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Combatting Jihadist Terrorism: A Quality-of-Life Perspective

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Abstract Many scholars and commentators have written on ways to counteract acts of terrorism initiated by Islamist militants associated with Jihadist groups operating predominantly in the Middle East and North Africa Region (hereafter the MENA region). Most of what has been published in the academic literature with respect to slowing, eventually stopping, the rate of Islamist-inspired terrorism has focused on short-term public safety solutions to the problem. In this paper, we build a quality-of-life model to address the drivers of Jihadist terrorism and deduce the underlying factors that contribute to counterterrorism programs directly from our understanding of these drivers. Specifically, we provide suggestive evidence to show increased incidence of Jihadist terrorism is mostly motivated by increased negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims toward their more affluent Western neighbors. This negative sentiment is influenced by a host of quality-of-life factors: *economic ill-being factors* (e.g., income disparities, poverty, and unemployment; and disparities in technological innovation), *political ill-being factors* (e.g., authoritarian tribal and exclusionary regimes), *religious ill-being factors* (e.g., increased Islamic religiosity, and lack of secularism), *globalization and media ill-being factors* (e.g., the global media), and *cultural ill-being factors* (e.g., perceived decadence of Western culture, and Western prejudice and discrimination). More effective counterterrorism strategies are

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deduced directly from understanding how these quality-of-life factors influence increased incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

> "In the pragmatist, streetwise climate of advanced postmodern capitalism, with its skepticism of big pictures and grand narratives, its hard-nosed disenchantment with the metaphysical, 'life' is one among a whole series of discredited totalities. We are invited to think small rather than big – ironically, at just the point when some of those out to destroy Western civilization are doing exactly the opposite. In the conflict between Western capitalism and radical Islam, a paucity of belief squares up to an excess of it. The West finds itself faced with a full-blooded metaphysical onslaught at just the historical point that it has, so to speak, philosophically disarmed. As far as belief goes, post-modernism prefers to travel light: it has beliefs, to be sure, but it does not have faith." — Terry Eagleton, *The Meaning of Life* New York: Barnes and Noble (2007)

Introduction

On September 11, 2001, the Western view of Islam changed profoundly, especially with respect to the unprecedented high levels of violence promulgated by fringe groups of Islamic fundamentalists (U.K. Essays 2013). Though "Jihadists[1]" represent only an extremely small minority of all Muslims living on the fringes of society, the impact of these militants on national and international perceptions of that reality has significantly altered relations between Western and Islamic nations. Boroumand and Boroumand (2002, p. 6) note that the birth of this type of terror directed at the international community and, the "Great Satan", the United States, by purported warriors of the Islamic faith has a new history. They place the beginning of this movement with the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 that over time, merged with the Arab Spring of December 2010 to December 2012. Their evaluation of past Islamic history finds no link to this type of brutal "jihad." The birth of modern Islamist terrorism, which they refer to as "Islamic-inspired Jihadist terrorism (or Jihadist or Jihadism for short). "Islamic-inspired" terrorism is seeded in a theologically flawed narrative with few historical roots (Keshavjee 2016). It is one that is developed from a desire to impose a "modern totalitarian challenge to both traditional Islam and modern democracy." Since the September 11, 2001 attacks the world geopolitical environment has been centrally concerned with efforts to end the actual and existential threats to Western nations

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[1] Within Islam, the terms "Jihad" and "Jihadism" refer to a personal struggle in devotion to Islam involving spiritual discipline. As understood by most Westerners, the two concepts reference "holy" war(s) waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty (Merriam Webster Dictionary https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jihad).

associated with Islamist militancy. Today, the terms "jihad," "Islamist," "radical," "militancy," and "terrorism" often are used interchangeably. From a geopolitical perspective, however, these terms generally refer to terrorist activities that originate in the Middle East and North Africa region (hereafter MENA region). Though the terrorism and violence associated with "Islam" is limited to an extremely small percentage of all Muslims, likely as few of 1 % of all socially disenfranchised youthful Muslim, the frequency or severity of the attacks cannot, and should not be ignored (Lewis 2004). Public policy leaders may differ on their views on the intensity and nature of the response, but all agree that there is a rapidly accelerating need to solve this stumbling block to peace and security for people of not only the region, but the world-as-a-whole. Any approach to solving the problem of increasing terrorism, however, cannot be one that focuses on the visible symptoms of terrorism, it also requires addressing the underlying systemic causes of these horrific acts. The approach or approaches also will require continuous systematic evaluation and carefully structured responses based on understanding of the phenomenon if we hope for true resolution. As such, our goal in this paper is to put forth a quality-of-life counterterrorism model based on understanding of the drivers of Islamic-inspired Jihadist terrorism (cf. Abu-Nimer and Hilal 2016). We build a quality-of-life model to address the drivers of Jihadist terrorism and deduce counterterrorism programs directly from our understanding of these drivers. Specifically, we provide suggestive evidence to show that the increased incidence of Jihadist terrorism is mostly motivated by increased negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims. This negative sentiment is influenced by a host of quality-of-life factors: *economic* factors (e.g., income disparities, poverty, and unemployment; and disparities in technological innovation), *political* factors (e.g., authoritarian tribal and exclusionary regimes), *religious* factors (e.g., increased Islamic religiosity, and lack of secularism), *globalization and media* factors (e.g., the global media), and *cultural* factors (e.g., perceived decadence of Western culture, and Western prejudice and discrimination). Counterterrorism strategies are deduced directly from understanding how these quality-of-life factors influence increased incidence of Jihadist terrorism. Although we have suggestive evidence of the impact of the aforementioned quality-of-life factors on the increased incidence of Jihadist terrorism, we offer specific theoretical propositions to help quality-of-life researchers frame the conversation and develop specific, testable hypotheses to conduct rigorous research in this important and ever growing area of research.

Terrorism

Throughout history terrorism has been a major problem in virtually all societies, albeit in response to different forces occurring in these societies. In all situations, though, terrorism is *the premeditated, systematic threat or use of violence by subnational groups to attain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation of a large audience* (Rosendorff and Sandler 2005). Most acts of terrorism are committed by anonymous perpetrators against anonymous targets (e.g., the use of suitcase bombs at bus stations, airports, and other mass transportation centers, the use of high altitude drones directed at either specific people or property). Most terrorist acts are committed against brother Muslims; only a comparatively few are directed against non-Muslims population living outside local Islamic communities (Islamic Terrorism 2017).

