

‘Paradigm of Consciousness’, Phenomenology and Sāṅkhya

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Abstract

Introduction This paper is introduced as the first in a series on a comparative study in phenomenology and Sāṅkhya. The issues intended to be investigated in this paper have been specified.

Intentionality Brentano’s attempt to characterize the Cartesian division of the world with the help of his concept of intentionality, his theory of intentionality and difficulties associated with it are discussed.

Paradox and Remedy Consciousness, which alone is argued to be intentional, is argued to make the world a paradoxical pseudo-totality preventing its theorization. The remedy for resolution of the paradox is presented.

Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality and ‘Paradigm of Consciousness’ The division of the world possible under the ‘Cartesian paradigm’ is shown to be of no help in resolving the paradox. Husserl’s theory of intentionality is shown to have distinguished itself from theories prior to it, in dividing the pseudo-totality that the world is, into genuine totalities under the ‘paradigm of consciousness’.

Phenomenological and ‘Natural’ Reduction The possibility of the being of phenomenology as a science as well as, that of the ‘natural sciences’ comprising the physical sciences as well as psychology, is traced to their being sciences of genuine totalities made possible by the division under the ‘paradigm of consciousness’ by Husserl’s theory of intentionality.

Sāṅkhya Sāṅkhya is argued to be a phenomenological discourse. In fact, it is argued to be a post-epoche discourse. Also, all cittaṽṛtti are argued to have their viṣaya, the concept which has been identified with ‘intentional object’ as the correlate of consciousness. Cittaṽṛtti, therefore, are argued to be intentional, and thereby equivalent to intentional mental processes. Parallels in Sāṅkhya to Husserl’s concepts of ‘matter’ and ‘quality’ of mental processes have been sought in Sāṅkhya.

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Introduction

As Chandradhar Sharma (1960) in the first chapter of his *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* observes, ‘Western philosophy has remained more or less true to the etymological meaning of the word “philosophy”¹ in being essentially an intellectual quest of truth’. Husserl’s phenomenology, a school in modern Western philosophy, we may say, is no exception to this. The avowed purpose, on the other hand, of almost all Indian *darśanas* has been annihilation of sufferings. They too indeed seek truth, but only as a worthy tool to achieve this purpose. The closely related pair of the classical Indian *darśanas*, namely Sāṅkhya-Yoga, is no exceptions to this.

The author came to notice extensive parallelism between phenomenology and the pair Sāṅkhya-Yoga so much so that looking at phenomenology through the grid of Sāṅkhya-Yoga helped his understanding of phenomenology, which prompted him to take up their comparative study.

The pair Sāṅkhya-Yoga, for its objective of annihilation of suffering, has its science as well as its engineering. If Yoga may be taken as the engineering of annihilation of sufferings, Sāṅkhya, we may say, is its underlying science. It is in view of the emphasis, which sciences, rather than engineering, place on rigour, that Sāṅkhya was isolated from the pair for comparing it with phenomenology, which also is certainly to be considered as a scientific theory (if eidetic). However, without compromising on rigour, we will entitle ourselves to draw upon the resources of Yoga in so far as its elaborations of concepts in Sāṅkhya can help our arguments.

The term Sāṅkhya derives from *Sāṅkhyā*, which means right knowledge. Sāṅkhya is one of the oldest *darśanas*, that is, schools of philosophy. It finds mention in several *upaniṣads* (such as *Chāndogya*, *Praśna*, *Kaṭha* and particularly in *Śvetāśvatara*), in *Mahābhārata*, *Bhagavadgītā*, and also in several *smṛtis* and *purāṇas*. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, which we will go by, is accepted as the earliest available and the most popular text on Sāṅkhya. It is compiled by Īśvarakṛṣṇa around 200 A. D. (Dasgupta 1922). It comprises 72 *kārikās* (verses). Relevant *kārikās* will be referred in this paper as *kārikā*, followed by its number. The commentary, *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*, written in ninth century A.D. (Dasgupta 1922) by Vācaspatiśrī (2005) will be referred as *kaumudī*, followed by the relevant section number.

This comparison of phenomenology even restricted only to Sāṅkhya was found to be too vast for a single paper and had to be divided, if tentatively, into the following issue-based parts: (1) consciousness (2) nature (in the sense of *prakṛti*) (3) constitution of objects, (4) constitution of subjects and (5) what Husserl calls ‘Pure ego’. The paper on the second topic (Burte 2015) is already published. Under the third topic, the author plans to discuss constitution of objects and the apparatus that constitutes them; under the fourth, that of subjective structures like *sūkṣma śāstra*

¹ Love of learning.

and under the fifth topic, he plans to compare ‘pure ego’ with what Sāṅkhya calls *puruṣa*. The treatment under each topic, rather than being exhaustive, is intended to focus on key issues.

