

# Stance, feeling and phenomenology

Matthew Ratcliffe

Received: 18 March 2009 / Accepted: 19 March 2009 / Published online: 3 April 2009  
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

**Abstract** This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This latter stance does not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility serves to illustrate that empiricism as an *all-encompassing* philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique.

**Keywords** Empiricism · Feeling · Phenomenology · Rationality · Stance

## 1 The implicit stance

According to Bas van Fraassen, empiricism cannot be a metaphysical position adopted on the basis of something other than experience, as its acceptance would then be contrary to the empiricist’s reliance upon experience. It cannot involve the dogmatic and unwavering acceptance of an empirical proposition either. That too would be contrary to empiricism, a doctrine that takes all empirical claims to be contestable. In order to characterise empiricism without falling into one trap or the other, van Fraassen offers an alternative account of it as a *stance*, rather than a set of propositions that are taken to be true:

---

M. Ratcliffe (✉)  
Department of Philosophy, University of Durham, 50-51 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HN, UK  
e-mail: m.j.ratcliffe@durham.ac.uk

A philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, approach, a cluster of such – possibly including some propositional attitudes such as beliefs as well). Such a stance may of course be expressed, and may involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot be simply equated with having beliefs or making assertions about what there is. (2002, pp. 47–48)

He calls this the ‘empirical stance’ rather than the ‘empiricist stance’ and, in what follows, I will take an empiricist to be someone who adopts the empirical stance as a basis for enquiry. We can distinguish between the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’ empiricist, where the former is *committed* to thinking about science and pursuing philosophy exclusively through the empirical stance, whilst the latter adopts it only for certain purposes. van Fraassen’s insistence that empiricism be free of all metaphysical presuppositions that are not based on experience indicates that he is a strong empiricist (sometimes, at least), as a proponent of the weak view would not be troubled by the thought that empiricism is not all-encompassing. In what follows, I will reject strong stance empiricism but I will not challenge the legitimacy and utility of adopting the empirical stance for certain purposes.

We might think of a stance as an attitude or group of inter-related attitudes that someone explicitly adopts towards a subject matter. Teller’s (2004) proposal that stances be construed as “epistemic policies” suggests such a view; policies are usually knowingly adopted on the basis of deliberation. Chakravartty (2004, p. 175) similarly states that “one generally *adopts* a stance because one *believes* that it is a sensible thing to do”. However, Teller (2004, p. 164) also notes that it is important to distinguish between implicit and explicit stances. One can unreflectively inhabit a stance, rather than taking it as an object of cognition or explicitly assenting to it.

It is not always clear whether van Fraassen’s ‘empirical stance’ is something he takes to be knowingly adopted or implicitly inhabited. In any case, the two kinds of stance will be intimately related, given that an implicit orientation will dispose one towards the adoption of certain explicit attitudes and beliefs. Hence we might think of implicit and explicit stances as ‘aspects’ of a more encompassing stance, rather than as wholly distinct. It is the implicit aspect that I will focus upon here. At various points, it does appear that van Fraassen is referring to this, rather than to something that is knowingly adopted or chosen. For example, he suggests that stances are ‘existential orientations’ and also compares his conception of a stance to Husserl’s conception of the ‘natural attitude’ (Van Fraassen 1994). According to Husserl (e.g. 1960, p. 19), in the context of everyday life, all experiences and thoughts take for granted the natural attitude of ‘believing’ in the existence of the world. This attitude is not akin to the propositional attitude of believing that some *x*, called the world, exists. Rather, it is something that we already *inhabit* when we adopt propositional attitudes. It comprises a pre-articulate sense of (a) there being a world, (b) what the world is like and (c) the nature of one’s relationship with the world.

Although a sense of the world’s existence is integral to most stances, this does not preclude the possibility of other significant variations in these stances, which

dispose people towards different commitments and lines of enquiry.<sup>1</sup> For example, van Fraassen (2002, p. 155) distinguishes two contrasting existential attitudes, a secular contentment with the scientific world-view and an “abiding wonder” that is more typical of the religious life, the latter being characterised by a pervasive *feeling* that the world will inevitably resist exhaustive scientific description. I think he has recognised something philosophically important here. Certain predicaments that we might casually refer to as beliefs or values are not attitudes directed at propositional contents but more encompassing senses of how things are with the world. These background stances are seldom reflected upon but they are describable, at least in part.