Among other goals, these manifestations of terrorism are intended to promote a sense of "ill-ease" in the target population who, in turn, experience their freedoms of movement and expression severely restricted by fear of becoming targets of aggression. Many people also are reluctant to make public expressions of their disdain for the perpetrators of the violence lest they become targets of terrorism themselves. The variety of forms that terrorism that occur each year increases in sophistication and variety and, tragically, in frequency. These assaults against people (targets) contribute to the animosity that both terrorists and its victims feel toward one another (Lewis 2003).

Terrorism: History and Legacy

Terrorism is not a modern phenomenon. Indeed, the history of targeting special groups of people with violence for changing either their behavior or that of "the state" (laws and policies) of which they are apart is present throughout Eastern and Western cultures since the beginning of recorded history. Sedgwick (2007) makes reference to the "wave theory" of terrorism. He sees terrorism in the context of a sort of rise and fall of a social phenomenon. Over the years certain types of terrorism have "come into fashion" and then "waned in popularity." He sees the current wave of "Religious Terrorism" (1980s to 2020s) as having followed the waves of Anarchist in the late 1800's to the early 1900s, Anti-Colonial in the 1920s to the 1960s, and New Left in the 1960s to the 1980s. Each of the players in the preceding and current waves draw on successes and try the same approach.

In-depth explorations of historical state- and non-state sponsored terrorism can be found in Chaliand and Blin's (2007) *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al-Qaeda*, Law's (2009) *Terrorism: A History,* also edited by Law (2015), his highly comprehensive *Routledge History of Terrorism*. All three of these books explore the underlying dynamics of terrorism and all three can be approached from the perspective of the terrorism-sensitive quality-of-life principles discussed throughout this paper. Particularly relevant to these discussions are drivers of terrorism contained in all three books. This paper builds on the historical analyses reported in these volumes and adds to them careful analysis of the linkages that exist between these historical accounts and the quality of life and well-being literatures that have emerged since the 1960s (Lewis 2003). These combined contributions are essential to identifying effective approaches to reducing the underlying causes that contribute to both state and non-state sponsored Islamic-inspired Jihadist terrorism.

Terrorism in the Modern Era: The U.S. Experience

The U.S. Bureau of Federal Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as "… organized behavior that involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that … appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping."[2] Acts of terrorism are in violation of both national and international laws and nearly always involve anonymous

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[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation (2015). Terrorism defined. Available from https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition.

perpetrators of violence directed at anonymous victims. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the world's largest international police organization, uses the same elements as the FBI in distinguishing acts of terrorism from other acts of individual or group violence albeit greater emphasis is placed on the international dimensions of such acts.

The *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD) housed at the START Center at University of Maryland (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) includes data from over 170,000 terrorist attacks from 1970 until 2017 (University of Maryland 2017). Countries, including the United States, maintain lists of foreign terrorist organizations (e.g., Al-Qaeda, Hamas) and domestic terrorist organizations (e.g., Ku Klux Klan, Earth Liberation Front). However, it is important to note that the distinction between international and domestic terrorism is not always apparent as the terrorists may engage in terrorism of domestic origins but act through global networks as in ISIS/ISIL (Czinkota et al. 2010). Moreover, terrorist networks are now taking on the characteristics of meta-national organizations, i.e., that of decentralized multinational corporations (Doz et al. 2004). For example, Al-Qaeda's activities are supported by non-governmental Islamist organizations world-wide using a wide range of flexible funding schemes that flow with ease across international borders. The majority of Islamist terrorist organizations function as private entities but, some, are sponsored by states and, thus, are government or "state-sponsored and funded organizations, albeit such sponsorship is almost always secretive and difficult to confirm. For example, the highly repressive political regimes of both Muamar Quadaffi and Saddam Hussein had extensive international networks engaged in terrorist activities. Iran, Sudan, and Syria were officially designated as *state sponsors of international terrorism* by the U.S. State Department as early as the mid-1990s.[3] Other countries have been added to the list as both the targets of terrorism against their own people and perpetrators of terrorism against other countries.[4] What is apparent from an examination of terrorism, at even the most rudimentary level, is that terrorism functions in a complex and dynamic world environment. The form that it takes, the perpetrators involved, and the sustainability of a terrorist cause and its network are equally complex and dynamic. Pilat (2009) offers a broad review of different perspectives of the causes of terrorism and concludes that while there may be multiple causes that are drivers of terrorism, our long-term success in counterterrorist responses "depend on as clear as possible an assessment of terrorism" (p. 181). What is clear is that understanding the systemic forces that contribute to extremism is a must to help develop sustainable strategies to counter the continued growth of terrorist movements. While clearly not alone as a rising terrorism movement, the one that has received the most notoriety in the twenty-first century is *Jihadist terrorism*.

A Quality-of-Life Model of Drivers of Jihadist Terrorism

We now turn our attention to understanding the drivers of Jihadist terrorism in Islamic societies that have experienced persecution by non-Islamic nations, especially by colonizing Western nations that have been the primary targets of acts of terrorism that

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[3] U.S. State Department. 2014.
[4] U.S. State Department of State. 2016.

have originated in Islamic nations located in the Middle East and North African region (hereafter "the MENA region). In such countries, developing counterterrorism programs to dismantle existing terrorist organizations are essentially short-term and focus on the immediate goal of maintaining public order and safety. These counterterrorism programs are short-term because new alternative militant organizations are likely to re-emerge. For example, simply creating a campaign to counter the recruiting call by Al-Qaeda in Iraq reduced recruits for that organization, but the rise of ISIL indicated that recruitment remains unaffected. To combat the re-emergence of Jihadist terrorism public policy and counterterrorism, officials within these countries and elsewhere need to implement quality-of-life intervention programs (i.e., programs designed with an eye on the drivers of Jihadist terrorism). These drivers are related to the economic, political, religious, globalization, media, and cultural conditions that serve as the emotional foundation for the propagation of Jihadist terrorism. A variety of studies have been conducted that show the power of these factors in both initiating and sustaining radicalization that can often end in acts of terrorism (e.g. Estes and Sirgy 2014; Estes and Tiliouine 2014; Freytag et al. 2011; Shahbaz et al. 2013). Central to our understanding of these environmental forces is the notion that a sympathetic population (e.g., marginalized and impoverished Muslims) feels aggrieved by another population (e.g., for purposes of this analysis "predominately economically advanced Western nations). This grievance often begins the process to an ultimate act of terror by a given individual. *These perceived grievances and growing frustrations fuel the terrorism process and motivated the aggrieved persons to action*, including acts of terrorism (Chiro and McCauley 2006; Crenshaw 2011; Della Porta 1995; Haslam 2006; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Royzman et al. 2005). See this grievance process in Fig. 1.

