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Narrative identity, practical identity and ethical subjectivity

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Abstract. The narrative approach to identity has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character. I argue that the narrative model of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity. Importantly for ethical subjectivity, the narrative model gives a central and irreducible role to the first-person perspective. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of work by Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard's work on practical identity and normative ethics. I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity.

1. Introduction

Interest in the narrative approach to questions of identity and selfhood has been increasingly popular in recent years. It has attracted attention outside of Continental philosophy, coming on the heels of an analytical "rediscovery" of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body-schema and bodily self-awareness.[1] The narrative approach is one that is oriented to the need for meaning in the lives of embodied, practical beings existing within the constraints of a temporal world. It has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere[2] – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character.

In this essay I argue that the narrative conception of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity because only the narrative model preserves the first-person perspective, which is essential to an ethical perspective. I will argue that the superiority of the narrative model arises from its practical orientation and its presupposition of self as embodied consciousness. It is in virtue of this premise that the narrative view can articulate a form

of continuity in identity consistent with the importance a person attaches to being the same experiential subject over time, namely, a continuation of one's concrete first-person perspective.

The same condition that makes the narrative view a superior account of personal identity also grounds the normative force of our moral judgements. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman's work on narrative identity, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard's work on practical identity and normative ethics. Korsgaard argues that moral agency arises from the reflective structure of human consciousness. For Korsgaard, the normative force of morality is tied to the first-person perspective, to "the position of an agent on whom morality is making a difficult claim."[3] I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore, any theory of personal identity that is going to be able to accommodate an ethical perspective must similarly be at grips with human embodiment. Consequently, the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity.

In setting out my case I will draw largely on Paul Ricoeur's work in *Time and Narrative* and *Oneself as Another* and Marya Schechtman's recent critique of causal models of personal identity in her book *The Constitution of Selves*. Although Schechtman provides her own account of narrative identity, it is comparatively underdeveloped and draws upon unstated premises of a kind that have been spelt out in detail in Ricoeur's more mature body of work. Nevertheless, Schechtman's work is valuable because she points to the extent to which mainstream psychological continuity theories implicitly value the kind of continuity that can only be articulated through the resources of narrative. This is because psychological continuity theories are motivated by concerns that are irreducibly first-personal: self-interest, compensation, moral responsibility and survival. Furthermore, being practical, these concerns are expressive of embodied subjectivity. I hope to show that both narrative and psychological continuity theories share the same practical premises, but only the narrative model can acknowledge them, and therefore, that narrative identity captures the inherently ethical dimensions of our identities as subjects.

2. Narrative identity and the embodied subject

For Ricoeur, being a self, or more accurately, selfhood, is not concerned with the reign of the cogito, but with the *activity* constitutive of reflective

self-awareness over time. For this reason, his philosophy is as oriented to philosophy of action as to philosophy of the subject. Ricoeur's account of narrative identity takes a post-structuralist, discursive approach. However, unlike Foucault's essentially negative conception of the self as subjectified by discourses of power, Ricoeur emphasises the active and creative aspects of the self through the deployment of the symbolic resources of imaginative redescription – the processes of which he presented in an earlier work, *The Rule of Metaphor*.[4] There he draws upon the Kantian productive imagination to show how innovation in meaning – and advances in understanding – are produced through the capacity of imagination to mediate and synthesise heterogeneous aspects of discourse: the affective dimensions of sound, rhythm and feeling, with the conceptual dimensions of denotation and connotation. Similarly, Ricoeur places the synthetic powers of imagination at the heart of the narrative processes through which self-understanding and identity are articulated.

Although the first-person perspective of narrator is fundamental to the narrative view, the critical model that I will present argues that the position of first-person narrator is tied to a much more complex structure of embodied selfhood. As living self-reflective beings we are subject to the mediating effects of biology, society, culture and time. Our self-understandings are structured by a multi-perspectival complex that links the first-person perspective to second and third-person perspectives. Understanding who a person is, Ricoeur tells us, is a matter of

> understanding how the self can be at one and the same time a person of whom we speak and a subject who designates herself in the first-person while addressing a second person ... The difficulty will be ... understanding how the third-person is designated in discourse as someone who designated himself as a first-person.[5]

The narrative view comes down to the claim that human understanding takes a narrative form. As self-understanding beings, persons have narrative identities. The narrative model is not simply a first-person report of an individual's subjective experiences and point of view, it is a complex model that interweaves the first-person subjective perspective with the second-person perspective of the communicative situation of social existence, along with a generalisable or third-person perspective presupposed by a shared world of meanings with public standards of objectivity. The narrative model is geared to representing the complex temporal and conceptual continuity of a person's life, and has this capacity in virtue of synthetic strategies that allow the co-ordination of heterogeneous aspects of time and human experience.

These strategies are the same as those by which a textual narrative creates the unity and meaning of a narrative. It is therefore necessary to say a few words about the conception of human existence and embodiment upon which the narrative view is premised. This brief exposition will help elucidate the practical basis of identity central to the concerns of Ricoeur, Schechtman and Korsgaard.

The three perspectives I enumerated above arise from our corporeal condition. Ricoeur has acknowledged his indebtedness to the work of Gabriel Marcel, who, like his contemporary and friend, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, argued that we have reflective self-awareness because we are beings with bodies; we are not Cartesian egos but corporeal beings, co-extensive with the rest of existence.[6] On this view, consciousness is a function of our bodily powers of perception. We perceive, not with an abstract intellect, but with our sensory-motor capacities. This encompasses such things as a sense of one's muscular power, the position of one's limbs in space, and the auditory and motor apparatus of language. As the expression of a bodily individual, perceptual-based consciousness is always perspectival; the features of objects and experiences are articulated against the backdrop of the sensory-motor capacities of one's body.

This situation, however, engenders an ambiguity. Being bodily, the sensing consciousness is itself perceptible. This means that perception is a kind of double-sided act: one always co-perceives the world with a perception of one's own body. This makes consciousness a kind of "internal double" of the world.[7] Interposed between the world and one's consciousness of it, one's body presents one with a "fundamental predicament,"[8] a double nature where one is both active and passive in relation to oneself. In Marcel's words, my body is both something I *have* and something I *am*; I am a "had" which the "haver" *is*. My body is untransferable property; something that can never be fully disposed since its active existence is a condition for its own instrumentality or disposability (BH, 82). The sensing, sensate body is simultaneously the logical subject of experience as well as an object in the experiential world.

