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Cultural Endorsement of Broad Leadership Prototypes and Wealth as Predictors of Corruption

Dejun Tony Kong[1] · Roger Volkema[2]

Abstract   Corruption is a social ill that involves public officials' misuse of entrusted power, which is a function of sociocultural factors. Rarely, however, do researchers view corruption as a leadership-related problem. In the current research, we conceptualize corruption as a leadership-related problem, and propose three broad leadership prototypes based on social value orientation theory and research. We seek to examine (1) how cultural endorsement of self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic leadership prototypes is related to corruption at the societal level and (2) how wealth moderates the relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption. Using archival data of 53 societies, we found that cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership was positively related to corruption, strengthened by wealth. Cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership and individualistic leadership, however, was not significantly related to corruption, and wealth did not moderate either of the relationships. The implications of these findings for theory and future research are discussed.

Keywords   Corruption · Self-serving leadership · Prosocial leadership · Individualistic leadership · Wealth · GLOBE

1 Introduction

Corruption represents a prominent issue, locally (Kaplan 2013) as well as globally (Cockcroft 2012; Doh et al. 2003; Wang and Rosenau 2001). The World Bank estimates that bribery alone has exceeded $1 trillion around the world (Gonzalez-Velazquez 2004),

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not to mention other forms of corruption such as kickbacks, sweeteners, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, blackmail, protection money, favoritism, and nepotism (Lindgreen 2004). Corruption not only hinders economic development but also undermines the public's subjective well-being (Heukamp and Ariño 2011).

Defined as public officials' misuse of entrusted power for private gain, corruption is a function of various factors, including political and legal infrastructures, economic policies, institutional roles, human development, and globalization (Seleim and Bontis 2009). To understand the development of this social ill, Collier (2002) proffered an institutional choice approach to corruption, which delineates how external factors constrain or legitimize corruption. External factors entail three macro-environmental categories: economic factors, political-legal factors, and sociocultural factors. Judge et al. (2011) contend that these three sets of factors have about the same level of influence on an individual's internalization of rules and incentives, which ultimately influences corruption.

Despite the importance of sociocultural factors, rarely do researchers consider corruption a leadership-related issue. By definition, however, corruption is public officials' power misuse, which is determined by sociocultural factors such as cultural values related to leadership. Just as little empirical research on leadership has emphasized cross-cultural components (Dickson et al. 2003; Scandura and Dorfman 2004), the extant perspective of corruption neglects leadership factors (Javidan et al. 2006a). Yet individuals have underlying assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes, and schemas about desirable traits and behaviors followers expect from leaders, which facilitate the distinction between leader-like and non-leader-like individuals (Epitropaki and Martin 2004; Javidan et al. 2006a; Lord et al. 1984; Offermann et al. 1994). Individuals base their sense-making on cultural contexts, which guide their beliefs about traits and behaviors that facilitate or impede desirable leadership (Den Hartog et al. 1999; Lord et al. 1982).

The present study adopts a wealth-value interactive approach, as taken by Husted (1999) and Getz and Volkema (2001). However, distinct from previous studies that focused on general cultural values (Hofstede 1980, 2003), we examine cultural values specifically related to leadership, as we propose that corruption is a leadership-related problem. Drawing upon Van Lange and colleagues' social value orientation theory and research (Van Lange 1999; Van Lange et al. 1997), we propose three broad prototypes of leadership—self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic leadership—and empirically identify these prototypes with the scores of six culturally-endorsed leadership styles from the GLOBE study (Javidan et al. 2006a). We seek to examine (1) the relationships between cultural endorsement of self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic leadership prototypes and corruption and (2) the moderating effect of wealth on the relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption. In so doing, the present research adds to corruption and cross-cultural leadership theories and research.

2 Corruption as a Leadership-Related Problem

Leadership has been the focus of scholarly attention since early in the twentieth century (Northouse 2013). Dictionaries define leadership in terms of a person's capacity to guide or direct others (Webster's New World College Dictionary 2014). Typically, there is an implicit contract that binds followers to leaders, a contract that concerns both means (ethical or otherwise) and ends.

While scholars rarely view corruption as a leadership-related problem, research on leaders' power misuse has explicitly modeled sociocultural factors as important determinants of corruption, along with leader and follower characteristics and behaviors (Kets de Vries 1993; Nahavandi 2012). For example, Ashforth and Anand (2003) discuss how corruption can be normalized in the private sector through organizational cultures. Likewise, societal assumptions, values, and beliefs regarding corruption also can be normalized, and thus become endorsed through socialization or environmental influences (Huang et al. 2011). These assumptions, values, and beliefs determine whether corruption is tolerated, accepted, encouraged, or rewarded, and whether corrupt leaders in the public sector will survive and thrive.

