

‘Inclusion’ in Martin Buber’s dialogue pedagogy

Jeong-Gil Woo

Abstract: In this study, we review the possibility and limitations of the dialogue pedagogy to make suggestions for extensions and modernizations of it, highlighting the concept of inclusion, which is a keystone of dialogue pedagogy, and focusing on the different pedagogical understanding and reception of it in the past few decades. It emerges that dialogue pedagogy can be of different character and significance depending on different positions toward the possibility of inclusion. Adhering to Buber’s position shown in his Heidelberg speech in 1925, we review what kind of logic and system Buber suggested with regard to the concept of inclusion and investigate the possibility of a theoretical extension for the contemporary context of education and pedagogy.

Keywords: Dialogue pedagogy · Dialogue philosophy · Inclusion · Martin Buber

„Umfassung“ in der Dialogpädagogik Martin Bubers

Zusammenfassung: Es geht in diesem Artikel um das Konzept der Umfassung, das einen Schlüsselbegriff in der Dialogpädagogik Martin Bubers einnimmt. Es werden in dieser Untersuchung verschiedene Verständnisse des Konzepts der Umfassung und deren Rezeptionen in der Pädagogik der letzten Jahrzehnte revidiert und in vier Kategorien klassifiziert. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass sich sowohl der wissenschaftliche Charakter der Dialogpädagogik als auch ihre Implikation für die pädagogische Praxis nach den Verständnissen der Umfassungsmöglichkeiten unterschiedlich verstehen lässt. Unter Berücksichtigung dieser unterschiedlichen Positionen und besonders aus einer vergleichenden Perspektive werden Vorschläge für die Erweiterung der Dialogpädagogik gemacht, um die Dialogpädagogik im zeitgenössischen Kontext weiter zu entwickeln.

Schlüsselwörter: Dialogpädagogik · Dialogphilosophie · Martin Buber · Umfassung

Published online: 15.11.2012
© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2012

Ass. Prof. Dr. J.-G. Woo (✉)
Graduate School of Education, Kyung Hee University
HoeGiDong 1, DongDaeMunGu, Seoul, South Korea
e-mail: woossia@khu.ac.kr

1 Introduction—between dialogue philosophy and dialogue pedagogy

I and Thou (1923) presents the core concept of dialogue philosophy by Martin Buber, where we can get a groundwork of his dialogue pedagogy in his speech “Education (Über das Erzieherische)”, where he was the keynote speaker at the Third International Education Conference in Heidelberg in 1925. In his speech, he expresses his ideas on certain themes such as the relationship between educational power and originator instinct in the individual, critique and guidance as an education principle, qualification and role of a teacher, problem of compulsion-freedom and compulsion-relatedness in the educational relationship, and above all, a “new education”¹ in contrast to the traditional form, which Buber calls an “education of eros and will to power” (Buber 1964, p. 26f.). This new education, suggested from the perspective of dialogue pedagogy, is of significance in that it is unprecedented in the history of pedagogy. Buber’s speech at Heidelberg brings great importance to dialogue pedagogy due to the fact that it is actually the only systematic writing on his new education.

In fact, alongside the warm atmosphere of positive reception, there have been skeptical reviews on the success of translating dialogue philosophy to dialogue pedagogy (cf. Borowitz 1971; Woo 2007; Lippitz and Woo 2008). The first and strongest support of this wariness was, to our surprise, Martin Buber himself. He admits the theoretical and practical limits of his dialogue pedagogy, stating that the unmediatedness and complete mutuality cannot or rather ought not to be achieved in an educational relationship. “It [complete mutuality; J.-G. W.] is a form of grace for which one must always be prepared but on which one can never count. Yet there are also many I-You relationships that by their very nature may never unfold into complete mutuality. [...] It becomes clear that the specifically educational relationship is incompatible with complete mutuality.” (Buber 1979, p. 154 f.; Kaufmann 1970, p. 178)²

However, even without referring to Buber’s self reflection in his “Afterword” (1957) which was published 34 years after *I and Thou* (1923), we can already take note of the traces of incompleteness of dialogue pedagogy in his speech “Education” (1925). Above all the basic words I-You/I-It, the keystones of dialogue philosophy or of the “ontology of between-man” (Ontologie des Zwischenmenschlichen: Buber 1962, p. 290; Buber 1965, p. 36) were unmentioned in this speech. It is the same case with his two other speeches on education, namely in “Education and World View” (Bildung und Weltanschauung, 1935) nor in “The Education of Character” (Über Charaktererziehung, 1939). Although a lot of research assumes that the I-It is a dehumanized and unsound status of the human relationship, marginalizing it and placing the I-You as the main pursuit in education. It is necessary to point out that Buber has never mentioned the pedagogical meaning or adaptability of his basic words in his speeches on education. The simple dichotomy of I-You/I-It, which Buber did not differentiate clearly from each other in everyday life, remains an ideological slogan in pedagogical receptions of dialogue pedagogy. And his statement “Nothing but the Image of God” (Buber 1964, p. 39; Smith 1979, p. 130) at the end of “Education” is somewhat inappropriate for the context of his speech. Not only in this speech, but his other speeches on education destitute of a systematic demonstration on dialogue-pedagogical status and the meaning of the eternal You, which he might have conceived from “Part Three” in *I and Thou*. In addition, the dynamic of the paradox

seen in the formulations such as “didactics of doing non-doing” (cf. Suter 1990, p. 1976), “a universal and individual, absolute and subjective ethics” (cf. Vogel 1970; Friedman 1967, p. 180), “an eternal ethic without axiomatized and canonized normativity or values education without indoctrination” (cf. Weinstein and Schwartz 1979) remains one of the most mysterious questions in modern pedagogy. When viewing the issues that arise from Buber's split between his initial dialogue philosophy in *I and Thou* and his speeches on dialogue pedagogy, it is regrettable to see that Buber never fully presented a direct systematic approach to dialogue pedagogy.

