Public Choice (2008) 136: 69–86
DOI 10.1007/s11127-008-9281-2

A simple way of estimating interest group ideology

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Received: 24 May 2007 / Accepted: 17 January 2008 / Published online: 1 February 2008

Abstract Political scientists have developed accepted numerical estimates of political ideology for legislators, candidates, parties and even nations, but interest groups lack such scores. This absence puts interest group research at a disadvantage compared to other subfields. I generate ideology scores for 72 groups across 10 years by combining groups' evaluations of Members of Congress with Poole and Rosenthal's estimates of Members' ideologies. Alternative methods are explored, and the validity of the scores is demonstrated. Examinations of the scores focus on the relative distribution of groups and Members of Congress and the link between a group's ideology and its campaign contributions.

Keywords Interest group ideology · Interest groups · Organized interests · NOMINATE

1 Introduction

Scholars have developed estimates for the ideological "ideal points" of legislators (Carson and Oppenheimer 1984; Poole and Rosenthal 1991, 1997; Weisberg 1972), foreign political parties (Middendorp 1989; Todosijevic 2004), Supreme Court justices (Martin and Quinn 2002; Segal and Cover 1989), and even nations (Voeten 2000). Meanwhile, virtually no effort has been made to estimate the ideology of interest groups.

Ever since Downs (1957), political scientists frequently assume that voters, office-holders, and other political actors will support politicians or policies that are closest to them in ideological space. Yet rather than putting interest groups precisely into such a space, researchers have had only nebulous notions that, for example, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) is liberal and the American Conservative Union (ACU) is conservative—but

This research would not have been possible without the innovations and contributions of Keith Poole, both to the field generally and to this paper in particular. The author thanks Michael Munger, Jason Reifler, Jay Hamilton, Tom Rice, Keith Poole, Scott de Marchi, John Aldrich, Michael Tofias, Frederick Boehmke, anonymous reviewers, and others along the way for their very helpful ideas and comments.

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how liberal or conservative we cannot say. The inability to more finely locate groups in ideological space has contributed to the astute observation that the interest groups literature tends to "grow, but does not accumulate" (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, p. 17).

This paper develops a simple way to estimate the ideology of interest groups.[1] These scores can help answer questions about the ideological distribution of interest groups, relative to each other (see Gray and Lowery 1996), the public, government actors, or political parties (e.g., Reinhardt and Victor 2007). They can also be used to explain interest groups' campaign contributions, to examine the conditions under which groups alter their ideological position in reaction to political events, or to measure or describe the public or national "mood" (Stimson 1991).

This paper does not present a complicated estimation procedure. Rather, I build on a commonly accepted measure of the ideology of Members of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores) to give scholars a much-needed measure of interest group ideology. I present ideological scores for 72 organized interest groups who distributed lists of their preferred votes on various congressional roll call votes in the years 1997–2006.[2] They represent a mix of liberal and conservative groups, narrow and broad in their concerns, ranging from property rights, abortion, and taxes, to animal rights, poverty, and gun control.

The procedure has three simple steps. First, I collect each group's list of important roll call votes in a given year. I compile each group's key votes myself, rather than relying on groups' published ratings of Members, since some groups double (or even triple) count particular votes, or count abstentions or absences as "incorrect" votes. Next, the group's preferred votes are matched to the House Members who voted "correctly" on each roll call. Finally, I calculate the mean of the left-right ideology estimates of all "perfectly" scoring Members, and attribute that score to the group who selected the votes. The resulting scores are shown in the Appendix.

The DW-NOMINATE scores on which these estimates rely has become "virtually canonical" (Jackman 2000).[3] The most often used alternative means of estimating Member ideology is the ratings of Members by the ADA, which have various problems (Herron 2001; Jackson and Kingdon 1992; Snyder 1992), including the fact that previously we have had no independent measure of the ideology of the ADA itself.

The technique produces interest group ideology estimates on a single liberal-conservative spectrum, as well as an unidentified second dimension.[4] Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE program allows comparisons to be made across congresses and between cham-

[1] By ideology, I mean simply the location of groups along a left-right continuum as demonstrated by their voting preferences. As Poole and Rosenthal note, on most congressional votes, "everyone to one side of a critical point will vote one way and everyone to the other side will vote the opposite way. . . . Consequently, nearly everything becomes a straight liberal/conservative issue" (2007, p. 3).