Tracing consciousness to intentionality, as introduced by Brentano to characterize the Cartesian paradigm, the present paper brings out how, while it makes apprehension possible, consciousness itself makes the world paradoxical, thereby making its theorization problematic. The remedy to this problem is traced in Husserl’s theory of intentionality, which the paper argues opens the ‘paradigm of consciousness’ and makes phenomenology on the one hand, and on the other hand, sciences of both sides of the Cartesian division possible. The paper then compares Sāṅkhya with phenomenology in its being a discourse under phenomenological reduction and compares intentional mental processes in phenomenology and *cittavṛtti* in Sāṅkhya regarding their intentionality, ‘quality’ and ‘matter’.

Intentionality

Descartes divided the world into mind and matter on the basis of indubitability of the former, and dubitability of the latter, with thought and extension as their respective essences. But the chief problem faced by this distinction was the fact that mind and matter do influence each other, which must negate the essentiality of the distinction. Monist theories such as idealism of Berkeley or physicalism tried to bypass this problem by dogmatically denying, respectively, matter or mind.

Brentano introduced ‘intentionality’ to characterize the division under what may be called the ‘Cartesian paradigm’ claiming, ‘all and only mental is intentional’, where to be ‘intentional’ is to be ‘of’ or ‘about’ something or to be directed to, or to refer to, something other than itself.

At the outset, one was likely to think of intentionality as a relation between mind and its object. A relation presumes mutually independent existence of what it relates, prior to their being related. Intentionality as a relation, therefore, demands mutually independent existence of the mind and the object. But then, it remains difficult to explain how the same physical object *as presented* can differ from person to person and also to the same person, from situation to situation, for example, Jocasta as the queen vs. the same Jocasta as his mother for Oedipus Rex (from McIntyre and Smith 1989). It is also difficult to explain how, on this theory, an existent like mind could relate to non-existents such as centaur, pegasus and golden mountains.

As quoted by Husserl (2001),² ‘Brentano...says that every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the mediaeval schoolmen called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we, not without ambiguity, call the relation to a content, the direction to an object or an immanent objectivity’. Here the objects, to which a mental process is intentionally directed, is called ‘intentional object’, which

² Husserl, ‘*Logical Investigations*’, hereafter ‘*LI*’, followed optionally by the investigation no, section number, paragraph number in that section and line number in that paragraph, for example, in the present case: (*LI* V §10,2,7).

are but ‘ideas’ or ‘conceptions’ of the objects (McIntyre and Smith 1989, P153). This theory identifies them with the content of mental processes. Therefore, the ‘intentional objects’ in the present sense must be distinguished to be, as existent and as mental, as mental processes themselves are. Such an ‘intentional object’, according to Brentano, is to be taken to ‘intentionally *in-exist*’, that is, exist *in* the intentional mental process itself as its *content*. Existence of the intentional mental process itself then guarantees existence, as intentional *in-existence*, of its ‘intentional object’. Even the objects like centaurs, round squares etc., which actually do not exist, could indeed intentionally *in-exist* the mental processes directed to them. Thus, Brentano’s theory could explain existence (as intentional *in-existence*) not only of the ‘same physical object as presented differently’ but also of non-existent objects like centaurs, round squares etc.

But all such ‘intentional objects’ being only mental, the theory of intentionality as a relation of mind to the intentional object can be seen to limit our experience only to the mental, to ideas as exemplified by Berkeley’s idealism, denying epistemic access either to the non-mental physical or to the non-existent objects. This stood against the theory of intentionality as a relation.

Paradox and Remedy

Portraits, words of languages, etc., also are ‘about’ or refer to something, but not intrinsically. Intrinsic reference, and hence intentionality, can be ascribed only to consciousness of something. Therefore, Brentano can be said to have introduced the concept of consciousness through ‘intentionality’.

Consciousness, according to Husserl (1913),³ does have its being.⁴ Our world must be taken to be a collection not only of objects but also of individual consciousnesses of objects with the same legitimacy. Thus, when I see the sun, the world comprises not only the sun but also my consciousness of the sun. If I become conscious also of the ‘consciousness of the sun’, this new consciousness also, with the same legitimacy, must belong to this collection, thereby modifying the world. There, in turn, can be an individual consciousness also of the modified entire collection. And this can go on. Now, there is a problem. Russell argues (Passmore 1966, p 224,3,1) ‘The paradoxes arise ... out of a certain kind of vicious circle. Such a vicious circle is generated whenever it is supposed that ”a collection of objects may contain members which can only be defined by means of the collection as a whole”’. Since this newest individual consciousness of the entire collection refers to the entire collection, the collection is to be presumed to be completed before the mention of, which means *without*, this individual consciousness, which, after all, *is* in the world as its member. This only means that the collection must be simultaneously completed and not completed. ‘This contradiction-that the class

³ Husserl, ‘*Ideas Pertaining to...*’ hereafter ‘*Ideas*’, followed optionally by page number, paragraph no, line number, followed by section number, paragraph number, line number.

