Asian Criminology (2014) 9:143–159
DOI 10.1007/s11417-014-9183-9

Dealing with the Aftermath of Japan's Triple Disaster: Building Social Capital Through Crime Prevention

Erik Herber

Received: 2 August 2013 / Accepted: 28 January 2014 / Published online: 26 February 2014

Abstract After the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster that struck Japan in March 2011, overall rates of reported crime, already low in international comparative terms, went further down. A relative absence of crime was accompanied, however, by a great awareness of the possibility of crime—as illustrated by emergency policies and numerous crime prevention initiatives and activities by both the police and groups of (local) volunteers. This article will show that the large scale and persistence of crime prevention campaigns and activities can be understood against the background of more general, persistent preoccupations with, and concerns about crime. Based on statistics, media reports, and interviews with (former) inhabitants of the struck Tōhoku area as well as members of NGO's, it will furthermore show that crime prevention activities, that up until now have received hardly any scholarly attention, were purposely employed to strengthen community ties, as well as to bring about ties between members of communities torn apart by the disasters. Focusing on crime and crime prevention activities after March 11, 2011 in Miyagi prefecture and specifically the town of Ishinomaki, this article will show that amidst overwhelming loss and uncertainty crime constituted and constitutes an opportunity for the (re-)building of social capital.

Keywords Japan · Disaster · Crime prevention · Community

Introduction[1]

In the afternoon of 11 March 2011, an undersea earthquake with a Richter scale magnitude of 9.0 occurred off the northeastern coast of Japan. The earthquake triggered a powerful tsunami that reached inundation heights of close to 40 m (Tsuji 2012) and caused vast destruction and loss of life. According to a recent report published by the National Police Association, 15,883 people died; 2,656 are still missing, and 6,145 people were injured (NPA 2013). In addition, close to 400,000 houses were completely or partially destroyed. As a result of the meltdown of

[1] Translations are the author's unless otherwise provided.

E. Herber (✉)
Faculty of Law, Institute for Metajuridica, Law and Governance/VVI, Leiden Institute for Area Studies (LIAS), School of Asian Studies (SAS), P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RALeiden, The Netherlands
e-mail: e.d.herber@hum.leidenuniv.nl

three nuclear reactors in the Fukushima Dai'ichi Nuclear Power Plant complex occurring in the wake of the tsunami, residents in the vicinity of the reactors had to be evacuated, while radiation caused serious harm to both the surrounding and wider environment (see Akahane et al. 2012). The triple disaster that hit Japan in addition left more than 290,000 people displaced; they are (as of August 2013) still living in emergency or temporary housing or with family, etc. (Government of Japan Reconstruction Agency 2013).

In covering the events, international media in particular zoomed in on locals' apparent "orderly" behavior following the disasters (see, e.g., New York Times 2011; Daily Mail 2011; ABC News 2011; see also the Courrier International 2011 (French translation of an article from the Tokyo Shimbun dealing with ways of reporting by the international media, etc.).[2] Japanese media, on the other hand, did report episodes of particularly theft and looting (some of which related to shortages of food and necessary daily supplies). On the internet, however, numerous "reports from the scene" circulated, suggesting that foreigners were going around robbing and killing, that crime was rapidly increasing, and general safety worsening.

Some questions that present themselves here, and that will be addressed in this article, are the following: what crimes did actually happen in the wake of the disasters? And how do these compare to the levels and nature of crime registered before March 11? How can the changes in crime rates—if any—be understood? In addressing these questions, this article will focus on crime in the three prefectures most severely affected: Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi.

Besides looking at levels and types of crime, this article will also examine the ways in which both police and local citizens addressed the perceived risks of crime. In the aftermath of the disasters, crime—occurrences of crime, risks thereof, and the need to prevent it—appeared to be of ongoing and intense concern. Why was it, amidst incredible devastation and loss of human lives, so important to—for example—continuously remind those in shelters to not let their wallets out of their sight and to lock their bicycles? How can the actions of both police and "crime prevention volunteers" be understood?

As will become clear, through pursuing these questions, an alternative view on "the absence of crime" in the aftermath of the disasters of 311 will present itself. This view will thus form a contrast with (non-Japanese) media reports on crime reminiscent of Adler's characterization of Japan as a "nation not obsessed with crime" (1982). Addressing these questions will furthermore allow for an examination of the role that crime plays not only as a source of fear and concern, but also as an opportunity to build *social capital* through crime prevention volunteerism.

While social capital has been defined in many ways, it will here be used to stand for "the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures" (Portes 2000).[3] The concept will in this article be used as a heuristic tool that will—as will become clear—bring into focus different dimensions of the role of crime, and—more particularly—crime prevention after and beyond 311 in Japanese (civil) society. Doing so will contribute to our understanding of this important, yet little acknowledged role.

[2] It should also be noted that there were those critical of this stereotypical "master narrative" of the calm and stoic Japanese (see, e.g., Poynter 2011).

[3] Portes in fact observes a growing consensus in the literature towards this definition. Others nevertheless use the concept to refer to the social networks themselves, or as both the networks as well as the resources that the network accrues to its members (for still more definitions, see, e.g., Coleman 1990; Putnam 1995, 1996; Adam and Roncevic 2003; Lin et al. 2001; Fine 2007; Haynes 2009). One reason for using the "Portes definition" in this article is that conforming to a (potential) consensus will facilitate debates on the concept and its use (when researchers speak the same language). Another reason is that the analytical separation of networks as resources (on one hand) and the benefits secured by virtue of membership of those networks (on the other) will help—as will become clear—make analytical sense of the findings.

In examining these issues, this article will focus in particular on the "case" of Miyagi prefecture, and that of one town in Miyagi prefecture: Ishinomaki, a fisherman's town on the north eastern coast of Japan. The reasons for focusing on Miyagi and the town of Ishinomaki were practical. Data on crime and responses to crime were uniquely accessible thanks to contacts with the Miyagi prefecture and Ishinomaki police, as well as those living and working in the area. Use will, thus, be made of data provided by the police forces already mentioned, as well as the 249 leaflets produced and locally distributed by the Miyagi police in the period between March 19, 2011 and July 3, 2012. The article is in addition—and finally—based on recorded conversations and interviews (held between May 2011 and August 2013) with inhabitants of the Ishinomaki area and those working and volunteering in this area for different NGO's.