## 2 Suspending stances

Existential phenomenology is a background theme throughout *The Empirical Stance*. In addition to describing stances as ‘existential’, van Fraassen suggests that philosophical work should be an “authentic, engaged project in the world”, a project that is “self-conscious and conscious of what sort of enterprise it is” (2002, p. 195). To unthinkingly inhabit a stance is a rather unphilosophical thing to do and van Fraassen does not do this; he attempts to make his existential orientation explicit. As I will show, the problem is that he is required to adopt a different orientation in order to do so. And implicit in this move is the acknowledgement that strong empiricism is philosophically lacking, in so far as it refuses to contemplate other existential orientations. Even if one takes the view that all enquiry is stance-dependent, an appreciation of the role of implicit stances can, I will suggest, be built into critical enquiry, rendering dogmatic and unwavering commitment to a stance philosophically untenable.

van Fraassen claims that a stance view of empiricism serves to insulate it from certain justificatory demands. One can legitimately be called upon to justify explicit premises but not, in the same way, to justify a stance. He defends a form of voluntarism, according to which a person is rationally *permitted* rather than rationally *obliged* to adopt a particular stance. Ladyman (2000, p. 845) criticises the claim for immunity to rational critique, remarking, “I am not sure why adopting an unjustifiable stance or attitude is any more respectable than simply accepting a proposition [...] which cannot be justified by its own lights”. However, in defence of van Fraassen, whenever an implicit stance is *operating*, it cannot itself be an object of criticism or indeed an object of description; whilst one is busy *being* an empiricist, one cannot justify one’s stance. An implicit stance is a background framework through which one thinks about things, rather than an object of thought. One cannot make that stance explicit without suspending its operation and adopting a different stance.

It might be argued that the same stance can be adopted either implicitly or explicitly and that making an implicit stance explicit does not therefore require any change in one’s commitment to it, any reorientation of stance. However, whereas implicitly inhabiting a stance implies unthinking *acceptance* of it, explicit contemplation of that same stance accommodates a range of different attitudes towards it, including

<sup>1</sup> I say ‘most’ as it is arguable that a sense of the *being* of things is eroded or radically altered in certain psychiatric illnesses, such as schizophrenia (Ratcliffe 2005, 2008).

rejection, doubt or acceptance. Hence, the project of describing a stance involves suspending commitments that are ordinarily unthinkingly accepted, thus facilitating the possibility of explicit attitudes towards them other than that of acceptance.

Consider again the case of Husserl's 'natural attitude'. According to Husserl, our sense that the world *is* and that we are *part of it* is not a matter of propositional content but an orientation that is taken for granted by both everyday and scientific experience and thought. The method he employs to describe its structure incorporates a perspectival shift, the epoché. This facilitates the *phenomenological reduction*, a very different existential orientation or stance that one inhabits whilst doing phenomenology. The epoché involves disengaging from the natural attitude, which is not rejected outright but bracketed or put out of play. This is not an easy thing to do, as what Husserl proposes to suspend is not a particular belief or set of beliefs but an ordinarily pre-reflective, tacit acceptance of the being of the world. The phenomenological stance that arises via the procedure offers the possibility of a distinctive kind of philosophical enquiry. Whilst accepting the world, one might ask what exists or what grounds there are for believing that certain things exist. But, having withdrawn from the natural attitude and suspended a commitment to the existence of things, one can now study the structure of that commitment.

Regardless of whether or not such a radical and complete perspectival shift is actually possible, the point remains that one has to suspend or 'bracket' commitment to an implicit stance—at least to some extent—in order to describe that stance. Husserl (1989, p. 183) makes this point with reference to the naturalistic stance: "As long as we live in the naturalistic attitude, it itself is not given in our field of research; what is grasped there is only what is experienced in it, what is thought in it, etc". It applies to the empirical stance too. Rather than committing to certain evaluative judgements, such as 'to get knowledge, we should look to experience', 'science is great but let's not get too scientific' and 'analytic metaphysics is dodgy', one brackets them in bracketing the stance that they are embedded in. And one studies them, rather than taking them for granted from the outset.