⁴ In fact, as per Husserl (cf. *Ideas* P 92,2,1; §49,3,1), it is absolute being, as against the being of objects, which can be thought of only as relative and relative again, to consciousness.

must at once have been completed and not completed- brings out the fact that there is no such class' (Passmore 1966, p224,3,9). Russell calls such a collection a 'pseudo-totality'. Statements about the pseudo-totality, which the world is thus seen to be, according Russell, have to be considered meaningless. As anomaly would have it, consciousness, which makes apprehension of the world possible, is itself seen to prevent its theorization.

Russell points out that a pseudo-totality, in order to develop its theory, has to be broken up into sets, each capable of being a genuine totality, after which a separate account of each such set could be given.

Paradox and Cartesian Paradigm

The 'Cartesian paradigm' divides the world into mind and matter. The realm of matter could be considered a genuine totality since it does not comprise consciousness. But since the realm of the mental does comprise individual consciousnesses of objects along with (mental) objects of consciousness, the same would be a pseudo-totality whereby the division of the world under the 'Cartesian paradigm' proves to be of no help.

Brentano's purpose in introducing intentionality was to characterize the divide between mind and matter under the 'Cartesian paradigm'. Though not quite successful in this pursuit, the concept of consciousness which was introduced by way of his concept of 'intentionality' could divide the world, differently, that is, into objects of consciousness on the one side and their consciousnesses on the other.

Let us examine the possibility of such a split in the case of idealism, Brentano's theory of intentionality and physicalism. For Berkeley's idealism, since being *is* being perceived, being of an object could not be separated from its consciousness even conceptually. Being of an object, for Brentano, was *in* being perceived, thus *immanent* to its consciousness as its content. Such consciousness deprived of its content could no longer be consciousness. Pulling the *in*-existing object out of the mental process of consciousness is no separating the two; it is destroying the consciousness as well as its *in*-existent content. As for physicalism also, even if it could at all constitute consciousness from matter, the constituted consciousness could only be inseparable from its constituent matter. Thus, all these theories fail to split the pseudo-totality that the world is, in the way suggested above.

Husserl's Theory of Intentionality and 'Paradigm of Consciousness'

This is where Husserl may be said to have contributed. He gave up the idea of intentionality as a relation, which freed him from demanding existence itself, of the objects of consciousness. Intentionality, Husserl held, is only intrinsic to the mental and it makes mental processes 'conscious of its object' *intrinsically*. He says (*LI V* §11,4), '[i]t makes no essential difference to an object presented and given to consciousness whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd. I think of Jupiter as I think of Bismarck'. Existence of the object was, thus, neither

essential nor repugnant to Husserl's theory of intentionality. This disengaged particularly, the physical objects of consciousness from the intentional mental processes of their consciousness, thus absolving the theory of the responsibility of explaining, particularly the old problem as to how the mental would interact with the physical. Secondly, the differences in the consciousnesses of the same physical object for different persons or for the same person in different situations as well as consciousness of non-existent of objects such as centaur and round squares posed no difficulty for his theory. Thus, 'consciousness', in the hands of Husserl, is seen to have succeeded in dividing the world differently.

The world, under the Cartesian paradigm, divides itself into, say, the 'Cartesian physical' and the 'Cartesian mental' and, under the 'paradigm of consciousness', into the 'individual consciousnesses of objects' and what we may call the 'objects of consciousnesses'. The 'objects of consciousnesses' divide themselves into the mental and the physical objects of consciousnesses. The 'individual consciousnesses of objects' together with the 'mental objects of consciousness' make up the realm of the 'Cartesian mental', while the realm of the 'physical objects of consciousness' can be identified with the realm of the 'Cartesian physical'.