To be precise, rather than a *relation* between body and self, there is a mutual presupposition between oneself as subject (I) and oneself as object (body). This structures subjectivity with a series of dialectical oppositions: subjective/objective; self/other; active/passive; personal/impersonal; mental/physical. Irreducible to any single component in the dialectic, "I" is to be understood as a dynamic *bodily perspective.* Consequently, "I" and "body" are always in an inseparable tension with one other. "I" and "body" are not two distinct components of a single person, but a single, irreducibly ambiguous structure, a "my body", or, as Marcel and Merleau-Ponty have described it, a "body-subject." As I will show later, the metaphysical view of embodied

consciousness contrasts dramatically with the metaphysics of re-identification employed in psychological continuity theories.

The concept of embodied consciousness marks a practical conception of self and renders the first-person perspective irreducible for logical reasons. The ambiguity of embodiment provides the reflective structure of self-awareness, or, in Korsgaard's terminology, the reflective stance. It is because we are embodied consciousnesses that we can view ourselves from two different standpoints: as objects of theoretical understanding (from a third-person perspective) or as the originators of our actions (from a first-person perspective). As Korsgaard notes, it is the perspective of ourselves and not a theoretical fact that necessitates the thought of "I" as agent:

> This does not mean that our existence as agents is asserted as a further fact, or requires a separately existing entity that should be discernible from a theoretical point of view. It is rather that from the practical point of view our relationship to our actions and choices is essentially authorial: from it, we view them as *our own*.[9]

The mutual implication of "I" and body shifts the question of continuity in identity to a matter of continuity of bodily perspective. Such bodily continuity is a condition of possibility of raising the question of my identity: I can ask "who am I?" because I am not self-identical. "My body" is both the questioner and the question. On this view, the numerical identical of one's body takes a different logical form to that of the numerical identity of objects in general because one's body is not merely an object but constitutive of oneself. Recall that the perceptual basis of consciousness gives rise to a subjectivity in which "I" and body are mutually implied; they share a dialectical relationship. This necessitates that I regard my current experiential body (that is, my body regarded as object, from a third-person perspective) as the numerically identical body with which I experienced at an earlier time by the fact that it is logically presupposed in the coherence of my first-person perspective. At the same time, the bodily basis of consciousness ensures that the continuity in my first-person perspective implies the same, numerically identical body. Without reference to my numerically identical body, the perspective of which "I" am expressive could not itself be identified or re-identified at all, since it would not be anchored in anything perceptual. In short, my numerical identity is established in my reflective act of appropriating my body-subject *as* me, and in doing so, establishing myself as a coherent bodily perspective. If we were not constituted by this integrated but tensive bodily continuity the pain of losing a sense of one's body as one's own – as well as one's capacity to rebuild one's life as one's own – could not arise, as it does for victims of

torture and violence.[10] The continuity of my body as the same body can never be simply an objective fact of biology or physics. It involves an intrinsic and self-constituted continuity: what Ricoeur and others call self-constancy or *ipseity* (OAA: 18). The reference of "I" is always an embodied subject, and continuity in personal identity necessarily entails the dynamic processes of self-constancy. Because the dynamic structure of appropriated bodily continuity proper to reflective self-awareness arises from our existence as *practical* beings, our philosophical conceptions of personal identity must, likewise, be practical and acknowledge the constitutive role of the first-person perspective.

The double perspective of embodied subjectivity is further complicated by a second-person perspective, which arises from and expresses the social – that is, intersubjective – mediation of one's sense of self. The second person mediation is related to the developmental nature of embodied consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty has described so well, we each become self-consciously aware of ourselves *as* subjects only after a certain period of bodily development concomitant with a basic level of social integration (PP: 174–87). Born immature and enduring a long period of juvenile dependency, we learn about our own bodies and capacities through our involvement with the bodies of other people, for example, directly through the communication of touch and vocalisation in being cared for (or abused), and indirectly through representations, observation and instruction, as well as through the complex processes of cultural encoding of differently sexed, coloured, aged or abled bodies. Through the communicative processes of socialisation we come to acquire concepts, emotional schema and behavioural repertoires through which we develop our self-conceptions.[11] Those processes, in different ways under different circumstances, have enabling and disabling effects on the various capacities and attributes that go toward forming our identities.

A consequence of the developmental and intersubjective nature of selfhood is that our personal histories precede our explicit self-understandings and so, our lives need to be recounted in order to be understood. As an individual's past becomes known to her through the resources of her carers, associates and culture, that understanding forms an essential part of the context in which she understands her present situation and who she is. In other words, our identities are formed socially and communicatively. We each form our self-understandings in relation to a community of interlocutors, either directly through interpersonal dialogue or indirectly through the communicative networks implied in the meanings that constitute our languages. Understanding who a person is, then, requires coherence and continuity in the psychological, physical, social, cultural and historical aspects of a person's life. Furthermore, this must be a coherence that can be grasped and endorsed in the first-person. I come to understand myself (and likewise, others understand who I am) as the

subject of a certain life, for example, as someone who was born at a specific date and place into a certain family; who has lived at certain places in certain ways; who has particular physical and character traits, weakness and abilities, hopes and fears; who has acted and suffered in certain ways; and who enjoys or is denied certain social and political status. In other words, who a person is is the named subject of a practical and conceptual complex of first, second and third-person perspectives which structure and unify a life grasped as it is lived.

Because a coherent identity is an achievement it can also fail. It can fail for various reasons: physiological pathology (for example, brain or metabolic disease), psychological pathology (for example, the trauma of personal violence), or social pathology (for example, political or religious persecution), all of which interfere with the afflicted person's capacity to form an integrated and positive self-conception, or to integrate his self-conception with his situation such that he can form meaningful and accurate practical expectations and appropriate intentions to act. Here, the dangers of delusional mental states are well-known. Less widely understood are the disabling effects of violence, especially sexual violence, on the first-person perspective. Recent feminist scholarship on autonomy provides invaluable insights in this regard.[12]

3. The synthetic powers of narrative

Given this developmental, intersubjective, practical, conception of selfhood, what is required for personal identity – that is, the unity of a single life such that it could be a life of one's own – is a model that can mediate and synthesise the diverse and heterogeneous aspects of life. That model is narrative. Of particular significance is the ability of narrative to coordinate different orders of time. Drawing upon Heidegger's phenomenology, Ricoeur has argued that, as essentially practical beings, we are necessarily oriented to our lives in terms of what we are to become. This orientation gives self-consciousness a fundamentally temporal and primarily, future-oriented, character. In short, one's life exists across a stretch of cosmological time from birth to death, but that linear time-span is experienced in terms of an interplay of past-present-future orientations, or phenomenological time.[13]

Ricoeur departs from Heidegger by refuting the idea that ordinary time (cosmological time) is derivative of phenomenological time. Rather than being opposed or subordinated, Ricoeur argues that these two orders of time mutually presuppose one another (TN: 23–59). In cosmological time what is considered to be a mere succession of moments is experienced by us as moments that are ordered in terms of past and present. That is, the flow of

instants or succession of "nows" is actually ordered in accord with our existential orientations. Taken as mere instants, there is nothing in the concept of a "now" that differentiates any one "now" as either past or present. However, we cannot think of time as succession without thinking in terms of times that are past, present or future within that succession.

