that academia needs to abandon the proverbial ivory tower and become more engaged with its environment. At the heart of the chapter are the following questions: What is it that academics do when they engage with *their* societies? What are the ideas, issues, and constraints surrounding

these forms of engagement? How do they reflect and/or reproduce the concepts of (academic) authority? Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2014 and 2015 on public engagement in the UK universities, Bacevic clearly shows that such positioning of academic actors is ambiguous and falls outside the new realm of neoliberal academia, where public engagement inevitably and simultaneously requires both compliance with and resistance to neoliberal transformations.

This discussion paves the way for the next chapter, *Searching for Authenticity and Success: Academic identity and production in neoliberal times*. Continuing from where the previous chapter left off, Özgür Budak investigates the relationship between neoliberalism's impact on academic careers and the reshaping of academic identity. Based on ethnographic fieldwork incorporating cultural sociological perspectives, Budak convincingly reveals that similar tensions, fluctuations, and criticisms have been voiced by actors in the university environment at the other end of the European continent: Turkey. 'The new era in higher education', the author argues, 'is frequently associated with increased feelings of insecurity and uncertainty' (see Chap. 3, p. 56). Using interview data with academics at the beginning of their career, Budak demonstrates that, in order to position herself or himself as a meaningful player in the neoliberal university environment, the academic feels obliged to internalize 'the sense of the game' and develop sophisticated survival strategies.

In the last chapter of this section, *Turkish Academics' Encounters with the Index in Social Sciences*, Eda Çetinkaya pursues a similar line of investigation to explore the changing nature of the relationship between everyday academic life and knowledge production, although with a particular emphasis on the *medium* (indexing, language, networks, digital technologies, etc.) and its effects on academic success. Drawing on ongoing, long-term ethnographic fieldwork in different universities in Ankara, Turkey, and in-depth interviews with academics from various generations, Çetinkaya argues that performance-based evaluation systems influence academics' understanding of scientific knowledge and publishing, generating new inequalities and coping strategies in neoliberal academia. Most academics feel neither safe nor empowered in neoliberal universities that manage them according to points, performance indicators, competition, academic titles, and time pressure. While the academics' responses to such transformations vary between resistance and acceptance due to their different profiles and personal skills, for many, the neoliberal restructuring of university creates despair.

In Part II, *Stories of Mediation, Negotiation and Resilience*, we continue to observe first-hand experiences *in situ* and listen to academics' voices in their natural, everyday habitat: the university. The fieldwork introduced in this section suggests a closer examination of the different university cultures and academic-political contexts where (seemingly) similar neoliberal higher educational policies have been implemented. Throughout the chapters, the authors seek to find answers to the following questions:

- How and in what ways do existing university cultures and academic dispositions interrogate, confront, or ease the way to implement neoliberal policies?
- How do recent neoliberal changes in higher education policy and university curricula, which prioritize the needs of capital rather than the social expectations and desires of the individual, influence post-baccalaureate (un)employment? What are the viable, constructive alternatives?
- What are the neoliberal knots that bind the transformation of university education to the transformation in academic research?
- What are the universal/global grounds that host different dynamics in different socio-political contexts to create similar transformations in university structures?

The section opens with Josef Kavka's thought-provoking essay, *Variegated Neoliberalization in Higher Education: Ambivalent responses to competitive funding in the Czech Republic*. The author questions the success of neoliberal transformation in Czech higher education, widely recognized as being regulated by academic elites adhering to traditional academic values. Based on qualitative interviews with students and academics in two well-established public universities, Kavka shows that neoliberalism does not function as a monolithic process; instead, it follows an uneven course, identified as 'creeping neoliberalization', which has been spurred by a new funding framework involving competitive and performance-based allocation of public resources. Eighteen months after the author's fieldwork, the students and academics from one of the universities under investigation organized demonstrations against the institution's leadership in response to two prominent professors having their contracts terminated, an example, among many, showing that neoliberalization does not necessarily crush the academia via the main gate; instead, it creeps in through a side entrance while remaining powerful and uninvited.

The next chapter, *Creating Jobs for the Social Good: Moving beyond the neoliberal model of education for employment*, continues to interrogate higher education policies *via* a multi-level (macro-, meso-, and micro-) approach. However, instead of looking at academics' present situation, Shana Cohen invites us to focus on the educational strategies that influence students' futures: neoliberal higher education policies addressing high unemployment among university graduates. Drawing on actual examples from the southern Mediterranean higher education landscape (specifically, Morocco) and assessing the effectiveness of current educational-policy strategies, Cohen emphasizes the significance of what is often disregarded—the existential 'meaning that jobs possess for individuals' (see Chap. 6, p. 136). From her extensive qualitative research in Morocco and survey data, she argues that 'making a contribution to society is often the most important aspect of a job to employees'. Therefore, 'an effective policy strategy [would] highlight individual fulfillment in employment, which includes making a social impact, before outlining the reforms to higher education that would enable individuals to make this contribution in their jobs' (see Chap. 6, p. 137).

To understand the broader impact of neoliberal educational policies, the phenomenon must be studied comparatively as a nexus that connects different university environments. The last chapter of this section, *Transformation, Reformation or Decline? The university in contemporary Morocco and Turkey* presents one such attempt. Hakan Ergül, Simten Coşar, and Fadma Ait Mous analyze the neoliberal phenomenon through comparative data from ongoing fieldwork designed as multi-sited ethnographic inquiry at both ends of the Mediterranean. Particular attention is devoted to the significant milestones—such as privatization of higher education and the implementation of market-oriented educational policies—during the last decade. The latter significantly refers to policy strategies (most prevalently the License, Masters', and Doctorate reform and the Bologna Process [BP]) that envisage the transformation of higher education in Europe and its sphere of influence. The authors argue that the 2000s mark a transformation in both countries, albeit certainly in different styles, with different justifications and in different modes and most probably, with different consequences. The parallels, on the other hand, can be found in many aspects, including the Bologna Declaration as the shared reference *certificate*, the European Higher Education Area as the shared reference space, and the BP as the shared title for the neoliberalization of the higher education system through Europe-oriented legitimizing

discourses and thus in terms of the discursive strategies resorted to and manipulated by the decision makers and implementers of the related measures. Drawing on a critical analysis of the legal arrangements and regulatory mechanisms alongside academics' experiences from both countries, the authors clearly demonstrate that the national political context and autocratic interventions in education have influenced the reform process, altering and distorting the democratic, (pseudo-) inclusive, and progressive values advertised by policy makers. The focus is on academics from various levels of the hierarchy who have been actively involved in producing, adjusting to, or implementing the policies that have dominated the last decade in higher education in Morocco and Turkey.

The chapters in this section orient the reader to the final section of the volume by offering a general framework for reading both the options for negotiation with and adaptation to the neoliberalization of higher education and also possibilities for dissent.

With Part III, *Voices of Dissent*, we turn our attention to critical voices questioning the unquestioned and rejecting the taken-for-granted order of things in neoliberal academia. The authors are well aware that we live in a neoliberal world and in neoliberal times and that neoliberalism has become ingrained in the public mind-set, including many academics. Today, its operational rationale and market-oriented norms are seen as ethics in themselves and as such accepted as inevitable. This acknowledgment, on the other hand, should not prevent us from seeing that there have always been contestations as to the basics of the neoliberal mind, neoliberal functioning, and neoliberal policies. The chapters in this section come from just such a critical tradition, tracing the potential and/or existing epistemological and ethical oppositional stances, acts, and strategies, developed as a response to neoliberal influences. The following questions lie at the heart of these discussions:

- How can one account for the encounter between feminist epistemologies and the neoliberal mind? What are the possibilities for dissent against neoliberalization that can dialectically spring from the gendered formation, intrinsic in the neoliberal mentality and gender-based reactions from within academia?
- What are the defining characteristics of the ideal academic (social) type of the neoliberal university, who appears, at least on the surface, to be immune to the *mal du siècle*? What are the philosophical, epistemological, and ethical underpinnings of such neoliberal academic dispositions?

In their chapter, *The Historico-Political Parameters of Academic Feminism in Turkey: Breaks and continuities*, İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu and Aylin Özman look at the historical evolution of academic feminism, which introduced new arguments and prospects onto the feminist agenda and the influence of cultural context. Despite the challenging account of feminist principles in the knowledge production process in the universities as similar to the West, the authors argue, the evolution of academic feminism in Turkey followed a divergent path both at the theoretical and practical levels and produced its own unique agenda. While taking issue with the risk of the pervasion of maleist academic culture into feminist academic concerns, the authors also highlight the potential of feminist academia to opt for a transformation in academic life to end the ghettoization of feminist and/or women and/or gender studies on campuses: 'the only way for academic feminism to continue toward its ultimate aim of transforming women's lives is to politicize itself in a way that eliminates the distinction between feminist activism and academic feminism' (see Chap. 8, p. 205). This argument certainly emphasizes that feminist academic knowledge production is in itself a *praxis*; thus, it is impossible to separate feminist activism from feminist knowledge and *vice-a-versa*. It is this integration of a feminist way of knowledge production in and through everyday life that offers grounds for imagining a counter-utopia *vis-à-vis* what Žižek calls a 'neoliberal utopia' (2008). It is not *utopian* to recall Žižek's earlier hope for a 'heartening species of human solidarity' (2008, p. 24), which for him cannot be derived from the liberal utopia. This hope can be linked to his more recent call for *reimagining* utopia.[10] Regarding academia, however, we shall suffice here to note that perhaps feminist academic culture hosts the venues for such a *reimagination*.

The last chapter of this book, *'Homo academicus' in University Inc.: The 'Ersatz' yuppie academic*, presents a famous intervention by Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu, a renowned sociologist with a profound passion for the philosophy of social sciences. As the title suggests, Nalbantoğlu's work (first published in Turkish in 2003) is a grounded and multi-dimensional discussion about the appearance of a new academic type, the 'yuppie academic' or the professor-entrepreneur, successfully 'imported' (see Chap. 9, p. 219) into Turkish academia. Drawing on an interdisciplinary analysis of the current state of affairs in neoliberal academia—one that moves between philosophy, sociology, social theory, and literature—the author asks (see Chap. 9, p. 219): 'Is it possible to consider the question of what is happening to academics separately from the basically philosophical ques-

tion of what is happening to academic *ethos* and academic morality under current conditions when the universities in Turkey have moved beyond specialization to increasingly internalize the model of a commercial enterprise?' What adds to this new version of Nalbantoğlu's earlier essay is Simten Coşar's constructive, feminist responses, whose multiple affiliations with the author (as his former student and the translator of this chapter) give her an exceptional position to make such an intervention.

As the editors of this volume and organizers of a workshop on the same topic, as coworkers and coresearchers in the fields covered in our coauthored chapter, we think that the critical approach running through all the chapters is most vivid in the final two chapters since they directly address the spheres of opportunity to consider alternatives to neoliberalization. We also believe that the collaborative experience with the field on this topic, which calls us to the field while simultaneously being in our own fields, promises a small attempt to request an alternative means of academic work(ing) together. The alternative lies in slowing down, sharing responsibilities without calculating the hours, minutes, and seconds required for the work, sharing responsibility without calculating the speed of working/burdening, and finally reflecting on our respective academic-political stances that resonate cooperatively through the work at hand. That is, the ethnographic lenses that run through the structures of everyday academic life turn out to offer both paths to read into and strategies to effectively resist neoliberalization.

The collective response within this volume can thus be placed alongside previous critical efforts that 'do not confront the world in a doctrinaire way with a new principle: Here is the truth, kneel down before it!', as Marx (1982) puts it. Instead, it is a modest, ethnographic journey intended to support other voyagers aiming to 'develop new principles for the world out of the world's own principles' (ibid.).

Notes

1. One example comes from the University of Wisconsin system, where 'inviting more conservative speakers to the campuses' has been proposed as a basis for bargaining for government funds (Sommerhauser 2016).
2. Project No. SBI 2015 7766; Funding institution: Hacettepe University (Scientific Research Coordination Unit), Project Name: Küreselleşme ve Akademide Dönüşüm: Kadın Akademisyenler

Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz (Globalization and Transformation in the Academia: A Comparative Analysis on Women Academics), start Date: 07 September 2016; End Date: 01 January 2017.

3. Butler (2015, p. 296) identifies the meaning of academic freedom with the immediate practice of the right to academic freedom, revealing the dire state of academics in Turkey in terms of the right to freedom. In this respect, she notes 'two sorts of rights violations: the one happens when an already established institution sets limits on its curriculum or faculty speech for political reasons; the other happens when the infrastructural conditions are destroyed or debilitated and render impossible the exercise of the right of academic freedom (and other rights as well, including the right to assembly and rights of mobility, presupposed by rights of access)'.

4. In her influential work, *The Economic Horror*, Viviane Forrester reminds us that '[a]chieving general indifference is more of the victory for a system than gaining partial support' (1999, p. 36).

5. Except for two new contributions, the preliminary versions of the chapters were presented at an international workshop, University in the Neoliberal Era: Cultures, Stories, Voices that Matter, coorganized by the Centre Jacques Berque Les Études en Sciences Humaines et Sociales au Maroc (CNRS), Ecole de Gouvernance et d'Economie (Rabat, Morocco) and Hacettepe University (Ankara, Turkey), held on 19 June 2014 in Rabat, Morocco.

6. J.M. Coetzee, the Nobel Prize winning novelist and professor, remembers these years as follows: 'It was always a bit of a lie that universities were self-governing institutions. Nevertheless, what universities suffered during the 1980s and 1990s was pretty shameful, as under threat of having their funding cut they allowed themselves to be turned into business enterprises, in which professors who had previously carried on their enquiries in sovereign freedom were transformed into harried employees required to fulfill quotas under the scrutiny of professional managers. Whether the old powers of the professoriate will ever be restored is much to be doubted' (Coetzee 2007, p. 35).

7. For examples of similar concerns, see Luxton and Mossman (2012), Newson and Polster (2010), and Currie and Newson (1998).

8. Gill (2010) explains the intention behind her methodological choice as follows: 'My 'data' are entirely unscientific, but nevertheless, I contend, they tell us something real and significant about our own workplaces … [I]t seems to me that it is this level that remains silenced in most fora—yet insistently asserts itself in our aching backs, tired eyes, difficulties in sleeping and in our multiple experiences of stress, anxiety, and overload' (p. 232).

9. Foundation universities, set up by prosperous families and educational foundations, first appeared in Turkey in 1984. While they are funded by the students and their foundations, most of them also benefit from the state donations. Despite their non-profit status, many foundation universities have been turning into for-profit institutions.

10. Here, we are inspired by Žižek's call for 'reinventing utopia' when the issue cannot be 'resolved within the coordinates of the possible, out of the pure earths of survival you have to invent a new space'. Although Žižek emphasizes that 'utopia is not a matter of imagination; utopia is innermost urgency', we think that imagination is the most urgent need, especially for those who *work* with and through knowledge. See Žižek's presentation at https://vimeo.com/7527571, date accessed 10 June 2016.

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Emerging Cultures: Between Neoliberal Know-How and Academic Universals

Beyond the Third Mission: Toward an Actor-Based Account of Universities' Relationship with Society

Jana Bacevic

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to contribute to the understanding of the contemporary global transformation in the relationship between university and society. It does this through an analysis of narratives related to the concept of 'public engagement,' in particular in the UK, as an example of the reconfiguration of university–society relationships in practice.

In recent decades, public discourse on higher education and research has become marked by a notable increase in discussions concerning the role of universities in society (e.g. E3M 2012; EC 2003, 2012). In the policy domain, this role is sometimes dubbed the 'third mission.' Reflecting its distinction from universities' traditional missions of teaching and research, it includes practices 'concerned with the generation, use, application and exploitation of knowledge and other university capabilities outside academic environments' (Molas-Gallart et al., cited in Shore and

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McLauchlan 2012, p. 67). Clearly, this definition covers a broad range of activities. Krčmarova (2011), for example, distinguishes between '(economic) growth-driven' and '(social and civic) engagement-driven' meanings of the term, noting that, 'in practice, the social and civic objectives accentuated in the latter conception are at a disadvantage, as the impacts on the economy are more easily quantified' (Krčmarova 2011, p. 319). This suggests that the third mission can be viewed as a part of a more general shift toward monitoring and quantifying universities' contributions to society.

Some critical scholars have attributed this shift to the introduction of governance techniques subsumed, particularly in the UK, under the term 'new public management' (Nedeva 2007; Olssen and Peters 2005; Shore and Wright 1999, 2000). Within this shift, public funding has increasingly been tied to performance, leading to the development of a number of mechanisms for measuring productivity and quality of academic work (such as university rankings and citation indexes). All of this has driven universities to increasingly compete against each other in the global education market, and for public funding (See e.g. Jessop 2008). This, in turn, is seen as a manifestation of the broader trend related to the combined tendencies of privatization, commodification and marketization of knowledge—all of which have come to be identified with the influence of neoliberal economic policies on the processes of knowledge production (e.g. Holmwood 2011; Santiago and Carvalho 2008; Canaan and Shumar 2008; Shore and Wright 2000; Slaughter and Rhoades 2000). While the rise of the third mission in higher education policy discourse has been the subject of research across different contexts and disciplines (Krčmarova 2011; Viale and Etzkovitz 2010; Laredo 2007), how these relationships work in practice remains somewhat underexplored. As Shore and McLauchlan (2012) note, 'We know relatively little about how universities are responding to the challenges and opportunities posed by the advance of "knowledge capitalism" and the new kinds of relationships, professional identities and research practices that these responses are creating' (p. 268).

The objective of this chapter is to contribute to understanding this relationship between the changing conditions of knowledge production associated with neoliberalism and the ways in which academics relate to society. The chapter intends to do this by shifting the focus from the global changes in the modes of knowledge production to the ways in which actors—in this case, academics at universities—experience, interpret

and reproduce these trends. It looks at the phenomenon of building university–society relationships in a contemporary university without assuming that actors either automatically adopt policy dictates—including those related to third mission objectives—or, conversely, that some forms of engagement necessarily represent a rejection of these models. The ways in which actors construct their relationships with society are, of course, to some extent influenced and shaped by the economic and institutional structures that frame and seek to direct these relationships; importantly, however, they are also integral to the formation of those relationships.

The epistemological dimension is essential here: rather than being seen as a consequence of the changing relationships between universities and societies, activities related to the third mission play an active role in constructing and negotiating the meanings of both, as well as their reciprocal relationship. In this sense, social engagement is an inextricable part of the construction of both the relationships and the boundaries between the university and society. By focusing on the actors' perspective, this chapter not only broadens the empirical scope of existing research on university–society relationships but also shifts the emphasis from top-down processes to the ways in which ideas and practices matter; that is, how they inform and shape large-scale societal transformations.

I begin by presenting a brief rationale for this position. First, I argue for the broadening of the conceptualization of the transformations in university life by providing more space for agency. Second, I situate this argument in the context of ethnographic research on public engagement in UK universities, conducted in 2014 and 2015.[1] I then use the results of this to highlight some of the main concepts and motives related to academics' engagement with society. The concluding part summarizes some of these themes, before discussing how they relate to—or challenge—attitudes toward neoliberalism in academia.

University Without Actors? Bringing Agency Back into Universities

The chapter frames agency as neither exclusively motivated by external constraints nor entirely autonomous, but as a 'socioculturally mediated capacity to act' (e.g. Ahearn 2001, p. 12). Focusing on how academics practice and reflect on public engagement can contribute to formulating a more nuanced account of the ways that broader structures, including policy drivers and institutional frameworks, interact with individual agency,

and therefore structure novel forms of university–society relationships (cf. Couldry 2010). However, this line of inquiry remains little more than a search for 'missing subjects' (cf. Katz 2013) unless we carefully consider how voices are operationalized in interpreting their role in the processes pertaining to the construction of university–society relationships.

Shore and McLauchlan (2012, p. 269) begin their inquiry by asking, '[W]hat new kinds of *subjects* are these "third stream" activities forging within the modern university (including university itself as a form of institutional subject)?' However, emphasizing the subjectivity and role of actors suggests that the agency of individual academics is largely motivated by external constraints, including policy and institutional discourses. Subjectivity, in this view, is operationalized as a product of institutional environments and/or external policy drivers. Neoliberalism applied as a diagnosis to explain the various aspects of the transformation of knowledge production becomes an 'alleged first (or ultimate) cause of a bewildering array of contemporary developments' (Peck 2010, p. 14). While some of these changes do happen at a global level, their manifestations are primarily understood in the local context. Actors, in turn, are reduced to being *victims* of neoliberal policy regimes, their agency interpreted primarily, even if not exclusively, in the context of these changes.

While it would be a mistake to ignore the importance of the conditions of knowledge production—global or local, though these may not necessarily be one and the same thing—for influencing how academics relate to *their* societies, it also makes sense to acknowledge the extent to which different forms of engagement constitute intentional practice. Academics 'operate within competitive arenas, struggling over symbolic and institutional recognition and scarce financial resources … [and] their interventions—whether through books, articles or speeches—are an integral part of this power struggle rather than an expression of some deeper self' (Baert 2012, p. 309). In other words, academics actually choose to engage in different activities outside of the teaching–research nexus. While local and institutional arrangements can certainly encourage or obstruct specific forms of engagement, they should not be seen as the sole determinant of engagement processes. In this sense, we can ask: What do academics *do* when they engage with the society? What kind of motives do they mention? What is it that they aim to achieve? What sort of constraints do they perceive?

In order to examine how academics construct university–society links in practice, this chapter focuses on the case of public engagement in the

UK. Clearly, public engagement in the UK is older than the higher education policies of the country's most recent government (or the one before that, for that matter). The idea that universities have a mission to serve the society has long been integral to the public imaginary surrounding higher education. Besides elite institutions like Oxford and Cambridge, the British university system developed through the founding of civic universities at the turn of the twentieth century that were initially designed as colleges of applied sciences; a major expansion in the 1960s, comprising nine new institutions and ten colleges that were turned into universities; and, most recently, the post-1992 transformation of polytechnics into universities (Whyte 2015; Ruegg 2004). Though with varying profiles and backgrounds, most of these institutions were strongly grounded in their local and/or regional contexts, many founded with the explicit aim to aid the development of their environments and allow access to higher education for a greater portion of the population, especially from previously excluded groups.

The rise of public engagement as a specific policy and practice can be traced back to the Royal Society's Bodmer Report, published in 1985. This focused on the public understanding of science; more specifically, it emphasized the need to shift from 'deficit to dialogue' and 'understanding' to 'engagement' (Watermeyer 2012a, p. 116), and pushed universities to become more active in engaging the public with research. Although the early efforts were primarily focused on natural sciences and STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) subjects, they quickly expanded to include the role of universities as a whole. In 2007, the Higher Education Funding Councils for UK financed six pilot projects, entitled 'Beacons for Public Engagement,' in order to promote this new vision of the universities' role. The National Coordinating Centre for Public Engagement was established in 2008 to support and follow up on the projects, while in 2010, the funding councils published the 'Concordat for Engaging the Public with Research' (see Watermeyer 2012b) which spelled out the expectations from and guidelines for practice for universities.

Most universities in the UK now have a specific organizational unit—or at least a person—responsible for facilitating public engagement and output. More importantly, however, impact—as a measurement of public engagement—has become part of the criteria in the 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF). REF is currently the main mechanism for assessing research produced in the UK and allocating research funding

accordingly. In this sense, there is a clear link between forms of public engagement and academic career progress, and while impact is far from being the only or most important measure of research productivity, it certainly plays a role in the ways in which academics are evaluated. While public engagement remains somewhat less controversial than impact—in part, because of the broadness and fuzziness of the term—there is less clarity concerning what engagement means to different actors, what it is that academics do when they engage with the society, what rationales and explanations they offer, what sorts of relationships or hierarchies are created through these practices. All of this indicates the need to understand specific modes of engagement and the ways that they come to shape the modes of university–society relationships.

The following section presents an analysis of the narratives and concepts related to public engagement among academic and managerial staff at one UK university. The university where the research was conducted is a rather prestigious, internationally renowned, public institution with a nationwide reputation for its work on public engagement. The data collection comprised interviews and participant observation over several periods spent at the university in February to April and September to November 2014, and April to May 2015. The majority of the participants were based at the university at the time of research. Some were in academic positions (at different levels of seniority); some were in management; and some were in managerial or administrative positions related to public engagement.

The analysis of the interviews is based on grounded theory. Grounded theory attempts to build theoretical categories on the basis of the *emic*, in the sense of building a two-way relationship between theory and data (Bryant and Charmaz 2007). In practice, this means first looking at the narratives and practices of academic workers in their specific institutional contexts, attempting to locate them within more general (global) trends and tendencies, seeing how they respond to and potentially shape these trends, and, finally, using these insights to inform theoretical discussion. Accordingly, the emphasis here is on the main concepts and contradictions arising from the interviews. In this sense, it does not aim to present an exhaustive picture of the participants' ideas and experiences of social engagement. Rather, it selects a few key themes and discusses their implications for understanding the relationship between conditions of knowledge production and human agency.

Engaging with Society: (Dis)continuities and Emerging Themes

(A)historicity: Business as Usual Versus Everything has Changed

Many authors have written about the increasing compression of time as one of the distinctive features of neoliberalism in academia: the speeding up of output, the shortening of evaluation cycles and the increase in time needed for dealing with administration and monitoring of one's performance (Vostal 2016; Leathwood and Read 2013; Kehm and Teichler 2013; Gill 2009). Unsurprisingly, therefore, most participants in the study feel that temporal framing plays an important role in their lives and identities. To begin with, there is a clear emphasis on impact as informing the shifting paradigm in higher education. A senior manager, who previously spent many years in research, describes it in the following way:

> It's understandable for academics, many of us are lecturers, so we have a thing for teaching people … However, there are a number of drivers in the academic life in the UK that make you think it would be valuable to listen as well as to speak. The most obvious driver that is current is the emphasis on impact research.

Similarly, a professional in charge of public engagement in a regional center comments: 'It transpired that public engagement is a very contemporary framing … it has roots in science, in science communication literature.'

Most analytical narratives presume that neoliberalism is a historically bounded policy, in the sense that it has a relatively clearly identifiable beginning (cf. Wacquant 2012; Peck 2010). While the informants' accounts do contrast the present state of affairs with some aspects of the past, they rarely attempt to assume a vantage point that is *outside* of the present. There is a very clear sense of public engagement being something that is happening 'here and now,' which suggests that it is impossible for the participants' to extricate their interpretation of university–society relationships from its contemporary discursive framing.

However, in parallel with this, we encounter the perception of public engagement as 'business as usual' as opposed to a specific, separate form of activity. A number of participants described public engagement as something that academics normally do anyway. One senior academic began our interview (whose topic I announced by referring to public

engagement) by saying: 'I might not conceptualize it [public engage-ment] the way that you do because it's just what I decided to do, if that makes sense … it might be called public engagement.' Another said: 'Actually, I think engagement is a kind of … it's a constant process of rethinking and reimagining … There is a constant reinvention of what we do [research], which is our core activity.' Or, in the words of an employee of the university's center for public engagement: 'For many academics, engagement is 'business as usual'—many of them anyway do it. Our job is to tap into that.'

This means that we need to question the extent to which there can be a neat dividing line between the pre-neoliberal and neoliberal periods in academic life. 'Business as usual' suggests that there has not been a major political, ideational and temporal rupture in the ways academics go about doing their work. It therefore contradicts the idea that neoliberalism is a specific or exceptional political and historical label. Whereas some policies identified as neoliberal have a clear timeframe, the actors' perceptions are already so informed by these transformations that all reflections on the past need to be understood as part of the construction of the present. In other words, reflections on how things used to be need to be understood, not as objective accounts of the past but as constructs used to emphasize the contrast between that period and the present time; memory is clearly being shaped by everything that has happened since (cf. Mead 1932). This might seem like an obvious point to make, but it makes sense to reiterate it, if nothing else, in order to keep in mind the contingent nature of labels such as the *present moment*.

The contrast between a past, characterized by the absence of institu-tional incentives and constraints, and the present is also relevant when we consider the relationship between different actors in the process. Audit culture, as a mechanism of governmentality, assumes a clear division between actors and a corresponding division of power. On the one hand, we have managers, whose role is to pressure academics to comply; on the other, we have academics, whose only alternatives are either to acquiesce or to 'resist' (cf. Shore and Davidson 2014; Leathwood and Read 2013). What the interviews suggest is that academics actually have a rather strong role in participating in and thus perpetuating forms of power in academia. Rather than simply being *victims* of monitoring, the participants in this research are actively involved in strategic attempts to use and reinterpret the mechanisms of measurement—including the measurement of public

engagement—in ways that support their own agendas. In this sense, the work of public engagement in many cases becomes the practice of documenting what informants refer to as 'business as usual.'

Of course, there are different ways to interpret this. One approach would be to see it as the internalization of the neoliberal drive for constant adaptation to a reinventing, entrepreneurial self (Ball and Olmedo 2013; Leathwood and Read 2013; Gill 2009; Rose 1989). Another would be to say that academics actually engage in mimicry; that is, they perform as if they comply with what is required in order to keep on doing what they had been doing all along. In both cases, there is a clear sense of agency on the part of academics. This means that treating academics as purely *victims* or (neoliberal) *culture dopes* is not particularly helpful if we want to develop a critical understanding of the reconfiguration of university–society relationships.

The public's involvement is also a prominent factor in discussions of the changing modes of public engagement. Here, we can observe both a diversification of both audiences themselves and modes of communicating with these audiences. It is to these modes that we turn next.

'Broadcasting' Versus 'Coproduction': Universities and Their Multiple Publics

Broadcasting is defined as a more *traditional* model of university–society relationships, in which the knowledge is produced within the university and then communicated—*broadcast*—to the public. Coproduction, on the other hand, assumes a very different distribution of authority, in which knowledge is jointly produced by the academic community, and the broader society. A natural scientist puts it in the following way:

> Say a decade ago, natural sciences certainly felt in jeopardy … there was real concern that the broader economy and the society at large need more scientifically literate, capable citizens, for the wellbeing of the economy. And there were also disastrous problems with science regulation, most famously genetically modified organisms, considerable concern around nanotechnology, and many others … there hadn't been an effective dialogue of what society wanted … So let's ensure there is a dialogue about those things. Some versions of that dialogue were not dialogue at all, they were broadcasting.

And he goes on to say:

> A lot of the stuff we used to call public understanding of science, that was clearly 'we know the answer, you need to understand it better' mode, which is not terribly sophisticated, but is part of the journey that got us where we are now.

A senior manager describes the shift from *broadcasting* to more participatory research:

> Our main funder explicitly requires us to work with patients and the public in the design and the delivery of research programmes. The crude version is, there's no point inventing a treatment that no patient would want to subject themselves to. And it's a different mind-set to medicine; much less patriarchal, or patronizing, if you wish. Not what it was 20 or 50 years ago; it's no longer 'we trust the man in the white coat'—things have moved on. It makes for a more complicated world, but definitely requires patient involvement.

Despite the overall impression that broadcasting is something that is no longer the dominant (or only) model of university–society relationships, some informants have hinted that the division between the modes still persists in the context of the disciplines. Thus, natural sciences and STEM subjects are more frequently associated with broadcasting while co-production is considered to be more characteristic of social sciences and humanities. This is corroborated by an overview of the projects that seek to engage the public, in which co-production figures, almost exclusively, in social sciences and humanities.

However, this does not in and of itself mean that the distribution of scientific authority is in any way truly *democratic*. What we face instead are, in fact, multiple publics, or a vision of society that is pretty well structured in terms of the capacity or agency of different subgroups to receive or contribute to the creation of scientific knowledge. As one participant puts it:

> We've moved from sharing our research and discussing it, sometimes co-designing and co-producing it with members of the public who have an interest and an appetite and the skills that allow them to participate in that dialogue, and particularly move away from broadcast, into a model where significant amounts of our research are done with a whole host of different external agencies, some of which are individuals, but it's actual organiza-

tions, governmental organizations and agencies, industry, all shades of government—local, regional.

This is arguably the most intriguing aspect of the construction of university–society relationships; namely, the ways in which academics imagine the surrounding society. Of course, some public engagement projects have an explicitly defined and/or somewhat bounded audience or target group while others are aimed at a more general public. In both cases, however, the ways in which those who participate in them think about the publics that they are engaging with can reveal a lot about the assumptions related to both the university and the society.

The first division that we encounter here is between politicians and policy-makers on the one hand, and the general public on the other hand. Although the university has a specific unit aimed at collecting and presenting the outcomes of research done by its academic staff in a manner relevant to policy-making, one member of the unit said explicitly: 'What we do is not public engagement, in the sense in which we do not aim to engage the public, but rather to influence policy.'

Although aiming to influence decision-making should clearly fit into the purview of universities' relationship with society, policy seems to fall outside of what is considered to be public. On the one hand, this distinction might be an effect of the ways in which public engagement is framed within the REF; on the other hand, given that measurement techniques explicitly address impacts on policy, it is rather strange that the staff involved in translating research into policy-relevant conclusions would not recognize this practice as something of public relevance. What seems more likely is that it has to do with the perceived nature of the relationship between universities and politicians/policy-makers.

The interviews hinted that the impact on policy is understood as at least in part dependent on informal networks and processes. In other words, policy-relevant knowledge is not intended to influence the general public first and then political decision-making. It is, instead, directed through less open channels, aiming for a more direct influence on policy-makers. One of the participants suggested the university aims to translate policy-relevant research into lobbying initiatives to ensure that the university is recognized as an important contributor to policy debates.

This resonates, to some extent, with the notion of epistemic communities as groups of experts, not all of which come from the academia, that share a general outlook and belong to the same networks of knowledge

production (see e.g. Davis-Cross 2013; Eyal and Bucholz 2010). However, whereas the concept of epistemic community assumes a relatively non-hierarchical distribution of power within the group, this does not seem to be the case when it comes to the links between the academia and policy-makers. Instead, the participants' narratives seem to ascribe a higher degree of power as well as agency in terms of policy outcomes to the political side: while academics *produce* knowledge, it is up to the politicians to decide which aspect of this knowledge they will *take up*. This is perhaps best illustrated by the following longer quote, in which an academic describes how she tried to pass on her recently published book to a senior politician:

> A lot of the work that I've written I wanted to have impact. I've said some quite controversial things about assessment, curriculum, social justice, so I would hope it would influence policy makers. Now the question is 'who are policy-makers'?—they are politicians. I suppose new potential—well, it won't be a Labour government, but if they became interested I'd be very happy to talk to them, but if [the Secretary of State for Education] became interested, I'd be very pleased to talk to him. You just want change for the young people themselves, so I think through any government … that's more important than being party political. I was in London the other day and I gave it to [an advisor] who sort of has [the Secretary of State's] ear … but would he have read it? That's the question.

In other words, one side of the universities' relationship with the society seems to consist of engaging *up*. The paradigmatic case is academics presenting research findings to decision-makers who, in turn, choose how (and whether) to adopt these findings and/or incorporate them into policy. The balance of political power, in this sense, clearly remains on the political side; academics have very little influence beyond the 'point of delivery.' In other words, they cannot claim ownership over the political consequences or implications of their research.

A similarly bounded concept of agency surfaces in one participant's recounting of the university's relationship with industry. Here, he says:

> I think it's what they [industry] really, really value, is the people we produce. Now, the knowledge is great, and if it's embedded in the right people who then go on to work for the industry then everybody`s really happy at that point. So whatever I say about research and knowledge, what the industry really values in the high potential to come out of universities into their … well-prepared talent, but it's a talent. That said, they like those people to be

prepared in the context of what industry is about, and I think they value the preparation we can give students and the rest of the world.

This does not mean that all universities' *publics* are similarly hierarchically ordered. A different relationship occurs in projects and activities that involve co-production. One of the lead investigators in one of these projects describes it in the following way:

> [The project] has a very kind of strong ethic about engaging in co-produced research …The first phase looked probably more like a conventional academic study in many ways [but then] that developed as a mechanism for engagement between local authority, statutory organizations and the police. And minority communities.

In practice, this means that academics first identify a specific group (or groups) of interest, such as ethnic minority communities from the south of the city, disabled persons, elderly citizens and single parents. Next, these groups are brought together or involved in a combination of research and advocacy, which usually entails the academics designing and predominantly carrying out the research itself. The findings of the research are then either fed back to the communities in question or integrated with the knowledge assumed to exist in the local community before being presented to policy-makers and decision-makers, such as local authorities.

These forms of engagement assume a different distribution of power than in the case of universities' relationships with expert publics. While there are clear attempts to involve representatives of different community groups in coordinating co-produced research, their role usually remains limited to data collection or providing input for the analysis, which is usually done by academics. Although research findings are typically presented to the representatives of the community in question, who are able to give feedback and even influence the formulation of the results, scientific authority tends to remain within the realm of the academia. As one researcher in such a project put it,

> I suppose [co-production] is quite a challenging activity. Because I suppose one of the issues that come about is the issue of translation, of what it means to sort of say 'let's work together on a piece of research' and sort of translating what does research do, what's research for, what's research design, what can research achieve.

She goes on to point out some of the issues in the process of communicating the ideas about research to the partners in co-production:

> So I suppose it's kind of a sense of being able to have a kind of dialogue so you have a kind of, you know, sort of flow of ideas between partners about the nature of research and specification about what research ought to be about and can do. So it's about trying to make research work out for people who sometimes have very specific, or perhaps not very clear, ideas on what research is for or what it can achieve.

In this case, the academic community involved in the project retains epistemic authority to decide what the research is about. Although the groups engaged in co-production are able to respond and give feedback, the responsibility and the final form in which the data is presented remains within the academia. This longer quote reflects well the issues arising from the presentation of research results:

> So, communities are diverse groups. They have cleavages, definitely divisions within and across community groups, so there are very different perspectives on claims on sort of things like inclusiveness …. So then we had an issue on how to produce a report that sort of reflected the collaborative roots. But we've fed back to people what we've reported, and ask them to reflect on it … and we've had to kind of negotiate with people about when they've objected to us, including things in the report that were very, very strong themes in the data … because they've wanted us to censor the data, and that's not something we were able to do.

Therefore, even in co-produced research, boundaries between universities and the society remain. They might be more porous, but they are far from being completely abandoned. At one point, one of staff member commented: 'Of course, we are working with those that are, in a manner, "the usual suspects"—people around the wealthy areas of the city. We do not reach those that we actually need to reach.'

In this sense, it can be argued that universities engage with the society in two basic modes. One could be described as *engaging up*—in the sense of producing knowledge (or human resources) that are eventually adopted by other actors, including policy-makers and industry. The other is *engaging down*—in cases in which the university or its staff transfer knowledge or skills related to certain areas of expertise to specific publics—usually themselves defined through policies that aim to define and order political subjectivities.

Conclusions

The main topics that emerge from the interviews and participant observation related to the construction of university–society relationships in a UK university seem to suggest several relevant points for understanding the role of actors and agency in contemporary academia. For one, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize academic agency *outside* the current political landscape. This means that academics predominantly view their own practice within existing institutional and political structures, including policy drivers that aim to promote specific forms of the universities' engagement with society. Yet, this by no means implies that academics see these policies as the sole driver of public engagement. Many, as we can see, describe the construction of university–society relationships as 'business as usual,' with the exception that it is being increasingly defined, measured and framed as engagement or impact.

On the one hand, therefore, there is a clear sense of temporal grounding—the 'tyranny of the moment' (cf. Vostal 2016, Hylland-Eriksen 2001) associated with neoliberal governmentality. From this perspective, although the participants might invoke nostalgic comparisons with how things used to be, these reminiscences need to be understood as a form of accentuating the specificities of the present condition. On the other hand, there is a sense of continuity, exemplified in the notion of public engagement as business as usual, the idea that the only significant change is actually in the capturing and documenting of what academics do. Yet, this is, of course, not entirely true; public engagement entails a substantial degree of labor, and although some of it is carried by administrative and managerial staff focusing on relationships with society, in order to exist in the first place, it requires academics to willingly participate or at least cooperate in such projects. This, as suggested, points to the relevance of bringing actors back in, or devoting more attention to the conceptualization of academic agency within the neoliberal university.

The other dominant theme to emerge concerns the ways in which the work of public engagement (re)constructs the relationship between the university and the *outside world*. While we can observe a discursive shift from broadcasting to co-production, closer analysis reveals that the relationship between universities and society is structured in multiple and hierarchical ways. The relationship between the university and politics, industry and even the media is characterized by what could best be described as engaging *up*: academics deliver research or, in some cases,

human resources, while it remains up to the governments, industry or other stakeholders to decide how they want to use them. The mode of co-production, however, most often entails another form of hierarchy in which authority related to the production of knowledge remains within the academic community. While the role of partner communities varies, from users through data collectors to collocutors, the center of power rarely shifts from academia toward them. What happens more frequently is that academics assert themselves as 'mediators' between these communities and power structures; in this way, they become 'voices of the marginalized,' or rather assume authority on the basis of the idea that they represent or channel—through academic forms of communication, including research—the identities and agency of groups that make up society (cf. Osborne 2004).

Of course, the role of academia in representing and mediating the interests of different and variously defined groups has long been a topic of research and debate, especially in sociology and anthropology (see e.g. Burawoy 2005; Marcus and Fischer 1999). Current research on the construction of university–society relationships converges with these discussions on the topic of the role of academics as actors. In other words, what the research presented here illustrates is how academics attempt to negotiate and redefine their own authority, and thus their position in society, in the context of new policies related to public engagement. The work of public engagement thus entails the redrawing of the boundaries between universities and societies, which, while becoming somewhat more porous, still maintain a division between the institutions and agents of scientific authority—academics—and the *rest* of the society.

This aspect adds to the longer thread of work on boundaries in the social sciences. From Gieryn's (1983) conceptualization of 'boundary work' as the process of demarcation between science and non-science to Lamont's (2009) analysis of the relationship between individual worldviews and the social construction of epistemic authority (see also Lamont and Molnár 2002), boundaries are important as a means of simultaneously defining what constitutes the university as a site of knowledge production in contrast to the society on the outside. In this context, agency in public engagement can be seen as the process of mediating structural conditions while maintaining structural privileges. Public engagement is therefore neither a practice of compliance nor a strategy of resistance to the transformation of higher education; instead, it is both. On the one hand, it can be considered as a response to the structural and institutional

changes emanating from the neoliberal transformation of the conditions of knowledge production. On the other hand, it involves actors in ways that, more or less consciously, relate to exactly the kind of privilege academia is associated with. In this sense, it presents a salient example of how academia manages to maintain some continuity in the context of global transformations.

Note

1. This research was conducted as part of the EU FP7-funded Marie Curie ITN 'Universities in the knowledge economy' (UNIKE), which compared the relationship between universities and the construction of transnational spaces in Europe and the Asia-Pacific (www.unike.au.dk).

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Searching for Authenticity and Success: Academic Identity and Production in Neoliberal Times

Özgür Budak

Introduction

Society's changing structure and relations, which are increasingly shaped by neoliberal principles and flexible work regimes, occupy a central place in contemporary sociology of education and culture. As an introduction to the problem, Clark's (1987) work focused on the shifting nature of higher education in terms of educational criteria and academic identity. In a decade dominated by emergent managerialism and marketization, academics' identity crises and the potential transformation of academic social relations was a significant factor in the impact of neoliberalism on higher education systems. Rising post-Fordist principles, with their all-encompassing effects on social life, started to change the meanings associated with academic identity and the processes shaping the structure of academic production. Apart from a transforming structural relationship between university, the economy and the state, new social dynamics are

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shifting the nature and development of academic identities. According to Clegg (2008), universities and academic life are becoming a fragmented and differentiated social medium, affecting both teaching and academic production in the post-Fordist era. Similarly, Trowler and Knight (2000) highlight the ritualistic nature of academic identity and the relationship between academic culture and the production of knowledge, particularly the increasingly fragmented nature of academic culture and the tensions of academic production in an institutional realm shaped by the new economy and more volatile career paths.

The study focuses on the interplay between the configurations of the neoliberal academic field and the survival strategies of junior academics within the existing power structure. At an individual level, the emergence of a flexible and adaptable disposition creates a tension between professional norms and actual survival strategies in a demanding environment, which raises several important questions. How can academics reconcile the pragmatics of a flexible labor regime with the established norms that shape the collective self-esteem of the cultural producers? How can the claim of authenticity stand alongside the publish or perish culture that is becoming increasingly widespread in Turkish academia? Finally, can we identify an ethos that reconciles and legitimizes the conflicting roles and strategies academics are being forced to adopt to stay afloat in the academic field?

Although universities are part of post-Fordist structural changes, there is also an apparent tension between the character of academic identity and knowledge production, and the market-oriented principles of the new economic policies. First, academics are middle-class cultural producers whose social positioning has been shaped predominantly by cultural and intellectual capital investment. Furthermore, as cultural producers, they draw symbolic boundaries concerning moral and intellectual autonomy with other class fractions, especially the money-producing (finance) strata of the middle class (Lamont 1992; Bourdieu 1996). Therefore, neoliberal policies and flexible accumulation regimes, which affect the autonomy of academic production, pose a serious threat, not only to career paths and strategies in higher education but also to the very identity and self-esteem of academics.

This study of the effects of neoliberalism on higher education draws mainly on three interconnected dimensions. The first dimension concerns institutional restructuring and resource distribution according to changing institutional priorities, which affect the objective structure of the academic

field. The second dimension is related to the professional socialization of academics in the academic field, which shapes career paths and individual development strategies. The third dimension is the emergent practical rationality or sense of the game among actors in the academic field, who are constantly adopting and internalizing the specific rationality the field encompasses. All of those dimensions have been scrutinized in the current literature (Davies 2005; Harris 2005; Archer 2014; Billot 2010). For example, Davies' investigation of the nature of intellectual work and its crisis within the Australian academic landscape highlighted how neoliberal governance has shaped moral codes of professionalism within universities. According to Davies (2005), apart from the ideological language of the neoliberal paradigm, governing principles and managerialism have subtly influenced the existing professional ethos of academics, creating a 'seductive landscape for academic success' (p. 8) that is adopted by actors trying to hold on to their careers. Davies also discussed a possible dual language that includes conflicting themes, such as playing the game and defending the autonomy of the university at both institutional and individual levels. Such dual language and social practices shape the conflicting characteristics of neoliberal academic subjects. For academics who are trying to maintain a balance between academic identity and career strategies in a precarious social setting, it 'feels good to be flexible and adaptable, but it also feels terrible when they realize we cannot afford to stop' (Davies 2005, p. 9).

In order to hold on to their jobs, neoliberal selves must become flexible, multi-skilled, mobile and be able to respond to new demands and situations (Sennett 2005). The new skill of survival brings with it a new ethos or dispositional set supporting the moral justification of neoliberal principles. First, as traditional institutional ties dissolve, academics tend to see responsibility as something that can only be achieved at the individual level (Harris 2005; Archer 2014; Billot 2010). Second, parameters of success and criticism are centered heavily on the workplace, so the cultural norms through which academics assess their abilities and future plans are produced within the ever-present influence of workplace efficiency because it is too risky to do otherwise (Davies 2005, p. 11). The second shift also produces a so-called detachment between professionalism and self-esteem as academics experience the tensions between the impact of neoliberal principles on the production of knowledge and the traditionally perceived sense of academic honor. In other words, academics trying to survive the managerialism formed under neoliberal career paths increasingly detach

their self-identity from the strategies they pursue to achieve success in the workplace. According to Shore (2010), this detachment has created a 'schizophrenic academic' (p. 20) identity, in which issues of one's self-honor, political worldview and actual professional work ethic become radically detached from each other, creating a fragmented academic identity and social setup within universities. Last, the illusion of individual and professional autonomy is created within neoliberal social norms. Apart from ideological propaganda, neoliberal governance has shaped a world of professional morality and efficiency in which individuals are encouraged to collectively invent virtues under audit managerialism and a general rhetoric of workplace efficiency (Davies 2005, p. 10). Academics now live in a system where managerial efficiency and individual assessment come with their own promises of success (in terms of new funds, grants and flexible resources in career building) as well as failure (being socially isolated, inefficient and lagging); they are adapting to the rules or the *illusion* of the game *via* internalized managerial surveillance, adapting to the precarious social setup under the empowering language of opportunities for success. In short, neoliberalism creates its own form of hegemony through career paths, managerialism and self-efficiency rituals, thereby imposing the sense of the game through compatible dispositions and the morality of actors located in the academic field.

Neoliberal Actors in Turkish Academia

Concerning academia in Turkey, one of the earliest warnings came from Nalbantoğlu (2003) in his famous paper (see Chap. 9 for the English translation) on the emergence of a neoliberal academic identity produced by the new economy. Aiming to describe the social type of an academic adapting to new ways of life in a neoliberal university, Nalbantoğlu's 'yuppie academic' (2003, p. 21) combines the level of individual entrepreneurship with resource management, creating knowledge compatible with the current range of possible ideas and social scientific parameters, thereby maximizing the benefits of focusing on certain topics while simultaneously minimizing the cost of investing in politically sensitive areas. The academic social type also included a particular fusion of a so-called global academic identity with supporting dispositions to create a lifestyle centered around academic tourism (Nalbantoğlu 2003, p. 28), gentrified campus urbanization and class-based symbols of intellectual production. The effects of the merger of multinational capital partnership with academic production

were also scrutinized by Ergur (2003) in his study on the marketization of the university. According to Ergur (ibid.), marketization of knowledge has shaped a language of legitimization that supports a pragmatic view of academic production by establishing close ties with broader market dynamics. Drawing on this discussion of cultural and institutional aspects of neoliberalization, I propose several themes regarding the neoliberalization of Turkey's higher education system:

1. Globalization as a meta-narrative that highlights the 'need' for bolstering multinational interaction while simultaneously using the symbolic power of the term 'global' to support the priorities of the new economy, thereby legitimizing its organizing principles.
2. The emerging managerialist culture and the import of free-market corporate culture as the only answer for financial and administrative problems in higher education, using a symbolic language that strengthens the incorporation of administrative efficiency and the production of academic knowledge that is closely linked with broader market mechanisms.
3. Budget policies based on market efficiency and academic production that prioritize the type of knowledge production compatible with the overall managerialist culture, which also shapes a rationality of funds and grants presented as the only way to improve academic standards and the only real alternative to budget cuts.
4. A continuous updating of a flexible labor force and the fiscal and cultural encouragement of the new academic identity in a new social setup that shapes a career path in which increasingly fragmented and isolated academics seek ways of survival in a delicate balance between academic production, increasing lecture time and fulfillment of project grants.

    This power structure as it exists currently in the neoliberal academic field eventually leads to specific tensions experienced at an individual level.