Object, 'Intentional' and 'True'

Husserl says (*Ideas*, P66,1,2; §37,1.16), 'It should be noted that intentional object of consciousness (taken in the manner⁵ in which the intentional object is the full correlate of a consciousness), by no means signifies the same as object seized upon.' and (*Ideas*, P72,1,13; §40,1.21), 'the entire essential content of the perceived thing, thus the whole physical thing standing there "in person" and all its qualities including all those which could ever be perceived, is a 'mere appearance' and that the "true physical thing" is the one determined by physics..., for which the characterizations are only by mathematical expressions.' These characterisations, he says (*Ideas*, P72,1,21; §40,1.29) are, 'something transcendent to the whole physical thing standing there "in person".... the space of physics cannot be the space belonging to the world given "in person" in perception'. This shows that Husserl has two distinct notions regarding physical objects: one as 'intentional object', as the correlate of consciousness, as the object 'actuality given "in person" in "perception"' and the other as 'true physical thing', for which the characterizations are only by mathematical expressions and which is fit to be 'seized upon'. As for the physical objects, Husserl says (*Ideas*, P69,2,18; §38,6,17), 'not only does the perception of the physical thing not contain the physical thing itself as part of its really inherent composition; the perception of the physical thing is also without any essential unity with it, its existence, naturally being presupposed here'. Thus Husserl is seen to assert transcendence of what he calls 'true physical objects' w.r.t. the mental processes of their perception.

⁵ Mark the distinction from the manner in which term 'intentional object' has been used previously.

Natural Attitude and Its Critique

In ‘natural attitude’ Husserl says (*Ideas*, P52,1,13; §29,1,14), ‘we come to an understanding with our fellow human being and in common with them posit an objective spatiotemporal actuality as our factually existent surrounding world to which we ourselves nonetheless belong’. Since this is the world we posit as our world, ‘actually’ existing and existing objectively, that is, independently of, and transcending, consciousness, we may understand the same as our ‘natural’ world,

But what we call ‘the actual world’, according to Husserl is (*Ideas*, P88,2,18; §47,2,18), ‘one special case among a multitude of possible worlds and surrounding worlds which, for their part, are nothing else but the correlates of essentially possible variants of the idea, “an experiencing consciousness,” with more or less orderly concatenations of experience’. The ‘experiencing consciousness’, being mental, does exist indubitably, but ‘the actual world’, as its correlate, just one spatial case among a multitude of possible worlds cannot be said to exist indubitably. Husserl does not approve of committing to existence of physical objects as independently of consciousness. He warns (*Ideas*, P89,1,1; §47,2,21), ‘one must not let oneself be deceived by speaking of the physical thing as transcending consciousness or as “existing in itself”’. Husserl, thus, disapproves of taking what we call the ‘natural world’ as the ‘actual world’ existing independently of, and transcending, consciousness.

Phenomenological Reduction and Phenomenological Science

Husserl now recommends what he calls ‘phenomenological reduction’, which, he says (*Ideas*, P108,1,6; §55,3,20), is but ‘an excluding of the natural attitude, or of the latter’s general positing’. This is made possible by Husserl’s theory of intentionality, which, as seen above, isolates the realm of consciousnesses of objects from the realm of the objects of consciousnesses, which also circumvents the difficult problem of interaction of the mental, which consciousness is, with the physical. What then remains as the residue, is the collection of all and only individual consciousnesses.

Excluding the positings of the natural attitude, unlike as in idealism, is neither denying nor even doubting the being of the posited objects; it is doubting only their being-qualified-thus-and-so (*Ideas*, P54,3,6; §31,5,6). This excluding is (*Ideas*, P55,2,15; §31,6,15) ‘epoche, a certain refraining from judgment which is compatible with the unshaken conviction of truth, even with the unshakable conviction of evident truth. The positing is “put out of action,” parenthesized, converted into the modification, “parenthesized positing;” the judgment simpliciter is converted into the “parenthesized judgment.”’.

Let us now examine the residue. The mental processes of consciousness,⁶ may be understood as ‘cogitations’ in general. On the other hand, a cogitation with the ego

⁶ ‘In the entire fullness of the concreteness within which they present themselves in their concrete context — the stream of mental processes’ (*Ideas*, P61,2,1; §34,3,1).

‘living in’ it may be seen as ‘cogito’ in the specific Cartesian sense. Cogito (*Ideas*, P61,1,4; §34,2,10) ‘comprises every “I perceive, I remember, I phantasy, I judge, I feel, I desire, I will,” and thus all egoical mental processes’.

In ‘natural living’ as Husserl says (cf. *Ideas*, P51,1,1; §28,1,14), ‘If I am directed “reflectively” to the ego and the cogitare’ (*Ideas*, P51,1,3; §28,1,16) ‘a new cogito is alive, one that, for its part, is not reflected on and thus is not objective for me.’ If a cogito is ‘reflected’ on, the ego enters the reflecting new cogito, which also means that it leaves the cogito reflected on, thereby converting it into a non-cogito cogitation. What is an object of consciousness, by definition, is not a cogito. Husserl distinguishes between consciousness in the modes, he calls ‘actional’ and ‘non-actional’ advertences (*Ideas*, P63,1,8; §35,3,15) and reserves (*Ideas*, P63,3,16; §35,5,16) the Cartesian term ‘cogito’ for the former. Husserl says (*Ideas*, P62,1,3; §35,1,11), ‘Something perceived can itself be a mental process of consciousness’. A mental process, which thus happens to be perceived to become an object of consciousness, has to be taken as ‘non-cogito cogitation’.