To understand the grievance, frustration, anger, and hate experienced by a sympathetic population, one must understand how economic, political, religious, globalization, media, and cultural institutions coalesce to breed this sentiment (see Figs. 2 and 3). Figure 2 presents the basic theory tree that informs Islamic-inspired terrorism under a very discrete set of socio-political situations. The model presented in Fig. 2 also places the individual in a complex pattern of socio-political forces that latterly encourage groups of people to engage in acts of terrorism. Figure 3 identifies the four major sectors found in every society (social; political, economic, and technological). The figure places these core components of the structure of all societies into a more complex social-political context, and calls for an analysis of the underlying values, norms, traditions and other, more contemporary, exogenous forces that impact the formation of contemporary society—population and environmental pressures, as well as threats to the natural environment and from political forces outside the society/country.

All the dynamic forces captured in Fig. 3 will be reflected in the discussion that follows. These also will inform the discussion and recommendations that appear at the end of the paper.

Economic Ill-Being Factors Related to the Rise of Islamist Terrorism among Marginalized Islamic Population Groups

Grievance, frustration, anger, and possibly hate experienced by a sympathetic population (e.g., Muslim and Arab humiliation and anger) may be related to economic factors and barriers to opportunity such as income disparities, poverty, unemployment, and

Fig. 1 The Effect of Macro-Environmental Factors on the Negative Sentiment of Aggrieved Muslims and Increased Demand for Jihadist Terrorism


**Fig. 2** The Quality-of-Life Model of Drivers of Jihadist Terrorism

Fig. 3 Quality-of-Life Analysis

disparities in technological innovation. There is much evidence that terrorism is linked to poverty. In other words, poverty, relative deprivation, and rapid socioeconomic change can create incentives for people to engage in political violence (e.g., Abadie 2004, 2006; Richardson 2013).

Income Disparities, Poverty, and Unemployment Income disparities, poverty, and unemployment are all significant factors influencing quality of life of a society. Much evidence in the quality-of-life literature suggest that income disparities play a significant role in quality of life of countries—that is, countries experiencing marked income disparities tend to score lower on quality-of-life measures than countries with less income disparities (e.g., Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Similarly, poor countries tend to score lower on quality-of-life indices than rich countries (e.g., Anand and Sen 1997). And unemployment is negatively related to quality-of-life measures (e.g., Sen 1981).

Continued and significant unemployment, particularly among youth, leads to a sense of aggrievement (e.g., Fougère et al. 2009; Papp and Winkelmann 2002). Consider the impact of rising unemployment among the youth in Arab countries. The UNDP report documents the fact that 26% of males between 15 and 24 residing in Arab countries are unemployed. The Arab population registers at 300 million, 37.5% under the age of 15, and three million are in the job market seeking employment every year. The rise of Islamic-inspired militancy is associated with the fact that that many Muslim countries have large youth populations that are mostly unemployed (Huntington 1993). Zaidi (2010) supports the idea that radicalization in Pakistan is multi-faceted, but he shows there is strong evidence to support the contention that impoverished young men make for a fertile recruiting market.

There is much evidence based on aggregate economic data showing that the MENA region is a global region with a majority of its population falling below the poverty line (Friedman 2007). Some have used these types of economic findings in a much broader historical context to frame the deeper issues that influence the current environment of radicalization enablers. Friedman (2007) explains that perhaps one major source of

Arab and Muslim humiliation is the fact that the GDP of Spain—Christian Spain that once was ruled by Arabs and Muslims—is slightly more than the GDP of all the 22 Arab states combined. This fact has been addressed by bin Laden as a great insult and source of humiliation for all Arabs and Muslims.

Studies found the positive causal relationship between unemployment and crime rate (Estes and Tiliouine 2014: Fougère et al. 2009; Papp and Winkelmann 2002). Bayat (2007) states that pervasiveness of unemployment and poverty, along with the rural migration to the cities is likely to be a footing for "major social upheaval." While a variety of studies have fallen short of validating the link between economic distress and terrorism, the general sense is that a combination of political suppression and economic deprivation can foster violence as a means to achieve better economic well-being and enhanced political freedom (Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006). Sambanis (2004) sums up the economic driver for violence when he writes, "The main point is that violent conflict will occur when it is expected to be more profitable than peace" (p. 167). Pargeter (2009) points out that in MENA countries where specific regions were areas of *extreme poverty* brought about by a central authority government policy of neglect (e.g. Libya and Tunisia) were areas ripe for recruitment to revolution and potentially related radicalization.

With respect to counterterrorism strategies, one may argue that the MENA region governments should be encouraged to develop a wide variety of projects that can employ a significant portion of their youth population. Consider the following example from the United States. Since 1992, the Youth Conservation Corps in New Mexico (USA) has put to work more than 8900 young people in 601 projects. The projects focused on youth development, natural resources conservation, community service, and education (*New Mexico Business Weekly* 2010). Based on this discussion, and that covered in considerable depth by Tiliouine and Estes 2016), we introduce our first theoretical proposition as follows:

> *Theoretical Proposition 1: High levels of economic disparities, poverty, and unemployment in Islamic societies play a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.*

In sum, the quality-of-life intervention is to provide economic assistance to aggrieved populations by investing in those regions through projects that benefit the youth. This type of large scale or entrepreneurial focused investment can drive a reduction in poverty. The development and implementation of policies and programs to provide employment opportunities for the youth among the aggrieved public are likely to help reduce the negative attitude toward the offending party, particularly among the youth, which in turn should reduce Jihadist terrorism.

Low Levels of Technological Innovation There is empirical evidence suggesting a positive link between technological innovation and societal quality of life (e.g., Edwards-Schachter et al. 2012). That is, countries that excel at technological innovation tend to score higher on quality-of-life metrics than countries with a poor record of research and innovation.