Exploring the Tensions of Academic Identity

The main tension in the academic identity of neoliberal times seems to lie between the required authenticity of academic work and the general parameters of career success. One of the obstacles facing young academics

is to reconcile the performativity demanded by the new university system (e.g. more international conferences, more funded projects, indexed publications, etc.) with an increasingly tight schedule divided between administrative work and teaching time. In other words, the resources required for authentic knowledge production often conflict with an ever-increasing workload in the fragmented world of academics, who are trying to hold on to their advancement in a precarious career path. How, then, can managerialism coexist with the cultural and intellectual normative structure that is seen as a basis for *authentic*[1] academic work? How do staff perceptions of institutional research, academic culture and the (non-)alignment between managerialism and social scientific knowledge production provide insights into the career conflicts between the 'academic manager and managed academic' (Winter 2009, pp. 121–131). Furthermore, how can academics reconcile their positioning in a field that has become unstable with post-Fordist labor policies and dynamics? How do academics decontextualize their identities in such an environment? These are the main questions this chapter investigates while looking at the ongoing process of identity formation as a means of tackling the academic field's resources and positioning. That is, identity is taken as a process of development, derived from the sense of the game or the practical rationality of those involved and their social positioning.

According to Briggs' (2007) formulation, the identity process has three main dimensions: professional norms describing the legitimizing referencing system to begin *high-quality* academic activity; a professional location in which individuals situate or contextualize their dispositions and morals depending on the particular workplace; and a professional role as the sum of academic and administrative responsibilities (Calhoun 1991). In his seminal work on corporate culture, Jackall (2009) argues that the lack of a stable bureaucratic structure and the absence of a clear path of evaluation and promotion create a double language in a post-Fordist working landscape, in which norms, professional attachment and actual career activities have been becoming increasingly distinct. Can this double language, with its own inherited tensions and fragmentation, be observed in junior academics' self and professional identities as well as their career strategies?

The dimensions to be investigated within the general theoretical framework discussed above require face-to-face inquiry with academics struggling to balance performance and authenticity. Therefore, I gathered data from a qualitative standpoint to listen to and voice the academics in

their working environments. Since my theoretical questions are anchored around the interplay between subjectivity, power relations and cultural production, I incorporated ethnographic insights from a cultural sociological perspective. Apart from the interview process, I spent time in offices and corridors to gain a further feel for the game, observing attitudes and symbols in the social setting of the departments.

The analysis is based on in-depth interviews with seven junior academics in Turkish universities who are in the earlier stages of their careers. They were selected specifically, in that they are socialized within the neoliberal academic culture. The selection was based on snowballing, which allows more confidentiality between the interviewees and the researcher. The interviewees were aged between 35 and 40. All have PhDs although none have tenure contracts or long-term employment prospects; that is, they are in the process of establishing their career base and legitimacy in the academia. The chapter particularly focuses on junior academics employed in private universities in İzmir, Turkey, specifically from social and administrative sciences: Department of Sociology (1), Department of Communication (2), Department of International Relations (2) and Department of Economics (2). My work with social science scholars employed in comparatively recently founded private universities is based on two main assumptions. First, the tension between success and authenticity is greater in specialties with well-established critical thinking on the human condition and social systems, possibly making the cultural codes of authentic academic work and career strategies radically incompatible with other areas of scientific production. Furthermore, the tension discussed above between authenticity and flexible strategies may be particularly disruptive for the identities of cultural producers since the critical assessment required in social science is not always compatible with the new flexible strategies adopted within academia. The second assumption is that although state universities and their staff also act in a similar environment, it would be easier to observe the interaction between neoliberal dynamics and academic actors in a social environment relying on private sector investment, sharing close ties to broader capital formations. The participants' names and identifiable information are anonymized as the closed, ritualistic character of academia imposes significant pressures on the actors. This can make academics reluctant to reveal the inner dynamics of the game since it would mean breaking certain rules accepted in the professional socialization of academics.[2]

The Threat of Social Isolation

The bureaucratic transformation, which has significant effects on career paths, working relations and institutional loyalty, also changes academics' professional identities. The erosion of traditional social ties and evaluation mechanisms in the workplace has led to a social setting where there are no longer clear, reliable paths for promotion and evaluation, forcing academics toward individualistic survival strategies based on the accumulation of social capital. In any future career crisis, this will enable the academic to utilize his/her own established network for quickly finding new or better jobs. The lack of a stable formal institutional structure and the relative instability of the jobs in private universities also lead to a fear of social isolation among academics. As Sennett (1998) points out, under neoliberal working conditions, survival becomes an individual responsibility, encouraging a new worker disposition that relies on social networks and capital to invest in a certain academic career to prepare for unforeseeable future crises in a volatile social setting. This new risk of disposability is more challenging than the old class-based meritocratic welfare state system since it is experienced at a very individual level. Consequently, a neoliberal academic subject becomes both more vulnerable and more competitive in order to adapt to the field's new parameters. Hakan[3] (35 years old), who recently finished his PhD in the United States and is working as a full-time lecturer while waiting for a more stable assistant professor position in the university, says that he feels he wasted a lot of time doing a PhD abroad: 'Now I came back to the country and I feel a sense of not belonging to my environment, as if the game's rules were changed and nobody told me.'

Banu (37) feels a similar sense of loss in the pragmatics and workload of an understaffed private university. She also completed her PhD in the United States and works as a lecturer in the Sociology Department: 'I fear I am no player in this game; I only know reading, writing and analyzing stuff. However, the university today is a big mess of lecturing, administrative jobs and more lecturing. I am just lingering.' Banu's pessimism is based on a fear of social isolation and her lack of knowledge of social ties and networks. Thus, in her words, she prefers to be an *outsider* focusing on her own individual place and not caring so much for her surroundings. She does not have a sense of belonging to the university as an institution although the 'sense of criticism alive' in social sciences still attracts her. Not all of the respondents, however, sounded as *defeatist* as Banu.

Aylin (35), for example, feels that the fear of isolation and volatility is not necessarily a formidable threat. For her, the struggle to stay alive in this structure also offers some opportunities for improving herself. She claims that academics today cannot isolate themselves from the broader environment that affects an academic career: 'It is not just a danger, it is a kind of opportunity, to be able to divert yourself to other areas, knowing new people. So in a way it depends on how you deal with the problems.' For her, making national and international social contacts are as important as producing a good article:

> At the beginning I was just studying alone; no one knew me and it was really hard to publish anything; so I focused on conferences and meetings to stay on the radar of other people. It suddenly became much easier to publish.

Her fear of social isolation can be eliminated only by a purposeful disposition to meet others, however, that does not necessarily mean coworking with the other academics. In most cases, including Aylin as well as Dilek (37), who completed her PhD in England, these academics prefer doing research alone if the outcome of the work is sufficiently *authentic*, meaning that the quality of the work or the subject matter is publishable in higher echelon journals. Respondents make a kind of calculation between the effort that a research project will require and the 'cost of making it co-authored.' That is, co-authorship is accepted if it provides an opportunity to make a breakthrough in the academic community in terms of authentic contribution or entering into a close-knit academic circle that is otherwise hard to penetrate. In other words, co-authorship and academic work itself become part of the ensemble of an individual career that has to be structured as the pursuit of a range of enterprises. Especially for those respondents who understand and adapt to the general structure of the game, an academic career is pretty much an individual activity aimed at certain future goals in which both knowledge production and social capital reflect the strategic character of this ethos and the structure of the enterprise form.

Apart from reflecting academic work as a form of enterprise, all the respondents see social networks as the central component of a successful academic career regardless of their ability to establish such ties. Accumulating sufficient social capital is seen as a priority even above cultivating their own institutions' inner networks. Banu recognizes this as a big disadvantage for her; she thinks that some people have the energy and

subtle strategic nature needed for establishing such bonds in the university while some—including herself—cannot: 'I am always friends with the wrong person; you know the romantic notion of the academy … some people have this talent for contacting the right person at the right time.' Banu's sense of defeat in the university comes not from the quality of her research work or lecturing but from the general social capital that can be accumulated in a certain amount of time: 'You have to be fast to make such links with other people; after some time when you get old, it is too late to turn the wheel.' This sense of urgency in terms of accumulating social capital is predominant in the respondents' perspectives. Both the *players of the game* and *outsiders* refer to a certain best moment for entering a social network before it becomes really hard to establish such relationships, especially to counter an uncertain future. In short, the accumulation of social capital is closely related to the individualist career strategy of preparing for a crisis before it 'hits you' as Hakan puts it. The players of the game, such as Aylin and Dilek, also actively monitor opportunities to gain admission to particular cultural and social networks and communities. Apart from inherently academic communities, these respondents also pursue activities involving other social networks, especially those with international ties, such as business associations, a Lions membership or an institutional membership, like the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

For the respondents who regard themselves as able to reach their goals in current academic life, cultural symbols, forms of individuality and social visibility produce rhetoric for success, which is also a sign of being culturally intelligible subjects in a hostile environment. Therefore, independently from their positioning *vis-à-vis* political affiliations or social scientific paradigms, they defend the symbolic world of the classed cultural and social objects that stand as a general surrounding the language of success, planning and adaptability.

One interesting example is Selim (38), who completed his PhD in another private university in Turkey. He feels 'ok' in terms of success within the academy. When I refer to the political debates concerning the nature of power and hegemony in the neoliberal society, he supports the criticisms against the neoliberal university and the erosion of academic independence; however, when we started talking about individual-level achievements, he constantly referred to the cultural and social symbols of being international, privileged and successful: 'The quality of an international conference can be seen in the hotels they arrange for you.' Selim

frequently refers to business class flights, the quality of foreign hotels and how he is a frequent flyer who has the opportunity to use airport lounges. Thus, in his world, the classed symbols of success are intertwined with the academic quality of certain activities. As Walkerdine (2003) argued, the subject who masters the neoliberal repertoires of the self will most probably be recognized as more competent, marketable and desirable in a society where neoliberal discourses of managerialism and success are dominant. Those who actively pursue the promised cultural and economic privileges easily adapt themselves to the classed symbolism of successful academic culture. Being a successful player in the academic field or staying as an outsider requires a constant need for (or fear of, in the case of being an outsider) updating the necessary credentials or labor to stay on one's career path. While perhaps endowed with certain economic, social and cultural privileges, the subject in the neoliberal academy is nevertheless also a 'failing subject' (Walkerdine 2003), characterized by constant dissatisfaction, guilt and an urge to improve.

The Significance of Being Busy

As discussed above, one of the biggest impacts on the neoliberal academy has been changing the sense of social adaptability and responsibility into something that can only be achieved at an individual level. As a consequence, both the *players* in and *outsiders* to the academic field describe a highly individualistic world, divided by a strict separation between success and failure. A fear of academic isolation and inability to react to future career crises go in parallel with opportunities and improvement in a volatile and internationalized world and shape a kind of dispositional quality embracing the academic identity as a continuous portfolio that can be achieved by adding individualistic credentials. Thus, in a world where managerial efficiency and capital investment prevail, an academic subject turns into a project in the making, a work in continuous progress (O'Flynn and Petersen 2007). Through an individualistic regime of self-development, many young academics make sense of the activities surrounding them as life opportunities taken or lost in a career path to develop into productive, useful and successful professionals. Although respondents such as Hakan and Banu claimed to be rejecting the 'rich boy game' and the professional rhetoric of privileged classes, they also describe an academic world heavily reliant on individualistic stories of success or failure.

Other respondents who are willing to participate in the game see themselves and other people as portfolios: 'You have to look good on paper so other people have an easy time to understand what kind of investment you have made, but at the same time you have to act accordingly,' claims Selim. In such a word of adaptability, individualization and opportunities, academics produce their own symbols of suffering and breaking through. Adding to the sense of urgency I discussed above, being busy is constituted as an indicator of getting it right while working hard to achieve goals is an indicator of moral toughness. Therefore, being busy emerges as a symbol, utilized to convey an image of potential energy and resilience with predominantly positive connotations. 'People are always trying to catch up to something,' Hakan says 'and sometimes that makes me feel isolated. I mean how can all those guys be so busy? Or do I have some malfunction?' The cartoons and slogans attached to the office doors of neoliberal academics indicate that being busy is something that can be carried as a 'badge of honor' (Walkerdine 2003). For example, a note tacked on the office door of one of the respondents read, 'Feel free to waste my valuable time.' In a world characterized by a continuous struggle for improvement, the term 'being busy' turns out to have an ironic double meaning: that is to say, being aware of the tensions and fragile character of the academic world while also being capable of staying afloat in such a demanding profession. Being busy is one of the central themes whereby neoliberal managerialism finds its way into the dispositional properties of individual academics, in their sense of belonging to a specific world of professional identity.

Ali (36), a social scientist with a working-class background, compares the department in the state university where he completed his graduate studies to the current social relations and architectural setting of the newly founded private university where he currently works: 'It is so annoying; sometimes a week passes before I encounter one of my colleagues in the department corridor. Everyone is busy but their works are so obscure; no one shares their articles' topics with other people.' Banu expresses a similar complaint about social relations in her department: 'I am fed up with being busy and trying to meet some deadline. I want things to go slower, but here, everyone is trying to finish an article behind locked doors.'

The symbols of professional and social dexterity can be read as the dispositional acceptance or adaptation of younger academics, who recognize that stress and insecurity is normal in their institutional fields, turning the

specific ideological character of a field into a subjective appreciation of a professional identity. Following Davies and Petersen (2005), I would argue that the morally accepted norms of academia illustrate the symbolic violence, a form of violence 'exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2002, p. 167). This violence can be observed in the academics' motivations to perform and be socially compatible, 'flexible, insecure and fragmented,' and restless subjects of a flexible work regime. Thus, neoliberal governance is turning power back onto the self in order to shape a self-governing subject. The work ethic and the aesthetic struggle faced by young academics are manifestations of internalized power relations in moral and aesthetic realms.

Through dexterity symbols like being busy, the individualistic and performative character of academic life is transformed into aesthetic and moral codes that are believed to be part of an inevitable struggle in today's academia. While this internalization of the neoliberal image of the academic is not inevitable, the tension embedded in a calculus of risks *versus* opportunities gives rise to a cultural landscape that encourages academics to respond to neoliberal aims, adaptations and assessments. This transformation is not part of any ideological meta-narrative but shaped and reasserted through the moral codes of efficiency and honesty in the working place (Shore 2010). Therefore, the flexible subject who is alert to the future risks of a social setting cultivates a dispositional set of properties that is quite compatible with the managerialist principles of the flexible labor regime.

Doing but Not Being: The Dual Language of the Neoliberal Subject

The neoliberal social setting imposes considerable physical, mental and emotional pressure on academics, who are trying to successfully balance an insecure financial future, a heavy administrative workload and the time and energy required to produce authentic academic work. Respondents used a dual language concerning their ability to tackle the workload and career plans. Some, like Banu and Ali, claimed that the current workload makes it nearly impossible to meet the expectations of a successful scholar; thus, on the one hand, they feel depressed about the contradictory nature of academic self-esteem and the practicalities of their career: 'I don't know what a successful career means. I have had to adapt myself to the new conditions and started to focus on ways of producing articles like everybody

does.' For Banu, the contradiction between workload and academic production is a disappointing aspect of the work, although she believes the capacity to produce decent work is there sooner or later; it is just a matter of 'tweaking the academic work to be able to publish better.' When asked what she meant by 'tweaking,' she responded with certain degree of pragmatism: 'You know you don't have to publish breakthrough articles every time so you have to sense what is worth trying and what is not.' Thus, for Banu, the production of academic papers is more or less a technical task related to keeping a balance between what is authentic and what is real. Within the pragmatics of the profession, authenticity becomes the quality of an academic work that is worthy of publication in higher echelon journals that add more to further promotions. Conversely, a journal with a lower impact factor or lower ranking in the relevant academic assessment processes is not seen as worthy of the investment of time, energy and intellectual resources. This mental rearrangement of the degree of authenticity highlights the existing power relations within the academic structure through the strategies and pragmatics of academic production.

Aylin defends the same practical approach to academic work. For her, producing articles is almost a technique. One cannot waste energy on something that is bound to fail so there must be a plan, a kind of short-term source management:

> It is not something you like or not. People publish dozens of articles while you wait for the best time and the golden topic. I learned that lesson quickly, so each paper needs its own effort and sources. Is it worth it? You have to ask this question over and over again.

Junior academics with an outsider stance think likewise, accepting the practical nature of academic knowledge while avoiding any ideological alliance with neoliberal jargon. However, this practical reason has its cost when it comes to self-esteem as a social science scholar. Most of the respondents, especially the outsiders who are reluctant to play the game efficiently, expressed a kind of detachment from their self-identity when it comes to the pragmatics of academic knowledge. Only one academic, Selim, who was strongly engaged in the symbolic language and pragmatism of the game, claimed to be content with the consistency between what he did and what he felt as an academic. Others mentioned that the constant insecurity and feeling of development pushed them to the limits. To a certain point, the pragmatics of publishing does not sit well with the

romantic idea of academia that they pursued in school. 'I don't identify myself with the job I do at work,' says Hakan, 'because if I do, I know very well that it would make me unhappy. So I decided to let go at school and focus on the brighter side of life at home.'

Banu also expresses a similar disposition toward the pragmatics of academic work: 'Well, I feel quite detached from the work so I am not that stressed anymore.' This almost cynical detachment between academic work and the 'brighter side of life' seems to be a way of reconciling the tension between being and doing as a neoliberal subject.[4] Interestingly, the detached disposition of the academic fits quite well with the social typology of the flexible professional that tries to reconcile the world of self-esteem and pragmatics in the fragmented world of the new economy. Sennett (2005) describes this post-Fordist world in terms of an urban professional ethos built on working hard and enjoying life. Archer (2014) argues that the contemporary neoliberal subject pursues a careful balance between opportunism and pessimism. Despite all the pressures of performativity, individuals have created spaces for the exercise of personal autonomy and agency. However, the social significance of this principled space is open to discussion. Is it a kind of resistance coming from the *sense critique* of the subjects? Or does it show that the detached disposition of working academics is a subtle strategy for creating the optimum balance between pragmatics and self-esteem that is quite essential in current academic cultural norms? I believe there is a need to analytically assess such moral and aesthetic explanations before linking them to the ability of young academics to adapt to the neoliberal intellectual climate.

Conclusion

In their recent study, Vatansever and Gezici Yalçın (2015) investigate the precarization of academic labor in Turkey's private universities. Although their research focuses on the daily results of a larger political economic restructuring, they also demonstrate the hegemonic character of the academic identity emerging from current tensions. What they call 'voluntary asceticism' (2015, pp. 239–246) can be defined as the embedded power relations within the labor structure of academia in Turkey. This embeddedness can be observed in the relative weakness of academics' ideological and institutional willingness to form unions and collective organizations to defend their rights, as compared to manual workers. This could partly result from their white-collar identity, which

often excludes working-class ethos and symbolism. As cultural producers, these academics also tend to resort to justifications that the flexible, individualistic and insecure rearrangement of the working landscape also comes with celebrated symbols, such as creativity, mobility and success. The myths of academic independence, higher-status aspirations, the distant goal of tenure contracts and the seductive cultural landscape of globalized academia shape an environment in which most academics seek an individualistic way to survive.

Although this chapter left several aspects to be investigated, it provided hints for tackling the subtle interplay between neoliberal subjectivity and the dynamics of the academic field. Apart from the discussion of structure and agency, it showed how a willingness to participate in a social field results in the internalization of the sense of the game or, in Bourdieu's terms, the *illusion* of the social positioning and parameters of the field. The new era in higher education is frequently associated with increased feelings of insecurity and uncertainty. The heavy workload and the lack of a strong institutional long-term career support shape a detached and fragmented academic identity. Some younger academics choose to heavily engage in the game and focus on the promises of a flexible labor system while others express their concerns and disillusion. Yet a close examination of dispositional properties reveals a struggle to adapt to the existing parameters of the academic field. Young academics that were born and raised within the neoliberal hegemonic language of political and social elites are developing strategies to remain meaningful actors in a volatile and precarious professional environment. Their internalization of the capacity to survive in such an environment can be seen in their constant drive to meet high expectations while maintaining a careful balance between pragmatism and self-esteem and in the detached character of their professional and intellectual identities. However, these dispositional properties can also be analyzed as symbolic violence through which the economic and social parameters of the new economy are transformed into a survival disposition, which actually internalizes the power relations within the new world of higher education. Therefore, apart from the political and social discourse of neoliberal governance, maybe it is time to turn our attention to the actual strategies of the actors and their inherent interdependence with the struggle for social positioning in the academic field, which in turn creates its own neoliberal subjective ethos, not as an institutional or political reasoning but as a moral and aesthetic justification.

Notes

1. I would like to note that the term 'authenticy' here refers not to a given objective sum of criteria but rather to the Bourdieusian conception of academic norms and symbols that are taken as an original 'social scientific' work by the academic community in a particular social context. Following Bourdieu's view of the distinct nature of institutional power and intellectual power, I argue that what it is to be an academic is by no means given but is a matter of a dynamic relationship between social and epistemological interests and structures (Barnett 2000, p. 256). Thus, academic identities are influenced by values and norms as well as by actors positioning themselves in the broader academic field.

2. In comparison to my previous work (i.e. interviews with finance professionals), the barriers between the academics and myself were indeed higher as they were more reluctant to reveal the subtle nature of the social relations they are living in. In contrast to the money-producing white-collar workers, the established rhetoric of scientific specialization and autonomy within academia acts as a social barrier. Thus, the pragmatically oriented money producer can discuss the so-called 'dirty tricks' of their field more easily than academics who construct their identity in relation to the cultural norms of academia.

3. All names are pseudonyms.

4. An interesting comparison of the detached nature of young academics can be seen from Archer's study of British higher education. One of her respondents revealed her experience with a meditation device, a flotation tank. For her, it was an unpleasant experience since the meditation forced her to isolate herself from the world as a mentally and emotionally single entity: 'My theory about it is that, before that, I did feel quite detached from work so I wasn't actually stressed because I wasn't quite in it for a while … But the flotation tank put me right back in there, which was weird' (2014, p. 279). As Archer notes (2014), being detached from the pragmatics of a neoliberal realm can function as a defense mechanism.

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Turkish Academics' Encounters with the Index in Social Sciences

Eda Çetinkaya

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the relationship between everyday academic life, which has gone through a series of micro and macro changes since the 1950s, and knowledge production practices and their relation to Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). In this framework, ICTs are one of the core components of the neoliberal restructuring of higher education and academia. They have replaced daily academic routines using paper, pen, and typewriter to become an indispensable *medium* of the knowledge production process, especially since the 1990s. The increase in the use of ICTs not only changes the working practices of academics and their relationship with the means of academic production and the media. It also affects their relationships with their colleagues

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and students, the methods they use to conduct research and access information, their lecturing techniques, their definition of academia and their overall thinking practices. Changes in knowledge production and distribution also shape the relationship academics establish with knowledge and with their own existence within academia. Thus, it is important to examine how ICTs are received in the academic environment and used by academics in their everyday lives, and how the academic knowledge produced *via* ICTs is developed within the neoliberal academic system alongside capitalist processes determining the pace of ICT development. In trying to explore these questions, I offer macro evaluations regarding what it is like to be an academic and the statuses of social sciences and the university system in Turkey in a period of rapid restructuration in the universities.

During the ethnographic fieldwork, I interviewed academics from various departments of the faculties of educational sciences, law, communication, and economics, and administrative sciences in order to explore diversities within social sciences. The qualitative data was gathered through semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 32 participants of different generations with different academic titles.[1] I carried out participant observations in academic environments, attended conferences regarding higher education and followed media content relevant to the topic. I also examined social media content produced, delivered, or received by a limited number of participants, some of whom belong to my most immediate academic environment.

One of the most prominent topics in the participants' accounts related to the production and circulation of knowledge: why and for whom it is produced, and where it is shared. Here, academic promotion criteria, which depend on publications to a great extent, and the 'competitive academic market' (Stengers 2011, p. 1) represent a significant part of 'academic capitalism' (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter 2010). One of the most explicit manifestations of the neoliberal restructuring of universities is the change in academics' purposes and methods of publication. Academics' preferences for knowledge production and sharing have been significantly affected by the hierarchical classification of academic publications (e.g. as national, international or A–B class academic journals), the inclusion of journals in citation indexes and the measurement of impact factors. Depending on how their publications are evaluated according to these classification systems, academics are offered opportunities for scholarships, funding, and positions (Pelger and Grottke 2015, p. 122). Although different criteria apply at different universities, considering that

the basic criteria in academic promotion are based on certain types of publications, the points obtained through publications can be considered as an 'output' or an 'international currency exchange,' just as is the case with the mode of production within the capitalist system (Wilkinson 2015, p. 99). Pelger and Grottke (2015, p. 124) argue that transforming academic knowledge into a 'currency exchange' causes the publications in top journals to appear as the dominant currency within the criteria of success. Lyotard also claims that, in the post-industrial and postmodern era, science, along with new technologies, has more than ever surrendered to dominant powers (1984, pp. 8–9): 'Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold; it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange' (Lyotard 1984, p. 4).

The performance evaluation reports regularly demanded by university administrations have strengthened their control over academics' everyday practices. In the current academic environment, university administrations prioritize indexed publications in their academic evaluation criteria for promotion to help the institution rank higher in national and international university rankings (Dowling 2014; Pelger and Grottke 2015; Willmott 2011). Publication houses represented in these indexes are also not immune to these free market power relations. Academic journal publishing, which has become a sector mainly based in the UK and USA, is one of the key components of the neoliberal restructuring of universities.

Starting from this background, I interviewed retired, middle-aged, and young academics[2] regarding their viewpoints and experiences of publications listed in citation indexes. Participants were selected according to the following criteria:

- retired academics who are less familiar with the current index system;
- middle-aged academics who have faced new policies regarding indexed publications as a precondition for getting a promotion at some point in their career;
- young academics trying to survive in a university system, where indexed publications had already gained critical importance for academic promotion and recruitment by the time they started their career.

The participants' opinions reflected not only changes in the purpose and form of academic knowledge production but also in the transformation of academic, scientific, and university practices. To explore this

transformation, I first discuss how neoliberal logic has been implemented by university administrations, especially with regard to the international academic ranking system. I then examine how neoliberal performance criteria, which may be internalized voluntarily or involuntarily following their imposition by university administrations, affect everyday academic life. I analyze the stress and pressures on academics caused by using publications classified in citation indexes as a performance tool. I also address the prospects for resistance among academics against these neoliberal academic patterns and the possibilities for alleviating their current academic insecurity. A constant theme throughout the chapter concerns the interconnection and simultaneous functioning of ICTs and the neoliberal academic system, which transforms and instrumentalizes academia and academics. For instance, the fact that academics subscribe to academic websites on social media and follow each other through these platforms indicates something more than the communication opportunities provided by ICTs. While these platforms provide academics with new ways of sharing their publications, they also increase their visibility. Furthermore, academics' CVs and activity reports, which include their publications, and which are regularly updated via ICT-based systems, can also be associated with academics' performance and visibility concerns within the neoliberal academic system.

Ranking and Indexing as Academic Performances

From the late eighteenth century until the late nineteenth century, there were various citation indexing systems, the first of which emerged in the context of legal studies. These systems were primarily used to introduce the literature and academics in certain fields, to determine the number of publications and to keep track of publications and research outcomes (Shapiro 1992, pp. 337–339). Since the 1980s, however, the purpose of citation indexing has changed in parallel with the neoliberal agenda (Espeland and Sauder 2007; Peters 1992). Due to a reduction in resources allocated to universities from government budgets, universities started to be managed like profit-driven enterprises, research budgets were reduced, short-term education programs spread, and the concept and assurance of permanent employment was abandoned. Instead, academics were encouraged to provide research budgets through projects while a quite successful ideological campaign was run within society claiming that academic studies, particularly in social sciences, were neither practical nor useful (Jemielniak

and Greenwood 2015, pp. 73–77; Peters 1992, p. 124). Universities run using calculations, measurement, and budget strategies became part of a culture of control. The key actors of universities are directly affected by these changes:

> The neo-liberal system converts students, faculty, administrators, and policy makers into specific kinds of social actors: meritocratic strivers who seek to climb the ladder of success higher and faster than their direct competitors. These neo-liberal persons together interact to produce a university system in which all are instrumental strivers constrained to follow tracks laid out for them. This is the death of higher education, not a reform of a system. (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, p. 73)

The media that academics chose to share information[3] also turned out to be an indicator defining them, affecting not only the way academics receive themselves but also how they are perceived by their colleagues within academia. Moreover, the fact that university administrators choose to reward academics for having indexed publications while offering them sufficient opportunity to produce them exemplifies how the competition-oriented neoliberal order of things in the university runs the reward–punishment dichotomy.[4] In fact, university administrations, described as 'champions or tyrants of list fetishism' by Willmott (2011, p. 430), seem to even interfere in academics' research topics, methods, and approaches in order to increase the possibility of their research being published in so-called elite journals.

Professor Ali[5] (1955), a dean in a faculty of communications, emphasized the pressure to publish on academics by university administrations: 'this is the work of merchant rectors … *Cited*[6] publications are important; but if you take the matter this far, it becomes no longer useful' (Interview with Ali, 17 December 2014). Ali also pointed out that this pressure is imposed on post-graduate students as well as academics. For example, he criticized the PhD graduation requirement in one of the foundation universities in Ankara to publish an article in an indexed journal following completion of the thesis:

> It is the preference of Bilkent University; OK, it is a private university after all. You know, I gave people much advice, but they did not listen to me so as not to look bad. Bilkent does not give the title 'Doctor' unless the person has an indexed publication. I told people to file a lawsuit against the university. They did not, of course. You defend your thesis and get your approval,

> but they tell you to come when you have an indexed publication. This is unacceptable. They have no such right. (Interview with Ali, 17 December 2014)

This requirement imposed on those PhD students who may be considered as new-generation academics (Pelger and Grottke 2015, p. 117) is a good example of how new academics are being shaped to fit into future universities from the beginning of their careers. Ali's criticism reveals how university administrations put pressure even on PhD students to publish at a time when having a permanent university position is gradually getting harder while the value of academic studies is frequently questioned.

Çağlar (1969), a senior professor in a department of philosophy, has so far managed to preserve his personal academic satisfaction to a certain extent and continue his studies according to former academic patterns and criteria. However, he also reported that he and his colleagues could not convince the university administration that social sciences should be evaluated on different terms than other fields when it comes to indexed publications, and that there is 'an established system' for doing this. 'The administration sees this like, when your work is published in these journals, the university directly ranks higher in the list. The university is in the top 500, it is in the top 100, and so on' (Interview with Çağlar, 22 December 2014).

The principle of mutual benefit in the liberal economy may be relevant here for academics with indexed publications and for university administrations. However, Çağlar, who tries to ignore the publication requirements determined via the parameters imposed by the neoliberal academic system, emphasized that the publications favored by the university do not always coincide with the publications he himself prefers in terms of his academic fulfillment and satisfaction:

> There are, for example, amazing journals in our field of study. *Hegel-JahrBuch* is one of these journals in which a study of mine is going to be published. But it is not classified in, let's say, *Arts and Humanities* or *Social Citation*.[7] Now, why is that? Because it does not have to be. It is already known all around the world; why would it feel the need to be in the indexes? For a journal to be classified in those citation indexes, it has to be published twice a year. But they don't do that. They say 'I publish once a year' so it is not classified in the indexes. This means that when I publish an article in this journal, I will be doing a very good thing for my academic career. But when I publish an article in one of those Turkish journals classified in the

Arts and Humanities or the *Social Citation*, I will be doing a good thing for the university. (Interview with Çağlar, 22 December 2014)

Ela (1971), a senior law professor, who generally publishes in German journals, also stated that she decides where she will publish her articles according to the significance of the journal, without considering whether it is listed in the citation indexes, and to the public opinion she wants to address 'within the objective standards of academic prestige,[8] not out of a concern for academic promotion at the university':

> As I write in German, I actually don't have a concern regarding the *citation indexes*[9] because in Germany there is no journal classified in the *citation indexes* in the field of public law. But there are, for example, some journals that have been published for 250 years, and when you have a publication in one of those journals in Germany, it is like you guarantee your professorship … I call this situation '*citation index* fetishism'. So, I send my articles to important journals appropriate for my studies. (Interview with Ela, 16 December 2014)

What Ela calls 'citation index fetishism' for having publications in 'important' journals and for being searched for in the indexes has also been termed 'ranking mania' (Pelger and Grottke 2015), 'ranking obsession' (Gruber 2014) and 'journal list fetishism' (Willmott 2011) in the literature.[10] According to Willmott, 'lists become fetishised when the publication outlet, the fetish object, assumes an importance greater than the substantive content and contribution of the scholarship' (2011, p. 430). Although this fetishization is initiated by administrators, it has the potential to be internalized and carried into academic everyday life by academics. It has also probability to be maintained as a performance area with through competition between them.

From 'Someone Else's Measure' to 'Our Goal': Acceptance, Internalization, and Resistance

Introducing a measurement system based on publication performance is one of the factors transforming both the role of the academic and the core purpose of doing science by changing academics' study practices and motivations (Lawrence 2008, p. 10), and affecting the pace and methods of their research (Stengers 2011; Vostal 2015). Münch (2014) describes

this situation as follows: 'Universities are turned into enterprises struggling for positions in the rankings' (2015, p. 6). Lawrence, too, considers 'the journal to be more important than the scientific message' within this insecure restructuring of universities based on career, profit, competition, and performance (2003, p. 259). Willmott, argues that publishing in top journals is an object of fantasy for academics despite their awareness that journal rankings do not always reflect the quality of publications. Nevertheless, they keep acting as if it is the case (2011, p. 430). Referring to Slavoj Žižek, Willmott also emphasizes that the truth, though well acknowledged, is ignored (2011, p. 430).

'List fetishism' not only shapes academic knowledge production practices and becomes a criterion of academic success by strengthening the academic 'image' but also provides the academics with legitimacy and recognition in their own fields of study. Therefore, publishing in indexed journals has become a 'performance indicator of universal standing' (Willmott 2011, p. 432). By accepting, supporting, internalizing, or not questioning university administrations' pressures, academic may risk losing the potential to resist neoliberal subject positions. Here, Goffman's (1990) argument about whether the person herself/himself believes the impression of reality she/he tries to make for others regarding the term 'performance' is significant. That is, believing in the promotion criteria approved by the dominant system may cause academics to experience inconsistency.

For instance, one junior professor Seda (1975) recounted how her faculty administration has pressured her to prepare to become a senior professor but admitted that she does not really care about it. However, the fact that Seda said, right after this statement, that she is lazy when it comes to publications, that she is angry with herself about this and that she keeps calculating the points accumulated through her publications, means she actually contradicts herself. 'I count on my English way too much. I mean, I make my own SWOT[11] analysis. I think "I write in English and get twice as many points anyway"' (Interview with Seda, 12 January 2015). Seda said she is comfortable as 'her articles are published in international journals' even though they are not classified in the indexes. Seda stated that she 'takes this as a matter of pride' that she still does not have an indexed publication. However, she also mentioned that academics around her gossip about her when they discuss the number of publications they have:

> This is competition, provocation even. I wrote this, I wrote that… *So what?* This is my answer. Here is a piece of advice from your elder. You shouldn't

worry about these things; when they talk to me like this, I laugh my ass off… I mind my own business, live my life. Do you live your life? Think about this. (Interview with Seda, 12 January 2015)

Although Seda notes that she does not care about the pressures of the administration and her colleagues regarding academic promotions and publications, it is obvious that she is at ease with publishing in English whenever she wants. Seda has chosen not to compare her productivity with others to protect herself from the pressure caused by competition: 'It is none of your business.[12] If you can say this, you will be happy… If I had started comparing myself with others, I would eventually have hung myself' (Interview with Seda, 12 January 2015).

Ayşe (1959), a professor in a department of business administration, reported that she was pressured to publish in indexed journals for promotion after she obtained her PhD and professorial degrees. She described this criterion as a 'challenge,' which also corresponds with the idea of performance and an act of proving oneself:

> Normally, when you become a senior professor, you are directly appointed to the position as well. When I became a senior professor, they called me and said, 'Yes, you are a senior professor now; but we ask you to do something. Can you produce a publication in a foreign language?' I said, 'I don't have to. What's this all about?' They said, 'This is a quite recent policy.' And I said, 'It's not my concern, because I earned my title beforehand'. Then they said, 'Please, help us with this. This is a new policy, and we want to put it into practice as of today.' I said, 'Okay.' I can't really ignore such challenges. I feel like, 'Can't you? What can't I?' (*She laughs*) (Interview with Ayşe, 27 January 2015)

When university administrations insistently 'ask' academics to accommodate themselves to the implementation of an index system in Turkey, usually because they cannot resist the pressure, they accept and internalize the situation individually instead of developing shared resistance against it. In describing the criterion imposed on her for a position she already deserved as a 'challenge,' Ayşe actually reveals how the criterion itself became a goal for her. Lawrence (2003, p. 259) explains this situation as follows: 'We scientists have enthusiastically colluded. What began as someone else's measure has become our (own) goal.'

During the interviews, increasing the number of indexed Turkish journals was often suggested as a novel solution to the hegemony of indexed

journals, especially of developed Western states. Sezgin (1977), a senior professor in a department of business administration, for instance, pointed out that there are fewer indexed journals in social sciences than in other sciences: 'I think there should be indexed publications, but they really cause great stress,' and claimed that articles from Turkey 'are sometimes rejected for absurd reasons' just because they are from Turkey (Interview with Sezgin, 16 January 2015). Here, she expresses her doubts about how 'objective' the article selection process of 'scientific' indexed journals is, the existence and significance of which she already acknowledges. The situation is thus self-contradictory. According to her, the solution lies in 'Turkish journals, I mean, not in Turkish but from Turkey, classified in the citation indexes which act like actual citations' (Interview with Sezgin, 16 January 2015). That is, Sezgin's solution to deal with the pressure to appear in indexed publications is to increase the number of journals that 'act like citations'[13] instead of rejecting and resisting, and creating new indexing areas.

Like Sezgin, who accepts the criteria of promotion and publication at universities, Ece has also internalized the system, even though she criticizes it. Ece (1981), an assistant in a department of sociology who has just completed her PhD, linked academia today to the neoliberal system and 'academic capitalism.' When asked whether she would publish in a prestigious journal that was not classified in the indexes, she said: 'Of course I wouldn't even waste my time, I simply wouldn't. Because it would do me no good … I mean, if you make a very good publication in a journal published in Turkey, it will do you no good' (Interview with Ece, 18 March 2015). She also stated that young academics accommodate to the index system better than their retired or middle-aged colleagues, and that this is because they have to do so:

I think new academics are better at internalizing this situation.[14] I believe they are more aware. But everyone feels the need to keep up with this system, and I can only take just so much. Because it is all about performance. You have to publish, do research… You have to conduct projects. You have to put all these outcomes to good use. You also have to give lectures and teach. I mean, you find yourself in such a rush that you are, how should I put it, in a state of academic capitalism. So, younger academics are aware of this situation, and they also feel that they have to accommodate to it and try to find a place for themselves in this chaos. (Interview with Ece, 18 March 2015)

Pelger and Grottke argue that new-generation academics are more likely to accept the requirements of top international journals if they want a permanent position within the academia (2015, p. 124). Ece's expressions 'accommodating to the system,' 'internalizing,' 'all about performance,' and 'outcome' all point to the neoliberal order of things in the universities.

Ece's and Ayşe's accounts show some similarities. Ece, who has just completed her PhD, internalizes the system although she is aware of its defects while Ayşe considers the system's requirements imposed by the university administration just when she got one step closer to being a professor as a 'challenge.' Yet she still tries to publish in indexed journals. Even though their ages and titles differ, the way they position themselves does not hint at resistance. Gruber, however, emphasizes that higher-status academics should take more responsibility for resisting the system:

> I strongly believe that senior academics in particular should create awareness of the dangerous developments with metrics and rankings in academia. We cannot expect early career academics to do that as they are under increasing pressure to 'perform' and have to 'play the game' to secure their jobs and to advance their careers. It is only rational and they cannot be blamed for that. (2014, p. 175)

As in the case of Ayşe and Ece, the reality is different when it comes to resisting the neoliberal academic system. A parallel example can be observed in Germany in 2012, when only 20 percent of business professors were willing to sign an open letter criticizing the ranking system (Pelger and Grottke 2015, p. 125). Thus, although Gruber states that academics of higher statuses may be better able than younger academics to resist performance pressure, it seems to be the academic system and/or the academic milieu, to which academics willingly or unwillingly surrender to different degrees, which determines their proclivity to resist rather than their titles. That is, no academic, no matter her/his title, has full job security in the neoliberal academic system.[15]

Lawrence, on the one hand, notes how academics are flattered through publications and conferences: 'Modern science is very fashion-conscious' (Lawrence 2002, p. 836). What he emphasizes here is the efforts of some academics to participate in as many well-known 'popular' conferences and publish as many articles in top journals as possible in order to increase their visibility. On the other hand, it is hard to determine what criteria to use to evaluate academics who struggle to work outside academic trends

or cannot become part of the system no matter how hard they try: 'I know many good scientists who refrain from travelling so that they can concentrate on teaching and working in their labs, and whose reputations suffer because they put their primary responsibilities first' (Lawrence 2002, p. 836).

When the factors determining academic priorities and career objectives are solely shaped by neoliberal education policies, academics' purposes of knowledge production and the core reason for academia become problematic. Çağlar, a senior professor in philosophy, reminds that this is also related to whether academics get involved in publishing in indexed journals, 'an established system' supported by university administrations. Being a part of the neoliberal academic system and being concerned about where to publish may be both a preference and an imposition; alternatively, one can 'refuse to be a part of this established system' even though it is imposed. According to Çağlar, this resistance may also be an opportunity for academics to discover their own individuality. Çağlar has made no effort to meet the requirements of the system for academic promotion for five years, revealing his own priorities: 'Because I've got things to do; I need to read Heidegger and all that stuff' (Interview with Çağlar, 22 December 2014). Thus, Sezgin's suggestion of indexed journals in Turkish as a partial solution for doing publications classified in citation indexes is apparently no solution for Çağlar at all:

> To publish in these so-called journals, I need to quit my fields of study and do something else. I mean, I need to do other studies … Now, can you tell me why I should have to do this? I have different fields of study. Well, they can tell me to go and publish in a British journal, but then the problem of language appears. And there is also few journals in our field of study, which means everyone studying in the field around the world seeks to publish in these journals, and this extends the period, I mean, the waiting period. So, you send your article to a journal, and they say 'OK, your article will be published'. But when you ask when it will be published, they say that they publish, let's say, twice a year; so, it will be published after eight issues. Now, why should we have to deal with all that stuff? (Interview with Çağlar, 22 December 2014)

While Çağlar resisted the imposition regarding academic publications, Orçun (1961), a junior history professor, similarly noted that the main problem arises when academics try to comply with the neoliberal academic performance system without even acknowledging or questioning it:

If you take this very seriously then that's the real danger here. I think practitioners, I mean all scientists out there, and social scientists should resist this imposition at certain points. If you panic and say, 'If I don't do this, [if I don't] publish one article in an indexed journal per year, I will lose my job', it means you are in deep water. That is, you don't call the shots. Science requires both a free spirit and a free mind. You need to have all the control. *By definition…*[16] (Interview with Orçun, 10 April 2015)

Performance expectations within the neoliberal academic system, the pressure to publish for academic promotion and the insecurity caused by the fact that 'we don't call the shots' may create stress and anxiety. The insecurity, pressure, supervision, control, and stress experienced by academics may also destroy academia—the one profession that has been considered somewhat safer than other lines of work. Today, like all in the workforce, academics are evaluated according to certain criteria defining 'success' by national and international institutions. According to Jemielniak and Greenwood, whereas academics in developed Western countries used to have more control over their academic careers prior to neoliberalism, they are now managed by hierarchical and bureaucratic control systems, just as in many other professions (2015, p. 77).

Moreover, the changing job descriptions of academics and the new insecurity of academia raise the significant question of how academics perceive themselves. Being identified as winners and losers through publications puts great pressure on them. 'Rather than genuinely fostering relevant knowledge, the emphasis on ranking seems to be driven by a desire to identify winners and losers in a game of academic prestige' (Adler and Harzing 2009, p. 74). Willmott also describes journal list fetishism that determines the winners and losers of the game within the citation index system as 'demoralizing,' 'divisive,' 'distasteful,' and 'damaging' for academics (2011, p. 430).

Comments like 'So what if I appear in the citation index? The citation index should search for me and find me instead' (Interview with Murat,[17] 25 September 2014) indicate the comfort of retired academics who achieved the highest positions in their careers without ever facing the index criterion. In contrast to retired academics, the criteria for indexed publication create pressure and stress even for early career academics. Selen (1988), an assistant in a department of journalism, described publishing as 'trouble in itself.' When asked her opinion, she said, 'I don't want to think about it' (Interview with Selen, 23 December 2014), postponing the thought of facing the imposition of publishing for as long as possible.

Buket (1981), who is preparing to become a junior professor in communication sciences, described academics as 'people who exist, who try to exist by writing' (Interview with Buket, 15 December 2014). She added that she does not write only for the sake of academia,[18] emphasizing the significance of the quality and accessibility of each publication. Although she has given priority to this while publishing so far, she is aware of the obligation of writing for peer-reviewed journals for academic promotion, and associates this with the terms 'restrictive,' 'distressful,' 'compulsory,' and 'obligatory.' However, there is no escape from this in academic life as long as the system remains unchanged. Buket claimed that academics are considered as 'racehorses,' and criticized the standardization of ways of working, which reminds us of the term 'slow science' (Stengers 2011) and the time pressure on academics. All the pressure and stress, combined with extra problems arising from the need for Turkish academics to use foreign languages and the difficulty of getting certain fields of study accepted in the international arena, grow continuously.

'Third World' Academia Revisited

Disputes over dichotomies determined by dominant developed countries, such as First World/Third World, center/periphery, West/the rest, have entered academia as well. Dirlik (1994, p. 330), for example, argues that postcolonial academic intellectuals only started to be taken seriously and respected after the mid-1980s. In this part, I focus on the academics' self-perception in relation to their Western counterparts in terms of publications classified in citation indexes. Their receptions revealed how they position Turkey and developed Western countries in terms of knowledge production.

The academics' accounts generally remarked how academic publishing was becoming especially dominated by the UK and USA. In addition, there is a hierarchy among journals. As Wilkinson puts it, 'all journals are refereed but some are more refereed than others' (2015, p. 100). Besides whether a journal is refereed or not, it is also important whether it is published by an internationally recognized publishing house. In such international academic publishing houses, the dominant academic language is English due to American and British power within the sector. Although there are demands to expand the language of academic publication beyond English in the twenty-first century (Adler and Harzing 2009, p. 76), it is hard to see any significant developments in that direction yet.

Professor Ayşe (1959) has already accepted the need to write in English, the dominant language within academia: 'After all, journals within the *Social Science Citation Index* are under the control of America and England, so you have to write in their language' (Interview with Ayşe, 27 January 2015). Two young academics, Ömer and Ece, also addressed the publication hierarchy among languages. According to Ömer (1982), an assistant in a department of sociology, who is writing his PhD thesis, writing in English means 'getting your share in the market' (Interview with Ömer, 18 March 2015). He compared Eastern and Western languages without distinguishing between the languages of developed Western countries. Ece (1981) emphasized the significant difference between European languages and English in terms of the publication hierarchy and the value attributed to publication:

> I have a Belgian friend. He has about 20–25 publications. I talk about a man two years older than me. He literally wore himself out to get a position at a university in Turkey, and he is considered a master in his job in his own country. But they did not even care about him just because his publications were not listed in the citation indexes. That's because he writes in French or in Dutch, and they are not included in the indexes. Does this mean that he is not good? No, on the contrary, he is very good. (Interview with Ece, 18 March 2015)

Thus, the dominance of English as academic language in international publications, as previously noted by Ece, restricts those academics who have high levels of expertise but write in their native language. This restriction also applies to the university administrations' evaluation criteria for academics, further supporting the dominance of English. Talat Halman [1931], the dean of a literature faculty, for instance, claimed that 'senior administrators consider publications in Turkish to be of no value at all' (Interview with Talat Halman, 20 August 2014). He used to work at Bilkent University, where the medium of instruction is English. Thus, besides the knowledge produced by academics, the language in which that knowledge is distributed also determines performance criteria.

While many young academic researchers believe that writing in English provides them with extra advantages, middle-aged and older academics associate writing in their native language with the level of sovereignty and development of a country.[19] Complaining that he has not been able to publish recently because of his administrative duties as the dean, Ali

(1955), for instance, associated publishing an article in an indexed journal in English with harming the national language:

> You look at people's files for academic promotion, and you think that they are English. All the studies are in English. Are we a colony? I mean, what has that got to do with anything? … This is Turkey! And then they complain that Turkish is not the language of science. Of course it is not; how can it be? (Interview with Ali, 17 December 2014)

Today, having international publications has perhaps become a matter of prestige and performance beyond increasing the international recognition of academics and strengthening academic networks. Indeed, Sevgi (1947), a retired professor of cinema studies, noted how having publications in Turkish nowadays sometimes appears 'shameful' within academia. She addressed the disappearing academic practice to which she thinks she belongs[20]: 'Publications in Turkish were absolutely not something to be ashamed of. On the contrary, it was valuable. That's why we are very different; just like Turkish movies (*she laughs*), we belong to different worlds'[21] (Interview with Sevgi, 19 January 2015).

Besides the domination of English as the universal language of academic publication, another concern raised during the interviews was the place of supposedly unpopular disciplines within the international academic environment. The participants frequently raised the question of how certain studies are accepted in certain disciplines if they are believed to have a little chance of appearing in international indexed journals:

> Which recognized American journal would accept to read an article on an aspect of Turkish literature? Maybe if it does, it will consider it important, so you will be able to call it a success. But they don't even deign to read it, because they don't care about Turkish culture, about Turkish literature enough[22]. (Interview with Talat Halman, 20 August 2014)

According to the academics interviewed in the present study, the chance to publish an article in an international journal is related to the 'popularity' of the relevant field of study, the research topic, and even the country in question at the time. Drawing on Thomas Kuhn's (2012) 'paradigm,' it is possible to argue that the popular research topics and methods of a certain period may also shape the content of publications. That is, academics may prioritize their studies in accordance with the criteria of relevant publishing houses within this 'citations game' (Dowling 2014, p. 281; Willmott

2011, p. 431). Or, as Bino and Krishna claim, 'the authors choose the topic and research methodology that is compatible with the journal's expectation' 2011, p. 240). Purani et al., who suggest that 'top' journals shape academic disciplines, highlight this simple reciprocity: 'Publishing in such journals provides legitimacy and exposure to an academic's research efforts … This would therefore lead to greater acceptance and popularity of topics that are generally supported by these journals' (Purani et al. 2014, p. 98).