The possible problematic member in the ‘totality of cogito’ is the cogito of the ‘totality of cogito’. But the ‘totality of cogito’, on becoming the object of this problematic cogito, no more remains a ‘totality of cogito’; it becomes rather a ‘totality of non-cogito cogitations’, thereby rendering itself unproblematic. Having got rid of the problem, the ‘totality of cogito’, that is, the ‘totality of individual consciousnesses’ remains a genuine totality, the account of which could be given, which is what Husserl aims at. Husserl characterizes this totality as (*Ideas*, P58,2,2; §33,3,2) ‘a new region of being never before delimited in its own peculiarity’, which, as he continues to say, is ‘a region which like any other region, is a region of individual being’. Husserl describes it as (*Ideas*, P91; the title of §29) ‘Absolute consciousness as the Residuum after Annihilation of the World’.

What then remains as the residue of phenomenological reduction is the collection of all and only individual consciousnesses and yes, their intentional correlates. This being a genuine totality permits phenomenological science.

‘Natural Reduction’ and Natural Sciences

Practitioners of ‘natural’ sciences indeed have their minds and egos. Yet, as Jaspers observes (Erlich et al. 1994, Selection 8, ‘Existence-Existenz’), the personal interest on the part of the scientist is not objective and the source of its motives is outside science. Not only the personal motives and the source of their motives, but also their consciousness of the objects of their study belong to the ‘phenomenal’ realm. ‘Natural sciences’, as we can see, do exclude these phenomenal entities, yet they do not deny their being as does physicalism. To use Husserl’s *terms*, these sciences merely put the phenomenal into ‘parenthesis’, ‘put it out of action’; they practice what may be called ‘natural reduction’ (as against ‘phenomenological reduction’).

The residue of ‘natural reduction’ comprises only objects of consciousnesses, no consciousness of objects, that is, no cogito. Since paradox could arise only if a member of a collection could refer to the whole collection, the residue of ‘natural reduction’ could only be a genuine totality permitting its theorization, permitting

‘natural’ sciences, namely, the physical sciences for the physical and psychology for the mental objects, which indeed are already there.

‘Putting out of action’ of the positings or putting them into parenthesis can be seen as the technique, invented by Husserl for excluding objects of consciousness, leaving a collection of ‘pure’ consciousness, a genuine totality, as its residue. Interestingly, the natural sciences also can be seen to have followed Husserl’s technique in a complimentary sense, already if unknowingly, the only difference being that, while phenomenology went after the ‘phenomenal’, the natural sciences went after the ‘natural’.

Sāṅkhya, a Phenomenological Science

We will now show that Sāṅkhya is a phenomenological science, rather, a post-epoche discourse and then compare intentional mental processes in regard to their intentionality, ‘quality’ and ‘matter’ with *cittavṛtti* in Sāṅkhya.

Sāṅkhya refers to physical objects only in relation to *indriya*, that is, organs, particularly, sense organs, as *indriyārtha*. Experience of *indriyārtha* characteristically involves *sannikarṣa* (contiguity) of *indriya* with *indriyārtha*. *Jñāna*, that is, the consciousness is a determination regarding the object. It occurs in *buddhi* in the contiguity of *indriya* with *indriyārtha*. The determination is called *dr̥ṣṭa* or *pratyakṣa*. This act of the determination may be described as *viṣayikarāṇa*⁷ of *artha* (roughly meaning ‘making of *viṣaya* out of *artha*’), which points to the distinction between *viṣaya* and *artha*. *Dr̥ṣṭa* or *pratyakṣa* is said to be the *viṣaya* of (perceptive) consciousness. *Viṣaya*, etymologically⁸ is what ties ‘*viṣayin*’, which here, is *jñāna* and renders it describable. The sense is that, it gives its form to *citta* to form *cittavṛtti* where the *vṛtti* of *citta* is *jñāna*. ‘*Viṣaya*’, like ‘intentional object’ makes sense of the object, ‘as perceived’ by the subject. *Viṣaya* may be taken to be equivalent to ‘intentional object’ or the object as ‘correlate of consciousness’.