Crime before and after March 11, 2011

In 2010, the crime rates in the Miyagi, Fukushima, and Iwate prefectures were relatively low, as these prefectures ranked 19th, 26th, and 46th, respectively, in the crime incidence chart of Japan's 47 prefectures.[4] Table 1 shows the total and relative crime incidence for these prefectures as well as the numbers and rates for the whole of Japan comparing March—December 2010 and 2011.

As can be seen, in 2011, the volume of registered crime dropped considerably. As the volume of crime went down nationwide, this drop can of course not be ascribed (solely) to the disasters of March 11. The dropping numbers and rates are in fact part of a trend that started already in 2003, as can be seen in Fig. 1. Remarkable, however, is that in the period following the disasters, crime in the three prefectures most severely affected went down to a much greater extent than the national average.

To see what crimes did and did not occur, let us now take a closer look at crime post 311 in the prefectures of Miyagi, Fukushima, and Iwate.

Comparing the numbers for 2010 and 2011, the only (registered) crime that increased was that of burglary (see Table 2). The burglaries in this case concerned predominantly abandoned houses and houses with damaged doors that formed relatively easy targets for (opportunistic) burglars. The rise in burglaries shown in Table 2 was caused entirely by the burglaries that took place in Fukushima (in Iwate and Miyagi, burglaries dropped 1 and 11 %, respectively). This rise was related to the fact that from April 22nd on, people living within a 20-km radius of the Fukushima Dai'ichi Nuclear Power Plant complex were forced to evacuate and leave their houses behind (see generally National Police Association, 2012b). In addition, there was in Fukushima also a rise in the number of stores plundered (from 200 in March–December 2010 to 248 in March–December 2011. Fukushima police, 2012,[5] National Police Association (hereafter, NPA) 2012b, p. 22). Other reported incidents include theft from ATMs, gasoline theft (from abandoned and "washed-up" cars), as well as incidents of fraud—of, e.g., people selling drinks that claimed to protect one from radiation poisoning and people collecting money for fictitious "victim aid funds" (Miyagi police 2011–2012. See also infra).

[4] For a comparison chart, see www.police.pref.gunma.jp (website of the Gunma prefecture police—last accessed 19 July 2013), numbers conform statistics of the National Police Agency of Japan.
[5] Data kindly supplied directly to author by the Fukushima Police Department.

Table 1 Comparison of numbers of registered crime in the prefectures of Miyagi, Fukushima, and Iwate, in periods of March–December 2010 and 2011

Registered crime (number)			Incidence rate (per100,000)		Population	
	March–Dec. 2010	March–Dec. 2011	March–Dec. 2010	March–Dec. 2011	March–Dec. 2010	March–Dec. 2011
Miyagi	21,201	17,452 (−17.7 %)	908.3	747.3	2,334,137	2,335,208
Fukushima	17,032	13,625 (−20 %)	838.1	676.4	2,032,302	2,014,291
Iwate	6,567	5,555 (−15.4 %)	492.6	420.2	1,333,157	1,322,036
Three prefectures combined	44,800	36,632 (−18.2 %)	786	645.9	5,699,596	5,671,535
Japan	1,357,391	1,268,106 (−6.6 %)	1062.1	992.3	127,717,770	127,789,439

Registered penal code offences, excluding traffic offences as well as crimes of manslaughter due to reckless driving (危険運転致死傷) and (serious) professional negligence related to traffic accidents (業務上(重)過失致死傷). Data for Table 1, 2, as well as Fig. 2 were kindly supplied to the author by the National Police Association

Crime prevention

Lest one would get the impression that crime was of no concern—befitting a nation "not obsessed by crime" (Adler 1983)—it is important to zoom in on the massive attention devoted to crime by the police in the aftermath of the disasters.

The police dispatched over 4,800 officers to the three affected prefectures (as well as 1,000 vehicles). As a result, there was a combined total of 13,800 police officers working in the area, performing a wide range of tasks. To name just a few, the police searched for those who went missing, increased crime prevention patrols, and generally supported the work of local police forces, provided (moral) support for victims in the shelters as well as making efforts to raise people's crime awareness (I will come back to this issue, infra). Eighty ATMs in the area surrounding the Fukushima Dai'ichi Power Plant were emptied, and surveillance cameras were installed at strategic places within the closed-off 20-km zone, so as to monitor the traffic of people and people and cars—in addition to the roadblocks set up at the edges of the zone. The police in addition recovered over 6,000 safes and was able to return 99.7 % of the content to the rightful owners (as of 24 April 2012—Miyagi Police 2012). Information was furthermore disseminated to the public in the affected areas in order to raise awareness of the possibility of different kinds of fraud (such as those mentioned *above*). Great efforts were thus made to remove as well as harden crime targets.



Fig. 1 Registered general penal code offenses 2003–2011 (Graph generated using data from the 2004 to 2012 White Papers on Crime (*Hanzai Hakusho*)), Hōmushō Hōmusōgōkenkyūjo (2004–2012)

Table 2 Comparison of numbers of general and selected penal code offenses registered in Miyagi, Fukushima, and Iwate (combined) for 2010 and 2011

	March–Dec. 2010	March–Dec. 2011	Percentage
General penal code offenses	44,800	36,632	−18.2 %
Murder, robbery, arson, rape	215	151	−29.8 %
Assault, extortion	1,726	1,542	−10.7 %
Theft			
	33,675	27,882	−17.2 %
Burglary	4,873	5,062	3.9 %
Vehicle theft	11,318	9,156	−19.1 %
Theft without burglary	17,484	13,664	−21.8 %
Intellectual crime	1,652	954	−42.3 %
Offense against public morals	370	328	−11.4 %
Other	7,162	5,775	−19.4 %

On the basis of the crime statistics listed *above*, it might nevertheless be tempting to conclude that for others than the police (the professional crime fighters), crime was not an issue. It was, however, very much an issue in terms of "crime talk." In the days following the disasters, many rumors about crime started going around, especially on internet forums as well as in "chain letters" that were sent around. "Reports from the scene" started appearing, either seemingly written by people living in the affected area, or those reporting what they had heard from friends in the area. These included violent offenses (of, e.g., stabbings, sexual offenses), often by foreigners as well as people from outside the affected prefectures. Police were often said to offer no help, even when asked.[6]

These rumors about crimes were part of a larger stream of rumors following the disasters, about, e.g., the emperor fleeing to Kyoto, advice given to military personnel to have their relatives leave Tokyo, or how it would take 10 years for electricity to be restored in the affected area (Iwama 2011). The stream of rumors in fact reached such proportions that on April 6, 2011, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications requested internet service providers to "take appropriate measures, while taking the freedom of expression into account" (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2012). That is to remove content judged to be in conflict with "laws, public order, and good morals." The police furthermore took measures to prevent the spread of "unsubstantiated rumors" by having such rumors removed (before April 6) from internet fora as well as by distributing pamphlets in the emergency shelters, etc. (NPA 2011; Miyagi Police 2011–2012; Yomiuri Online April 2011).