Ahmed (1991) offers a "post-modernist" view of the resurgence of Islamic framing of the world. He makes an argument that in the current environment, there is an effort to use the "ideal Muslim behavior." In some manner, it is a rejection of a dated "Western Orientalism" view as first put forward by American-Israeli-Arab scholar, Edward Said (Said 1970) and, subsequently, by a very large number of post-colonial scholars around the world (Lewis 2002; Tiliouine and Estes 2016). He notes that the West continues to create unease and that some Muslims "continue to exhibit a cultural inferiority complex in relation to the West." (p. 224). He seems to suggest that the fall of communism and the embracing of a consumerism driven society by many from the failed communist regions are inconsistent with an embrace of Islam. Landis (2015) feels that even the "Arab Spring" of 2011 was driven by western ideals so powerful that they overwhelmed traditional Islamic traditions. It is these collisions of Islam and the West that seem to drive Ahmed further to suggest that Islam may be a moderating force in the acceptance of Western materialism. Given, the rise of global communications and access to technologies and media supported materialism; there may be a growing tension within Islamic communities. Poverty and the size of the youthful populations in most MENA region country almost certainly is playing a role in a view that is inconsistent- between Islam and technology as the West uses it. A more savvy and Wester-focused segment of the population may view Islam as an "inhibitor of modernization" while others who are trying to apply the brakes to materialism may view technology in a negative manner. Radicalism and militancy in the context of a population may arise from either one side or the other of the view of technological innovation among people in those populations. When these two conflicting views of technology collide, tension builds within the societies and conflict occurs.

Let's consider the case of how Islamist thinking may play a role in the tension that leads to radicalization. From either side of the materialism and technology issue, the Western view of unfettered innovation and materialism. On the one side, Muslims and particularly Arabs may feel a sense of "humiliation" because they may perceive themselves as lagging significantly behind many economic and technological dimensions. At the same time, those trying to adhere to a Muslim-focused rejection of technology for perceived blatant materialism purposes may be "upset" with the forcing of Western-oriented technology driven materialism on their society. In either case, the seeds of discord and discontent are present with a potential focus of blame on the West.

Some figures regarding technology and innovation support the notion of disparity between the West and one group of Middle Eastern Muslim countries. Based on the second *Arab Human Development Report*, a publication issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2003), *the Arab countries have lagged economically along many fronts. For example, Arab countries produced 171 international patents compared to 16,328 produced by South Korea alone.* The average number of scientists and engineers working in research and development in the Arab countries is 371 per million people, compared to the world average of 979. This is surprising given the important, often remarkable and ground breaking, contributions made by Muslims to science, technology, medicine, finance, and literature during its "Golden Age" of the 13th and 14th centuries (cf. Levi 2012; Renima et al. 2016).

There are only 18 computers per one thousand people in the Arab countries, compared with a global average of 78 per one-thousand. Internet penetration among Arabic speakers is only 17.5% (UNDP 2003). Furthermore, much of the Arab World

has suffered from brain drain. Between 1995 and 1996, more than 25% of the university graduates in Arab countries have immigrated to Western countries (UNDP 2003).

Lack of technological innovation and brain drain are problems that are hard to tackle. But that is not to say that these problems are insoluble. An aggrieved population that suffers from lack of technological innovation can learn from India's economic development practices. India has managed to increase its level of product innovation and decrease its brain drain significantly (Friedman 2007). India managed to do so by investing in IT education and developing the infrastructure that supports IT firms located in India. An excellent example within the Muslim world is Turkey which has demonstrated strong economic growth in a diversified economic base. The Turkish economy has undergone a transformation from agricultural to industrial, enhanced by rapid urbanization, especially after 1982. The World Bank reported that Turkish GDP growth averaged nearly 7% in the 5 years from 2003 to 2007, that poverty decreased from 27% to 17%, and that the Turkish economy has recovered faster than many countries from the economic downturn with a growth rate more than 8% in 2010 (World Bank–Turkey Partnership 2011). The World Bank attributes much of this success to Turkish economic management moves that "hold the key to raising Turkey's potential growth rate in the medium term, allowing it to build sustainable higher living standards for Turkey's young, entrepreneurial population" (World Bank–Turkey Partnership: Country Program Snapshot, March 2011). Based on this discussion, we introduce our second theoretical proposition as follows:

Theoretical Proposition 2: Low levels of technological innovation in Islamic societies play a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn play a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

With respect to counterterrorism strategies, this quality-of-life analysis should lead us to conclude that development and implementation of policies and programs to foster technological innovation in aggrieved MENA countries are likely to help reduce the negative attitude toward the offending party, particularly among political activists. Doing so should decrease the incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

Political Ill-Being Factors Related to the Rise of Islamic-Inspired Jihadist Terrorism

Political factors play an important role in the experience of anger and frustration among the aggrieved. An important example of a political factor that is associated with radicalism and militancy is the prevalence of regimes that are exclusionary and viewed by a variety of groups within the country's population as illegitimate. Political disaffection or suppression can be a key catalyst in both terrorism and civil war (e.g. Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006; Thompson 1989).

Authoritarian Tribal and Exclusionary Regimes There is some evidence suggesting that countries with authoritarian regimes score low on quality-of-life indices than countries with democratic regimes (e.g., Dasgupta and Weale 1992).

A major political situation that seems to have caused much anger and humiliation among Muslims (particularly Arab-Muslims) is the fact that many of the political regimes are authoritarian and suppressive of many freedoms that Westerners take for granted. While two of the most modernized Muslim countries were modernized under authoritarian rule, Turkey and Iran (Farhat-Holzman 2012), generally authoritarian or single tribal focused regimes restrict widespread plural political participation. Some of those who have legitimate grievances believe that social change can be brought about only through violent means (Crenshaw 2011). Pargeter (2009) points out that central governments in the MENA region, such as Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia have had a history of marginalizing and even blocking a variety of peoples and regions from any real participation in the process of governing and self-determination. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein brutalized the Shia populations and in Libya, Muammar Quadaffi did the same to tribes outside of his ruling tribe and supporters. In countries like Morocco and Tunisia, political and economic disenfranchisement, while nowhere near as brutal, was directed by the elites who had consolidated their power in the post-independence environment. When coupled with the creation of many of these countries by Western colonial powers (based on map coordinates or resources instead of historically deep social, political, and ethnic loyalties), the disenfranchisement is not surprising. The effect of lack of political participation in many Arab and Muslim countries, government nepotism, and rampant corruption is a recipe for terrorism (Feldman 2008).

