

## A Conception of Evil

PAUL FORMOSA

*School of HPRC, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia;*  
*e-mail: p.formosa@uq.edu.au*

### 1. Introduction

The language of evil has recently made a return to our moral and political discourses.<sup>1</sup> This raises the analytic question of what exactly evil is. There are three important senses of the term “evil.” First, there is the axiological sense, where “evil” and “bad” are effectively synonymous. This is the sense in which evil can cover “everything adverse in human lives” from “wars and massacres” to “drought and plague.”<sup>2</sup> It is in this sense that evil takes on its familiar role as the opposite or lack of good. Second, there is the trivial moral sense, where “evil” and “wrong” are effectively synonymous. In this sense, we can speak of both white lies and genocide as evil. Third, “evil” is used in a more restricted sense when we say things like: “What Hitler did was not merely wrong, it was evil.” Here “evil” refers to those acts of moral agents that go significantly beyond the pale of mere wrongdoing. Failing to keep a promise or telling a white lie may be morally wrong, but unlike genocide or sadistic torture, it is not evil. In this sense the term “evil”, or “EVIL” as Marcus Singer calls it, has no direct moral equivalents.<sup>3</sup> Moral evil, in this restricted sense, is never trivial. It is a term that carries with it an enormous moral gravity and expresses our very strongest moral condemnations. It is the question of how we are to make sense of the specific moral difference between “evil” and “mere wrongdoing” that will be our concern. In order to specify this difference we will defend a specific conception of what acts and which persons should count as evil.

### 2. Preliminaries to a Theory of Evil

While all moral evils are, at least, morally wrong, not all moral wrongs are evil. A clear example is the Holocaust. Such an event was wrong, but it was more than just wrong, it was evil. In contrast, failing to keep a

promise may be wrong but not evil. As such, evil is clearly a “wrong-intensifier,” though this could mean two things.<sup>4</sup> It could mean that there is a quantitative threshold that needs to be met, so that an evil action is just a very wrong action. It could also mean that there is a qualitative difference, so that an evil action is a wrong one intensified by the presence of some additional property or properties. These additional evil-making properties would pick out what it is about evil that horrifies us and makes us wish to condemn it in the very strongest possible moral terms. There are some philosophers who Luke Russell calls “evil skeptics,” who may deny that there is any substantive difference between evil and wrong.<sup>5</sup> The best response to this challenge is to argue that in ordinary language we do make such a substantive distinction and to present and defend a useful and coherent conception of evil.

It has been argued by Eve Garrard, Daniel Haybron and Hillel Steiner that there is a qualitative difference between evil and wrong, although Russell has recently challenged this claim.<sup>6</sup> The qualitative difference claim is usually defended by drawing on the intuition that to call what Hitler did very wrong is never the same as calling it evil. However, the general claim that there is a qualitative difference between evil and wrong is unconvincing for two reasons. First, it cannot work as a general claim because the particulars of one’s theories of wrong and evil are required to decide the matter. For example, if a person holds the position that it is harmful consequences alone that make an act evil, and he also holds the position that it is harmful consequences alone that make an act wrong, then he would not endorse the qualitative difference position. Second, it might be the case that while we can, technically, substitute “very, wrong” for “evil,” as a matter of taste and practice, our intuition is that we should never do this as it is disrespectful to the victims of evil. Perhaps it is this intuition that underlies the above argument and, if so, the qualitative difference position does not follow from it. This does not mean that the qualitative difference position is wrong, but only that we should not assume that there is, or stipulate that there must be, a qualitative difference between evil and wrong.

A theory of evil provides, in terms made familiar by John Rawls, a conceptualization of the concept of moral evil. The concept defines the problem; the conceptualization gives the solution.<sup>7</sup> Thus a theory of evil is a solution to the problem of which acts are so morally abhorrent that they go significantly, qualitatively or quantitatively, beyond the pale of mere moral wrongness. Such a task raises numerous meta-ethical considerations. The standard argumentative strategy to defend theories of evil is to give various examples of supposedly evil acts, and use them to claim that a particular theory of evil, usually one’s own, matches our common

intuitions or everyday language use better than competing theories.<sup>8</sup> The problem with this approach is that the intuitions or everyday language use that is being relied upon is often too malleable, varied, and vague to provide the sort of fine-grained distinctions that are required. Above and beyond this issue lies the further problem of determining how much weight we are to give to intuitions and everyday language use in relation to deciding on a moral theory, and how much and on what grounds our intuitions and language use should be open to revision on the basis of a moral theory.<sup>9</sup> Another problem arises if we are to ask whose intuitions we are to appeal to. People from different historical periods and from different cultural groups may not share our moral intuitions about evil. In that case, whose intuitions are right? Given these problems, it is reasonable to claim that while intuitive plausibility should remain an important check on any theory of evil, this alone cannot definitively decide the issue.

Clearly then, other conditions are required to supplement this approach. Both Adam Morton and Russell, for example, take up this task by outlining extra meta-level constraints that must be met by any theory of evil.<sup>10</sup> Russell, for example, suggests that a theory of evil should, among other things, be useful, although he fails to unpack fully what this might imply. A theory of evil is useful if it allows us to conceptually address the main pragmatic concerns that are raised by evil. A useful theory of evil should, among other things, provide a set of conceptual tools to help identify evil when it does occur, help to prevent or minimize future evils from occurring, and help us to respond in ethically and politically appropriate ways to the aftermath of evil. However, such a broad condition is one that any theory of evil should meet. Therefore, it is likely to be of little practical use in actually differentiating between competing theories of evil that are all useful, but which also face certain intuitive difficulties.