The article thematizes the incompleteness of dialogue pedagogy, focusing on the problem of inclusion³. Inclusion is a key concept of elucidating the educational relationship, a central theme of dialogue pedagogy, and has a sort of bridge function, bringing a concrete phenomenon of the encounter, or the between in dialogue philosophy in a classroom where dialogue pedagogy is performed and practiced. Firstly, in order to confirm Buber's position, we will study Buber's conceptualization of inclusion, highlighting two examples of inclusion in his speech (Chap. 2). In addition, we will investigate the broad spectrum of understanding and interpretation of inclusion in the receptions of dialogue pedagogy (Chap. 3). This will help us take a look at where the possibility and limitations of dialogue pedagogy lie. Based on this, we will make suggestions for dialogue pedagogy in order to establish a more valid and meaningful concept of education in contemporary pedagogy (Chap. 4).

2 Dynamics of the between—the power of exclusiveness and inclusion

In order to understand the concept of inclusion, it is important to investigate two images that Buber illustrates. The first is the “contemplation of tree” which Buber gives as an explanation, differentiating the quality of relationships between I-You and I-It in the first part of *I and Thou*.

I contemplate a tree. I can accept it as a picture [...] I can feel it as movement [...] I can assign it to a species and observe it as an instance, with an eye to its construction and its way of life. I can dissolve it into a number, into a pure relation between numbers, and eternalize it. Throughout all of this the tree remains my object and has its place and its time and span, its kind and condition. But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I contemplate the tree I am drawn into a relation, and the tree ceases to be an It. The power of exclusiveness has seized me. (Buber 1979, p. 13 f.; Kaufmann 1970, p. 57 f.)

In this example, we see, observe and contemplate objects in everyday life. In this activity, these things become objects of our feelings, awareness and acceptance. At this moment, according to Buber, the object remains in the sphere of “I-It”. Although the tree is initially perceived as an object, it changes into “I-You” through occurrence. This is the moment when the I-It becomes the I-You. The motive of this change is, as Buber says, not my intention or an endeavor of the tree, but the “power of exclusiveness”. However, Buber does not offer any additional explain to this. What is clear though, is that this power belongs neither to me nor the tree. It comes from somewhere without any forecast, excluding the

situational elements except me and the tree, changing the I-It relationship between I and the tree into the I-You relationship. If this change occurs, “the tree is no impression, no play of my imagination, no aspect of a mood; it confronts me bodily and has to deal with me as I must deal with it” (Buber 1979, p. 14; Kaufmann 1970, p. 58). “What encounters me is neither the soul of a tree nor a dryad, but the tree itself [...] Relation is reciprocity.” (Buber 1979, p. 14). Some would argue that Buber set the intentions of the participants as a precondition for the transformation from the I-It to the I-You based on the expression “if will and grace are joined”. For instance, Kim interprets the “will” as an “intention of the I” and “grace” as an “intention of the other who is participated in the situation”. According to this reading, the “encounter can be accomplished through the combination of the intentions of the I and his partner” (Kim 2011, p. 249). There is no disagreement that the partners are participating in the dialogue situation with expectation and waiting for the occurrence of the encounter. This is necessary, but an insufficient condition. If we literally accept what Buber states, the power of exclusiveness does not belong to the I or the other, nor does it depend on the situation. Buber’s “grace” is a grace, not just because it is out of my control, but also of the partner’s. It is not that the I is a grace to his partner and vice versa. In the case of the “power of exclusiveness”, there is more than the “will” of the I and his partner which lies out of the boundary of their control. As we will see in the following chapters, the concept of grace is related to the intervention and workings of the “eternal You”. Buber’s encounter is a de-subjective and non-intentional phenomenon. “The relation to the You is unmediated. [...] Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have disintegrated encounters occur.” (Buber 1979, p. 19; Kaufmann 1970, p. 62 f.). Similar to Buber, Theunissen says that the mediated relationship, where an intentionality of the subject is working, cannot be an I-You relationship. According to him, the “join of will and grace” does not mean that “the I meets You or You meets the I”. Rather, it should be understood that “we meet us” (Theunissen 1963/1964, p. 322), which cannot be properly explained within the context of subject philosophy. Therefore, the moment of exclusiveness is a motive of immeasurability, which just occurs independently upon my will and hope. We can expect and wait for it, but not plan and project. It is a grace in its literal sense. Of course, the phenomenon through the power of exclusiveness can occur not only in a man-to-thing relationship, but in a man-to-man relationship. However, the characteristics in the latter’s limitations are not so clear to capture as in the former case due to the humans objectifying—or rather what Buber refers to as “experience” (Buber 1979, p. 16)—one another and regulating each other at the same time. “It is a privilege of man that I can set an insurmountable barrier through a hidden action of my being”. (Buber 1962, p. 275)

While the concept of the “power of exclusiveness” is both for relationships of man-and-thing and man-and-man, the concept of inclusion is specifically an educational relationship. In general, inclusion means “considering someone or something as part of a larger group”. However, Buber has a different usage, as we will see in the following paragraphs. Buber defines traditional education as an activity of “eros and will to power” and proposes that these should be substituted through a new education. If “education is a selection of a world through an educator” (Buber 1964, p. 35), it is not free from arbitrariness of the educator and unwished violence of objectification towards the other. To avoid these risks, which seems to be inevitable in the education of eros and will to power, there

should be an “elementary experience which shatters at least the assurance of the erotic as well as the cratic man, but sometimes does more, through which a reverse of the system of direction should be accomplished and hereby the essence of education should be taken up in himself” (cf. Buber 1964, p. 30; Smith 1979, p. 30). Buber calls this “transition of direction through an elementary experience”, namely an “experience of the other side” as “inclusion”. Then, what is it like and how does it happen? To explain, Buber gives an example of a “situation of striking with a fist” and a “situation of caress”.