The phenomenological stance makes explicit—or at least attempts to make explicit—the structure of the empirical stance. Whilst the strong empiricist commits to a stance, variants of the phenomenological stance 'dig deeper' and diagnose the underlying structure of that commitment, a sense of the world and our relationship to it that is not revealed to empiricist thought but taken for granted by it. However, the fact that such an enquiry is possible implies that strong empiricism is untenable. The argument runs as follows:

1. The empirical stance incorporates epistemic dispositions of type *x*.
2. The phenomenological stance describes *x*-type dispositions.
3. The phenomenological stance does not itself incorporate *x*-type dispositions.
4. The phenomenological stance is epistemically possible.
5. Therefore, philosophical enquiry is not restricted to reliance on *x*-type dispositions.
6. Strong stance empiricism restricts philosophical enquiry to reliance on *x*-type dispositions.
7. Therefore strong stance empiricism is untenable.

In addition to revealing the contingency of stances and describing their structure, phenomenology has at least the potential to critically evaluate stances, by exposing the pretensions and confusions that some stances involve. For example, the naturalistic stance, as characterised by Husserl (1989, p. 29), is a theoretical attitude, which involves a spectatorial “disengaging” from everyday practical dealings. However, according to Husserl, it continues to tacitly presuppose a practical appreciation of the existence of things that is integral to the natural attitude. Thus, whilst naturalism aspires to be all-encompassing, it fails to accommodate or even recognise the attitude upon which it is itself founded. Husserl adds that everyday experience and thought also incorporate a “personalistic” attitude or stance. Whilst the naturalist seeks to integrate the personal into the impersonal, Husserl argues that the naturalistic stance remains parasitic upon the personalistic stance but *forgets* that this is so, resulting in further confusion. Regardless of whether or not such claims are ultimately accepted, they at least serve to illustrate that phenomenological *critique* of stances is a possibility.

Hence, returning to Ladyman’s remark, one cannot criticise an implicit stance whilst inhabiting it but the project of describing stances can itself incorporate critique. Indeed, the possibility of such a critical project is itself a criticism of the view that philosophy is to be done by *committing* to any particular stance. Van Fraassen describes becoming an empiricist as “similar or analogous to conversion to a cause, a religion, an ideology, to capitalism or socialism, to a worldview” (2002, p. 61). He also distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic philosophical stances. The authentic empiricist, he says, should adopt the empirical stance as a “self-conscious” commitment (2002, p. 195). Thus the empirical stance, although initially implicit, can be made explicit and then knowingly and legitimately adopted. But, once a stance that facilitates description of pre-reflective empiricist commitment has been adopted, one is not then in a *philosophical* position to authentically commit to the empirical stance, given that a realm of enquiry has been discovered that is not and cannot be encompassed by it. The philosopher can, at this point, either knowingly commit to something partial and restrictive or adopt a more open, critical attitude towards stances. What I am not suggesting is that we should *commit* to a different stance, such as a phenomenological stance. Amongst other problems, we would be left with the question of which stance ought to be adopted in order to describe the phenomenological stance, and which stance to describe the stance that is employed to describe it, and so on ad infinitum. In place of any ‘closed’ stance, one might instead seek to cultivate a stance of openness to other possibilities, an enquiry that utilises and perhaps also investigates a range of stances, without committing to just one of them and then remaining cut off from all philosophical possibilities that fall outside of it. An empirical stance can thus be authentically adopted as an *aspect* of philosophical enquiry but wholesale commitment to it in the form of strong empiricism is unwarranted.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See also Rowbottom (2005, p. 221) for the view that philosophical enquiry is characterised by a “critical attitude” rather than by inflexible commitment to a stance.

### 3 Feeling and authenticity

The involvement of stances in philosophy is, I have suggested, quite compatible with critical enquiry. Even so, acknowledgement of their role does have important repercussions for how we conceive of philosophical thought. More specifically, it requires assigning pivotal roles both to *feelings* and to the *acknowledgement of the role played by feelings*. This is because feeling is one of the main constituents of an implicit stance.