[2] These data are provided by the non-profit organization Voter Information Services (2003, 2007), which gathers them from the groups (http://www.vis.org). Project Vote Smart, a similar website, lists at least 100 additional groups that rate Members entirely or partly according to their roll-call votes (http://projectvotesmart.org). Thus the universe of groups that can be scaled using the technique described here is not small, although Ansolabehere et al.'s (2002) compilation of lobbying disclosure data and PAC donations in the 1990s finds 2,296 distinct trade and professional associations, labor unions, and citizen groups.

[3] Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE program derives an ideology score for Members according to their vector of votes, such that for a given vote q, Members whose ideal point is $< q$ are more likely to vote nay and those whose ideal point is $> q$ are more likely to vote yea. Combining this formula for all votes and all Members leads to a very specific ideal point for each Member, with standard errors derived by parametric bootstrap (Lewis and Poole 2004).

[4] In congressional voting, the second dimension is believed by many to be related to race or civil rights, but Poole and Rosenthal show that the first dimension clearly dominates in significance and substantive meaning.

bers. Accordingly, the ideology scores derived from the Poole and Rosenthal estimates can be mapped onto like scores for representatives, senators, and even presidents.[5]

By isolating the few votes each group cares about, the method selects Members who are not just liberal or conservative in general, but who are liberal or conservative on the issue the group was organized around. As Fowler (1982) has shown, interest groups choose their key votes *knowing* which Members will be rated high or low. Thus we need not be concerned that Members' votes on issues outside the interest group's domain will significantly skew the scores.

This method is substantially similar to the method used by Groseclose and Milyo (2005). They average the ADA scores for Members who named various "policy groups" on the floor, and attribute that score to the think tank or interest group. The present method has two significant advantages over Groseclose and Milyo's if our goal is to estimate interest group ideology (their goal was to estimate bias in the media). Substantively, since we are interested in interest group preferences, it makes more sense for the *groups* to select *Members* who reflect their ideology than for Members to choose groups. Pragmatically, it is far less labor-intensive to use the scorecards of interest groups than to search the *Congressional Record* for Members' references to various think tanks. Moreover, several groups in the Groseclose and Milyo study also release voting scorecards, which allows us to compare the two methods. For the nine groups that were scaled using both methods, the correlation between theirs and mine is remarkably high at −0.989, despite completely different methods of gathering data and slightly different time periods.[6]

2 Evaluating the scores

To assess the validity of the scores, let us first look at the distribution of groups. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that the scores pass the quick test of our expectations: ADA and ACU are strongly liberal and conservative respectively; Peace Majority is the most liberal and the John Birch Society most conservative. Further, the scores (as shown in the top line of Fig. 3) are not normally or uniformly distributed, but are polarized on the left and right.

The scores allow us to compare the ideologies of these interest groups to Members of Congress. If it is the case that the interest group population comprises the most active, politically concerned individuals who share a common interest (just as congressional committees tend to represent Members who are most concerned about a policy area—but see Krehbiel 1990), we would expect the median interest group on each side to be more ideologically extreme than the respective party medians in the House of Representatives (Hall and Grofman 1990; Snyder 1992). (An alternative hypothesis is that groups might be more evenly spread, since at least one scholar—Krehbiel 1994, p. 68—believes the purpose of interest groups' ratings is "to discriminate more finely between legislators in the middle range of a policy

Applying Poole's optimal classification technique to the groups in this paper (a subject I will return to) produces second-dimension estimates that improve correct classification by only 0.3% over the first dimension alone.

[5] Such comparisons should be done with caution since the reliability of the scores varies. Reliability is captured in the standard error of the mean, which accounts for the numbers of votes and Members used to calculate each score (see Appendix). As Poole, Rosenthal, and their colleagues have spent decades trying to develop standard errors for their estimates, I make no further attempt to do so in this paper. Users may choose to drop scores that use fewer than five votes.

[6] Their selection of Members is drawn from floor speeches made in the period from 1993 through 2002; I compute the average score for each group across the years 1997–2006.