Besides being talked and written about, crime was also one of the foci of the support effort that came about in the aftermath of the disasters. In the months following the disasters, a number of initiatives and projects were set up by nonprofit organizations to help prevent crime. There were, for example, several projects set up to deliver "crime prevention buzzers" (alarms, over 30,000 in total) to women in the affected areas—especially in the temporary shelters, in view of a perceived risk of sexual offenses. Several volunteer groups for crime prevention donated "crime prevention goods" (torches, armbands, uniforms, and even cars)

[6] For examples, from internet fora, see: http://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/mxx941/2870080.html; http://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/mxx941/2911558.html; http://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/mxx941/2938786.html; http://detail.chiebukuro.yahoo.co.jp/qa/question_detail/q1457932349. Accessed 26 July 2013.

to fellow crime prevention groups in the area, or money so that they could buy new goods themselves.[7]

The crime prevention goods offered here seemed to be aimed at fulfilling basic "crime prevention needs." A need for victims of the disasters to provide for their own safety in the aftermath of the disasters, but also a perceived need to engage in crime prevention activities in more *general terms*, unconnected to the disasters. The first need may be self evident—something close to a human right or a human security demand, brought about by the chaos and turmoil of the disasters. The second need (apparent or real) requires some clarification. How can we understand a perceived *need* to be able to engage in crime prevention, leading people to donate substantial sums of money as well as goods? Furthermore, how does this "crime aid" relate to the civilian and governmental concern with crime as expressed *above*? And finally, what role could or does crime prevention volunteerism play in the bringing about of social capital?

Crime fear, talk, and fun

In order to answer the questions raised, it is necessary to briefly address levels of crime and responses to crime in Japan in more general terms, before addressing crime prevention volunteerism and its potential social capital building function after 311.

In comparison with other industrialized countries like France, UK, Germany, and the US, levels of registered crime in Japan are relatively low (see Table 3). Nevertheless, a comparatively low incidence of crime does not translate into a comparatively low interest in or concern about crime. In 1991, Futaba Igarashi already compared articles covering crime in the New York Times with those in major Japanese newspapers, and found that the Japanese newspapers devoted about 23 times as many articles to crime as did the New York Times (Igarashi 1991). In a more recent article on juvenile crime in Japan, Fenwick (2007) similarly notes that a relative absence of crime in Japan does not lead to a relative absence of crime talk. On the contrary, like in many countries, crimes in Japan regularly lead to media "reporting frenzies" (as well as defamation suits—to the extent that in many bookstores in Japan one can find a shelve dedicated to "media damage" or "trial by media"—see West 2006; Gamble and Watanabe 2004).

One might, nevertheless, be tempted to think that the relatively low levels of registered crime are a result of underreporting (by either or both the public and police), and that the real level of crime could be (much) higher.[8] The International Crime Victims Surveys (1992-2004-5, hereafter ICVS) have shown that reporting rates in Japan are indeed relatively low. However, they also show very low rates of victimization. Especially significant here is that while data from the ICVS consistently show very low levels of actual victimization, they also show comparatively high levels of *fear* of victimization. In the latest ICVS (2004–2005), Japan ranks 14 out of 15 in terms of overall levels of victimization, while it has among the highest percentages of people who, e.g., feel unsafe on the streets after dark or feel there is a

[7] For examples of such projects and initiatives that all took place in 2011, see http://www.bouhan-nippon.jp/try/try12_27.htm (website of the crime prevention association of the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper; "buzzer project"); http://bondproject.sblo.jp/article/44181636.html (women's support NPO "Bond": "buzzers for women project"); www.miyagi-kenbouren.comassociation of crime prevention groups Miyagi (financial and material support of local crime prevention groups); http://jenhp.cocolog-nifty.com/emergency/cat22624968/index.html (Japan Emergency NPO: donation of crime prevention goods and car to the Ishinomaki youth crime prevention group), etc. All websites accessed on 26 July 2013.

[8] See in this regard also Hamai (2004) who showed how changing police registration practices affected the levels of registered crime—as well as clearance rates (and perceptions of crime).

Table 3 Incidence rates of crime in Japan, France, Germany, UK, and US per 100,000 inhabitants

Year	Japan	France	Germany	UK	US
00	1,925	6,421	7,625	9,917	4,125
01	2,149	6,880	7,736	10,552	4,163
02	2,239	6,932	7,893	11,366	4,125
03	2,185	6,666	7,963	11,391	4,067
04	2,006	6,386	8,037	10,626	3,977
05	1,776	6,235	7,747	10,400	3,901
06	1,604	6,103	7,647	10,102	3,826
07	1,491	5,833	7,635	9,157	3,748
08	1,420	5,751	7,436	8,636	3,673
09	1,330	5,639	7,383	7,915	3,473
10	1,239	5,491	7,253	7,513	3,346

high risk of their houses being burglarized—despite (comparatively) low levels of risk of becoming victims of street crimes or burglary.

There is of course no standard of "reasonableness" when it comes to fear of crime. That is, it is hardly more appropriate, reasonable, or rational for Japanese people to be less concerned about crime, just because people in countries with higher crime rates happen to be less concerned. Nevertheless, it is important here to establish that in comparative terms, people in Japan seem to be sensitive to (perceived) risks of crime and victimization. A recent (2012) survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet's Office furthermore shows that 81.1 % of the people feel that society has become less safe in the past 10 years, while only 15.8 % feel safety has improved. This in spite of the fact that crime rates have been going down since 2003 and are now back at the level of the early 1980s (although it should be noted that these percentages are still an improvement compared to 2004, when 86.6 % of the 3,000 respondents thought society was becoming less safe).