Contiguity between two entities, like relation between the two, must presuppose existence of the two entities as well as their mutual transcendence. Therefore, *indriyārtha* deserves to be taken to exist independently and as transcendent to *indriya*. Yoga does acknowledge such *indriyārtha* by calling it clearly as *vastu*. *Vyāsabhāṣya*⁹ on yoga does assert transcendence of ‘*vastu*’. ‘*Vastu*’, with all this, may, therefore, be taken to be equivalent to ‘true object’.

However, Sāṅkhya is not seen to acknowledge existence of *indriyārtha* in its own right by clearly referring to it, say, as *vastu*. But thereby the same may be said to

⁷ वृत्त्यन्तरविषयीकृतत्वमर्थस्य। Vṛtti-antaraviṣayikṛtatvam arthasya. (Tatva Vaiśārādī on Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.11 as given in Sāṅga Yoga Darśana, henceforth, SYD).

⁸ Henceforth, Sāṅkhya kārikā (2005) will be represented by ‘kārikā n’ at the end, where ‘n’ is the serial number of the kārikā. It will, if at all, be preceded by Kaumudī m, which stands for comment number m of Sāṅkhya tattva kaumudī. For example in this case (*Kaumudī* 30 on kārikā 5).

विशिन्वन्ति विषयिणमनुबध्नन्ति स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्वन्तीति यावत्। Visinvanti viṣayīṇam anubadhnanti svena rūpeṇa nirūpaṇīyam kurvanti iti yāvat. (*Kaumudī* 30 on kārikā 5).

⁹ चित्तस्य बाह्यवस्तुपरागात्...। Cittasya bāhyavastu-uparāgāt... (*Vyāsabhāṣya* on Pātañjala Yoga sūtra 1.7 as given in Sāṅkhya Yoga Dars’ana, hereafter SYD).

remain within what Husserl calls ‘phenomenological attitude’ and hence in no need of the exercise of epoche. Sāṅkhya, therefore, may be described as already a ‘post-epoche’ discourse.

Cittavṛtti and Their *Viśaya*

Cittavṛtti, a term in Yoga, is *vṛtti* of *citta*. *Citta*,¹⁰ as the seat of consciousness refers to *buddhi* or even to *antaḥkaraṇa*, the collection of all the internal faculties, which, all the same, derive as well as include *buddhi*. Dictionary¹¹ meaning of *vṛtti* is conduct, course of action, behaviour, etc. In our context, *vṛtti* may be taken to have the same sense as ‘process’ in the phrase ‘mental process’. Yoga classifies exhaustively all *cittavṛtti* precisely into five¹² kinds, namely¹³ *pramāṇa*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*, *nidrā* and *smṛti*. We will now show that *cittavṛtti* of each kind does have its *viśaya*.

Pramāṇa vṛtti divides into its three¹⁴ kinds, namely¹⁵ *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*, which translate, respectively, to perception, inference and verbal authority. *Indriya* is said to be in *sannikarṣa* when it is *prativīṣaya*,¹⁶ that is, when its regard is turned to its *indriya-artha*. Here, *sannikarṣa*¹⁷ itself is *vṛtti* of the *indriya*. Such a *vṛtti* is *pratyakṣa pramāṇa vṛtti*. *Pratyakṣa*, also called *drṣṭa*, is *determination*.¹⁸ occurring in that *vṛtti*. The object ‘as thus determined’ is the *viśaya* of the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa vṛtti* and the consciousness here is of the *viśaya*. This *viśaya* is described as *vāstava* because *sannikarṣa* is essentially with *vastu*, a ‘true’ object. The *viśaya*, not only of *pratyakṣa* but of other two kinds of *pramāṇa*,¹⁹ namely, *anumāna* and *āgama* also are said to be *vāstava* as they are dependent²⁰ upon *pratyakṣa*.

¹⁰ चित्तशब्देनान्तःकरणं बुद्धिमुपलक्षयति॥ Cittaśabdena antaḥkaraṇam buddhim ca upalakṣayati. (*Tattvavaiśārādī* on *Yoga sūtra* 1).

While ‘buddhi’ is a technical term in Sāṅkhya, its dictionary meaning is ‘the power of forming and retaining conceptions and general notions, intelligence, mind, discernment, judgment, perception’. It derives from root ‘budh’ which means ‘to be aware, to be acquainted with’.

¹¹ Monier-Williams (1899).

¹² वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः ... । Vṛttayah pañcatayyah... (*Pātañjala Yoga sūtra* 1.5 in SYD).

¹³ प्रमाणविषयविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः । Pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayah. (*Pātañjala Yoga sūtra* 1.7 to 1.11 in SYD).