The "Arab Spring" (17 December 2010 – December 2012) is a testimony to the fact that anger and humiliation of Arabs and Muslims is partly related to authoritarian, tribal, and exclusionary government regimes. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the ongoing revolts in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain reflect this anger. The United States and its Western allies have attempted to effectively advocate for democracy, freedom, and human rights to diffuse the anger that Arabs and Muslims feel towards the West with mixed results. Gul (2012) suggests that the West may need to better understand the role of "secular Islam" in the democracies such as Turkey. Sometimes, a Western misinterpretation of secularism can lead to the view that the West is against Islamic oriented government and would support an authoritarian or despotic choice over moderate secular governments that embrace any sort of Islamic tenants. Lust (2011) points out that individuals, political parties, and governments in the region will also often play on the fear to either keep or usurp power. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) warn us of "Al-Qaeda's Jujitsu politics" (pp. 156–158). That is, militant groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, in part, justify their violence directed at Western countries because of contemporary Western support for despotic regimes. The more secular regimes (e.g., Bahrain) react (or overreact) to provocations from protestors, the more ammunition militant groups acquire in their *Jihad*. Based on the preceding discussion, we introduce our third theoretical proposition as follows:

Theoretical Proposition 3: Chronic authoritarian/tribal/exclusionary rule in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

What is the counterterrorism strategy that can be deduced from the preceding analysis? One can argue that all governments, particularly governments in the MENA region, should take the high moral road to assert the primacy of human rights

and reaffirm the importance of international law. For governments to gain credibility among their own citizens and the international community at large, they should ensure that the political regime in their own countries reflect an open and democratic society (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997). The international community should encourage authoritarian regimes to institute democratic and civil principles, not through force but through education and taking the high moral road of affirming human rights (cf. The Stanley Foundation 2005). In sum, while it is a very tricky and delicate dance, work toward development and implementation of policies and programs to strengthen democratic regimes and transform autocratic regimes into democratic regimes in countries with an aggrieved populace are likely to help reduce the negative attitude toward the offending party, particularly among the youth and political activists.

Religious Ill-Being Factors Related to the Rise of Jihadist Terrorism

Religion has long been recognized by researchers from a variety of the social sciences as something that clearly fulfills the need of many individuals and groups in finding a meaning in their identities (Seul 1999). McBride (2011) recounts the findings of a number of studies that draw her to assert that terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda exploit the strength of religion in self-identity and group affiliation by "marrying organizational identification to an over-arching religious paradigm." (p. 565).

Islam is a religion of tolerance, peace, and advancement of good will between Muslims and non-Muslims. The first tenant of Islam is to *submit to the will of Allah* and the will of *Allah*, as revealed in the *Holy Kor'an,* clearly teaches that the level of animosity and violence occurring between Muslims and non-Muslim today is well outside the realm of religious teaching, any religious teachings irrespective of the Islamic domination. Readers should note that there is absolutely no foundation contained in either the *Holy Kor'an*, or the summary of sayings and acts of the Prophet life, the *Hadith*, that gives legitimacy to the violence taking place by militants under the pretext of Islam. None whatsoever (Keshavjee 2016).

In effect, Islamic teachings regarding the need for a personal and collective *jihad*, periods of intense reflection and retrospection engaged in by Muslims to improve the religious conduct of their lives, exclude all forms of violence as possible within the religious principles on which Islam is based. Readers also need to remember that the same pattern of inter-faith violence existed during the period of Christian crusades to the Holy Land when Crusaders, operating with the support of Papal mandate, took the lives of hundreds of thousands of Muslims in the name of Christianity or, later, in Catholic Spain and Portugal (the Iberian Peninsula), when the Christians forced both Muslims and Jews to convert to Christianly, leave their countries of birth or, alternatively, die by sword in the name of the Roman Church. The death toll that resulted from this period of the brutal Inquisition is among the least paralleled in other societies anywhere in the world. The point here is that the "Jihadist" mindset has been prevalent in other religions and used for political gain by leaders.

In today's world, as in the past, two religious factors may be significant in contributing to a rise of anger among an aggrieved populace. These are a rising religiosity and a lack of secularism in society. We discuss these two potential drivers of Islamist terrorism in some detail below.

Rising Religiosity Religiosity (vs. religion) is a complex phenomenon that broadly refers to religious orientation and the degree of personal involvement of an individual with the practices of a religious tradition. According to Cornwall et al. (1986) and Koenig et al. (2005), the concept includes experiential, ritualistic, ideological, intellectual, creedal, communal, doctrinal, moral, as well as the cultural dimensions of personal involvement in religion.

Sociologists of religion have observed that an individual's religious beliefs, sense of belonging in a religious community, and religious behavior (religiosity) often are not congruent with an individual's actual religious behavior inasmuch as considerable diversity surrounds a person's degree pf involvement in religion (O'Toole 2001). This contradiction is particularly apparent in Judaism where ethnic identity as a Jew often takes precedence over one's actual degree of involvement in daily Judaic practices (Rosenfeld 2017). This dichotomy appears to be less extreme among Christians since the period of the Reformation (1517–1648) during which a firm distinction was made between religious and civil society practices (Michalos and Weijers 2017). The contradiction also is less extreme among Muslims for whom their basic identity and daily activities of all facets of life are inseparable linked to their identity as Muslims (Joshanloo 2017). Also, the subject of religious belief, practices, and religiosity have been the topic of a wide range of quality of life studies for decades (Gee & Veveers, 1990; Ferris 2002; Nagpal et al. 2015).

Religiosity is negatively associated with country level of development and quality of life. In other words, there is evidence in the quality-of-life literature suggesting that countries with increased religiosity tend to score lower on quality-of-life measures than countries with decreased religiosity (e.g., Barber 2013).

Ahmed (2004) notes that Muslim youth in the United States are significantly more religious than their non-Muslim compatriots. However, studies like Burris and Jackson (2000) have shown that Christians who are more religious oriented will also exhibit increased "religious self-stereotyping" if their group membership is viewed as being threatened. Hence, any religious-oriented individual, regardless of faith, might be driven more to the core dogma of that religion.

In the context of the present paper a heightened religiosity, driven by that core dogma, is hypothesized as having a direct and behavior-shaping relationship with the willingness of individuals to engage in terrorist activities and other acts of aggression that are intended to reduce what are experienced as social pathologies against the targets of their animosity. These targets are often identified as an anathematic outgroup threatening the very core of one's own group social and personal identity. In contrast, increased religiosity, with an increasing closer adherence to Islamic religious teachings and practices (e.g. such as formal worship of Allah multiple time each day, the avoidance of alcohol and "unclean" food), as dictated by Allah (God) through his prophet Mohammed, in turn, can lead to a religious extremism that may give rise to radicalism and militancy (Wade 2009).