Resick et al. (2011) contend that the public's acceptance of corruption is largely guided by their beliefs regarding desirable leadership prototype(s) in their culture. For example, Nordic Europeans value transparency and equality and, accordingly, have the highest level of endorsement of leadership with integrity; Middle Easterners do not value transparency and equality as much and, therefore, have less endorsement of this leadership prototype (Resick et al. 2006). At the same time, public officials' perceptions of the public's acceptance of corruption are guided by their beliefs regarding desirable leadership prototype(s) in their culture as well. Social psychologists have consistently found that social norms, as the normative behavioral expectations in a given context, guide individual behaviors (Cialdini et al. 1991). In other words, individual behaviors are influenced by observation (and subsequent modeling) of others because individuals are inclined to engage in socially-approved/appropriate behaviors.

This is the tenet of social proof theory: "one means we use to determine what is correct is to find out what other people think is correct" (Cialdini 2006, p. 116); individuals are looking for social endorsement when they decide on their behaviors. Moore and Gino (2013) also maintain that "social norms provide individuals with the proof they need to categorize behavior as appropriate or inappropriate… Thus, when a local social norm neglects morally relevant consequences, it dampens moral awareness and, through this dampening, will increase unethical behavior" (p. 57). Therefore, the public's and public officials' shared perceptions of desirable leadership prototype(s) shape cultural endorsement of the leadership prototype(s).

3 Cultural Endorsement of Three Broad Leadership Prototypes and Corruption

Much of the early research on leadership was bound by the cultural/ethnic homogeneity of experimental participants and the ethnocentricity of theoretical models (Northouse 2013; Schein 2006). The globalization of world economy in the latter third of the twentieth century raised awareness of the role that culture plays in determining interpersonal processes and defining effectiveness, not only for leadership theory and practice but also for theories and practice of negotiation, social influence, team management, and other leader behavior-related fields. Many social scientists, Hofstede (1980, 1983, 1984) chief among them, sought to codify cultural dimensions while examining their relations with various forms of human behaviors.

Besides Hofstede's studies, the GLOBE study (House et al. 2002) also aimed to quantify cultural values. In the GLOBE study, however, researchers focused more on identifying desirable and undesirable leadership styles across cultures. Their empirical

analysis of sixty-two societies identified six leadership styles, which can inform corruption research. The styles include self-protective, participative, charismatic/value-based, team-oriented, humane-oriented, and autonomous leadership (Javidan et al. 2006a). Self-protective leadership is characterized by self-centeredness, status consciousness, self-face saving, and conflict inducement. Participative leadership values participation (e.g., seeking input from others) rather than autocratic or authoritarian approaches. Charismatic/value-based leadership is visionary, transformational, inspirational, and decisive, with an emphasis on self-sacrifice and integrity. Team-oriented leadership values collaboration, diplomacy, administrative competence, and non-malevolence. Humane-oriented leadership promotes modesty, supportiveness, compassion, and generosity. Finally, autonomous leadership values individualism and independence.

We contend that these six leadership styles can be categorized into three broad prototypes of leadership—self-serving (self-protective and not participative), prosocial (charismatic/value-based, team-oriented, and humane-oriented), and individualistic (autonomous) leadership—based on the underlying social value orientations associated with the leadership prototypes. Self-serving leadership focuses on increasing personal benefits at the expense of collective welfare; prosocial leadership focuses on increasing collective welfare and fairness; and individualistic leadership focuses on increasing personal benefits without sacrificing collective welfare.

Social value orientations are predictive of a range of social behaviors such as altruistic behaviors (e.g., McClintock and Allison 1989; Van Lange et al. 2007), negotiation behaviors (e.g., De Dreu and Boles 1998; De Dreu and Van Lange 1995), and cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas (e.g., Balliet et al. 2009), all of which are related to leadership. Van Lange and colleagues (Van Lange 1999; Van Lange et al. 1997) have shown that self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic value orientations exist across cultures. Although little cross-cultural research has explored the underlying social value orientations of leadership, intra-cultural research has shown the relationship between leaders' social value orientations and their social behaviors. For example, in their experimental studies, van Dijk and De Cremer (2006) found that leaders' social value orientations determined their resource allocation behaviors; specifically, self-serving leaders allocated more resources to themselves than prosocial leaders. We argue that the cross-cultural variation in a society's endorsement of self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic leadership prototypes determines cross-cultural variation in corruption.