¹⁴ त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टम् । Trividham pramāṇam iṣṭam. (kārikā 4).

¹⁵ प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि । pratyakṣa-anumāna-āgamāḥ pramāṇāni. (*Yogasūtra* 1.7 in SYD).

¹⁶ विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते इति प्रतिविषयम् = इन्द्रियम् । अर्थसन्निकृष्टमिन्द्रियमित्यर्थः । Viśayam viśayam prati vartate iti prativīṣayam = indriyam. Artha-sannikṛṣṭam indriyam iti arthaḥ. (*Koumudī* 30 on Kārikā 5).

¹⁷ वृत्तिषु सन्निकर्षः । vṛtṭiḥ ca sannikarṣaḥ. (*Koumudī* 30 on kārikā 5).

¹⁸ प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं । Prativīṣaya-adhyavasāyah drṣṭam. (kārikā 5) तस्मिन् अध्यवसायः, तदाश्रित इत्यर्थः । Tasmin adhyavasāyah, tad āśritaḥ iti arthaḥ. Adhyavasāyah buddhi-vyāpārah jñānam. (*Koumudī* 30 on Kārikā 5).

¹⁹ प्रमाणस्य विषयो वास्तवः । Pramāṇasya viśayah vāstavaḥ. (Bhāsvatī on *Yoga Sūtra* 1. 9 in SYD).

²⁰ प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वप्रमाणेषु ज्येष्ठत्वात् तदधीनत्वाच्चानुमानादीनाम् । Pratyakṣasya sarva pramāṇeṣu jyeṣṭhatvāt tat adhīnatvāt ca anumānādīnām. (*Koumudī* 29 on kārikā 4).

Viparyaya, like *pramāṇa*, also involves *sannikarṣa* with *vastu*. Therefore, it, indeed, is cognition, if mistaken, of a *vastu*. It is consciousness at variance²¹ from the *rūpa*, that is, form of the *vastu*. In any case, however, a *viṣaya*, it does have.

Vikalpa also has its *viṣaya*. But unlike *pramāṇa* or *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*²² is *vastuśūnya*, that is, without any *vastu*, that is, without any ‘true’ physical thing. *Vikalpa* is a cognition based only on the meaning of words, typically illustrated in thinking of ‘son of barren woman’, ‘tooth of crow’, ‘hair of tortoise’, etc. as its *viṣaya*. *Vikalpa vṛtti* corresponds, I suggest, to what Husserl calls ‘free phantasy’, which he illustrates as phantasy of ‘the flute-playing centaur’ (*Ideas*, P42,28; §23,1,6) pegasus, round squares and so on. Thus, though without *vastu*, *vikalpa* is not without *viṣaya*.

Nidrā means sleep. It, indeed, is an experience, if an experience²³ of *abhāva*, that is, of ‘nothingness’ because, on waking up, say, from a deep sleep, one can ‘remember’ it. Husserl does not seem to specifically refer to sleep as a kind of mental process. That, of which is the experience has to be taken as the *viṣaya* of *nidrā vṛtti*. We have to say that *nidrā vṛtti* also has its *viṣaya*, namely, ‘nothingness’.

*Smṛti*²⁴ is memory. It has the ‘remembered’ as its *viṣaya*.

***Cittavṛtti* and Intentionality**

What has *viṣaya* is *saviṣayaka*. With *viṣaya* as ‘intentional object’ in the sense of ‘intentional correlate of consciousness’, *saviṣayaka* may be taken to mean ‘intentional’ and *saviṣayakatva*, ‘intentionality’. As shown above, all *cittavṛtti* are essentially intrinsically intentional and their objects, when they do exist as physical objects, are transcendent. Therefore, intentionality of *cittavṛtti* can be said to confirm Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Since only the mental can be intrinsically intentional, *cittavṛtti* may be seen to be mental and hence equivalent to ‘intentional mental processes’.

‘Quality’

Husserl says (*LI V* §10,2,14),

manner in which consciousness refers to an object’ (an expression used by Brentano in other passages) is presentative in a presentation, judicial in a judgment, etc. etc. Brentano’s attempted classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments and emotions (phenomena of love and hate) is plainly based upon this ‘manners of reference’ of which three basically different kinds are distinguished (each admitting of many further specifications).

²¹ विपर्ययो मिथ्याजानमतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठितम्। Viparyayaḥ mithyā-jñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭhitam. (*Yoga sūtra* 1.8 in SYD) अतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठितं, ज्ञेयस्य यद् यथाऽर्थं रूपं न तद्रूपप्रतिष्ठितम् मिथ्याजानमिति। atadrūpa-pratiṣṭhitam, jñeyasya yad yathārtham rūpam na tad rūpa-pratiṣṭhitam, mithyajñānam iti. (Bhāsvatī on *Yoga sūtra* 1.8 in SYD).