Again, let us consider the case of Jihadist terrorism. Based on the second *Arab Human Development Report* (UNDP, 2003), the Arab countries have produced only 1% of the books published worldwide. Quite striking is the fact that a large majority of the publications are religious in nature — over triple the world average. This is a possible indicator to a rise of religiosity in the Arab World that works to the exclusion of both secular evidence-based ideas.

The Gallup study's examination of the attitudes that constitute the radical extreme delves into the relationship between the extremists and the Islamic faith they espouse. The study found that while religious rhetoric is closely associated with extremists, and that extremists do give high priority to their spiritual and moral values, the real difference between those who condone terrorist acts and all others is about politics, not piety. Most Muslims, both moderates (90%) and extremists (4%), identify religion as an important part of their daily lives (Esposito and Mogahed 2007). These facts point to the rise of religiosity in general in the Muslim world. Human history is replete with examples of warfare related to rising religiosity. Nicholas Wade, the author of *The Faith Instinct*, argues that rising religiosity and warfare are linked (Wade 2009). In 2012, Islamic militants in Mali destroyed ancient shrines and tombs, held sacred by the local Sufi adherents of Islam and relics of significant historical importance to the country, because they believed that people were worshiping them as idols in violation other Islamic principles.

Today's groups of Islamist terrorists essentially have co-opted Islam as the major justification for the violent acts of terrorism committed against Westerners. *But there is absolutely no foundation for such behavior in the religious teachings of Islam* (Tiliouine and Estes 2016) As noted earlier, Boroumand and Boroumand (2002) refer to this Islamist view as one that is very new and has it beginnings in 1979, not one that is drawn from the long history of the faith of Islam. Again, they view Islamist interpretation of Christian Holy Scripture as corrupt and a direct threat to both Islam and the religions of the West (Schroeder 2014). Based on the preceding discussion we introduce our fourth theoretical proposition:

Theoretical Proposition 4: Increased religiosity in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

The counterterrorism implication here is that Islamic leaders, referred to as Iman's, need to speak more openly about these contradictions between the teachings of Allah, the Islamic Ummah, and the relationship of the Ummah toward their neighbors however different the diverse nature of the people they may encounter are from themselves. They also need to lead their congregations into exploring the true teachings of Islam in relation to such extreme behavior and, in turn, must become active spokespersons leading the way for peace and harmony between Muslims and others (Keshavjee 2016). A world consisting of more than 1.6 billion Muslims and 1.4 billion Christians cannot move forward without the forceful leaderships of persons in both faith communities. In the end, Christians and Muslims worship the same God, pursue the same values and are more like one another than they are different. And these similarities must figure prominently if Jihadist terrorism is to be eliminated. But the major change that is needed in the attitudes of both groups of one another will depend principally on the aggressive teaching of Iman's and religious leaders of the true tenants of their faith and how their faith has been distorted to achieve unholy purposes (Tiliouine and Estes 2016).

Another counterterrorism implication of the preceding quality-of-life analysis is to develop programs that introduce more diverse and secular ideas in MENA societies with an aggrieved populace. How can this be accomplished? One way is through science education. Others may involve the study of comparative theology and

philosophy, creative arts, and human knowledge. The more people become well-versed in science/technology and arts/humanities, the more likely they become less religiously-obsessed. One study with national data indicates a negative relationship between level of education and one's religiosity: the most educated are the least religious (Albrecht and Heaton 1984). That does not mean that they become less spiritual.

Religion and spirituality need to be distinguished from one another. The better-educated masses (educated in science/technology and humanities) are more likely to feel more spiritual and understanding of the complexity of life. Spirituality is then translated into a personal form of communion with one's own conception of "God." That conception may be divorced from the religious conception (cf. Wade 2009). At the same time, mainstream religions across cultures offer spiritual paths toward truth. Understanding both classic and modern theology and philosophy provides an alternative religious conception to the radical one. A blind adherence to religious dogma, without an enlightened view of personal spirituality offered in a secularized context can lead to a simple blind view that can, in turn, easily lead to manipulation and exploitation of religious fervor. In sum, one can argue that development and implementation of policies and programs to increase education in science/technology and arts/humanities among the aggrieved public, particularly among children and youth, are likely to help reduce the negative attitude toward the offending party.

Lack of Secularism There is some evidence in the quality-of-life literature suggesting that secularism is associated with quality-of-life measures (e.g., Li and Bond 2010). In other words, countries that are more secular (less religious) tend to score higher on quality-of-life indices than countries that are less secular.

Lack of secularism in certain inward-looking MENA countries may play a significant role in the rise of radicalism and militancy in those countries. For example, Wade (2009) also points to the notion that Qur'anic discussion of warfare is directly associated with the joys of paradise, which further justifies and encourages violence (cf. Kennedy, 2007). While the western view may be that there is no separation of religion and state in Islamic countries, the interpretation of how embedded Islam and meshed with the state is one that is misunderstood (Gul 2012). "The idea that any group of persons, any activities, any part of human life is in any sense outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to Muslim thought," writes Bernard Lewis (2002, p. 100), a leading scholar of Islam. While this quote would lead many in the West to believe that any nation that has an Islamic government is not secular, there are many scholars who have examined the topic and report that such a "blanket" statement or view fails to address the wide variance and application of Islamic-oriented democracy. Hefner (2014a, b) also provides support for a historical Islam that was steeped in diversity and plurality.

It follows that policies that encourage some sort of demarcation between religion and the State should be encouraged. This is not to say that a strict application of a Western view of the separation of "Mosque and State" be strongly advocated. As is often the case, change in culturally held beliefs, is one that is strategically built initially upon nuances. Some Islamic states in the MENA region use the Shari'a as their only or primary source of law. Reformers in the Muslim world have met much resistance from the religious clerics who continue to exercise their power of persuasion on the public. Separation of religion from the State is perceived as a Western liberal concept by

Muslim clerics (Huntington 1993). There are many anecdotes of failures of reform to separate religion from state, the most recent examples are in Iran and Turkey. Secular leader's countries such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan are struggling to maintain their foothold of power. Radical fundamentalist movements in these countries push hard for a restoration of Islamic rule and pose a serious threat to the stability of secular governments (Fox and Sandler 2005). Based on the preceding discussion we introduce our fifth theoretical proposition:

> *Theoretical Proposition 5: Decreased secularism in traditional Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.*

Although secularization efforts are used by radical fundamentalists as rallying points in opposition to secularization (e.g., ISIS) the counterterrorism quality-of-life implication is to develop programs that promote secularism with a clear eye on benefits gained by such a path. That is, development and implementation of policies and programs to promote secularism in countries with an aggrieved public are likely to help reduce Jihadist terrorism.