Van Fraassen (e.g. 2002, Lecture 3) approvingly draws on the work of William James, to argue for the view that a shift in stance involves a kind of affective transformation of the world.<sup>3</sup> In his various works, James has a great deal to say about the role of feelings in philosophical enquiry. I use the term ‘feeling’ rather than ‘emotion’ here, as not all of the affective states referred to by James appear on familiar lists of emotions. Many of the feelings that guide philosophical enquiry are all-encompassing ways of experiencing the world and one’s relationship with it, such as feelings of strangeness, mystery, tranquillity, unreality, limitation, contingency, coherence, anxiety, satisfaction, frustration, mystery, meaninglessness, significance, separateness, homeliness, completeness and so on.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, van Fraassen himself remarks that “none of the familiar emotions that anyone would list as feelings or passions may be involved” (2002, p. 107).

According to James, our primary means of epistemic access to the world is our practical, bodily commerce with it, rather than theoretical detachment. We do not philosophise as disembodied loci of rational thought, stripped of our practical, affective, bodily attunement to things. And our various bodily feelings contribute to the way the world is experienced as being:

Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when we form our philosophical opinions. Intellect, will, taste, and passion co-operate just as they do in practical affairs... (James 1956, p. 92)

For James, philosophies are not, first and foremost, sets of articulate claims but “our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pull of the cosmos” (1981, p. 7). Our most fundamental metaphysical commitments are constituted by “inarticulate feelings of reality”; existential orientations (1902, p. 74). These orientations can differ considerably and thus spawn very different explicit philosophical attitudes. For example, James famously distinguishes the “tender-minded” empiricist from the “tough-minded” rationalist (1981, p. 10). He goes further to propose that philosophers should come clean and confess the underlying feelings that drive their enquiries, admitting that, for him, the rationalist philosophy “seems too buttoned-up and white-chokered and clean-shaven a thing to speak for the vast slow-breathing unconscious Kosmos with its dread abysses and its unknown tides” (1912, pp. 277–278). That said, it is important to appreciate that making such feelings explicit is itself a philosophical

<sup>3</sup> van Fraassen also appeals to Sartre’s account of emotion as something that ‘magically’ transforms the world (2002, p. 104) and that can thus facilitate a shift in philosophical, scientific or everyday orientation.

<sup>4</sup> Elsewhere, I refer to such feelings as ‘existential feelings’ and offer an analysis of how they can be both affective, bodily states and ways in which one ‘finds oneself in a world’ (Ratcliffe 2005, 2008). James similarly regarded bodily feelings as inextricable from world-experience (see Ratcliffe 2008, Chap. 8).

task. They cannot simply be ‘confessed’ without careful reflection upon what one ordinarily takes for granted.

James also indicates that the rationalist philosophy is an inauthentic one. He remarks on a tendency to avoid the insecurity of the experienced world by constructing and debating abstract systems instead. The abstract philosophical universe is, James says:

...far less an account of this actual world than a clear addition built upon it, a classic sanctuary in which the rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused and gothic character which mere facts present. It is no *explanation* of our concrete universe, it is another thing altogether, a substitute for it, a remedy, a way of escape. (1981, p. 14)

Van Fraassen, in his discussion of ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ philosophical stances, is especially hard on contemporary analytic metaphysics. This, he claims, is disconnected from the realities of experience and instead plays around with abstract constructs produced through obfuscatory re-description of already familiar phenomena; “its mighty labours address simulacra of no importance at all” (2002, p. 4). I suspect that he is right to distinguish philosophical stances that grapple with our predicament from those that are obliviously cut-off from it. However, it is important to acknowledge that there is no *necessary* connection between the kind of conviction involved and the explicit content of the view that is adopted. Existential orientations do at least comprise *dispositions* towards certain kinds of questions, arguments and positions. As Cooper (2002, p. 235) puts it, there is a difference “at the affective level, in the tone, as it were, that the world takes on” for those who advocate contrasting philosophical accounts of the world and our position in it. However, a range of orientations, which include varying degrees and kinds of engagement with one’s existential predicament, might well come into play when different people respond to the same question in the same way. *An explicit philosophy does not itself require a specific kind of affective attitude*. Hence an account of contrasting affective attitudes will not serve to distinguish inauthentic and authentic philosophies at the level of explicit methods, claims, styles and positions. Putting all analytic metaphysicians in the ‘inauthentic philosophers’ camp is thus unwarranted. The same applies to empiricists. Empiricism as an existential orientation is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence to a body of explicit philosophical claims. One could assent to explicit claims typically made by ‘empiricists’ without knowingly or unknowingly adopting the empirical stance.