During my interviews, I observed that the conventional wisdom is that for Turkish academics to get their studies to be accepted, they should select certain research topics in Turkey:

> In social sciences, you should acknowledge this first: there is an academic sharing, or rather a division of labor in this world. And Turkey is not the one constructing theories in this division of labor. To be honest, America and Europe produce theories. What they ask of you regarding the citation indexes is some knowledge of your own country … Now, I really don't want to be misunderstood; I don't suggest that this is the work of the West, but there really is a division of labor … So, why would they let you publish anything else when practical knowledge is already available? I mean, the number of journals, their periods of publication, and the number of articles to be accepted are all pre-determined; so, this is truly a market, such a *competitive* one[23]. (Interview with Ömer, 18 March 2015)

Besides the hierarchy in the international academic arena, described as a 'market' by Ömer, Feray (1970) also explained that currently popular research topics have a better chance of being published: 'If I publish something sensational, it will be immediately published,' emphasizing that 'academics are expected to do such things' regardless of the content of publications and research topics:

> As we certainly are a Third World country, we are expected to study a sensational research topic on the global agenda. If we study more popular and trendy matters that attract lots of attention, such as the Kurdish issue, immigration, refugees and violence against women, only then can we attract their attention. (Interview with Feray, 23 December 2014)

Besides her thoughts that 'sensational' and critical articles regarding Turkey have a better chance of being published in international journals, Feray also believes that some academics act 'strategically,' and publish on

similar research topics over a very short time in order to increase the number of their publications without conducting different research:

> You can produce many publications by adding different aspects to the very same template, or, how can I say, you can publish twenty similar articles from one thesis just by changing the sentences. Naturally, people doing this have a thick file, and of course they benefit more. But people who work on different research topics, do field research for each of these from scratch, and spend months on each of the studies lose the game from the beginning as their file is thin. There are such problems. I mean, there is no such thing as merit. So people don't work. They act as strategically as possible. Everyone tries to come to the fore by having as many publications as possible in many irrelevant journals. (Interview with Feray, 23 December 2014)

Scientific production now corresponds to a process full of wars of title, university rankings, and strategic time management as to who is more productive and successful. Lawrence, too, just like Feray, describes an academic environment where the primary purpose is to produce many publications in the shortest time possible: 'Findings are sliced as thin as salami and submitted to different journals to produce more papers' (Lawrence 2003, p. 259).

Ayşe, who described the feeling she had when she first faced the index criterion when she was so close to becoming a professor as 'being shocked,' said that it is harder to get studies in Turkish to be accepted in the field of business administration due to the dominance of Western countries:

> Journals [included] in the social science citation index are serious journals; especially the ones in the field of business administration are twice as serious. Because it's like taking coals to Newcastle because business administration is a subject matter under the domination of the Western world, especially of America … I was shocked, but what could I do? The criterion was set, so I said 'la havle ve la kuvvete'[24] and got to work[25]. (Interview with Ayşe, 27 January 2015)[26]

Pelger and Grottke also argue that the USA determines 'good and acceptable' research standards, methods, and topics related to PhD education in accounting in Germany (2015, p. 119). Here, one of the main problems is that the homogenous scientific understanding of research topics and methods determined by the West-centered academic world excludes what is different or novel. Another inequality rises out of personal and

institutional relationships in academic networks regarding scientific production. According to Medina (2013), scientific knowledge is shaped by connections between scientists, colleagues, scientific institutions, non-scientific institutions, the public and social worlds, and technology. These relationships in scientific knowledge production are determined by the 'processes of competition, conflict, negotiation and exchange between fields shap[ing] the social world' (p. 15). The following section focuses on Turkish academics' receptions of personal, institutional, and technological networks regarding publication procedures.

Networks and Networking in Academic Publishing

Today, it is obvious that academic communication goes hand in hand with internet technology largely due to the opportunities provided by ICTs. E-mail accounts, social media platforms, blogs, forums, and so on, all provide academics with opportunities to establish regular relationships and expand their academic networks beyond time and space, nationally and internationally. Gruber (2014) argues that the completion of an academic study is actually only the beginning of the research process nowadays. For example, a marketing campaign may be run as soon as a study is completed to promote it. Gruber explains how ICTs can be a medium to create communication networks during this marketing process:

> tweeting and/or blogging about the latest publication, putting a link to the article in the email signature, shooting a video or recording a podcast, highlighting the key findings of the article, and putting the article (pre-copyright form version) in university repositories and on platforms such as ResearchGate and academia.edu. All done in the hope of creating awareness that then (hopefully) will lead to downloads and citations. (2014, p. 173)[27]

ICTs also provide opportunities such as open-source and open-access databases for distributing knowledge. Thus, ICTs may be useful for breaking traditional barriers between academics by offering new opportunities of access and distribution of knowledge, reducing the hierarchy in the production of knowledge (Binz-Scharf et al. 2015, p. 533), and creating 'new communication regimes, new forms of collaboration and new spatial organization for science' (Hine 2006, p. 270). In his interview, Ömer (1982) also addressed the transformation in traditional academic publishing:

> The issue of citation really marketized the whole academic production process, and transformed it into a mechanism abusing the system. Thus, I feel like there is no point in sustaining journal publishing; I mean, not only journal publishing but all kinds of publishing through these media. (Interview with Ömer, 18 March 2015)

Adler and Harzing also argue that it is no longer necessary to rely on the classical journal publishing system, within which a study may lose its currency due to the slow refereeing, approval, and publication processes compared with the rapid communication and open-access opportunities offered by ICTs (2009, pp. 75–76).[28] However, based on their ethnographic field research conducted in biology labs, Binz-Scharf et al. acknowledge that traditional social relationships still dominate academics' production practices despite ICT-mediated innovations in knowledge production and distribution. This indicates that certain factors, such as the importance of face-to-face communication, preference of working with known and trusted colleagues, and geographical closeness, are still relevant in the academia (Binz-Scharf et al. 2015, p. 543). Thus, an academic in the Third World trying to step into the scientific circles led by developed Western countries and publishing in recognized journals of the field inevitably begins the 'game' one step behind.

ICTs offer new ways for academics to prove themselves nationally and internationally within the ever-developing academic world. In particular, the social media networks used by academics enable them to follow people and research topics from their fields of study, and to inform more people of their own studies by sharing them on these platforms. However, despite these opportunities, Eylül (1979), a junior international relations professor believes that university academics used to be much more comfortable introducing and proving themselves in their fields of study, even though there were no ICTs back then when there were fewer universities. This is not the case today. Eylül acknowledges the effect of the Internet, saying, 'we now have something to make connections' (Interview with Eylül, 21 January 2015); however, 'highly qualified instructors in this world of images' may fall behind just because they are not capable or in favor of presenting themselves in accordance with the requirements of the neoliberal age. That is, having a widespread academic network does not only depend on the opportunities provided by ICTs; it also depends on how academics can present themselves through ICTs.[29]

Addressing the power relations and inequalities in the process of academic knowledge production, Bino and Krishna emphasize the importance of connections for determining publishing inequality among academics: 'First, along with writers and readers, institutions such as universities and journals also have an active role in the exchange. Second, networks of authors and readers are pivotal in shaping the knowledge output and explaining the visibility of it' (Bino and Krishna 2011, p. 237). It is obvious that the visibility of academics depends not only on the opportunities of access provided via ICTs but also on the networks of publishing houses and relevant institutions. Similarly, Lawrence notes that people who know each other support one another whereas those who are not approved of are excluded, or that recognized people are invited to committees and conferences, presented with awards and directly requested to write (2003, p. 260). This situation may indicate that new-generation or unknown academics are trying to gain a place through a process that treats them inequitably compared to their national and international academic 'competitors.'

Ömer stated that publishing in journals is all about strong academic connections, describing articles as 'the masturbation we do for each other' (Interview with Ömer, 18 March 2015), referring to the limited access to academic knowledge, which some academics lack any social concern regarding the production of knowledge. Here, academics' concerns for performance and the significance of academic networks once again come to the fore. Ömer, for example, admitted that he had had the chance to meet an editor 'of a publishing house where thousands of academics would probably want to publish,' and his eyes had sparkled with excitement following their conversation:

> Somehow, I met a Turkish academic studying in America at an event following a conference. We had a good conversation; he kind of liked me, I guess. I really got along with him. So, at the end of the night, we shook hands and he told me exactly this, and I have to say that he is also an editor of a well recognized journal in the field of sociology: 'If you ever have trouble in getting your articles published, just send me an e-mail.' You know what I mean? I mean, this is how it goes, with the people you know … I said to myself 'Really?' Because this is really very important … Because if you publish there, you can reach everyone. But when you publish in *Toplum ve Bilim*,[30] only hundreds of people will know you in Turkey. Do you understand what I'm saying? And this is how it works out.[31] (Interview with Ömer, 18 March 2015)

Ömer's example is indeed an encounter many academics today would get excited about. Lawrence explains what it means for academics to publish in a prestigious journal:

> Young researchers see a paper in a good journal as their introduction to the scientific élite. The established seek publication in leading journals to certify their high opinion of themselves. All are learning that building capital in the hard currency of the audit society can be safer and easier than founding a reputation on discoveries. (Lawrence 2003, p. 259)

This situation, though we criticize it as publication fetishism, reminds us of the willingness of academics, especially insecure new-generation academics, to survive in this neoliberal academic world. This insecurity among academics can also be observed various cases of plagiarism.[32] Likewise, paid services are referred to as serious concern that generates insecurity about sources of academic knowledge, as Professor Ali (1955) explains: 'I know people who give 500 dollars to get publication points … They give you your ISBN and all, you get your citation points, and you really appear in the indexes; but there is no such publication' (Interview with Ali, 17 December 2014). Thus, even the existence of a publication has become dubious.

The unreliability of sources of academic publications is well attested in the issue of plagiarism,[33] which creates a 'scientific' environment where academics do not trust each other and accuse each other of 'dishonesty,' to add to feelings of insecurity in the workplace. Melih (1948), a retired anthropology professor, believes that the new rules imposed by the system 'mechanize academics,' which decreases quality, encourages 'begging for publication,'[34] and 'makes science unpleasant'[35] (Interview with Melih, 22 January 2015). Türkan (1954), a senior professor of sociology, stressed that, due to the value attributed to articles published in indexed journals and academic journals becoming a commercial area, academic publication has turned into a technical skill that depends on formulas:

> They did a workshop; they even gave a certificate at the end. It was called *Springer*; they were Americans or whatever; they talked in English. They explained how to publish in indexed journals … They have such formulas. They told us to use active sentences not passive ones. They told us to say one thing at most in each sentence. It's like maths; works like clockwork. Then you can get your stuff published. (Interview with Türkan, 21 August 2014)

Novel practices offered by the neoliberal system, such as formula-based training in how to publish in indexed journal, may lead to the commodification of knowledge and doubts over academics' knowledge production and dissemination practices. For instance, Derya (1960), a senior professor of sociology due to retire in a few years, asked herself, 'What do I serve?' and 'Does knowledge really serve knowledge?' and admitted that she feels very 'vulnerable and insecure' (Interview with Derya, 25 December 2014).

Although Derya questions knowledge itself and academics' roles, she nevertheless accepts the order of the neoliberal system when she says, 'We all struggle to make publications in a citation indexed journal.' As for the dominant production practice of her time, another retired professor, Sevgi (1947), says, 'I'm not sure if we worked because we enjoyed working back then. Now it is all about points. What happens if I publish this? I think we did not have such concerns' (Interview with Sevgi, 19 January 2015). Sevgi also points out that the understanding of publication at universities has become more and more 'competitive' and transformed into an academic practice depending on individual success. This transformation may also correspond to an academic world individualizing the number of publications each person produces. Buket (1981), for instance, explained the individualized academic world in terms of academics' isolation and performance concerns:

> Everyone has sunk into her/his solitude. We now constantly speculate on quite daily matters such as 'I should get this title, or conduct more projects in accordance with that performance criterion'; I mean, 'I should secure my job at the university so that I should do projects,' and so on. (Interview with Buket, 15 December 2014)

It is obvious that the former conditions of the academics, that were idealized by some, have been destroyed, and that scientific production is now organized according to a career-oriented and competitive neoliberal system, just as is the case with other work based on commercial activities. It seems that we are heading toward a system of knowledge production and academic existence where everything is justifiable for the sake of success, predominantly defined by neoliberal criteria and values. Meanwhile, scientific concerns are ignored.

Conclusion

Academics feel neither safe nor empowered in neoliberal universities, run according to points, performance, competition, academic titles, and time pressure. Most participants on whose accounts this chapter is built are aware of the changing processes of academic knowledge production and distribution. Nevertheless, I observed some acceptance and internalization of the situation among practicing academics, and a belief that they cannot afford to change the system. Retired academics criticize the index system, often relating it to a colonization process that involves moving away from one's native language. However, it is obvious that they feel more comfortable since they never actually faced the pressure of the index. Middle-aged academics fall into two groups: those who accept conditions for the sake of their careers and those who, albeit individually, try to resist the system. Young academics feel the greatest pressure to publish, mostly out of the fear of losing their jobs.

I also observed a general atmosphere of despair among participants regarding the university and academic professions. Academics of different ages used the expression 'Third World country' to describe Turkey's situation within the academic arena. Within this context, I observed that there is an acknowledgment that Turkish academics start their academic careers under unequal conditions in the global academic arena. The common perception that field knowledge on conflicting and sensitive matters regarding Turkey is valuable and that Turkey is not a country where the academics develop theories certainly supports the perception of Turkey as a Third World country.

Although Jemielniak and Greenwood (2015, p. 73) claim that it is now too late to resist the neoliberal university system, they do offer some suggestions: 'The first step in this is to examine the big picture of academia and organizational changes it is undergoing as a prologue to change strategies.' It is also important to collectivize individual and corporate resistances against the index system. As a starting point of resistance, academics need to question their own existence and purposes of knowledge production. According to Sennett (1998, p. 117), 'the problem we confront is how to organize our life histories now, in a capitalism which disposes us to drift.' In order to be optimistic about universities and academia, we should therefore first consider how to react, and then learn to unite once more within an academia where globalization and individualization are intertwined instead of accepting many micro and macro problems.

Notes

1. The 32 participants included 15 women and 17 men. Dates of birth of the participants varied between 1931 and 1988.
2. Age categorization varies with geography, gender, and historical period. The present study defines academics born between 1930 and 1955 as retired or senior, between 1955 and 1975 as middle-aged, and after 1975 as young. The United Nations defines a cut-off of 60+ years to refer to the older population. This definition is consistent with this study. The United Nations also defines 15–24 as the young population. However, this age range does not include the young academics within the study as an academic career usually begins in the 20s. Following the completion of PhD education, academics usually reach their 40s before they gain the title 'senior professor.' Therefore, the age range in the present study is determined according to the beginning and duration of academic career and experiences and relations with ICTs. http://www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/ageingdefnolder/en/; http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf, date accessed 30 January 2016.
3. The change of value attributed to the media through which knowledge is shared is especially significant regarding books. Retired academics, in particular, stated that books were what really mattered in the field of social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s. During the interviews, participants mentioned that books reflect the way of thinking of academics at a deeper level while articles are considered insufficient in this regard, and that those who did not have any books were teased as 'the professor without a book.' Nowadays, however, there was a common perception among the participants that an article published in an indexed journal earns more points than a book, although this imposition of the system is highly criticized and academics still consider books to be of higher value. Participants preferred journal articles for faster academic promotion. Where the article is published may be more important than the article itself. Thus, how academics are perceived may vary in terms of where they publish according to different points of view and generations.
4. There are, for instance, such policies that the academics who publish in an indexed journal may receive international conference

support from the scientific research unit of the related university just because of their publication even though they do not even present a paper.

5. All the participants except for Talat S. Halman, who died in December 2014, are given pseudonyms to protect their anonymity. In order to commemorate him with respect, Halman is included in the study using his real name in accordance with the permission he granted during the interviews. The pseudonyms are followed by the birth year of the participants throughout the text.

6. Expressions similar to Ali's 'cite publication' were used by the academics when they expressed their thoughts on the citation index.

7. 'Social Citation' is an expression similar to Ali's expression 'Cite publication,' which normally does not exist but means the Social Science Citation Index. Italicized quotations indicate words consciously spoken in English by the participants though they all have Turkish equivalents. This in itself can be considered as indicating how far the citation index has entered everyday academic life in Turkey.

8. It is important to remember that academic prestige has always existed, though to different degrees within particular historical periods, just as is the case with the academic publication criteria for promotion. However, Ela's definition of academic prestige here refers to a period not entirely shaped by neoliberal academic patterns.

9. The participant preferred the English version during the interview.

10. Special software has been designed for the citation metrics of academics. The very meaningfully named software *Publish and Perish* offers academics the opportunity to analyze their citations using *Google Scholar* in a 'mechanistic way' (Harzing 2007).

11. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.

12. Here, Seda actually said, 'It is none of your business' in English though she was talking Turkish during the interview. This situation may be related to wither pride in her English, considering it as a performance indicator.

13. How the expression 'acting like Citation' was described is also important. The value attributed by academics to indexed journals is the subject matter of a different study.

14. The 'better' the neoliberal academic system is internalized, the easier it will be to maintain it within everyday academic life.

15. On January 2016, members of a platform called 'Academics for Peace' in Turkey signed a Peace Declaration that called for the end of armed conflict in eastern Turkey. The resulting investigations, threats, and dismissals of the signatory academics from their university posts indicate once more that academics in Turkey may have neither job nor even life safety, depending on what they do or do not publish, or what thoughts they defend. This state of affairs also exemplifies the interconnectedness between the neoliberal precarious work conditions with authoritarian policy preferences.

    http://barisicinakademisyenler.net/node/63.html; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35321895, date accessed 2 February 2016.

16. The expression 'by definition' was used in English by Orçun. Orçun's preference of using only this word in English while talking in Turkish reflected his belief that freedom in academia is only limited to definitions.

17. A retired public relations professor who was born in 1943.

18. Publications outside academics' main fields of study are invisible with regard to academic performance, which is also significant in terms of the relationship between academic specialization and capitalism.

19. The participants' accounts include inferences regarding the development of the nation and the protection of the national language in support of the ideology of the nation state. This may lead to a contradiction that, on the one hand, protection of national values against the West is defended, while on the other hand, Turkey is criticized and Western modernity and development are praised. An example of this is as follows:

    There is no such thing in the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation today, or in any European country. No one there worries that 'I could not be a proper scientist, because I could not enter the *SSCI*… Such scandals only happen in third world countries; countries that are like a slave to the others, that do not produce knowledge (Interview with Doğan, 20 November 2013) (1946, professor, Turkish Language).

20. Considering Sevgi's perception of the past and today, it can be said that academics' views regarding publications in Turkish has changed somewhat. According to Sevgi, publications in Turkish are considered to be of less value than especially publications in English. During the interviews, young academics who have no problem with English prefer to write in English in order to be recognized internationally and to get higher points. This situation can be considered in terms of the image and prestige of academics as well as the system's points criteria. It is also important that some academics working at METU and Bilkent University, where the medium of instruction is English, admitted that 'They forget to write in Turkish' or 'They are having trouble in writing in Turkish.'

21. This is a line often used in scenes in Turkish cinema, especially between the 1950s and 1970s, in which lovers from different social classes cannot come together.

22. Reading this account, one should keep in mind that there are different centers and journals, such as 'Oriental Studies' and 'Turkish Studies,' in developed Western countries in which some Turkish academics are involved. These include https://oi.uchicago.edu/; http://www.orient.uni-leipzig.de/en/institute/; https://www.jstor.org/journal/joriestud; http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/ftur20/current; https://ejts.revues.org/, date accessed 2 February 2016. When considered with regard to parochialism, scientific fields believed to be unpopular internationally have also gained visibility due to the increasing importance attached to multiculturalism, the development of cooperation between universities due to globalization and the advantages of new ICT-based publishing platforms.

23. The word 'competitive' was used in English before being repeated in Turkish by the participant.

24. A religious expression in Islam that people say when they wish for patience.

25. We see that Ayşe accepted the imposition of indexed publication without standing up against the administration, and did not try to resist even when she was a senior professor.

26. Mentioning the difficulty of producing indexed publications, Ayşe also pointed out the significance of these publications in the development of academic networks and in gaining a place in the established academic system. Eylül (1979, junior professor, international

relations) also stated that 'not being present in the international arena is another qualitative problem' (Interview with Eylül, 21 January 2015).

27. The statement 'A study recently published in *PLOS ONE* found that papers uploaded to Academia receive a 69 % boost in citations over 5 years' on the homepage of *Academia.edu* also indicates how ICTs increase visibility in the marketing of academic knowledge. https://www.academia.edu, date accessed 23 March 2016.

28. That new journals have recently been published electronically and not printed is a development that can be considered in this regard.

29. This presentation depends on the performance of the academic, and how and through what media s/he presents herself/himself.

30. One of the significant social science journals in Turkey, published three times a year with a wide distribution network as of 1977. http://www.toplumvebilim.com/public/default.aspx

31. Simge's account, contrary to Ömer, reminds us that publishing in significant journals does not only depend on academic networks. According to Simge, the perception of publishing through acquaintances is some kind of 'urban legend' among academics:

Two colleagues of mine who wanted to send manuscripts to a journal within the SSCI in which I published an article—it was years ago, and these two collegaues are both younger than me, one lives abroad and the other in Turkey, and one of them studies political economy and the other studies political science—asked for a connection from me. They thought that I got publications classified in the SSCI with the help of some acquaintances I know there. But they were wrong. (She laughs) There is such a perception. Of course, it is not totally unfounded. But it does not work only through acquaintances (Correspondence with Simge, 20 March 2016). (1968, professor, Political Science).

32. I observed that, despite the distribution opportunities ICTs offer to academics, they still hesitate to share their studies on social media platforms due to copyright obligations (academics tend to have insufficient knowledge about copyright), concerns regarding plagiarism and their general usage habits. Thus, no matter how much it is accepted, '[o]pen science is still far removed from reality,' as suggested by Binz-Scharf et al. (2015, p. 543).

33. As for the effect of websites offering paid services to write assignments, theses, or articles, most participants claimed that ICTs have increased such ethical concerns. Attempts have been made to solve this problem through ICT-assisted programs. Such programs result from insecurity in academia.

34. He mentioned, for instance, that people include their wives or friends as a writer in their publications. As Melih noted, 'People start to send articles to poor quality journals within the Science Citation Index, published, for example, in Bulgaria or Azerbaijan. Just for the sake of the title' (Interview with Melih, 22 January 2015). Melih thereby reveals his prejudices regarding the academic publications of the countries in question, which indicates how academics' receptions of inequality between the journals of developed Western countries and 'the others' is reproduced.

35. Especially retired academics described the decreasing quality of publication content and index fetishism with expressions such as 'unserious' and 'it doesn't matter whether they are published or not.'

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Stories of Mediation, Negotiation and Resilience

Variegated Neoliberalization in Higher Education: Ambivalent Responses to Competitive Funding in the Czech Republic

Josef Kavka

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores how a higher education (HE) system regulated by academic self-governance and traditional academic values has been impacted by neoliberalization. Scholars who have studied Czech HE since the end of socialism in 1989 have noted the domination of an 'academic oligarchy' in its governance in which high-ranking academics set the main policy goals at the national level and retain a monopoly of power in university governance (Dobbins and Knill 2009, pp. 411–412;

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Pabian 2009; Hundlova et al. 2010). Such a system has been criticized by Czech and international experts as economically unsustainable, excessively inward looking and ignoring the interests of other societal and economic actors (for reviews, see Pabian 2007; Mateju et al. 2009; Fiala and Nantl 2010). A radical legislative reform process, initiated in 2006, sought to open Czech HE to extra-academic interests and introduce market mechanisms, specifically the introduction of tuition fees, limitation of permanent tenure-tracks, and the empowerment of external stakeholders and executives in intra-university governance. However, the reform failed in the face of widespread public protests organized by students and academics in 2011 and 2012. This raises the question of how, in absence of any comprehensive legislative reform, neoliberalization—understood as a 'politically guided intensification of market rule and commodification' (Brenner et al. 2010, p. 184)—has been able to thrive in Czech HE for ten years.

Among other factors and structural forces, competitive and performance-based public funding can be seen as one powerful, yet discrete, trigger of neoliberalization in the Czech HE. It has been introduced gradually since the second half of the 2000s without any major organized contestation within the academic community that continues to dominate the governance of Czech universities and Czech HE policy (Dvorackova et al. 2014). The new system of funding encouraged a heterogeneous expansion of market-conforming behavior and competitive logics, and the spread of market-based reasoning inside academia. To examine the uneven impacts of competitive and performance-based funding, I borrow the concept of 'variegated neoliberalization' (Brenner et al. 2010) to analyze two departments of philosophy in the arts faculties of two public research universities. I focus on humanities and public research institutions because they are generally considered as HE disciplines that are the most insulated from market forces, practices and rationales. The two universities represent important differences in the extent of neoliberalization: as the dominant HE institution in the Czech Republic, the Charles University in Prague has remained relatively isolated from market forces whereas the Palacky University in Olomouc has undergone quite significant market-oriented transformations. Given that my primary aim is to understand how neoliberalization can develop in a system dominated by high-ranking academics, I will analyze in more detail developments at the Faculty of Arts of Palacky University (FPU)

than the situation at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University (FCU), which has not undergone such a radical transformation.

This chapter rejects simplistic conceptions of 'neoliberalism' as a market-driven destruction of traditional and local institutional orders. Using the concept of social resilience (Hall and Lamont 2013), I consider the opportunities that market-oriented restructuring opens and closes for different actors, groups and institutions, who might be more or less active in their appropriation of or resistance to various market-oriented principles and measures, depending on their position and resources.

The chapter is structured in three sections. The first section introduces variegated neoliberalization and reviews the literature on market-oriented HE reforms and the role of competitive funding as a reform trigger. The second section presents Czech HE and examines the rise of a new system of public funding of Czech universities, based on competitive grants and performance-based indicators. The third part analyzes the different outcomes of neoliberalization at two HE institutions, paying special attention to the implications for academics and students of neoliberalization at FPU.

Variegated Neoliberalization in Higher Education

There is great variety in the terminology describing HE policy evolution over the last 30 years: market-oriented and neoliberal reforms (Leslie and Slaughter 1997; Bruno et al. 2010; Dale and Robertson 2009; Amaral 2012); the modernization agenda (Shattock 2009, 2014; Charle and Soulié 2007) and the diffusion of new public management (NPM)-inspired practices (Musselin and Teixeira 2014; Cussó and Normand 2013). Despite this plurality, there is a consensus on the underlying principles of these transformations:

- Policies encouraging institutional autonomy and accountability in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) have reshaped the relationship between the state and HEIs around new market-oriented measures such as performance-based and competitive funding (Shattock 2014), or quality assurance and evaluation (Cussó and Normand 2013).
- The increase in private, performance-based and competitive funding has spurred the diffusion of market and quasi-market logics in academia (Leslie and Slaughter 1997; Rhoades and Slaughter 2004; Krücken and Serrano-Velarde 2012; Shattock 2014).

- Managerial/entrepreneurial practices in the internal governance of HEIs have developed to the detriment of bureaucratic/collegial ones while central executive bodies have been empowered at the expense of deliberative bodies (Cussó and Normand 2013; Musselin 2009). Performance-based and competitive funding is one of the major causes of this evolution (Shattock 2014).

These transformations of HE correspond to wider neoliberalization processes observed in different sectors of the economy, society and public policy worldwide. Brenner et al. (2010) developed the concept of 'variegated neoliberalization' in order to overcome what they saw as an unfruitful binary opposition in the critical political economy literature between a hegemonic, global and homogenous conception of neoliberalism on the one hand and its nationally and locally specific, unstable, contested and uneven nature on the other. For Brenner et al., neoliberalization is 'constitutively and systemically uneven,' while simultaneously following several common general patterns: '[A]cross all contexts in which they have been mobilized, neoliberalization processes have facilitated marketization and commodification, while simultaneously *intensifying* the uneven development of regulatory forms across places, territories and scales' (ibid., p. 184). The authors call for an analysis of the '*differential* impacts of neoliberalization processes upon national and subnational regulatory spaces' that are not to be only framed as 'receptacles for, but as active progenitors of, market-driven regulatory experiments and policy reforms' (ibid., p. 198).

Applied to Czech HE, the concept of variegated neoliberalization requires research on multiple levels, from national HE policy to specific university departments, including the influence of international and European trends and organizations as well as the changing identities and practices of academics (academic representatives and students). Reviewing the literature on the market-oriented transformation of HE, Kandiko concludes that 'neoliberalism' has been manifested 'in three major trends in higher education: privatization, commercialization, and corporatization' (2010, p. 157). While none of these can be deduced from a quick look at the main structure of Czech HE, more specific aspects of HE neoliberalization noted by Kandiko can be seen in Czech HEIs, particularly the reduction in lifetime jobs, the constitution of a more 'contingent faculty' (Kandiko 2010, p. 158) and the rise of market-like rationales and profit-motives inside some spheres of academia. This development raises

important questions. What are the factors and mechanisms that generate these changes? How can they operate in a largely public university system characterized by the significant autonomy of individual actors, collegial governance and the overall predominance of high-ranking academics with traditional academic values? The second and third parts of this chapter demonstrate the crucial role of the national system for allocating public funds to universities. Its effects have been uneven, depending both on the position of each HEI in the national hierarchy and on more specific factors relative to particular institutional histories and cultures that have shaped the more or less liberal mind-set of faculty leaders.

Analyzing the evolution of various Western HE systems, several authors have emphasized the role of public-funding cuts and competitive and the contractual public funding of universities as the main lever of market-oriented reforms. The transformation of Czech HE followed this scenario, and the ensuing consequences were described by Michael Shattock, former President of Warwick University, a widely recognized HE expert and university entrepreneur (2014) in the following way:

> arguably the most influential driver for change in institutional governance structures has been changes in the nature of funding streams because they provoke the need for new decision-making process and demand greater attention to institutional strategies. In all our continental European examples the introduction of performance-based funding has transformed internal institutional dynamics and encouraged new styles of leadership. (p. 12)

These new dynamics did not have uniform effects as they opened new possibilities of action to certain groups of actors or institutions while closing other opportunities, as a collective publication, *Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era* (Hall and Lamont 2013), convincingly demonstrates. Thus, the competitive and performance-based funding transforms existing academic hierarchies, values and principles. While it can increase individual risks and profit-motives in academia, it can also contribute to some forms of emancipation from traditional academic hierarchies through the promotion of more market-oriented ones.

Cuts in public HE budgets have been another powerful incentive for HE reforms. Their significance was observed recently in Italy after the 2008 financial crisis (Reale et al. 2014, pp. 47–48). Leslie and Slaughter demonstrated the importance of budget cuts for the introduction of pro-market reforms at the level of universities and their departments. Coining the term

'academic capitalism,' the authors explored the development of 'market and market-like behaviours,' 'competitive logics' and the 'encroachment of the profit motive' in academia (Leslie and Slaughter 1997, p. 4). They showed that this market-oriented restructuring emerged in the public research universities in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States following the decline of block grants and funding without earmarks at the end of 1980s. Drawing on resource dependence theory, they showed that attempts to maintain or increase budgets forced universities to compete for additional resources. If academics fail in competition for these additional funds, 'there are no bureaucratic resources; they do without' (ibid., p. 11). This necessity to seek additional resources modifies academics' everyday practices, prompting them to 'maximize profits' (Leslie and Slaughter 1997, p. 4). Before showing how these theories and analyses can clarify the case of two Czech Faculties of Arts, the following section reviews the evolution of the Czech HE since 1989 with the introduction of contractual and performance-based funding as its main recent reform.

Neoliberalization Through Discrete Reforms of Public Funding

Czech HEIs are predominantly public, providing education without requiring tuition fees. In 2012, of all Czech students, 79% (340,000) were enrolled at public HEIs, 14% were in private institutions, 7% attended public or private higher professional schools,[1] while the remaining 1% were in two state HEIs funded by the Ministries of Defense and Interior. All study programs in public institutions are conducted in Czech and follow the standard duration of 3+1 years for BAs and 2+1 years for MAs. Private HEIs have existed since 1998 and are funded mainly through student tuition fees. Overall, private funding in the Czech HE represents about 20% of resources, which is about the average for European Union member states (Koucky 2013, p. 11).

During the socialist regime, the Czech HEIs were governed by the state bureaucracy. After the collapse of 1989, Czech academia applied the Humboldtian university model allegedly present in Czechoslovakia before the Second World War. This gave academics a level of autonomy unprecedented in Western Europe at the end of twentieth century. In 1992, the Ministry of Education guaranteed and reinforced the

autonomy of academia through a per capita funding system. Replacing a system where the budget of every HEI was renegotiated annually, formula-based per capita funding provided financial resources according to a single criterion: the number of students and graduates. This per capita funding scheme helped to fuel an extremely sharp increase in student numbers. While only about 15% of 19–20 years old were HE students in 1991, the rate reached 50% in 2005 (Pabian et al. 2010, p. 23), representing a fourfold increase in the space of less than 20 years (Koucky 2013, p. 3). Meanwhile, universities remained predominantly governed by academics, with power anchored in university departments (Melichar and Pabian 2007, p. 46; Pabian et al. 2011, pp. 96–97). The main regulatory body at state level has been the Accreditation Commission, comprised exclusively of high-profile academics who supervise the quality of study programs according to academic criteria (Fiala and Nantl 2010, p. 556; Dvorackova et al. 2014).

The Humboldtian design of HE in Czech Republic was, from its introduction in the beginning of 1990s, the object of criticism from certain politicians, university chair holders and national or international experts who emphasized the necessity for reform. Since 1992, the majority of proposed reform projects urged a market-oriented restructuring of Czech universities based on measures described in the first section of this chapter (Pabian 2007). Reform pressures gradually increased, especially following the OECD Country Note published in 2006 (File et al. 2006). A large-scale legislative reform project was subsequently launched in which several expert teams, two center-right governments and one caretaker government negotiated with academic representative bodies (the Czech Rectors Conference and the Council of HEIs of the Czech Republic) to draft a new HE law. The main reform propositions included the introduction of tuition fees, the empowerment of university executives with external stakeholders and the development of short professional study programs and the suppression of lifetime employment of professors. However, following repeated public protests, which peaked in February–March 2012, the reform process was blocked and no systematic reform took place. Instead, new systems of university public funding were introduced more discreetly, which, combined with an omnipresent reform discourse, have contributed to important ideational and institutional transformations observable inside some HEIs.

Neoliberalization Through Competitive and Performance-Based Funding

Because the highly publicized reform attempts attracted the most attention, observers concluded that the Humboldtian bastion of Czech universities had successfully resisted reforms. However, a series of more incremental, discrete and, on the face of it, 'technical' changes have had an impact. First, an amendment to the Higher Education Act was passed in 2005 (Act 552/2005) which transformed the legal status of public subsidies to HEIs by allowing them to keep any unspent funding, which encourages them to adopt a more strategic approach to finance planning. Before this law was passed, HEIs had to return budgetary surpluses back to the government. Although this change has received little comment in the HE literature, it is of crucial importance as it has provided HEIs with an opportunity to develop a more long-term budgetary strategy, thereby bringing about a diversification of HEI development strategies.

Second, in the late 2000s, incremental funding of university research activity was replaced by a new Evaluation Methodology (EM) that is 'arguably the most radical performance-based research evaluation system in Europe' (Young 2013, p. 13). It was criticized by both protest movements of Czech researchers and an international expert team engaged by the government to evaluate the EM in 2011. The team concluded that the EM was a 'dangerous experimentation, [that] pays most attention to the wrong things […]. [It] distorts behavior, reduces the stability of the research system and hampers its performance' (quoted in Linkova and Stöckelova 2012, p. 619). Referred to locally as a coffee grinder, it takes 'research outputs from all disciplines and organizations (universities, academy of science and research institutes) and reduces them to a common numerical point system' (ibid.). The number of points gained by each institution is the only criteria used to distribute the majority of public research funding. The rest of the research budget is grants distributed competitively to research and development (R&D) projects administered by various grant agencies and ministries (Koucky 2013, p. 7).

The third aspect contributing to the variegated neoliberalization of Czech HE is the decline of the most important undesignated fund allocated by the Ministry of Education funding HEI teaching activity. Following the global economic crisis, the absolute level of public funding for HEI teaching was reduced by 14% between 2009 and 2012. However, the 30% per capita decline of non-performance-based resources was even more

important because, since 2010, the Ministry of Education has reduced the absolute amount of formula per capita funding. In other words, funding based on quality and performance-based indicators (QPBIs) has gradually replaced the formula-based allocation. In 2014, 22.5% of funds earmarked for teaching was distributed according to performance-based indicators and 77.5%, according to the per capita formula (Koucky 2013, pp. 9–10; MSMT 2013). Consequently, those HEIs with the worst QPBIs saw their budgets decline even if the number of their students and graduates was increasing. Conversely, the supposedly best HEIs could admit fewer students without seeing a decline in their teaching budget (Zápis z 4. zasedání akademického senátu FCU 2010).

The QPBIs were developed by a Czech HE expert who has been repeatedly engaged as a senior official in the Ministry of Education since 1990 and who is considered the best expert on the allocation of public funds to Czech universities. In our interview, he emphasized the advantages of steering the HE system through funding instruments. The main advantage consists in the simplicity of procedures leading to the modification of rules used for allocating public money for teaching. They can be modified by a ministerial decree, without the consent of government and parliament, and therefore in a less politicized and more discreet way. Consultations with academic representatives do occur, but without a formal power to veto a ministerial proposition. In the case of QPBI, the Ministry of Education found a general consensus with academic representative bodies (Czech Rectors Conference, Council of HEIs), which disagreed radically only with the indicator of graduate unemployment—the criterion that is the most distant from a traditional core of the academic profession: research and teaching (other indicators are very academic in that sense). Negotiated during the preparations of radical neoliberal HE legislative reform, the academics were able to see the new funding rules of as acceptable changes that would not radically transform the academic profession and identity (Interview with the former high-official of the Ministry, 10 September 2014).

In the context of declining public funding, important external resources also became available from the European Structural Funds (ESF), which created an impetus for change in provincial HEIs because these funds could be accessed only by HEIs outside Prague, which was not itself eligible. In order to succeed in the competition for ESF resources,[2] academics had to prepare project applications and mobilize their own administrative resources. In addition, the expectations of the two operational programs of

the ESF (*OP Education for Competitiveness, OP Research and Development for Innovations*) reflect the discourse of a knowledge-based economy, which pushes universities to become more closely linked to industry in order to contribute to national competitiveness by producing employable professionals and applied (or applicable) research (Walkenhorst 2008; Sum and Jessop 2013). The following section analyzes in more depth the diverse impacts of such new public-funding schemes on two faculties of arts.

Variegated Neoliberalization in the Humanities Sector[3]

Historically, there have been just three public research universities in the Czech Republic. The biggest and oldest is Charles University in Prague (founded in 1348, with 48,200 students in 2013); the second biggest and most rapidly modernizing is Masaryk University in Brno (founded in 1919, with 37,351 students); the third is Palacky University in Olomouc (founded in 1573, with 21,316 students). My fieldwork was conducted in FCU and FPU. Both faculties have the highest number of students in their respective universities (7608 in FCU and 5774 in FPU in 2012). Both faculties identify themselves as research and internationally oriented. However, FCU is recognized as the most important Czech academic institution in the humanities and social sciences according to the Czech bibliometric database. FPU seeks to compensate for its lack of the resources necessary to become a higher quality international research university by cooperating with local administrations, associations and firms.

FCU appeared to be more insulated from pressures for market-oriented restructuring than FPU, which engaged in and was influenced by radical neoliberalization processes. This may be partially explained by mechanisms observed by Leslie and Slaughter (1997), who noted that the main trigger for developing market-conforming behaviors and competitive logics is the decline of undesignated funding, which forces HEIs to seek external resources. Indeed, FCU, as the dominant Czech institution in its domain, was more resistant to national funding reforms than the more peripheral FPU. However, this (center-periphery) explanation cannot alone explain some of the radical market-oriented measures introduced at FPU because ethnographic research conducted by Dvorackova et al. (2014) in five Czech faculties shows that some institutions that are more peripheral than

FPU were less engaged in the neoliberalization process. Nevertheless, my research at FPU indicates that the reform of HEI funding and its reinterpretation by FPU's leaders was clearly the main trigger for its market-oriented restructuring.

Diversified Impact of National Funding Reforms

The basic budget structure of the more peripheral FPU was profoundly modified between 2007 and 2012 while the budget structure of the dominant FCU remained stable. More specifically, undesignated funding at FPU (the formula-based per capita funding) decreased from 55% of its total budget in 2007 to only 35% in 2012 (the decline of 12% in absolute terms was partially due to a reduction of funding per student and partially due to FPU's mediocre results according to performance-based indicators). In the same period, the main undesignated funding remained stable at FCU thanks to its high scores in QPBIs (Zápis z 4. Zasedání 2010). However, the decline of undesignated sources at FPU was more than compensated for by an influx of competitive funding from the ESF (inaccessible for the Prague-based FCU). FPU's level of ESF resources increased from 5% of the total budget in 2009 to 31% in 2012.

Research funding, the third main component of both universities' budgets, was remained at 30% for FCU and about 12% for FPU. It could be supposed that the new competitive allocation of research funding should have encouraged market-oriented restructuring, and should have done so more at FCU, where this budget represents almost a third of all resources (against a tenth at FPU). However, FCU has managed to limit the competitive logic of funding through its specific and rather egalitarian way of resource redistribution among its faculties and departments. Even though it receives research funding according to the research outcomes of its academics as evaluated by the EM, it still redistributes its budget in a way which is explicitly designated as 'non-competitive' and which aims to focus on midterm institutional development rather than on short-term research outcomes (Zápis z 21. zasedání 2012). On the other hand, FPU, including its Faculty of Arts specifically, allocates its research funding according to each unit's contribution to the performance indicators. The objective is to encourage faculties, departments and individual academics to gain more R&D points (counted in the EM) and subsequently more money from the state. We will consider this decentralization of economic

responsibility, which is one of the basic aspects of neoliberalization (Hall and Lamont 2013), further in the following section.

Decentralization of Financial Responsibility

According to Leslie and Slaughter, the tendency of academic capitalism is to transfer economic responsibility to the level of basic university units such as departments or institutes (1997, p. 22). In consequence, every unit becomes responsible for the management of its own funding in a way that it must actively pursue policies that guarantee enough funding for its own budgetary needs. While representatives of the well-established Faculty of Arts at FCU have rejected such a decentralization of financial responsibility (Zápis z 21. zasedani 2010), it has been gradually adopted at FPU since 2007–2008.

In the second half of the 2000s, a new financial administrator responsible for financial affairs joined FPU. Having worked previously as a financial manager in a multinational firm, he was hired in order to implement an accounting and managerial IT system, *SAP Varias Education*, which is a version of a widely used enterprise resource planning system adapted for use in educational environments. Even if the interviewed administrator regretted that this new version had fewer functionalities than that used in the private sector, he claimed that when the faculty started using it, it was as if 'we turned the light on in the accounting system; suddenly we could see where the money was going and where it was, let's say, getting lost' (Financial administrator of the FPU 2014).

This newly gained transparency in cost–benefit analysis stimulated the progressive introduction of a so-called decentralized model of funding. This model is based on the redistribution of resources among departments according to the number of European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) credits. The ECTS credits of all courses taught by a given department are multiplied by the number of students passing these courses. Such a policy has disadvantaged departments with fewer students per professor as they make huge 'productivity gaps' visible. In addition, since 2011, departments transfer their 'profits' and 'losses' from one annual budget to another, which has meant that the core budget of the Department of Philosophy has diminished by more than 50% between 2009 and 2012. Although the departments' losses and gains at the end of each year are based only on the accounting balance within FPU because they are not legally binding, they nevertheless generate new vocabularies and normative pressures. For

instance, there has been a distinction made between 'indebted departments' and 'departments proving their solidarity' by agreeing at the end of every year that certain part of their 'profits' should be used to cover the 'debts' of the 'weaker' components. FPU's new financial administrator acknowledged that these debts were only virtual, but at the same time the system is seen as a way to urge certain departments and academics to search for additional resources: essentially ESF funding and research grants (Financial administrator of the FPU 2014).

In general, the departments that do not perform well according to the decentralized budget model are seen as problematic. They appear in 'red numbers' on the score tables that are projected at the regular meetings of department directors with the Dean and which are publicly accessible on the university's website. Different kinds of stigmatization of 'weak' and 'indebted' components have had tangible impacts on the structure of the university. For example, when the number of the ECTS credits in the Department of Czech Philology declined sharply, the 'problem was resolved by the change of the department's director' (Dean of FPU in the Academic Senate, Zápis ze zasedání akademického senátu FPU 06/2011). The most problematic are the small Departments of Philosophy, Classical Philology and Dutch Philology, which do not attract enough students to generate the necessary number of ECTS credits. In order to realize economies of scale and pull indebted departments out of the red, university leaders presented a proposal for profound restructuring by merging small departments into bigger institutes. The measure would allow for shared teaching by delivering the same courses to bigger classes. However, because the reform proposal generated severe opposition, it failed to gain approval in the University Academic Senate.

Contrary to FPU, FCU distributes its resources between its components in a less competitive way. While FCU's Dean took into consideration the quantitative indicators of FCU's version of the decentralized funding model, he also considered qualitative criteria linked to the specific conditions of each department used in budget negotiations with the department heads (Zápis ze 7. zasedání 2011). He explicitly declared that there could not and would not be a 'transparent' funding allocation system based on 'hard objective criteria' (Zápis z 21. zasedání 2010). Even though FCU's leaders have adopted a pervasive system of evaluation, these are based on highly diversified criteria, including student evaluations, quality of supervised student theses, publications and funding. Moreover, these criteria

are not directly linked to the funding theoretically generated by individual departments or academics (ibid.).

There are no visible controversies concerning the departmental funding at FCU. Those categorized as problematic are departments with difficulties linked to supposedly low quality of teaching (coherence of curricula, quality of student theses) or research potential and results (number of professors and assistant professors and their publications). Between 2010 and 2013, several non-compliance cases regarding such quality criteria involved the Departments of Japanese Philology, Andragogy and Cultural Studies. The pressure exercised on these departments by the Dean and the University Academic Senate led to important restructuring, ranging from the replacement of three department directors to the dissolution of the formerly autonomous department of Cultural Studies in the Department of Ethnology. Paradoxically, these departments were among the most financially sound at FCU, bringing substantial additional resources to the university as a whole by organizing paid courses of lifelong learning and attracting high numbers of students, including even fee-paying foreign students (ibid.).

The Appropriation of Market-Oriented Restructuring by Academics

The decentralization of economic responsibility at FPU has not stopped at the department level as it has percolated down to individuals. University leaders described on several occasions in interviews and in the Academic Senate that the ideal model of faculty funding is one in which individual academics directly cover their own costs (e.g. salary, insurance, taxes) (Zápis ze zasedání akademického senátu FPU 06/2011; Financial administrator of the FPU). It has become gradually accepted that an increasing proportion of academics do not have tenure so their employment should be linked to research projects in which they participate even if they have the same teaching load. It follows that when project resources end, the university will not fund these academics unless it agrees to renew their contract. The most radical case we have seen concerns a managerial method driven by the clear objective to reduce the university's financial responsibility for its members. One of the interviewed academics lost 90% of his permanent job contract so that he remained legally responsible to the university for only 10%, even if he continued to teach the same number of hours. This meant that 90% of his contract was funded by and legally bound to his

educational and research projects. Academics, particularly younger ones, are thus being transformed into 'state-subsidized entrepreneurs,' as Leslie and Slaughter (1997, p. 9) put it, who may participate without restriction in a variety of research and educational projects, working with multiple employers, grant-donors or business partners. This implies that they also have to individually assume the risk of income fluctuation. FPU's management believes that this flexibility will ensure that the university will not run out of financial resources when ESF capital stops flowing in (Financial administrator of the FPU 2014).

The question remains: Why did academics in leadership positions impose these market-oriented reforms, which appeared to be contrary to their corporate interest? At FPU, the academic community elects the Dean and his team every four years. Both academics and students are represented in the University Academic Senate, which votes on the university's budget and redistribution system. Since 2007, the senate has limited some of the Dean's most radical market-oriented restructuring projects. However, the Dean's leadership was de facto approved by his re-election in 2014. Some possible reasons for the more or less explicit support of market-oriented restructuring could be found in academics' overall liberal, individualist and rationalist mind-set or in a rise in their average incomes of about 20% between 2007 and 2012 (including both regular salary and income from grants and projects). Other factors explaining the role of academics and students in FPU's reforms can were revealed by the ethnographic research I conducted in the Philosophy Department,[4] which was one of the main losers.

The majority of the Philosophy Department's academic personnel agreed with the main features of the university's evolution. While regretting some of the market-oriented measures, they acknowledged that these steps were necessary to deal with FPU's and their own department's difficult financial situation. The interviewee mentioned earlier, that now has only 10% of his working hours covered by the university, confirms that his 'situation might be considered rather unfair.' Nevertheless, he acknowledges that 'the situation is difficult: the university has less and less resources and this will be even worse with the end of the European projects' (interview with lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, 29 March 2014). Even according to the only radical critic of the Dean's leadership that I found, a senior member of the Philosophy Department, 'the Dean has succeeded in dealing with a lot of issues. He set university life in motion and […] led the university out of debt' (interview with senior

lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, 13 March 2014). As explained earlier, since 2010, the rules of the EM have been applied to redistribute an increasing part of the university's budget among individual researchers. Despite the widely shared criticism of the bibliometric evaluation of science in general, the Philosophy Department's members did not mobilize against its use inside their own institution. One of them, a member of the University Academic Senate, who describes himself as being in 'constructive opposition' to the Dean, guardedly accepted the internal use of the EM as 'a motivating tool':

> The research budget could have been distributed immediately and every member of the university would be financially better off. But in that case, not everybody would have realized … there would not have been the direct motivation for publishing. The system in use supports directly the outcomes that are taken into account by the [national] EM. (Interview with lecturer at the Department of Philosophy at the FPU, 16 May 2014 in Olomouc)

Neither the academics nor the students I interviewed questioned the university's and department's discourse of 'financial crisis.' That is, they did not claim that the university's overall financial balance was positive or that a university could be seen as a public service that should not be run on a business model. Even though some of the Philosophy Department's members understood well that its 'debt' was only theoretical (as an internal university management tool, the debt has no legal standing), they believed that additional funds needed to be attracted to assure the university's and the department's future. Moreover, they understood that this future is very uncertain financially: state resources have become chronically unstable while ESF funding might dry up when the current funding period ended after 2014. Rather than criticizing the State or the university's leadership for financial instability, as was the case at FCU, the majority of interviewed academics accepted their financial responsibility. They mobilized in the competition for additional funds even if it implied a reduction in the number of permanent job contracts and a modification of the traditional identity of their academic discipline. Instead of contesting the rules of the new game, FPU's academics strived to become better players. As exemplary neoliberal subjects, they assumed individual responsibility for structural or collective failures. Thus, they considered that transferring economic pressure onto individual members of the staff is an appropriate way to value active academics and encourage all of them

to generate more income from the national performance-based system for distributing public money among HEIs. The new financial rules at FPU have also diluted and modified the traditionally rigid hierarchies of the academic profession, which may partially explain why junior department members reacted positively overall to FPU's neoliberal restructuring. Formerly subordinated young post-doctorate academics or assistant professors can now conduct their own well-funded research projects (e.g. academic distinctions do not seem to constitute an important criteria in the allocation of ESF funds), increase their personal incomes and benefit from recognition from university leaders when they win a major research contract. On the other hand, the formerly dominant senior professors, who have either not participated or succeeded in the competition for extra resources, have become less well remunerated in comparison to some of their more entrepreneurial and successful colleagues, which have put them under pressure from the university leadership. Such is the case of one senior lecturer in FPU's Philosophy Department, who might be considered one *loser* in the market-oriented restructuring. He was criticized by the Dean for not bringing in any significant outside funds and for generating few points in the EM. This senior lecturer was one of the few critics of FPU's market-oriented restructuring. The fact that he was an isolated critic may be partially explained both by his position as formerly dominant university who has lost out in the restructuring and by the narrow corporatist character of his arguments. These were based on the principle that philosophy as an academic discipline is specific and somehow superior to other mainly more recent and utilitarian social and human sciences. Following his logic, only philosophy has particular characteristics allowing it to be exempted from the general pressure on accountability, performance and competitiveness. That such arguments lack any major universalizing ambitions makes them less likely to be heard outside the narrow field of philosophy.