In phenomenological time, it is the successive ordering of past, present and future that gives away its indebtedness to cosmic time. The past is always *before* the present which is always *after* the past and *before* the future. The order of succession is invariable, and this order is not part of the concepts of past, present or future considered as existential orientations. Because we are beings who act, and in doing so, initiate beginnings, endings and turning points within the succession of cosmological time, our actions give objective time its phenomenological character: time "drags" or "flies"; we "make time" for doing things; and we sometimes speak of entering a new era in our lives. While consciousness may endow experience with its own temporal qualities, being bodily we are nevertheless mortal creatures whose existence is circumscribed by the passage of cosmic time.

If we want to speak of who a person is, or refer to the same person at different times, we need to employ a model which coordinates these two temporal orders. When we are concerned with identity over time we actually employ two distinct notions of sameness: *ipse* identity (the sameness effected through self-constancy, in the first-person) and *idem* identity (the sameness of an object from the third-person perspective) (OAA: 18). To describe someone as being the "same" is to bring into play and co-ordinate two temporal models, given from distinct but partial perspectives in a dialectical relation consonant with the mixed nature of embodied subjectivity.

Ricoeur describes the human experience of time as one in which cosmological and phenomenological time are interwoven or "sutured" together (TN3: 123). An example of such suturing is the role of the birth certificate. It anchors a child in both a socio-cultural history and a moment in objective time through the child's certification with a family name and a date and place of birth. Ricoeur argues that the narrative model provides the means for creating such a temporally continuous, conceptual whole by bringing the elements of life into relations of "emplotment," just as a story's plot configures its constitutive elements to create a unified entity. Ricoeur calls this capacity peculiar to narrative the "synthesis of the heterogenous."[14]

Ricoeur's narrative theory arises out of a philosophical methodology in the Kantian tradition. Like Kantian judgement, narrative employs an epistemological strategy that is not modelled on a passivity of vision, but on an imaginative *act*.[15] The orientation to action makes it appropriate for practical beings like ourselves. In setting out his case for the synthetic resources of

narrative Ricoeur takes as his paradigm Aristotle's definition of narrative as "the imitation of an action." The central feature of narrative is emplotment ("muthos"), the imaginative ordering of the diverse elements of human acting and suffering into a structure that has a beginning, a middle and an end. In virtue of the action being circumscribed in this way, the plot is able to forge a kind of causal continuity out of its chronological ordering (OOA: 142). It is this conversion that so well "imitates" the continuity demanded in a life.

Emplotment has this effect, argues Ricoeur, because narrative and action share a semantic network. Narrative emplotment organises relations between actors, character, objects, motives and circumstances, etc., in such a way as to provide answers to questions of "why?", "who?", "how?", "where?", etc. Furthermore, it is the ability to answer these questions that delimits the sphere of action. We understand what a narrative "imitates" (what it is about) when we grasp the network of relations that connect the diverse elements of the narrative into a unity in which each element has a *mutually explanatory relation* to others, and in which each element stands in a relation of causality to the "end", or point of the story. It is in the light of the ending that the necessity of the elements is confirmed. Likewise the ending is intelligible only as the culmination of the constitutive events. As part of a larger whole, each incident takes its place in the explanatory network that constitutes the narrative's response to "why?", "how?", "who?", etc. To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies under the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfilment in the conclusion of the story. The conclusion is not logically implied by some previous premise, rather, it gives the story an "end point", which in turn, furnishes the point of view from which the story can be perceived as forming a whole (TN1: 67). In this way, neither the time nor the order of emplotment is mere sequence, but a complex order of causality (TN1: 41).

Unlike fictional narratives, actions in "real life" do not have the clear limits of a beginning, middle or an end.[16] Beginning, middle and end are logical relations of a unity, and in the flow and openness of everyday life the starting and finishing points are not merely given, but, in some sense, have to be established. Adopting the Aristotelian convention, Ricoeur says that a "beginning is not the absence of some antecedent but the absence of necessity in the succession"; an end is just what follows something else "either as its necessary sequel or as its usual [and hence probable] sequel"; while the middle is defined purely by its position as intermediary in the succession (TN1: 38–9). These logical relations are relations of *internal* necessity and distinguish the unity and the time of action from the flow of objective time. In our lives we nominate (and frequently debate) the point of origin of a sequence of events that comprises a "happening" by reference to what followed it (and

our conception of the action as a whole), not by reference to the Big Bang, for example. Similarly we nominate end points by reference to what went before. The time of the plot is simultaneous with the construction of the necessity that connects the elements of the plot into a conceptual unity. In narrative understanding, order, causality, and intelligibility are given in one structure.

These elastic means of determining starting and finishing points are just one means by which different times are coordinated narratively. By connecting earlier and later events narrative sentences articulate no less than three temporal dimensions: that of the event being described; that of the earlier event in terms of which the latter is described, and the time of the narrator (TN1: 146). These multiple temporal dimensions are utilised, for example, when what is depicted as the "past" and the "present" within a plot does not necessarily correspond to the "before" and "after" of the narrative's linear, episodic structure. A narrative may begin with a culminating event, or it may devote long passages to events depicted as occurring within relatively short periods of time. Different times can also be represented through the use of literary devices such as flashbacks or setting scenes in disjointed manner. Dates and times can be severed from their denotative function; grammatical tenses can be changed, and changes in the tempo and duration of scenes create a temporality that is "lived" in the story that does not coincide with either the time of the world in which the narrative is read or performed, nor the time that the unfolding events are said to depict.[17] However, it is the chronological ordering of these temporalities that creates the "followability" of the narrative. Although literary, these devices deploy the same web of semantic relations and strategies that we employ in constructing the continuity and intelligibility of our own lives through memory, projection, and the recollection and reconstruction of events through the schematisation of feelings, images, beliefs, memories, etc. As a practical being whose existence is structured by action, the meaning and continuity of my life and identity – who I am – is structured through the textual resources of narrative.

Drawing analogies to the procedures of psychoanalysis and courts of law, Ricoeur emphasises the point that we are "caught up" in various plots and "entangled" in the stories of others. In being caught up in many stories (for example, of family, gender, ethnicity, class, profession, etc) the question arises concerning the "actual stories the subject can take up and hold as constitutive of his personal identity" (TN1: 74). To this problematic narrative responds by providing the strategies for coherence and continuity between the potential or inchoate story implied in the fields in which one acts and suffers, and the actual story one assumes responsibility for. In being a self (in being self-same) one acknowledges that one is the "who" implied in the stories recounted of one's life.