Globalization and Media Ill-Being Factors Related to the Rise of Jihadist Terrorism

Globalization can bring about marginalization when countries fall behind in delivering a standard of living below the norm, in which the norm is clearly publicized through the global media (e.g., Sirgy 1998; Sirgy et al. 1998). In other words, the marginalized people become acutely aware of their backwardness by witnessing the standard of living (and potentially the perceived decadence and political indifference) of the developed world. This is exactly what happened to many of the less-developed Arab and Muslim countries Friedman (2007). Arabs and Muslims have felt an increasing sense of social alienation and a sense of humiliation at their comparative backwardness in the broader globalized society and economy. Various studies have examined how this radicalization is related to the view that the Islamic world has been yielding to Western pressure and watering down Islamic law (Ferrero 2005). Globalization and the widespread dissemination of media have allowed the entire Islamic world to observe and be involved in the debate. As media have delivered a constant stream of content, the Islamic population observed their descent from a great Islamic civilization to a world of underdevelopment. History shows that they had a great sense of pride in their Arab and Muslim identity; now they seem to have lost that sense of pride. The media have played a significant role in the promulgation of these feelings of dissonance and dislocation.

The Global Media Friedman (2007) has argued that globalization serves to create greater flow among people and cultures. In other words, globalization breaks down barriers among people of different nationalities and culture. Globalization connects people to people. Thus, people become increasingly aware of other people and their culture. The effect of globalization on cultural awareness is positive to some people but negative to others. Doran (2002) sees terrorism toward the West in the context of an Islamic civil war that the West is drawn into. The real war is not so much about what

goes on it the West, but how Islamic governments are now corrupted from their ideals. Global media, however, often plays a role in highlighting the negatives of Islamic countries on broadcasts and a variety media platform from the internet and mobile social media. Cftci (2012) notes that Islamophobia has reached unprecedented levels in the West. Much of that message of all Muslims are backwards, inferior, fanatical, and violent finds its way onto platforms viewed by the Islamic World. Donald Trump's advocacy for "banning all Muslims" from coming to the United States was posted in Islamic country media almost immediately. It also found its way into recruitment videos for ISIL. In such a global media environment, many Muslims around the world, especially Arab-Muslims feel frustrated and humiliated by the awareness of how the West has treated them both currently and throughout history; and according to Friedman, this perception may have contributed to the rise of the suicide bombers of Al-Qaeda and other Islamist terror organizations.

Furthermore, according to Friedman (2007), globalization has made the backwardness of the Arab-Muslin world (compared to the Western world), hard to ignore. Arab-Muslim intellectuals have consistently demanded solutions from their political leaders by pointing to this backwardness. This perceived backwardness has been a great source of humiliation and loss of pride among Muslims and Arabs. The notion of restoring the Caliphate is an emotional appeal to rebuild a rival civilization to that of the Western civilization, and create a major source of pride and honor to all Muslims worldwide. A contributing factor to this problem is the lack of awareness and appreciation among broad Western audiences of the major contributions of Islamic civilization to science and arts over history (see Stearns 2014). At the same time, there is a mythical view held by Islamists of an Islamic Golden Age (Al-Andalus in the Middle-Ages) that flourished until it was brutally destroyed by the colonization of Islamic lands by the Western powers. While there was a flourishing culture in parts of MENA, the "Golden Age had long been in decline. There were still tribal conflicts, and a variety of social ills before the Western colonization. In a post-colonial environment, the failure to achieve a return to the mythical "Golden Age" contributed to a level of enhanced mythical proportions. Key here too is that in this environment of unmet expectations, Islamists use of the West as the reason for failure. This further contributes to the epic narrative. Githens-Mazer (2008) points out this perceived "injustice" combined with a view that it was done with "contempt" to "humiliate" a flourishing culture is a key element in radicalization. Based on the preceding discussion we introduce our sixth theoretical proposition:

Theoretical Proposition 6: Increased use of global media in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

With respect to counterterrorism, the same forces of globalization that have served to propagate the image of "backwardness" of the aggrieved population can be used to highlight and publicize progress and achievements. Much emphasis can be placed on what the aggrieved population has contributed to modern society (Maziak 2005). Consider the following example. In 2008, a science exhibition was held at the University of Sharjah (U.A.E) called "Sultans of Science Rediscovered." The exhibition covered Arab and Muslim scientific achievements in architecture, arts, astronomy, engineering, exploration, flight, mathematics, medicine, optics, fine and utilitarian

technology, and water control (http://www.adach.ae/en/default.aspx). The conference recognized Muslims' scientific achievements. The same venue was used to develop an agenda for next steps for future advancements in science and technology in Muslim countries (AMEinfo.com 2008). This is very important in that not only can science and technology help create wealth, but they can help reduce societal tensions and build international bridges for badly needed dialogue and mutual understanding (Maziak 2005). In sum, development and implementation of policies and programs to publicize political, cultural, scientific, and technological achievements, particularly in global media, are likely to help reduce Jihadist terrorism.

Cultural Ill-Being Factors Related to the Rise of Jihadist Terrorism

Culture plays an important role in the festering of anger and negative feelings of an aggrieved public toward an offending party. For example, Friedman (2007) has argued that there is a host of cultural factors that have contributed to the festering of anger and humiliation among Muslims, particularly Arab Muslims. These are related to the perception that Western culture is decadent and the manifest prejudice and discrimination leveled against Muslim immigrants in the West.

Perceived Decadence of Western Culture There is some evidence in the quality-of-life literature suggesting that Islamic societies that reject modernity and adhere to Islamic law tend to report lower levels of quality of life (e.g., Estes and Sirgy 2014). Modernity can be construed as reflective of Western culture. Hence, Islamic countries that reject modernity are likely to experience lower levels of well-being, compared to countries embracing modernity.