The question arises as to how we distinguish authenticity and inauthenticity at the level of *doctrine*, rather than *attitude*. What sets apart an existentially engaged philosophy from an abstract game that has become estranged from the realities of our predicament? There are plenty of candidates for the latter category. I’d bet on a lot of recent talk about ‘qualia’ and ‘consciousness’, and the somewhat mechanistic ‘belief-desire psychology’ that the so-called ‘folk’ are alleged to rely upon.<sup>5</sup> (Van Fraassen 1994, also nominates the latter.) But the critical enterprise involves engaging with such positions and showing them to be misguided, via phenomenological or some other form of critique, rather than simply retreating to a different stance. Now it might

<sup>5</sup> See Ratcliffe (2007) for a critique of the widespread view that there is a ‘folk’ belief-desire psychology.

well turn out that there is a strong connection between certain doctrines and attitudes. Perhaps some doctrines are only ever inauthentically endorsed. It may even be that authentic assent to certain doctrines is psychologically impossible.<sup>6</sup> However, in many cases, the connection will be looser. Even if a philosophical position is inauthentic, meaning that it fails to connect with the realities of experience, a philosopher might well authentically endorse it in ignorance; she might have a genuine, felt conviction towards it, even though that conviction is misplaced. And there is no quick and easy method for determining which camp one's own philosophy falls into. However, those who strive for an 'authentic' philosophy will, it can be assumed, reject inauthentic simulacra once they are exposed as such by means of critique.

The kind of critique involved is not just a matter of exchanging reasoned arguments. Explicit philosophical exchanges are also structured by affective orientations or stances that dispose participants towards different kinds of conviction and commitment. It is important to note that feelings not only stifle debate but also enable it. Hookway (2002, pp. 255–256) distinguishes "felt doubt" from purely intellectual doubt and observes that feelings of doubt and conviction play an important role in regulating intellectual enquiry. For example, there is the question of when to stop; there comes a time in one's enquiries when one has to cease questioning and rest content with one's position. Otherwise one could never establish an existential orientation to serve as the basis for enquiry; there would just be the chaos of all-encompassing doubt. According to Hookway, one stops at the point where anxiety is relieved and replaced by feelings of comfort, contentment, ease, peace, satisfaction and groundedness. Hence the role of feeling in philosophical enquiry is neither to constitute an impenetrable position nor a level of epistemic openness that prevents one ever getting started; "doubt and dogmatism may be related as fear is to hope: effective inquiry requires the effective management of both" (Hookway 2002, p. 256; 2003). A critical, philosophical stance is not a matter of critically reflecting upon every aspect of one's explicit position and background stance at every opportunity but of having some kind of balance between doubt and commitment. And, as with specific convictions, longer-term commitments are not in themselves philosophically problematic unless they operate with immunity from critical reflection.<sup>7</sup>

One important issue is that of whether there is a best stance from which to access the world and thus whether a certain kind of affective responsiveness best attunes one to things. For example, Goldie (2004, p. 92) refers to having the "right emotional dispositions" and Stocker (2004, pp. 135–148) suggests that an important aspect of education, especially moral education, is the cultivation of appropriate patterns of emotional response. However, philosophical enquiry need not involve pursuit of a single, best stance. Indeed, I think the ability to shift one's existential orientation or background stance, at least to some degree, is an important aspect of it. This point is illustrated by the work of certain phenomenological philosophers. For example, Heidegger's *Angst* is an affective re-orientation, involving a loss of the implicit stance

<sup>6</sup> Cooper (2002) suggests that this applies to varieties of humanism, which advocate a view of our relationship with the world that is existentially unbearable and so cannot be authentically endorsed.