4. Character and the "who" of narrative

The narrative model yields understanding of identity in terms of character, which is itself articulated only in relation to the whole conceptual network of a practical semantics. Interestingly, Ricoeur notes that in the Aristotelian paradigm of plot we find a reversal of the relationship between agent and action that defined ethics in the *Nichomachean Ethics*. For Aristotle, in ethics there is a subordination of action to character: actions should follow from a virtuous character. In poetry, however, character is subordinated to actions such that we understand the characters of a poem in the light of their actions and sufferings, rather than judging their actions, ethically, in the light of their character.[18]

In a lived narrative however, the formative influence runs both ways between character and action. The "who?" of character can only be answered by the round-about route of "what?", "why?" and "how?"; that is, by mobilizing the whole semantic network of action. A person's actions are informed by her character and circumstances, while her character is informed by earlier actions and sufferings. The activity and passivity of character is simply an expression of the ambiguities of an embodied and socially mediated subjectivity, which play out in a dialectic of the self as both a "reader" and "writer" of one's life story. There is a relation of mutual presupposition between the agent of the act who appropriates the (life) stories as her own, and the character implied in the content of the stories so appropriated. In this way, narrative unites character and self-constancy into identity by synthesizing the dialectical oppositions laid down by embodiment (OAA: 166). The relative stability of character – its sameness over time – is an enacted stability; a mediation between the self-constancy of *ipseity* and the sameness of *idem* identity which anchors a person's first-person perspective in her bodily, social and historical conditions of existence. As the subject of a life, the question of a person's identity – "who?" – must ultimately be resolved in an act rather than by a fact: who I am is something that I must attest to. In doing so I recuperate the identity presupposed or implied in the narrative I endorse and, thus, effect the permanence in time of my identity.[19] To demonstrate, Schechtman cites the example of the character Charlotte Vale, played by Bette Davis in the movie *Now Voyager*. Through the manipulative skills of a doctor, Charlotte is transformed from being an overweight and unattractive "spinster aunt" to a slim and alluring woman. She takes a cruise to indulge her new sense of self and becomes involved with an unhappily married man, Jerry:

> As their intimacy grows she tries to help him understand her better by showing him a photograph of her sombre family. Pointing to the photo

> he asks, "Who is the fat lady with the heavy brows and all the hair?" . . . Charlotte/Bette Davis's reply: "I'm the fat lady . . ."
>
> She does not tell him she has a past self who was a fat lady . . . nor even that she *was* the fat lady . . . she *is* the fat lady with the hair and the brows.[20] (CS: 113).

5. Restraints on narrative identities

Clearly, we can err in our judgements about ourselves. Because our identities are practical, that is, complexes of actions, the narrative identity that a person claims for himself can be tested for objectivity in much the same way that claims are tested in juridical reasoning, that is, in terms of defeasibility. The idea that identity is defeasible is the idea that it

> is subject to termination or "*defeat*" in a number of different contingencies but remains intact if no such contingencies mature.[21]

Rather than a description of facts, a claim about action (and identity) is "an ascription of liability justified by the facts" (Hart 1949:190). Liability implies agency and, so, ascription concerns the connection between the descriptive facts and the first-person, agential perspective that together comprise the meaning of the action. For example, to claim "Arthur hit me" is to not only describe the movements of two bodies but to assert something about Arthur's agency. However, the ascription of an intention to hit me is not based on a *description* of his psychological state, but is an interpretation based on cultural conventions about what counts as a case of hitting. The accusation of hitting could be defeated, for example, by showing that Arthur struck me accidentally as a result of throwing out his arms to balance himself. As H. L. A. Hart argues, when actions are ascribed to an agent we do not employ rules of truth or falsity, rather,

> Our concept of action, like our concept of property is a social concept and logically dependent on accepted rules of conduct. (Hart, 1949: 189)

The connection between facts described in the third person and the first-personal, agential perspective is made by recourse to the social norms governing the possible meanings of the actions of the type under consideration. A claim to an identity might be defeated by showing that the connections between third-person descriptions and the first-person psychological states fail to meet the standard of what society currently understands by that identity; or it might fail to satisfy social criteria for meaning-making, which include linguistic, legal and other institutional practices. To illustrate, consider Glen:

Glen regards himself as a modest, virtuous and retiring fellow, and rarely allows an opportunity to pass for pointing out to his colleagues and neighbours the many and exotic ways in which he is virtuous, modest and retiring. In short, he is a performative contradiction. On normative criteria for the ascription of "modesty", "virtue" and "retiring", the descriptive facts about what he does do not square with the psychological states entailed by the meanings he ascribes to himself. Thus, his identity is subject to defeat. The social criteria of meaning vary from culture to culture, for example, many of the actions considered virtuous and honourable by Ancient Greeks would have been regarded as selfish and barbarous by medieval Christians, whose dogmatic piety strikes many moderns as cruel.

Two other constraints on the narrative self-constitution view emerge from its social mediation: what Schechtman describes as the reality constraint and the articulation constraint (CS: 114–120). The reality constraint requires that one's narrative cohere with reality. It cannot be premised upon factual errors of a major kind (for example, being totally wrong about the date, place and current events), because such errors disable the semantic web that links "who" to "where" and "when" etc. Because such errors disable the semantic network of action, they also disable the practical capacities that allow us to function as persons; we cannot realise our self-interests, or take responsibility for our actions, nor reap the rewards of our efforts. A reason to reject a person's self-narrative, then, is if it clearly lacks justificatory evidence and the person nevertheless claims to be justified by whatever evidence there is. For example, Susan claims to be the illegitimate daughter of a member of a royal family on the basis of her aunt's dying utterance. Further, she claims that powerful associates of that family have tampered with medical records and bribed people to deny all knowledge of her birth. There is no material evidence for the maternity claim and only an argument from ignorance to support it, and so, it violates the reality constraint.

The articulation restraint demands that one must be capable of a minimal level of self-articulation below which one becomes incapable of directing and taking responsibility for one's actions. The idea here is that when some aspect of one's activities is unable to be self-explicated, those aspects remain incomprehensible to oneself and are unable to be integrated into one's self-conception. In these circumstances, one's actions, desires and goals will remain determined by obscure motives, impulses or causes and so those actions will not be formally attributable to the person as her *own* actions.[22] These motives or causes may well be such that if one were to become reflectively aware of them, one would take steps to ensure that one did not act on them, as is the case, for example, for recovering addicts. By the same reasoning, one cannot retrospectively take credit for actions that one would have chosen *if* one

were to become reflectively aware of their meaning and value. On this view, for actions to be strictly one's own they must be reflectively self-ascribed or attested to, or at the very least, expressive of values that one has previously attested to and, as a result, acted in accordance with.