Fig. 1 Each *marker* represents the average score for the group (or for House Democrats, as noted) across the years 1997–2006. Fifteen groups are omitted for legibility

spectrum.") Indeed, nearly 70% of the groups in the sample are more extreme than the average Republican and Democratic Members of Congress. This apparent extremism of interest groups relative to Members sometimes is assumed but has not before been demonstrated empirically.

In addition, the conservative groups in this sample are also farther away from zero than liberal groups are—probably due to the Republican-dominated Congress active during the time period under study here. Some socially oriented conservative groups, such as the Family Research Council, John Birch Society and American Conservative Union, are farther to the right than some fiscally or security-oriented conservative groups, such as the National Federation of Independent Business, American Security Council, and League of Private Property Voters. However, the second-dimension scores produced by averaging "perfect" Members' second-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores do not divide along a social-fiscal dimension, or any other identifiable dimension. This lack of meaning for interest groups' second dimension makes sense, since each interest group is interested in something different—the environment, health care, foreign policy—and such groups are likely to see government involvement in their issue to be more important than government involvement in other issues. Some scholars are starting to explore the meaning or existence of a second dimension for interest group ideology (e.g., Heaney 2004).

To further assess the scores' validity, I compare groups' scores to their campaign contribution patterns. Poole et al. (1987) show that among 12 political action committees (PACs) who both rated Members and contributed to many races, the higher the rating, the more money the group is likely to give to that Member. From this and from general expectations, we can expect that the more conservative a group, the greater the percentage of its contributions it will give to Republicans as opposed to Democrats. Indeed, as shown in Fig. 4, the percentage of a group's contributions to Republican as opposed to Democratic House candidates is well predicted by the group's left-right ideology score. The group ideology score



Fig. 2 Each interest group marker represents the average score for the group (or for Republicans or all Members of the House, as noted) across the years 1997–2006. Four groups are omitted for legibility



Fig. 3 Each marker represents one group-year. The party and House medians are the DW-NOMINATE average across the five congresses

predicts the percentage of contributions to Republicans very well, with an R^2 of 0.954 and a correlation of 0.977 (root mean standard error 0.092).

While a positive relationship may not seem surprising, the strength of the relationship is interesting in light of a debate in the literature over the connection between ideology and PAC donations. Various studies have shown that the way a PAC chooses to allocate its



Fig. 4 Each marker represents one group-year. Groups on the 50% line actually gave no money to political campaigns

contributions is largely a function of Members' party (Herndon 1982; Wilcox 1989) and/or ideology (Gopoian 1984; Grier and Munger 1993; Poole et al. 1987). But Grenzke finds that "in general, the incumbent's party affiliation is one of the least important considerations when the PAC allocates its money" (1989, p. 254) The relationship shown here is also important evidence that the ideological groups in this sample appear to be following an electoral strategy (Wright 1989), rather than an access strategy (Hall and Wayman 1990; Langbein 1986) in their PAC money allocation patterns.

The strong relationship between contributions and ideology might also be less interesting if it is only ideologically extreme interest groups that have PACs. But Fig. 4 (and t-tests) show that the groups in this sample who have PACs are no more ideologically extreme than those without them. The decision of ideologically oriented as to whether or not to form a PAC—a question not yet sufficiently addressed in the literature—does not appear to depend on how extreme or mainstream the interest group is.[7] The finding that PAC formation may be independent of group ideology is also statistically testable only with numerical ideology estimates of interest groups.

3 Comparing alternative methods

I argue that Members who are perfect on a voting scorecard well represent the underlying ideology of a group. But critics might argue that using only perfectly scoring Members discards too much information about how groups viewed "imperfect" Members. In particular, the ideology of groups without any "perfect" Members cannot be estimated at all. Two possible solutions are to use a cutoff point of less than 100%, or to use a weighted average.

[7] Rather, the literature has focused almost exclusively on corporate PACs (for a survey and critique, see Gray and Lowery 1997).

In Fig. 3, scores produced from the DW-NOMINATE scores of Members who vote with the group 90, 85, or 80% of the time yield substantially similar results, showing that the scores are robust to small changes in the cutoff. However, while a cutoff of 90% produces scores with greater variance than at 100%, a cutoff of 80% produces lower variance than the higher cutoffs do—suggesting that a cutoff of less than 100% would produce inconsistent estimates. Weighting all Members' DW-NOMINATE score according to each group's rating of each Member produces even more ambiguous results by artificially pushing groups to the center. If the weighted averages in Fig. 3 are to be believed, virtually all of the groups in the sample are more moderate than the median Republican or Democratic Member of the House.