<sup>7</sup> I use the term 'conviction' to refer to specific instances of assent. I treat 'commitments' as consistent, long-term sets of implicit and/or explicit dispositions, which incorporate normative prescriptions.



that constitutes an everyday sense of belonging to the world. Like the epoché, it is philosophically informative in allowing one to reflect on what one obviously inhabited when immersed in a different stance (Heidegger 1962, Division One: VI). Similarly, Sartre's 'nausea' is an affective re-orientation that reveals the contingency of what is ordinarily taken for granted (Sartre 1963).

Being open to other stances not only aids solitary reflection; it is indispensable to critical, philosophical dialogue. Feelings regulate conviction, doubt, appreciation of the contingency of one's own orientation and openness to change. But, as Hookway notes, it is important not to be too open; what looks like excessive stubbornness on the part of individuals might turn out to "contribute to the success of a community of inquirers" (2002, p. 262). Perhaps what is needed at the group level is a range of different affective dispositions, rather than everyone having the same 'optimal' level of openness. However, what certainly will not help critical enquiry is unreflective inhabiting of a stance that is impervious to the possibility of alternative stances.

In addition to feelings playing a role in philosophical enquiry, I suggest that *an appreciation of the role played by feelings in philosophical enquiry* can itself play an important role in philosophical enquiry. In recognising that disagreements are often partly or largely down to differing affective orientations, one can attempt to articulate those orientations and thus understand the nature of the disagreement, rather than pursuing argument after argument, all of which fail to hit home. James (1912) acknowledges that coming to appreciate the feelings of others is an important aspect of philosophical understanding. He says of the rationalists:

I show my feelings; why will they not show theirs? I know they *have* a personal feeling about the through-and-through universe, which is entirely different from mine, and which I should very likely be much the better for gaining if they would only show me how. (1912, p. 278)

The practical skills of suspending stances, reflecting upon them and moving between them are surely important constituents of critical enquiry. One can seek to attune one's feelings to the critical, reflective enterprise, rather than simply confessing them and being honest about certain dogmatic commitments.

**Acknowledgements** I am grateful to Darrell Rowbottom and to an anonymous referee for providing very detailed and helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks also to Robin Hendry and Amanda Taylor for helpful discussions.

## References

- Chakravartty, A. (2004). Stance relativism. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 35, 173–184.
- Cooper, D. E. (2002). *The measure of things: Humanism, humility and mystery*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goldie, P. (2004). Emotion, feeling, and knowledge of the world. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), *Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotions* (pp. 91–106). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time* (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hookway, C. (2002). Emotions and epistemic evaluation. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich, & M. Siegal (Eds.), *The Cognitive Basis of Science* (pp. 251–262). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hookway, C. (2003). Affective states and epistemic immediacy. *Metaphilosophy*, 34, 78–96.
- Husserl, E. (1960). *Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology* (D. Cairns, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

- Husserl, E. (1989). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: Second book* (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- James, W. (1902). *The varieties of religious experience*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co.
- James, W. (1912). *Essays in radical empiricism*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co.
- James, W. (1956). *The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy*. New York: Dover Publications.
- James, W. (1981). *Pragmatism*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Ladyman, J. (2000). What's really wrong with constructive empiricism? van Fraassen and the metaphysics of modality. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 51, 837–856.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2005). The feeling of being. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 12(8–10), 45–63.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2007). *Rethinking commonsense psychology: A critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ratcliffe, M. (2008). *Feelings of being: Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rowbottom, D. P. (2005). The empirical stance vs. the critical attitude. *South African Journal of Philosophy*, 24, 200–223.
- Sartre, J. P. (1963). *Nausea* (R. Baldick, Trans.). London: Penguin.
- Stocker, M. (2004). Some considerations about intellectual desire and emotions. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), *Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotions* (pp. 135–148). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Teller, P. (2004). What is a stance? *Philosophical Studies*, 121, 159–170.
- van Fraassen, B. C. (1994). Against transcendental empiricism. In T. J. Stapleton (Ed.), *The question of hermeneutics* (pp. 309–335). Amsterdam: Kluwer.
- van Fraassen, B. C. (2002). *The empirical stance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.