Students' Positive But Ambivalent Responses to Neoliberalization in FPU[5]

In describing the state of the art of 'neoliberalism' in HE, Kandiko listed the main measures occurring as a part of the efforts to reduce HE costs: 'limiting the number of full-time faculty, hiring more temporary faculty, and increasing class size, particularly in low-cost fields of study, […] pursu[ing] externally funded research' (Kandiko 2010, p. 158). Although

I was able to see all of these measures at FPU, my research did not reveal any tangible developments in teaching practices in the Philosophy Department. Because the FPU's senate rejected the Dean's proposal to merge small departments, the student–teacher ratio remained very low in the Philosophy Department. Neither can I corroborate Kandiko's assertion that 'neoliberal practices […] discourage interaction between faculty and students' (ibid., p. 158). Rather, I found that such interaction remains among the most appreciated aspects of the Philosophy Department according to the interviewed philosophy students. The department's small size and informal relations with teachers seem to be one of its stable and prominent characteristics since 1990.

The interviewed philosophy students either ignored FPU's market-oriented restructuring or generally perceived it as a positive development. Only a few of the interviewees were interested in the inner functioning of the university and knew about the 'financial troubles' of the Philosophy Department. They did not question the construction of this economic reality. Some students knew about the increasing number of opportunities concerning student research grants, considering them as another example of the financial incentives that could help to resolve the supposed problem of an immobile university. The informed students perceived the increase in research grants available to them on a competitive basis as progress. Indeed, these grants and projects fortify relations between students and academics (graduate students take part in collective research projects) and probably also improve the quality of learning through research. They also open some additional opportunities in terms of international mobility. However, these new possibilities only affect a small minority of exceptional students, primarily at graduate level, without addressing the challenges caused by massification and the growth in the number of students from increasingly diverse cultural and social backgrounds.

A large majority of the interviewed students expressed two kinds of opinions or preferences that sum up one of the problematic effects of neoliberalization. They appreciated the 'active academics' who receive grants and develop projects funded from external sources. They see such teachers in opposition to the stereotype of inactive academics who do not pursue any new research, teach from obsolete textbooks and ignore their students. However, my interviewees tended to conflate different academic activities, in that receiving grants and being funded from external sources supposedly correlate with teaching activity and support to students. One of the consequences of neoliberal restructuring is that, in order to be seen

as 'active,' academics need to adopt entrepreneurial behavior (i.e. seeking external funding, involvement in collective grants). At the same time, the majority of philosophy students valued their department's 'friendly atmosphere,' 'informal relations' with teaching and administrative staff, and the absence of 'bureaucratic [paper-related] problems.' However, engagement in grants and projects tends to reduce the academics' capacity to get involved in any student support beyond the formal framework of their teaching activity or their relationship to a few selected students participating in a research project. Indeed, the 'friendly atmosphere' is conditioned by the academics' availability and relatively low student–teacher ratio. Yet, these conditions are endangered by market-oriented restructuring. In contrast to the demand to increase the number of externally funded projects and grants, university guidelines no longer seem to require that academics be available to supervise their students.

Conclusion

The recent evolution of Czech HE corroborates the claim that changes in the system of distributing public funds to universities can trigger important transformations in university relations, their inner governance, identities, values and everyday academic practices. In the Czech Republic, no tuition fees were introduced for public HEIs while their academics retained their dominant position in governance structures and the overall shaping of HE policy. Nevertheless, budget cuts in undesignated funds, an increase of resources available from competitive grants and the introduction of performance-based indicators for HEI funding have provoked an important, yet uneven, market-oriented restructuring of Czech public research universities. On the one hand, the dominant universities and academics, such as at FCU, have retained their traditional academic principles and values as their main operative logic. Their leadership has not reproduced the highly competitive funding criteria for distributing resources among faculties, departments and individual academics. It is as if FCU's leaders knew that their university was so crucial for national HE that the government could not afford to abandon it financially. Consequently, FCU's academics have remained relatively insulated from any systematic pressure to compete for external funds or publish to gain more points according to the national EM. On the other hand, FPU's Faculty of Arts has pursued market-oriented restructuring. Concerned about financial instability, its leadership has delegated financial and economic responsibility to

departments and even individual academics, who have been encouraged to compete for additional resources. Further research is necessary to generalize from my observations concerning the link between each HEI's position in the (inter)national HE hierarchy and its tendency to participate in neoliberal restructuring. Regarding the effects of neoliberalization, I found that FPU's overall financial situation has improved, but job insecurity has increased and the market-like rationale of academics has been reinforced. More extensive inquiries are needed to investigate whether and how teaching activity has been transformed.

Neoliberalization has expanded into parts of Czech HE through incremental, *technical* funding instruments, rather than as a frontal imposition of a homogenous doctrine or ideology. Even in FPU, where reforms did have the radical, tangible consequences described above, other typically neoliberal measures, such as outsourcing peripheral activities (e.g. cleaning, supervision) to private companies, have been blocked because they appeared to be non-profitable. This can be seen as one final illustration of the extent to which neoliberalization in Czech HE has been variegated.

Notes

1. Established by the 1996 amendment of the existing School Act, the Higher Professional Schools are an extension of secondary education. They lack 'any systematic links to existing public universities' (Koucky 2013, p. 4).
2. There is no statistical data available on the probability of success of university projects in the selection procedure, but according to academics interviewed from the FPU, the probability of a positive answer to a request for funding was relatively high.
3. To assure the anonymity of the persons interviewed, I modified some personal, social and professional characteristics that are not connected to the main arguments put forward in this section.
4. Besides semi-participative observation in lectures and social gatherings organized by the philosophy students, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 philosophy students (bachelor and masters) and six of the ten permanent members of the department's teaching staff.
5. As FCU representatives blocked neoliberal restructuring in their university, the following section deals exclusively with the philosophy students at FPU. The students' profiles varied from those who

were deeply involved in philosophy studies and the department's life (e.g. participation in research projects, attending student and academic conferences, frequent and familiar contact with particular lecturers, preparation of a PhD project) to those who attended only a minority of classes and had considered abandoning their studies to engage in other subjects or professional life.

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Creating Jobs for the Social Good: Moving Beyond the Neoliberal Model of Education for Employment

Shana Cohen

INTRODUCTION

In the mid-1990s, when I was conducting my dissertation research (Cohen 2004), a young man running a small shop to produce tapes and CDs, primarily of pop music he copied from various sources, told me how he had created the business because he was fed up looking for a job. 'After Independence,' he explained, 'my grandfather could just walk out into the street and find a job. There weren't that many people then.' Now, he continued, there were a large number of young university graduates looking for employment, and not just any employment but secure jobs that would allow them to build families and plan for a future. In 2009, during another research stay in Morocco, a retired civil servant explained to me how her children had been educated in the French school system through the *lycée* (secondary school) before departing for France for their university education, after which they remained there for employment. 'They went to

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119

the French school and thus don't really feel Moroccan. They couldn't stay here,' she remarked, not sadly, but rather as an observation of a logical sequence of events. Finally, during a short trip to Morocco in 2012, the dean of a public university talked to me about the national policy, launched in 2005 in a *Discours Royal*,[1] to train social workers (*agents de développement*) in Morocco (Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development 2012). The objective of the program was to train 10,000 workers between 2008 and 2012 and to produce 6400 graduates from specialized university degree programs (Tanmia 2009).[2] The dean complained that the university already had approximately 350 graduates now but no jobs for them to go to after finishing their degree. 'The government had to think about the connection between the market and higher education,' he stated.

All three conversations point not only to the lack of jobs in Morocco for university graduates but also to a more profound issue, namely, the connection between education and training, job creation, the capacity of individuals to progress in a job and make a contribution to the work of the organization, and citizenship. Similarly, the World Development Report (WDR) on jobs notes that jobs have a much greater function than employment or income in itself. WDR states, 'Jobs contribute to how people view themselves and relate to others. Most people feel strongly that their jobs should be meaningful and contribute to society' (2013, p. 85).

Yet, policy regarding higher education has increasingly adopted instrumentalist strategies influenced by business management principles and measurements of productivity, and, ultimately, neoliberal ideas. Internationally, some of the clearest examples of this trend include assessing publication outputs through citations, the impact factor of journals, referencing by policymakers, and so on; emphasizing the economic contribution of academic research and university services; relying on casual teaching; and addressing students as customers (Saunders 2010; Aronowitz 2000; Cooper et al. 2002; Olssen and Peters 2005; Brown 2015; Giroux 2002, 2008; Patrick 2013).

The adoption of neoliberal ideas has transformed the nature of public and private educational institutions, most importantly perhaps, their capacity to intersect multiple strands of political, social, and economic agency (Cohen 2014a). Academics have responded by challenging the discourse of human capital that subsumes education into economic gain and the devaluation of liberal arts, thereby also devaluing critical thinking and the acquisition of general knowledge (Brown 2015). Patrick calls

for associating education with 'wellbeing and individual flourishing.' 'The real shame of neoliberalism,' she writes, is that 'the needs of the individual as a human being have been subjugated to the needs of capital and the economy' (Patrick 2013, p. 6).

In Morocco, policy strategies regarding higher education have also stressed the need to improve the quality of training and higher education in order to improve employment prospects and meet private sector demand for skills (European Commission Tempus Program 2010).[3] However, rather than focus primarily on restoring liberal arts education, I suggest in this chapter that an effective strategic response to the influence of neoliberalism on Moroccan higher education would be to highlight social desire in a job and from there consider the social and material purposes of both employment and higher education. For instance, an International Social Survey Programme survey on jobs in 33 countries found that the majority of respondents wanted a job that contributed to the welfare of others (2005). Similarly, Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000) list nine variables that contribute to increased job satisfaction, which encompass both material and social rewards, including 'helping people,' 'usefulness to society,' and 'good relationships with colleagues' (2000, p. 4).

The Moroccan Program to Support Appropriate Training for Employment (PAAFE) does contain social objectives in its mission, for example, 'the deepening of national identity' and 'the establishment of a new social contract' (2013, p. 11). Analyzing programs like PAAFE, which aim to reform higher education in Morocco in order to increase graduate employment opportunities, this chapter asks if policies should link the abstract goal of establishing a new social contract to the practical desire to achieve social impact in a job. Education, in this scenario, must prepare graduates to achieve social goals. In other words, policy should create a virtuous circle through reinforcing in its different programs the interrelation of the social and material functions of employment. This would then change the content and aims of vocational training and education, as well as student expectations regarding job responsibilities and performance assessment, and how the value and reputation of companies or institutions are measured and developed.

This chapter draws on an analysis of international aid agency and national policy documents regarding higher education and employment as well as fieldwork conducted in 2009 in public hospitals and schools in Rabat. The first section of the chapter analyzes the prominent arguments among international organizations and policymakers concerning

job creation and policy strategies in Morocco and elsewhere that connect higher education with employment. In reviewing these arguments, the section highlights the dominance of economic thinking and the narrow intellectual consensus in policy strategies. It argues instead for a more accurate multidisciplinary approach to account for the social function of jobs. The second section draws on qualitative research conducted with frontline health staff and teachers in Morocco. Demonstrating how training, job management, social contribution, productivity, and service quality intersect, the section outlines a new approach for guiding employment and higher education policies that focuses on the connection between the social purposes of public institutions and private organizations, and the expectations and meaning of citizenship.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND JOBS IN MOROCCO

The Problem of Unemployment

Reducing unemployment rates among younger generations of university and vocational school graduates in the Arab world in general and in Morocco more specifically has been a policy priority for several decades. Structural adjustment and market reforms introduced in the 1970s (Egypt) and 1980s (Morocco) instigated a decline in public sector hiring while, at the same time, private sector employment did not expand rapidly enough to keep up with population growth. Furthermore, more women were now entering the workforce for a combination of reasons, including new opportunities and aspirations, and the need for two family incomes to maintain a household (Alami 2004).

Although after the Arab Spring the challenge of regional unemployment rates, particularly for educated young people, has become perhaps a more prominent political issue internationally, policy responses have not become more urgent, innovative, or expansive. As of 2012, the unemployment rate among young people (15–24) in Tunisia was the second highest in North Africa, at 37.6 percent, exceeded only by Libya at 48.7 percent. In 2013, the unemployment rate in Egypt was 34.2 percent, Algeria 24.8 percent, and Morocco 18.6 percent (OECD 2015). Unemployment rates in Egypt for women have been consistently much higher than men's (31 percent higher) and Algeria (19 percent higher), and, as of 2011, also 5 percent higher in Tunisia, reversing an earlier trend. In North Africa and the rest of the Arab world, unemployment rates are worst for those who have gone

through higher education, with rates in Egypt and Tunisia well above 30 percent as of 2012 (European Commission Tempus Program 2014a).

The general unemployment rate in Morocco in the first trimester of 2015 was 1,157,000 or 9.9 percent of the population (High Commissioner for the Plan/*Haut Commissariat au Plan*). In 2014, which is the most recent year for data on unemployment by education, 4.6 percent of the population without a diploma was unemployed, 15.2 percent with secondary education, and 20 percent with higher education. Data from 2011 offers slightly more specific comparative unemployment rates of 22.3 percent among university graduates and 19.7 percent among professional or vocational school graduates, while the 2011 unemployment rate for men and women with secondary education was 16 percent.[4]

Due to population growth and rising numbers of students enrolled in higher education, unemployment rates among university and professional school graduates should logically grow. The number of graduates was predicted to rise from 506,000 students in 2010–2011 to 706,000 in 2015 and to 800,000 in 2020 (AFDB 2013). Beyond unemployment, Morocco faces problems of underemployment and insecure unstable employment. There is no data specific to educated Moroccan men and women, but for the overall population, approximately 30 percent lost their job between 2013 and 2014, while the overall number of underemployed (part-time included) rose from 978,000 to 1,100,000 and from 530,000 to 589,000 in urban areas (Maghrebemergent 2015).

The imbalance between population and economic growth has conventionally been cited as the primary factor driving unemployment rates. Though fertility rates are declining in North Africa (PRB 2007), growth over the past several decades has meant that the population of working age has outstripped the job supply. In 2011, people between 15 and 24 years of age made up 20.3 percent of Egypt's population, 18.9 percent of Tunisia's and 19.5 percent of Morocco's (European Commission Tempus Program 2014b). However, the percentage of the population under 15 in Morocco is expected to decline from 27.5 percent in 2010 to 20.9 percent in 2030, to around 8 million people. This decline may have little effect on employment, however, as the percentage of the population over 60 will continue to grow during the same period, from 8.3 percent in 2010 to 20.9 percent in 2030, marking an increase from 2.6 million to 5.8 million people (ibid).

More specific to graduates, the sectors that have grown over the past decade have been agriculture, construction, and public works and services, but not the sectors where higher skill levels are required. For instance, between 2008

and 2013, agriculture grew 9.3 percent versus 4.3 percent for the economy overall (Finances 2015). A report from a 2011 High Commissioner for Planning (*Haut Commissarait au Plan* or HCP) round table on unemployment stated that job creation during this decade had been highest in construction and public works, where between 48,000 and 63,000 jobs had been created annually since 2008, and in the service sector, with 84,000 jobs created. Agriculture produces about 13,000 new jobs annually and industry, including artisanal work, 10,000 (Haut Commissariat du Plan 2014).

Other Reasons for Unemployment

Besides population growth and lack of job creation in relevant industries, analysts have also attributed the high unemployment rates among young educated men and women in the region to five other factors: (1) the size of the public sector, which can constrain private sector growth; (2) inadequate skills for the job market; (3) rigidity of labor laws, particularly in the public sector, which has led to relatively higher wages, more job security and, in some instances, less scrutiny of performance than in the private sector; (4) the difficulty of establishing small and medium-sized businesses because of the regulatory and tax regimes and lack of access to capital; and (5) aspirations for stable, salaried, white-collar employment rather than vocational employment and/or more flexible work (Masood 2012).

Job creation strategies mirror the consensus on the determinants of unemployment. The common principles include (1) increasing economic growth both generally and specifically through investment, easier access to credit and regulatory reform of business creation and labor practices; (2) improving the quality and orientation of education and training to match labor supply with demand; (3) encouraging entrepreneurship and self-employment (and not looking to the public sector for employment); and (4) ensuring the labor rights of young people, in part to make jobs more appealing (ILO 2013).

Similar to suggestions in the media (Maghrebemergent 2014) and to Moroccan government and development agency reports (namely among the elites), PAAFE cites the necessary annual growth rate to address unemployment as 6 percent versus an average rate over the past ten years of 4.9 percent (2013, p. iv). Likewise, HCP claims 6.5 percent growth is needed to reduce the unemployment rate to approximately 6.7 percent (Haut Commissariat du Plan 2014). Each percentage point of growth is supposed to create between 15,000 and 20,000 posts, making any rise in economic

growth rates a central tenet of employment strategies.[5] In its 2013 country report on Morocco, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acknowledges the importance of economic growth but is less optimistic about the capacity of growth to address youth unemployment, particularly among young men and women with post-secondary school education. The report states that 'while overall employment has been responsive to changes in output, youth employment has steadily decreased in recent years despite sustained GDP growth rates' (ibid., 2013). The IMF predicts that youth unemployment rates will remain high because of population growth at about 15 percent over the next few years. The report places more emphasis on structural reform or increasing flexibility in the labor market and supporting the capacity to start and grow a business, to increase youth employment, particularly for those that are more educated. According to the report, market competition between businesses will drive up wages for skilled employees, offering better opportunities for younger generations of educated workers that still consider public sector salaries and security as commensurate with their qualifications (Masood 2012).

Listing ten principles to create jobs, an OECD report on employment makes the more general claim that diversified, dynamic economies where small and medium-sized businesses are easy to establish in multiple areas will produce jobs for graduates. The report calls for both '[f]lexible training, education and employment services … required to proactively respond to skills gaps that may act as barriers and obstacles to business growth and expansion' and for 'individuals [to] have the generic skills to be adaptable and innovative' with 'school to work transitions for youth, and employment transitions over the lifecycle, [that] can be facilitated by the development of clear local pathways between education and work' (OECD 2014).

The Role of Education in Unemployment

Speaking at a World Bank meeting on joblessness in 2011, Alia El-Mahdi, the Director of the Center of Economic and Financial Studies and Research (CEFRS) in Cairo, associated unemployment with education, claiming, first, that 'up until now the quality of education has not been up to any acceptable standards especially in public sector schools. And second, training, especially vocational training activities, has been almost forgotten for a very long time' (World Bank 2015). Echoing her complaint, the former Jordanian Labor Minister Samir Murad remarked in a media interview that

[o]nly about 30,000 young Jordanians are currently enrolled in vocational schools that produce badly needed plumbers and carpenters, while more than 10 times as many study at universities. Once they graduate, many of the more educated struggle to find jobs. (Laub 2015)

According to the World Bank, over 30 percent of respondents in one of their enterprise surveys claimed that skill level was a major constraint in creating jobs (Masood 2012).

The conclusions of reports on the role of education in unemployment are often the same as analyses of the causes of unemployment—science and engineering faculties must *produce* more graduates. Likewise, there are too many graduates of faculties that have little connection to the job market while there are too many graduates without work experience when they start looking for a job. Graduates are thus burdened with the combination of an unattractive degree and a lack of compensatory work experience. The *WDR* agrees with promoting work experience to make graduates more attractive to employers but the report also emphasizes the importance of acquiring a core set of 'basic skills, both cognitive and social' that are 'necessary for productive employment, and …. cannot just be acquired on the job.' The *WDR* adds,

[w]ithout such generic skills, the prospects of improving employment opportunities and earnings are thin. Skills are also critical for countries to move up the value-added ladder, as they can ignite innovation, produce the benefits of mutual learning, and hence lead to job creation themselves. (*WDR* 2013, p. 36)

Ragui Assaad, who has written extensively on job markets in the Middle East (Assaad et al. 2002; Assaad 2010; Assaad and Levison 2013), emphasizes unrealistic expectations as a cause. As he and his co-authors (2000) note, '[e]ducated workers expect to get regular full-time salaried work and are therefore willing to wait for it. Less educated workers are much less likely to ever find such work'[6] (2000, p. 16).

The mismatch between the skills offered in higher education and industry demand, and the expectation of employment that fulfills aspirations for a particular lifestyle, which includes not only owning a house but also private education for children and private health care, prevent any significant effort to reduce high unemployment rates among better-educated young Moroccans.

Privatizing Education to Raise Employment Rates

There are far more students in public universities than in private higher education in Morocco, despite foreign and political interest in creating a competitive private higher education market. As of 2010, there were 103 public universities and 192 private universities or colleges (Lauali and Meyer 2013). In 2011–2012, there were 615,000 students enrolled in public universities in Morocco but less than 40,000 students in the private sector, with over half of this population based in Rabat and Casablanca.[7] At the same time, public education in general has experienced declining enrollment for over a decade, with 191 primary and secondary schools closing for lack of students between 2008 and 2013 (*Mbog* 2015). Beyond the needed investment in facilities, teacher training and more complex support, particularly for low-income students, this decline, whether deserved or not, is also due to poor reputation. This in turn is based on factors like teacher absenteeism because they are also working in the private sector, loss of students from middle-class families so that public schools become associated with lower social class, and, importantly, perceptions of government support for private schools.[8]

In an interview with the French newspaper *Mbog* (2015), Sylvain Aubry criticizes the growth of private schools in Morocco[9] as an indication that inequality is being reinforced (*Majdi* 2014): 'For fifteen years, successive governments in Morocco have encouraged the expansion of the private education sector. Today, the number of students in private primary schools has increased from 4 per cent in 1999 to 15 per cent in 2015.' For Aubry, the 'authorities have not ceased to champion the idea that private education is better than public, which is not true' (*Mbog* 2015). Indeed, the Palace, different governments, and international partners over the past 20 years have invested in the creation of a number of private institutes and universities specialized in science, administration, or business management.

The new private institutions often utilize foreign partners' own curricula, and have advisory councils or committees composed of a number of European and American faculty. The predominant language of instruction, with the exception of the Program for Applied Social Science Research in Arabic at EGE-Rabat, is French (EGE-Rabat 2015). To name only a few of dozens of partnerships, these institutes include *l'Institut Supérieur des Hautes Etudes en Développement Durable* (ISHEDD, in partnership with the University of Sherbrooke and the Canadian government),

l'École de Gouvernance et d'Economie de Rabat (part of *Mohammed VI Polytechnic University*), *Université Internationale de Casablanca* (UIC, a member of Laureate International Universities), *l'Université Mundiapolis* (with a number of international partners), and *l'École de Architecture de Casablanca* (with European partners in addition to Morocco's public *École d'Architecture*).

These partnerships and the orientation toward the job market by public universities, the *grandes écoles privées* and the new private universities reflect the narrow range of confidence in their own degrees. Most of the *grandes écoles privées* and new private universities focus on business management, engineering, science, and information systems, though a few now specialize in professions like architecture and have faculties of medicine and health. The former use a language of ensuring high-level job placements whereas universities like Université Internationale de Casablanca au Maroc (UIC) emphasize collaboration within education between sectors, thereby pioneering public policies like PAAFE. One of the most prominent private business schools, Advanced Studies in Management (*Hautes Etudes en Management* or HEM), states that one of its three principal pedagogical objectives is training executives who can occupy high-level positions of responsibility in firms and managers (COOs) who understand management and workplace culture. Generally, HEM wants its students to have the capacity to respond to the current and future expectations of businesses while allowing for their own ambitions and sense of fulfillment. In contrast, the mission statement of the Science Faculty in Rabat, one of the best public science faculties in the country, explains that it created applied degrees in 1991 to coordinate more closely with the labor market. Since 1997, this faculty has created a number of vocational degree streams to better prepare its graduates for labor market demand (Faculte des Sciences Rabat 2015).

The rapid expansion of private options for higher education that provide skills in professions, management, and scientific research evokes questions about unequal access to job opportunities and career development.[10] Fees for private institutions, coupled with the likely advantage of private primary and secondary education in gaining entrance to these institutions, hinder equal opportunity. The semi-public *École de Gouvernance et d'Economie de Rabat* (EGE-Rabat) charges 70,000 DH annually while private institutions like *Haute École de Management* (HEM), *Institut de Génie Appliqué* (IGA), *L'Université Internationale de Casablanca* (UIC), and *École Supérieure Internationale de Gestion* (ESIG) charge approximately 40,000–70,000 DH a year.[11] To give a more detailed example, at

UIC, registration fees alone are 3500 DH, while tuition for the Faculty of Science and Engineering is 57,500–67,500 DH, 52,500–62,500 DH in the Faculty of Science and Health, 57,500–65,000 DH in the Faculty of Commerce and Management, and 62,500 DH in the Faculty of Hotel Management and Sports. Of course, fees represent only the first obstacle as students may also need to pay for field trips, academic support, and other extracurricular activities that enhance the educational experience. Several foundations, such as *Fondation Cheikh Zaid* and *Fondation Cheikh Khalifa* (Medias24 2014) have contributed to the establishment of non-profit universities for the study of medicine in Rabat and Casablanca, though students still pay fees of more than 100,000 DH annually unless they receive financial aid.

Faced with the unemployment rates of young graduates and concern among development agencies of reproducing inequality in education and then in job opportunities, the objective of programs like PAAFE is to reform public and private education in order to increase fairness while aligning it more closely with labor market demand. Pursuing the same aim as a number of policies addressing unemployment rates, and tightening the relationship between education and the labor market, PAAFE's aims include greater engagement of business in the sector, particularly in offering internships and in management, better quality control, greater coordination across relevant bodies, diversification of the kinds of education and training on offer, and greater equity (2013, pp. iii–iv).

The program's more specific objective is to contribute to reducing unemployment to 8 percent by 2020 by increasing the number and ability of university graduates and qualified technicians.[12] The targets for 2015 were an 89 percent employment rate for graduates of higher education and 68 percent for graduates of professional schools, as well as a rise of 42 percent in the number of students in professional schools by the end of 2014, and a rise in the number of technical secondary school graduates among baccalaureates to 11 percent in 2014. Other targets included promoting internships and apprenticeships and better governance in the sector.

Finally, building closer connections with business to reduce unemployment reflects higher education policy internationally. Mirroring the language in PAAFE about encouraging more input from business into higher education, the British Government's Commission on Social Mobility and Child Poverty recommended that employers build long-term relationships with schools on 'mentoring, careers advice, and

insights into work,' in a document entitled *Elitist Britain* (2015, p. 68). Like the PAAFE report, the British commission recommends that firms offer more work experience and internships, as these help students get jobs, while work experience, internships, and apprenticeships should become more respected routes to employment compared to education. Finally, similarly to PAAFE, the British commission encourages firms to focus on meritocracy and fairness, specifically by hiring young people from more diverse social origins and tracking these hires specifically in their data collection (Briefing 2015).

Changing Expectations to Create More Jobs

The focus on numerical targets and structural changes in policies like PAAFE, such as more opportunities for internships and widening the range of degrees, as well as more coordinated management, omits the softer but also mentioned causes of graduate unemployment—expectations of stable, salaried employment and the inverse fear of the insecurity engendered by self-employment or a position in the private sector. The PAAFE report therefore mentions as a government principle of reducing unemployment, 'the development among young people of a spirit of initiative and enterprise' (2013, p. iv).

Internationally, policymakers have recognized the seriousness of the issue, because of not only its relation to political unrest but also individual concerns for limited life opportunities and satisfaction.[13] During the Arab Spring, international organizations and development agencies conducted numerous seminars and high-level meetings on joblessness, and published several reports on the subject (see the 2013 WDR and Global Employment Trends for Youth 2013). At a special session of the International Labour Organization's (ILO) governing body in 2011, Dorothea Schmidt, a senior specialist in unemployment at the ILO, explained that low wages, lack of social protection and more general insecurity of employment, and ultimately, low expectations of future mobility affected political behavior. In a press release for the meeting, she is quoted as saying, 'it is no wonder that many young people are angry' (ILO 2011).

Demonstrations in front of the Moroccan parliament, for instance, in 2012, and the larger undercurrent of alienation (Emperador and Bogaert 2014; Cohen 2004) reflect a continued desire for security. An article in *La Vie Economique* declares:

> Today, youth, very legitimately, search for jobs that are stable, with the right compensation, and the educated unemployed beating the pavement regularly in Rabat near Parliament to claim their insertion into the public service is a typical example of this.

The article goes on to question why employment activity levels have gone down from 54.5 percent in 1999 to 48.5 percent in 2013. Three potential explanations are increasing number of years in education, the low participation of women in the workforce and the long-term unemployed leaving the job market altogether out of discouragement (*Aguenious* 2014).

As I suggest below, the consensus on causes and solutions regarding unemployment, and the absence of any policy or program to address the fuzzier issues of aspirations, discouragement, self-identity, and willingness to accept risk, begs the question of whether alternative thinking is needed. The next sections therefore outline a different conceptual and practical approach to inform such thinking.

THINKING CREATIVELY ABOUT PROVIDING JOBS THAT YOUNG PEOPLE WANT

The 2013 *WDR* on jobs distinguishes between a job and employment. Citing the International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS), which determines standard definitions for official use across countries, the report notes that a job is 'a set of tasks and duties performed, or meant to be performed, by one person, including for an employer or in self-employment' (2013, p. 63). The report differentiates a job from employment by noting that people can have more than one job, or set of tasks, while the employed signifies the individuals who do the tasks. The report, in a rather limited way, defines unemployment as 'The existence of unemployment means that people do not find the jobs they want' (2013, p. 63). The report goes on to illustrate how jobs endow individuals with social status and allow them to generate opportunities for themselves and their dependents, for example, an older woman who earns respect by selling vegetables in a market in Vietnam or a rice farmer who uses his earnings to educate his children.

The *WDR* likewise argues for '[m]easures that support inclusion, extend access to voice and rights, and improve transparency and accountability in the labor market' (2013, p. 144). These steps 'can increase the extent to

which people perceive that they have a stake in society. This perception can be especially critical when risks of social unrest from youth unemployment and conflict are high' (*WDR* 2013, p. 36). The report warns that programs 'can undermine social cohesion if they have weak governance or divisive targeting' and recommends programs such as public works that 'can facilitate community participation and engagement between citizens and local authorities' (ibid). The *WDR* goes on to claim: 'Jobs define who people are in many ways; by shaping values and behaviors, they can influence trust and civic engagement' (2013, p. 75).

Education too is a life experience, in spite of the imposition of neoliberal policies, as it represents not just training in the development of certain skills but also an economic and social world. Students have to find the financial means to be in education and gain opportunities to participate in political advocacy, clubs, recreational activities, and so on. Fida Adely writes,

> Educational institutions are important for at least three reasons. First, most young people spend a significant amount of their time there. These institutions are important social spaces for youth. Second, schools as local institutions provide an important window onto how both national and regional forces take shape locally. Third and finally, education as a contemporary development project has been instrumental in the construction of new expectations and new ways of being in the world. Education is central to understanding what choices and dilemmas youth face today. (2009, p. 372)

Adely adds that analysis of higher education

> needs to go beyond the reference to educated unemployment, which dominates how education is typically inserted into studies of youth in the region. Exploring education in all its aspects is a critical means by which Middle East studies can address youth in new and distinctive ways. (ibid)

If jobs and education are both important for shaping values, building trust, encouraging service for others, life expectations and aspirations, and ultimately, self-identity, then how should social policy respond?

Guy Standing has written extensively (2014a, b, c, d) on the existence of a new 'precariat,' which differs from a proletariat grounded in secure, manual labor. This new class is composed of a mixture of groups, with different levels of education, trades and skills, but all engaged in labor that does not fulfill their potential, lacks benefits and security, and both depends

on and encourages the loss of individual civic, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Standing has hope for the role of educated workers who belong to the precariat, in that they may lead the transformation from 'denizens' to 'citizens' (2014a) in claiming rights:

> The third and potentially most progressive group consists largely of educated people who feel denied a future, a sense that they can build their lives and careers, after being promised their qualifications would lead to that. They experience a sense of relative deprivation or status frustration. This is becoming a source of immense stress. (2014b)

He adds later in the same article,

> those in the precariat with a university degree are unlikely to feel comfortable defining themselves as working class but, as they do not own property or have a salary, they are equally unlikely to feel comfortable calling themselves middle class. (2014a, p. 10)

Though his description of the feeling of precariousness would apply to educated young men and women, often whether employed or not, Standing's policy recommendations (call to action) and his discourse remain faithful to materialist conceptions of security, identity, and social mobilization. For Standing, the precariat is becoming a 'class in itself' through struggling for recognition, representation, and redistribution. Standing's most prominent policy recommendation is the provision of a basic income to ensure financial security. He also, importantly, stresses that the precariat should claim more control over their time, more rights to public spaces (parks, libraries, community buildings, etc.) that enhance their quality of life and individual abilities, and more knowledge, and thus awareness, of their own social and economic position in relation to others and thus the unequal distribution and access to resources. Education should not be a commodity to buy and then sell on the job market. Standing instead calls for 'real liberating education, financial knowledge, and financial and other capital' (2014a, p. 10).

Rather than focusing on social agency determined by material position and correspondingly primarily material responses (income, provision of space), I suggest developing a response to insecurity through considering the social and political purpose of institutions and related narratives of citizenship. Institutions cultivate what Michael Sandel envisions as 'deep

citizenship' (Sandel 1998; Clarke 1996) and Colin Crouch calls 'positive citizenship' (Crouch 2012); that is, 'where groups and organisations of people together develop collective identities, perceive the interests of these identities, and autonomously formulate demands based on them, which they pass on to the political system' (2012, p. 4). Etienne Balibar argues for understanding citizenship as interconnected with the transformation of institutions. He writes that the form of citizenship within the West's welfare state system used to integrate national status with educational and employment opportunities and increased rights to state support. However, the more recent privatization of these opportunities and rights combined with pervasive political alienation has, in Balibar's terms, destroyed the older notion of citizenship while also allowing its reconstruction through claiming new rights that in turn affect the role and functioning of institutions. In my own work on Morocco (2004), I have discussed how economic insecurity among university educated men and women has undermined the individual and collective class identity, necessary to perpetuate the dominance of economic influence over institutions, allowing for the potential rise of sociality as the dominant paradigm of institutional management and mission.

Though Sandel (1998) has been criticized for his nostalgia for pre-1960s America[14] and his binary opposition of procedural liberalism versus civic republicanism (Pangle 1998; Beiner 1998; Kymlicka 1998), his emphasis on the political economy of citizenship potentially provides the basis for moving from Balibar's theoretical conception to a more practical, policy-oriented process of transforming educational institutions and jobs to support individual fulfillment as a social actor. Sandel argues for nurturing mediating institutions that facilitate individual and local participation in the public sphere. In *Democracy's Discontent* (1998), Sandel writes fondly about small businesses because they challenge economic policy that favors multinational corporations and monopolies in business, and consequently the concentration of economic and political decision-making among distant elites. In other words, economic organizations can serve a critical political purpose for sustaining democracy.

The relevance of his thinking for policymaking on employment and higher education in countries like Morocco is that he perceives strong local and national institutions as critical for the cultivation of common values and political engagement across diverse groups. Research that I conducted in Morocco on public services and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Cohen 2014b) indicates that individual and group

initiatives to make a social contribution improved the quality and effectiveness of public services and led to a cohesive and stable working unit where staff experienced high morale. This initiative depended on and, in turn, perpetuated shared values among staff concerning individual dignity, public good, vocational commitment, and State obligation to citizens.

For example, a nurse who worked in the same gastroenterology unit at the teaching hospital remarked, 'It is only humanity as a motivation here. It is only the humane side and our religion that pushes us to do the work that we have here.' A doctor working at a public hospital stated, 'I am happy to do a service for patients who don't have money. It is true that it is medicine at a basic level. There aren't enough nurses, technicians or equipment.' A doctor working in a public teaching hospital commented, 'I like the social side of the public hospital … I could earn three times more in the private sector but the mentality is more commercial.' At the end of the conversation, she concluded: 'We aren't here for the conditions [of the hospital]. We have chairs that are twenty years old, not luxury. We take care of our patients.' A unit head in the teaching hospital also emphasized his humanistic view of the profession:

> Me, I could not work in the private sector. When I practice medicine, I see a patient who has need of me to cure him. I cannot profit from that. He does everything to come to see me—he gathers money from his family, friends to come to be treated. I cannot profit from that; I have to practice my trade … I have done some replacement work but I was not at ease with it. In the private sector, they view a patient as a client who pays. When they see a patient, they see how much this person can pay them. If the person can pay everything, then the patient receives good treatment until the end. If he doesn't have the means, he pays what he can and then the doctor sends him to the public sector.

The unit head mentioned that developing social initiative was part of how he conducted residence training. He emphasized to his students the importance of being resourceful by working through networks of business, NGOs, and individual contacts to acquire medicines and equipment. When they eventually become doctors, the students should not depend on the hospital administration for investment or even interest but rather work collectively as a unit to improve quality. The unit head, a man with decades of experience in the medical profession, advocated a different form of entrepreneurism than that of policymakers eager for students and

recent graduates to create their own jobs. The purpose of teaching initiative was to sustain a public good available for all Moroccans regardless of income and to ensure the functioning of a public institution.

Though individual and group initiative in this case substituted for declining public investment brought on by neoliberal policies, the example has a more positive lesson. In the hospital, as well as other sites in this research, frontline resource management only succeeds within a network of business and NGO partnerships, and relies on a shared perception of how individual responsibility for the welfare of others, the social role of institutions, job satisfaction, and professional training intersect (Cohen 2014b). Effective initiative thus relies upon the civic resources, Sandel claims are required to contend with globalization, or 'the places and stories, memories and meanings, incidents and identities, that situate us in the world and give our lives their moral particularity' (1998, p. 349).

Returning to Balibar's intersection of institutional transformation and citizenship, there is an interdependence between individual agency and the sense of social belonging and achieving the social purpose of public institutions, as well as related businesses and charities. This interdependence itself depends on policymaking that primarily defines value, among other concepts, by its social rather than financial dimension, and where policy objectives assume that individual fulfillment rather than external performance measurement is the most effective and efficient way of achieving the desired impact. Such a policy orientation disrupts the detachment of politics from lived experiences and values that Sandel complains about, instead making moral principles, like that of the primacy of human dignity, the fulcrum for strategic thinking and collective action.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the narrow consensus around higher education reform and employability, where university and professional education must hone its objectives on meeting private sector demand and job placement. The chapter critiques the limitations of this policy approach but also offers a constructive alternative. The chapter suggests focusing on the meaning that jobs possess for individuals and how this meaning should influence higher education. Referring to qualitative research in Morocco and survey data, the chapter argues that making a contribution to society is often the most important aspect of a job to employees. This subjective valuation of social impact corresponds with statements by the ILO, World

Bank, and Moroccan government, which emphasize the significance of employment to perceptions of social belonging and life opportunity.

An effective policy strategy linking higher education and employment would thus be to highlight individual fulfillment in employment, which includes making a social impact, before outlining the reforms to higher education that would enable individuals to make this contribution in their jobs. Future qualitative research could explore the criteria for individual fulfillment in different jobs in Morocco; the skills and management, especially autonomy, needed to achieve this fulfillment; and the importance of social contribution in performance assessments and professional mobility. The effect of both the policy orientation and the research would, in principle, be to create a virtuous circle between employment and higher education, where policy pushes employers to acknowledge the importance of the social value of work, employers integrate social impact into job descriptions and the creation of new jobs, and university and professional degree programs include critical thinking about social progress and the role of different sectors and institutions, and corresponding practical skill development. Perhaps more importantly, highlighting the social value of work would emphasize the general social necessity and responsibility of creating jobs, and the contribution education and work make to the functioning and conceptual meaning of society.

Notes

1. 18 May 2005.
2. In 2009, the development organization *Tanmia* listed the desired skills for the *agents de developpement*.
3. With the Emergency Program of 2009–12, universities have had to focus on governance, income-generating activities like consultancy, continuing education, marketing to businesses, supporting start-ups and protecting intellectual property, and setting up and investing in companies.
4. All statistics in this paragraph are from HCP.
5. The IMF (2013) country report offers a more precise figure, stating that 'each percentage point of economic growth has generated about 0.4 percent growth in employment' (p. 10).
6. Focusing particularly on women, the authors write that '[u]nemployment rates are highest for those with technical secondary education and non-university higher education ("higher" in the figure)

.... The possibility of public-sector employment in the past has raised the expectation of regular salaried employment among this group, so that they are now participating at rates comparable to those of their male counterparts. These expectations of employment remain essentially unfulfilled, however, with a large fraction of those seeking work unable to find suitable employment' (ibid). The authors add that the lack of salaried employment in the private sector and social sanctions against self-employment for women make entering this kind of employment extremely difficult, exacerbating unemployment rates.

7. *La Vie Economique* 4/7/2014.

8. Abdelhak Eddoubi, Director of the National Commission on Evaluation, rejects private education as an option, stating in a *Jeune Afrique* article (21 April 2009): 'All comparisons between the public and private are completely biased. Students who enter the private sector come from higher income groups, where there are the means to give them support [in their education].' Private school students benefit from smaller classes, better materials, and so on to produce better results than public schools.

9. In 2013–14, there were 3,454,268 children enrolled in public primary schools versus 575,874 children in private primary schools; 1,491,419 in public secondary schools and 126,686 in private secondary schools; and 905,309 in public professional secondary schools and 82,825 in private professional secondary schools (MEN 2013).

10. The number of private higher education bodies grew by 186 percent between 2000 and 2010 (Lauali and Meyer 2013).

11. For a list of private institutions, see http://enseignementsuperieur.lavieeco.com/grandes-ecoles/3, date accessed 15 November 2015.

12. The report on the program cites weak primary school scores in international math and science exams as proof of inadequate preparation for the job market (18).

13. The WDR (2012) emphasizes the gap between the quality of the jobs available and the expectations of young people. Citing Tunisia, it warns of the potential for social unrest due to frustration and disappointment: 'In countries with high youth unemployment, job opportunities are not commensurate with the expectations created

by the expansion of education systems. And the active labor market programs needed to defuse social tensions in the short term may not do much for poverty reduction because many of the jobless come from middle-class families, and devoting public resources to finance them may reduce economic dynamism' (p. 87).

14. To give an example, Sandel (1998) writes the following about the early twentieth century in the United States:

> The economic arguments of our day bear little resemblance to the issues that divided Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Croly and Louis D. Brandeis. They were concerned with the structure of the economy and debated how to preserve democratic government in the face of concentrated economic power. We are concerned with the overall level of economic output and debate how to promote economic growth while assuring broad access to the fruits of prosperity. …. Beginning in the late New Deal and culminating in the early 1960s, the political economy of growth and distributive justice displaced the political economy of citizenship. (p. 250)

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Transformation, Reformation or Decline? The University in Contemporary Morocco and Turkey

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Introduction

This chapter is derived from an ongoing, broader comparative research project on recent transformations in the field of higher education in Turkey and Morocco with an eye on both similarities and differences in state-led neoliberalization policies and corresponding responses from within universities. The fieldwork involved multi-sited, comparative ethnographic inquiry in academic institutions in two Mediterranean countries.

Due to rapid changes in the global neoliberal order of things, the topic of the chapter concerns open-ended research that may not be completely finalized. Based on long-term observations, academics' accounts and first-hand experiences, we present comparative snapshots from two fields. In the Moroccan case, because our data comes from preliminary fieldwork,

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it requires further inquiry. Nevertheless, it yields several valuable insights regarding current and subsequent discussions in the topic. Because structural and institutional dynamics have helped create differences between the two data sets, it is worth considering this first. Briefly, in the Moroccan case, the centralized running of neoliberal reforms does not seem to have necessitated a mode of implementation that addressed every university separately. Although the rhetoric of a participatory approach was echoed in many reform attempts, it became rather a sequence of top-down, government-led initiatives, requiring standardized implementation across universities and other academic institutions. In such a transformation, academics are called upon at a later stage to play active roles in implementing reforms, that is, not as *the executors* but as the *media* to channel possible reactions to the reforms in addition to connecting policymakers with the campuses. Thus, it may be apt to note that, contrary to the seemingly inclusive meetings prior to the reforms, the academics' executive responsibility in the initial phase of transformations in Morocco has been relatively limited.

In Turkey's case, on the other hand, the centralized mode of transformation process has until recently unfolded to articulate even opposing academics as active executors of neoliberal policies. This strategy can be described as implementing neoliberal measures through dividing first the universities, then the faculties and then the departments into seemingly separate sites of policy execution. This strategic option has helped Bologna Process to be conceived with a centralized mentality yet implemented by academics themselves in each university in Turkey.

The literature on neoliberalization in general, and the neoliberalization of academia in particular, has grown in the past decade under a variety of labels, including the 'university in ruins' (Readings 1999), marketization and 'vocationalization of higher education' (Giroux 2014), the 'corporate university' (Giroux and Myrsiades 2001), 'university Inc.' (Washburn 2005; Nalbantoğlu 2016) and 'academic capitalism' (Cantwell and Kauppinen 2014; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; Slaughter and Leslie 1997). Despite the increasing number of publications devoted to analyzing the neoliberal transformation of higher education, the main focus so far has remained on macro-educational policies (Brown and Carasso 2013; Reinalda 2011), with less attention paid to either the political, national and domestic differences that occur during implementation or their perception by the main actors in academia (i.e. academics and students). Increasing scholarly interest in the topic has also risked the

meaning of neoliberalism becoming ambiguous (Venugopal 2015; Yazıcı 2013; cf. Connell 2010). More specifically, anything related to the running of the free market and/or anything that is connected to privatization discourse and/or anything that resonates with commercial logic is being automatically associated with neoliberalism so that neoliberalism has turned into something involving either one, some or all of these factors. Consequently, it is becoming an all-encompassing, universalized and unidirectional category, a term simultaneously signifying everything and nothing that has occurred during capitalism's most recent era. Given this, comprehending neoliberalization within and beyond academic life necessitates moving beyond grand narratives, standardized and automatically universalizing definitions; it requires in-depth scrutiny—both geographical and historical—of contextual dynamics. Thus, we believe in the value of a comparative ethnographic study, in that it can avoid relying on any generalized ready-made definition of neoliberalism while also helping to bridge the gap in the literature regarding the neoliberal transformation of higher education.

We chose Morocco and Turkey due to their historical, political and cultural similarities and differences.[1] Our choice was also influenced by the two countries' strong connections with European higher education yet with significant differences, and by their similar dual higher education (public and private) system, large student populations[2] and their ambition to be regional leaders in higher education.

The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part, we offer a brief discussion on the two countries' encounters with neoliberalization in higher education. In so doing, we focus on their efforts to adjust their higher education systems to the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), with the Bologna Process being a critical factor in both contexts, despite its more explicit influence on and visibility in the Turkish case. Drawing on a critical analysis of legal arrangements and regulatory mechanisms, we clearly demonstrate that national political context and autocratic policy implementation in the field of education have intervened in the process, altering and distorting the democratic, inclusive and progressive values promoted by the Bologna Process. In line with our findings, Yağcı (2010) argues that, despite the identical strategic framework and applied measures in specific countries, the Bologna reform is not a unidirectional process because institutional and contextual national and domestic variations hinder the process's ability to achieve convergence. In the second part, we concentrate on academics' accounts in Turkey along-

side some preliminary observations in Morocco. The narratives in both countries pertain to everyday academic life, focusing on those academics who have been actively involved in and/or invited to contribute to the adjustment to and implementation of new policies in universities. In the third part, we offer a tentative argument as to the implications of the way academics relate to neoliberal transformation processes.

Given that our discussion in this chapter develops through ethnographic readings alongside a touch of structural dynamics, our aim is more to interrogate the way the neoliberal order of things is understood, perceived and/or experienced by academics themselves. Nevertheless, as academics with experience in both Turkey and Morocco, we have had our own experiences of neoliberalization in higher education and thus developed our own understanding of the process. This makes us talk with an already accumulated knowledge and experience about neoliberalization. For us, the neoliberalization of higher education means an extension of accumulation by dispossession for and through the never-ending flow of finance capital. Here, the preference is for transnational commercial activity over production and for private investment at the expense of public investment (Harvey 2005, 2003; Coşar and Ergül 2015). The immediate reflections of this understanding in higher education involve privatization and commercialization, hence the dislocation of education as a public good by the priority of profitability. Certainly, the way we narrate the accounts of the academics we interviewed, and our personal experiences and observations, is informed by this definition, which is basically formulated on structuralist grounds. However, we are also keen on offering that space to the academics themselves as active carriers, opponents and/or implementers of neoliberal policies to forge their own accounts. Thus, we try to avoid falling into the structuralist trap of positioning the academics as victims and/or passive observers of a wider socio-political transformation.

Within this framework, our interviews concentrate on simple yet essential topics regarding the meanings attributed to academic life by the academics themselves. We then proceed to understand how they define the current state of affairs in everyday academic life in terms of existing conditions and ongoing changes. Finally, we try to orient the interviews to a reflexive stage in which both the interviewees and ourselves, the academics-cum-interviewers, reflect on the roles that we play in the course of neoliberal policymaking and its implementation in universities.