I also used the alternative cutoff points to predict the proportion of campaign donations to Republicans. Again, there is no linear relationship between the cutoff points and the ability to explain contributions. A 90% cutoff actually has the highest R^2 (0.957), but an 85% cutoff performs worse ($R^2 = 0.916$) than an 80% cutoff ($R^2 = 0.935$). The weighted average has a low R^2 (0.919) and the highest error. The 100 and 90% scores are almost identical (correlation = 0.998), but I consider the 100% cutoff superior for the theoretical reason that it excludes Members who have voted against the group's interest, and the methodological reason that any other cutoff is arbitrary and could lead to significant inconsistencies.

A complementary problem is that when groups select only a few votes in a given year, the number of Members averaged may be high, drawing the group artificially toward the center. For example, both the Christian Coalition and the Humane Society used only one vote to rate Members in 2002, resulting in a slightly liberal score for the Christian Coalition and pushing the Humane Society's previously liberal score just to the right of zero. In general, the scores are not especially sensitive to the number of votes used. My examination of these data persuades me that five votes, and usually fewer, are enough to generate reasonable estimates. Still, users may choose to drop scores that rely on a very small number of votes to rate Members.

Another possible critique is that because the available population of roll call votes varies by year, interest group movement in space could be a product of the issues considered in a given year rather than any change in ideology. Yet as Fowler (1982) learned, even as issues change, groups still keep in mind the Members they wish to rate highly when making their selection of important votes. Further, while in the present paper interest groups' scores are derived from their most important votes in a calendar year, the Poole and Rosenthal scores they are based on change only every two years. Therefore, any movement by groups from the first session to the second session in a Congress must come from choices by the group, not movement by Members. Researchers could exploit this recurring natural experiment to make inferences about the conditions under which groups change their preferences.

Several scholars have suggested alternative methods that I should compare against my own. One possibility is to focus on Members who voted counter to all of the group's preferred votes, since voting against a measure can be easier than voting for it. Yet almost half (47%) of the groups' preferred votes were "No" votes. The scores produced by this alternative are considerably worse predictors of campaign contributions ($R^2 = 0.786$). Another idea for an ideology estimate is the Pearson correlation coefficient between a group's rating of each Member and the DW-NOMINATE score for that Member. This method generates a scale from -1 to $+1$, with liberal groups having negative correlations and conservative groups having positive correlations. However, this correlation is truly a measure of the *dimensionality* of each group's scoring of Members, and as evidence, the lowest-scoring group (averaged across years) is the ADA and the highest is the ACU, which may well be the most

typically liberal and conservative groups, but not the most extreme.[8] Yet another idea is to average the Poole and Rosenthal scores of the Members who voted with the group on all or all but one vote. The scores produced by this method correlate with mine at 0.960, and predict contributions with an R^2 of 0.874. As with lowering the cutoffs, this alternative captures Members who are less ideologically representative of the groups' preferences, and tends to push groups toward the center.

Finally, Keith Poole graciously plugged 73 groups for which I had preferred votes into his W-NOMINATE and Optimal Classification (OC) programs (see his website, http://voteview.com). Doing so allowed us to scale the groups and House Members simultaneously, as if the groups were voting Members with many abstentions. Although we aggregated the data across five congresses in order to generate reliable estimates, only 61 groups could be scaled given the number of votes they "cast." Using various methods of aggregation and averaging, my annual scores, which rely on Members' DW-NOMINATE scores, were compared to Poole's ten-year-period scores, which use W-NOMINATE or OC methods. The scores produced by W-NOMINATE and OC correlate with my scores at 0.88 or better, which is quite high given the multiple adjustments needed to compare them.[9] Further, while my scores predict contributions to Republicans with an R^2 of 0.95, the OC and W-NOMINATE scores perform less well, with R^2s of 0.91 and 0.79, respectively. Moreover, Poole's methods when applied to interest groups are difficult to use, require more data and produce more instances of missing observations than mine do, and do not allow groups' positions to vary over time (unless ten or more congresses are used).