There is an important implication of this view of the embodied self and attestation. Attestation is what Korsgaard describes in terms of reflective endorsement. Through critical self-reflection one forms core beliefs and values – convictions – that provide reasons for one's actions. Convictions guide our actions and evaluations in a deliberative, moral sense. By guiding action, convictions make concrete one's moral perspective and express the moral dimension of personal identity. Correlatively, the absence of attestation and self-constancy – for example, in approaching personal identity from an impersonal perspective – marks the absence of an ethical subjectivity. When the first-personal perspective is removed at the foundational level of a theory of personal identity, nothing can re-introduce ethical life into such an identity. This is because such approaches employ a perspective proper to explanation not ethics. Ethics for practical beings such as ourselves is not a question of explaining "what makes people concerned about moral matters?", but a normative question of "how ought I *act*?". As Korsgaard points out:

> The difference is one of perspective. A theory that could explain why someone does the right thing – in a way that is adequate from a third-person perspective – could nevertheless fail to justify the action from the agent's own first-person perspective, and so, fail to support normative claims. (SN: 14)

To summarise, the narrative model provides a framework for understanding persons as beings whose existence is primarily practical, temporal and self-concerned. Narrative identity is not simply a first-person report but complex structure that interweaves first, second and third-person perspectives into a semantic whole with an implied subject who attests to her identity and in doing so constitutes it *as* her identity, and whose claims concerning identity are subject to certain constraints and can be tested by processes of validation. I will now proceed to argue that the plausibility of mainstream accounts of personal identity that employ impersonal, causal models of identity, rests upon an implicit reliance upon a first-personal form of continuity that I have been describing as narrative continuity.

6. Schechtman and narrative continuity

The integrative and interpretative character of embodied selfhood makes very complex and specific demands on a theory of personal identity. As

Locke noted, personal identity requires that one recognise and endorse the self that one is said to be. This can be seen in Locke's well-known definition of a person as "a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and *can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places*"[23] (my emphasis), and his later comment that "where-ever a man finds, what he calls *himself*, there I think another may say is the same *person*" (1979: 346). As Schechtman puts it, Locke was proposing a self-constitution view of personal identity by proposing that the continuity in my identity is partly constituted by my own reflective activity in recognising and appropriating my identity *as* my own (CS: 105). The emphasis that Locke placed on memory has come to dominate contemporary accounts of personal identity, to the neglect of the self-constituting aspects of his account. In *The Constitution of Selves*, Schechtman sets out to provide a corrective to this imbalance. She argues that current mainstream psychological continuity theories end up being incoherent because of their orientation to the question of identity in terms of the third-person perspective of re-identification. These accounts suffer from problems related to either the attempt to establish an identity relation, or the attempt to bypass it. In short, the candidate theories either insist upon numerical identity or they trade numerical identity for qualitative identity, but the cost is the same: the loss of a reason for caring about personal identity. Schechtman argues that what these theories fail to realise is that they are motivated by a prior value – namely a certain kind of continuity – and that their arguments eventually lead them to undermine that value, rendering them incoherent. She argues that the kind of continuity that matters to us, and which motivates psychological continuity theories, is the kind of continuity that can only be effected from the first-person perspective in narrative continuity.

For psychological continuity theories what it is that makes someone the same person at different times – that is, the metaphysical account of identity – is given in terms of causation: personal identity consists in causal connections between memories or "person-stages" or time-slices of a person's life. Schechtman argues, however, that once we examine the reasons underpinning the choice of the psychological approach to personal identity we will be forced to realise the inadequacy of the impersonal approach and subsequently recognise the self-constituting basis of continuity in identity. Schechtman argues that the reasons that make personal identity matter, and so, which motivate psychological continuity theories are four practical concerns: self-interest, moral responsibility, compensation (receiving benefits or losses in the future for one's actions in the present), and survival. All of the theorists that Schechtman discusses appeal to one or more of these concerns in assessing the success of their accounts.[24]

In claiming that what we take to be important about identity is the four concerns, Schechtman argues that it matters to me that I continue to be the same person because it matters to me that *my* interests are realised (for example, that it is my wishes that are respected in executing my will); that *I* am held morally responsible for *my* actions; that *I* go on the holiday I saved for; and finally, that *I* continue to exist (or cease to exist, as the case may be), not simply someone who is extremely similar to me. Because they each involve processes of reflective endorsement or attestation of my attributes, values, goals and interests, the four concerns express the intrinsic (that is, self-constituted or first-personal) continuity in my identity. My sense of what it is to be the same person at different times entails a continued sense of who I am, where "who" I am is constituted by the expression of, and continuity in, my concerns about self-interest, moral responsibility, compensation and survival. In short, it matters to me that I continue to exercise the same first-person-perspective; that I regard myself as the subject of the self-same life. Of course these are not our only concerns, but they express the fundamental contours of our practical existence; they are essential features of the field of action within which identity is articulated.

Although Schechtman believes that psychological continuity is the right way to think about personal identity, she argues that the accounts provided by psychological continuity theorists (her targets are Shoemaker, Perry, Parfit, and Lewis), have lost sight of the fact that they are motivated by practical concerns, and as a result they lead to absurdities. What they universally fail to realise is that our choices of explanatory candidates for personal identity are driven by our prior valuing of a self-constituted, first-personal continuity and not the other way around. She argues that, for example, the plausibility of the brain as the store of identity is earned at the cost of a proper analysis of the concept of personal identity:

> It is only because we have empirical reason to believe that it is the brain that causes the psychological continuity we value that we want to make it part of our definition of what constitutes personal identity. If we found that our assumptions about the brain's causal powers were mistaken, we would certainly no longer take it to be required for the continuation of the person. (CS: 23)

What an analysis of the concept of personal identity should turn up, according to Schechtman, is a description of the qualitative features of the kind of continuity we care about. To demonstrate, Schechtman asks the reader to consider three cases of continuity (ibid). In the first, I go to sleep and wake up as usual (the normal case). In the second I go to sleep and then I am smothered by a madman who brainwashes my neighbour to have exactly the psychological

states that I would have had, had I woken up as usual. This is the kind of continuity employed by many (but not all) psychological continuity theories that maintain causal connections between psychological states. In the third case, I go to sleep and wake up on a cloud with wings and a harp, with the psychological states I would have had, had I woken up as usual.