Among these three broad prototypes of leadership, self-serving leadership is the most closely related to corruption, according to the definition of corruption. Self-serving leaders are highly self-centered and autocratic (Javidan et al. 2006a; Van de Vliert and Einarsen 2008), typically behaving in an antisocial manner by pursuing self-interests at the expense of the legitimate interests of followers and collective welfare (Conger 1990; Van de Vliert and Einarsen 2008). In a society where self-serving leadership is culturally endorsed, the public expects their leaders to achieve self-interests at the expense of collective welfare, thus tolerating, if not endorsing, such leader behaviors. Stated otherwise, cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership is likely to be a sociocultural predictor of corruption; a society that tolerates and condones self-serving leadership is likely to tolerate and accept corruption, thus providing fertile grounds for corruption. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1 At the societal level, cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership is positively related to corruption.

In addition, we hypothesize that cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership may be negatively related to corruption. As mentioned earlier, the prosocial leadership prototype entails charismatic/value-based, team-oriented, and humane-oriented leadership identified by the GLOBE study. Charismatic/value-based leadership is characterized by self-sacrifice and integrity; team-oriented leadership is characterized by collaboration, administrative competence, and non-malevolence; and humane-oriented leadership is characterized by generosity, compassion, and supportiveness (Javidan et al. 2006a). A society that endorses prosocial leadership is likely to value self-sacrifice, integrity, cooperation, and altruism, expecting their public officials to behave prosocially. In other words, a society that endorses prosocial leadership does not condone corruption but rather punishes corruptive behaviors. Hence, we argue that cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership is likely to be negatively related to corruption.

Hypothesis 2   At the societal level, cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership is negatively related to corruption.

Because individualistic leadership is only concerned with individual gains without sacrificing collective welfare, a society that endorses such leadership is likely to value independence. Given that corruption is an issue related to socioeconomic interdependence, we argue that cultural endorsement of individualistic leadership is modestly related or unrelated to corruption; therefore, we make no prediction regarding their relationship.

4 A Wealth-Contingent View of Cultural Endorsement of Self-Serving Leadership and Corruption

While we hypothesize a positive relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption (Hypothesis 1), it is conceivable that societal wealth could moderate this relationship. Clashing moral values theories of corruption posit that there is no clear distinction between one's private and public roles in many societies; therefore, reaping private gain at the expense of public interests (i.e., self-servingly) is not regarded as morally reprehensible or even illegal (de Graaf 2007). For example, Rose-Ackerman (1999) noted that "[i]n the private sector, gift giving is pervasive and highly valued, and it seems natural to provide jobs and contracts to one's friends and relatives. No one sees any reason not to carry over such practices into the public realm. In fact, the very idea of a sharp distinction between private and public life seems alien to many people" (p. 91).

In addition, cultural relativity theory suggests that individuals' beliefs and behaviors should be understood with these individuals' culture taken into consideration, and likewise, social and organizational practices should be understood with culture taken into consideration (e.g., Hofstede 1983; Dimitratos et al. 2011; Vignoles et al. 2000). For example, what constitutes good-quality life must be measured within a specific sociocultural environment (Hofstede 1984). Additionally, the meaning of cooperation is culturally conditioned (e.g., the US vs. China; Keller and Loewenstein 2011). Likewise, the meaning (self-serving or not) of corruption is likely to differ across cultures (Collier 2002); corruption is likely to be deemed self-serving in one culture but not in another culture.

Based on theories of clashing moral values and cultural relativity, the self-serving meaning of corruption may differ in wealthy versus poor societies. It might be argued that in wealthier societies, corruption means attaining private gains and self-interests at the expense of public welfare (i.e., self-serving), whereas in poorer societies, corruption means

attaining relational/ingroup benefits (i.e., not self-serving but ingroup-serving). Therefore, we expect the positive relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption to increase as societal wealth increases.

Hypothesis 3 At the societal level, wealth moderates (strengthens) the relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption.

5 Methods

5.1 Sample

The sample consisted of 51 societies in Europe (19), Asia (13), Africa (8), Central and South America (8), and North America (3), plus Australia and New Zealand (in total, 53 societies).