Interestingly, by scaling the groups and Members of Congress in the same matrix, we can say with much more certainty that the groups in this sample are more ideologically extreme than most Members of Congress. Averaged across the ten-year period, my method suggests that 72.6% of the groups are more extreme than the appropriate party median, although no group is more extreme than the most extreme Members of the House. Quite similarly, 70.5% of the OC-scaled groups are more extreme than the OC-scaled median Member of the appropriate party, and 11.5% are more extreme than the most extreme liberal and conservative House Members.[10] Thus my estimates of interest group ideology are no more extreme than the results generated by plugging groups and Members simultaneously into the same scaling program, and provides strong support for my contention that the interest groups in this sample are truly more ideologically extreme than the majority of Congress.

This paper has shown that estimating the ideology of interest groups who rate Members of Congress is both possible and simple, and that such scores are needed in the subfield. In total, ten alternative methods were compared against the method I advocate, and none was demonstrated to be as easy to use and more highly correlated with groups' partisan contributions. Future research should build on these scores by extending the time period and number of groups scaled. Researchers might try to identify the second dimension, although this paper suggests there may not be a single meaning for a second dimension. The strong

[8]For example, the ADA and ACU are unlikely to be more ideologically extreme than Peace Action or the Friends Committee on National Legislation (a Quaker anti-war group) on the left, or the John Birch Society or Eagle Forum on the right. Nevertheless, these alternative scores predict partisan campaign contributions at the same rate as the method I advocate ($R^2 = 0.954$; root MSE $= 0.093$) and exhibit a similar distribution pattern (the correlation between my scores and this alternative is 0.959).

[9]By comparison, scholars who have developed their own methods of scaling legislators find correlations between two methods of 0.77 and above to be "fairly high" (Clinton and Meirowitz 2001, p. 251) or superior to others (Bailey 2001).

[10]W-NOMINATE scores that are generated by few votes tend to push voters to the extremes; OC does not have this effect and therefore is the more appropriate comparison.

correlation between groups' scores and PAC contributions implies that scholars might reasonably estimate the ideology of many more groups and even challenger candidates, whose ideal points are difficult to determine.[11] This would give scholars even outside the interest group literature an important tool for understanding electoral and related phenomena.

[11] PACs' ideologies could be estimated using the method here; then the scores for the PACs that donate to a challenger could be averaged (possibly weighted by dollar amount) and attributed to the challenger.

Appendix: Interest group ideology estimates[12]

Interest Group	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
AFL-CIO	−0.448	−0.453	−0.464	−0.497	−0.460	−0.470	−0.474	−0.493	−0.394	−0.440
	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.006	0.002
AFSCME			−0.417	−0.474	−0.415	−0.460	−0.442	−0.424	−0.423	−0.501
			0.004	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.027
Alliance for Retired Americans							−0.461		−0.448	
							0.004		0.003	
American Association of University Women	−0.448	−0.357	−0.416	−0.414	−0.429	−0.454	−0.425	−0.349	−0.428	−0.457
	0.006	0.010	0.004	0.010	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.013	0.005	0.005
American Conservative Union	0.564	0.544	0.670	0.598	0.605	0.569	0.615	0.642	0.663	0.702
	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.026	0.003	0.004	0.011
American Legion							0.227			
							0.031			
American Medical Student Association							−0.410			
							0.010			
American Public Health Association		−0.458	−0.452	−0.463	−0.455		−0.479	−0.175		
		0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004		0.004	0.023		
American Security Council						0.453	0.487	0.502	0.506	
						0.007	0.007	0.004	0.004	

[12]The standard error of the mean, which reflects the numbers of votes and Members that produced each score, appears below each score. Where no standard error is displayed, there is no variation in the score, because only one Member's score is used.