A man belabours another, who remains still. Then let us assume, that the striker suddenly receives in his soul the blow which he strikes: the same blow; that he receives it as the other who remains still. For the space of a moment he experiences the situation from the other side. Reality imposes itself on him. (Buber 1964, p. 30; Smith 1979, p. 123)

A man caresses a woman, who lets herself be caressed. Then let us assume that he feels the contact from two sides – with the palm of his hand still, and also with the woman's skin. The twofold nature of the gesture, as one that takes place between two persons, thrills through the depth of enjoyment in his heart and stirs it. If he does not deafen his heart he will have – not to renounce the enjoyment but – to love. (Buber 1964, p. 30 f.; Smith 1979, p. 124)

The “experience of the other side” seems to be transcendental. He states that it is possible for a person to get out of his own physical bounds and penetrate into his partner, not only physically but also psychologically, without losing himself. The word “suddenly (*urplötzlich*)” brings forth an instance of eternity, namely, an eternalized moment (cf. Buber 1979, p. 40, 47). This “space of a moment” is not a process of an experience, but an instance of realization. At this very moment, the partner gets realized within the I. The I does not hit the partner to realize him, but rather just occurs, which Buber calls “transfusion” (Buber 1979, p. 31), occurring at the moment of belaboring, which is unrelated to the intention of the I. It is the same with the example of the caress. The man who caresses feels his own action of caressing and at the same time, he experiences the feeling of the woman who is caressed. In doing so, he did not intend to experience the feeling of the other side. This experience of the other side has just occurred in the process of caress, regardless of his intention as well as her wish or consent. At this moment, the man who caresses is himself and the woman who lets herself be caressed at the same time. The I is both the I and his partner simultaneously and the I comes back to what he was directly after this transfusion—the event which Buber identifies as inclusion. It is not clear who the I is at the moment of inclusion, whether it be the I or the partner at the same time, or even a third superperson who includes all these elements in him, or even an omnipotent observer. What is clear is that the possibility of the I-You is the same as the possibility of inclusion. Buber defines “inclusion” as “the complete realization of the submissive person, the desired partner, the ‘partner’, not by his fancy but by the actuality of being”. The experience of the other side is according to Buber, not an output of a fantasy or speculation, but a real experience. While “empathy” is a trial in which the I remains an I, project myself in the place of the partner, still confirms the subjective limit of the I that the I cannot be the partner at the end. In contrast to this, inclusion means “extension of

one's own concreteness, the fulfillment of the actual situation of life, the complete presence of the reality in which one participates" (Buber 1964, p. 31; Smith 1979, p. 124). To repeat, in the event of inclusion, the I is the I and his partner at the same time. To refer to Buber's words, the whole being of my partner, who is participated in the situation which the I is also in with, is fully presented and realized in the I without any intentional endeavors, even if just for a second, like the person who belabours and the person who get belaboured become united in a personality, like the man who caresses and the woman who gets caressed are overlapped in one figure. (cf. Buber 1964, p. 32) The reason why this event is interesting and important from a pedagogical perspective is because, Buber calls it as "inclusion", he himself states it to be the key concept of the dialogical relationship and the dialogue pedagogy, and it has been widely accepted in the reception of dialogue pedagogy (Buber 1964, p. 33; cf. Hendley 1978, p. 142). Buber describes this as "dialogical" and defines that the "educational relationship is a pure dialogical one." (Buber 1964, p. 33)

"The power of exclusiveness" and "inclusion" takes on an evidently mysterious character. In the background, there is a subject who remains silent. As Röhrig comments, "my own will has to keep silent here" (1964, p. 467). The power of exclusiveness is not an instrument at my disposal. Not that the I cannot include or exclude the partner, but that the I and the partner get captivated by the unknown power. Only at this moment, the encounter or a transition to the I-You relationship can occur. This concept of encounter continues to the conceptualization of education. Buber's education is a pure dialogical relationship and this is nothing but the inclusion⁴. Inclusion is not the goal of the I who belabors or caresses, but rather, at the very moment of inclusion, the intention of the I ceases to work. Only then does the I get consigned to a graceful power, where the I gets transcendental insights on the partner. Inclusion occurs regardless of the will of the I and the experience of the other side is allowed to me for nothing. Inclusion is like a "spark" (Buber 1964, p. 69) which blossoms out and goes out on its will. This spark feeds on grace. "Encounter occurs by grace. The You encounters me by grace. It cannot be found by seeking". (Buber 1979, p. 18; Kaufmann 1970, p. 62)

3 The spectrum of interpretation of inclusion

If dialogue pedagogy, as many studies on it have insisted, aims to achieve the I-You relationship through education, the concept of inclusion is a touchstone for success in dialogue pedagogy. Buber's inclusion has a different connotation from its general usage of acceptance, tolerance, or embracing. It is an account of the moment when the I-It relationship transforms into the I-You relationship. Namely, it is a genealogy of the educational relationship in dialogue pedagogy. Without the concept of inclusion, dialogue pedagogy, which identifies education as an unmediated dialogical relationship, confronts a critical defect theoretically. In the following chapter, we will investigate the broad spectrum of understanding and interpreting inclusion in the reception of dialogue pedagogy. Roughly speaking, there are two positions in regards to inclusion; [1] negation of the possibility of inclusion and [2] affirmation of this possibility. The former can further be divided into two cases; [1.1] quasi affirmation in form, but strictly to say, a substantial negation in

its content (inclusion as imagination, ability and atmosphere) and [1.2] impossibility of inclusion as a beginning point of discussion.

3.1 Inclusion as imagination

There have been attempts to understand inclusion not as an "experience of the other side" in its literal meaning, but as an "imagination of the other side". Friedman gives an explanation as follows:

Confirmation is inter-human, but it is not simply social or interpersonal. ... The confirmation of the other must include an actual experiencing of the other side of the relationship so that the other must include an actual experiencing of the other side of the relationship so that one can imagine quite concretely what another is feeling, thinking, perceiving, and knowing. This 'inclusion' or 'imagining the real' does not abolish the basic distance between oneself and the other. (Friedman 1967, p. 175; cf. Friedman 2005, p. 29)

At first glance, the "actual experiencing of the other side" seems to be exactly what Buber means when discussing inclusion. However, "imagining the real" is not "the real itself". To be precise, Friedman's understanding of inclusion seems to be a process and result of the imagination of the I who tries to be virtually in the position of his partner. The I makes an effort to think of how the partner feels, thinks, and knows. However, at this moment, the I remains I and cannot be the partner without losing being himself at the same time. The I is here while the partner is on the other side without any physical, psychological, or probably even spiritual connection. The only possible way from the I to the other side in Friedman's interpretation is the "imagining"—or it lacks at least an explanation on how. This form of Buber's inclusion is more dynamic than an activity of merely imagination. Imagining, according to Friedman, seems to be a variation of what Buber identifies as "empathy". In other words, Friedman's imagining the of the I is when a person remains distant from his partner and tries to project himself to the other side of the partner and overlap his own position and into the partner's. A similar interpretation of inclusion is to be found in the concept of "sympathy" by Hook. His description of inclusion, namely a "positive attitude of imaginative concern for the personal needs of his students" (1963, p. 229), seems at first glance to be an affirmation of the possibility of inclusion. However, this does not match Buber's thought. It affirms in fact, the impossibility of Buber's inclusion and instead, suggests a substitution with empathy in forms of "imagination and sympathy".