There are several factors that in recent years can be said to have contributed to these feelings of concern about crime and safety. In the 1990s, a number of shocking scandals occurred, revolving around what were perceived to be police failures.[9] What these scandals brought about was (among others) a change in crime recording policies and practices, resulting in the recording of more "trivial" crime, soaring levels of registered crime (see Fig. 2), and dropping clearance rates.

Media attention for the "rising crime" combined with an enormous amount of publicity surrounding a range of violent crimes.[10] This combined attention in turn helped bring about the perception of a general increasing threat of (serious) crime, while coinciding with a growing attention for victims of crime. These circumstances then led to the coming about of a "moral panic" about increasing crime (see, e.g., Hamai and Ellis 2006, p. 162; see also Miyazawa 2008). According to Kawai, the boundaries between people's daily surroundings that had always been perceived as safe and crime free, and the more dangerous outside world within which crimes occurred fell apart. Crime appeared to have entered the sphere of people's daily

[9] Two murders in particular received much media attention: one by a group of teenagers in Tochigi (1999), another by a stalker in Okegawa (1999). Both murders occurred in spite of repeated requests for police protection by the victims' families.

[10] For example, the murder of two children (one of whom was beheaded) by a 14-year-old boy (1997); the hijacking of a bus by 17 year old, during which 1 passenger was killed (2000); the killing of a girl by her 11-year-old classmate (2004).



Fig. 2 Comparison of the numbers of burglaries of empty houses in the prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima in March–December 2010 and 2011

life and surroundings, leading to a collapse of the "myth of safety" that had until then survived (Kawai 2004).

These developments on one hand led to legal changes that allowed for harsher punishments for offenders as well a strengthening of the position of victims of crime within the criminal process (see Kawaide 2010; Saeki 2010 (on the position of victims in the criminal process); see Shiroshita 2005; Herber 2010 on sentencing law and practices, see also generally Hamai and Ellis 2006 and Miyazawa 2008). On the other hand, they signaled the beginning of what may be best described as a "crime prevention boom."

Crime prevention and neighborhood associations

Crime prevention has for a long time already been part of the activities of local neighborhood associations (*chōnaikai*, *jichikai*, *chōkai* (etc.)—hereafter NA).[11] Members[12] of these associations (among other things) take care of fire prevention, look after elderly people in the neighborhood, organize local events and festivals (etc.), and furthermore have close connections to local governments.[13] In this sense, Japanese society can be said to be rich in social capital, in view of the vast and numerous networks that allow members to "cash in" social and practical benefits in their daily lives.[14]

Besides crime prevention embedded in these NA, more or less separate crime prevention associations did also exist, numbering 3,056 (177,831 people) in 2003. Since then, however, the

[11] On the history, organization, and activities of these neighborhood associations, see, e.g., Nakano 2005 and Pekkanen 2006.

[12] Households, rather than individuals, are the basic unit of membership. For more information on activities, organization and aims, etc., see http://www.chokai.info/list/. Accessed 26 July 2013.

[13] In their study on neighborhood associations and governance in Japan, Tsujinaka, Pekkanen and Yamamoto in fact note that 98 % of the studied local governments collaborated with neighborhood associations in their daily work (2009: 255).

[14] See generally Pekkanen (2006) who argues (among other things) that participation in NA's creates and sustains social capital in Japan , while also questioning the extent to which this social capital is the same as social capital elsewhere (ibid., 128). I will come back to this matter below.



Fig. 3 Registered general penal code offenses 1946–2002 (Graph generated using data from the 2003 White Paper on Crime (*Hanzai Hakusho*)), Hōmushō Hōmusōgōkenkyūjo (2003)

number of volunteer crime prevention groups has grown explosively, to the extent that in 2012, there were 46,673[15] of such groups, in which 2,773,597 people participated (see Figs. 3 and 4).

It is arguably unlikely that the number of groups would have grown as explosively without an existing (latent) willingness to engage in crime prevention activities. Nevertheless, the police have as of 2003 been very actively supporting and stimulating the formation of these groups. They did so by providing information to the neighborhood associations and schools, Parent Teaching associations (etc.) on the nature of crime in the local neighborhood, and by giving information on how to form a group, where to get one's "crime prevention goods," effective ways of patrolling, etc.[16]

According to a survey held by the National Police Association in 2011, 48.2 % of the groups conducted activities on more than 10 days per month; another 37.4 % indicated being active about 2–9 days per month. Regularly conducted activities included patrolling the neighborhood on foot, accompanying children to school, inspecting dangerous places, raising crime awareness, making safety maps (maps indicating streets that are safe to walk—e.g., when going to school (NPA 2012a). Groups tend to have large percentages (45–50 %) of people in their 60s, with roughly equal percentages of male and female participants (NPA 2012; see, e.g., also Tokyo Metropolitan Government 2012). The great majority of the groups (93.3 %) have connections with the police, with local neighborhood associations (85.1 %), as well as with schools (77.1 %), local fire departments (72.9 %), and parent teacher associations (66 %) (ibid, 8).

When it comes to the reasons for people to take part in these crime prevention activities, no nationwide level research appears to have been conducted. Locally administered surveys show that the majority initially takes part with the aim of improving neighborhood safety (79.7 % according to a survey conducted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in 2012), while another 40.3 % indicated that they saw participating as an opportunity to get in touch with people living in the area, while another 37.6 % indicated they did so because they were concerned about crime (ibid, 7). These percentages largely correlate with those found by Sakamoto and Nakai (2006), who furthermore observed that those participating for longer periods of time (2–3 years)

[15] This is the number of crime prevention volunteer groups registered by the police. According to police officials I spoke to there are also unregistered groups, which would mean that the actual number of volunteers engaged in crime prevention activities is higher than the number given here.

[16] See generally http://www.npa.go.jp/safetylife/seianki55/index.html—crime prevention support site of the national police association; for a specific local example of how the police provides advice to aspiring crime prevention volunteers, see www.police.pref.mie.jp/upload/20110301-203519.pdf. Accessed 26 July 2013.