Schechtman argues that what directs our judgements concerning particular instances of survival and identity is our basic valuing of a certain kind of continuity, namely the kind consistent with the four concerns because they function as the rationale for *practical* identity. The third case, in contradistinction to the second, is like our ordinary sense of continuity because it is consistent with self-interested concern, moral responsibility, compensation and survival. The concept of my dying and going to heaven is consistent with my self-interested concern for my future (the things happen that I want to happen, namely I go to heaven); it is consistent with my being held morally responsible for my actions and for being compensated for my efforts and sacrifices on earth; and it is consistent with my survival, since it is me up there in heaven, not someone who happens to be psychologically continuous with me. There is a qualitative difference between the kinds of continuity found in the second and third scenarios, and that difference consists in the constitutive role of the first-person perspective.

In further defence of her view that the plausibility of psychological continuity theory turns on the unexamined premises of the four concerns, Schechtman argues that if we consciously detach the four concerns from these theories and embrace a purely causal approach to personal identity, the accounts will falter. The reason for this is that while ever the connections between memories, person-stages or time-slices in the history of a person are regarded causally, that is, as extrinsic relations (from a third-person perspective), the theory cannot generate a good reason to care about identity. This can been seen by a brief consideration of the problem of transitivity.

Since Locke, theorists of personal identity concerned with re-identification have been troubled by the problem of transitivity, as demonstrated in Reid's well-known objection to Locke.[25] This problem arises from insisting that re-identification necessitates numerical identity, which must take the logical form of an identity relation. The problem of maintaining numerical identity despite extremes of change has been addressed in psychological continuity theories by employing criteria of sufficiently over-lapping memories and psychological states. Numerical identity is said to hold just so long as each memory, person-stage or time-slice has sufficient of the psychological states characteristic of a preceding memory, person-stage or time-slice. Theorists differ in their views about the degree of overlap and the nature of the cause that connects them, but they all agree that the connectedness and continuity need to be such that

they secure what matters in survival, namely, one's sense of being the same person – that is, one's being the same experiential subject.

The problem of transitivity and the inventiveness of philosophical responses to it are starkly illustrated in Schechtman's discussion of the case of "branching identity". Branching identity concerns a hypothetical scenario where two people seem to be psychologically continuous with a single earlier person, typically through brain bisection and transplantation or through replication with some sort of science-fiction technology. For example, if my brain is bisected and placed in two different bodies (assuming that my mental states are duplicated) I would be psychologically continuous with two distinct persons. To illustrate:



Here, A is identical with B and C, but C and B are different from each other. Psychological continuity theorists solve the transitivity problem (that is, the problem that B and C do not share an identity relation with each other, despite both sharing it with A), by insisting that identity must be non-branching, that is, by insisting that one cannot be psychologically continuous with a person if one is psychologically continuous with someone else. In this case, A would not be the same person as either B or C because A has branching identity, while neither B nor C do. The problem with such a solution is that now identity depends upon the existence of a third party. In this case, if C did not exist, A and B would be the same person; if B did not exist A and C would be the same person.

The absurdity of this can be demonstrated when we consider the four concerns (CS: 30). Take the case of survival. During brain bifurcation surgery my brain is divided in two and placed in two bodies. If the operation is a failure and only one half of my brain takes in a new body, then I survive. However, if the operation is a success and both halves take, then I do not survive, even though the only additional fact is the mere existence of another functioning brain.

Next consider moral responsibility: if I believed that the recipient of my left brain was continuous with me, and so, morally responsible for my actions and deserving of my rewards, it is hard to see why that same person should

cease to be responsible and deserving simply by the appearance of someone else (namely the person with my right brain). Perhaps more pointedly, in the case of self-interested concern, Schechtman notes that:

> if I fear for the pain felt by the left brain recipient as I fear for my own, it seems grossly implausible that the existence of the right brain recipient could mitigate the pain felt by the left brained person, so there seems no good reason that knowledge of a second transplant should mitigate my fear (CS: 33).

In other words, in the case of branching identity, the existence of a person who, on the standard account, would be identical to me, has no effect upon anything that matters to me about identity: self-interest, moral responsibility, compensation or survival.

Shoemaker, at least, acknowledges that the non-branching clause may lead a person's identity to rely upon something it should not. His response is to direct our attention to the careful use of rigid and non-rigid designators to refer to the pre-fission and post-fission persons. Shoemaker urges that, in this way, it is possible to logically maintain that

> the person with the left half of Brown's brain might pick out a different person in the case where both halves of Brown's brain are transplanted than it does in the case where only one is (CS: 35).

While Shoemaker's response retains the necessity of identity, it is at the cost of the importance of identity. As Schechtman points out, even though he gives us designators for different individuals, there are no differences in the characteristics of these individuals. This makes it impossible to have a reason for A to prefer either B or C. In short, Shoemaker's response fails to capture what matters to us about our survival.

An alternative way around the transitivity problem is provided by Lewis's four-dimensionalist account of personal identity. Rather than an identity relation between memory-stages or time-slices he conceives of identity in terms of a unity relation within a single perduring person. On this view, persons do not exist at points in time, they exist over time. Only person time-slices exist at points in time, and a person consists in the unity of all her time-slices. In this way, person time-slices are non-identical, but a person is self-identical across time. Personal identity, on this view, consists in

> the question of what relation a person at time-slice at t_2 needs to bear to a person time-slice at t_1 if they are to be time-slices of the same person, and this relation will not be identity (CS: 38).

This overcomes the problem of transitivity by providing a framework in which it is possible to conceive of B and C as distinct persons because A and B share a different unity relation to that shared by A and C. However, this manoeuvre leads to the problem of "multiple occupancy." If A-B is one person and A-C is another, from the post-fission perspective there must be two persons in A's body. To combat this implausibility Lewis qualifies the relation between such persons by introducing tensed statements to count persons (CS: 40). The problem that this leads to however, is that we are required to either adjust our ordinary sense of who we deal with in the world such that we come to regard persons as merely person-parts, or we count persons at times. Clearly the latter is unacceptable to the four-dimensionalist because it would reintroduce the problem of transitivity, but the former is unacceptable to everybody. We could, alternatively, endorse the multiple occupancy view. Either way, however, we have lost the capacity to express what matters about personal identity, namely, one's continued existence as the same experiential subject.

The more radical alternative then, is to do away with numerical identity altogether. This is Parfit's approach. He argues that it is qualitative identity that matters to survival rather than numerical.[26] Qualitative identity is achieved through strong connectedness of overlapping psychological states. Unlike Shoemaker, for example, who argues that identity requires that psychological states be caused in the right way (namely, by one having actually experienced the events of which one has a memory), Parfit will accept any cause. While this approach certainly avoids the abovementioned pitfalls of transitivity, it succumbs to incoherence because of its explicitly impersonal and extrinsic approach to psychological connectedness.