3.2 Inclusion as ability

The second variation for understanding inclusion is "inclusion as an ability of a subject". For example, Weinstein and Schwartz regard inclusion as the subject's ability; "A teacher is incapable of choosing the effective world for his student if he cannot experience the student's needs from the standpoint of student and teacher. Inclusion means just such an ability." (1979, p. 206) A similar understanding of inclusion is to be found in Suter's work. He describes, "It is neither knowledge nor age which gives advantage to an educa-

tor. It is an ability to experience his own activity from the side of his partner. As soon as the children are able to do it, the educational relationship ends and a friendship begins” (Suter 1990, p. 177). They do not regard inclusion, the experience of the other side, as a contingent occurrence in the sphere of the between, but as a sort of ability or quality of a specific subject—in this case, educator. If the motive of inclusion is reduced to the ability of a subject, then the primacy of the between or dialogue, which is the distinctive contribution of dialogue philosophy and dialogue pedagogy, will consequently lose its significance. In other words, dialogue relationship is due to the ability of the subjects rather than the power of exclusiveness. In addition, the educational relationship is an achievement of the educational will and ability, not a fruit of grace. However, it’s important to remember that this is not what Buber intended with the following statement, “It is not the educational intention but it is the meeting which is educationally fruitful” (Buber 1964, p. 58; Smith 1979, p. 135). It is important not to overlook that this position presupposes an asymmetry in ability and attitude for dialogue between the educator and student. However, if we take into consideration that Buber conceptualized his philosophy not as a pragmatic, but as “ontology of between-man” (Buber 1962, p. 290; Buber 1965, p. 36), the understanding of inclusion as an ability could reduce the significance of Buber’s philosophy and pedagogy.

3.3 Inclusion as atmosphere

Another possible understanding of inclusion which does not show a full trust to its possibility is inclusion as atmosphere. Brose, for example, in his article for the most part, repeatedly states Buber’s theory of inclusion without any intention of a systematic reconstruction. However, he adds an unusual comment, “As a main responsible man, educator creates an educational atmosphere of inclusion and he experiences being educated of the children” (1983, p. 385). It is not clear what Brose means in regards to atmosphere of inclusion and above all on what ground.

What is important to remember is that Buber does not mention anything about “imagination, ability, or atmosphere” in regards to inclusion. He does not add any supplements to this concept. To be faithful to Buber’s original text, he conceptualized his dialogue pedagogy with a belief that inclusion, an experience of the other side, is possible not only in its name and rhetoric, but also in its content and in an empirical dimension. Inclusion is defined as an “extension of one’s own concreteness, the fulfillment of the actual situation of life, the complete presence of the reality in which one participates” (Buber 1964, p. 31; Smith 1979, p. 124). Therefore, the various understandings of inclusion as “imagination, ability, or atmosphere” are, to be precise, neither inclusion itself, nor an affirmation of inclusion. Of course, the constitutive endeavor of these attempts to understand and adapt the concept of inclusion as a key concept in dialogue pedagogy is worth acknowledging.

3.4 Inclusion as attitude

In contrast to the three cases of “formal affirmation and substantial negative of inclusion”, there is also a complete negation of inclusion. In this position, not only is the power of exclusiveness and inclusion irrational, but the very concept of dialogue pedagogy is an

object of criticism and that it is nothing more than an idea of excessive romanticism (cf. Brezinka 1964). This critical perspective, the resonance of dialogue pedagogy in an educational praxis, is considerably restrictive in spite of the contribution of dialogue pedagogy, which has opened a new dimension in defining the educational relationship.

There is also another approach to the romantic motive of dialogue pedagogy, which can be called "attitude pedagogy" (Rödler 1996, p. 1). They are on the one hand aware of the possible romantic character of dialogue pedagogy, yet they try to adapt constitutive ideas of dialogue pedagogy to educational practice. In other words, they suggest that we assume a positive attitude, *as if* the power of exclusiveness could work. The inclusion could be made and the I-You relationship in the educational relationship could be achieved through an intentional endeavor of an educator, though they are actually not possible. By confronting the "actual limit of the dialogue pedagogy" (Buber 1964, p. 36), we assume that if it were a theoretically possible project (cf. Suter 1990, p. 176), and continued to have a "systematic-correcting interpretation" (Grytzka 1981, p. 63), we would then choose a practical pedagogy for an educational practice through inclusion rather than a pedagogy as just a strict science of education, which would investigate the theoretical possibility of inclusion, prior to the practical purpose of dialogue pedagogy. While this would be a warm and sympathetic way to better educational practice, there is a risk to lose sensitivity to the chasm between theory and practice, as well as reduce dialogue pedagogy into an "attitude-pedagogy". The following question of Rödler implies such a skepticism; "Is it enough with just an 'attitude' for dialogue pedagogy?" (1996).

It is of no doubt that the "romantic interpretation of dialogue pedagogy with good intention" (cf. Brezinka 1964, p. 200) or "attitude pedagogy" are expressions of hope for a better education and how they are actually giving a positive impetus for a dialogical relationship in education. However, it should not be overlooked that the excessive romanticism of the reality of education can result in restricting the diversity of interpretation. The fact that Brezinka, especially in an example of Buber's dialogue pedagogy, suggests a "warning against excessive romanticism of dialogue pedagogy and a realistic turn to pedagogy" from a critical perspective on romanticizing and irrational tendency of pedagogy in the 1960's when dialogue pedagogy was still at its zenith of prosperity, as well as Rödler, around thirty years after Brezinka, suggests a skeptical reflection on the attitude approach, has been a significant stepping stone in the history of reception of dialogue pedagogy. The romantic and attitude approach to pedagogy—like in the understanding of Cohen, who interprets "the teacher's act of inclusion" as "he [teacher] must face himself *as if* standing on the side opposite, exist[ing] within the other's soul" (1979, p. 92 f.), or as in the interpretation of Scudder, the "teacher has to create an atmosphere of mutuality in spite of its impossibility" (1968, p. 140)—have been the mainstream approach towards dialogue pedagogy. In addition, this kind of romanticism continues today in the form of having "no comment" on the possibility of inclusion (cf. Reger 1966; Reitemeyer 1995; Cohn 2001; Black 2005; Son 2010). Without a close examination on the dynamics of the sphere of the between, the transition of the I-It to the I-You relationship, complete mutuality in education, and education as encounter will remain as a vacant slogan or propaganda.