Fig. 4 Numbers of volunteer crime prevention groups and members 2003–2012 (>5 pers., minimum of 1 activity × per month) (Graph generated using 2013 National Police Association data, 2013. Data available online at: http://www.npa.go.jp/safetylife/seianki/seianki20130321_1.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2013)

especially felt they (1) contributed to neighborhood safety (74.1 %), that they (2) raised crime prevention awareness (70.4 %), and that they (3) had made new friends and met new acquaintances (74.1 %) (Sakamoto and Nakai 2007, p. 1, see also Yoshinaka 2006, p. 33).

While crime concerns accordingly play an important part, the opportunity to socialize with other people in the neighborhood and meet new people turns out to be equally important. So important in fact, that at times "crime prevention" would seem to simply be a convenient opportunity to organize social events, such as "crime prevention sports tournaments" and "crime prevention drinks."[17] In this sense, the groups and networks set up to bring about the goal of crime prevention, constitute (social capital) resources allowing members to enrich their social lives—irrespective of the attaining of crime prevention goals.

It is important to note here that concerns about crime, in spite of their potential to constrain social interaction (see generally Liska and Warner 1991) here instead appear to stimulate such interaction. One could interpret this circumstance (stimulated interaction) in terms of a Durkheimian functionality of crime, connected with the affirming of existing norms by condemning violations of these norms (Durkheim 1933, 1938). And in fact, crime prevention activities are often part of larger campaigns against crimes, involving meetings where causes and evils of crime are discussed, and where condemnation may be more or less explicit.[18]

Most activities engaged in, however, seem to revolve around crime prevention norms—rules to follow, things to (not) do, to make the neighborhood safe—rather than a condemnation of norms broken. The activities are about eliminating the risk of crime—and, judging from people's reasons for participating (as listed above), often not even about that.[19] Besides opportunities to get in touch with people living in the same area, crime prevention activities

[17] Personal observation made while in Japan (Tokyo, Saitama), 2011, 2012.

[18] Based on talks with volunteers in Tokyo, Saitama as well as Nagasaki (2011–2013). See in this regard also Nakano 2005, p. 80).

[19] The picture painted by Nakano, who studied (among other things) a group of people engaged in crime prevention with the specific purpose of preventing juvenile delinquency, is that of people participating because they are, for various reasons, expected to do so, and are relatively unconcerned with the "official goals" of the activities undertaken (Nakano 2005: 80).

are often one part of a whole of volunteering activities[20] that people engage in for various reasons. Nakano in fact notes in this regard that volunteers gain satisfaction from their activities "in part because volunteering is a publicly recognized activity that is praised by the media and state," and that people furthermore gain local respect through volunteering, "by drawing on a nationally recognized discourse of social contribution" (2005).[21] In this sense, crime prevention volunteering should be understood in terms of its connection with other "neighborhood volunteering" activities, as well as concerns about and fears of crime.

How, now, did these characteristics of crime prevention volunteering come into play in the town of Ishinomaki, in the aftermath of 311? And what kinds and levels of crime would volunteers "confront"? It is to these questions that we will now turn.

Raising crime awareness: the case of Ishinomaki

Ishinomaki, a town with a population of almost 150,000 people, located on the north eastern shore of Japan, was hit heavily by the earthquake and tsunami. Three thousand four hundred thirteen people died, while another 507 went missing. Forty-six percent of the city was struck and over 22,000 houses were destroyed. As a result, after the disasters struck, more than 50,000 people were in need of immediate shelter. At first, people stayed in schools, gymnasiums, and other public buildings still standing, but by October 2011, those who had lost their houses—and who had no other place to go—were provided with temporary (prefab) housing (7,297 houses for 15,801 people—Ishinomaki police 2012).

As far as crime went, in Ishinomaki, a trend similar to the one described *above* could be witnessed. While some "opportunity-related" crime such as looting and burglary was witnessed (Ishinomaki police 2012), levels of registered crime including theft went down (overall from 2,266 to 1,778, a 21 % decrease, compared to a 16 % decrease that was witnessed at the prefectural level—Ishinomaki police 2012).

Nevertheless, the Ishinomaki police invested enormous amounts of time and resources to draw continued attention to the risks of crime. From the moment people were gathered in emergency shelters, the police started visiting these shelters on a daily basis, warning people of the risks of, e.g., theft, the importance of not losing sight of their valuables, as well as informing them that the rumors about heinous crimes committed by (e.g.,) gangs of foreigners that had started going around were false.

Not only did the police come by, giving instructions and talking to those in the shelters, they also started spreading leaflets produced[22] by the prefectural Miyagi police. In these leaflets[23], citizens were warned against the risks of various kinds of crime—e.g., burglary, fund fraud

[20] Many crime prevention groups are formed in response to NA's urging their members to do so. As a result, groups are to a great extent made up of those already volunteering in the NA (in the survey conducted by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in 2012 mentioned already above, 72.8 % of those participating in crime prevention activities indicated that their group was formed in response to an NA request).

[21] For in depth (qualitative) descriptions of volunteers' motivations, see Nakano 2005: 16–38.

[22] Japanese police actively and continuously appear to urge citizens to follow rules, inform them of dangers, etc., by means of leaflets, posters, banners, etc., that can typically be found in community centers, train, and bus stations (and other public places), as well as the numerous police boxes (*kōban*) (personal observation, Tokyo (etc.) 1997–2013).

[23] The police distributed two series: the "crime prevention newsletter" and a leaflet called "community news—(community) ties"). These leaflets are also available online at: http://www.police.pref.miyagi.jp/hp/jishin/bouhan_dayori/jpn/bouhan_jpn23.html. Accessed 28 July 2013. The leaflets are typically one-page documents with big headers, some comic-like drawings, and a short explanation of (e.g.,) a type of crime that might have occurred, and what one could do to prevent becoming a victim of such a crime oneself.

(people collecting money for nonexistent aid), sexual crimes (March 19, no. 26; April 8, no. 21[24]; personal communication), as well as the risks of aftershocks (etc.) (April 8, no. 23). The leaflets also informed citizens, however, about all the extra measures taken by the police to keep the area safe, while also alerting them to special police units that could offer special guidance on, amongst others, crime prevention issues (March 31). All in all, the police produced 212 of such leaflets in the period from March 11, 2011 to December 31, 2011.