A European Portrait in Local Frames: The Bologna Process and LMD Reform

The global crisis of neoliberal capitalism, which has reverberated in different ways across countries and regions, has hit particularly hard those countries, including Turkey and Morocco, which have long been disadvantaged by the asymmetrical operation of accumulation regimes. This state of affairs has direct connections with education systems. In Turkey, the regime itself has come to be defined with reference to the crisis, especially in the last decade, when one can observe the most dramatic changes in Turkey's education system both generally and specifically in higher education, which has had immediate consequences for the academic routine. During this period, Turkey has also been adjusting its university system to the EHEA—as it is understood and framed by the Council of Higher Education (YÖK-Yükseköğretim Kurulu 2016)—within the scope of the Bologna Process. Morocco's higher education system, too, has been witnessing comprehensive adjustment over the same period. Although situated in a rather different socio-political (historical) setting than Turkey's, Morocco has also taken EHEA as its reference point; however, unlike Turkey, it is not an official signatory to the Bologna Process. Nevertheless, the state has ambitiously embraced Bologna Process requirements, seeing it as a progressive initiative to help Morocco 'present itself as a reform leader in the region, being the first in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to introduce the "LMD system" [*Licence, Master, Doctorate*][3] in its public universities' (Kohstall 2012). Thus, both countries have experienced transformations during the 2000s, albeit certainly in different styles, with different justifications, through different strategies, in different modes and most probably with different consequences. The parallelisms, on the other hand, can be seen in their use of the Bologna Declaration as a common reference certificate, the EHEA as a shared reference point and the Bologna Process as the shared name for the neoliberalization of higher education system through Europe-oriented legitimizing discourses.

The restructuring of higher education system in Turkey started in the early 2000s. The process was orchestrated by the YÖK, established as a constitutional organ in 1982, within the scope of the Law on Higher Education devised under the military regime (1980–1983), as a direct outcome of the 1980 *coup d'état*. It was designed to centralize the running of the university system by acting as the institution authorized to oversee and coordinate higher education. The official justification for this

was the supposed need to respond to increasing numbers of university students while also preventing the politicization of campuses that would, it was claimed, endanger stability in instruction and academic production.[4]

Yet within a larger picture, it can be argued that YÖK was designed to work in line with the *coup* spirit: instituting the structural prerequisites for the smooth working of neoliberal transformation in Turkey. This required authoritarian measures to ensure that the populace was 'depoliticized' in tune with conservative cultural priorities. This can be seen from the first articles of the Law on Higher Education (November 1981), where the aim of higher education is stated as:

> to educate the students so that they will be loyal to Atatürk nationalism and to Atatürk's reforms and principles; [they] will be in accord with the national, ethical, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish Nation … [they] will put the common good above their personal interests and have full devotion to family, country and nation; [they] will be fully conscious of their duties and responsibilities towards their country and will act accordingly. (*English version*, The Council of Higher Education, March 2000)

Other aims stated in the article ironically emphasize critical thinking, scientific outlook, scientific research and accumulation of knowledge. The law also aims at guaranteeing nationalist and statist loyalties among academics by including in the list of actions leading to disciplinary action such behaviors as acting against the 'indivisible unity of the state with its country and people.' The law also mentions 'crimes directly or indirectly involving restriction of the freedom of learning and teaching' as actions leading to disciplinary action, which in practice indicates the need to prevent any possibility of students or academics' boycotting classes. Although, given the other authoritarian measures imposed during the military regime, these rules and regulations are hardly surprising, this law has been retained mostly unamended under successive center-right and center-left governments that, as a superficial discursive political stance, have rejected and/or criticized the 1980 *coup d'état* and the military regime and called for liberal rights and democratization in Turkey. Among the amendments that have been made, one important example was the removal of having one YÖK General Council member appointed by the military's General Command as this symbolized a significant step in the council's civilianization, and thus toward the possibility that it might assume a less authoritarian supervisory role. However, we should note immediately that the

General Command still maintains its authority to appoint members to other committees under YÖK, such as the Higher Education Supervising Council and the Inter-University Council.

Although the Bologna Process was put onto Turkey's higher education agenda within this structural framework, this does not mean that it, in essence, necessitates authoritarian measures nor that it is an exclusively neoliberal project. Rather, we would argue that the Bologna Process represents more a venue than a project, taking on various compositions in different geographical settings. Thus, it symbolizes the workings of neoliberal preferences through the manipulation of discourses on academic freedom, flexibility in teaching, student-centered teaching and, of course, autonomy. It is also significant in that it symbolizes the value of a central overseeing body for adjusting the educational sphere to the neoliberal structure. In 2006, Turkey started participating actively within the context of its EU membership candidacy. Since then, the governments have proceeded to transform Turkish education in accordance with the Bologna criteria. Universities throughout Turkey started—willingly or reluctantly or both—to adjust their curricula to those of Europe with reference to the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS). Although making Turkey's university credit system compatible with Europe's is at first sight only a technical task, such a curricular adjustment also conceals a pedagogical and educational mentality based on free-market rationality.

Similarly to Turkey, the 1980s represented an important chapter for Morocco's neoliberal structural transformation, with a significant influence on the following decades. The financial crises of the early 1980s and their detrimental economic, social and political impacts (Cherkaoui and Ben Ali 2003) encouraged the country to prepare and implement a macro neo-liberal economic program that prioritized liberalization and privatization policies to foster foreign investment. International financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), supported the country's efforts. The European Union, too, played a significant role in encouraging neoliberal economic reforms in the Mediterranean region (Colombo 2011, p. 2). The educational reforms of the 1980s, strongly influenced by the World Bank and the IMF, were

> different in their scope and philosophy from all [the] previous efforts … The purposes of these reforms were to lower to the waste rate [in educational resources] and to improve the system by restructuring all the levels of education in Morocco. (Boubkir and Boukamhi 2005, p. 21)

Given commonalities in terms of financial crises and the regional or global actors behind neoliberal reforms in other countries with vulnerable economies, the similarities between Morocco and Turkey are unsurprising, and not limited to finance, as evidenced by their shared experience of the top-down neoliberalization of their higher education systems through Europeanization. Thus, these reforms can be considered within the scope of the global neoliberal turn. In Morocco, the link between higher education reforms and broader neoliberal policy agendas[5] is all the more clear since the government's recognition of the need for educational reform referred to the World Bank's 1993 report diagnosing a crisis in the country's educational system. Indeed, the structural problems of Morocco's education system and their destructive economic effects were echoed in a number of World Bank reports published in the first half of the 1990s (see for example World Bank 1991, 1995; Llorent-Bedmar 2014), which emphasized that a comprehensive educational vision was essential in order to develop more competitive, sustainable and efficient economy and a fairer society. Only such a vision, the reports concluded, could produce a strategy incorporating different levels of education, including vocational education, to improve the system's responsiveness to the local labor market. One of the policy recommendations prioritized in several reports was decentralization of the educational system.

King Hassan II appointed a Parliamentary Commission in 1994 to address the issue and come up with innovative solutions. However, the commission failed to present a coherent reform project due to lack of agreement about the ways, means and content of the amendments to propose to improve the educational system (Ben Mokhtar and Hameed Lotfi 2004). As a second option, the King disbanded the Parliamentary Commission and entrusted government departments in charge of education and vocational training with preparing their own needs analyses and policy proposal reports, which provided a detailed evaluation of the situation and offered proposals for improvements (ibid.). The government departments involved in the preparation of the reports also took on the task of building a national consensus regarding the need for reform and the means and content of the reform agenda.

In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s witnessed a sharp deterioration in the field of education: '[i]n the attempt to reverse this trend, already apparent by the 1990s, a royally designated "decade of education" was kicked off in Morocco in 1999 with the publication of a roadmap to education reform' (Colombo 2011, p. 5). The period between 1999 and

2005 marked the emergence of a consensus over education. King Hassan II appointed a *Commission Spéciale Education Formation* (COSEF), headed by M. Abdelaziz Meziane-Belefkih, one of the King's advisors, which was entrusted with the task of creating this consensus and to 'reconcile the nation and its schools' (Belfkih 2003). The first critical attempt was to draft a National Charter of Education and Training in 1999, which was adopted by Parliament in 2000 (Bill 01–00). As a reference framework for the Ministry of Education (MoE), the charter's main objectives regarding higher education were to improve the quality of education, eliminate the problem of graduate unemployment and adapt and open education up to its socioeconomic environment, encourage research and innovation in the universities and offer better working conditions and adequate learning resources for both students and academics. This marked a turning point in national education policy by introducing a new, more participatory approach. In particular, the charter placed specific emphasis on the decentralization of education while proposing more inclusive strategies to directly address the 'local needs and realities' of different regions across Morocco (Sassi et al. 2011). In response, regional academies for education and training located in the 16 administrative regions were entrusted with 'developing up to 30 percent of the curriculum for their respective regions to help ensure that these curricula are locally relevant. In addition, regional *Délégations* are charged with … providing services for education in their respective region' (ibid.).

The participatory aspect of this policy was outlined by its president: 'The (COSEF) groups other than the president, thirty-three members, including representatives of political parties (14) and unions (8). The other 11 members were selected individually, or among the ulemas, economic operators and officials of non-governmental organizations and parents' associations' (Belfkih 2003). Nationwide workshops, conferences and meetings were other outlets employed for sustaining the widening consensus on the charter. Such public relations strategies enabled the reform process to be present as the most important development in Morocco's educational sphere since independence.[6] Nevertheless, the reform program failed in many areas and encountered delays during its implementation phase. To address the problem, an Education Emergency Plan (2009–2012), called 'Najah,' was drawn up in order to boost the reform process. This plan was embraced by the most influential global and regional financial actors, including the World Bank,[7] the EU, the French Development Agency, the European Investment Bank and the African Development Bank.

As one of the few academics invited to participate in the decision-making processes and pilot the LMD model in his institution, Dr. Mostapha, one of our key informants, argued that the reform's failure was not unpredictable: 'I could see this coming (…) There was not enough political will. People just wanted to *do* these reforms. They had not thought long enough whether the reforms are going to be viable or not (…) They realized that they are losing the ball' (28 May 2014). During the later stages of the interview, he listed the lack of sufficient educational resources, including poorly equipped academic personnel and the government's pseudo-participatory approach as other important reasons for the poor reform performance. In order to tackle the problem, the Emergency Plan put particular emphasis on sustaining the autonomy of universities and higher education institutes from central government control and increasing educators' skills and knowledge via training, along with other objectives such as enhancing the quality of higher education and improving the number of students in scientific research and engineering courses.

Aziz Guedari, the head of the research and statistical division at the MoE, explains the motivation behind the request for autonomy: 'We have to take into account regional needs. The current political landscape demands more decentralization and greater regionalization' (OBG Report 2012, p. 222). This emphasis on the regional league is not a coincidence: Because Morocco aims to lead the Middle East and North African region in higher education, it willingly takes part in the competition between the region's advanced economies (e.g. Egypt). The implementation of a European higher education system via the Bologna Process-inspired French LMD model (or 3-5-8) in former French colonies in the Maghreb is the clearest example of how the joining of the Bologna Process has encouraged new collaborations and alignments among the Franco-Maghrebin countries, such as Morocco (in 2003), Algeria (in 2004) and Tunisia (in 2005). There are many indicators of this strong commitment to the Europeanization of higher education among African countries, notably the conference series on *African Universities' Adaptation to the Bologna Process*. These meetings took place in Dakar, Senegal (July 2005), El Jadida, Morocco (May 2006), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2007), focusing particularly on the decision-making processes of African universities and countries concerning Bologna Process; the direct and indirect effects of the Bologna model; mobility, accreditation and quality

assurance aspects; and the role of international and/or financial organizations in the promotion of the Bologna model. The reforms, regional and bilateral collaborations and regional meetings on the European model clearly show that the Bologna Process's impact has already eliminated barriers between northern and sub-Saharan or southern Africa (for further details, see WENR 2007).

Such changes are in line with the Moroccan government's regional development strategies, including South-South cooperation, investing in the country's special location as a 'gate towards Africa'[8] (Thomas 2016) via key sectors, among which higher education occupies a central position. For government officials, the fact that many African students prefer to enroll in Moroccan higher education institutions is an asset that is often neglected. 'It is the African elite that come to study in Morocco. This is where relationships are created' (*Foreign Affairs*, November–December 2015, p. 4), according to Hamid Benelafdil, the former general director of the government-led Moroccan Investment Development Agency. In 2013, a few years after the implementation of the Emergency Plan, King Mohammed VI delivered a speech for the 60th anniversary of the Revolution of the King and the People, in which education occupied a central position. The King underlined that '[m]any significant achievements have been made in the area of education and training' due to the efforts of successive governments, 'who have all worked on the implementation of this charter, particularly the last one, which deployed all the necessary means and resources to implement the Emergency Program.' However, emphasizing that 'the gains made since this program's implementation was started have not been consolidated,' he added, 'I am indeed sad to note that the state of education is worse now than it was twenty years ago' (MWN 2013). Persistent problems of unequal access to education, increasing need for skilled workers and engineers in new industries and lack of foreign language capacity were identified as some of the fundamental shortcomings. The government's Action Plan 2013–2016, particularly targeting university education, was seen as the 'third trial,' repeating the similar mistakes in previous reforms (2000–2009) and the Emergency Plan (2009–2012) (Lemaizi 2015). The Council of Education prepared and published its Strategic Vision for the Reform of Moroccan Schools, scheduled to take place between 2015 and 2030. The reform program invited, once again,[9] 'all the components of society, public authorities, NGOs, political parties, unions, civil society, media … to a permanent

mobilization around the strategic vision' (MAP 2015). Improving access to higher education, promoting quality, internationalization[10] and lifelong learning to meet the needs of the employment market are among the core elements of the new vision (Mohamed 2016).

BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

As of the end of 2016, structural transformation has accelerated in both Moroccan and Turkish higher education systems in general and in their universities in particular. Depending on each country's socio-political dynamics, political history, and international role and location, the transformation processes were launched in different ways, with different means and strategies. However, one can still depict parallelisms. The first and perhaps the most striking parallelism can be found in the impact of the Bologna Process on transformation rhetoric and agenda in both countries. Although with different statuses, both Turkey—as an EU candidate country—and Morocco—as a former French colony and part of the EU's Neighborhood Policy—took the Bologna Process first as a guiding agenda and second as part of their references to legitimize the drafting and implementation of their own neoliberal reform policies.

While decision-making circles in both countries have constantly noted the impasses in higher education, in Morocco, crisis rhetoric was utilized to justify a series of government interventions and reforms aiming at Europeanization of higher education. Drawing on her comparative study on the educational reforms implemented in Morocco and Egypt during the last decade, Kohstall itemizes the main episodes as follows: '[T]he narrative on the crisis of higher education as a phase of problem identification; the fabrication of a national consensus through the establishment of commissions during the decision making process; and the production of change in the university during the implementation phase' (Kohstall 2012). Despite frequent references to 'crisis' (see, for example, TALIM 2015; Cherkaoui 2011) in higher education, for many in academia, the term itself has remained something of a black box as it has never been sufficiently defined.

Turkey's neoliberal transformation, on the other hand, which started earlier in the 1980s, has reached a point of crisis recently, when an implosion in the universities evolved into a structural crisis, orchestrated by

the government itself. In particular, since January 2016, when purges began against a group of academics asking for peace in the country,[11] the oppressive measures of the government, YÖK and the universities themselves, working apparently in almost complete harmony, signify more a *crisis of neoliberal measures in the hands of authoritarian governments* than 'the crisis of the universities.' Certainly, developments in both countries directly relate to the neoliberal turn in university life, where one can observe a pervasive neoliberal discourse flowing through reform agendas. Thus, while a neoliberal course has continued through different time periods, requiring different legal adjustments at different speeds, the discursive strategies seem to coincide. In Turkey, the Bologna Process provided a terminology toolkit for YÖK to use in explaining, justifying and specifying the know-how of the reform agendas: shareholder/stakeholder, strategy, autonomy, accountability, transparency, competition quality, flexibility in learning, lifelong learning and so on. While the terms shareholder/stakeholder, competition and strategy are directly adopted from within corporate discourse and justify the redesign of university courses, terms like autonomy, accountability, transparency, quality, learning-centered education, flexibility in learning and lifelong learning are mainly presented as having democratic and egalitarian credentials (for a comprehensive discussion, *see* Güllüpınar and Gökalp 2014). All, however, are transliterated from within the neoliberal paradigm.

Thus, autonomy concerns the ability of universities to raise their own financial resources—and the 'strategy' to do so is already spelled out: making industry a shareholder/stakeholder on campuses. Accountability and transparency are understood as making universities open to outside checks and balances—here, 'outside' implies free-market forces with students as consumers. Quality is understood in terms of the quantification of the teaching process, evaluated in terms of student performance in the courses. Although learning-centered education is presented as student-centered teaching with a nod to democratic educational philosophy, it ultimately connotes compatibility between course teaching or 'learning outcomes' and free-market demands. Flexibility in learning is *advertised* as crossing strict disciplinary boundaries to offer grounds for multi-disciplinarity. In tandem with this advertising, lifelong learning is presented as a means to keep individuals sociable and 'employable' throughout their lives. Both end up referring to strategies for training students to become part of a flexible labor force rather than educating them, making them employable

without offering the grounds for employment. In such a context, it is not knowledge but information that is considered the yardstick for measuring the social value of individuals.

This emphasis on measurability is also paralleled by the technicalization of the Bologna Process. While YÖK presents the Bologna Process as a means for advancing higher education, it rejects dialogue with the universities; rather, it declares the *to-do* list as a technical matter. The same style can also be observed in the academic personnel placed in charge of the coordination of the Bologna Process in universities. In our research, we tried to avoid focusing on the technicalities of the implementation of Bologna Process-related higher education policies to prevent our attention being diverted from the understanding of how academics in Turkey *experienced* the process.

Our textual analysis concerning the Moroccan reforms suggests that the most frequent terms employed to define educational policies were governance, performance, quality and openness to environment, mobility, cooperation, internationalization, autonomy and student-centered higher education. These notions are clearly in line with the Bologna Process perspective, providing significant evidence of the state's commitment to adapt Moroccan higher education to EHEA requirements. While Europe's LMD was presented as the most progressive and feasible model for Moroccan universities, its connection to the Bologna Process was omitted or carefully obscured in official discourse. This perhaps helps us understand why Moroccan academics lacked sufficient background information regarding the Bologna Process.

It is useful to briefly consider the chronology of structural change in Morocco. The reforms were first announced as an internal issue, suggested by a domestic need-based analysis, which was an implicit attempt to imply that the proposed transformations were driven by homegrown requirements rather than external (read as non-Moroccan/European) authorities. Even though the path of higher education reform in Morocco has been presented officially as long overdue and driven by local needs, close analysis demonstrates that the internationalization of higher education was on the reform designers' agenda and encouraged by the interventions of international financial agencies like the World Bank, the IMF and the EU. 'The narrative on a specific type of crisis and internationalization as its proper remedy,' as Kohstall rightfully points out, 'enables international organizations and

policy-makers to impose a neoliberal reform agenda on the university' (2012). The participatory approach adopted to introduce the LMD reform was also one of the government policies highly recommended by international aid agencies advocating 'better governance.'[12] Our field data, on the other hand, supports Kohstall's observation that, in Morocco, 'higher education reforms remain confined to elite struggle' (Kohstall 2012), excluding the wider academic public and the university. In fact, the participatory approach remained as part of the government policies aiming to avoid criticisms that might jeopardize the Education Ministry's enforcement of top-down neoliberal policies as reform. Nevertheless, such an approach ended up imposing unpopular measures that generated dissident from concerned actors in academia (i.e. students, lecturers and administrative staff). The quick decision to introduce the LMD European model in 2003 created a strong backlash. These actors' concerns included inadequate technical support and poor infrastructure (e.g. educational technologies, classrooms, teaching materials), difficulties in supervising and monitoring large numbers of students, poor technical knowledge among lecturers, and insufficient student mobility. When we asked about academic freedom and institutional autonomy at the university/faculty level since the recent educational reforms, one of our interviewees, Dr. Zakaria, quoted a former dean from the University of Casablanca: 'I am struggling to have chairs! And it's enough for me!' (15 April 2014).

The examples covered so far provide just snapshots of the similarities between the Turkish and Moroccan cases in terms of each state's centralized, authoritarian educational approach. However, Morocco and Turkey are obviously not alone in this manner: 'The implementation of LMD in Maghreb universities was adopted at different periods with a top-down political decision. It was introduced under the umbrella of national commissions as was done in Algeria and Morocco or by a presidential decree in Tunisia' (Mohammed 2011).

The solid accounts from the everyday practices of the academics themselves also indicate a more vivid contextual setting with its own peculiarities in different cultural and political settings. While this sometimes facilitates neoliberal transformation in universities, it also—perhaps simultaneously—offers the clues for manipulating and/or resisting the transformation.

Academia in Everyday Life: Breaches, 'Right Lives' and 'Falsehoods'?

Recalling Adorno, Dr. Deniz mentions that 'there is no right life in a false country.'[13] She has been one of our key informants, responsible for the implementation of the Bologna Process in a public university for seven years. This is our second round of interview with her, two years after the first and three months after the Turkish government's infamously authoritarian measures leaped forward to bring the transformation there to its final phase. Her comment clearly concerns the way academics in Turkey who have been targeted by the government have pursued their rights. At a time when the university seems to have turned into a mere administrative machine in almost all its facets, our aim was to make sense of this particular mode, in which authoritarian politics occupies neoliberal campuses and the possible niches that might offer those academics opting for alternatives to manipulate this invasion. Dr. Deniz's reply was to our question about the possible connection between the technicalization of academic life and the way oppressive measures work against academic freedom so as to turn academics as actors into agents of know-how rather than academic knowledge production is epitomized in the above quotation. We believe that this statement not only indicates a rather gloomy *better-than-nothing* attitude toward *doing* the technique at least but also hints at the potential within academia itself to come up with a substantial alternative to the neoliberal mode of academic knowledge production. In other words, continuing the search for the right strategy even under totally false conditions symbolizes academics as actors beyond being neoliberal policy implementers of the Bologna Process.

Since January 2016, the neoliberal transformation of Turkey's university system has radically changed. While never absent from the agenda-setting, policymaking and policy-implementing supervised by the YÖK, the authoritarian aspect has recently taken hold of Turkish universities countrywide, melting the academic into administrative work while restricting the task of the latter to silencing socio-political opposition in the academia. Throughout 2016, there has been a massive purge of opposition academics.[14] Among them are those who have been involved in the implementation of the Bologna Process. Yet, it is certain that the measures adopted within the scope of the Bologna Process are still in force.

Actually, the accounts of those academics carrying out the necessary measures in line with the Bologna Process credentials already echo the

authoritarian steps. Dr. Deniz, again, had already highlighted them in the first round of our interviews:

> The unit in charge of the Bologna Process [in the university] regularly informs us about the procedures or deadlines via official announcements … with a very hierarchical, very patriarchal language … as if someone gives you an order [in the army] … those teams in charge of Bologna Process: you are requested to finish this and that by the deadline mentioned.

An ironically similar note can be observed in the rather boastful emphasis of Dr. Erol, vice dean in charge of the academic curricula and the Bologna Process in a foundation university, on '*having*' those who opposed certain requirements of the Bologna Process-related measures '*do it*' [emphasis ours]. Dr. Erol's boasting matches with Dr. Deniz's critical approach in confirming the authoritarian mode in pushing academics as actors onto neoliberal pathways: 'Bologna Process is an obligation for us … imposed by YÖK. There are sanctions, certain official directives and instructions. Everybody must follow them. We are talking about YÖK, the superior institution … Nobody has the luxury to say "we do not subscribe to this idea."'

This state of mind, which naturalizes the to-dos that eventually define the neoliberal transformation of higher education, yet without taking any academic and/or individual responsibility for the everyday course of academic life, parallels the disinterest and/or detached attitude toward the seemingly disconnected aspect of this transformation. Thus, this preliminary interview data encourages us to argue that the academics who are actively involved in the adjustment to the Bologna Process and its implementation in the universities display limited interest in getting to know the details about it and thus gain awareness of the process as a whole and the historical context within which it has operated: 'I think none of us was sufficiently informed about or aware of the bigger picture when we started to implement the system. YÖK dictated to us: "Here is the calendar you must follow … you are obliged to adjust your system by the deadline"' (Dr. Deniz, 22 March 2014).

Such remarks are echoed from of the other end of the Mediterranean. In his response to our inquiry about the state's preferences in the neoliberal reform process, Dr. Mostapha, one of our key interviewees in Morocco,[15] notes:

The idea [of *LMD* reform] at the very beginning was very open and flexible … But then … in 2003 they brought the reform, put it on the table and said "take it or leave it". This's how things worked here. Let me tell you something very, very scary: When the reform started, the people in the committee didn't know the difference between module and unit … the difference between a track and a module. They [MoE] didn't prepare a communication campaign to inform even the stakeholders … the students, the faculty and the [academic] community. (28 May 2014)

This account of the reform's top-down style can be extended to question Turkish academics' roles in a process that directly affects them. Thus, Dr. Defne, a senior expert in educational measurement and evaluation, serving as the dean in one of the foundation universities during the time of the interview, adds:

I do not think the academics were given any chance to discuss the Bologna Process before it started to be implemented in Turkey. The process first arrived as something technical … We found ourselves in an incredibly heavy, bureaucratic burden of … adjusting the entire curricula to the new accreditation system by the deadlines. We didn't even know why we were doing this at the time … and honestly speaking, I think this is still the case today.

Regardless of whether their accounts represent a critical approach when asked about the fundamental factors driving the process, the academics we interviewed in Turkey give formulaic responses about the aims of the Bologna Process and YÖK: 'in order to encourage the mobility of academics, students and the personnel in Europe.' For example, Dr. Defne[16] responded to our question regarding the dominant conceptualization of higher education, the university and knowledge production in the Bologna Process as follows:

Well, I don't think the Bologna Process suggests anything new on that … All it says is "I want to expand the European higher education area … And for this, I want to introduce certain standards for accreditation procedures." The Bologna Process doesn't intervene in universities' internal policies.

This particular reply, ignoring the Bologna Process's neoliberal context and its implementation in universities according to YÖK dictates, matches the definition on YÖK's official webpage.[17] The process is thereby reduced into a set of at best pedagogical but mostly technical procedures while

carefully disguising the free-market dimension and the top-down style in adjusting course curricula to Bologna standards. In our interviews, it is possible to distinguish two approaches among the academics that coalesce in the technicalization of the Bologna Process, which feeds into the free-market model and authoritarian style of *getting things done*. First, there is the interpretation that Bologna Process is a necessary and necessitated frame. Second, there is the *assumption* that the Bologna Process is a 'business-as-usual policy.' These two definitions merge in the call for authoritarian measures in the face of demands to search for alternatives in setting the reform agenda in university education. This can be observed in the accounts pertaining to each. First, Dr. İnci's[18] emphasis on certain needs of university education to be met by the criteria enforced through the Bologna Process and YÖK exemplifies the supposed inevitability of the process for the sake of improving university education:

> As far as I could observe, YÖK considered [the Bologna Process] as part of the Total Quality System ... [In Turkey] not all the universities have a Total Quality System to check whether there are course curricula ... or ... whether the professors are competent in the courses ... You know, the syllabus is important. But I know that in some established universities in Ankara you might not find a course curriculum, let alone syllabi ... I think that the Bologna Process has been an instrument for that purpose.

Although starting from a different point of emphasis, Dr. Sevda's remark on the process as yet another bureaucratic burden matches well with the view that the Bologna Process represents an inevitability, which leaves actors with no other options but acquiescence:

> The university administration demanding that we do certain things within certain timelines ... all these frames, templates, formats ... Unfortunately, the Bologna Process could never develop into a process we believe in. We said "now that we're into this thing ... then there is this set of stuff that the Bologna Process requires, and the sooner we get them over with, the better."

Actually these remarks give hints about the passivity—read in terms of autonomy and critical thinking—on the part of the universities in implementing the Bologna Process in Turkey. Among the multitude of agendas, introduced in a rather rapid sequence by the government in Morocco, one can identify a call for a similar passivity and/or easy acquiescence. Thus, Dr. Zakaria, in his critical remarks on the government's monopolistic style

of reforming the higher education system, takes his examples from the redrafting of course curricula:

> For the undergraduate, the ministry is a bit conservative … uniformity … all the curricula should be the same in Agadir, in Rabat, etc. whatever the context … the teachers, … we're not used to gathering and thinking about something which dominates our courses. Really, we are stuck with our courses and our seminars, so we don't have this kind of view of discussing curricula, a new curricula. (15 April 2014)

He simultaneously underlines the distinction between graduate and undergraduate levels, pointing at a space for academics' involvement in designing the courses they think about and teach: 'because you can't reduplicate the same Master [and Ph.D.] everywhere; each one should have an autonomous Master' (ibid.).

These accounts, pertaining to the involvement of academics in university life, in the reforms that (in)directly affect the courses they teach, the research they conduct, the work they publish, their relations with students, with the administrative units, and their administrative roles, merge into a rather precarious state of being. As in the case of the Bologna Process in Turkey, the academics in Morocco may be called to active roles in the implementation of measures for particular modules of neoliberal policy packages. This very same role-playing may also make them into the passive executors of already-set policy agendas—as in the case of adjusting their syllabi to fit a standard scheme, which requires justifying the course according to outputs listed not in terms of such 'ambiguous' priorities as 'knowing, understanding, getting acquainted with, being subject to, being informed about.' According to YÖK, these priorities challenge the criteria of the 'measurability, observability and accessibility' of the learning process (Yükseköğretim Kurulu 2010, pp. 28–29).

This playing with academic terminology throughout the campuses actually hints at a discursive strategy to dissociate a certain understanding of academic knowledge from everyday academic life. In this process, while those stances that normalize the to-dos as business can be considered as examples of the colonization of the academic imagination, which one expects to remain critical to at least a minimum degree, by neoliberal educational policy preferences, it seems that others who are or might be more critical about the process lack the strategic means to challenge the process. It is here that the problem of alienation/indifference appears. Thus, in the words of Dr. Deniz (2014):

> I have found the Bologna Process's imagination of higher education and university environment quite problematic since the beginning. But then, for years, it's … me who has been officially responsible … for the Bologna Process in our faculty, monitoring things that are completely against my understanding of the university … such a schizophrenic way of existence … I was never ever able to raise my voice during the meetings once to say something like "that is all ridiculous"… My thoughts, ideas, criticisms, political stance … all were parenthesized during such meetings.

One might expect that such a critical stance—though silenced—requires a counter stance to the transformations planned in the Bologna Process and implemented in Europe (e.g. Spain, Greece). Yet, none of the participants are informed about global counter movements while also, as we sensed in some cases, reluctant to share their personal opinions. Dr. Erol, in parallel to his approach to the whole transformation process and YÖK's role in it, 'googled' the words 'Bologna Process, student protest' on his office PC before continuing: 'What do these people complain about? Cultural corruption? Imperialist influence? These are completely meaningless. It's the EU who is giving you the money, not us.' As for the Moroccan case, despite the critical voices that one can hear from individual academics—as revealed in our interviewees' accounts—there happens to be no organized opposition at all: '…. no strikes.'

As the interview data suggest, and similar to countless other policies in the higher education system in Turkey since the 1980s, the Bologna Process appears to be just another example of a state-led, neoliberal transformation process through excessively hierarchical, bureaucratic bodies (in this case YÖK). The Bologna Process has never been discussed or negotiated with the main actors in the universities. Considering the current flux that has hijacked university structures in Turkey, it is all the more doubtful whether there will ever be grounds for such a discussion and/or negotiation in the near future.

The flux in Morocco seems to be never-ending and ever-changing reform agendas. In both cases, one might observe the neoliberal (symbolic and/or *real*) violence that is epitomized in the *speed* of our times. The *speed of our times* symbolizes both the epitome and the fall of modern ways of *doing academia* in the uncomfortable distinction between the hard sciences and the *soft*. It symbolizes the tension between solving the problem and getting to the heart of it as a whole through longitudinal analysis of its various aspects, from non-human to human. In other words, it symbolizes the end of the *conflict of faculties* as we know it, perhaps with

the total elimination of the conflict through the elimination of knowledge per se. This rather bleak condition of academic knowledge production processes runs through Dr. Mostapha's brief observation of the university-state-commerce and industry nexus:

> When you drive through the campus, you see the engineering school … a very impressive building with all the facilities that you can probably hope for … and for a very, very limited student population … something around 300 students [out of 20.000]. Because they study engineering, they deserve such facilities. … That creates, in my opinion, some sort of symbolic violence because, when you move on in the campus and see the departments of social sciences, history, geography… you realize that there is an injustice here. It is an indirect message saying to part of the students that "because you do humanities, this is what you deserve!" (28 May 2015)

Conclusion

This ongoing research project, which initially started in one specific geographical context, Turkey, before extending to the other side of the Mediterranean in Morocco, is now spreading through Europe, including the Balkans, and to North America. Considering the recent dislocation in Turkey's academia, the most recent monopolistic reform attempts of the state in Morocco, and disturbances in North America (Coşar 2016), not to mention continuing unrest in Europe's campuses, it seems that this research has already assumed an open-ended course. For the purposes that initially set the contours of this chapter and the edited volume as a whole, it is nevertheless possible to reach a tentative conclusion regarding the neoliberal transformation of academia in Turkey and Morocco. Our starting point was to inquire about, understand and reflect on the way that we, as academics, encounter, relate to and unfold through the neo-liberal agendas. We therefore mainly relied on academics' own accounts in and of everyday academic life. In so doing, we were careful not to ignore the structural assets that offered a background to and/or set the stage for the reform agendas, influenced by regional and global financial and educational actors, devised by governmental agencies and implemented by the academics themselves.

Within this framework, the part of reform regarding the LMD system was the most visible aspect of higher education reform in Morocco to the concerned actors. Our field observations showed that despite claims on the

part of the government that the reform agenda was initiated with a participatory approach, students, teachers and administrative staff at Moroccan universities are not sufficiently informed. Our interviewees were, therefore, unable to define the overall strategy of the reform or link it to a larger framework, including external processes and dynamics. A striking example of this is the lack of reference to the pivotal role of the EHEA, to its most influential actor, the Bologna Process, and to key regional/global political and financial players (e.g. the World Bank, EU or IMF) behind the reforms. Instead, the field data revealed that both academics and administrative staff were more concerned with the LMD reform and its implications for several aspects of higher education, toward which they developed a variety of reactions, ranging from adaptation to criticism, dissatisfaction and disappointment. There were, needless to say, exceptions, with some being outspokenly critical of the structural, market-oriented trends behind the new educational policies, such as Dr. Mostapha, who observes, in Morocco,

> the issue of university is timely now … at a time when you have a government that is putting neoliberal policies in place. Public-private partnership, for instance … What does that mean?[19] I've listened to the Minister of Higher Education, appealing to ambassadors, "we want you to come and set up a business here". What does that mean to the Moroccan higher education? For Moroccan society? (28 May 2014)

Such criticisms repeated during the interviews and our observations in situ highlight a specific trait of Morocco's higher education reforms. Despite a series of inclusive initiatives and constantly reproduced discourse of participation, it is still the elite (financial and political) imaginary that is determining the present and future of higher education in Morocco.

Currently, Morocco's higher education system is going through its latest trial with reform through the most recent program—Strategic Vision 2015–2030—through the Higher Council for Education, Training and Scientific Research,[20] the governance body to monitor public policies related to education. However, the rhetorical packaging of this version of national education reform does not differ substantially from the previous ones. That is, it supposedly operates through democratic voices, calls for quality, cultural diversity, fairness, internationalization and harmonization in education. This is certainly not the first time that the Moroccan public has listened to such ambitious, grand promises. The same rhetorical refer-

ences can also be followed in various instances of higher education reforms in Turkey under the auspices of YÖK in the last decade. However, ultimately, reform agendas and practices operate through a collective performance of the illusion of democracy and the power of autocracy that values only the voice of the market while the voices of the main subjects in academia are carefully excluded. This is all the more evident in the rather confusing call to the academics, students, administrative staff and other social groups with stakes in higher education to meet, discuss, negotiate and actively participate in different stages of the reform. For the time being, we can tentatively argue that these meetings turn out to be rather stylistic, at best informative and at worst manipulative on the part of the authorities to check, measure and, if possible, *deter* potential opposition.[21] This is in line with what Nick Couldry (2010) articulates in his most recent book: The dominant discourse of neoliberalism, using the disguise of seemingly democratic values—such as individual-as-consumer's freedom of choice—does not value voice; in fact, it 'denies the voice' (Couldry 2010, p. 135).

Read together with frighteningly widespread examples of a 'new authoritarianism' (Giroux 2015) or a 'new brutalism in higher education' (see Warner 2014) across the world, one might inevitably ask: What long-term impacts can we expect from such top-down, elitist and market-oriented measures on individual academics and the university as a whole? Part of the answer lies perhaps in the voices articulated in this volume, particularly in Chap. 3, Chap. 4 and Chap. 9, as well as in Giroux and Searls Giroux's (2004) earlier observations:

> [T]oo many academics have retreated into narrow specialties that serve largely to consolidate authority rather than critique its abuses. Refusing to take positions on controversial issues or to examine the role they might play in lessening human suffering, professionalized academics become models of moral indifference and civic spectatorship, unfortunate examples of what it means to disconnect learning from public life. (p. 277)

However, as the field speaks from below, there are still voices insisting on an alternative and resisting this silencing:

> Yes, they are doing horrible things to us; but those horrible things are part of the bigger picture … That is why I think a more sound struggle can be pursued, not by limiting our focus on what is happening to us, but by remembering again and again … the links between the things that are happening to us and the other things [happening on a wider scale]. We think

that we have such a privileged position. Actually we do not. I mean …
people experience [the horrible things happening] in various ways; and this
is what falls to our share. (Interview with Dr. Deniz, 9 April 2016)

Notes

1. These basic similarities include close relations with European and
   French (intellectual/academic) cultures, Islamic (influence on)
   education since the pre-modern era, the long-lasting debate over
   secularization, massification of higher education, negotiations
   between an authoritarian administration and democratic actors,
   and the ramifications of and challenges within the political and
   social spheres imposed by such dynamics and processes. One sig-
   nificant difference worth keeping in mind concerns the countries'
   political regimes: Morocco is a constitutional monarchy and *dawla
   islāmiyya* (Islamic state) as defined by its constitution's preamble,
   in which the monarch is given the status of 'Commander of the
   Faithful,' the religious leader of Moroccan Muslims and head of
   religious institutions. According to its constitution, Turkey, on the
   other hand, is a democratic and secular social republic, governed
   by the rule of law. Such definitions may naturally bring in mind
   conventional binaries such as modern versus traditional, secular
   versus religious or conservative versus liberal. In countries like
   Morocco and Turkey, however, context matters, so the reality may
   be more complicated than it appears at the first glance. In Turkey's
   case, for instance in the post-1980 era, an Islamic element has con-
   sistently permeated higher education, though in an indirect fash-
   ion. The unfolding of this permeation preempts an easy reading of
   this development as 'Islamization.' It has more to do with the reli-
   gious conservatism accompanying a certain type of Turkish nation-
   alism. Briefly, one can consider the hegemonic politico-cultural
   constellation of the post-1980 period with reference to the
   Turkish-Islamic synthesis, advocated by the 1980 *coup d'état* lead-
   ers during the three-year military regime, when the national
   education system was reconstituted along the lines of this synthe-
   sis. Likewise, the following civilian governments also included their
   share of this hegemonic constellation. The 2000s, on the other
   hand, can be considered as the period when this synthesis was
   shaken by alternative Islamist claims to hegemony. At the other

end of the Mediterranean, in Morocco, where Islamic education was mandatory throughout the public education system during the 1960s and 1970s, and where, until the 1990s, 'Arabization' constituted the core component of the 'ideologically charged religious education curriculum' (Wainscott 2014, p. 46), the last two decades have witnessed significant educational revisions in Islamic education in its curricula, emphasizing 'human rights values of tolerance, forgiveness and communication' with the aim of creating 'more tolerant, open, rational and modern citizens' (ibid., pp. 47, 51). The result is a relatively decentralized, multilingual, diverse educational environment (Sassi et al. 2011, pp. 605–608). (Regarding multilingualism, Arabic and Amazigh are the country's two official languages according to 2011 Constitution, while French and English have varying influence on the political, educational, diplomatic, scientific, economic and intellectual spheres.) For a comprehensive anthropological account of the role of Islamic and colonial/European influence on higher education in Morocco, see Eickelman 1985; for an overview of reforms to Islamic education in Morocco from the twentieth century until the first decade of the twenty-first century, see Wainscott 2014.

2. Along with Russia and Romania, Turkey is among the top ten countries in terms of the volume of enrollments (for a brief global overview, see Calderon 2012).

3. Bachelor's, master's and PhD.

4. For the ruling cadres, the high level of political engagement on the campuses in the 1960s and 1970s, which at times led to breaks in instruction in the universities, was a major problem of Turkey's higher education system.

5. The intervention of the World Bank and IMF during the early 1980s affected the educational reforms by aiming to restructure all levels of education in Morocco.

6. Such as the authors in the 'Systèmes Educatifs, Savoir, Technologies et Innovation,' in the *50 Ans de Développement Humain & Perspectives 2025 Report* (Lamrini 2005).

7. The World Bank approved a US$60 million *Development Policy Loan* to support the implementation of the Emergency Plan in order to support the new *Country Partnership Strategy* (2010–2013), aiming to enhance 'growth, competitiveness and employment' (see World Bank 2010).

8. In a meeting organized by the American University of Leadership on 3 June 2016, Lahcen Daoudi, Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Training, emphasized the increasing number of African students (over 15,000) attending Moroccan higher education, many of whom are not even required to have a visa.

9. The stylistic reference to participation, inviting all relevant parties, such as 'ministries, actors in the field, political parties, unions, parents, economic institutions, civil society, students, experts and ulemas,' has been frequently reproduced in the Council's reform rhetoric (*L'Economist*, 9 September 2014, p. 10).

10. Collaborations with European programs (Aqi-Umed, Tempus), the British Council and bilateral cooperation with France, the UK, Germany, Belgium and the USA are examples of internationalization.

11. This is not an individual, local case that one can understand without elaborating its links to the new phase of the neoliberal agenda; rather, it should be seen as a typical example of what Giroux (2015) calls 'new authoritarianism':

   Across the globe, a new historical conjuncture is emerging in which attacks on higher education as a democratic institution and on dissident public voices in general—whether journalists, whistleblowers, or academics—are intensifying with sobering consequences … The right-wing defense of the neoliberal dismantling of the universities as a site of critical inquiry in many countries is more brazen and arrogant than anything we have seen in the past. (p. 108)

12. The World Bank (2003), *Better Governance for Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Enhancing Inclusiveness and Accountability*, Washington, DC: The World Bank.

13. Interview, 9 April 2016.

14. As of 31 October 2016, 125 academics have been dismissed, 15 resigned, 1 was forced to retire, 513 have been subjected to disciplinary investigation, 85 have been subjected to preventive suspension and 7 have been suspended from administrative duty. The statistics are taken from Academics for Peace—Solidarity Network. https://barisicinakademisyenler.net/node/314

15. The interviewees are senior professors with different academic backgrounds from two public universities, located in Casablanca

and Kenitra. They were selected for their profound knowledge about Moroccan higher education and rich experience in local and international academic circles. The objective was to explore crucial aspects of the recent transformation. While one of our participants, Dr. Zakaria, has been actively involved in the establishment of a number of academic institutions and curricula, our second interviewee, Dr. Mostapha, participated in the committees as part of preliminary official attempts at LMD reform.

16. For reasons of anonymity, all participants are referred to by pseudonyms throughout the paper.
17. http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/uluslararasi-iliskiler/bologna-sureci
18. This associate professor at a foundation university prefers to be called a 'Bologna expert' (11 May 2015).
19. Mostapha believes that there might be other perhaps more viable options in the Moroccan context, such as the educational *waqf* system, that are often neglected during policymaking.
20. http://www.csefrs.ma/default.aspx#8
21. The Council organized meetings in Morocco's main regions in order to present and discuss the new *Strategy*. The Casablanca-Settat meeting, for instance, was held on 4 November 2015. The audience was forced to sit through PowerPoint presentations delivered by Council members first before being given the floor to make their remarks and state their objections. Our observations and discussions with the participants in situ suggest that, for many attendees, the government's participatory approach in organizing the events represented a kind of stage where actors and stakeholders (e.g. lecturers, parents, students, union members, NGOs and so on) were invited to express their grievances or anger, thereby functioning as social catharsis.

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Voices of Dissent

The Historico-Political Parameters of Academic Feminism in Turkey: Breaks and Continuities

İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu and Aylin Özman

INTRODUCTION

Academic feminism, which entails a reconsideration of academia as an invented space of maleist power and status, became prominent in Western universities during the 1960s. This institutionalization of feminism in universities as an extension of second-wave feminism into the academic *milieu* signified a challenge to the male-dominant scientific discourse that rendered knowledge on women invisible and worthless. Such an academic move, comprising both epistemological and theoretical dimensions, had repercussions for the feminist mind-set, bringing new concerns, arguments and future perspectives into the feminist agenda. The emergence of

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academic feminism in Turkey followed a path similar to that in the West, although with certain exceptions, particularly regarding shifts in feminist concerns and strategies.

The historical roots of academic feminism in Turkey can be traced back to the rise of second-wave feminism in the post-1980 period. However, the challenging intervention of feminist principles in the knowledge production process took a different course both theoretically and practically, paving the way for more diverse debates than in the West. The cross-cutting effects of the idiosyncratic social, historical and political dynamics regarding modernization/westernization and nationalization, together with cultural codes shaped by the interaction of Islamic, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean social identities on feminist practices, laid the ground for the formation of a unique feminist agenda in the country. Nevertheless, regardless of the *sui generis* characteristics of feminist dynamics in Turkey, the overall concern of feminists in academia proved to be the same as that of their sisters elsewhere: to transform women's lives under the guidance of feminist knowledge.

Set against this background, in this chapter, we aim to analyze from a politico-historical perspective the production of feminist knowledge in Turkey with regard to major debates and issues. Our study is structured on two cross-cutting thematic axes. While drawing attention to women's/gender research centers as platforms of feminist knowledge production and dissemination, we also intend to provide a map of women-oriented scientific studies, which in fact date back long before the institutionalization of academic feminism in Turkey. As for women's/gender research centers, we choose to focus mainly on those in Middle East Technical University (METU), İstanbul University and Ankara University since they are among Turkey's most institutionalized academic bodies in terms of both feminist education and knowledge production.

The methodology of our research is based on documentary analysis of the main articles, books and research undertaken within the scope of the feminist paradigm, as well as primary qualitative research carried out through semi-structured interviews with the chairpersons of the centers and prominent feminist academics working there. As for documentary analysis, we do not aim to present an exhaustive account of all conducted studies but rather intend to offer an analysis of major works that are significant in depicting the thematic and epistemological breaks and continuities in the evolution of feminist studies in Turkey.

We propose a tripartite periodization that we consider to be illuminative for showing the paradigmatic breaks and continuities in feminist

knowledge production in conjunction with socio-political dynamics. In this context, we name the early years of the Turkish Republic (founded in 1923) until 1980 the early period, when gender studies evolved under the predominance of *women-related* works, and the post-1980 period up until the early 2000s the foundational period, which saw the first initiatives toward the institutionalization of academic feminism through the establishment of the women's/gender studies programs and centers in various universities. The foundational period is also distinct from the previous period for its production of *women-focused* studies, which in fact can be seen as the result of the interaction between the newly emerging second-wave feminist movement and academia. Last, taking into consideration the increase in the number of the women's/gender studies centers as well as ideological diversification among feminist approaches, we label the post-2000s as the period of plurality.

The chapter consists of three main parts. In the first part, we investigate the dialectical relationship between academic feminism and the feminist movement in the USA and Western Europe, with particular emphasis on the historical dynamics of the institutionalization of feminism in academia. The autonomy-integration debate and the arguments regarding naming alternatives, specifically women's/gender/feminist, are the major controversies in the institutionalization of academic feminism. The second part analyzes the evolution of feminist knowledge production and women's/gender studies centers in Turkey during the early and foundational periods. In this part, we particularly focus on institutional, administrative and academic practices at METU, İstanbul University and Ankara University. In the third part, we explore feminist research undertaken within academia in the post-2000s, providing a schematic overview that takes into consideration the epistemological and ideological diversification prevalent in feminist knowledge production. While mapping this plurality, we also elaborate on the implications of neoliberal policies on knowledge production and the institutional structure of women's/gender research centers.

THE MOVEMENT, THE ACADEMIA AND THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The conceptualization of 'academic feminism' invites us to question and reconstruct the malestream meaning of academia. Entailing a reconsideration of academia as an invented space of maleist power and status, the feminist critique represents a transformatory initiative involving the

dialectics of theory and practice. In general terms, with reference to the *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2014), 'academic'—from the French *académique* or medieval Latin *academicus*—means 'not connected to a real or practical situation.' 'Feminism'—from the French *féminisme*—on the other hand, refers to 'the belief and aim that women should have the same rights and opportunities as men, the struggle to achieve this aim'. Accordingly, when the academy is considered within the semiological borders of this broadly accepted meaning, the conceptualization of 'academic feminism' becomes a paradoxical category that, in the final analysis, makes it impossible to speak of academic feminism as a field of study. That is, the collocation of the academe and feminism in this context ultimately becomes oxymoronic.[1] Ironically, on the other hand, it is in this very context that academic feminism comes to life—through *problematizing the academe itself*. While questioning male-dominant norms and structures within the academia, academic feminism particularly prioritizes the interaction between knowledge production and practical experience, namely, the dialectics of theory and practice—the *praxis. Praxis* is inherent in feminism, both individually and collectively, as a theory shaped by experience and a movement rising through experience fed by theory, a continuing metamorphosis.[2] This chapter revolves around the different dimensions and the potentials as well as the breaks and continuities of this metamorphosis.

Academic feminism, aiming at questioning and transforming male-dominant rationales and practices in academia, incorporates many actors as well as institutionalized and non-institutionalized practices—feminist scholars and research, feminist student collectives, various initiatives and platforms, women's/gender/feminist studies, centers and academic programs. In this chapter, however, we limit academic feminism to institutionalized practices, specifically women/gender/feminist studies, centers and programs in universities.

Academic feminism functions at two levels. While aiming to transform education and research along feminist lines and create an academic *milieu* responsive to gender equality within the university, at the same time it aims to raise awareness on gender equality in society at large. In this process, the conceptual baggage that it provides for the feminist movement is particularly critical. For instance, Margaret Mead's well-known anthropological study of three New Guinea tribes, *Sex and Temperament in Primitive Societies* (1935), is regarded as one of the key intellectual sources for conceptualizing gender, with its strong implications for the evolution of the

second-wave feminist movement in the USA. Mead's account of different gender identities in New Guinea attributed disparate gender roles at odds with the mainstream pattern, in which men are regarded as strong, aggressive and success-oriented, and women are nurturing housewives:

> If those temperamental attitudes which we have traditionally regarded as feminine—such as passivity, responsiveness, and a willingness to cherish children—can so easily be set up as the masculine pattern in one tribe, and in another be outlawed for the majority of women as well as for the majority of men, we no longer have any basis for regarding such aspects of behavior as sex-linked. (Mead [orig. 1935] 1963, p. 221)

By revealing the cultural dimension of differences between women and men, Mead's analysis functioned as a major reference point for future feminist generations in their efforts to conceptualize gender. In this context, the concept of gender, first used by Ann Oakley (1972) to highlight the centrality of cultural and social processes in the formation of sexual roles and identities, has made a critical contribution by providing an analytical instrument for future research and the feminist movement itself.