4 Affirming the possibility of inclusion

The second position is an affirmation of inclusion, not only in its form, but also in an empirical dimension. It is true that these three cases of [1.1] (inclusion as imagination, ability, and atmosphere) could also be regarded as an indirect affirmation of the possibility of inclusion. In these assertions of a broadened theory of inclusion, the phenomenon of inclusion is not explicitly denied, even though they do not give a complete trust to what Buber said in regard to inclusion. However, the fact that they do not deny formally the possibility of inclusion of Buber does not mean that they agree to the theory of inclusion of Buber. As investigated above, they seem to be of the same opinion with Buber in its form. They identified inclusion, in its contents, intentionally or unintentionally, with what Buber calls “empathy”. This seems to be of good reason due to the fact that it is actually not easy to get a consensus that the inclusion in the example of “belaboring and caress” is common and natural occurrences. How can one person be both he and his partner at the same time? How can a person here be another person on the other side without losing his own being and come back to himself again? If this person were another person on the other side, can he stay without losing being himself and with a full realization of his partner in himself simultaneously? Is the inclusion a phenomenon beyond a physical, intellectual, and psychological dimension? Namely, is it maybe a thing of spiritual and religious dimension? These series of questions reminds us of a self-reflection that Viller wrote, which Buber attached in his book, “The dialogical principle” (1962). He tells of his old reminiscences about a form of “between-human”. Namely, there is a between-human between you and me which consists of a half-you and a half-me. Therefore I am I and the between-human and you are you and the between-human at the same time.

Wiesenhaus, 27. Dec. 1877. I have a superstitious belief in a between-human. I am not it and you are not it either, but someone comes into being between you and me who is the You to me and I am also You to the other. In this way, each of us has his own between-human with a reciprocal double-name. The between-humans, in which each of us are comprised of fifty percent, are all different from each other. The one who thinks, feels, and speaks – this is the very between-human and to him belongs the thought. It makes us free. (Buber 1962, p.298)

Viller paraphrases in his letter (1879) about the “between-human” once again. To say it briefly, B between A and C can have its meaning only in relation to A and C. If the circumstance of B, namely A and C changes into D and E, B between D and E is not the same with the B between A and C. Therefore, the between-human character of B is completely dependent on the relationship and temporal (cf. *ibid.*). Buber does not directly introduce the concept of Viller’s between-human, but the concepts have something in common in its orientation towards the relationship and transcendence. However, Buber’s concept of the between is not a substantial one, as seen in Viller’s. The reason why Buber’s between seems to be ambiguous and opaque is because it is not a substantial and independent being as it is in the case of the between-human of Viller, which nevertheless, carries out such a function as if it were a real substance in the system of Buber’s philosophy. In other words, because we are used to a language that is subject-centered, it is quite strange to give a philosophical priority to the sphere of the between rather than to the

participants in the sphere of the between. To be able to insist that the inclusion of Buber from his perspective is possible, we have to be ready to accept the philosophical primacy of the relationship or the between as the most fundamental premise of the ontology of the between-human, not only in a logical and ideal way, but also in an empirical and practical dimension. This readiness to accept has something to do with the dimension of the individual experience and the belief beyond knowledge. As soon as we cross the horizon of the knowledge, we confront a dimension of the unknowable or what Buber described metaphorically as "secret, light, eternity, the face of God" (Buber 1964, p. 73). The fact that the philosophy of Buber has received somewhat uncomfortable comments such as "quasi theology" (Theunissen 1963/1964, p. 328), "religious-fundamental reduction or a logical leap" (Kurzweil 1973, p. 433; Höltershinken 1971, p. 134), "mysticism" (Kurzweil 1973, p. 428 f.; Vogel 1970, p. 181; Grinnell 1983, p. 192), "abstract and metaphorical language" (Vierheilig 1996, p. 28) reflects this situation.

The concept of inclusion does not fare well from these comments as well, as the less we understand Buber's philosophy metaphorically and as a language of utopia that lies beyond our everyday educational reality, the more seriously and empirically we may accept it. It is not enough with ambiguity such as "the possibility for inclusion is *somewhat limited*" (Shady 2010, p. 86) or "the teacher *is somehow able to* swing boldly over into the life of his student" (Hendley 1978, p. 142). The possibility of inclusion in Buber's thought is neither "somewhat limited" nor "somehow possible". His concept of inclusion is concrete and realistic. To be able to appreciate his concept of inclusion and its pedagogical significance, it is inevitable to accept a sort of mysticism which the philosophy of Buber transports with itself. This means that we have to acknowledge the existential leap or the dynamics of the ontology of the between-man as an educationally meaningful motive. Only then may the anthropology of the teacher and a didactics of dialogue pedagogy establish both a theoretical and practical basis. The expression, "subjectless subject in the pedagogy of Buber" (cf. Game and Metcalf 2008)⁵ is and should be empirically right and appropriate, even though the expression implies in itself a paradox. Because the educational relationship in dialogue pedagogy is characterized only through the concept of inclusion, though it is not a mutual but a one-sided inclusion, and the didactics of dialogue pedagogy become possible only on the premise that the teacher can be his student simultaneously without losing his ontological uniqueness.

5 One-sided inclusion and extension of the concept of education

Dialogue philosophy does not guarantee the success of dialogue pedagogy. Unmediatedness and complete mutuality cannot and ought not to be accomplished in a few specific relationships. Amongst these particular relationships, there belongs the educational relationship. Namely, while mutual inclusion is an ideal for dialogue philosophy, dialogue pedagogy should satisfy itself as a one-sided inclusion⁶ due to the fact that according to Buber, if inclusion is not one-sided anymore, this relationship transforms from an education to a friendship.