These leaflets thus provided those in shelters with reliable information about safety issues, with an emphasis on crime. As a source of reliable information, they were also a source of reassurance contradicting the abovementioned "sensationalist" rumors. As they, furthermore, informed people about the extra measures taken to keep the area safe, they also constituted a source of moral support. Part of this moral support was also to inform people what was being done by locals such as themselves to help doing things that needed to be done. Crime prevention and crime prevention activities were here presented as an example of such activities—activities through which locals came together, and through which community ties were strengthened.[25] See for example the leaflet distributed on May 10 (no. 59, Fig. 5).

This leaflet, called "bonds" or "ties," shows pictures of volunteers ("local inhabitants") on crime prevention patrol in Ishinomaki and Sendai. People are thus informed of the crime prevention activities engaged in by local volunteers and by "the local community." The header states: "inhabitants of the prefecture do their best, towards recovery!" It in addition informs people that the police have been "strengthening their patrols," pursuant to the many police officers dispatched to the area from all over the country. People are furthermore informed that in cooperation with crime prevention associations, "crime prevention goods" are being offered to bring about an environment allowing for easy ways to conduct crime prevention activities, and that the energy of the inhabitants of the prefecture improves locals' "feelings of security." The slogan at the bottom reads: "~holding hands 「one heart」."

Crime prevention activities are, thus, on one hand depicted as part of what is being done by locals to help the area recover from the disasters. On the other hand, they are portrayed as a means to provide local moral support, contribute to, and strengthen the local community.[26] This portrayal thus strongly ties into the "discourse of social contribution" referred to earlier. At the same time, the constant efforts made by the police to raise people's "crime awareness" arguably contribute to the appeal of crime prevention as a means to make one's social contribution. While people are on one hand made aware of the (potential) dangers of crime, they are at the same time being offered an opportunity to do something about those dangers.

Crime prevention activities, with their connection to the "social contribution discourse," are thus being *employed*, as a means to an end that includes much more than the elimination of crime. While the diminishing of crime could (in theory) be one of the benefits that the volunteers could secure by virtue of membership of a crime prevention group, the social contribution discourse in any case ensured that such membership provided "its own reward." In terms of social capital, it would here, thus, seem that actors could secure benefits that simply came with their membership.[27]

This employment of "crime prevention" was not restricted, however, to the distributing of leaflets such as the one described, and the stimulating of crime prevention by providing crime

[24] Numbering on leaflets.

[25] The "community bonds" unit from Tokyo referred to *above* is also illustrative of this idea.

[26] The word used in the leaflet, and more generally in comparable contexts, is that of 地域 (*chiiki*), that literally translates as "region," or "area."

[27] The values that implicitly attach to membership here (such as social recognition) thus preclude a clear analytical separation between resources as means and benefits as ends, where social capital would here thus appear to reside (in part at least) in membership of networks itself (cf. note 3).

Fig. 5 Leaflet ("bonds" or "ties") showing pictures of volunteers ("local inhabitants") on crime prevention patrol in Ishinomaki and Sendai, 10 May 2011

prevention goods. Among those living in temporary housing, the police appointed so-called "crime prevention supporters" (90 persons, by February 2013), who were responsible for making sure that crime prevention measures were being taken, and crime prevention activities organized (see also the leaflet distributed on April 5 2011, no. 11). Besides these initiatives taken by the police, the existing neighborhood associations also helped set up "self governing bodies" as part of the neighborhood associations that also organized and still organize crime prevention activities and events.

The perceived need to get those living in emergency housing "organized" came about as a result of the displacement of people following the disasters. When people were moved to emergency housing, many wound up being surrounded by people from different neighborhoods, different parts of the city—people they did not know. The appointing of "crime prevention supporters" and the organizing of crime prevention activities provided opportunities for strangers to interact and to get to know each other. Police officers and participants mentioned this social element explicitly, when providing reasons for organizing and participating in these activities, linking it, however, to the ultimate goal of crime prevention. Or, as one police officer phrased it: "It is about rebuilding the local community, the bonds between the local inhabitants that have been the basis on which local crime has up until now been prevented."

In addition, several volunteers (as well as police officers when asked about their impressions of volunteers' motives[28]) mentioned improving neighborhood safety, crime prevention, as well as contributing to the local community and area. Engaging in these activities arguably provided participants the social capital means to "cash in" the benefits of new connections[29] with those around them, as well as (potentially) preventing crime and the satisfaction of doing something useful for the community.

Remarkable about the social capital built through crime prevention in Japan in general, and Ishinomaki in particular is the facilitating role played by the police. As indicated *above*, the police provide information as well as material support to help citizens form "self-organized" (自主) crime prevention groups. In Ishinomaki, they did more. The police very actively made people aware of the issue of crime. On one hand, they raised people's awareness of the dangers of crime and the kinds of crime that were occurring. On the other hand, they also comforted people that they could rest assured that the police were keeping them safe from those dangers, as well as qualifying these dangers by providing reliable information amidst streams of rumors about crime. The police thus had a very active hand in bringing about the "shared objectives" that were being pursued. In other words, by raising crime awareness, engaging citizens in a common crime prevention effort, as well as providing citizens with the means to do so, and linking these efforts to the "building of a community" (in line with the "social contribution discourse"), the police provided for opportunities that could arguably (given also what we know about the experiences of those taking part in crime prevention activities) allow for the coming about, or strengthening of "norms and trust"—and by extension, social capital.

As indicated, people's reasons for participating in crime prevention activities seemed to be, to an important extent, about the social capital benefit of preventing crime. The question then is: do or did these activities indeed help prevent crime? In general (Japanese) terms, the little evidence available suggests that crime prevention volunteering can indeed contribute to the prevention of crime (see, e.g., Yoshinaka 2006; see also Takagi et al. 2010, 2012, and references listed there). To what extent such volunteering contributed to the preventing of crime in the aftermath of 311 in general, and in the city of Ishinomaki in particular, is not easy to assess. One problem here is, obviously, that of comparing "before" and "after," given the extremely unusual circumstances in which people have been in living in the aftermath of the disasters. In addition, as indicated, there was in the aftermath of 311 a vast police force striving for crime prevention, complicating the assessment of any impact of crime prevention volunteering.