Typically, terrorist groups view the offending party in the most negative terms. The offending party is the enemy, decadent, and evil. Again, consider the case of Jihadist terrorism. A major impetus to restore the Caliphate is the frustration that Muslims feel in observing the lifestyle of Westerners, and especially how this lifestyle is influencing their own youth. When Muslim fundamentalists look at the West they see evil—a culture of decadence and promiscuity. Restoring the Caliphate is a means to replace a decadent culture with a moral one—not only for all Muslims but for the entire of humanity (Friedman 2007). In a Gallup poll conducted in nine Muslim countries in December 2001 and January 2002, most respondents indicated that they considered the United States to be evil in terms of being ruthless, arrogant, aggressive, and a *corrupting influence* (Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Green 2002). Shafiq (2009) examines data from the 2005 Pew Project and finds that both education and income have a significant influence in people's support for democracy in Muslim countries. Based on the preceding discussion we introduce our seventh theoretical proposition:

> *Theoretical Proposition 7: Increased perception of decadence of Western culture in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.*

The counterterrorism implication in this case is to identify the exact nature of the negative image of the offending party and launch promotion campaigns to change this image in the minds of the aggrieved party. Much of the work on "in-group versus out-

group behavior" from sociology and social psychology (e.g., Costarelli, & Gerłowska, 2015; Effelsberg & Solia, 2015) can be molded to help address this problem. Promotion campaigns should focus on "humanizing" the offending party by highlighting societal problems and showing how responsible and moral leaders are dealing with these problems in human terms (Landau and Rosenberg 1986). That is, development and implementation of policies and programs to promote the offending party as "human" afflicted with humanity problems and trying to deal with these problems through responsible and moral leadership are likely to help reduce Jihadist terrorism.

Western Prejudice and Discrimination There is much evidence suggesting that immigrants who experience prejudice and discrimination are likely to experience lower levels of life satisfaction than those who experience less prejudice and discrimination (Safi 2009). Many of the immigrants communicate their negative experiences in their host countries to their friends and relatives in their home countries. Again, consider the case of the Arabs and Muslims who perceive prejudice and discrimination. Many Arabs and Muslims, having immigrated to Western countries (or having grown up in the West), feel very alienated because of their efforts to maintain their own Islamic culture. A recent study by Fischer et al. (2007) found that Muslims in Germany were not more aggressive than Christians and secular westerners (as perceived by the westerners), but were actually concerned that Western societies were threatening their religious identity through various actions (e.g. no headscarves in schools, etc.). This perceived threat to religious identity was found to be a driver in the creation of a different "attitude toward terrorism." Unfortunately, this may well lead some to view this as an affirmation of the stereotype held by the Westerners.

There have been many incidences of Western expression of prejudice and discrimination against Muslims in places like the U.S., the U.K., France, and Germany. An example of this prejudice is the 2007 referendum in Switzerland that resulted in a vote against building minarets. The result is a feeling of rejection—a feeling that "you are not one of us." This sense of alienation quickly turns to humiliation, anger, and rage, which in turn make Arab and Muslim youth highly receptive to the persuasive message of terrorist groups and their recruiting disciples (Friedman 2007). McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) warn us how militant groups such as Al-Qaeda use "minor provocations" (e.g., the failed Nigerian terrorist, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the "Underwear Bomber") to their advantage. Typically, minor provocations induce public policy officials to overreact by creating policies and programs that exacerbate prejudice and discrimination directed at the Arab-Muslim community (e.g., new visa restrictions, profiling at airports, overzealous law enforcement agents arresting and interrogating Arab-Muslims based on "atypical" behaviors or very minor offenses). Such manifestations of prejudice and discrimination are further used by militant groups to promote their *Jihad*. Based on the preceding discussion we introduce our eighth theoretical proposition:

> *Theoretical Proposition 8: Increased perception of Western prejudice and discrimination against Muslim immigrants in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.*

The counterterrorism implications in this case must be the enforcement of all laws related to prejudice and discrimination as well as cultural awareness and sensitivity

Table 1 Summary of the Model's Theoretical Propositions

Theoretical Proposition 1: High levels of economic disparities, poverty, and unemployment in Islamic societies play a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

Theoretical Proposition 2: Low levels of technological innovation in Islamic societies play a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

Theoretical Proposition 3: Chronic authoritarian/tribal/exclusionary rule in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

Theoretical Proposition 4: Increased religiosity in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

Theoretical Proposition 5: Decreased secularism in traditional Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

Theoretical Proposition 6: Increased use of global media in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

Theoretical Proposition 7: Increased perception of decadence of Western culture in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

Theoretical Proposition 8: Increased perception of Western prejudice and discrimination against Muslim immigrants in Islamic societies plays a significant role in the negative sentiment of aggrieved Muslims, which in turn plays a role in incidence of Jihadist terrorism.

training in all sectors of society. One can observe many years of progress made in U.S. race relations and civil rights of Arabs and Muslims immigrants in the West. Also, for any progress to be realized, "offending" countries must promote policies that encourage educational and cultural exchange programs with the aggrieved parties. In sum, development and implementation of policies and programs to reduce prejudice and discrimination toward the aggrieved party is likely to help reduce Jihadist terrorism.

The formal testing of each of these empirical theoretical hypotheses will be the subject of another paper—one that examines more formally the contribution of subjective well-being and personal attitudes vis-à-vis the complex social, political, economic, technological, and ideologically-based hypothesis listed above.

Conclusion

A fundamental requirement for any effort by the offending party to create bridges and mend fences with the aggrieved party, whether it be through diplomacy, media reporting, or marketing, is to begin with an attitude of respect and open-mindedness that is free of ethnocentrism and stereotypical thinking. Understanding the overlapping attitudes shared by extremists and moderates is essential for any communications to be effective. With respect to Jihadist terrorism, a Gallup study concludes: "There are 1.3 billion Muslims today worldwide. If the 7% (91 million) of the politically radicalized continue to feel politically dominated, occupied, and disrespected, the West will have little, if any, chance of changing their minds (Esposito and Mogahed 2007). If strategically directed quality-of-life intervention programs can work to diminish this feeling

and reduce the percentage of the politically radicalized, this could lead to a significant reduction in Jihadist terrorism. Combating terrorism using military force to dismantle terrorist organizations can be viewed as short-term and short-sided solution. It is best to focus on the big picture that explains the quality-of-life drivers for terrorism and implement quality-of-life intervention programs to reduce Jihadist terrorism.

All in all, we tried in this paper to offer a quality-of-life model of Jihadist terrorism that has significant implications for counterterrorism. See a summary of the theoretical propositions of the model in Table 1. Our hope is that scholars doing research in this area find this model helpful in unifying their thoughts and provoke future research. We also hope that public policy officials who are focused on counterterrorism find our quality-of-life model helpful in guiding their decision-making to help reduce Jihadist terrorism.

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