As I noted earlier, Schechtman argues that a causal approach to personal identity undermines the explanatory power of psychological continuity theories because once the connections between persons' "parts" and temporal stages are regarded from a third-person perspective (that is, as extrinsically related), the theory cannot generate reasons for someone to care more about being connected to one future person than any another, regardless of how similar a person is to oneself. This is because causal continuity is different in kind from the self-constancy that underpins the continuity of the four concerns.

Failing to realise this difference leads psychological continuity theorists to collapse "being me" into "being someone like me" (CS: 53). If my survival consists in the on-going existence of attributes exemplified in me, rather than in me being the numerically identical subject of my experiences, then it is not at all clear why I should, for example, dread what will happen to a future person in whom those attributes are exemplified just as I would for myself. After all, I will not feel her pain – I cannot even anticipate her pain since I can only anticipate my own. Similarly, in this situation, the notions of moral

responsibility and compensation break down: it only makes sense to punish or reward me for my efforts, not someone else who happens to be more like me than anyone else. As Schechtman points out, it is one thing to "make Sally work after school so that she can go to college . . . making her twin sister work after school so that Sally can go to college is quite another." (CS: 52). It was precisely this kind of threat to moral responsibility that concerned Locke.[27]

Even though Shoemaker comes closer than most by insisting that identity is caused by actual experience, and in that sense, is intrinsically connected, he fails to realise that causal connectedness is insufficient to provide the continuity and numerical identity that underpins first-person experience. While Shoemaker is to be commended for his generally non-reductionist approach, he fails to recognise the difference in kinds of continuity and so his approach threatens to reduce identity to continuity of the same brain.

While ever a person is considered to be only extrinsically related to another person – whether or not that person is identical or psychologically continuous with her – these persons cannot have reason to care more for each other than they would for any other person who is very similar to them. However, the reverse is true. We are concerned about ourselves in ways that are different from the ways in which we are concerned about others, namely through the four concerns. This is no arbitrary psychological quirk; it is an expression of the fact that as persons we are bodily perspectives. It is an expression of the fact that one's first-person perspective and one's body are mutually constitutive. The four concerns express precisely the kind of continuity and numerical identity that I have described in terms of self-constancy: the mutual implication of self and body that is irreducible to a third-person perspective.

To be consistent with the importance we place on personal identity we are required to accept the principle that only intrinsically self-constituted relations between features of two persons can determine that they are the same person (CS: 34). Those intrinsic relations express a peculiar logical form, namely, self-constancy, which is expressive of our practical being. The fundamental importance of the four concerns requires that any account of personal identity make room for self-constituting activity. The only available model that can articulate this kind of continuity is the narrative model. I now want to connect narrative identity to ethics through a brief consideration of normative ethics and autonomy.

7. Narrative identity, practical identity and moral life

The importance of practical identity to moral life is argued cogently in Korsgaard's endorsement account of autonomy, which emphasises the role of

self-reflection in giving normative weight to our moral reasons. As Mackenzie explains:

> Self-consciousness is the reflective capacity to call into question our beliefs, desires and motives; it is the reflective capacity to ask ourselves whether these constitute reasons for us. Reasons are impulses, perceptions and desires that have withstood reflective scrutiny. The capacity for reflection, then, is the source of normativity; it gives us a choice about what we should believe, what we should decide, how we should act.[28]

When we reflect upon our situations and look for reasons to guide our actions, we appeal to those beliefs, feelings and ideas that have the capacity to move or motivate us. The candidates for reasons for acting are the beliefs, feelings and ideas that have a practical significance for us. Such reasons, argues Korsgaard, are those that emerge directly from our self-conceptions, our practical identities. Practical identity

> is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking . . . Practical identity is a complex matter . . . You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, a member of a certain profession, someone's lover or friend, and so on (SN: 101).

That description is a description of oneself as the subject of a complex personal, social, political life. Because our identities are complex, our reasons for acting can also be complex. However, for a reason to have normative weight, that is, to give rise to an obligation that directs one's actions in a specified way, that reason must involve the mobilisation, coordination and direction of a whole network of perceptions, beliefs, thoughts and feelings; it must mobilise a semantic web of action. In other words, the normative force of reasons arises from a narrative conception of identity. By appeal to a narrative identity we can identify the relationships, roles and capacities that define and give direction to our lives.

It is in this sense that the concept and moral value of autonomy is to be understood. For Korsgaard, a person's will functions as the source of "moral law" (the duties and obligations that direct one's actions), to the extent that it expresses a set of core attributes upon which one has critically reflected and endorsed. Being attested to, these attributes comprise a person's identity, and a person's identity becomes the source of her morality. When a person acts against or disavows her reflectively endorsed reasons, she prompts the question of "who" she is by way of questions "what?" and "why?" she so

acted. In this way, narrative identity and moral life go hand in glove in a reflective conception of personhood.

The capacity to form reasons for one's actions and to act in accordance with those reasons turns on critical self-reflection. This requires a minimal level of physical, psychological and social coherence of the type proposed by narrative identity. It is not enough that one's psychological states are caused in one way or another, or even that they have a high degree of overlap (although this is obviously very important). What matters is that the person is able to take her psychological states – beliefs, feelings and convictions – as her own and endorse them as the source of the obligations she feels compelled to act in accordance with. That is, she has to take up a position vis-à-vis herself (in Lockean terminology, self-constitute) in order to be an agent. As Diana Meyers has argued, personal autonomy requires a self that has both constancy and variability because the circumstances in which we are required to act can vary a great deal (SS: 71). Persons who exhibit psychological compartmentalisation or disjointed personalities, for example, are limited to "narrow situation-specific control." Lacking global self-knowledge, their actions tend to be directed by circumstances rather than by a coherent sense of self. In terms strikingly similar to the narrative self, Meyer's describes the autonomous self as structured by "characterological strands" which express sets of personal qualities and which can combine in a variety of ways in response to different circumstances:

> in an integrated personality . . . characterological strands unite the disparate elements of the true self. These characterological strands ground the reasons that govern the autonomous individual's conduct (SS: 70).

Korsgaard has argued that ethical life arises from the first-person perspective because the normative force of our reasons is tied to "the position of an agent on whom morality is making a difficult claim" (SN: 14). This means that morality is essentially a matter of practical reasoning, and that the grounds from which we reason, or deliberate are constituted, at least in part, by our personal identities. The idea that practical identity underpins the normative authority of reasons turns on the idea of constitutive ends. Unless the reasons that direct our actions are grounded in core attributes of ourselves which we value – that is, unless our ends (our goods) are embodied in who we each are – our actions and beliefs will be arbitrary and pointless. However, constitutive ends need not be deterministic. As Meyers notes, through critical self-reflection, self-knowledge, and self-direction, one can emphasise an existing trait or replace it. The latter is achieved by placing oneself in situations that promote the acquisition of the desired trait.[29] However, this can only

occur through the exercise of the first-person perspective: by taking one's traits as reasons for acting. In this way moral life is shaped by both social experiences and personal direction – in narrative terminology, by the coordination of first, second and third-person perspectives through self-constancy. The model that we need in order to make sense of ourselves as moral beings is practical identity of a kind underpinned by narrative continuity, that is, a narrative identity.