It should furthermore be noted that, while media reports about the "Japanese calm" in the aftermath of 311 seemed to be based on the assumption that disasters such as those of 311 will lead to more crime (than usual), this assumption is not (generally) correct. In the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake too, levels of registered crime went down in the area struck (Adachi 2012). Furthermore, research on the connection between disasters and crime outside Japan too does in addition not appear to have led to conclusive results (Varano et al. 2010). Significantly, Varano et al. (referring to Cromwell et al. 1995) note in this regard: "Depending on the nature of a disaster, crime rates may initially decline as citizens (even "career" offenders) seek shelter and must "dig out" of the damaged area; personal shelter and survival needs may trump criminal motivations." 2010: 44). While more research on this issue is obviously called for, it

[28] Officers of the Ishinomaki police mentioned the following motivations for volunteers to participate (based on talks with the around 90 volunteers active in Ishinomaki): improving neighborhood safety, contributing to the community ("the local area"), preventing crime, and meeting other locals.

[29] I am assuming here that to those surrounded by people unknown to them, after having lost their house—and often, relatives and friends—making new connections is a "benefit."

is quite conceivable—in light of the vast destruction caused by the 311 earthquake and tsunami—that this is in fact part of what happened in the aftermath of 311.

If one thing has become clear, however, it is that there is more to the crime prevention activities than "net results" in terms of crime rates. In the aftermath of a disaster that brought about loss on a scale as terrible as the disasters of 11 March 2011, the potential for social capital building that the crime prevention activities have allowed for can be said to constitute a benefit of its own.

Conclusion

This article shows that after the disasters that happened in Japan on 11 March 2011, in all three of the most heavily affected prefectures, levels of registered crime went down more than in the rest of Japan. The dangers of crime and risks of victimization were nevertheless topics of ongoing public concern. This circumstance can be largely explained in terms of two important factors:

1. A more generally (relatively) high level of preoccupation with and fear of crime that has resulted in large numbers of volunteers engaging in crime prevention activities. People's willingness to engage in such activities can in addition be said to have come about against the background of a more general positive appreciation and recognition of those making a social contribution by volunteering (the "social contribution discourse").
2. Police activities aimed at raising crime awareness. By raising awareness of crime and the necessity of crime prevention, a "collective goal" was introduced, while the organization of volunteers' crime prevention activities allowed for people to come together to pursue this "collective goal."

The attention for crime and crime prevention activities allowed for opportunities to rebuild social capital in the aftermath of a disaster and devastation that left people displaced and communities torn. The extent to which the goal of crime prevention was attained remains hard to assess, in view of the extraordinary circumstances as well as the (unusual) large police presence that also engaged in wide-scale crime prevention activities. The (re-)introduction of a collective goal, however, as well as the coming about of shared opportunities to pursue this goal may have provided their own intrinsic reward. More research will be needed, however, to address the motives and experiences of the volunteers participating in these crime prevention activities, as well as the crime prevention and social capital impact that these activities may have and have had.

Acknowledgments The author would like to thank the Ishinomaki, Fukushima, and Miyagi Police departments for their kind assistance, as well as Paul Nieuwenhuize and the anonymous reviewers of the Asian Journal of Criminology for their comments on a previous version of this article.

References

ABC News (2011). Japanese, Waiting in Line for Hours, Follow Social Order After Quake. Available online at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/japan-victims-show-resilience-earthquake-tsunami-sign-sense/story?id=13135355. Accessed 28 June 2013.

Adachi, M. (2012). Concerning crimes occurring directly after major earthquakes (*Daishinsai Hassei Chokugo not Hanzai ni tsuite*). *Kantou Gakuin Hougaku, 21*(4), 49–70.

Adam, F., & Rončević, B. (2003). Social capital: recent debates and research trends. *Social Science Information, 42*(2), 155–183.

Adler, F. (1983). *Nations not obsessed with crime*. Rothman: Littleton Co.
Akahane, K., Yonai, S., Fukuda, S., et al. (2012). The Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident and exposures in the environment. *Environmentalist, 32*, 136–143.
Coleman, J. (1990). *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Courrier International (2011). Le calme nippon ébranle la presse étrangère (Calm Japan shakes up the foreign press). http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2011/03/22/le-calme-nippon-ebranle-la-presse-etrangere. Accessed 28 July 2013.
Cromwell, P., Dunham, R., Akers, R., & Lanza-Kaduce, L. (1995). Routine activities and social control in the aftermath of a natural catastrophe. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 3*, 56–69.
Daily Maill online (2011). No looting, just keeping calm and carrying on: Ordinary Japanese try to get back to normality. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1366532/Japan-tsunami-earthquake-Keeping-calm-carrying-normality.html. Accessed 28 July 2013.
Durkheim, E. (1933). *The division of labor*. Trans. G. Simpson, New York: Macmillan.
Durkheim, E. (1938). The Rules of Sociological Method (Trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller; George EG Catlin, Ed.). New York: Free Press.
Fenwick, M. (2007). Youth Crime and Crime Control in Contemporary Japan. In C. Sumner (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Criminology. doi: 10.1002/9780470998960.ch6.
Fine, B. (2007). Eleven hypotheses on the conceptual history of social capital: a response to James Farr. *Political Theory, 35*(1), 47–53.
Gamble, A., & Takesato, W. (2004). *A public betrayed: an inside look at Japanese media atrocities and their warnings to the west*. Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc.
Government of Japan Reconstruction Agency (2013). Number of Evacuees Nationwide (*Zenkoku Hinansha no Kazu*). Http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/. Accessed 28 July 2013.
Hamai, K., & Ellis, T. (2006). Crime and criminal justice in modern Japan: from reintegrative shaming to popular punitivism. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 34*, 157–178.
Haynes, P. J. (2009). Before going any further with social capital: eight key criticisms to adress.
Herber, E. D. (2010). Change and continuity in Japanese criminal justice. *Journal of Japanese Law, 15*(29), 137–152.
Hōmushō Hōmusōgōkenkyūjo (2003–2012), White Paper on Crime (*Hanzai Hakusho*), Tokyo: Taiheiinsatsusha, issues 2003 to 2012.
Igarashi, F. (1991). *Crime reporting (Hanzai Houdou)*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Iwama, D. (2011). The Great Eastern Japan Disaster—were the Japanese really calm? (*Higashi Nihon Daishinsai Nihonjin ha Hontou ni Reisei Datta no ka*). Http://www.shobi-u.ac.jp/upload/file/pdf/2011/1213/20111213-05.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2013.
International Crime Victims Surveys (1992–2004). http://www.unicri.it/services/library_documentation/publications/icvs/. Accessed 28 July 2013.
Kawai, M. (2004). *Paradox of the collapse of the safety myth (Anzen Shinwa Hōkai no Paradokkusu)*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Kawaide, T. (2010). Victim participation in the criminal trial in Japan. *Journal of the Japan-Netherlands Institute, 10*, 48–56.
Lin, N., Cook, K. S., & Burt, R. S. (Eds.). (2001). *Social capital: theory and research*. Transaction Publishers.
Liska, A. E., & Warner, B. D. (1991). Functions of crime: a paradoxical process. *American Journal of Sociology, 96*, 1441–1463.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2012). Request to Groups of those working in the Electronic Communication Industries Concerning the Appropriate Handling of Unsubstantiated Rumors about the Great Eastern Japan Disaster (*Higashi Nihon Daishinsai ni Kakawaru Intaanettojou no Ryuugenhigo he no Tekisetsu na Taiou ni Kansuru Denki Tsuushinjigyoushadantai ni Taisuru Yousei*). http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01kiban08_01000023.html. Accessed 28 July 2013.
Miyagi Police (2011–2012). Pamphlets produced between 11 March 2011 and July 3 2012. http://www.police.pref.miyagi.jp/hp/jishin/bouhan_dayori/jpn/bouhan_jpn23.html. Accessed 28 July 2013.
Miyazawa, S. (2008). The politics of increasing punitiveness and the rising populism in Japanese criminal justice policy. *Punishment and Society, 10*, 47–77.
Nakano, L. Y. (2005). *Community volunteers in Japan—everyday stories of social change*. New York: Routledge.
National Police Association (2012a). Damage caused by the North Eastern Region Pacific Ocean Earthquake of 2011, and Measures Taken by the Police (*Heisei 23 nen Touhoku Chihou Taiheiyouchuu Jishin no Higaijoukyou to Keisatsu no Sochi*). http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2013.
National Police Association (2012b). Measures Taken by the Police in Connection with the Great Eastern Japan Disaster (*Higashi Nihon Daishinsai ni Tomonau Keisatsu Sochi*). http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/keisatsusoti/index.htm. Accessed 28 July 2013.