Interest Group	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
American Wilderness Coalition							−0.441	−0.234	−0.420	−0.327
							0.004	0.025	0.009	0.016
Americans United for Separation of					−0.547		−0.408	−0.435	−0.420	−0.501
Church and State					0.021		0.004	0.008	0.005	0.005
Americans for Democratic Action	−0.529	−0.480	−0.479	−0.575	−0.529	−0.507	−0.542	−0.504	−0.525	−0.529
	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Americans for Tax Reform				0.427	0.511	0.517	0.652	0.564	0.526	
				0.019	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.007	
Americans for the Arts					−0.268	−0.281	−0.307	−0.292	−0.131	−0.101
					0.012	0.014	0.011	0.010	0.012	0.024
Arab-American Institute							0.512	−0.434	0.336	
							0.459	0.221	0.017	
Associated Builders and Contractors	0.441	0.455	0.461	0.465	0.489	0.368	0.504	0.457		
	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.019	0.005	0.006		
BIPAC (Business-Industry PAC)							0.507	0.509	0.456	0.535
							0.002	0.003	0.004	0.004
Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence			−0.410			−0.327	−0.438	−0.352		
			0.008			0.013	0.018	0.021		
Bread for the World		−0.134	−0.402		0.036	−0.405	−0.391			
		0.013	0.007		0.023	0.008	0.007			
Business and Professional Women/USA					−0.439	−0.555	−0.516	−0.099	−0.467	
					0.004	0.008		0.050	0.010	

Interest Group	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Campaign for Corporate Reform						−0.518				
						0.010				
Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation							−0.083	−0.406		
							0.353	0.176		
Center for Security Policy					0.388	0.462	0.595	0.356		
					0.009	0.012	0.006	0.022		
Children's Defense Fund Action Council			−0.453	−0.472	−0.468		−0.479	−0.498	−0.492	−0.444
			0.003	0.004	0.004		0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004
Christian Coalition					0.485	−0.085	0.546			
					0.005	0.031	0.003			
Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants (CURE)	−0.576	−0.373	−0.613	−0.260	−0.249	−0.306	−0.302	−0.355		
	0.013	0.077	0.013	0.018	0.027	0.020	0.070	0.011		
Citizens for Global Solutions			−0.522	−0.374	−0.487	−0.521	−0.449	−0.423	−0.386	
			0.006	0.009	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	
Consumers Union	0.032	−0.454								
	0.021	0.009								
Democrats.com					−0.497	−0.243				
					0.004	0.029				
Eagle Forum		0.541		0.669	0.630	0.571	0.674	0.663	0.592	0.620
		0.007		0.014	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.015	0.006
Family Research Council			0.403	0.421	0.681	0.544	0.548	0.487	0.623	0.520
			0.008	0.012	0.005	0.004	0.003	0.023	0.004	0.006

Interest Group	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Friends Committee on National	−0.489	−0.484	−0.619	−0.451		−0.549	−0.604	−0.594	−0.497	−0.556
Legislation	0.025	0.004	0.010	0.012			0.021	0.012	0.006	0.005
Gun Owners of America		0.442	0.587	0.505	0.564	0.301	0.597	0.363	0.563	
		0.096	0.019	0.025	0.020	0.023	0.010	0.021	0.159	
Hadassah					−0.402	−0.354	−0.183	−0.374	−0.408	
					0.005	0.012	0.034	0.021	0.012	
Human Rights Campaign		−0.415	−0.498	−0.382	−0.439			−0.377	−0.308	−0.323
		0.009	0.004	0.009	0.006			0.010	0.019	0.024
Humane Society of the United States			−0.372		−0.334	0.053	−0.422	−0.291		
			0.012		0.016	0.043	0.008	0.023		
Information Technology Industry Council			0.350	0.410	0.340	0.426	0.354	0.379		
			0.007	0.008	0.012	0.008	0.013	0.010		
International Association of Fire Fighters			−0.418	−0.402						
			0.011	0.004						
International Association of Machinists	−0.374		−0.346	−0.439	−0.352	−0.422	−0.416	−0.446	−0.437	
	0.006		0.012	0.006	0.017	0.007	0.004	0.004	0.005	
International Brotherhood of		−0.455	−0.467		−0.423	−0.393	−0.450	−0.430	−0.382	−0.360
Boilermakers		0.006	0.008		0.005	0.016	0.005	0.004	0.011	0.008
John Birch Society			0.788		0.911			1.308	1.415	0.487
			0.019		0.041					0.232
League of Conservation Voters	−0.405	−0.470	−0.495	−0.505	−0.487	−0.540	−0.465	−0.458	−0.491	−0.475
	0.012	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004