5.2 Measures

5.2.1 Corruption

Corruption of each society was indicated by its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provided by Transparency International (2003), with values ranging from 0 to 10 (http://archive. transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2003). CPI reflects the views of observers, including businesspeople, country risk analysts, and the general public, on the degree of corruption in a society's public sector. This index has been shown to have acceptable validity over years and has been widely used in academic research on corruption (e.g., Davis and Ruhe 2003; Getz and Volkema 2001; Ray 2008; Seleim and Bontis 2009). We reverse scored the CPI, with a larger score indicating a higher level of corruption.

5.2.2 Cultural Endorsement of Leadership Prototypes

Cultural endorsement of the six specific leadership styles was indicated by the respective average scores of the perceived effectiveness of these leadership styles from the GLOBE study (Den Hartog et al. 1999, pp. 238–239). The datum for Germany was the sum of former West Germany (FRG) and East Germany (GDR), weighted by the sample size. The datum for South Africa was the sum of South Africa (Black sample) and South Africa (White sample), weighted by the sample size. A larger score represented a higher level of cultural endorsement of a specific leadership style.

To empirically demonstrate that cultural endorsement of the six leadership styles can be categorized into cultural endorsement of three broad leadership prototypes, we conducted a generalized-least-squares factor analysis with varimax rotation to extract three factors. As expected, cultural endorsement of charismatic/value-based (rotated factor loading score .96), team-oriented (.83), and humane-oriented (.47) leadership loaded onto the first factor (having an Eigenvalue of 2.38 and explaining 39.62 % of the variance); cultural endorsement of self-protective (1.00) and participative (−.79) leadership loaded onto the second factor (having an Eigenvalue of 1.74 and explaining 28.91 % of the variance); and cultural endorsement of autonomous (−.48) leadership loaded onto the third factor (having an Eigenvalue of 1.00 and explaining 16.59 %). All the cross-loading scores were below

|.40|. We aggregated the GLOBE scores to derive the scores of cultural endorsement of the three broad leadership prototypes, with a larger score indicating stronger cultural endorsement of a broad leadership prototype.

5.2.3 Wealth

We used the average gross national income (GNI) per capita in PPP terms (constant 2005 international dollars) in 1990, 1995, and 2000 provided by the United Nations Development Program (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/100106.html) as an indicator of societal wealth (e.g., Fischer and Van de Vliert 2011). To reduce the skewness of its distribution, we followed Van de Vliert and colleagues' practice (e.g., Van de Vliert 2006; Van de Vliert et al. 2009) and log-transformed the index. A larger score indicated greater societal wealth.

5.2.4 Control Variables

We included a political-legal factor (democracy) and a sociocultural factor (ethnic diversity) as two control variables related to corruption based on previous research. Previous research has shown that democracy and corruption have an inverse relationship (e.g., O'Connor and Fischer 2012). We used the unified democracy scores (http://www.unified-democracy-scores.org/uds.html), which incorporate information from ten measures of democracy assessing components such as participation, inclusiveness, political liberties, competitive elections, freedom of expression, etc. (Pemstein et al. 2010). A larger unified democracy score represented a higher level of democracy in a society. Previous research has shown that ethnic diversity is related to corruption (Easterly 2001). We collected ethnic diversity data from Alesina et al. (2003). A larger score indicated a higher level of ethnic diversity.

6 Results

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables. The average level of corruption among the 53 societies was 4.93. Table 2 presents the results of regression analysis with three steps. Prior to creating the interaction terms, we

Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations

Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Corruption	4.93	2.58						
2. Wealth	9.16	1.09	−.80***					
3. Cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership	3.06	.38	.66***	−.43***				
4. Cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership	5.51	.25	.13	−.25	−.10			
5. Cultural endorsement of individualistic leadership	3.83	.45	−.01	.05	.14	−.09		
6. Democracy	.74	.83	−.65***	.56***	−.68***	.14	.04	
7. Ethnic diversity	.36	.24	.38**	−.35*	.28*	.11	−.22	−.49***

N = 53. * *p* < .05; ** *p* < .01; *** *p* < .001 (two-tailed)

Table 2 Results of regression analysis predicting corruption

	Step 1 β	Step 2 β	Step 3 β
Democracy	−.07	.08	.12
Ethnic diversity	.03	.06	.07
Cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership	.36***	.38***	.35***
Cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership	.02	.04	.04
Cultural endorsement of individualistic leadership	−.02	.06	.06
Wealth	−.59***	−.67***	−.72***
Cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership × wealth		.24**	.27**
Cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership × wealth			.06
Cultural endorsement of individualistic leadership × wealth			−.07
R^2	.76	.79	.80
F (df1, df2)	24.62 (6, 46)***	25.17 (7, 45)***	19.37 (9, 43)***
ΔR^2		.03	.01
ΔF (df1, df2)		7.53 (1, 45)**	.61 (2, 43)