National Police Association (2013). Concerning the 2011 Tōhoku district - off the Pacific ocean earthquake: the greath eastern Japan disaster (Heisei 23 nen tōhokuchihōtaiheiyōokijishin (higashinihon daishinsai) ni tsuite). http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/. Accessed 21 Dec 2013.

New York Times (2011). The Japanese could teach us a thing or two. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/opinion/20kristof.html?_r=0. Accessed 28 July 2013.

Pekkanen, R. (2006). *Japan's dual civil society—members without advocates*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Portes, A. (2000). Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. In: E. L. Lesser (Ed.), *Knowledge and Social Capital* (pp 43–67). Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Poynter, 2011. Coverage of Japanese citizens' 'stoic' response to tragedy both accurate, stereotypical. http://www.poynter.org/how-tos/newsgathering-storytelling/diversity-at-work/126006/japanese-citizens-stoic-response-to-tragedy-both-accurate-stereotypical/. Accessed 28 July 2013.

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Tuning in, Tunig Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America. The 1995 Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture. http://www.jstor.org/stable/420517. Accessed 28 July 2013.

Putnam, R. D. (1996). *Bowling alone: democracy in America at the end of the twentieth century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Saeki, M. (2010). Victim participation in criminal trials in Japan. *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 38*, 149–165.

Shiroshita, Y. (2005). Raising the statutory penalty limits and the legislative policy. (*Ryouteikei no Hikiage to Rippou Seisaku*). *Japanese Journal of Sociological Criminology, 30*, 7–19.

Sakamoto, Y., Nakai, N. (2007). A study on participants' consciousness in voluntary organization for crime prevention (*Jishu Bouhan Dantai no Sanka Ishiki ni Kansuru Kenkyuu*). www.soc.titech.ac.jp/~nakai/paper/b_sakamoto.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2013.

Takagi, D., Ikeda, K., & Kawachi, I. (2012). Neighborhood social capital and crime victimization: comparison of spatial regression analysis and hierarchical regression analysis. *Social Science and Medicine, 75*, 1895–1902.

Takagi, D., Tsuji, R., & Ikeda, K. (2010). Crime control by local communities: focusing on social capital and cooperative behaviors in neighbourhoods (*chi'iki komyuniti ni yoru hanzaiyokusei: chi'iki no shakaishihon oyobi kyouryoku ni shouten wo atete*). *Japanese Journal of Social Psychology (Shakaishinrigaku kenkyuu), 26*(1), 36–45.

Tsuji, Y. (2012). Observing the Tsunami of the Great Eastern Japan Disaster (*Higashi Nihon Daishinsai no Tsunami wo Kousatsu suru*), article on the website of the Japan Broadcasting Association (*Nippon Housou Kai)*. http://www.nhk.or.jp/sonae/chiebukuro/column/20120306.html. Accessed 28-07-2013.

Tsujinaka, Y., Pekkanen, R., & Yamamoto, H. (2009). *Neighborhood associations and governance in Japan (Gendai Nihon no Jichikai/Chounaikai)*. Tokyo: Bokutakusha.

Varano, S. P., Schafer, J. A., Cancino, J. M., Decker, S. H., & Greene, J. R. (2010). A tale of three cities: crime and displacement after Hurricane Katrina. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 38*(1), 42–50.

West, M. D. (2006). *Secrets, sex and spectacle: the rules of scandal in Japan and the United States, 2006*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Yomiuri Online (2011). Internet Providers Demanded to Autonomously Remove Online Rumors (*Netto no Ryuugenhigo, Kanrisha no Jishusakujo wo Yousei*). http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/20110406-OYT1T00939.htm. Accessed 28 July 2013).

Yoshinaka, N. (2006). Crime prevention in Japan—the significance, scope, and limits of environmental criminology. *Hiroshima Hogaku, 30*(2), 23–40.