In conclusion, I have argued that the kind of continuity necessitated by practical identity and ethical subjectivity is not provided by the standard causal models of psychological continuity, but rather, is presupposed by them. The superiority of the narrative model arises from its presupposition of self as embodied consciousness. It is in virtue of this premise that the narrative view can articulate a form of continuity consistent with the importance of identity, namely, the continuation of one's concrete first-person perspective. Finally, it is from the first-person perspective that one's moral perspective emerges because the normative force of one's reasons for acting are tied to the first-personal perspective of agent.

Notes

1. See for example, J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan (eds), *The Body and the Self* (Cambridge, MA and London: Bradford/MIT Press, 1998).
2. For example, the somewhat confused discussion by Samantha Vice in "Literature and the Narrative Self" in *Philosophy* 78, 2003.
3. See Korsgaard's discussion of the criteria of explanatory and normative adequacy in explanation in Christine Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996: 14–16; hereafter SN.
4. Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor, multidisciplinary studies in the creation of meaning in language*, tr. Robert Czerny and Kathleen McLaughlin (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).
5. Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself As Another*, tr. Kathleen Blamey, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992): 34–5; hereafter OAA.
6. Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery Of Being: 1. Reflection and Mystery* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1960): 97: "The self that owns things can never, even in thought, be reduced to a completely dematerialized ego. It seems to me impossible even to conceive how a dematerialized ego could have any claim, or any care, to possess anything; but the two notions of claiming and caring are implied, of course, in every case of something's being possessed."
7. See Merleau-Ponty's extended description in *Phenomenology of Perception*, tr. Colin Smith (London and New Jersey: Routledge, 1992): 236–269; hereafter PP.
8. Marcel, *Being and Having, an Existentialist Diary* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965): 101; hereafter BH.
9. Christine Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 378.

10. A powerful example of the integrative and nature of selfhood is presented in Susan Brison's essay "Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory and Personal Identity", in *Feminists Rethink the Self*, ed D.T. Meyers, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).
11. For an extremely insightful account of the interplay of these aspects of personal and social life, see Catriona Mackenzie, "Critical Reflection, Self-knowledge, and the Emotions" in *Philosophical Explorations* 5: 3, October 2002.
12. For example, Susan Brison, *Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) and Meyers (ed) (1997).
13. See Paul Ricoeur *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 3, tr. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,1988), hereafter TN3; See also Kim Atkins, "Ricoeur's 'Human Time' as a response to the Problem of Closure in Heideggerian Temporality" in *Philosophy Today*, Summer 2000.
14. Paul Ricoeur *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1, tr. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984): 66; hereafter TN1.
15. Ricoeur distinguishes his theory of narrative from Alisdair MacIntyre's. MacIntyre, while concerned with the stories that we tell from the midst of everyday life, does not concern himself with the connection between literary fictions and lived narratives. For MacIntyre, Ricoeur says, the problems related to the power of fiction to refigure life do not arise. But then neither does the opportunity to realize the wealth of literary strategies for understanding the lived world. See OAA: 158–160.
16. This view is contested by David Carr in *Time, Narrative and History* (Bloomington, ILL: Indiana University Press, 1991), who mistakenly argues that Ricoeur's appeal to literary models commits Ricoeur to the position that narrative structure must be imposed on experience. The major difference between the two philosophers lies in their differing conceptions of the unity of experience. Carr remains within the bounds of Husserlian phenomenology, seemingly unaware of the presuppositions which Ricoeur has painstakingly identified. The overdetermination of action within Carr 's account radically undermines any critical role imagination may play in determining meaning. See David Pellauer, "Limning The Liminal: Carr and Ricoeur on Time and Narrative", in *Philosophy Today*, Spring, 1991.
17. Ricoeur devotes a large part of *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 2, tr. Kathleen Mclaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994); hereafter TN2, to demonstrating the various ways in which time can be represented, directly and indirectly, through the use of poetic devices. His analyses of *Mrs Dalloway*, *The Magic Mountain* and *Remembrance of Things Past* centre on the diverse variations of time produced by the interplay of a three tiered structure of time: the time of narrating; the narrated time; and the fictive experience of time produced through "the conjunction/disjunction of the time it takes to narrate and narrated time" (TN2: 77).
18. By so giving action priority over character, Aristotle establishes the mimetic status of action. It is in ethics . . . that the subject precedes the action in the order of ethical qualities. In poetics, the composition of the action by the poet governs the ethical qualities of the characters. The subordination of character to action . . . seals the equivalence of "representation of action" and "organization of events." TN1: 37.
19. OAA: 107. See also Jean Greisch, "Testimony and Attestation" in *Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action*, ed. Richard Kearney (London: Sage Publications, 1996).
20. Marya Schechtman, *The Constitution of Selves* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); hereafter CS.
21. H.L.A. Hart, "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, No. 49 (1949): 175.

22. For a developed account of this view of personal agency and autonomy see Diana Meyers, *Self, Society and Personal Choice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); hereafter SS.
23. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human*, ed. P. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979): 355.
24. Lewis, Shoemaker and Perry all emphasize the value of numerical identity precisely so that persons can be held responsible for their actions, legitimately enjoy the fruits of their labours, and survive. Parfit is not concerned with numerical identity but nevertheless affirms the value of survival when he argues that that replication is "as good as ordinary survival." See Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984): 201.
25. Reid cited in CS: 27: "suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking a standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging." As a result, the general is the same person as the soldier, but not as the boy, although the soldier and the boy are the same person.
26. Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
27. See Raymond Martin, "Locke's Psychology of Personal Identity" the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*: Vol. 38 (1), 2000.
28. Catriona Mackenzie, "Relational Autonomy and Practical Identity," (unpublished), presented to the School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, 2003: 8–9.
29. Meyers gives the following example: "having enrolled in nursing school with the aim of becoming a surgical nurse, Ellen realises that she is more squeamish ... than most ... Socialization into femininity with the premium this gender norm places on fragility and helplessness has imparted this quality to her, and so her squeamishness is constitutive in Sandel's sense of the term. Still, in order to achieve her goal, Ellen might choose to overcome her sqeamishness by witnessing additional operations. If her desensitisation program is successful ... Ellen will have eradicated a constitutive quality, and she will have replaced one constitutive quality with a chosen yet equally constitutive one." (SS: 95).