$N = 53$. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

centered wealth and cultural endorsement of the three broad leadership prototypes to their respective means (Aiken and West 1991). As shown in Table 2 (Step 1), consistent with previous research (e.g., Husted 1999), wealth was negatively related to corruption ($\beta = -.59$, $p < .001$). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership was positively related to corruption ($\beta = .36$, $p < .001$). However, inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership was not significantly related to corruption ($\beta = .02$, $p = .82$). Neither was cultural endorsement of individualistic leadership ($\beta = -.02$, $p = .75$). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the interaction of cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and wealth was positively related to corruption ($\beta = .24$, $p < .01$) (see Table 2, Step 2). Simple slope tests (without control variables) (Aiken and West 1991) suggests that the relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption was non-significant in poorer societies (-1 SD) (simple slope = 1.04, $p = .18$) but was significant and positive in wealthier societies (simple slope = 3.75, $p < .001$) (see Fig. 1).

Finally, to check the robustness of our findings, we included the interaction terms of wealth and cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership and of wealth and cultural endorsement of individualistic leadership in the last step of the regression analysis. As Table 2 shows, neither was significant while the interaction of cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and wealth remained significant ($\beta = .27$, $p < .01$).

7 Discussion

In the current research, we proposed a novel view of corruption as a leadership-related problem. Using three broad prototypes of culturally-endorsed leadership (self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic) derived from the GLOBE study (Javidan et al. 2006a), we

Fig. 1 Wealth as a moderator for the relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption

examined their relationships with corruption at the societal level, as well as the moderating role that societal wealth plays in the relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption. By analyzing archival data of 53 societies, we found empirical support for two of our three hypotheses. Specifically, cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership was positively related to corruption whereas cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership and individualistic leadership were not significantly related to corruption. Wealth moderated (strengthened) the relationship between cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and corruption.

These expected and unexpected findings stress the important role that leadership-related cultural values can play in understanding the critical problem of corruption that many societies are facing. Our findings convey the message that in order to decrease or eliminate corruption, societies need to reduce cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership (particularly for wealthier societies) through education, social media, and other mass communication channels. In addition to this implication for anti-corruption intervention, the current research also provides implications for corruption and cross-cultural leadership theories and research.

7.1 Theoretical Implications

7.1.1 Corruption Theory and Research

As mentioned earlier, previous research has identified a range of corruption determinants, and yet many critical sociocultural factors have not been systematically investigated. This study affirmed that cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership has a wealth-contingent, positive relationship with corruption, whereas cultural endorsement of individualistic leadership has no significant relationship with corruption. Yet surprisingly, cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership has no significant relationship with corruption either. To our knowledge, the current research is the first to show the linkage between leadership-related cultural values and corruption, thereby embedding corruption in the leadership literature.

7.1.2 Cross-Cultural Leadership Theory and Research

The field of cross-cultural leadership has identified factors that determine cross-cultural differences in leadership prototypes, behaviors, and functions. This field moves away from studies comparing two or three cultures, which can "end up providing a single data point that is unrelated (and not relatable) to other literature" (Dickson et al. 2003, p. 748). Drawing upon Van Lange and colleagues' social value orientation theory and research, we proposed three broad prototypes of leadership—self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic leadership—and assessed them using the scores of cultural endorsement of six specific leadership styles from the GLOBE study. This adds to the leadership literature by providing a parsimonious and yet theoretically grounded view of leadership.

Against the backdrop of researchers proposing numerous leadership concepts such as "charismatic leadership" (Conger and Kanungo 1987), "transactional leadership" (Bass 1997), "transformational leadership" (Bass 1997), "ethical leadership" (Brown et al. 2005), "servant leadership" (Greenleaf 1977; Van Dierendonck 2011), "authentic leadership" (Walumbwa et al. 2008), "paternalistic leadership" (Pellegrini and Scandura 2008), and so forth, many of which face conceptual, empirical, or practical problems (e.g., Cooper et al. 2005; Van Knippenberg and Sitkin 2013), we argue that leadership can be broadly categorized according to its underlying social value orientations. We urge researchers to shift their focus from leader behaviors to leader social value orientations (motivation), given that social value orientations have shown their predictive validity *across cultures*. By identifying cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership and wealth as two factors that jointly predict corruption and by identifying cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership and individualistic leadership as two factors irrelevant to corruption, the current research has shown that these leadership prototypes have differential value in predicting different socio-psychological functioning within societies, thus advancing a nuanced knowledge of cross-cultural leadership.