Interest Group	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
League of Private Property Voters	0.453	0.461	0.494	0.501	0.528	0.542	0.584		0.521	0.532
	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.004		0.008	0.006
Liberty Lobby				0.416						
				0.014						
NAACP	−0.538	−0.381	−0.468	−0.504	−0.531	−0.416	−0.537	−0.478	−0.524	
	0.004	0.006	0.004	0.010	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.003	
NARAL Pro-Choice America	−0.449	−0.460	−0.417	−0.426	−0.378	−0.431	−0.428	−0.389	−0.421	
	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.005	0.008	0.012	0.008	
National Association of Social Workers			−0.483	−0.276	−0.421	−0.470	−0.472	−0.442		
			0.004	0.014	0.008	0.007	0.005	0.007		
National Breast Cancer Coalition			−0.198		−0.362					
			0.022		0.015					
National Catholic Social Justice Lobby	−0.552	−0.494	−0.580	−0.605	−0.305	−0.540	−0.452	−0.383	−0.473	−0.445
	0.007		0.008	0.005	0.022	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.004	0.010
National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare			−0.465	−0.402	−0.390	−0.412				
			0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004				
National Council of La Raza	−0.499	−0.488	−0.589		−0.575			−0.203	−0.391	
	0.006	0.004	0.014		0.011			0.016	0.007	
National Education Association	−0.419	−0.417	−0.340	−0.384	−0.398	−0.420	−0.372	−0.418	−0.411	−0.492
	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.007	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.007
National Federation of Independent Business	0.428	0.486	0.490	0.499	0.497	0.476	0.512	0.457	0.521	0.503
	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.006	0.004	0.009

Interest Group	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
National Right-to-Life Coalition	0.390	0.456	0.464	0.368	0.389	0.484	0.480	0.437	0.488	0.488
	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.009	0.007	0.005	0.004	0.011	0.007	0.009
Numbers USA					0.453	0.452	0.362	0.573	0.617	
					0.024	0.015	0.031	0.004	0.011	
Peace Action				−0.660	−0.742	−0.607	−0.478	−0.536	−0.607	
				0.010	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.006	0.005	
Peace Majority.org						−0.634	−0.509	−0.675	−0.737	−0.702
						0.017	0.004	0.010	0.007	0.021
Peace PAC	−0.502	−0.407	−0.537	−0.330	−0.514	−0.511	−0.420	−0.458		
	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.035	0.007	0.006	0.005	0.006		
Population Connection			−0.338	−0.368	−0.473	−0.430	−0.307	−0.319	−0.354	
			0.007	0.009	0.005	0.005	0.020	0.020	0.013	
Public Citizen Congress Watch	−0.543	−0.503	−0.485	−0.446	−0.528	−0.509	−0.500	−0.430		−0.554
	0.014	0.007	0.005	0.010	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.010		0.019
Radical Middle					0.411		0.273	0.192		
					0.017		0.016	0.017		
Republican Liberty Council—Civil Rights	0.602									
	0.086									

Interest Group	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Republican Liberty Council—Economic	0.217	0.607	0.439	0.596	0.580	0.720	0.716	0.699	0.808	
		0.008			0.019	0.074	0.036	0.031	0.012	
Service Employees International Union			−0.442	−0.479		−0.441	−0.437	−0.440	−0.485	−0.508
			0.004	0.009		0.030	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.004
Sierra Club			−0.431	−0.440	−0.469	−0.461	−0.458	−0.438	−0.483	
			0.007	0.006	0.004	0.008	0.005	0.006	0.004	
Taxpayers for Common Sense								0.704		
U.S. Border Control							0.554	0.599	0.553	
							0.009	0.007	0.008	
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	0.431	0.426	0.405	0.404	0.450	0.446	0.502	0.500	0.512	
	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.002	0.016	
U.S. Public Interest Research Group	−0.428	−0.478	−0.568	−0.521	−0.516	−0.495	−0.531	−0.436		−0.351
	0.011	0.004	0.005		0.004	0.004	0.004	0.008		0.018
USA for the International Criminal Court						−0.394				
						0.019				
United Auto Workers			−0.490	−0.493	−0.463	−0.534	−0.462	−0.475	−0.428	
			0.003	0.003	0.007	0.043	0.008	0.003	0.007	
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers	−0.514	−0.363	−0.461	−0.547	−0.566	−0.516	−0.534			
	0.013	0.051	0.012	0.007	0.006	0.004	0.006			

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