²² शब्दजानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः। Śabdajānāna-anupāti vastuśūnyaḥ vikalpaḥ. (*Pātañjala Yoga sūtra* 1.9).

²³ अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा। Abhāvapratyay-ālambanā nidrā. (*Pātañjala Yoga sūtra* 1.10).

²⁴ अनुभूतविषयासंप्रमोषः स्मृतिः। Anubhūtavīṣaya-asampraṁoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ. (*Pātañjala Yoga sūtra* 1.7 to 1.11 in SYD).

Following this, we may take ‘presentation’, ‘judgment’ and ‘emotions’, each admitting ‘many further specifications’, as the ‘manners of reference’.

Husserl, on his part, talks (*LI V* §20,6,5) in terms of ‘quality’ and ‘matter’ (*LI V* §20,1,6) as the two components of every mental act. ‘Quality’ is ‘the general act-character, which stamps an act as merely presentative, judgmental, emotional, desiderative etc.’ and ‘matter’, which is identified also as the ‘content’ of the act, is the other act-character, which stamps it (the act) as representing *this*, as judging *that* etc. etc. (*LI V* §20,1,4). This concept, ‘quality’, we can say, falls under what Brentano called ‘manner of reference’ and sensory perception, phantasy, memory etc. can be taken as what Brentano calls ‘further specifications’ of ‘manner of presentation’, which is one of the ‘manners of reference’.

Kinds of *Cittavṛtti* and *Kleśa* as Quality

The five kinds (of *cittavṛtti*), I suggest, are but different ‘further specifications’, which Brentano anticipates, of ‘manner of presentation’, which is one of the ‘three kinds of manners of reference’ to what he calls ‘matter’. *Pramāṇa* and *viparyaya* can be said to account for judgmental manner of referencing. *Śāntatva*, *ghoratva* and *mūḍhatva* account for the emotional manners of referencing *viśeṣa viśaya*. As per Yoga also *cittavṛtti* are carriers of sufferences²⁵ (*kleśa*) as well as *akleśa* (the opposite of *kleśa*), which may be taken to belong to ‘emotional manner’ in which consciousness refers to ‘matter’. Hence, the five kinds of *cittavṛtti* as ‘presentative’, *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya* as ‘judgmental’ and the *kleśa* associated with *cittavṛtti* as ‘emotional’ manners of reference may be taken to belong to what Husserl called ‘quality’ of *cittavṛtti*, with which the *cittavṛtti* refer to their respective *viśaya*.

Conclusion

Paradox

Consciousness, which makes apprehension of the world possible, itself, is shown to make the world a paradoxical pseudo-totality and defy theorization of the world.

Husserl’s theory of Intentionality and ‘Paradigm of Consciousness’

The division of the world possible under the ‘Cartesian paradigm’ is shown to be of no help in resolving the paradox. Husserl’s theory of intentionality, as against theories prior to it, is shown to have distinguished itself in dividing the pseudo-totality that the world is, into genuine totalities under the ‘paradigm of consciousness’.

²⁵ वृत्तयः पञ्चतन्मयः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः। Vṛttayaḥ pañcatanmayaḥ klišṭā-aklišṭāḥ (*Pātāñjala Yoga sūtra* 1.5).

Phenomenological and ‘Natural’ Reduction

The divide under the ‘paradigm of consciousness’ is argued to split the pseudo-totality that the world is, into genuine totalities to make possible not only ‘phenomenological reduction’, thereby making phenomenology as the science of consciousnesses of objects possible but also make ‘natural reduction’ possible, thereby making possible, the sciences of the objects of consciousness on both sides of the Cartesian divide, namely, the physical sciences as well as psychology.

Sāṅkhya

Sāṅkhya is argued to be a phenomenological science like Husserl’s phenomenology, by showing it to be a post-epoche discourse. The Sāṅkhya concept *viśaya* of consciousness is shown to correspond to ‘intentional correlate of consciousness’. All the five kinds of *cittavṛtti* are shown to be intrinsically ‘intentional’ and hence equivalent to ‘intentional mental processes’. The basis of division of *cittavṛtti* into their five kinds as ‘manners of presentation’, *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya* as judgmental manners and *kleśa* and *akleśa* associated with *cittavṛttis* or *śāntatva*, *ghoratva* and *mūḍhatva* of *viśeṣa viśaya* as ‘emotional manners’ have been shown to belong to ‘quality’ as ‘manners of reference’ to ‘matter’.

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