Cross-cultural leadership is a promising topic in leadership research and needs more empirical research. Although the nature and socio-psychological functions of self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic leadership need further theoretical clarification and empirical investigations, our research has demonstrated their predictive value in cross-cultural research with regard to corruption. The GLOBE study found that cultural endorsement of self-protective leadership was positively related to certain cultural dimensions such as uncertainty avoidance and power distance and was negatively related to other cultural dimensions such as gender egalitarianism, in-group collectivism, and performance orientation. Therefore, self-serving leadership may be particularly relevant or important in cultures of high power distance and uncertainty avoidance but low gender egalitarianism, in-group collectivism, and performance orientation. Other than corruption, can cultural endorsement of self-serving leadership predict other types of selfish behaviors? A richer understanding of self-serving leadership and its cultural endorsement can benefit cross-cultural leadership theory and practice.

7.2 Limitations and Directions for Future Research

As with all studies, the current research comes with some caveats. These represent both caution in interpreting/applying the findings and additional opportunities for future research. First, the sample size (53 societies) was relatively small, though comparable to those of many other cross-cultural studies (e.g., Fischer and Van de Vliert 2011; O'Connor

and Fischer 2012; Van de Vliert et al. 2009). Yet it afforded us sufficient statistical power in testing our hypotheses. Second, the dependent measure—corruption—was taken from Transparency International, an oft-cited source used in ethics research (e.g., Davis and Ruhe 2003; Getz and Volkema 2001; Husted 1999; Seleim and Bontis 2009). It represents perceived corruption, albeit based on multiple and varied sources, rather than actual corruption. This is a common limitation in the vast majority of research on corruption. While actual corruption is difficult to measure by the very nature of its legal consequences, it may be necessary or important to distinguish between actual and perceived corruption in some research. When condition permits, future research should gather data of actual corruption in various societies and re-examine corruption issues using these data. Third, due to our theoretical focus, our current analysis was at the societal level. It is conceivable that there could be wealth differences across subcultures within a geographically large society such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Russia, and the US (e.g., Van de Vliert et al. 2013). These more nuanced differences can also be considered in future research, which is likely to generate more insight on cross-cultural issues.

Despite these limitations, this research provides a couple of promising directions for future research. First, many studies on cultural values used Hofstede's (1980) cultural dimensions (e.g., Davis and Ruhe 2003; Husted 1999; Getz and Volkema 2001). However, there have been healthy debates regarding the validity and reliability of the GLOBE classification versus Hofstede's model, including whose classification should be the basis for future cross-cultural research (e.g., Javidan et al. 2006b; McSweeney 2002; Smith 2006; Williamson 2002). While Hofstede's classification has arguably been employed in more studies (by virtue of having been around much longer), it has also been criticized as being dated and industry-specific. In comparison to Hofstede's cultural dimensions, the select dimensions identified by the GLOBE study appear at least as promising under certain circumstances to cross-cultural leadership research in the years to come. One important rationale for the focus on the leadership-related cultural values identified by the GLOBE study rather than Hofstede's general cultural dimensions is that leadership-related cultural values are more likely to be changed than general cultural values (which are related to leadership and other sociocultural aspects). Therefore, significant findings of leadership-related cultural values have potential implications for more feasible intervention methods. We urge future research to continue investigating the nature of cultural endorsement of self-serving, prosocial, and individualistic leadership prototypes and their value in predicting other socio-psychological functioning at the societal level and in moderating the relationships among factors at lower (e.g., organization) levels.

Second, we urge future research to explain the surprisingly non-significant relationship between cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership and corruption with primary data. Prosocial leadership is charismatic, value-based, team-oriented, and humane-oriented. It is likely that charisma and integrity may have culturally conditioned meanings just like cooperation (Keller and Loewenstein 2011). However, our finding that corruption was not a joint function of cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership and wealth seemed to refute this speculation. Future research may explore potential moderators for the relationship between cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership and corruption to explain when cultural endorsement of prosocial leadership is a significant predictor of corruption. Such research efforts can identify the underlying mechanism(s) and shed light on both leadership and corruption research.

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