Inclusion cannot be mutual. He [educator] experiences the pupil's being educated, but the pupil cannot experience the educating of the educator. The educator stands at both ends of the common situation, the pupil only at one end. In the moment when the pupil is able to throw himself across and experience from over there, the educative relation would be burst asunder, or change into friendship. (Buber 1964, p. 36 f.; Smith 1979, p. 128; cf. Buber 1979, p. 154 f.)

What is noticeable in this definition of education is Buber's regards towards inclusion as educator-centeredness. In other words, Buber defines education and the educational relationship mainly from the perspective of the educator. The fact that this central perspective of dialogue pedagogy is, strictly speaking, not reciprocal and dialogical, but teacher-centered, implies that there is probably a limit of dialogue pedagogy. What is clear though is that this concept of dialogue is, as Tischner rightly mentioned, a "leading dialogue" (1985, p. 183) which is evidently shown in his definition that "only [a] one sided inclusion is education". If this is the case, what are the educational-anthropological problems emerge from this assertion?

First, dialogue pedagogy presupposes an inevitable asymmetry in the abilities between the educator and student. In other words, it is assumed that there is a fundamental difference between the nature of the student and educator. While the educator is a person who is mature and developed a competency—whether it be a competency of imagination, performativity, or creating an atmosphere—the student is a being of relative deficit of these competencies in comparison to the educator. This kind of educational-anthropological prescription is "theory of being of deficit of an educatee" (Kant 1998, p. 697; cf. Ricken 1999, p. 94 f.), which is the typical understanding of traditional pedagogy. Although Buber himself expressed explicitly that he intended to leave the traditional concepts of education behind, he seems to still be deeply in contact with it, due to the fact that he advocates the teacher-centeredness and theory of deficit-being of the student (cf. Reger 1966, p. 230; Brezinka 1963, p. 199). This adherence to the traditional seems to be related to a religious background, from which his dialogue pedagogy and the calling of the teacher are rooted. "For the first time a young teacher enters a class independently. [...] The class before him is like a mirror of mankind, so multiform, so full of contradictions, so inaccessible. [...] 'These boys—I have not sought them out; I have been put here and have to accept them as they are'" (Buber 1964, p. 66; Smith 1979, p. 141). This kind of calling system, namely "the relationship of creator and creature, the God and his messenger, and teacher and student" needs inevitably, concepts of perfection, deficit and responsibility. We do not say that these concepts are of no significance, yet, it is important not to overlook how Buber's dialogue pedagogy actually resembles traditional pedagogy in its educational-anthropological fundament, regardless of the fact that dialogue pedagogy could not accomplish the ideal of a complete mutual relationship in education.

Secondly, it may be asked whether the concept of education should be restricted to a one-sided inclusion. Of course, the idea of Buber that only one sided inclusion is education is worth recognizing. No one would object to his opinion that education is an existential change for the student through the intervention of the teacher, both actively and passively. However, there is an educational phenomenon in our everyday educational lives which does not belong to Buber's concept of education. The intention of teaching for a teacher does not disturb or exclude the possibility of learning for him. In other

words, the teacher, during the teaching process, can learn from his students, despite the student's intentions to teach their teacher and the teacher's intentions to learn, resulting in both sides going through the process without recognizing such learning. Learning is not an exclusive experience for the students. Rather, it is open to all who are participating in the educational relationship. The diary of a veteran elementary school teacher, who has taught for 25 years, shows how she reflects on the learning experience from students, or rather, with the students.

Yes, how much do I owe to my first class? In April, we made small groups and at the time, they were so unpracticed and unable to cooperate, but now, they are teaching me in a more mature and fine way of behaving! How arrogant and shameful I was that I was jaded by the love that I thought I was always giving. Miyoung gave me a candy from her candy necklace which she took as a prize for being the best group. I scolded her because I thought she had destroyed the necklace which I made with such effort and she said in tears. "I just wanted to share my prize with you, teacher." How valuable her lesson was to me about sharing and loving! (Park et al. 2008, p. 160)

The confessions of the teacher in the chapter "Children Who Teach Me" (ibid., p. 159–181) are definitely not a rhetoric to beautify or romanticize the educational interaction. As students experience motives of existential change from the teacher, he learns also from the students, either intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously.

This is an empirical reality of education. Palmer, an experienced lecturer at teacher workshops, brings it into a metaphorical expression:

Mentors and apprentices are partners in an ancient human dance, and one of teaching's great rewards is the daily chance it gives us to get back on the dance floor. It is the dance of the spiraling generations, in which the old empower the young with their experience and the young empower the old with new life, reweaving the fabric of the human community as they touch and turn. ... Mentoring is a mutuality that requires more than meeting the right teacher: the teacher must meet the right student. (Palmer 2007, p. 22 f.)

"The teacher within, the voice of the inward teacher or conversation with a teacher within" (ibid., p. 30) which Palmer regards as a valuable motive does not imply just great teachers in the past whom he had experienced. It implies also the teacher himself and students who are participating in the conversation with him. In this context, we need to pay attention to Friedman's pedagogical interpretation of inclusion;

Inclusion must return again and again in the teaching situation, for it not only regulates but constitutes it. Through discovering the 'otherness' of the pupil the teacher discovers his own real limits, but also through this discovery he recognizes the forces of the world which the child needs to grow and he draws those forces into himself. Thus through his concern with the child, the teacher educates himself. (Friedman 1956, p. 98)

Teachers are, in contrast to Buber's assertion, open to the experience of learning. In this context, we share the view that there is a possibility to interpret Buber's relationship of

friendship as a part of the educational relationship if he had taken an existential change of teacher which was unintentionally caused by students in a dialogical relationship into consideration (cf. Caselmann 1974, p. 118; Hendley 1978, p. 143 f.; Brose 1983, p. 386).