Apart from academia's contributions to the feminist movement, the interaction between theory and practice also encompasses the support provided by the movement to feminist knowledge production. For instance, the first course on women's studies, initiated in the Free University of Seattle in 1965, was influenced by and affiliated with the Students for a Democratic Society, a new leftist student activist movement in the USA. Likewise, the first official programs on women's studies in San Diego and Suny Universities in the 1970s took shape in line with the second-wave feminist movement.[3]

On the Proper Naming

The proper naming of the field has been a controversial issue in feminist knowledge production and its dissemination in the institutionalization of academic feminism. The search for a name is a process of differentiation based on efforts to delineate the exact boundaries of the field in contextual terms rather than as a mere administrative process of labeling. Thus, each alternative name, such as *women's studies*, *feminist studies* and *gender studies*, represents divergent perspectives on gender inequality as well as concerns about the ways and means of guaranteeing and securing feminist effectiveness in academia.

During the early years, the widely used name 'women's studies' was thought to be inclusive of feminist aims and concerns. Yet, the evolution of academic feminism led to counterarguments that the term women's studies was marginalizing the field and preventing it from being taken seriously scientifically. Such critiques were in fact valid in most parts of the world—developed and developing—and prepared the ground for the shift in naming preferences from women's studies to gender studies.[4] For instance, in the UK, the assertion that 'gender studies' was a more academic and legitimate term that also appealed to more students than 'women's studies' while including masculinity and sexual orientation studies alongside women's studies played a critical role—very similar to the Mexican case (Stromquist 2001, pp. 373–374). The counterarguments against changing to gender studies primarily emphasized this expansion of the field, which, for advocates of the term 'women's studies,' included topics such as masculinity and transgender that would inevitably shift the focus away from women (De Groot and Maynard 1993) and weaken motivation in the struggle to eradicate patriarchal structures, thereby depoliticizing the field (Evans 1991). However, for supporters of 'gender studies,' naming the field only with a focus on women was essentialist and far from academically neutral.

Drawing the academic boundaries of the field with reference to gender (studies) would make it possible to establish links with *queer*, *transgender* and *postcolonial* theories considered vital for ensuring the persistence and effectiveness of feminism in academia (Gillis and Munford 2003). The term 'gender studies' is in fact compatible with the poststructuralist *école*, which has become more prominent within the field. Yet, despite the academic value of its research,[5] the poststructuralist approach has been severely criticized for undermining power relations in the society, as well as its weakness in transcending the confines of academia. The other alternative is feminist studies. Compared to the other two preferences (i.e. gender studies and women's studies), feminist studies is distinguished by its stronger emphasis on the political nature of the field.

Autonomy or Integration?

Another major debate, alongside the naming issue, revolves around the question of whether feminist studies in academia should be organized as a separate field in its own right or as an integrated area within existing disciplines (Hemmings 2006). The aim is to find out the proper institutionalization mechanism to increase the effectiveness, transformative power

and authority of feminist knowledge and methodology. The arguments in favor of the autonomous organization of women's studies focus on the advantages of autonomy for enhancing interdisciplinary feminist dialogue, which would contribute to improving feminist knowledge production and dissemination. In seeing autonomy risking the marginalization of women's studies, supporters of integrity advocate an alternative organization in which women's studies operates within existing disciplines. Such a pattern can be considered as a strategic tool for increasing the competency of feminism in challenging malestream methodologies and curricula. However, the integration argument has a major shortcoming in that the operation of women's studies within strictly defined disciplinary boundaries could hinder the interdisciplinary practices of feminist academics. Moreover, since the workings of women's studies in the integrated model depend much more on the academics themselves than it does on the autonomous organization pattern, any absence or leave of an academic is thought to have negative implications both for the permanence and for the long-term development of the field. Some feminist academics endorse the co-existence of both institutional forms as constituting the most proper structuration. They argue that women's studies should operate through particular disciplines to transform them while simultaneously being organized as an autonomous discipline in order to be able to produce new models and approaches (Stacey et al. 1992).

Ultimately, it seems quite impractical to propose one universally accepted model of institutionalization since the effectiveness of a particular model is largely bound by the dynamics underlying the rise and evolution of the feminist movement in each particular historico-political context as well as the organizational culture of each university. For instance, despite high levels of gender awareness in both Spain and Holland, the academic institutionalization of feminism is quite limited there; instead, women's studies mostly operate through alternative platforms such as seminars, forums and working groups, rather than through autonomous units or programs (Stromquist 2001, p. 376).

ACADEMIC FEMINISM IN TURKEY: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL DYNAMICS

In the Turkish case, the institutionalization of women's/gender studies in academia closely paralleled the rise of the feminist movement in the West, albeit with a significant time lag. The process whereby the Western

world was fueled by the radical feminist movement of 1968 only started to affect Turkey in the 1990s due to the rise of its own feminist movement post-1980. We therefore provide an overview of the evolution of studies on women in Turkish universities before the rise of its feminist movement in order to ground an analysis for detecting the breaks, continuities and transformations in feminist research both before and after the institutionalization of feminism in Turkish academia.

We should note that prior to the rise of Turkey's feminist movement post-1980, women's/gender studies were quite limited, being mainly carried out within the modernist paradigm rather than feminist epistemology. To borrow Ferhunde Özbay's (1990, pp. 2–7) periodization, the literature on women's studies in the period from the early years of the Republic until 1980 can be elaborated in terms of three phases that refer to diversification of the thematic focus of such studies.

In the first phase, comprising work produced during the 1920s and 1930s, gender equality mainly focused on the legal dimension. Emphasizing the centrality of the status and visibility of women in the public sphere for achieving gender equality, early work mostly problematized the political, educational and economic rights of women. The Kemalist modernization process and the Republican mind-set were praised in terms of their emancipatory effects on women while the socio-political and cultural dimensions of modernization were considered to be the best alternative to the Ottoman context.[6] During the 1940s and 1950s, concomitant with the increasing significance of anthropological and sociological works in the social sciences literature, the women's issue was largely investigated through village monographs. These, however, did not focus on women's status but rather on debates revolving around the dynamics of family and village life, and the social division of labor, which in fact encompassed women's life experiences. The monographs in question signified a shift from the modernist to the economic development approach (Berkes 1942; Boran 1945; Yasa 1955). The third phase, extending from the 1960s to 1970s, witnessed an increase in fertility studies, reflecting the rising significance of family planning in the governmental agenda due to rapid economic and social changes, particularly population growth and rural-urban migration. While further emphasizing the role of education for bettering women's status, the fertility studies functioned substantially as confirmatory devices for Kemalist[7] reforms through their provision of supportive empirical data (Karadayı 1971; Özbay 1975, 1979). Moreover, the period also welcomed studies in social psychology, focusing on women's social

roles. These studies particularly concentrated on the relationship between sexual roles and women's personal identity with reference to socialization theories (Kağıtçıbaşı 1972; Kağıtçıbaşı and Kansu 1976–1977).

Regarding women's studies during the 1970s, there appeared to be an ideological diversification of approach due to political fragmentation of Turkish society and academia. This diversification was solidified in the dominance of studies conducted from Islamic, Kemalist and Marxist perspectives. While Islamist studies suggested that women's problems only applied to those women with ideological stances outside the borders of the Islamic world view (Erdoğan 1979; İşler 1979; Topaloğlu 1980), studies conducted within the Kemalist paradigm continued to describe women who were unable to exercise their legal rights as subjects of the women's issue.[8] Marxist studies, on the other hand, approached the issue from a class-reductionist perspective, focusing on gender inequality through an analysis of the problems and status of working women. However, despite differences in the arguments, approaches and strategies of these politically and ideologically rival positions, they all displayed a shared anti-feminist stance (Altındal 1970; Özbudun 1984).

Overall, most research conducted before the mid-1970s included women-related studies that viewed women as a variable in nationalist, modernist, socialist or religious social projects. Nevertheless, these studies had significant implications for knowledge production on the women's issue by laying the foundations for future studies. The late 1970s to post-1980s were a threshold between the early and foundational years, with the earliest examples of academic feminist studies in which women became the main focus of research (Sancar 2003; Kandiyoti 2010, p. 41). At this point, the supportive strategy of the United Nations (UN) during the 1970s should be noted as the key motivator for the emergence of women's studies in many countries, including Turkey, as Deniz Kandiyoti highlights:

> As in many countries, the story of women's studies in Turkey is inextricably linked to the moment when the issue of "women in development" (WID) was put on the global agenda at the first international UN conference on Women in Mexico city in 1975, a conference that prompted the growth of a new administrative and ideational infrastructure. … It is against the background of this new administrative and ideational infrastructure that women's studies (as distinct from women's movements that have a much longer history) started to take shape in Turkey in the 1970s. (Kandiyoti 2010, pp. 168–169)

The publication of *Women in Turkish Society*, edited by a highly respected scholar from Ankara University, Nermin Abadan Unat, is regarded as the founding step in establishing women's studies as a legitimate field of academic research. One of the earliest collections of work on the status of women in Turkey, the book includes presentations from the congress organized by the Turkish Social Sciences Association under the same title in 1978, three years after the Mexico City conference. Its significance lies in the fact of it being the earliest example of a multidimensional work on the women's issue, incorporating demography, health, work life, education, literature, religion and politics. Although it does not signify a radical epistemological break with prior research carried out within the modernist paradigm, it stands as a worthy effort at raising awareness on women's studies in academia through a direct focus on the women's issue through its multidisciplinary perspective. As stated in its introduction, the aim was to 'afford the reader a better grasp of the relationship between the status and the problems of women and such basic issues as underdevelopment, dependency and the struggle for rapid structural changes' (Abadan Unat 1981, p. XI). There are two main reasons to contextualize *Women in Turkish Society* within the scope of feminist literature in Turkey. First, the book's content laid the ground for a critical reading of Republican modernization with all its deficiencies and failures, rather than merely describing it as a success story. The second reason particularly relates to the personal identity of Abadan Unat, both as a feminist—which she claimed to be years later—and as a scholar with an active role in educating future feminist generations.

Most studies that followed Abadan Unat's work were based on a perspective that integrated women as a variable or subject matter into the research, carried out within the borders of existing social science disciplines. Although research conducted during these years cannot be considered novel in terms of its methodology and perspective, it nevertheless made a valuable contribution to feminist knowledge accumulation, particularly regarding women's political, economic and social status, albeit without problematizing the patriarchal structure and relations in the private sphere. At this point, we should note that one particular study of women's political participation by Şirin Tekeli, a feminist scholar at İstanbul University, was distinctive at the time both for its critical perspective toward Kemalist modernization and for Tekeli's analysis of women as political subjects.[9]

The rise of the feminist movement in Turkey during the 1980s led to a shift from studies focusing on the 'problems' of women to studies investigating the structural sources of these problems from a perspective aiming at empowering women and securing their visibility. These studies, carried out within different disciplines, including sociology, political science, law, history, economics, psychology and literature, largely focused on topics such as violence against women (Yüksel 1990), women's labor (Ecevit 1986; Berik 1987), women's political participation (Arat 1989; Koray 1991) and women's human rights under the paradigms of their own disciplines (Ecevit 2015). By politicizing previously untouched problems, such as violence against women, harassment, intra-marriage rape, virginity, honor and domestic labor, which had long been confined to the private sphere, the 1980s feminist movement laid the foundations for a paradigmatic change in women's studies carried out in universities. Such change was particularly crystallized in the edited book *1980ler Türkiye'sinde Kadın Bakış Açısından Kadınlar* (Women in 1980s' Turkey from a Woman's Perspective),[10] published in 1989, ten years after Abadan Unat's work. Like *Women in Turkish Society*, the new edited volume was the end product of a conference—the International Conference on Women's Position in Turkey in the 1980s—held in Kassel University, Germany, in 1989. It included works focusing on women's history, women's roles in production and reproduction, their means of resistance within both the private and public spheres, violence against women and the struggle against violence, women's sexuality and male dominance in Turkish society. The chapters were written by 'women questioning the women's proposition from a feminist perspective' (Tekeli 1990b, p. 36), which made the book the earliest example of 'women's studies,' conceived as a solid reflection of the women's movement in universities. Despite differences in the perspectives of the authors about feminism, all the chapters reflected one common concern: 'to understand how women's status is determined by the system of patriarchal power relations in specific conditions, what kind of oppression women experience, and how they can resist oppression' (Tekeli 1990b, p. 37).

The dividing line between the feminist studies of the 1990s, including the book just discussed, and previous 'women-related studies' is manifest in their approach toward Kemalist modernization. Whereas such modernization policies were strongly praised from the perspective of women's emancipation during the early days, they became a focus of criticism in the feminist writings of the 1990s, which concentrated on two main

interrelated levels. The first concerned the silence of Kemalist cadres regarding private sphere relations, particularly the traditional roles of women as mothers and wives, while aiming at implementing equality between women and men in the public sphere through citizenship rights. In Turkey, the motto of the feminist movement in the 1980s—'the private is political'—became reflected in research, aiming to highlight the links between the private and the public spheres, particularly regarding women's (domestic) labor,[11] violence against women and maleist power in society.[12]

The second critique of Kemalist modernization concerns the modernist historiography that contextualizes the modernization project as a radical break with the Ottoman past.[13] Kemalist historiography is seen as simply following a pattern of defining contradictions between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire and therefore criticized for ignoring women's struggles during the Empire while taking up women as passive subjects who should be 'indebted' to the Republican cadres for 'endowing' them with rights. In this sense, the major implication of the feminist movement for scholarly research has been the erosion of the alliance constructed between the modern-citizen woman and Republican modernity. Feminist academic research on women's history mostly scrutinized the inadequacies of the argument about women's participation in the public sphere in the early Republican era. It offered instead a critical reading of Kemalist 'ideal woman' stereotypes and drew attention to the emerging women's movement in late Ottoman times, particularly in the Second Constitutional Era.[14]

Thus, studies conducted by second-generation women scholars guided and motivated by the feminist movement differ from those of the first generation in their critical approach toward Kemalism. However, such differences do not indicate a rupture[15] as the two generations interact in various ways, whether supportively or in conflict. A close look at the evolution of women's studies programs as autonomous graduate research fields in Turkish universities provides clues regarding relationships between these two generations. The establishment and institutionalization of women's studies programs in İstanbul University, METU and Ankara University are critical in this respect, as they are the oldest programs in Turkey based on feminist principles.

The evolution of the institutionalization of feminism in Turkish academia dates back to the establishment of the Women's Problems Research and Implementation Center (*Kadın Sorunları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*—KSAUM) in İstanbul University in 1989. KSAUM was followed

by the Women's Problems Research and Implementation Center (*Kadın Sorunları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi*—KASAUM) founded in Ankara University and the Gender and Women's Studies Graduate Programme (*Toplumsal Cinsiyet ve Kadın Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı*) founded in METU in 1993 and 1994, respectively.

The establishment of KSAUM coincided with the Association for Supporting Contemporary Life (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği*—ÇYDD), a non-governmental organization established in 1989 working for modernization of the country in line with 'Atatürk's principles and revolutions.' KSAUM was initially established to strengthen and support ÇYDD, as KSAUM's founders, four women professors from İstanbul University, were also members of the administrative board of ÇYYD.[16] In fact, ÇYDD was not a women's organization as far as its aims were considered, as all its founding and administrative board members were women with an unconditional attachment to Kemalist modernization. Accordingly, the major concern motivating the establishment of ÇYDD was the rising Islamic movement in the 1980s, with all its political and social implications, such as the increase in the number of *imam hatip* high schools, vocational schools for training *imams* and the issue of women's headscarves.[17] Because secularism was thought to be the foundation of women's rights, it was prioritized even above the women's issue itself. During its early days, KSAUM adopted a similar stance, which explains the dominance of the Kemalist perspective seen in the works of first-generation women scholars. One year after its establishment, in the 1990–1991 academic year, a 12-hour interdisciplinary master's course on women's studies was introduced (Berktay 1992), followed by an autonomous women's studies program under the Institute of Social Sciences.

Alongside its positive effects on the development of academic feminism, the program in question was instrumental in establishing an interactive relationship between Kemalist first-generation scholars and second-generation feminists, enabling the former to acquire knowledge on feminist perspectives and theories. However, this transformative effect was limited in İstanbul University, as became particularly apparent as opinions between the two generations diverged regarding the struggles of women who wanted to wear a headscarf for their educational and employment rights during the 1990s. Once first-generation women scholars retired,[18] the program and the center (KSAUM) were run by second- and third-generation feminist scholars. Fatmagül Berktay, Professor of Political Science in İstanbul University, who has played an active role since

KSAUM's early days and acted as Director for 2010–2013, explains the respective positions of Kemalist and feminist scholars during the founding years of the center:

> The master's program was established two years after the foundation of İstanbul University, Women's Problems Research and Implementation Center … While the Center had a largely Kemalist-modernist inclination, the program involved women from the feminist movement who were critical of the Kemalist modernization perspective. But Necla Arat was the head of both the program and the center, and in this sense these two were integrated. However, they should have been separated and, in fact, they were *de facto* operating separately. Despite the differences between the feminist and Kemalist perspectives, we did not face any resistance to get involved in the center, which was established through the efforts of Kemalist women. They knew what we were thinking but we were able to act together. (Interview with Fatmagül Berktay, 10 October 2015)

Serpil Çakır, Professor of Political Science in İstanbul University, a feminist scholar working actively in KSAUM, highlights the significant role played by the first generation in establishing KSAUM:

> The women who established the center in İstanbul University were Kemalists, yet they were sincere in their efforts to achieve something for women. They worked very hard to convince both YÖK and the university administration to open the center. The university allocated an office yet did not provide anything else. Everything else, such as tables, paper and computers were donated. They established the Women Research Association to raise funds and donations. (Interview with Serpil Çakır, 12 October 2015)

In the case of Ankara University, the relationship between the two generations of women scholars followed a somewhat different path characterized by a more cooperative and collaborative type of interaction. Serpil Sancar, Professor of Political Science in Ankara University, who has been the director of KASAUM since its early days, recounts the supportive attitudes of the first generation during the foundation of the center:

> Before us, there was another generation in the university. The first generation of the Republic, so to speak, the Kemalist women. The students of Nermin Abadan Unat, let's say. They acted as our representatives, organizing our formal affairs with the rectorate. Since our language was more feminist [the administrators in the higher echelons, in the rectorate,] were

looking at us as if we were weird creatures. The other generation opened our way and invited us to do the job ourselves. There was cooperation between the modernists and feminists. (Interview with Serpil Sancar, 2 July 2015)[19]

METU, on the other hand, presents quite a different model in the evolution of academic feminism compared to İstanbul University and Ankara University. In METU, women's studies was institutionalized without any established center directly through the foundation of the master's program in 1994. Yıldız Ecevit, the chair of the women's studies program in METU, elaborates on this:

We started out with scholars or activists or scholar-activists associated with feminism. In my opinion, we are the first generation; our students, most of whom are associate professors by now, are the second generation; and our current students are the third. In Ankara University, there was another generation before us. If you consider like this, there seems to be four generations; yet, if we are talking about feminist studies, then it started with our generation. (Interview with Yıldız Ecevit, 2 July 2015)

Another distinguishing feature of the establishment of the women's studies program in METU is the role of United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as Ecevit notes:

İstanbul University established the center. I was curious about how they did it and got in touch with Necla Arat … I spoke with Feride Acar for us to follow the example. However, we learned that it was not easy to establish a center, and we gave up the project. At that point, UNDP made a suggestion to us. With KSGM [*Kadın Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü* (Women's Problems General Directorate)], UNDP opted for METU to promote the gender issue at the universities. Me, Feride Acar, Yakın Ertürk, Zehra Kasnakoğlu, Ayşe Saktanber; all of us were involved in the process. UNDP signed a protocol with us and funded us to establish a master's program. We worked on the schedule for a year, examined some of the models abroad, and we opened the program. (Interview with Yıldız Ecevit, 2 July 2015)

Regarding the issue of naming of the centers and programs, the debate revolved around two alternatives, namely 'women's studies' or 'gender studies.' Of these alternatives, women's studies/problems was generally preferred. Although 'feminist studies' was considered as a viable option by all the scholars interviewed, this option was ignored by their particular

centers and programs and others in Turkey. Ecevit's view of the METU case helps to understand the various arguments regarding naming:

> When we first established the program, its name was 'gender and women's studies', but in those years, in 1994, the concept of gender was not that much used in Turkish, so we opted for women's studies. 20 years have passed since then. Now, we applied to change the name of the program to 'women's and gender studies.' Historically, these studies were first founded as feminist studies. Later on, to get accepted, not to be marginalized, they were changed to 'women's studies.' For me, the best would be feminist studies. To call it gender is useful; it is as if you embrace everybody. When you call it gender and women's studies, you don't overlook women, you emphasize them as political subjects. (Interview with Yıldız Ecevit, 2 July 2015)

Berktay's arguments on proper naming follows a similar pattern to Ecevit's:

> It might be more proper to use gender studies instead of women's studies, but in those years this never was on the agenda. Certainly, the proper name would be feminist studies. This name moves women's studies or the woman category away from identity politics. There is also a risk of LGBTI and queer theory getting confined within identity politics. The emphasis on woman on the other hand involves the risk of being trapped in womanism. In fact, there is no difference between womanism and essentialism. (Interview with Fatmagül Berktay, 10 October 2015)

The prevalence of the Women's Problems Research and Implementation Center as the *proper* naming can be interpreted both as a reiteration of the very first center established in İstanbul University and as a sign of the similarity between academia's perspective while approaching the *women's issue* and a *problem* area. Another conclusion that can be drawn with reference to this particular naming, more specifically to the co-existence of research and implementation, relates to the desire of such centers—similar to their counterparts in the West—to construct a bridge between academia and women's real-life experiences, to use the research and knowledge produced in universities to transform women's lives.

In other respects, we can argue that, although the operation and presence of a women's studies master's program can, at first sight, be regarded as indicating autonomy, it is hard to consider the field as truly autonomous, particularly in the institutional sense of the term, since the programs

are usually run by women academics affiliated to different departments, such as political science, sociology, economics, law and history, rather than having their own academic cadres. This also makes it harder for the field to integrate with other social science disciplines. The sub-department of Gender Studies, established under the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, in Ankara University in 2011 can be considered as a significant model in terms of autonomy, although it is too early to argue that the department has eliminated the risk of ghettoization. As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to propose a universally recognized model for the institutionalization of women's studies. Taking into consideration the evolution and operation of women's studies in the Turkish context, Serpil Sancar highlights the advantages of a hybrid model:

> This is not a question of autonomy or integration, the two should coexist. You refine the mainstream through integration and you produce knowledge through autonomy. If there is no autonomy, you cannot produce knowledge. You can produce graduate work only if you are autonomous; you organize your own juries, give them [students] your own degree. We are afraid of, we abstain from affecting the mainstream. We didn't think about that enough. (Interview with Serpil Sancar, 2 July 2015)

While emphasizing the difficulties that scholars working in the field of women's/gender studies encounter, Çakır from KSAUM also highlights the advantages of such co-existence:

> We already paid the price of doing academic research on women. You should be knowledgeable in many fields: psychology, sociology, history … But still you are deemed worthless because of your research field. Yet, you are dealing with historiography, paradigms and all others. This moves women away from the field … Thus, it loses strength. That's why we should have both autonomy and integration. There should be an autonomous program; but at the same time, we should open courses within existing programs. (Interview with Serpil Çakır, 12 October 2015)

Rethinking Academic Feminism in Turkey in the 2000s

In delineating the borders of academic feminism in Turkey in the 2000s, two major dimensions come to the forefront. First, in the historical evolution of academic feminism, the 2000s refers to a period of plurality where

the academy witnessed a diversification of feminist research both thematically and methodologically, particularly with the ever-increasing effect of the postmodernist paradigm in social sciences. Second, women's/gender studies experienced a compartmentalization, fueled by the conservative-neoliberal hegemony. Newly established women's/gender studies centers in this respect proved to be effective platforms for conservative-neoliberal discourse to reproduce its ideological stance based on the prioritization of women's traditional roles in the private sphere and hence their identification with the family.

The Institutionalization Process—In the Wake of the Conservative-Neoliberal Intervention

Academic feminism, institutionalized in well-established universities during the 1990s, witnessed significant quantitative and qualitative changes during the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP) rule, which first came to power in 2002.[20] With the establishment of new universities,[21] there was a dramatic increase in the number of the women's/gender research centers.[22] At first sight, it seems possible to interpret such an increase signaling the further extension of feminism in academia. However, considering the dynamics underlying their establishment and their operational ineffectiveness, these centers are in reality a façade beyond the contours of academic feminism.[23] Contrary to the experience of centers established in the 1990s, most of the newly established ones have neither feminist concerns nor links with the feminist movement; rather, they have been founded directly based on initiatives taken by university administrations in conjunction with The Council of Higher Education (*Yükseköğretim Kurumu*, YÖK) and/or under the auspices of the political authorities.[24] By closely interacting with provincial administrative units—that is provincial and/or district governors—these centers lack a feminist perspective in their activities, such as the meetings and educational seminars that are usually provided to local women. A conservative discourse is clear in the thematic profile of the seminars organized by such centers, their mission statements and the curriculums of their programs, in which women are mostly addressed with reference to Islamic and/or traditional values and nationalist sentiments and confined within the borders of traditional gender roles. For instance, one may observe such a conservative pattern in the opening speech given by the Süleyman Demirel

University's Vice-Rector at the 'Woman in Islam' seminar organized by the university's Women's Problems Research and Implementation Center in 2012:

> Whatever we say about *our* [emphasis is ours] women and daughters, all the words and sentences are insufficient to show how valuable they are as sacred trusts. Let's never forget that we, the men, carry women as sacred trusts. If we as men improved our perceptions regarding this matter … we would then complete our task of establishing a free society. (Hüseyin Akyıldız'ın Açılış Konuşması, 2012)

Likewise, in a speech given by a woman scholar at Kars Kafkas University's Women's Problems Research and Implementation Center on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of women's enfranchisement, a nationalist-conservative stance was again apparent:

> The Turkish woman, the Turkish mother is always strong. I think that we should follow in the footsteps of our predecessors, the brave patriotic Turkish women. We should work hard, very hard for the future of our children, grandchildren and our country, being aware of every issue and all the unfortunate events that we witness. (Where do we stand on Women's Rights Day? [*Kadın Hakları Gününde Neredeyiz?*] 2008)

The following opening speech was given by the university's vice-rector, a woman academic, at the International Interdisciplinary Women's Studies Congress organized by the Rectorate of Sakarya University in 2009. It is particularly striking for its explicitly anti-feminist disposition:

> [W]omen are our mothers, wives, children, sisters. That's why there should not be gender discrimination, equality between the sexes. Respectability, virtuousness, kindness should be considered with regard to attitudes—behaviors—understanding … [W]omen, the building block of the family and society, and hence family and society should be glorified … Our aim is not to advocate feminism but the provision of equality of opportunity in the society … the glorification of family and society … the establishment of social dialogue and cooperation between woman and man, the participation of women in the political decision-making process and the labor force, respect for familial and social values, cultural values. (The 1st International Interdisciplinary Women's Studies Congress [*Uluslararası—Disiplinlerarası I. Kadın Çalışmaları Kongresi*], 5–7 March, 2009, p. 4)

As far as graduate programs are concerned, the master's program offered by Samsun Ondokuz Mayıs University's Women and Family Research Department provides clues about the conservatization of the educational process—as also implied in its naming.[25] Out of 23 elective courses, six consider women within the contours of family life (Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Kadın ve Aile Araştırmaları Merkezi Program Bilgi Paketi [*Ondokuz Mayıs University, Institute of Social Sciences, Women and Family Research Center-program information package*], 2015).

Accordingly, we may argue that most of the centers in newly established universities function as legitimizing *academic* units for governmental policies on women, further developing, reproducing and strengthening the conservative-neoliberal mind-set through their activities. Rather than indicating scientific knowledge production, most of their educational seminars—seminars organized for parents and/or career training provided in line with market demands—aims at fulfilling the goals of lifelong learning practices in accordance with the principles of the newly established Continuous Education Centers (*Sürekli Eğitim Merkezleri*). These were implemented under the EU's Bologna Process that paralleled the neoliberal restructuration during the 2000s in Turkey. Thus, it seems quite interesting that the mentality behind these vocational courses organized for adult women reveal a convergence between the interests of the conservative AKP government and modernist-Kemalist women, despite the latter's rigid dissociation of their stance from that of religious conservatives. Such convergence is particularly explicit in terms of the detachment of both sides from feminist principles, and the hierarchy that they have developed between *victimized* and *savior* women, which implies the instrumentalization of needy women as a group to be indoctrinated for the achievement of grand social projects.

The implications of these newly established centers that have popped up through conservative-neoliberal interventionist policies for the development of academic feminism can be explained at two closely interrelated levels. First, the politicization of academic personnel policies, specifically in terms of process of appointment and tenure, is worth mentioning. The elimination of specified academic criteria and the merit-based strategy from the appointment processes is a major obstacle undermining the transformative capacity and integrity of academic feminism. Such strategies, which are largely practiced to create new cadres and fill available positions in the universities, encourage the recruitment of academic staff

who lack the necessary knowledge and are disengaged from feminist politics. Accordingly, although this expansion increases the number of studies of women's issues, these studies are far from contributing to feminist knowledge production, qualitatively, as they do not share feminist perspectives and methodologies. To borrow Ecevit's conceptualization, the compartmentalization of research leads to a distinction between 'women-related studies' and 'women-focused studies.' The former signifies studies undertaken from within a positivist paradigm with no concerns regarding gender inequality while the latter refers to critical studies based on feminist epistemology and methodology (Ecevit 2015).[26] We should therefore distinguish between studies conducted by first-generation scholars and the newly emerging women-related studies. However, although studies conducted in the early period adopted a similar epistemological and methodological frame to current women-related studies, they differ radically regarding the former's formative role in providing data on women's social, political and economic status in the early Republic—then an untouched issue. In contrast, current women-related studies, produced long after the rise of the feminist movement and the academic institutionalization of feminism, can only be seen as a backward step. Second, and in addition to the politicization of academic personnel policies, the new structuration has implications at both the institutional and academic levels as it inherently risks weakening academic feminism through its adverse effects on possibilities for cooperation and solidarity while undermining feminist efforts to challenge the mainstream social sciences.

On Feminist Epistemology and Research—Toward a Juncture of Plurality

The 2000s witnessed growing diversification of feminist studies both thematically and methodologically. While the thematic focus of the 1990s, such as women's history, women's labor or violence against women, maintained its place within the field,[27] new research interests and approaches emerged that were particularly taken up by the third generation. These scholars, most of whom were students of feminist academics in Turkey or abroad during their PhD studies, have played a crucial role in the field's development in the 2000s through their contributions to feminist knowledge production with research on ethnicity, identity, body, media, militarism and masculinity, which are topics rarely problematized before the 2000s.[28] Apart from the expansion witnessed at the thematic level, the

2000s also saw methodological challenges in women's studies, particularly in a shift from a modernist to postmodernist paradigm.[29] By introducing a new conceptual and theoretical framework, such a shift represents a move from emphasizing equality to difference, from a focus on woman as subject to women's multiple identities, and from the conceptualization of gender structured on the dichotomy between men and women to a more comprehensive understanding that also includes LGBTI. While the postmodern approach has its valuable aspects in considering religious, ethnic and cultural differences between women, it also has its own limitations, which are most apparent in its ignoring of class distinctions and the relationship between capitalism and patriarchal society.[30] Similarly, while inspiring a pluralist-democratic approach to flourish in women's studies through its inclusivist perspective on different gender identities, the postmodern paradigm has also had certain negative repercussions for the development of feminist theory, as noted by Yıldız Ecevit:

> Masculinity studies can be considered as an improvement, but it still was too early for that. It could have been better if masculinity research had been developed after the consolidation of the women's studies as a respectable discipline. The worst blow, however, came from postmodernism. When you look from a modernist perspective and believe in the indispensability of feminist theory, you may say that the coming of a strong postmodern wave during the maturation period of feminism left the work of modernist feminists, who were engaged with theoretical questions, unfinished. The significance of theory declined. (Interview with Yıldız Ecevit, 2 July 2015)

This paradigmatic shift seen in studies conducted by some third-generation feminist scholars can be analyzed in terms of three interrelated dynamics.

First, the proliferation of poststructuralist, postmodern and postcolonial studies in social sciences, particularly within disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, historiography and literature, constitutes a critical turn. The second dynamic relates to the transformation witnessed within the feminist movement itself. During the 1980s, Turkey's feminist movement was dominated by middle-class, more educated women who problematized sexist relationships in the private realm. However, by the mid-1990s, the movement had diversified, particularly with the politicization of Kurdish and pious Muslim women. This diversification, and accompanying critiques, grew further with the rise of the LGBTI movement, with the traditional feminist perspective being denounced as conservative due to its

mentality based on men-women duality. However, while the relationship between the established feminist movement and these newly politicized subjects was tense and difficult during the early years, over time, it became more interactive and transformative. The third dynamic directly relates to the rise of neoliberalism, which we use here as an umbrella term denoting the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, characterized mainly by flexible labor relations. However, within the neoliberal political *milieu*, we believe that the radicalism of the postmodern perspective is confined to theory, without affecting actual practical politics. All three dynamics encourage the fragmentation and erosion of women as feminist subjects, both theoretically and practically.

Another significant development during the 2000s that eroded the women's position as political subjects was the spread of *project feminism*, which gained wide currency in both the feminist movement and academia as a result of neoliberal policy preferences. Within the context of the *neoliberal university*, which instrumentalizes scientific knowledge in accordance with the demands of the market, project management is conceived as a means for creating resources or revenue for funding an institution's expenses, whether private or state sourced. Scholars are then pressurized to get involved in a competitive project market, depicted as a prominent aspect of academic performance and enforced through certain intra-institutional mechanisms for academic promotion and recruitment. This leads both to the instrumentalization of reason, which hinders the development of critical thinking in academia, and also, through project fetishism or project-oriented production, risks transforming universities into *higher education institutions* operating through market rules without any autonomy and/or independence.[31]

Alongside such threats to knowledge production, the project-oriented perspective also damages the dissemination of the knowledge produced, in total contradiction to the foundational principle of the feminist work ethic of using knowledge about women for the empowerment of women.[32] In establishing the basis for marketizing the academy, the dominance of a project-oriented mentality within universities hinders the establishment of solidarity, shared research and knowledge accumulation, which are vital for the development of women's studies. In such a neoliberal *milieu*, feminist scholars risk becoming 'career opportunistic'[33] competent subjects, which is a significant threat to the transformative power of feminism. The lack of a holistic feminist perspective in most projects also renders women-

as-subjects invisible, creating yet another conflict between project fetishism and the feminist perspective.

Concluding Remarks

The evolution of women's/gender studies began with interventions in the dominant approaches to social sciences from a feminist perspective. The field then gradually organized itself and started to operate according to its unique research themes and methods. Almost everywhere, the initial step had involved historical studies aiming to develop women's collective memory.[34] Following a similar pattern, studies conducted in Turkey enabled women to be perceived as historically active subjects in contrast to their passive and invisible positioning within the contours of masculinist historical writing. After initially focusing on the narratives of *heroines*, feminist historiography expanded to include stories about the daily practices of *ordinary* women. However, academic feminism's intervention in social sciences was not restricted to studies on women as it also emphasized that studying gender relations was essential for deciphering relations and structures of power and domination, which simultaneously proved to be methodologically instrumental for comprehending the linkages between micro- and macro-power mechanisms.

The ongoing development of academic feminism is strongly associated with the feminist movement as a whole. While forming an interactive relationship, each realm also empowers women in society on their own accord. However, such a relationship did not evolve without limitations. In particular, the relationship lost its initial power with academic feminism becoming confined within its own theoretical, academic discourse. The issue of how to (re)build an effective relationship between theory and practice still largely applies for both academic feminism and the general feminist movement in different parts of the world, including Turkey. As is commonly recognized, feminist knowledge produced in academia can only be reflected in practical actions through a continuous, mutual transfusion between the wider feminist movement and academia itself.

In this chapter, we explored the historical evolution of academic feminism in Turkey in relation to two interconnected dimensions. In providing a schematic overview of women-oriented scientific studies produced during the Republican era, we also focused on women's/gender research centers as platforms where feminist knowledge is produced and disseminated in Turkey. As elaborated throughout the chapter, we argue that

women's/gender studies in Turkey has been largely the product of socio-political contingencies, with nation building and modernization the major dynamics underlying the evolution of the field. The post-1980s' rise of Turkey's feminist movement as a social opposition platform subjectivizing women stimulated the field to start considering women's particular conditions and needs or demands. Yet, women's/gender studies currently faces a constant threat, both in Turkey and elsewhere, due to the hegemony of neoliberalism in academia. As with the dominating effects of nationalist and modernist political projects on the field, neoliberal politics weakens and transforms feminist knowledge production in line with its own political and strategic priorities.

Hence, at present, alongside the prevailing obstructive institutional practices in universities, there are also structural obstacles preventing feminist knowledge becoming a transformative power. In this regard, the pragmatist perception of knowledge and its instrumentalization in line with market rules, as the two key constituents of the neoliberal hegemony in academia, impinge on women's studies, as well as the university as a whole. The conceptual confusion fueled by the neoliberal setting also further aggravates the current crisis in academia. The use of the same concepts in both neoliberal discourse and feminism, yet to denote different meanings, is critical in this regard. For instance, while interdisciplinarity within feminist discourse signifies *a practice of transgressing* disciplinary boundaries to produce new forms of critical knowledge, in neoliberal terminology it denotes a strategic option for knowledge production involving the modularization and compartmentalization of knowledge, which (it is claimed) increases the competitiveness and effectiveness of the university in the market (Alvanoudi 2009, pp. 45–46).

Universities in the neoliberal context can thus be considered as operating like enterprises in which students are 'customers/consumers,' knowledge and education are 'commodities' and tuition fees are 'prices' (Alvanoudi 2009, p. 39). Through such transformations of academia to shape it in accordance with the needs of the market, neoliberal policies produce structural obstacles against critical thinking, particularly for feminist studies, which is founded on criticizing the relationship between knowledge and power. In this context, the only way for academic feminism to continue toward its ultimate aim of transforming women's lives is to politicize itself in a way that eliminates the distinction between feminist activism and academic feminism.

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

1. For an elaboration, see Stacey (2000).
2. Most of the research that focuses on the relationship between theory and practice is normative and theoretical. Studies elaborating on the dynamics behind such a relationship, on the other hand, are largely based on the authors' experiences and observations, and generally lack a holistic perspective. For the US, Spanish and Australian experiences regarding the theory-practice interaction, see Messer-Davidow (2002), Threlfall (2006) and Simic (2010), respectively.
3. In the years that followed, programs expanded to other universities in the USA while new courses and programs were initiated in Western Europe during the 1980s, Latin America in the mid-1980s and Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia in the 1990s (Stromquist 2001, pp. 373–374).
4. For particular country cases, see Stromquist (2001).
5. See Butler (1990), Irigaray (1977), Cixous (1976) and Kristeva (1982).
6. During the period, debates on women's social status were largely brought onto the agenda as a substantial part of national identity building. In this context, women's civil and political rights were legitimized by reference to pre-Islamic Turkish society in the nationalist discourse, including arguments for the localization of Westernization. Ziya Gökalp was the pillar of such an approach (see Gökalp, [1923] 2015). Similar themes can also be seen in the speeches of academics in public conferences organized by the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP*) (Ansay 1939). The writings of Afet İnan, one of the key women figures of the time, completely reflect the dominant perspective of the early Republican period (İnan 1964, 1975).
7. Kemalism, named after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding leader of modern Turkey, is the official ideology of the Turkish Republic. Its major principles are republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism and revolutionism.
8. Research on the repercussions of Republican reforms on the betterment of the status of women, conducted on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic, was either published or sponsored by the state. See, for instance, Taşkıran (1973). The

declaration of 1975 as Women's International Year encouraged Kemalists to conduct more studies and organize a congress on women's issues. See Topçuoğlu (1978) and Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği [Turkish Association of University Women] (1978).

9. Tekeli's work was first published in 1978. For the full text, see Tekeli (1982). Years after completing her thesis, Tekeli pointed out that, although she herself had no feminist inclinations then, her findings had a crucial impact on the development of her feminist identity. In protest against the hierarchical structuring of universities under the Council of Higher Education (*Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu*, YÖK) established after the 1980 *coup d'état*, Tekeli resigned from her university position to continue her struggle as a feminist activist, albeit with strong ties to academia. Alongside her active involvement in civil society initiatives, being among the founding members of the Women's Library and Information Center Foundation (*Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi Vakfı*), the Association for Supporting Women Candidates (*Kadın Adayları Destekleme Derneği*, KADER), Tekeli continued her academic studies outside the university. Tekeli's experience well illustrates the interdependency of theory and practice and academia and the movement.

10. For the full text, see Tekeli (1990a).

11. Yıldız Ecevit's study on the implications of gender inequality in production and the labor market within manufacturing, and Nükhet Sirman's research on the repercussions of the relationship or cooperation of village women in production are among the pivotal studies in this respect. See Ecevit (1986) and Sirman (1988).

12. Research on violence against women is mostly produced with reference to feminist field experiences. The Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation (*Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınma Vakfı*-MOR ÇATI) played a crucial role in challenging the dominant perspective that considered violence against women as an individual, psychological problem and/or normalized it on the basis of religious beliefs and traditional values (see *Evdeki Terör: Kadına Yönelik Şiddet* [Terror in the Home: Violence against Women], 1996; *Geleceğim Elimde* [My Future is in my Hands], 1998). These studies collect the research of various scholars, lawyers, psychologist-psychiatrists and sociologists working in the field, as well as

incorporating the experiences of women subjected to violence. In considering the physical, economic and psychological dimensions of violence against women, these studies challenged arguments that explained violence in terms of personal or cultural factors, particularly focusing on the relationship between male dominance-patriarchal power and violence. Apart from MOR ÇATI's publications, another pioneering study in this respect is İlkkaracan et al. (1996).

13. For a discussion of feminist historiography in the Ottoman-Turkish context, see Çakır (2007).

14. The Women's Library and Information Center Foundation, established by a group of feminist women in 1990, documented 1500 issues of 38 women's journals published between 1895 and 1927. It should be noted, however, that this does not cover all women's journals, as it only includes those journals catalogued in various libraries in İstanbul. See Kadın Dergileri Bibliyografyası (1993). On the women's movement in the Ottoman era, see Çakır (1994) and Demirdirek (1993). Regarding Kemalist women's identity, see Durakbaşa (1998a, 1998b). For a critical reading problematizing women's subjectification within the contours of Kemalist modernism, see Kandiyoti (1987, 1989, 1995).

15. For a discussion of the implications of the Kemalist modernization project for the emergence of Turkey's feminist movement in the 1980s, and hence the links between the two generations, see Arat (1991, 1995).

16. Türkan Saylan and Aysel Ekşi are both professors of medicine, Aysel Çelikel is a professor of law, while Necla Arat is a professor of philosophy. Türkan Saylan was the president of ÇYDD while Necla Arat was the president of KSAUM. For further information on ÇYDD, see www.cydd.org.tr.

17. Some of the initial activities of the association included the organization of seminars on secular education, a petition campaign aiming to attract the public aware that secularism was under threat and a march for 'respect for secularism.'

18. Necla Arat remained as the program coordinator and president of the center until her retirement from the university.

19. Sancar mentions Mine Tan, Ülker Gürkan, Aysel Aziz and Berna Alpagun as the first generation.

20. The changes were certainly not restricted to the universities, but also included government policies regarding women. For more, see Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2011).
21. The number of universities was 79 before 2002 and reached 193 in 2015. For a list of universities in Turkey, see http://www.yok.gov.tr/web/guest/universitelerimiz
22. As of March 2015, there are 62 women's/gender studies research centers in various universities in Turkey. According to YÖK's official figures, 28 offer master's and Ph.D. programs. However, in practice, the total number of graduate programs appears to be 12: 7 master's and 5 Ph.D. programs.
23. There are no particular studies of the newly established centers. These evaluations are based on information provided on the web pages of the various centers as well as observations during our visits to some of them.
24. The establishment of women's/gender studies programs must be approved by YÖK as the central authority governing higher education.
25. In the naming of several women's studies centers operating in different universities, the word 'women' is associated with the 'family': specifically, the Women and Family Problems Research and Implementation Center. Examples of such centers include Yalova University, Bingöl University, İstanbul Ticaret University, Hitit University, Hasan Kalyoncu University and Gediz University.
26. Such differentiation has been most apparent within the context of presentations at interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary conferences on women's studies in Turkey, which became widespread during the 2000s. Starting with the seminar organized by Ankara University in 1996, many conferences have been held in various universities: Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi-İstanbul (1997); Çukurova University-Adana (1997); Ege University-İzmir (1998); TODAİE-Ankara (1998); Ankara University (2002); Yeditepe University-İstanbul (2004); Sakarya University (2009); Dokuz Eylül University-İzmir (2009); Dokuz Eylül University-İzmir (2012); Dokuz Eylül University-İzmir (2014); Çukurova University-Adana (2015); Middle East Technical University-Ankara (2015).

27. On the history of women, see Durakbaşa (2000), Çakır (2006),
    Kerestecioğlu (2001), Akşit (2005), Akay (2003), Berktay (2003),
    Zihnioğlu (2003) and Sancar (2012). For studies on women's
    labor, see for instance Dedeoğlu and Öztürk (2010). For ethno-
    graphic research on the relationship between working middle-class
    women and women working as housekeepers, see Bora (2005). On
    violence against women, see Altınay and Arat (2007) and Özkazanç
    (2013).

28. For studies on the relationship between nationalism, militarism
    and gender, see Altınay (2000), Akgül (2011) and Sünbüloğlu
    (2013). The shift from 'women's studies' to 'gender studies' also
    involved the emergence of masculinity studies. For example, see
    Sancar (2009), although Sancar analyzes masculinity from within
    the modernist paradigm. Other studies approach masculinity
    through postmodern lenses, considering gender status from a plu-
    ralist perspective. For example, see Mutluer (2008). With the plu-
    ralization of the feminist movement, 'Kurdish feminism' proved to
    be one of the newly emerging research areas. See Çağlayan (2013,
    2014).

29. See, for example, Özkazanç (2015) and Yardımcı (2013). See also
    Cogito (2011).

30. In fact, some feminist studies do employ class analysis to focus on
    the links between patriarchal structures and capitalism. For exam-
    ple, the theoretical work of Gülnur Acar Savran (2004), a promi-
    nent figure within the socialist feminist movement, provides a
    critical reading of postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches
    from a Marxist perspective. While Savran's discussion is rather
    philosophical and theoretical, other feminist studies from within
    the Marxist paradigm concentrate mostly on women's labor. See,
    for instance, Özbudun (2015).

31. What we criticize at this point is the production of scientific knowl-
    edge under the dominance of the project-oriented rationale.
    Certainly, running projects is a common process in knowledge
    production. Given that it has been accepted since Aristotle that
    theory production relies on empirical data, the critique here does
    not imply a concern with field studies, but rather is related to the
    commodification and marketization of scientific knowledge.

32. This not only concerns academia but the feminist movement as
    well. The survival of feminist organizations depends more and

more on their performance in projects, so much so that, in time, some of them have become so alienated from the *raison d'être* of the wider feminist movement that they have abandoned feminist principles. For a discussion about the threat of the neoliberal rationale, with particular reference to the dissolution of public space and the capacity of feminist politics to develop alternatives, see Coşar and Özkan Kerestecioğlu (2016) and Coşar and Özkan Kerestecioğlu (2013), respectively.

33. We borrow this concept from bell hooks (2000). Here, it should also be noted that the critique of project feminism does not imply a rejection of conducting projects, as 'the project of feminism' is not identical with 'project feminism.'

34. For an elaboration, see Scott (1991).

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'Homo Academicus' in University Inc.: The *Ersatz Yuppie* Academic

Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu

'Neither do they understand, nor do they feel'[1]

> *Herakleitos,* Fragman 104
> *(Diels-Kranz numbering)*

We should not forget since Aristotle, in many texts written on 'spirit,' and 'soul' (*psuchˉe*) in ancient Hellas, these and similar words were not conceived in psychological terms but rather as words that can be deemed physiological; they referred

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   217

Today, a certain parlance has spread through meetings and writings deemed to be 'scientific,' in which the participants of such meetings and the readers of such writings usually appear to acquiesce. Although it was initially justified to require 'distance' for the sake of demonstrating 'objectivity,' this parlance has now too often become banal, hence boring. Moreover, one can frequently observe that the same parlance easily turns into a *language of academic diplomacy and idle talk [das Gerede].* In this chapter, I want to pursue a rather roundabout path to show how I take issue with the academic *ethos*, of which I am a part, and explain that this issue concerns not only me but also all of us as human beings. I aim to do this by replacing idle talk with a parlance that matches my own search for a form of language that I carefully ensure is not *ersatz.* I should note that the following observations and evaluations, which I try to ensure follow theoretical guidance and even prejudices, are limited to a specific generation of agents of academic practice.

Meanwhile, there is 'ethics,' raised in almost all spheres and incessantly debated. As for the issue of 'ethics,' seen even on billboards, disregarding recipes that often comprise empty rhetoric does not resolve a deeper problem. This is because this problem concerns not only academic spheres such as sociology—my 'official' occupation—but also many other life spaces in a period when 'corrosion of character' has accelerated, and the fact that it has been taken for granted is even more scary. Considering that one dimension of our debate concerns 'ethics'—which is also a headache for philosophy—and that nowadays 'ethical recipes' are on the agenda and the subject of so much nonsense in many modern professions or occupations, it is appropriate to underline one issue immediately: that the problem with 'ethics' cannot be reduced to some cliché and that this word concerns

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to characteristics that are specific to the body (*sôma*). Therefore, considering that human acts are referred to through these words, which we can name in terms of the body, as physiological words, I preferred to transliterate the word '*phrén*'—diaphragm—as '*thumós*' as a matter of feelings, although it is translated as 'heart.' In the phrase in Turkish—*kan beynine sıçramak*—which means 'fit to be tied' in English—but is a phrase that symbolizes the interwoven relationship of the body (*kan*–blood) and the intellect (*beyin/beynine*–mind) a similar expression can be observed. Such an expression belongs to a period when the body–soul separation had not even been imagined. For the specific meanings of these words, see Erhat 1975, pp. 33–41.

ethos rather than 'ethics.'[2] Ultimately, this closely bears on our existence as people living in Turkey.