Thirdly, the concept of education as a one sided inclusion has only an adult-child relationship as its object and is chiefly teacher and adult-oriented. However, considering the fact that it is not only about children and adolescents, but also adults in contemporary education, which Buber himself had experienced as an organizer and educator in an adult education center⁷, the concept of his education needs to be corrected and complemented towards the direction in which one sided inclusion (education) as well as mutual inclusion (friendship) are all included. In this context, Hendley suggests, referencing Dewey that an extension of dialogue pedagogy is necessary;

Certainly at the higher stages of formal education, teacher and students are in some sense partners in a common activity in which each has something to contribute as well as to gain. Dewey, for one, would describe educating as a shared activity in which the teacher is a learner, and the learner is, without knowing it, a teacher – and upon the whole, the less consciousness there is, on either side, of either giving or receiving instruction, the better. (Hendley 1978, p. 143)

It might have probably been more clarifying if Buber had distinguished the one-sidedness and reciprocity of inclusion as the limit between education and non-education. However, this is neither a useful nor meaningful system considering contemporary pedagogy. It is important and necessary to reconstruct the boundaries of dialogue pedagogy into a more extended and modern one.

Lastly, if inclusion is something that happens unintentionally and beyond the control of participants, it is rather unnatural and arbitrary to understand inclusion as a scientific criterion to set the limits of friendship and education. Educational influence is not restricted to the boundaries of a certain peer group or the teacher to the student. A real dialogue is blind in its direction and occurs without any prescribed scenarios. If the educational relationship were a dialogical one, then the power of education would be at work from both sides of the teacher and student. An existential-educational change is not an exclusive property of the student. In principle, the teacher is not isolated from this kind of education. Though Buber identified only half of this phenomenon, it is necessary to restore the pedagogical significance of the other in contemporary education. This can be seen in an old canon of Confucian pedagogy, *The Analects* (論語), which states that “walking in a group of three, there must be a teacher for me (三人行必有我師)” (cf. Legge 1935, p. 202; Gardner 2003, p. 134; Slingerland 2003, p. 71). This is also reviewed in *The Book of Rites* (禮記), stating that “a circulation of teaching and learning of a teacher in himself, namely learning through teaching and enriching the teaching through learning (教學相長)” (Shin 2001, p. 40), offering insight on the context. They are common in that the being of a teacher is in principle open to an experience of learning even from and with the student. The teacher and student are commonly participating in an education, not just for the student, but also the teacher. They are performing institutionally divided roles of teaching and learning, where both agents are in fact the teacher and learner at the same time. Based on this, we can suggest that Buber’s dialogue pedagogy can exit from its enclosed concept of education and open up to new possibilities. In other

words, dialogue pedagogy would be able to be more faithful to modern realities including adult and continuing education without giving up the key concept of a complete mutuality in the educational relationship.

6 Conclusion

A pedagogy which has an educational life of human beings as its premise and object is always in continuous creation, change and development. Dialogue pedagogy, the theme of this study, is no exception. It is important and necessary to complement the concept and system of dialogue pedagogy, which Buber could not bring to its elaborate completion due to his social-historical situation and his limited understanding on education. In this context, we reviewed the possibility and limit of dialogue pedagogy to make suggestions for a modernization of it, highlighting the concept of inclusion and focusing on its different understandings in the last few decades in pedagogy. It has shown that dialogue pedagogy can be of different character and significance based on the different positions of inclusion. What is important though is to ascertain what Buber said and demonstrated. Only this basis—by admitting that a fact is in many cases opaque and ambiguous in itself and needs re-interpretation—a praise can have its validity, a critique can have its productivity and a trial for complementation can have its necessity. What we have tried to do in this article is to remember what kind of logic and system that Buber suggested in regards to his concept of inclusion and to incorporate it in a contemporary context of education and pedagogy. Although Buber has passed on, his pedagogy remains significant today. Dialogue pedagogy must not be restricted to merely Buber's socio-historical era due to the fact that the ontology of the between-human as well as his educational practice, is not just a museum of past dogma, but a call to understand and better the between in everyday educational life.

Endnotes

- 1 Theunissen refers to the historical meaning of dialogue philosophy using a contrast between "the old philosophy and a new philosophy" (cf. 1977, p.243 f.). In the same context the dialogue pedagogy and its educational ideas can also be called a "new pedagogy" which differs from the "traditional education of eros and will to power."
- 2 In order to indicate the information about original text and translation, we will use the following form "(Author + Year + Page/Translator + Year + Page)".
- 3 The ordinary German word for "inclusion" is "Umfassung". Another suggestion for this translation can be "embracing" (Kaufmann 1970, p. 89) which has more active connotation in itself. In this article however, considering the conventional usage and in order to minimize unnecessary association in meaning, we will use the English translation "inclusion". However, even in this case, the word "inclusion" is just a translation for "Umfassung" and has little to do with "inclusion" in modern English.
- 4 Buber differentiates Inclusion into the following three subdivisions: abstract but mutual inclusion, concrete and one sided inclusion (education), and mutual inclusion (friendship). (Buber 1964, p.34 f.) See Chap. IV in regards to the difference between "education" and "friendship".

- 5 “there is seeing, but no see-er or seen”, “non-subjective ontological state”, “pedagogy without a project”, “hopeless hope”, or “a non subject-based ontology”. (Game and Metcalfe 2008, p. 462, 464, 467, 472)
- 6 Borowitz comments in his article “Education is not I-Thou” about the chasm between the dialogue philosophy and dialogue pedagogy of Buber as follows; “Martin Buber, however, was not an orthodox Buberian. With regard to education, he made a major break with his own ‘system’. Education, Buber taught, for all that it must center about the person, education is not I-Thou.” (Borowitz 1971, p. 328)
- 7 Guilherme and Morgan point out; “Given that much of Buber’s philosophy is based on dialogue, on community and on mutuality, it is puzzling that relatively little has been written on the implications of Buber’s thought for the theory and practice of non-formal adult education.” They discuss Martin Buber’s philosophy of education and its implications for a non-formal adult education (2009, p. 565).

References

- Black, L. W. (2005). Dialogue in the lecture hall. *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication*, 6(1), 31–40.
- Borowitz, E. (1971). Education is not I-Thou. *Religious Education*, 66(5), 326–331.
- Brezinka, W. (1964). Die Pädagogik und die erzieherische Wirklichkeit. In H. Röhrs (Ed.), *Erziehungswissenschaft und Erziehungswirklichkeit* (pp. 192–220). Frankfurt a. M.: Akademische.
- Brose, K. (1983). Das Erziehungsd Denken Martin Bubers. *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik*, 59, 381–396.
- Buber, M. (1962). Elemente der Zwischenmenschlichen. In M. Buber (Ed.), *Das Dialogische Prinzip* (pp. 269–298). Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider.
- Buber, M. (1964). *Reden über Erziehung* (8th ed.). Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider. In R. G. Smith (Trans.). (1979). *Between man and man* (pp. 109–147). Glasgow: Collins.
- Buber, M. (1965). *Urdistanz und Beziehung* (3rd ed.). Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider.
- Buber, M. (1979). *Ich und Du* (10th ed.). Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider. In W. Kaufmann (Trans.). (1970). *I and Thou*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
- Caselmann, C. (1974). Martin Buber als Erzieher. In B. Gerner (Ed.), *Martin Buber. Pädagogische Interpretationen zu seinem Werk* (pp. 110–124). München: Ehrenwirth.
- Cohen, A. (1979). Martin Buber and changes in modern education. *Oxford Review of Education*, 5(1), 81–103.
- Cohn, F. (2001). Existential medicine: Martin Buber and physician-patient relationships. *The Journal of Continuing Education in the Health Professions*, 21, 170–181.
- Friedman, M. (1956). Martin Buber’s philosophy of education. *Educational Theory*, 2, 95–104.
- Friedman, M. (1967). The base of Buber’s ethics. In P. A. Schlipp & M. Friedman (Eds.), *The philosophy of Martin Buber* (pp. 171–200). London: Cambridge University Press.
- Friedman, M. (2005). Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin. In B. Kluwer & J. Kluwer (Eds.), *Dialogue as a mean of collective communication* (pp. 29–39). New York: Academic/Plenum.
- Game, A., & Metcalfe, A. (2008). The teacher’s vocation: Ontology of response. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 27, 461–473.
- Gardner, D. K. (2003). *Zhu Xi’s reading of the analects*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Grinnell, F. (1983). The problem of intersubjectivity: A comparison of Martin Buber and Alfred Schutz. *Human Studies*, 6, 185–195.
- Grytzka, U. (1981). Die gegenwärtige Rezeption Martin Bubers in der Pädagogik. *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik*, 27, 53–64.

- Guilherme, A., & Morgan, W. J. (2009). Martin Buber's philosophy of education and its implications for adult non-formal education. *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, 28(5), 565–581.
- Hendley, B. (1978). Martin Buber on the teacher/student relationship: A critical appraisal. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 12, 141–148.
- Hook, S. (1963). *Education for modern man*. New York: Knopf.
- Höltershinken, D. (1971). Religiöse Erziehung bei Martin Buber. *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik*, 47, 121–139.
- Kant, I. (1998). Über Pädagogik. In W. Weischedel (Ed.), *Immanuel Kant* (Vol. VI, pp. 695–778). Darmstadt: WBG.
- Kim, S.-D. (2011). Martin Buber's anthropology. In S.-D. Kim (Ed. & Trans.), *Phenomenological philosophy of dialogue by S. Strasser* (pp. 241–268). Seoul: Philosophy & Reality.
- Kurzweil, Z. E. (1973). Martin Bubers Erziehungslehre und die Moderne. In N. Kluge (Ed.), *Das pädagogische Verhältnis* (p. 418–436). Darmstadt: WBG.
- Legge, J. (1935). *The Chinese classics* (Vol. I, 2nd ed., revised). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lippitz, W., & Woo, J.-G. (2008). Pädagogischer Bezug. Erzieherisches Verhältnis. In U. Frost et al. (Ed.), *Handbuch der Erziehungswissenschaft* (Vol. I, pp. 405–419). Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Palmer, P. J. (2007). *The courage to teach* (10th Anniversary ed.). San Francisco: Wiley.
- Park, N.-G., Park, J.-H., & Moon, J.-H. (2008). *How does a teacher grow up?* Seoul: Woori.
- Reger, A. (1966). Der unterrichtliche Dialog. *Pädagogische Welt*, 20, 226–234.
- Reitemeyer, U. (1995). Dialogisches Prinzip und pädagogische Begegnung. *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik*, 71, 442–454.
- Ricken, N. (1999). *Subjektivität und Kontingenz*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Röhrig, P. (1964). Der Begriff der Verantwortung bei Martin Buber. In W. P. Eckert & E. L. Ehrlich (Eds.), *Judenhass—Schuld der Christen?!* (pp. 457–478). Essen: Driewer.
- Rödler, P. (1996). Martin Buber: Anachronismus oder neue Chance für die Pädagogik? In J. Vierheilig & W. Lanwer-Koppelin (Eds.), *Martin Buber: Anachronismus oder neue Chance für die Pädagogik?* (pp. 1–5). Butzbach-Griedel: AFRA.
- Scudder, J. R. (1968). Freedom without authority. *Educational Theory*, 18, 133–142.
- Shady, S. L. H., & Larson, M. (2010). Tolerance, empathy, or inclusion? Insights from Martin Buber. *Educational Theory*, 60, 81–96.
- Shin, C. H. (2001). *A study on a modern educational implication of the doctrine of the mean*. Dissertation, Korea University.
- Slingerland, E. (2003). *Confucius analects*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Son, W.-J. (2010). The moral educational meaning proposed by Martin Buber's philosophy of encounter. *Philosophy of Ethics and Philosophy Education*, 13, 65–83.
- Suter, A. (1990). 'Beziehung erzieht'. *Pädagogische Rundschau*, 44, 171–180.
- Theunissen, M. (1963/1964). Bubers negative Ontologie des Zwischen. *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 71, 319–330.
- Theunissen, M. (1977). *Der Andere*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Tischner, W. (1985). *Der Dialog als grundlegendes Prinzip der Erziehung*. Frankfurt a. M.: Lang.
- Vierheilig, J. (1996). Dialogik als Erziehungsprinzip. In P. Rödler (Ed.), *Martin Buber—Anachronismus oder Neue Chance für die Pädagogik?* (pp. 17–74). Butzbach: AFRA.
- Vogel, M. (1970). The concept of responsibility in the thought of Martin Buber. *Harvard Educational Review*, 63(2), 159–182.
- Weinstein, J., & Schwartz, M. S. (1979). Values education without indoctrination. *The Educational Forum*, 43(2), 203–212.
- Woo, J.-G. (2007). Zwischen Dialogphilosophie und Dialogpädagogik Martin Bubers. *The Korean Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 40, 139–161.