Thus, this manuscript will elaborate on what happens to *ethos*, and to the 'individual/personal morality' that is closely related to it under contemporary objective historical–social constraints, with special reference to the academic occupation as a specific social practice and, within that, a material social type. When necessary, I will adopt a 'symptomatic' reading.

I believe that the dominant order targeted over the last three decades by an ebb and flow of various counter-discourses (feminism, multiculturalism, etc.) to 'scientism' and 'positivism' has itself begun secretly circumventing and encircling these counter-positions from behind a new mask, even defending itself by using their own rhetoric. Evidence of this circumvention and serious oppression can be seen in the fact that these counter-positions, which originally opposed the dominant order on just grounds due to changing social conditions, have been transformed in essence if not in name, declined and ultimately adjusted by articulating into that order.[3] It is inevitable therefore that such oppression also works on academic personalities, though to varying degrees.

Is it possible to consider the question of what is happening to academics separately from the basically philosophical question of what is happening to academic *ethos* and academic morality under current conditions as universities in Turkey move beyond specialization and increasingly internalize the model of the commercial enterprise? Can we still talk about the 'ethics of conviction' (*Gesinnungsethik*) and 'ethics of responsibility' (*Verantwortungsethik*) that underlay Max Weber's warnings to his students in 1919 regarding what was happening in the political sphere as well as to science,[4] in Turkey's new conditions, where an imported 'yuppie' academic existence is flourishing? In a period when a plethora of recipes like 'business ethics,' 'marketing ethics,' 'health ethics' and the like are put on the agenda through formulaic discourses with total disregard for the philosophical background of the specific topic, can one read this obsession with 'ethics' from a 'symptomatic' perspective to conclude that it signifies unease about a loss and, even worse, a transformation of this current theme into 'symbolic capital?'

From Kant's and Hegel's age to contemporary era, no competent thinker has acquiesced in shelving this question, whose philosophical dimension is ignored in Turkey and hidden by the cunning follies that are endemic to every type of Eurocentrism. These thinkers never credited

those artificial considerations that tend to discuss the question of 'ought' (*Sollen*) independently from the question of 'is' (*Sein*). For the time being, I cannot offer an answer as to whether this problem was and is situated similarly in non-'Western' belief/knowledge circles in the past and today; yet we have to acknowledge that these 'others,' which the *pro-Realpolitics* 'West' confined to oblivion, while holding them in high esteem, continue to be our sources of inspiration, too. Under the conditions of modernity, now the gods have packed their bags and left for good and the desert has expanded (Nietzsche: 'die Wüste wächst') thereby desacralizing and demystifying the world (Weber: 'Entzauberung der Welt'), at a time when human beings are provided with a life furnished with a strong but *monotonic* happiness on this earth and in this world, which are rapidly turning into a desert from where 'lady memory' (*Mnemosyne*) has been quickly locked out,[5] one of the issues that explicitly or implicitly characterizes all outstanding ways of thinking has always been *ethos* and morality.

This has another meaning: The reason that such a slippery subject turns into an 'issue' or a 'concern' (*Sache*) is due to the moral plaster that circumscribes one's self, starting from early periods of socialization and parental discipline and extending to advanced ages, which is internalized with all its inner contradictions through the changing conditions of existence. Ultimately, we are talking about the 'values' that are central to the society, and this is so whether they are somehow questioned or manipulated with the instinct to acquire power (e.g. in academic work life). When one chooses the academic field as vocation for this or that personal (or 'individual') reason, and no matter to what extent it is devalued within the frame of those realities that seemingly operate, one faces the hierarchy of values with its accompanying imagination and inner contradictions, and the question of morality. The moral contradictions we experience due to our life strategies come to mind on an individual basis in different ways, regardless of how we try to force them out of our memory.

While considering the same problem with a view to the types of *homo academicus*, which shed skin to adjust to the changes that affect the unity of the vocations, called 'academic life' but now divided into spheres of expertise, there is one other point that I find necessary to keep in the background of the discussions: the fact that one cannot consider relations between power and ownership irrespective of transformations in the cultural market. Another dimension of the problem that we will discuss is that we are going through a transitory phase of vocational and professional practices without subjects, and that a new machine-like human nature is

emerging due to a new 'artificial' nature, while the moral values born out of human experience and deposited in the flow of history are now barely operated *via* some binding principles such as 'professional codes' of conduct.[6] We must therefore seriously elaborate, in a sense develop, in Fredric Jameson's terms, the 'visual ontology'[7] of how these 'human artifices,' whose origins can be traced far back to *tekhne*, form this brand new 'artificial' nature (*physis*), and how rapidly they have replaced the nature that used to flow mostly without intervention. If we acknowledge the importance of this re-discovery while chasing after the new, 'off-the-shelf' theoretical fashions as the ones who forgot Lukács' emphasis of the 'ontological' dimension of existence in his last great work, we will have to admit that we are at the very initial stages of the path in this respect, too.

There is, however, another dominant process that undermines the 'professional ethics' required in the vocations within the scope of the contemporary social division of labor and the readily assumed 'professionalist' ideologies. This process is related to the rather irrational and banal *principle of profit* (that cannot even be considered a principle), and the perception of everything as *values of exchange*. What renders many ethical recipes hollow is ultimately this internalized process, which in fact does not work at all. So long as this irrationality is ignored, which extends beyond work life to pervade other life spaces, whether in a visible or hidden way, we cannot argue that the questioning of professional and other values and moral measures has been completed. This is an important issue, which those academics who prefer launching ideas onto the market as *cultural capital* rather than *living with the ideas* need to be especially reminded of.

If 'ethics' (*Ethik*), in Adorno's terms, is the 'uncomfortable conscience' of morality (*Moral; morality; moeurs; mores*), then we can also come to a similar conclusion about this problem that lies beneath the neon lights (exchange values; profitability),[8] which bring in numerous benefits when fade out. That is, we can argue that 'ethics' emerges artificially as a result of the embarrassment and fear of morality itself because of its moralism, but that it falls victim to a harmony, which ignores the contradictory nature of morality and which covers these contradictions so that eventually it stops functioning.[9]

Our companion in thinking Hans-Georg Gadamer, who passed away recently, years ago noted three dominant tendencies that not only characterize the *mass* university but which also undermine 'living with ideas' (Gadamer 1988, pp. 1–22, 1992, pp. 47–59). He stressed that, under the circumstances of the contemporary 'mass university,' the distance to

the ideal of 'living with ideas' (*das Leben in Ideen*) is persistently increasing, and that the question 'of whose/what use' (*cui bono; wem gefällt es?*) emerges, pointing out that this has resulted in three types of alienation (*eine dreifache Entfremdung*). The first type of alienation is the collapse of the *Universitas Scholarum* and the tendency to consider students as 'human-resource,' and later as 'clients.' The second is the start of the collapse of *Universitas Literarum* as a result of the departmentalization of sciences due to their rupture as disciplines and the lack of communication within each discipline. The third type, closely associated with the first two, is 'narrow specialization,' caused by the question 'cui bono?' (Gadamer 1988, pp. 10–14). I would add that the growing resemblance between university libraries and data banks is a natural extension of this development.

I would rather not emphasize further the importance of the three features that can be expected of the scholar for Gadamer.[10] These are the importance of falling into the pit like the contemplative Thales, but in a very special way—that sovereignty relies unconditionally on knowledge—the importance of the loneliness of the scientist as a tragic actor and her/his courageous stance to shoulder this loneliness with all its weight; and the importance of displaying real modesty without falling into false humility. I have also considered these three features in my other work (e.g. Nalbantoğlu 2000, pp. 34–35). For now, therefore, we should return to the present and to those of us who claim to have chosen modern academic life as a 'vocation' (*als Beruf*).

It seems that we live in university structurations that have adjusted themselves well to contemporary conditions in which both *technoscience* (Horkheimer),[11] which forces us to put aside 'memory,' and *modernity*, which changed its catchword from the 'monumental' to 'incompletion' and 'fragment' (Steiner 2001, p. 320), are identical with the market mechanism. Focusing on the *dominant* working of the market order in the university sphere in its particularity, it becomes clear that the distinction between the private and state university is not as important as it is supposed to be. Although expressed with goodwill and innocently by the authorities of state universities, the phrase 'entrepreneur university' and the identification of the students in some private universities as 'clients' indicate a course of events that is objectively not innocent at all.[12] Moreover, we constantly face the reality that now the '[p]rofitable, instrumental, exhibitionist artifacts—the vast majority in every genre—are ephemeral' (Steiner 2001, p. 309) due to the 'unfinished' and 'fragmented' state that

continuously characterizes this process. Just because of this rather discomforting reality, if we do not limit this ephemerality to a general discussion and elaborate on the 'fishbowl exhibitionism' that is specific to modernity with concrete examples from different spheres, for example, from the social sciences, then both our analysis and the discussion on the 'ethical' dimension of this problem that concerns everyone will be incomplete.

On the other hand, against the ethical recipes that malfunction due to their over-adjustment, there are still moral criteria—albeit eroded due to the conflict of interests—shared in every society, latently internalized, more or less obeyed, shelved when they do not serve one's purpose and recalled in times of conflict of interest. These criteria cannot be considered apart from the living rules and norms of the social–historical context and the 'value' measures that emerge from the increase in the emotional weight of these norms, as expressed rather bleakly by contemporary social psychologists.[13] I will return to the importance of this point in the concluding remarks of this article.

When this question is subjected to a *symptomatic* reading, it is transformed into an interrogation of how far 'that is the apposite/right to do' (Kant's 'das Daß' and 'das Tunliche,' Aristoteles' 'to hóti' and 'tò déon')[14] or 'that thing,' which is internalized, though in a latent way, or to which we are forced to conform alongside or even contrary to the ethical recipes that are also symptoms of a professional disease, would proceed in and beyond academic practices. A good way to do this might be to proceed not through extremely general idle talk on *ethics* but through considering a social type whose characteristics are displayed by certain individuals.

A note on the current state of affairs: Contemporary universities compete with each other in the restructuration race to adjust to volatile, general and academic–cultural market conditions; on the other hand, there is persistent use of the term *academics' morality*, which has been to a great extent degraded in the age of the 'mass university,' as if to cover up this state of affairs; hence an unease and conscientious qualm has arisen due to this contradiction. Perhaps this unease and qualm may play a significant role, though not the main one, in the high frequency of reference to *ethical* templates. Thus this contradictory situation and the requirement of our chosen 'vocation' makes it essential to observe closely and discuss how *entrepreneur* university education—also carried out in Turkey *via* a managerial understanding under the conditions of the world market and the 'new economy' and subject to much verbosity—is restructured, and

the deep effects of this restructuration on the modern university *ethos* and academics' morality.

Given this background, we can now elaborate through a small, negative example that I consider as a 'social type.'

As I will explain below, I consider it apt to use this concept of 'social type,' which has also been somewhat left to die in sociology in close connection with ethics and morality. One can cite many sources in this respect, but I am content that the observations and assessments in this work, which attempts to offer a discussion on the texture of the character and morality of a *homo academicus*, of such a specific 'social type,' inter-meshed with *whatever is left from* the academic *ethos* in the age of *entrepreneur university*, rely theoretically on the observations of and reflections on the life by Gadamer, Adorno and Steiner.

However, the phrase 'whatever is left' ultimately leads to the following question: In today's clinical world, which displays an unfinished, fragmented state of affairs, what is left from 'that thing' (*to hóti*) that used to be processed mostly by community spirit and pressure and thus from 'the right thing to do' (*tò déon*; *das Tunliche*), and from the search for the right solution (*àgathòn kai déon*; *gut und bindend*) to which the person was expected to conform since it works for the good of all? This is all the more relevant when one recalls that the ethical recipes that are offered from a currently rather worn-out bourgeois conception of property, even those general, latent and minimum moral (*minima moralia*) standards that society attempts to preserve through making them common, continuously stumble in the face of ruthless facts, masked by the pseudo civilization polish that fits this *new economy* and *new age* fabrication. Given this state of affairs, we can understand to a certain extent why those individuals who seem at least to embrace ethical and moral formulas unavoidably fall into impasses, inconsistencies and subjective hypocrisies.[15]

Pointing out this objective situation by no means clears such individuals in our judgment because someone who gives the impression that s/he has chosen 'science' as 'vocation—however conceived (*Wissenschaft als Beruf*)—[16] has to pay the bill in her/his life. If someone appears to have chosen the ideal of 'living with ideas,' s/he has to be attentive to refraining from the objective conditions that are voluntarily adopted by the ordinary majority, which we mostly justify. In other words, s/he has to be attentive to refraining from those states of being that can easily be avoided from the very start, and thus, criticize 'that thing' (*to hóti*) that is required by the scientific vocation and which is accepted overtly or covertly. At the

same time, s/he is required not to forget 'that thing' (*to hóti*), which also means that the individual might not be choosing her/his vocation and its requirements at the very outset. And no one would oppose this.

Elaborating this rather fine point in the limited space of this work, one should not suffice with experience and observations; rather s/he has to elevate them to the theoretical reflection plane as much as possible. Aside from the fact that forced ethical recipes in many contemporary work and life spaces do not work, one should not forget that it is not possible to talk about a more or less internally consistent, integral *ethos*. Nevertheless, one should also not forget that due to 'that thing,' which works latently, there are tendencies that resist the current. But what if even this 'counter-current' state of being is used by a certain part of the academic–cultural type as some sort of cosmetic, with the aim of 'cultural capital accumulation' as a result of the historically determined social conditions in which one happens to reside?

While seeking answers to this and similar questions, the hopelessness in the face of the future and *lack of utopias* that characterizes the academic *ethos* of the present draws our attention.[17] Thus, it is also necessary to put on the agenda how this state of affairs, known by everyone, affects the 'objective subjectivity' that is specific to *homo academicus*—that type of the contemporary herd *individual* animal (Nietzsche)—in other words (how it affects) her/his social character and psychic structure. For this effect is not limited to individual morality; it has serious consequences that extend beyond and affect professional/vocational ethics. Put conversely, one has to admit that 'professional ethics' cannot be considered independently of the 'individual morality,' displayed in the motion of everyday life. As might be foreseen, the academic milieu where the examples on which I will focus as a totality in terms of 'social type' is a social institution. Some of us reside in this institution and it hosts traps of impasse for individuals despite all effort and care to the contrary. Briefly, discussing the 'least common' character of the individuals that fall under this social typology and considering how this character rapidly deteriorates cannot go beyond psychologizing this state of affairs without considering 'University Inc.' This has rapidly been furnished with a private enterprise mentality, especially in the 1980s, so that today it sees its students as 'clients' and thus despises them. Strangest of all, rather than producing the template for this order on its own, it imports it rather hastily—and mostly incompetently—from the academic–cultural industries of the 'developed' capital orders that are imitated by the commanded brains.[18]

If my arguments are considered to be criticisms, then I should also add the following: Aside from all disciplinary, theoretical and practical differences, if as bosses, managers and science workers we all share a voyage on this ship navigating the cultural capital market without a compass, such delicate matters as 'morality,' 'ethics' and 'ethos' concern us all. Those who want to stand still and pursue a successful academic career in the academic market have difficulty maintaining that fuzzy line between uncontrolled ambition in the race to advance, which leads to suspicions about their honesty on the one hand and limiting their ambition, restraining themselves on the other. I therefore hope that the following examples elaborated in a sufficiently abstract manner can remind the workers in the academic milieu about certain things; that they might echo in their thoughts. I also hope that this echo can occur not only in our minds but also in our hearts. Why do I need to add this hope? This is because, despite the artificial separation imposed by the modern age on our intellect, on our *noûs* (in Aristotle's sense), of Adorno's brilliant insight that '[i]ntelligence is a moral category. [*Intelligenz ist eine moralische Kategorie.*] The separation of feeling and understanding from each other [*Die Trennung von Gefühl und Verstand*] … hypostatizes the historically achieved splintering of human beings into functions' (MM, 127th Reflection).[1]

We come across this situation in all academic thinking and 'designing' spheres, especially in social science. Keeping in mind that one cannot draw a clear-cut line between *invention* and *creation*, we can consider the word 'invention' in its negative sense in Turkish (as echoed in the idiom 'this must be a new invention!')[2] in order to argue that the *invention-ism* that characterizes the contemporary age deprives many products of thinking of being a real 'creation,' both in my own discipline and in many other spheres. Under the command of commodity fetishism, this state of

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[1] Translator's note: Throughout the text, I rely on Dennis Redmond's 2005 copyleft translation of Minima Moralia. In certain instances, I move between three languages—English, German and Turkish—trying to voice three versions of the same text through quotations in the Turkish version. In doing so, I try to attract attention to the way *interpretation* is continuously re-made through translation in different periods and geographies. I should also note that my interventions are guided by feminist modalities. The English version of the text can be reached at: http://members.efn.org/~dredmond/MinimaMoralia.html (Accessed: March 15, 2016).

[2] Translator's note: In Turkish, those unapproved instances that are considered to be absurd are sometimes met with this phrase, connoting the inherent conservatism that lies dormant in the popular culture.

affairs is closely connected with mass production and consumption conditions, and the increase in technological acceleration, which enables the flexibility that is specific to *new capitalism*. If Adorno were alive, he would surely have been appalled by such clear verification of what he depicted.[19]

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Here it would be appropriate to rely on the category 'social type' that I propose above, which is also among the theoretical tools used by sociologists (without exaggeration, we can think of Baudelaire's *flâneur*,[20] Simmel's 'the stranger' [*Der Fremde*], (Simmel 1908, pp. 509–512; English ed. 1971, pp. 143–149), Mills 'white-collar' (Mills 1951), and even Said's 'intellectuals in exile').[21] Thus, instead of talking in too general and futile a style, and playing with idle talk, we will be able to partially consider a fact, of which various appearances come to counter us in our daily experiences, through this micro-sociological category.

Depending on the quantity of examples that I think comprise a 'social type' in our academic world, the differences among individuals can become either more visible or ambiguous. Moreover, because of the shaping and orientation of the individual's character structure by societal origins, there could be numerous differences among individuals located within a specific 'social type.' However, one must pay attention here to the common denominator that can be observed in more or less every example and those features that can be abstracted due to their commonality between examples.

Besides, there are so many significantly negative realities whose roots should be searched for in the history of Turkish society that this state of affairs marks the specific 'social type' that I will identify in the coming pages. For example, how come the cruelties inherent to the pseudo-elites of a couple of generations back, whose ancestry can even exemplify tyranny, can come to the surface through such finely varnished urbaneness and (idle) polished sophistication, when this type is forced into real close contact, a face-to-face connection with those social segments that it adds to its own cultural capital by transforming them into 'objects' of analysis in her/his own discourse?[22] Such depictions also offer the opportunity to elaborate on the issue of ethics and morality, as emphasized above. Thus, why would we not also analyze this specific academic 'social type,' which persistently displays a deep-seated self-indulgence by turning it into an 'object?' Why not derive moral lessons from such an endeavor?

What then is the common denominator that should be sought in this specific social type? Is it the academic context? In this case, yes. Is it an *ethos* that is specific to a certain period? Certainly, if one can talk about the existence of ethos.

I noted above that it would be futile to discuss the question of 'ethics' in this context and with a view to the related 'social type,' regardless of the dissolving effect that the conditions specific to 'new capitalism' have on the social character of academic 'intellectual workers' who have been directed to mass production. Today, as the world empties itself out, we meet such modern individuals in our academic world that has been transformed into an enterprise who desperately hold onto the individualist ideologies for standing still that were pumped into them by the very same world.[23]

Looking back to the past, it is possible to note that the seeds of this development were first sown way back in the 1950s on the land of academia, in the 'American decade.' Thus, even a rough classification would tell us that we might identify successive typologies of academics, with the seeds of the latter emerging from the former. And by closely observing one type of academics, we might argue that a mass of specialized[24] 'academic workers' with extremely limited intellectual horizons is emerging in the universities, currently undergoing a transformation. Certainly, the academic context hosting all these typologies cannot be considered independently of the way that university structuration in Turkey has followed transformations abroad and adjusted to the new situation without reservations. On the other hand, as early as the late 1940s, there were many diagnoses and assessments that made the same typologies a sitting target, for instance in American sociology. Sociologist Nathaniel Cantor, in one of his articles published in a professional journal in those years, warned us that '[i]ntellectual ping-pong in text or classroom is not to be confused with understanding' (Cantor 1949, p. 24). Quoting C.E.M. Joad, he noted that the meaning of knowledge for life was not being questioned at all: 'For, outside their special subjects, these men of science are as helpless as wasps on window panes …. in a word, they are informed without being intelligent.'[25]

Observing that the incidents of which the 'social type' that I will discuss in this work get involved, and that the social and individual qualities indicated by these incidents first came into being within a left-liberal atmosphere and mostly within the scope of an 'opposition' discourse to an 'authority,' also opens the way to an interesting theoretical and ethical evaluation. Certainly, as a result of the relative weakening of authoritarianism with a central European origin that put its stamp on the university life of

the previous period in the 1960s, it was all the more natural that criticism in the academic sphere was fiercely unleashed. Although this criticism (e.g. the tradition of the '68ers) was sometimes directed at the wrong targets and in an exaggerated fashion, when considered together with social developments and fluctuations in the same decade it is possible to note a certain level of direction. The trick of the issue is as follows: When and under which conditions, circumventing academic life, against which authority and with which real purpose was this criticism raised? Keeping this question in mind, it is now time to turn to the task of locating the question of what ethics has to do with this on more concrete ground by exploring especially this last point in relation to certain specific and suggestive observations on Turkey.

With this aim, thinking about the course of academic circles in Turkey, especially since the 1970s, in conjunction with general economic and political developments, let us turn a currently middle-aged academic segment into a 'human landscape.' As the overt oppression of totalitarian foreign powers that encircled the academic atmosphere approached, one could witness that the democratic procedures that could be relatively developed, especially in more developed campuses, could not be comprehended by those who had no idea of Weber's 'ethics of responsibility' (*Verantwortungsethik*). When concrete past experiences are recalled today, I assume that many can give examples of uncontrolled and irresponsible criticism, behind which personal or group interests are shrewdly hidden. It is a subject of sociological analysis that these terminal examples have turned into democracy hijacking, where democratic tolerance is most clearly displayed in the name of so-called 'democratization.' However, such an elaboration should not be initiated merely in reference to the premise of failing to internalize democracy. The ever-weakening of the hopes for social transformation in the 1970s might have played a role in the increased prominence of a rather self-seeking 'survival' instinct, which goes along with certain types of feelings of weakness, especially among certain segments.

However, one should especially concentrate, not on what the demanders say nor on their discourses, but on what they actually do due to their objective social dispositions and the possible moral outcomes of their acts that concern us all. As far as the widespread fracture of the *ethos* is concerned, rather than offering comments, it is more meaningful to focus on such specific examples to determine whether implicit moral measures, characterized as 'that thing' alongside the manifold ethical recipes, can work or not. Thus, we will conduct a small test of the claims of weighty thinkers concerning the individuals of modern society. This small effort

will also remind us once more that seeking shelter in the existing *humanist* recipes on *ethics* is useless, and even ill-advised.

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Now, let us turn a phenomenon, which I think warns each of us of the danger that we face, into 'the object of analysis,' and have a closer look at the 'social type,' which I will call the 'Ersatz yuppie academic' for the time being.[26]

Here I take issue with a small segment of academia containing those who were students in Turkey and perhaps in other 'periphery' societies in the late 1970s, and who later stepped into academic life as faculty. Despite so many class differences among its members, the roots of this segment do not lie deep down within social stratification. The strategies and tactics that they mobilize for survival and pursuing their careers, and the actions they resort to realize their aims are more important than which strata in the social status quo serve as reference points for adjusting their levels of expectation. This nuance inevitably forces us to think about both ethos and the moral texture specific to the social type concerned. Consider that the individuals who I think represent this social type aspire to participate in university life in the major cities of developed countries. At the first chance, they go to these countries and complete their graduate studies over varying periods of time while at the same time keeping their academic positions in their home institutions intact. This is related to a certain extent to the patterning by the *lingua franca* of the environments in which they were educated while also being in line with levels of expectation that will readily enable them to become 'yuppie'-like. One feature has to be particularly underlined here. Those who look down on such empirical research as field or archival work by labeling them 'empiricist' in order to avoid carrying too much burden, especially in university life in a *periphery* society, form a significant sub-group within this small group. A parallel can be seen in their almost carnal consumption patterns (like *light* beer, decaffeinated coffee etc.), considered to be signifiers of the *yuppie* period in the act of theorizing (like *light* theory, *light* urbanism). Thus, at this point we do not face an unknown, a brand new fact for the time being.

If, however, we dig into the incident/fact a bit deeper, as I will explain through sufficient examples, we face the problem of institutional ethics and a moral problem at the level of individuals, which takes various forms: the immediate waking of the sleeping lion (e.g. the *green card*) in the

hearts of certain *ersatz yuppie* candidates as soon as they go abroad, their efforts to extend their Ph.D. studies abroad for as long as possible as some form of insurance; yet at the same time, their efforts to retain their positions in their home institutions for as long as possible until their status has become clear, without any consideration for faculty shortages due to the political regulations that marked the 1980s; and finally the emergence of both major and minor bottlenecks due to the tolerance for their departments for their egocentric actions. We should remind ourselves that such tolerance is rather foreign to the administrative mentality of equivalent departments in the hosting countries.

Thus it is possible to note that at least some of those who aim at staying in a post abroad are not concerned with completing their theses as soon as possible and returning to their countries to the departments in which cadres are spared for them, and contributing to education under the existing conditions. Moreover, in order to justify their stance, they always find excuses, such as their department's failure to do anything for them in the past (and I wonder if those departments abroad provide such favors as unconditionally as do departments in Turkey). It is frequently observed that when the future of education is at stake in Turkey, where there is still something that can be achieved even if society has gone adrift on 'Özalization,'[3] this segment, whose persistent efforts to achieve a final entry into foreign lands surfaces over time, and which exemplifies widespread nonchalance (and *desperation*), displays genuine insensitivity. Although all sorts of excuses, both subjective and objective, can be raised regarding this matter, it is a fact that one falls into an objective hypocrisy. Is it not therefore both a moral and 'ethical' question?

We are not done yet, however. Allow me to go back a bit. The lived examples, which I will generally touch upon, might be helpful in understanding the shoots that blossomed in the social characters of some of those managing to stay in a post abroad. While these shoots already existed, they blossomed in the 'flexible manufacturing' conditions of the

[3] Translator's note: 'Özalization' is a Turkey-specific concept, forged with a certain derogatory sense. It refers to a prominent political figure of the 1980s and early 1990s, Turgut Özal (1927–1993), who served as prime minister of Turkey in two critical governments (45th and 46th—1983/1987). Parliament elected Özal the President of the Republic in 1989. He served as President until his death in 1993. Özal is mostly known as the architecture of the 24 January (1980) economic package, and as the technocrat who continued with the implementation of the measures in the package under the military regime (1980–1983) after the 12 September 1980 *coup d'état*.

New World, which Richard Sennett terms, *via* examples from other sectors, as the 'corrosion of character.'[27]

We should remember the fragile period when the September 12 bosses,[4] who were re-organizing the universities *via* the very involvement of certain essential university members, took the *relatively* democratic academic milieus under their supervision. For example, what to say of those who did mind overtly asking to violate the collective decisions of those who have the privilege to participate and express their opinions, though informally, in those departmental meetings, which were run as democratically as possible despite the siege of negative external conditions, due to the failure of their friends in the examinations, which are prepared in accordance with shared decisions and most possible objective measures? At a time when the external onslaught on the university was so explicit, the threat posed against this barely sustained democratic development signifies some kind of piracy of democracy. Furthermore, one cannot talk about personal morality, let alone *professional ethics*, in reference to those who exploit existing conditions in favor of individual and group interests through such accusations that there is no democracy in their departments by using opinions from the left and ordinary liberal literature in a rather ignorant fashion, and without considering the risk that they might be putting the academic milieus under, within which they are treated with unique tolerance despite their self-seeking middle- and lower middle-class caprices. Looking back to those excessively weird days, this state of affairs was not considered to be possible then. It might be apt to analyze the rather blinding effect of so-called left and democratic discourses within the scope of historical–sociological empirical research.

Nevertheless, in a period when anti-democratic measures to counter the spirit of the university work to full capacity, defining the exploitation of those spaces of limited freedom where democratic processes operate as far as possible as mere blindness would ignore a deep-lying process. If one may note any blindness here at all, I would prefer to see this as a consciously staged performance of blindness rather than a survival strategy or reality. Likewise, I would argue that numerous personal interests and benefits are sought, even in that period, by perceiving a limited space of

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[4] Translator's note: Here the author refers to the intermingling of the authoritarian mentality—as solidified in the military rule (1980–1983) after the 12 September 1980 *coup d'état*—and the neoliberal free-market mentality—as solidified in the governments that followed.

freedom, where a democratic stance could work anti-democratically. At this point, we therefore face a 'structural' problem that cannot be easily dismissed as youthful excitement—despite the seeming disparity of the examples. Moreover, we can suggest the following argument: such hopeless objections against the spheres of tolerance by characterizing them unjustly as anti-democratic in the name of the so-called 'civil society,' and in a manner that almost points the finger at them as if informing against them to the repressive forces, can also be said to have hinted at an earlier stage of the anti-democratic and conservative stance that the *Ersatzen* started to display as they matured. What does the flashback that I presented above tell us about this 'least common' morality in Turkey, let alone about academic ethics?

More interestingly, are not the ones who admit that they *see* this country *as a prison* and try to postpone their return as much as possible or do whatever they can to find a place in that glorious *West* in whose asymmetry they can fit their characters easily the same persons? In the meantime, we should beware of a very important detail! None of the individuals that we are observing as a 'social type' with its various *aporias* have been subjected to prosecution, dismissed from work, imprisoned or tortured. Then I should ask: What are the local structural reasons behind these academics' perceptions of Turkey as a *prison* who freely offer ample discourse on 'democracy,' 'identity,' 'multi-culturalism,' 'gender,' 'is there architecture or not?' on the basis of ready-made templates, even when they are well situated—and it is a reality that they aspire to stay so all the time? And what are local structural reasons that render the common feature of their character as such? This is an important sociological question, which cannot be easily dismissed. More importantly, why do some of these same individuals opt for guaranteeing their posts in their home institutions at the expense of blocking employment opportunities for their peers until they secure their positions abroad? Can this state of mind be considered as a type or a signifier of the 'parasitic psychology' (*parasitäter Psychologie*), of 'astonishing post-existence' (*eine wunderliche Post-Existenz*) that Adorno points at?

Leaving aside the many differences between individual examples, the most important parameter defining the individuals who compose the social type that I aim to explore in this work is not to invent hasty update *projects*,[28] which mostly lack thought, with the aim to conform to the 'publish or perish' principle and find themselves a place in university circles abroad. Rather, the main decisive factor is the gear that whirls in those elite, preferably the *top ten* academic institutions of the so-called 'developed' world,

which can be considered as a 'Master' (*Herr*), and which pushed them into the status of some kind of a modern servitude. A discussion on the pillow talk that this relatively small 'master' pursues with the stronger 'seigniors' (international corporations, state and the state within etc.), which prevail both in the 'center' societies and which also globally go beyond the scope of this text. Although some of those from the 'peripheral' countries seem to be aware of and resent this interconnection, it is a fact that, in the dialectics that characterize the self-interest and mental dependence, the majority adopt the position of the 'servant' (*Knecht*), partially out of despair but in most cases with a sly willingness.[29] On the other hand, since the present 'master' is the university stock company endemic to capitalism (in the [North] American case 'knowledge factory'), the kind-but-firm-master style that is specific to the past-time nobility of the 'Old World' is no longer valid under the conditions of the New World. The new 'master' already employs the qualified labor force ('the ranks of the excess academic unemployed') as a 'commodity' under supposedly 'free' market conditions. In any case, it keeps at its hand the ranks of the 'well-educated' unemployed of its own multicultural country, a labor force reserve out of which those with the required qualifications, the most beneficial ones, will be selected. The gear whirls mostly through short-term contracts built on insecurity. The students, too, are aware that they are the 'clients,' and thus they tend to exploit the conditions to the extent possible by their keenness to get a return on the money they pay to the academic enterprise. Leaving aside those from state universities who hardly got any opportunity to offer a course for a semester, those in the more or less secure middle-rank echelons of the university have to engage in unbelievable *shows* before their student-clients to attract listeners to their course and score high in the students' evaluations sent to the administration.

Meanwhile, there is always the qualified labor force from the *periphery*, knocking on the door, determined to become a part of the center. This foreign labor force supply is a golden opportunity in the *unanimous eyes of the corporate* master for servicing the onerous and less valued courses, which its professors evade in order to meet deadlines for their books and chase after remunerative projects. The Ph.D. candidates from peripheral countries who seem to be relatively knowledgeable have learnt well that they are themselves potential subjects of investment and that they have to market their labor force as a fine commodity because the *alla turca* canniness that works at home does not work abroad. Hence, they have to learn the fine techniques, specific to contemporary civilization, for offer-

ing themselves for sale. When it is required, the universities of the *center*, which are in a continuous *ratings* race, resort to the option of temporary employment for those whom they consider the best among the desperate *others* instead of choosing from the pool of unemployed citizens. The real reason behind this is fluctuations in the academic labor force market in the *developed* world. The academic market, which runs alongside the 'culture industry,' does not refrain from applying this fundamental 'convertibility' principle of the 'market in general' to relevant human-commodities that it deems 'temporary.'

In short, it is not possible to say that this labor force, composed of those who seize the first chance to escape abroad, does not at least initially have bargaining power. Moreover, despite ample radical discourse wasted with *alla turca* canniness in the past before the corporate *masters* abroad, this labor force does not even have the power to resist a prostitute who has recently entered the sector. Thus, in response to the madam's remark that 'Hey, you are just capital!,' they cannot claim in a smoky tone that 'No, not at all: on my ID it says "provided with a ration card for bread for manual workers"' (Ayhan 1982, p. 25).[5] In my opinion, we face a reality that recalls Hegel's implication that it is necessary to be more cautious of the 'slave' than the 'Master.'[30]

At this point, one recalls Adorno's reference to Hegel's dialectics as an analogy, where he discusses the effects of excessive specialization in music composition and performance *via* modern technical organization and instruments. Adorno's depiction, which I believe would be useful to integrate into a work that explains the transformation of the ideal of *Universitas* both in the 'center' and in Turkey, is as follows: 'The more completely the ends subjugate the means, the more threatening becomes the rule of the means over the ends: this is the aesthetic dialectic of master and servant. Every process of integration is accompanied, falsely [*im Falschen*-HUN], by a process of disintegration. It causes every part to disappear in the whole [*im Ganzen*-HUN], even

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[5] Translator's note: Here, another feminist intervention is all the more necessary. Despite its philosophical depth, the text falls into maleist derogatory view of prostitutes. This fall employs the male gaze into capital–labor relations as a form of power that unconditionally accepts men as the power holder and women as dominated subjects, and that reproduces this domination even when questioning the relation of exploitation.

The author travels through the texts by quoting from Ece Ayhan, a highly regarded Turkish poet, nationally and internationally.

though it can contribute to the creation of a whole only if it is preserved' (1999, pp. 199–200).[31] This is a point worth thinking about regarding discussions on the 'university in ruins' that became heated recently (see endnote 33).

In the case of immigrant academics, in addition to such self-seeking deeds as dumping previous collaborations once a new partner deemed to be more beneficial is found abroad, each and every incessantly followed opportunity that emerges is a touch of hope, like the periodical US green card lotteries. The fact that academics from other *periphery* countries adopt the same tactics makes the race harder. Since it is inevitable that this race leads to a hidden or open, violent competition among the potential candidates, those coming from the 'periphery' are forced to compete with both local inhabitants and other foreigners as early as during their Ph.D. studies. Beyond that, however, they are pushed into a rivalry with their fellow citizens, which undoubtedly harms the already unstable personal character and moral texture. What is more interesting is that this state of affairs is sometimes internalized more quickly by immigrant than local academics; they demonstrate an immediate adjustment and indifference with an almost animal-like instinct *vis-à-vis* the corrosion of their own character. Ultimately, this insensitivity cannot be considered separately from the universal leveling process in which the ability to discern *things* is lost (Gadamer 1974, p. 123; English version: 36).

This shows us the following: on this spectrum, which I temporarily term the *Ersatz yuppie* academic, and which has shades of gray in line with the colors of the world of commodities, it is impossible to expect, permanent solidarities aside, even the tendency toward short-term relations. Each and every observable cooperation is in fact played on the basis of an insecure and betrayal-prone calculation of interest, whereby efforts are made to detect any possible animosity of the partner.[32]

Although these characters learn numerous ruses and acquire the merit to create projects that follow one another, the world of foreign academic corporations, behind its token polish, does not regard them as one of its brand, and thus takes no notice of them. Thus, some among these characters, who eventually realize that they will not for a long time or perhaps ever be granted equal status with their hosting peers, return to Turkey willy-nilly with the deep wish that this return be temporary, bring with them to university circles the 'seller's' mentality that they have acquired abroad. They also return in a state of being that hosts new concerns, hidden or explicit resentment, and

unreliability, in addition to deep invisible marks, which have long been ingrained in their characters as modern individuals. The most frightening feature of this labor force, which is much more attached to foreign lands than to Turkey and ready to leave at the first opportunity, is the contradictory amalgam of the *alla turca* characteristics ingrained in their characters and the colorless clinical aspect specific to the modern academic *Knecht*, acquired in the West. While they take canny steps, ignoring the possibility that they might be reminded of the moral contradictions they experience, they never give up knocking on foreign doors in the hope that their *worth* will eventually be appreciated; and they continue their life as such. Sometimes, it becomes very entertaining to take a close look at the social–individual moral texture of this specific type of less-developed modern entities when they reserve a place and hold onto power in the academic and culture industries of this disliked country to which they *inevitably* return due to rather worsening academic conditions abroad.[33] Certainly, one has to keep in mind that comedy is a time-lapse tragedy.

They are more than willing to grind their academic lifespans in the wheels of the academic cultural industry of foreign metropolises; and for the sake of this, they followed the latest thinking fashion by prioritizing foreign publications long before the imposition of current rules in the universities. Meanwhile, they accepted the dominance of global 'instrumental reason,' which is free and clear of morality. In the beginning of their careers, a hint of future conformism is seen in their search for a colorless buzz, which might involve talking out of both sides of the mouth, surrounded by anonymous referees whose names are hidden in the peer review system of the professional journals. Likewise, the style of papers accepted for presentation at international congresses indicates the same conformism that the beginners will meet. These congresses mostly resemble a stock market; in direct proportion to their reputation, individuals try to attract the attention of possible buyers and to ruin, in diplomatic style, the work of those potential competitors that they think they can afford to criticize.[34] In the meantime, in tourist mood, characteristic of the large and small milieus of academic tourism and acquisitive greed, they pursue new connections that may produce material and non-material benefits. In the rough templates that are nonreflecting yet conforming to the fashion of the day, which the *Ersatz yuppie* academics e-mail to the organizers and publishers before the *deadline*, the most weighty concepts end up with unbearable lightness while the most important words are degraded and

rapidly consumed and omitted under the pressure of instantaneously fol-
lowing the rising trends of the *new academic economy*.[35] This provides an
example of the lack of love, displayed in relation to what Adorno terms
the *things*, and which inevitably orients toward human beings. Considered
from this perspective, the feeling and intuition that *Ersatz* works arouse in
the audience is that one faces intellectual *kitsch*.[36]

The incorporation of these new human-machines who undertake the
voluntary tele-work of the international academic-culture industry and
tourism into a multi-directional exploitation mechanism, which oper-
ates at global as well as individual levels over their own or other *periphery*
societies under the guidance of the *center*, is another critically important
aspect of the issue at hand.

While the *center* galaxy goes through its own downfall toward a
far, occult future (Derrida's *l'à-venir*, which he counterposes against
le futur), there is certainly not much that it can learn from the less-
developed actors knocking on its door regarding the societies that it
embodies. The *center* is generally right about this perception because its
own connoisseur authors from its own world of language have already
explained its historical fate, which sticks the *others* with the painful bill,
yet again, and at a level that those young novices of academia can never,
ever reach—how dare they, after all.[37] Up-to-date and fashionable theo-
retical templates are primarily developed by the elite thinkers of the *cen-
ter* countries, and the second-class labor force army that descend from
the *periphery* follow these works closely. Academic-culture industries,
specific to developed capitalism do not need to learn anything about
their own cultural, architectural and similar environments, which they
know excessively and which they have consumed to a great extent from
these young novices. Since they always feel hunger for consumable new
information about the *others* in the *periphery*, the best way for the ado-
lescents to be recognized in the eyes of the *Master* is to transform the
periphery into an *object of desire*, tailored in accordance with the patterns
of contemporary fashion and into a *stockpile* (*Bestand*) for the academic
industry; and then to put it up for sale in the *market of concepts*. Even
those individuals who suffer strain when faced with the pathology of this
state of affairs and who reach an impasse as they try to hold on to certain
moral assets, ultimately make the most rational choice for themselves by
shamefacedly supplying the international cultural market with data, find-
ings and assessments related to their own societies and cultures, which
they assume to be demanded and bought by the *center*. This process

generally works through internalized advertising techniques. Since the cup and its size are provided by theories originating from the *center*, the smartest thing to do is to assume the role of contractor or agency, or at most, in terms of an old term, 'comprador' in exporting raw material, or at most semi-manufactured opinion. In the meantime, one should emphasize that the demands of the 'center' rarely go beyond the up-to-date, workable average.[38]

   Thus, in the *academia* of contemporary global conditions, the *repro-duction* of the import pattern of cultural commodities, which works through a dependence on the *center*, is incessantly repeated by the efforts of some among this crew who unwillingly return to Turkey after linger-ing in other *peripheral* countries, which they deem to be the 'second best,' to turn themselves into a cultural investment in the *periphery* that has utility for the *center*. In the meantime, they strive to carve a place for themselves in this market by using those concepts (like democracy, civil society, woman, multiculturalism, identity or [O!]ther!), which they consider as an investment. In these instances, even when they criticize orientalism, they act as agents of a 'flexible' orientalism and positivism in the *periphery*.[39] This rather daunting inclination of such parvenus to positivism has already been noted ('*Latecomers and newcomers alike have a worrisome affinity for positivism*') (MM, 32nd Reflection).[6] The Ersatz who is all the more ready to turn her/his professional identity—and this is another variant of the molded personality coated on Nieztsche's contemporary 'herd individual'—which is dependent on the industrial culture market of the developed countries whose products are getting boringly standardized, into a personal investment and profit start to pro-cess local raw material and *supplies* through such second import 'means of idea production' as 'identity,' 'geographies of the other,' 'architectures

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[6] Translator's note: Here a feminist intervention is needed regarding Hannah Arendt's work on Rahel Varnhagen, who she described as a parvenu, not as an act of disrespect, but as a state of affairs relating to identity politics in the most general sense of the term. Arendt's many readings of her era, its past and future with a non-humanistic pro-Enlightenment stance share considerable concerns with the main figures of the Frankfurt School. However, her parallel readings regarding the *Life of Mind, eclipse of the mind, thinking-ego and parvenu* among others do not create the same attraction as male writings of the Frankfurt School. The recurrence of this perhaps unintentional but rather systematic neglect, and the resulting attempt to manipulate Arendt's works by the New Right in the North American context, is another topic that deserves scholarly attention, especially in a period when academic life and scholarly thinking are once more in shackles.

of the other,' 'postfeminist readings,' even when they play the role of the *opponent* in societies like Turkey's.[40] We should also note that these dry projects, which can also display parrot-like radical attitudes, provide temporary conscience relief by delaying their hidden chagrins in the open-air *prison*. The excessive officiousness that is put to work for keeping language flashy when it is presented as an attempt at *true* communication with the others leads to the question of playing the opposition for power and of the possibility that rapid writers may not have sufficiently grasped their themes, not to mention their commitment to these themes. In any case, what could be discovered as a consequence of delving into the fine details and inner contradictions of the language and concepts that are used would not do any good to the contractor. Therefore, so-called radical, over-consumed exotic jargon consists of no more than lingering on the borders of truisms, familiar to everyone, but not touching anyone's interests; and this comes with its numerous benefits. In an age when the Gods have left the earth and the economy of heroism has long disappeared, we can understand this state of being to an extent. But then it becomes meaningless to characterize a work as 'intellectual' because, even in such an activity, the information is used not out of a wish for a real 'conversation' and 'communication,' but for turning it into power as an industrial activity; and here too, a greedy and sly technical calculation works.

When they are not stuck in the middle of the 'clash of civilizations,' which covertly feeds them, they unawarely support and feedback the disposition imposed on them by the powerful through seeming counter-discourses. Such academics dress for the appearance of struggling for a 'civil society' that hosts those organizations that nowadays turn into corporations; some others, on the other hand, are the undiscriminating representatives of smiling anthropomorphism. Thus, a *symptomatic* reading of initial big talk radicalism, which we exemplified in the early 1980s might from today's distance lead to considering it as an early signifier of collaboration with the academic corporate order. What is at stake here is a submissiveness that hides itself ever more mischievously as it accelerates proportionally with the thickening of the shell of radical rhetoric while its content becomes emptied. Leaving aside the power-oriented, *heart*-free bellicosity of this group, a second group takes its 'oriental' opinion capital from the *sunset* country and, regardless of the local alternatives in the sunset, applies this capital to *sunrise* societies and cultures. Mostly secondhand data belonging to the latter are decorated with theoretical terms and

put into the service of hypocritical humanisms that strive to re-establish themselves.

Thus, those in the *periphery* who continue to work as contractors of an international 'republic of lore and science' that is in ruins because it is interwoven with the global 'seigniors' are forced to finish, say, a comparative eclectic inventory of the educational systems in a certain discipline of two countries in their region by a deadline determined by the editors and publishing houses. This preoccupation too is pursued with the hope that one day their real value will be recognized in the *center*, and primarily through an inquiry about foreign academic–cultural markets,[41] with the same internalized advertising mentality. In the meantime, it is also necessary not to pass over the domestic academic and cultural market of the country, which happen to be the forced zone for settlement, considered to be the *prison*. Such *lofty* (!) feelings toward one's own society aside, it is always necessary to keep on solid ground, a locus of power for ensuring that the pragmatic, *alla turca*-European amalgams of academic enterprises map their accounts and profit.

Some may object, saying that 'under the current conditions of academic world these are the rules of the game; what can we do?' In response to this opportunist cliché, we can comfortably transliterate Brecht's saying: 'Humanity had the power to know to be longer-lasting.' However, the real problem lies in the fact that these new 'theoretical research technicians,' for whom self-promotion is more important than anything and anyone else, have long been totally insensitive to such statements. Some of the character properties specific to the 'extrovert' (Riesman) audience, discussed by Adorno (see endnote 27), who submit to the 'pseudo-realism' of television with despair and schizophrenic surrender, can also be observed in today's *Ersatz* academics. Such motivation is also reflected in the critical–theoretical literature. These works increasingly resemble the meaningless 1940s US tabloid stories.[42] I do not think that a technique resembling Brecht's 'estrangement-effect' (*Verfremdungseffekt*, in brief *V-Effekt*), aiming to eliminate a particular 'alienation' (*Entfremdung*) exclusive to the *literati* has ever been developed.

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Since I have noted a specific instance of the corrosion of character, let me take issue with the cost of the *flexible* academic manufacturing conditions of today's world for the character and mental structure of the 'social

types' that I have been discussing. I could ignore this issue, 'leaving it to them to resolve,' but I did not want to do so due to its close connection with *ethics* and morality, which are among the points of concern within the scope of this essay. Thus it needs to be considered to a certain extent. I will explore the nature of the cost that this crew of academics, among whom one can observe all shades of gray, tries to avoid on the basis of a number of indicators that I deem to be important. These indicators, after all, are just some abstractions, which everyone can see or deduce *via* her/his first hand experiences and observations in life.

Even a cursory elaboration of their self-exhibition and self-selling, allows one to understand that this really tiny sector of society is not only *Ersatz* but also the *Ersatz* of the *dystopic yuppie* republic, nourished in those worlds, especially in the 1980s. As if confirming Adorno's pitiless diagnosis, cultivation of the self (*cultura animi*) has no priority in the egocentric 'designs' for the future of those who voluntarily accept the conditions of the international academic industry and tourism. The only thing that drives them is an almost a bestial (*tierisch*),[7] senseless, cynical and timid impulse for opening themselves at any cost a space *primarily* in the foreign academic world. One can consider this sufficiently objective situation as a survival strategy pursued by oppressing the powerless when needed or through token humanly niceties with hidden profit-seeking goals or professional warmth, and when needed *new world-ish* informalities in a world full of rivals and even enemies, which while not necessarily really existing, are assumed to be there due to a schizoid–paranoid psychological state.[43]

What comes out of such an effort cannot be that *creation* which can emerge in that tranquility, in the serene interval, produced by 'solitude' (*Einsamkeit*). Considering the discussion so far, it would most probably be easily understood that solitude, the *sine qua non* for true *creativity* in any sphere, is an extremely difficult state of being. It is appropriate to suggest that keeping the external world out as much as possible and producing in tranquility (*ataraxia*), which Steiner (who recognized that progress in science and technology is inversely correlated with solitude) thought to be necessary for 'harvesting of the self'[44] (Steiner 2001, pp. 315, 213)

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[7] Translator's note: Here 'tierisch' also means animal-like. In the Turkish version of the text, the author uses a Turkish term that corresponds to 'animal-like.' Because, from a feminist ecological stance, referring to (the features of) animals as means to negate, criticize, belittle or degrade certain 'human' acts is another instance of violence, I preferred to translate *tierisch* as bestial rather than 'animal-like.'

is difficult or even impossible to achieve for the related social type for reasons that I have listed above. I consider it futile to expect those who do business with a greedy ambition, which would sound antipathetic to anyone with a minimum degree of sensitivity, to prefer that melancholy and loneliness, which are indispensable for the search for truth, and to take moral responsibility. For the most important feature that renders 'solitude' really *distinguished* is that it generates its own peculiar time ('time that is not time') and thus its own possibility to 'create' while at the same time leading to an almost 'playful' ecstasy, rather than through working in servitude to *deadlines* as the above-mentioned types do.

Especially in a race in which one strives for foreign academic markets, individuals lose whatever is left from their moral coating, giving importance to a sensitivity to moral–ethical issues only so long as they are instrumental for their own idle discourses; their senseless industriousness is continuously fueled by an ambition full of *Angst*. The same individuals are inevitably obliged to incur individually differentiated bodily and mental costs; most probably due to the fact that they remain in a state of high tension as they cleverly adjust to the established academic orders and/or play a token societal *outsider* and *opponent* role. One cannot expect such people to live through and feel the free-time in which not only joy and ecstasy but also sorrow and pain are valued. Although capitalism, which imposes the asymmetrical 'worktime-leisure time' distinction, has stuffed the patchy concept of *culture* into *leisure time*, these types do not have the time even to think about their own *Halbbildungs*,[45] let alone free-time. They are not aware of it; or, even if they are, they do not have the courage to do so.

In any case, it is not inapt to think that such a tense existence has its psychosomatic consequences. A not-insignificant cost is incurred on the bodymind due to the overt or covert emulation of empty lifestyles, loaded with hidden violence despite their elite appearance, which are specific to allegedly *developed* societies, but facing disrespect in *developed* academic markets, which operate on the basis of the law of the jungle. The cost is directly proportional to a minimum level of *Bildung*, which is even too much for the social domination of the social classes and stratum in which the individual has been born and raised, or strives for her/his second birth by later struggling for inclusion. As a side effect, ambition, indifferent to morality, leads to serious psychosomatic sickness in some while others who have a bit more *Bildung*, and who are shrewder and manage their own affairs well with pseudo-professional warmth, try to draw pseudo-mystical veils over the danger that they sense is approaching their body and mind.

The dense pressure of this inner unrest may sometimes pressure the individual to such an extent that the times that s/he spares for herself/himself turns out to be filled with the obsession with a pathological wellness (*pathischen Gesundheit*) and with the idiocy of *attaining* something,[46] for example, with the California-like Western-looking *new age* practices, most of which are fraudulent and inevitably inciting individual hedonism.[47] The pseudo-spiritual *Otherness*-service sector is also immediately at hand to fill in the inner emptiness of the individual with yet another emptiness through the empty discourses and colorful activities that it offers to every customer who pays the price, and which exploits the mental state of the individual by means of rubbing it down. Such activities fit perfectly with the *Ersatz yuppie* academics avoidance of entering the court of conscience. Those who display ambition and the arts of *instrumental reason* to the extent that they find no interest in abandoning individualist cunning are in fact the signifiers of a general stupidity. Since the mental structures of the individuals involved in such idiocy, who are conscious of their failure in the face of a merciless world that is ready to discard them any time, are hardened as they age,[48] the spiritual and bodily flattering services that they turn to so as to eliminate inner tension does not lead to any transformation in their characters, which are distorted by the whirling gear.[49] The fact is that the limited leisure time (*Freizeit*), spent to *let off steam*, will after a while turn into a period of time that is spent as worktime, far from bringing peace.

Thus, such *leisure time* activities indicate a body tidying and spiritual refining that involve an almost industrial rushing that is far away from *playfulness*[50] and pursued as a duty, fakeness that people can never admit to themselves.[8] In a world that ultimately *likens [and thus] ruins* you,[51] those who try to sell various ways of escaping and *forgetting* as a lifestyle that does not lead to any fundamental transformation in private lives that increasingly resemble objective work conditions—although clothed in pseudo-spiritualties—or in the character of the individual,[52] both

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[8] Translator's note to endnote 50: 1. DR uses 'happiness' for Glück. Here, I prefer the term 'fortune' because the term was translated into Turkish to mean 'pleasant' in English. This, I believe, recalls Machiavelli's use of the term 'fortune' in relation to one's intelligent manipulation of fate. 2. Considering Adorno's distinction between truth/true and pseudo/false/appearance, I also prefer to use 'true' as the adjective of experience rather than 'actual' (DR prefers this term).

of themselves and others, live a grotesque and tragic lie.[9] It is doubtful whether the obsessive escapes of these ambitious individuals, who play the familiar game with the cunning acquiescence to the mint while seemingly rejecting the hard currency would heal themselves—left selfless by the gear—let alone those *others* on which they offer analysis. And at this point, I 'leave it to them to resolve the issue.'

For in an atmosphere that fuels memory loss, life is damaged. Where 'faith' (*fide*), 'trust' and 'hope' (the triplet associated with the meaning of *confidential*)—which are specific to thinking through morality—fade,[53] then even *memories* are for forgetting the past immediately. Considering the examples I have offered, 'fishbowl exhibitionism' (Steiner 2001, p. 264) constantly calls the ones who have a memory like a sieve and who, as I noted above, continuously avoid paying the cost through voluntary *amnesia*, in conformity with the spiritual refinements that remind them of the requirement that they have to offer themselves as commodities to the academic market like the modern artists.[54,10] In this vicious cycle in which they use *language* as a means of power, it does not occur to them that it is *language* itself that actually does the thinking and that tricks them when necessary; even if they catch a glimpse of it, they prefer to lose it. In modern society, even if one writes on the subject of *memory loss*, there is no room for *Mnemosyne* in the non-intellectual minds.

It seems that the parade of pornographic noise, ambitious hustle and grandiose show in their surrounding environment (*Umwelt*) do not ensure permanent satisfaction for those who lose their never-formed selves to this flood[55] for they continually struggle in vain to eliminate the distress, sorrow and unrest that insidiously occupy their mind. In this struggle, some assume an aggressive stance while others continue their efforts in a civilized manner under the guise of someone at peace with herself/himself. The only difference is that, in the latter case, the same state of being is clothed

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[9] Translator's note to endnote 52: Because the author has so far used the words spirit, intellect and mind interchangeably for the translation of the German word 'Geist,' I prefer to use 'spiritual/mental' for the word that he uses in Turkish—'ruhsal.'

[10] Translator's note to endnote 54: In the English translation of the text (by DR), the term selected—'enchantment'—is slightly different from the word selected for the Turkish translation—'cadılık'—which means 'witchcraft' in English. I would prefer to continue with the English translation, since 'witchcraft' might be another instance of maleist thinking in this valuable text—in terms of the strict distinction between a 'manly' way of knowing and 'women's' knowledge, which for centuries have been equated with non-scientific ways of understanding and in certain disciplines with witchcraft for a considerable period of time.

in a consideration that actually works as commercial speculation to spread a deceptive warmth into the hearts of the others. This must be what Adorno terms 'selflessness in speculation' [*Selbstlosigkeit auf Spekulation*]. In fact, they try to transfer the cost of the unrest and weirdness onto nearby or far away 'others' through a calculative secrecy and silly desperation and disregard. Even these limited assessments indicate that we face hypocritical work on both the objective and subjective planes. When the different expressions in our examples are decoded, ethical principles aside, we should ask again what is happening to the *minimum morality* that is shared by everyone.

* * *

If we recall the argument that intellect is a 'moral category,' we can safely argue that this is still valid for the pseudo-interdisciplinarity related to the will to power and power relations,[56] and to the cultural pseudo-activity (*Pseudoaktivität*) that serves as a backup to academic life.[11] Certainly, everyone is left homeless today even in her/his home and searching for a home(land). Yet, is there no other way than to pursue this never-ending effort by means of a pseudo-opponent submissiveness? I doubt it. We are fortunate that there are still some who can claim 'there is no correct life in falsehood.'[57]

Now for my last remark, which although you might not believe it, permit me say in any case: The common point reached by those who consciously opt for 'amnesia,' is *stupidity*. Yes, merely *stupidity*. The fact that those who give the impression that they are struggling against the global idiocy that is foisted on all of us and who are thus expected to continue with the struggle, just when they are expected to be alert and competent can ultimately be viewed as an example of the universal stupidity that pumps template ambition into individuals. These new opinion entrepreneurs are also responsible for an exploitation that also works on those *others*, who they talk about by turning into objects and raw material, who they write about and consume lavishly in congress tourism. They display such idiocy that it prevents them from seeing the satisfaction that would

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[11] Translator's note to endnote 56: I found the English version of the text from the following source: Derrida, J. The Future of the Profession or the University without Condition (Thanks to the 'Humanities,' What Could Take Place Tomorrow). 2002. In Cohen, T. (Ed.). *Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 24–57. The quotation is from p. 50.

be ensured for their thoughtless and tense mental state by the digestion of the plenitude of information that they store with the instinct to quickly put on sale in the academic market through refinement of such information in *noûs*. As Unamuno once said, 'human beings are dangerous not because they are evil but because of their stupidity.' Adorno also pointing out something similar when he talked about the turning of those intellects that the *science corporation* (*Der Wissenschaftsbetrieb*)[12] set to work to make them its own mirror into 'voluntary and diligent inspectors' of themselves (*als die freiwilligen und eifrigen Kontrolleure ihrer selbst*) and the 'pathological stupidity' that the effort to think professionally pushed them into.[58,13]

Preoccupation with knowledge, especially philosophy, is meaningful so long as it emerges out of and feeds into a strong desire to establish a life that is free of distortion.[59] Otherwise, much reading in itself results in mental constipation and unnecessary information burden. Moreover, accessing *knowledge* follows step by step through the construction of an independent and brave *I* who dares to endure a painful solitude when necessary, in other words, through the construction of the *self*. Those who presume that crowd brim full with knowledge and discourse can lead a person to a proper life either do so through naive idle dreaming or because of hiding something from others, even from themselves. One should not forget that even if the paths of those who reject following the pathways of thinking that need to be opened up with patience despite the blockade of an artificial 'surrounding environment' (*Umwelt*) since this 'would be of no use' (*cui bono*), and who take the shortcut, preferring the semi-ignorant information world, full of bright words and concepts, are characterized by goodwill, goodwill does not have much importance in the eyes of the university corporation that is dissolving through its totalization. In the meantime, we should not neglect the fact that the *others* are once more exploited in the mass universities to whose dissolution *Ersatz yuppie* academics (in)advertently contribute while consumed by their own ambitions even in their protected positions. It is certain that this involves 'injustice,' beyond 'irresponsibleness.'[60]

[12] Translator's note: The author prefers to use 'science corporation' for the academic life that he focuses on.

[13] Translator's note to endnote 58: In the English translation, the sentence starts as follows: 'Their resentment.' In the Turkish translation, the sentence starts with 'Their never-ending hate and.' In the Turkish translation, the word used for 'resentment' is 'hınç,' which means 'ressentiment' in English rather than 'resentment.'

More importantly, this 'injustice' is a violation of the shared traits that unfold in the *minima moralia*, which precedes the entire *ethos* that both familiar monotheist religions—for Heidegger, all parvenus—and the Enlightenment tried to establish. It is this *minima moralia* that is observable in the particular existence of any collective human life throughout history, and which brings meaning to existence even today, after all the trauma. And the shared traits are: fundamental conscience (*Gewissen*), a feeling of responsibility and indebtedness and, for that reason, acceptance of one's guilt (*Schuldigsein*), and closely related to this acceptance, truthful testimony (*Bezeugung*).[61] Irrespective of its particular reason, however, it would be difficult to identify the minimum latent measure required by the conversation of humanity (*Hölderlin*) in those who do not and/or cannot undertake the *other* effort that necessitates patience; who (can) find nothing that serves their own self-interest in such an endeavor since they find it beneficial to ignore such shared traits that precede even the most basic morality. Here I do not even mention religious, semi-religious, pseudo-religious or secular ethics. Nevertheless, there are many whose *noûs* do not forget the following: they know that *knowledge* is a close relative of *morality*; they also remind first themselves that if one wills a real 'communication' between us as the ones who are obliged to face the brutal realities, rather than burying one's head in the sand, it is necessary to know how to listen to the music sleeping in *that thing*, called *minima moralia*, which flourishes on the same terrain as those (brutal) realities.

NOTES

1. It should be noted that for copyright reasons, the quotation from Eugène Ionesco in the original (Turkish) version of the article is not included in this English translation.
2. One can see that this issue is not ignored in some publications on the *ethical* aspect of contemporary professions and vocations. For example, in one of his works on architecture, Karsten Harries notes: 'That I choose this title, now for a third time, for this book shows that the issue it raises continues to challenge me, where "ethical" as I here understand it, has more to do with the Greek *ethos* than with what we usually mean by "ethics", for example, when we speak of "business ethics" or "medical ethics": this is not at all a book in what might be called "architectural ethics"' (Harries 1997, p. xii).

3. The early works (in the 1990s) of the founder and main theoretician of the pioneering 'Cultural Studies Center'—wrongly called the 'Birmingham School,' by the following mimetics—which was dissolved recently, Stuart Hall, offers sufficient grounds to consider the new field of study aimed at and the way the initial intentions thenceforth are treated in other social contexts (See Hall 1990, pp. 11–23, especially pp. 22–23).

4. Here, I refer directly to Weber's lecture, entitled 'Science as Vocation' [*Wissenschaft als Beruf*], in which he points out the dangers of the tendencies that started to determine science in modern world conditions, especially in Germany. For the German version of the lecture, see http://www.pscw.uva.nl/sociosite/TOPICS/ weber.html; for its English version (see Weber 1946, pp. 129–156).

5. 'Devastation is the high-velocity expulsion of Mnemosyne. The words, "the wasteland grows" come from another realm than the current appraisals of our age. Nietzsche said "wasteland grows" nearly three quarters of a century ago. And he added, "Woe to him who hides wastelands within"' (Heidegger 1968, p. 30 [*Die Verwüstung ist die auf hohen Toren laufende Vertreibung der Mnemosyne. Das Wort* 'die Wüste wächst' *kommt aus einem anderen Ort als die gängigen Beurteilungen unserer Zeit.* 'Die Wüste wächst' *sagte Nietzsche vor fast 70 Jahren. Er fügt hinzu*: 'weh dem, der Wüsten birgt' [HUN] Heidegger 1954, pp. 11–12.]

6. For example, the ethical state of the professional code of architecture in the United Kingdom in 1968 included clear provisions that architects should definitely distance themselves from commercial pressures, that they should not act as business people, that they should not hold shares or other interests in the sphere of construction or in the companies, manufacturing construction material, that they should not advertise themselves and that they should not mark down in competing with each other. By the first half of the 1980s, the sanctioning power of these provisions had been seriously eroded under the pressure of the UK government, which was the biggest customer of both the free market and the architects (See Seymes et al. 1995, pp. 22–23). Here, we need to discuss the same issue on the basis of examples and with a view to the general structure of the academic vocation.

7. In an earlier work, Jameson notes: 'our society has begun to offer us the world—now mostly a collection of products of our own

making—as just such a body, that you can possess visually, and collect images of. Were an ontology of this artificial, person-produced universe still possible, it would have to be an ontology of the visual, of being as the visible first and foremost, with the other senses draining off it; all the fights about power and desire have to take place here, between the mastery of the gaze and the illimitable richness of the visual object; it is ironic that the highest stage of civilization (thus far) has transformed human nature into this single protean sense, which *even moralism can surely no longer wish to amputate*' (Jameson 1992, p. 1) [emphasis mine]. See also those sections that focus on Lukács in Jameson's new book (2002, pp. 82–85). The general discussion that Lukács offers in *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* is expanded in the 'Introduction to Ontology,' published posthumously. 'History is an irreversible process,' Lukács tells us, 'and it therefore seems natural to start the ontological investigation of history with the irreversibility of time. It is evident that we have here a genuine ontological relationship [*ontologischer Zusammenhang*-HUN]. If this characteristic [*Wesensart*-HUN] of time were not the insuperable foundation of any existent [*unaufhebbare Fundament eines jeden Seins*-HUN], then the problem of the necessary historicity of being could not even arise' (Lukács 1978, p. 70; see Lukács 1984, 1986, pp. 612–613). As I noted in one of my previous works, the aim of Lukács to reach an authoritative theory of ethics, which he referred to more than once, starting with his return to aesthetics—his first favorite topic—and ending in the way station of ontology, but which he could not achieve in his lifetime, is a contemporary '*odyssey*' that manifests itself from time to time in his later works, which were met by undeserved disinterest. When one takes into consideration 'visuality,' which he claimed will mark the next era, any labor in this line has importance also for morality. For the time being, let us suffice with Lukács' words: 'The manner and direction of the abstractions and thought experiments (*Gedankenexperimente*) are not determined by the epistemological and methodological (at least of all logical) standpoints [*erkenntnistheoretische oder methodologische (am wenigsten logische)*], but by the thing itself [*die Sache selbst*-HUN], i.e. the ontological nature of the material in question' (Lukács 1978, p. 49). [Translator's note: The author refers to Lukács 1984, 1986, p. 596 for the German version of the

quotation.] Besides, the question of morality cannot be considered independently of the question of labor. See especially, 'Die Arbeit' 2. Halbband, pp. 7–116. For the English version of this section, see Lukács 1980.

8. I deliberately refer to this resemblance and not just on the basis of Heidegger's depiction that in the place, well lit by neon lights, the background becomes more darkened and unsafe. Adorno, too, in one his works on 'mass culture' notes as follows: 'The neon signs which hang over our cities and outshine the natural light of the night with their own are comets presaging the natural disaster of society, its frozen death. Yet they do not come from the sky. They are controlled from earth. It depends upon human beings themselves whether they will extinguish these lights and awake from a nightmare which only threatens to become actual as long as men believe in it' (Adorno 1991, p. 83; German version 1997b, p. 335).

9. 'Ethics is actually the bad conscience of morality, conscience about oneself' (Adorno 2000, pp. 9–10 and p. 185–fn. 20, 21). [*Ethik ist das schlechte Gewissen, das Gewissen über sich selber* (Adorno 1996, pp. 21–22; 269–270.)] Adorno (Lecture of November 8, 1956, Vo 1295) presents this depiction in his previous lectures on the same topic as follows: 'The concept of ethics is much more popular than moral philosophy. [Because, relative to moral philosophy] it does not sound so inflexible, it appears to have loftier, more human connotations; it does not simply abandon human actions to the realm of chance, but contains the promise of something like a specific sphere of universality against which human behavior can be measured. Ethics is bad conscience, conscience about oneself. It is the effort to talk about conscience, without interpolating the forcefulness that it embodies' (pp. 185–186, fn. 21). For details of this argument, see Nalbantoğlu 2002b, pp. 187–229. The slogan 'ethical values' (!) that nowadays appears even on billboards indicates that there are such values that exist apart from 'ethical' patterns—I previously discussed this matter in (Nalbantoğlu 2002a, pp. 176–192).

10. Interestingly, Gadamer, in his opening speech in 1946 ('*Veröffentlicht unter der Lizenz, Nr. 88 der Sowjetischen Militärverwaltung in Deutschland*')—which was allowed to be printed [*Rektoratsrede*, February 5, 1946]—as the president of the

university when Leipzig was within the borders of USSR military zone—summarizes the three traits expected to be possessed by the man of science (*der Mann der Wissenschaft*) as follows: '*Erstens: er muß auf eine Weise geistesabwesend sein können, die nur dem im Angesicht letzter Wahrheitsfragen Stehenden widerfährt… Zweitens: [Er] geht im Verfolg seiner Arbeit durch Zweifel an sich selbst, die bis zur Verzweiflung anwachsen können… Das ist die Tragödie des Forschertums… Drittens: [Er] muß von echter Bescheidenheit sein*' (see Gadamer 1947, pp. 13–15).

11. 'Technology makes memory superfluous' (Horkheimer 1967, p. 68).

12. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see Nalbantoğlu 2000, pp. 3–20 and pp. 27–35; pp. 37–40; pp. 41–46.

13. For details, see Nalbantoğlu 2002b, pp. 187–229; especially pp. 191–203.

14. The same can be said of the sphere of aesthetics; especially when one considers those 'so-called yuppie' literati who push the phrase 'aesthetization of life' to the ground. As Adorno has noted, 'In ethical life *tò déon* (Aristoteles) has its own principle (*to hóti*) and does not have to rely on practical philosophy [Kant]; the same is valid for aesthetics, too; it does not rely on a theoretical artscience [*Kunstwissenschaft*]' (Adorno 1973, p. 393, 1997a, p. 263).

15. For a general discussion on the same topic, see Nalbantoğlu 2001, pp. 11–23.

16. The importance of this point becomes clearer when considered in relation to Max Weber's lecture—with the same title—to students in the Winter Term of 1919 (See fn. 3).

17. (Adorno 1998b, pp. 203–205) [thenceforth MM]. Adorno's diagnosis is important for understanding the impasse of individuality and the significance of utopia for ethics today. At the end of 127th, he states the following: 'Neither synthesis of psychic compartments, alienated from each other, nor a therapeutic displacement of the ratio with irrational ferments [*nicht die therapeutische Versetzung der ratio mit irrationalen Fermenten*], is any help against the splitting of thought, but rather the self-constitution of the element of the wish [*Element des Wunsches*], which constitutes thinking as antithetical thinking. Only when that element is completely dissolved into the objectivity of thought with no heteronomous remnant left behind [*ohne heteronomen Rest in die Objektivität*

des Gedankens aufgelöst wird], does it drive toward utopia' (p. 205). [Translator's note: In the German expressions in brackets, the author (HUN) refers to Adorno 1951].

18. See 'Modern Çağda *Universitas* Kavramına Ne Oldu?' (What Happened to the Concept of *Universitas* in the Modern Age?) and 'Dalgın Thales, Uyanık Üniversite A.Ş.' (Abstracted Thales, Shrewd University Inc.) in Nalbantoğlu (2000, pp. 3–40). Adorno had already mentioned the withering away of academic freedom in the age of the 'mass university': '*Academic freedom is degraded into customer service and must submit to inspections*' (1998b, p. 274). [*Freiheit der Lehre wird zum Kundendienst erniedrigt und soll sich Kontrollen fügen* (1969, p. 186)] [emphasis mine].

19. One can see that the painful depictions Adorno made between 1945 and 1947 shed light on contemporary era. For example, he states: 'It is a miserable ideology, to claim that under present conditions the administration of a trust requires any more intelligence, experience, and even training than reading a manometer. While this is tenaciously upheld in material production, the Spirit [Geist-DR] is subjugated to its opposite. This is the doctrine, since gone to the dogs, of the *universitas literarum* [Latin: world of knowledge-DR], of the equality of all in the republic of sciences [*Republik der Wissenschaften*-HUN], wherein every person does not merely check up on everyone else, but is supposed to be qualified to do what anyone else does, equally well. Interchangeability subjugates thought to the same procedure just as exchange does to things [*Vertretbarkeit unterwirft die Gedanken derselben Prozedur wie der Tausch die Dinge*-HUN]. What is incommensurable is eliminated. Since however thought must first of all critique the comprehensive commensurability [*allumfassende Kommensurabilität*-HUN], which stems from the exchange-relationship, this commensurability, as the intellectual [geistiges-DR] relations of production turns against the productive forces.... Non-interchangeability alone could halt the integration of the Spirit in to the ranks of employee [*Unvertretbarkeit allein könnte der Eingliederung des Geistes in die Angestelltenschaft Einhalt tun*]' (MM, Reflection 83). [Translator's note: Since both authors used parentheses to refer to the German original text, I preferred to mark which parentheses is used by which author by the authors'

initials. Thus: Dennis Redmond: DR; Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu: HUN.]

20. Walter Benjamin offers a slight warning through the pages of *Passagen-Werk* for those who repetitively use the word *flâneur* as if it is magical with a somewhat 'cinematic time' absurdity, and praise *flâneur* as a type: 'In the person of *Flâneur* the intelligentsia becomes acquainted with the marketplace. It surrenders itself to the market, thinking merely to look around; but in fact is already seeking a buyer. In this intermediate stage, in which it still has patrons but is starting to bend to the demands of the market (in the guise of the *feuilleton*), it constitutes the *bohème*. The uncertainty of its economic position corresponds to the ambiguity of its political function. The latter is manifest especially clearly in the figures of the professional conspirators who are recruited from the *bohème*' (Benjamin 1993, p. 99, 1999, p. 21; cf.). George Steiner (1999), while commenting on the translation of this grand and unfinished work, describes the scene represented by the *flâneur* as follows: 'the *flâneur* type refers to the panorama of the city, formed in the cinematic time' (p. 4).

21. For the use of this palpable concept, see Baker 2002.

22. Akçuraoğlu Yusuf Bey (June 9, 1336/April 9, 1920), who for me was the most valuable ideologue-thinker of the Republican era in Turkey pointed out 'the strata of mimetic intellectuals, who were not many in number but whose social effects go beyond their numbers, trying to sustain a pleasant life through İstanbul's international capital.' He located these intellectuals among the opponents of the Union and Progress Party and in a way noted an *avant-garde* for their present examples [The article was published later on in 1924. See Akçuraoğlu (1924, pp. 21–32; especially p. 31)]. This depiction is all the more true for the present *parvenus*, who cannot become pleb-citizens yet who are sly enough not to care about becoming as such for their immediate interests. The elite families of the Republic, who claimed monopoly over knowledge tried to implant 'cultivation,' primarily into those who continued their bloodline. However, this cultivation, that lifeless civility cannot go beyond being a technique that well serves a *Halbbildung*, which insidiously follows new opportunities, was brought about by rapid changes in objective social conditions. The shifts and transformations in the class bases of such families and family traditions, which are by nature prejudiced against the 'others,' and which are inculcated

into the new generations, some of whom opt for their parents pro- fessions, have not yet been discussed in detail in terms of their vari- ous dimensions in the history of Turkish society.

23. Adorno finishes the 83rd reflection in MM (*Vice-President*) in a manner that might hit anyone with a minimum sensitivity in the age of the mass university: 'A pencil and eraser are of more use to thought than a staff of assistants. Those who wish neither to hand themselves over wholesale to individualism of intellectual produc- tion, nor to commit themselves headlong to the collectivism of an egalitarian interchangeability, which is contemptuous of human beings, *must rely on free and solidaristic cooperative labor under common responsibility. Anything else would would sell out the Spirit [Geist-DR] to forms of business and thereby ultimately to the latter's interests*' [emphasis mine].

24. Siegfried Kracauer had already emphasized in the late 1920s that the 'culture of expertise' inevitably displays myopia in relation to the broader social landscape beyond the narrow sphere on which one specializes and that this should be considered no different from fecklessness, especially in times of political turmoil. Moreover, while pointing out that those preoccupations, characterized as 'expertise,' can in no sense be regarded as expertise in the real sense of the term, Kracauer was stressing the need to mobilize the details of one's specialization in a way that would feed into a more comprehensive model so that the 'culture of expertise' would become meaningful. In that he was almost certainly running well ahead of present-day calls for 'interdisciplinarity.' See Kracauer (2001, p. 404). For the last point, see also Levin 1995, p. 10.

25. The original can be found in Joad (1939, p. 294).

26. Among many friends who proposed alternatives to this tentative characterization, was Dr. Belkıs Ayhan Tarhan. In a close reading group, inspired from fragments of Parmenides and Herakleitos in M. Heidegger's lectures on *Was heißt Denken?/What is Called Thinking?*, the alternative was named as 'the reluctant academic'— a type that can be considered within the scope of a kind that is discussed in the book, whose reason works at a high speed, who cannot concern herself/himself and thus get preoccupied with the 'things,' someone whom Nietzsche characterizes as the 'last man' (*die letzten Menschen*), corresponding to the increasing desertifica- tion of the conditions of the new (modern) ages. In order to pre- empt misunderstanding in Turkish, to a certain extent, I could

have named it as the 'narrow-hearted academic.' However, apart from the social type discussed in this text, there are many academic types who reduce the 'things' to dull 'objects' of analysis rather than turning them into a concern, an issue (*das Sache*) through mindful and heartfelt consideration. Therefore I will continue with the characterization of *Ersatz yuppie* until a more telling description is found.

27. Sennett (1998); Turkish version, 2002. David Riesman, once a teacher of Sennett, as C. Wright Mills had analyzed the 'white-collars' as the prototype of the new US middle class, which was crystallized especially in the late 1940s with special emphasis on their 'other-directed' characters *vis-à-vis* old middle-class types, which he characterized as 'inner-directed.' See Riesman et al. (1973, pp. 263–266). Adorno, too, who elaborated on the mass stupefying leveling techniques of the US culture industry, used Riesman's distinction between the old and new character types to analyze the reflection of the 'other-directed' type (i.e. desperate in the face of external objective conditions), which develops along with the retreat of the old protestant ethos and the 'inner-directed' type. Analyzing popular novels of the past from Adorno's perspective, one can observe that the emphasis is on *inwardness*, inner contradictions of the spirit and psychological impasses. But the individual asked for and reinforced by contemporary popular culture, especially television, which enables the surrender of the individual *via* imagery, is a type characterized as other-directed yet also one that is totally surrendered through such means and techniques, whose thoughts and feelings are turned into clichés. Adorno (1954), who elaborates on the corrupting effect of this new state of affairs on moral codes, fueled by the pseudo-realism of television, writes as follows: 'The middle-class "ontology" is preserved in an almost fossilized way but is severed from the mentality of the middle classes. By being superimposed on people with whose living conditions and mental make-up it is no longer in accordance, this middle-class "ontology" assumes an increasingly authoritarian and at the same time hollow character' p. 218 and fn. 2. [The journal in which Adorno's article was published was called *Hollywood Quarterly* before 1951, and *Film Quarterly* from 1958 onwards. Thenceforth it will be referred to as *QFRT*.]

28. One might say that Adorno based his analysis on the consideration of *not only those, fitting into the social types that I discuss now*, but also keeping in mind the dispersion of the *ethos, whose force can draw all of us into its black hole*: 'Everyone must always be planning something. It is necessary to exhaust free-time. It is planned, employed for undertakings, filled up with the visit of every possible institution or through the fastest possible locomotion. The shadow of this falls on intellectual labor [*die intellektuelle Arbeit*-HUN]. It takes place with a bad conscience [*mit schlechtem Gewissen*-HUN], as if it were moonlighting from some sort of urgent, albeit purely imaginary occupation. In order to justify its (MM, 91st Reflection) own activity to itself, it adopts to itself, it adopts the gestures of what is hectic, under high pressure, of the enterprise racing against the clock, of every sensibility—including itself—which stands in its way … Similarly, the forms of the production process [*die Formen des Produktionsprozesses*-HUN] are repeated more generally in private life [*im Privatleben*-HUN] or in the forms of work that were exempt from these forms … *One's entire life is supposed to look like an occupation* [*Das ganze Leben soll wie Beruf aussehen*-HUN]. Through this similarity, anything not yet immediately dedicated to material gain will be hidden. Yet the fear [*Die Angst*-HUN] thereby expressed, only reflects a much deeper one' [emphasis mine]. [Translator's note: In this quotation, there are contradictions between the Turkish and English translations. As a tentative resolution, I preferred to translate the Turkish quotation into English rather than automatically quoting from the English translation.]
29. For the original and abstract discussion on 'master-slave' dialectics, see Hegel 1970, pp. 145–155; English version: 1977, pp. 111–119.
30. One can find the supporting arguments in Adorno's same work. He points out that the inherent meaning of Master-ethics [*Der implizite Sinn der Herrenmoral*] lies in the postulate that '*anyone willing to live has to make it through*' [*wer leben wolle, müsse zupacken*-HUN]. He also adds, '*Slave-ethics* [Sklavenmoral-DR] *is in fact bad: it is still only master-ethics* [Herrenmoral-DR].' [*Die Sklavenmoral ist schlecht in der Tat: sie ist immer noch Herrenmoral*-HUN]. See Adorno (1998b, pp. 99 and 192 [emphasis mine]).
31. Here the author gives the quotation in German from Adorno (1997c, p. 232). (Editor's note)

32. This state of affairs actually results from the fear, lack of confidence and ultimately lack of love that lies behind the whole civilization polish, and in the face of 'things,' including her/himself. Referring to Adorno once more: 'In the eyes of any "mundane person," who pursues interests and who has plans to realize, human beings whom s/he meets automatically turn into friends and foes' [*Freund und Feind*]. By trying to figure out their possible role in one's plans, one has already reduced them into objects from the very start (MM, 85th Reflection). Likewise in the 18th Reflection (*Asylum for the Homeless*), we meet with a similar depiction: 'ethics today means not being at home in one's house. … a loveless lack of attention for things, which ultimately turns against human beings, too … There is no right life in the wrong one' [*es gehört zur Moral, nicht bei sich selber zu Hause zu sein…einer lieblosen Nichtachtung für die Dinge, die notwendig auch gegen die Menschen sich kehrt,… Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen*-HUN.] (p. 41). [I think that the last sentence would better be translated as 'there is no right life in falsehood.'] In the meantime, it is encouraging to see that Said, who is keen on distinguishing the 'exile intellectual' type, which he refers to metaphorically, from the servile professionals who display this lack of love, also recalls this 18th Reflection (1995, pp. 61–62).

33. On this topic, there is considerable literature. See, for example, Clark and Royle (1995), and particularly Readings (1995, pp. 15–28).

34. This point is especially underlined in a text by Zygmunt Bauman (2000, pp. 5–6) on a book, which is of utmost importance for our topic. For the book on which Bauman writes, see Oakes and Vidich (1999). Bauman cannot refrain from remembering Durkheim's hope that professional ethics would replace the void once the religious foundations of morality have collapsed.

35. In fact, one has to admit that this state of affairs is not new. Kant's two ironic public letters of 1798 to publisher and philosopher Friedrich Nicolai indicate the determination of the trend to catch up with the age by the book market (and thus their ephemerality). They also offer a real example for the counter-positioning of those who do science patiently. See Kant (1968, pp. 433–438). [For the English version, see Kant 1997, pp. 621–625.]

36. I think that the following very interesting statement that Adorno makes in one of his works (1932) on *kitsch* in music is also true for

products that at first hand appear to be outstanding: 'The worst kitsch is kitsch with "class" [*Der ärgste Kitsch ist der mit "Niveau"*-HUN], which is not recognizable, but has compositional ambition. The only means of tearing off its mask is *technical* critique—elements of kitsch [*Kitschelemente*-HUN] in music that is intended as "serious" [*in "Ernst"*-HUN] always give themselves away by technical anomalies. [But] True, the latter only provide the point of departure: technical anomie does not necessarily need to be kitsch' (Adorno 2002, p. 504, German version: 1984, p. 794).

37. George Steiner's last work, *Grammars of Creation* (2001), which displays unique honesty and modesty, is a perfect example.

38. In the words of my invaluable professor Dr. Necat Erder, there are in fact two fronts to the research process in 'peripheral' cultures and societies, which is arranged to fit into what is deemed to be prior by the 'center': on the one hand, there is the importing of expensive theoretical frames; on the other hand, there is cheap information exporting (November 28, 2002—Personal correspondence). I agree with Professor Erder's assessment. I think its meaning goes beyond a resemblance that refers to economic dependence. Since *ersatz yuppie* academics are deprived of a moral–intellectual power that would enable the 'quality control' of the expensive theoretical frames that they import on a seasonal basis, data and comments that are derived from hasty adjustment of the frames, many of which are botched although imported, turn knowledge into a meaningless 'fast food' commodity exchange. After all, under the conditions of contemporary mass production, one cannot claim that the taste of the 'center' is rather 'selective' or can one?

39. When those who are included in this type gain their place in the 'center' temporarily or—god willing—permanently, they might be undervalued in the words of a native colleague as 'our resident orientalist.' I would like to thank my invaluable professor Dr. Necat Erder once again, who witnessed and shared with me such a characterization of a visiting academic from the 'periphery.' Professor Erder, who has contributed significantly to the training of his students and whose penetrative observation, analysis and expressive power is well known, also highlighted two further issues that I have not emphasized sufficiently: (1) Such a tendency is not reserved to the type under discussion. It was there in the 1980s and it can be

traced back to the 1950s. What distinguishes the current period from the past is that the process of the commodification of knowledge has deepened on a global scale. (2) In the past, those who went from the 'peripheral' countries to the 'center' were paid equivalent wages. Now, however, those who depart from Turkey generally have to take on more work in return for significantly less payment (28 November 2002—Personal correspondence).

40. I would like to thank Sinan Kadir Çelik, who read an earlier version of this text and drew my attention to the following quotation from Terry Eagleton, which Çelik thinks supports my argument: 'Some, one might predict, would assume that the dominant system was entirely negative—that nothing *within* this seamlessly non-contradictory whole could by definition be of value—and turn from it in dismay to idealize some numinous Other. This cult would no doubt be coupled with a guilty self-laceration on the part of some scions of the first world who would hanker to be just about anybody but themselves. One might forecast an enormous upsurge of interest in the alien, deviant, exotic, unincorporable. Perhaps there would be a quickening of concern for non-human animals; or perhaps radical theorists would be frantically trying to communicate with aardvarks or the inhabitants of Alpha Centauri, while hoping of course that their communications would remain suitably unintelligible' (Eagleton 1996, p. 7).

41. Although there is really little work on the dangers and absurdities, awaiting the university, and 'human sciences' and scientific 'work' as parts of the university in this market, and under the conditions of the 'information society,' one of the recent texts of Jacques Derrida, who had already considered this topic, contains important hints for the issues that are discussed here. In order not to lengthen the text more than necessary, I refrain from following these hints, apart from directing the reader to the relevant source: see Derrida 2002b, pp. 202–237.

42. 'The stories' says Adorno, 'teach their readers that one has to be "realistic," that one has to give up romantic ideas, that one has to adjust oneself at any price, and that nothing more can be expected of any individual. The perennial middle-class conflict between individuality and society has been reduced to a dim memory' (1954, p. 220). Pseudo-realism of this sort is hidden in popular culture literature, specific to *Ersatz* letters, though it appears to be radical.

Those antipathetic texts of Baudrillard, which form the sources of inspiration for *Ersatz* letters and which themselves display a state of schizophrenia, might be the most vivid contemporary example of pseudo-realist lyrics.

43. A friend who read an earlier version of the text drew my attention to the following lines from Edip Cansever's *Şairin Seyir Defteri* (The Poet's Journal) [(2001) '*Bezik Oynayan Kadınlar, Seniha'nın Günlüğünden/II' (Women Playing Bezique, From Seniha's Journal)*; p. 226]: '*But/How difficult it is to start, how fragile / Continuing, just continuing / That easy: / As if nothing has happened / Heart beats, watch spring / Years years years / With an unresolved frustration / Making lack of love a permanent smile.*' On the other hand, while noting that '[t]act [*Takt*-HUN] is distinguishing the differences,' Adorno could not refrain from adding the following on the current nominal use of tact: 'Emancipated and purely individualized tact ultimately turns into a mere lie [*Schließlich wird der emanzipierte, rein individuelle Takt zur bloßen Lüge*] … Behind the demand to relate to the individuals informally and accepting them as such lies an eager supervision, checking whether each word tacitly gives an account of what the addressee, amidst an all-encompassing hierarchy hardened in itself is saying, and which are the addressee's chances' (MM, 16th Reflection). One cannot but consider the following by Adorno in another Reflection: 'They are to be found in all political camps, even there, where the rejection of the system is taken for granted and for that reason a *lax and cunning* conformism of its own has developed. Often they win people over through some benevolence, through the sympathetic sharing of the life of others—selflessnes as speculation! [*Selbstlosigkeit auf Spekulation*-HUN] They are clever, witty, sensible, and flexible: they have polished the old trader-spirit *[alten Händlergeist]* with the achievements of the day-before-yesterday's psychology. They are ready for anything, even love, *yet always faithlessly*. They betray not from instinctual drives, but from principle: they betray because they value even themselves as a profit, which they do not wish to share with anyone else [*noch sich selber werten sie als Profit, den sie keinem anderen gönnen*-HUN]. They are bound to the Spirit [Geist-DR] in a push-and-pull style with affinity and hate [*An den* Geist *bindet sie Wahlverwandtschaft und Haß*-HUN]: they

are a temptation for the thoughtful, but also their worst enemies'
(Adorno 1998b, p. 24) [emphasis mine].

44. On the same topic (see Nalbantoğlu 2002b, pp. 187–229).

45. 'Pseudo-culture is spirit overcome by fetishism of commodities'
(Adorno 1993, p. 28). [*Halbbildung ist der vom Fetischcharakter
der Ware ergriffene Geist*-HUN] (Adorno [1959] 1979, p. 108).

46. I would like to thank Dr. Orhan Tekelioğlu, who proposed the
term 'idiocy' as more appropriate than 'stupidity.' However, the
Turkish version of the word 'idiocy' (*bön*) seems to contain a fea-
ture that does not pertain to my examples: that is, 'innocence.'
Some friends proposed 'mindlessness,' or even 'foolishness.' The
examples included in the category of the social type that we focus
on fall within mainstream stupidity because of both their indiffer-
ent narrow-mindedness toward even the simple morality guarding
others and their restlessness, which costs others and ultimately
themselves. Thus, for me, we cannot characterize them as exhibit-
ing 'mindlessness' since they can mobilize 'instrumental reason,'
especially in their short-term steps. In the final analysis, whichever
term we prefer to use, this state of affairs has to be considered as
stupification, folly and idiocy in both general/objective and indi-
vidual/subjective terms.

47. As if confirming this diagnosis, Adorno adds the following in one
of his reflections, which I quoted before (MM, 91st Reflection):
'*Doing things and going places* is the sensorium's attempt to create
a kind of protective stimulus against a threatening collectivization
… The strategy here is to outdo the danger. One lives to a certain
extent worse, that is with still lest of an ego, than one can expect to
live [*mit noch weniger Ich*-HUN]. At the same time one learns,
through *the playful excess of giving up the self*, that for someone who
in all seriousness lives without an ego, things can be easier instead
of harder. … *Pseudoactivity is a re-insurance* [Rückversicherun:
reinsurance, a secondary insurance covering a set of original insur-
ance policies-DR], *the expression of preparation for self-sacrifice*, in
which alone one has an inkling of a guarantee of self-preservation.
Security beckons in the adaptation to the most extreme insecurity.
*It is conceived of as a flight charter, which brings one as quickly as
possible someplace else.* …It is the foundation of what the bourgeoisie
inaccurately called the flight from oneself, from the inner void [*was
die Bürger zu Unrecht die Flucht vor sich selbst, vor der inneren Leere*

zu nennen-HUN]. Whoever wants to come along is not allowed to be different' [emphasis mine].

48. Again a warning from Adorno on the elderly: 'Unresistingly, for a quarter century, elderly bourgeois *who ought to know better* have been running over to the culture industry, which has so precisely calculated their starving hearts' (MM, 96th Reflection) [emphasis mine]. For my examples in this text, the race that is run with advertiser's mentality seems to gain a more repressive and corrosive character.

49. In the meantime, one should not pass over Horkheimer's and Adorno's texts—well past the time—on this obsession with the 'body,' which has provided bracing 'material' for recent theoretical discourse. These two thinkers, who connect the topic of the 'body' with the Janus-faced history of Europe—one written (read as 'official') and the other 'underground'—[*Unter der bekannten Geschichte Europas läuft eine unterirdische*-HUN], emphasize that the love–hate relationship with the body colors all recent cultural history, which deems the body a 'property' [*Die Haßliebe gegen den Körper färbt alle neuere Kultur*-HUN]. And as if they had already sensed present-day 'yuppie' sub-culture, they do not refrain from stating the following: '*The body cannot be turned back into the envelope of the soul. It remains a cadaver, no matter how trained and fit it may be*' [*Der Körper ist nicht wieder zurückzuverwandeln in den Leib. Er bleibt die Leiche, auch wenn er noch so sehr ertüchtigt wird*-HUN]. See Horkheimer and Adorno: 267; English version, 2002, p. 194 [emphasis mine].

50. Here, too, Adorno offers an interesting observation: 'One could not imagine Nietzsche in an office, the secretary answering the phone in the foyer, sitting at desk until five, then playing golf after a day's work. In the face of the pressure of society, it is only the cunning intertwining of fortune and labor [*Einzig listige Verschränkung von Glück und Arbeit*] that leaves the door open for true experience. It is constantly less tolerated. Even the so-called intellectual occupations *are being utterly divested of pleasure, by their increasing resemblance to business.* …No spiritual fulfillment may be attached to work, which would otherwise lose its functional obscurity in the totality of purpose, no spark of sensibility [*Besinnung*] may fall in free-time, because it might spring into the work-world and set it aflame. While work and pleasure are becom-

ing more and more similar in their structure, they are at the same time separated ever more strictly by invisible lines of demarcation. *Joy and Spirit [Lust und Geist-*HUN*] are being driven out of both in equal measure. In both, brute [tierisch-*HUN*] seriousness [Ernst-*HUN*] and pseudoactivity [Pseudoaktivität-*HUN*] prevails'* (MM, 84th Reflection) [emphasis mine].

51. Siegfried Kracauer states that 'the world has already guaranteed that the individual cannot reach to her/himself [that s/he had lost] … [f]urthermore, though one does not care about the world, the world cares her/him so as to push her/him to total distress, not being able to reach peace and serenity' (2002, p. 178). If I amend my note to my translation, for the sample here I could comfortably say the following: '[e]ven if one is disinclined to anything, the world makes her/him similar' [to the others]. [Kracauer resorts to the following expression in the original German text: *Indessen: man will nichts tun, und man wird getan* (2002, p. 178, fn. 9).]

52. We can take Diana Christensen, played by Faye Dunaway in the award-winning black comedy, 'Network,' directed by Sidney Lumet (1976), as an example. This synthetic character, composed of spiritual/mental particles, and displayed by many types in real life, tragicomically hosts the spiritual/mental structure of the 'yuppies' and 'bobos' as early as the 1970s. In the script, written by Paddy Chayefsky, the nihilism that also permits the type discussed in this text, is sufficiently expressed in the dialogues of this brutal schizoid–paranoid character, who believes in fortune tellers and who is obsessed with ratings, even in her most intimate moments. See http://www.geocities.com/karl_rackwitz/slumet1.html. The general typecasting of this perilous personality was previously explained in the *Dialectics of Enlightenment* [1944, 1947] as follows: '[Under the conditions of culture industry] personality means hardly more than dazzling white teeth and freedom from body odor and emotions. That is the triumph of culture industry: the compulsive imitation by consumers of cultural commodities, which at the same time, they recognize as false' [personality *bedeutet ihnen kaum mehr etwas anderes als blendend weiße Zähne und Freiheit von Achselschweiß und Emotionen. Das ist der Triumph der Reklame in der Kulturindustrie, die zwangshafte Mimesis der Konsumenten an die zugleich durchschauten Kulturwaren-*HUN] (Horkheimer and Adorno, p. 191; English version: p. 136).

53. 'Words do remind us unnervingly of our losses' (Steiner 2001, p. 319).

54. Turning to Adorno, once more: 'The oft-cited play-acting of modern artists, however, their exhibitionism [*Exhibitionismus*-HUN], is the gesture, through which they put themselves as goods [*als Waren*-HUN] on the market' (MM, 137th Reflection). In the following reflection, Adorno offers another very important statement that also refers to academics: 'Social enchantment unavoidably turns those who do not play along into self-seeking types, while those without a self, who live according to the reality principle, are called selfless [*und der* ohne Selbst *dem Prinzip der Realität nachlebt, heißt selbstlos*]' (MM, 138th Reflection) [emphasis mine]. For a better analysis of the distortion emphasized here, please see fn. 54.

55. 'The pseudo-cultured person practices self-preservation without a self. [S/h]e can no longer realize subjectivity as bourgeois theory would define it—in the sense of experience and ideas. Experience… in which practice and association establish tradition in the individual—is replaced by the selective, disconnected, inter-changeable and ephemeral state of being informed which, as one can already observe, will promptly be cancelled by other information' (Adorno 1993, p. 33). [*Der Halbgebildete betreibt Selbsterhaltung ohne Selbst. Worin nach jeglicher bürgerlichen Theorie Subjektivität sich erfüllte, Erfahrung und Begriff, kann er sich nicht mehr leisten;… Erfahrung, die Kontinuität des Bewußtseins,… wird ersetzt durch die punktuelle, unverbundene, auchwechselbare und ephemere Informiertheit, der schon anzumerken ist, daß sie im nächsten Augenblick durch andere Informationen weggewischt wird.*] (Adorno [1959] 1979, p. 115.) [emphasis mine]

56. Roland Barthes and Louis Althusser had expressed their doubts at an earlier time about (the 'xxxxx studies') interdisciplinarity, where now the *Ersatz* are fooling around with no direction and as soldiers of fortune. Derrida who is a fervent supporter of 'unconditional university', too, states his deep concerns as follows: 'The deconstructive task of the Humanities to come will not let itself be contained within the traditional limits of the departments that today, belong, by their very status, to the Humanities. These Humanities to come [*l'à-venir?*-HUN] will cross disciplinary borders without, all the same, dissolving the specificity of each discipline into what

is called, often in a very confused way, interdisciplinarity or into what is lumped with another food-for-everything concept, "cultural studies."' (Derrida 2002b). I have tried to draw attention to Althusser's and Barthes' position in relation to 'pseudo-interdisciplinarity' in my previous works. See, for example, Nalbantoğlu (2000, p. 137 and fn. 3).

57. See endnote 32 above.

58. Adorno does not suffice with this. He goes further by spelling out such severe comments about the 'research technicians' [*Die Forschungstechniker*-HUN], all of whom are afflicted with collective stupidity despite so many differences, and the young intellectuals [*Die junge Intellektuelle*] who share the same fate with them: 'Because thinking [*Denken*] burdens them with a subjective responsibility, which their objective position in the production process prevents them from fulfilling, they renounce it, shake a bit and run over to the other side. The displeasure of thinking soon turns into the incapacity to think at all: people who effortlessly invent the most refined statistical objections, when it is a question of sabotaging a cognition, are not capable of making the simplest predictions of content ex cathedra [Latin: from the chair, e.g. Papal decision]. ... Many still wait in fear and shame, at being caught with their defect. [*Manche warten noch mit Angst und Scham darauf, ihres Defekts überführt zu werden.*] ... Their never-ending hate and ressentiment, is socially rationalized in the following assertion: thinking is unscientific. [*Ihr Ressentimen wird gesell-schaftlich rationalisiert unter der Form: Denken ist unwissenschaftlich*-HUN]. ... The collective stupidity of research technicians [*Die kollektive Dummheit der Forschungstechniker*-HUN] is not simply the absence or regression of intellectual capacities, but an over-growth of the capacity of thought itself, which eats away the latter with its own energy. The masochistic malice [Bosheit-DR] of young intellectuals derives from the malevolence [Bösartigkeit-DR] of their illness. G [*Die masohistische Bosheit der jungen Intellektuellen rührt von der Bösartigkeit ihrer Erkrankung her*-HUN.]' (MM, 80th Reflection, p. 128). For the struggle against 'amnesia,' which stupefies such intellectuals (see also Çelik 2002, pp. 17–18).

59. For example, Pierre Hadot emphasizes this issue as the most important distinction between ancient philosophers and modern ones: since the ancient philosophers chose a life in accordance with

philo-sophia, thus rejecting to choose among other modalities of life—although they could do so easily, they produced a discourse that is specific to such a life (e.g. Thales, as presented by Aristotle). On the other hand, many modern philosophers console themselves with the dream that the manufacture of discourse will eventually restore their lives to the level that they deserve. For detailed discussion, see Hadot 2002; French version: *Quest-ce que la philosophie antique?* 1995.

60. Derrida, who I think certainly well knows those who do not take on responsibility in the contemporary 'mass university,' has long been elaborating on the relationship between 'responsibility' and 'justice,' which he claims to be beyond deconstruction (Derrida 1994, p. xix.).

61. As anyone with a somewhat similar approach might admit, such shared traits that originate from the struggles of the collective life, which Heidegger emphasizes in *Being and Time*, are in close relation with the conceptualization of justice that is found to be beyond deconstruction. See Derrida (2002a, p. 51).

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Index

Note: Page numbers followed by "n" denote notes.