### **3. Arguments for a Combination Theory of Evil**

While there are many things that we might say are evil, such as acts, persons, principles, and institutions, most theories of evil would have us define evil acts or deeds as primary. We will follow this common approach, given that it is at least intuitively plausible that we need to be able to identify evil acts, and thus evildoers, before we can identify evil persons.

There are at least, and arguably only, four different general approaches or ways to conceive of evil acts. On a victim approach it is something about the consequences for the victims of the wrongdoing, in

particular the amount of harm inflicted upon them, that makes an act not just wrong, but evil. On a perpetrator approach it is something about the perpetrators of a wrongdoing, such as their motive or intention, that makes an act not just wrong, but evil. On a bystander approach it is something about us as bystanders or evaluators of an act, such as our inability to comprehend why the act was done or our feeling of utter horror or disgust when contemplating the act, that makes an act not just wrong, but evil. On a combination approach, it is some combination of the factors picked out by victim, perpetrator and bystander approaches, that make an act not just wrong, but evil.

Alternatively, one might wish to shy away from an explicit conception of evil without shying away from thinking about evil, as Susan Nieman and Richard Bernstein attempt to do.<sup>11</sup> While this is certainly a reasonable approach to take, it is an approach that lacks a certain amount of clarity. It lacks clarity because a specific conception of evil, however broad, is implicitly at work, such as that genocide but not lying counts as evil, even if the conception remains, perhaps for good reasons, somewhat vague. For the sake of clarity, if nothing else, we should at least try to make our implicit assumptions about what evil is, explicit in the form of a conception of evil.

However, before proceeding, we shall need to defend the claim that there are many roots of evil, and not a single root.<sup>12</sup> Motives such as envy, malice, greed, hatred, boredom, honor, pride, revenge, ambition, thoughtlessness, a lack of self-esteem, ideology, and faith can all, at times, be roots of evil. Motives such as honor or boredom rarely lead to evil, although sometimes they do, while hatred and malice often lead to evil, although sometimes they do not. Some perpetrators of evil may think that they are doing their duty or what is right, when in fact they do evil, whereas others may revel in the fact that their acts are evil, and may even perform such acts solely for the reason that they are evil. People are motivated to perform acts that are evil for all sorts of reasons. As such, there are many roots of evil. Philosophers who think that there is a single root of all evil, be it money, pride or a lack of self-esteem, are simply suffering from the effects of a poverty of examples.

There are a number of victim approaches to conceiving of evil. Guy Adams and Danny Balfour conceive of an evil act as one in which “humans inflict pain and suffering on other human beings.”<sup>13</sup> This conception is clearly insufficient. Doctors often inflict pain and suffering on others in the course of their practice, but we do not call this evil. Fred E. Katz conceives of evil as “behaviors that deprive innocent people of their humanity, from small scale assaults on a person’s dignity to outright murder.”<sup>14</sup> However, this conception is too broad as it includes, which

the author takes as one of its merits, everything from the white lie to murder. But this fails to clearly differentiate wrong from evil, and so fails to invest the term “evil” with the moral gravity that is required of it. For Claudia Card, “an evil is a reasonably foreseeable harm (that need not be highly probable) that falls within a certain range of magnitude and importance and is brought about, seriously risked, sustained, aggravated, or tolerated by culpable wrongdoing.”<sup>15</sup>

Victim approaches, such as Card’s, are very appealing due both to their theoretical simplicity and their moral clarity. These two virtues are both exemplified in the isolation of the suffering endured by victims, rather than the perpetrator’s psychology, as what makes an evil act evil. The psychological thinness of victim approaches allows them to elegantly account for the fact that evil has many different roots and ensure that wrongs that cause very minor harms, no matter how maliciously motivated, are not thought of as evil. But, as in many a tragedy, it is the very theoretical strengths of victim approaches that ultimately lead to their downfall.

To see why, let us consider the following example. When Dave, who normally never drinks, hears of the sudden death of his closest friend, he drives to a nearby bar and gets grossly intoxicated. Dave then decides to drive home from the bar. While on the way home his erratic driving, brought on by his intoxication, causes another car to swerve and crash into a tree, killing the family of five inside. On realizing the next day what he has done, Dave is overcome by guilt, shame, and remorse. Clearly, Dave acted culpably wrongly by driving home while intoxicated, and his actions were immensely harmful, as they brought about the deaths of five people, including three children. But is Dave’s act evil? Many of us would find it intuitively plausible to think that what Dave did was very wrong, but not evil.

The general problem with victim approaches is that they must require that any culpably wrongful act that inflicts much harm is necessarily evil, because no other factors, besides the amount of harm, are at all relevant to a judgment of evil. But the example of Dave exposes the shortcomings of this approach, since surely, in at least this case, the perpetrator’s situation, psychology, motive, and subsequent response are at least relevant to our judgment about whether or not his actions are evil. This being so, it follows that it is not only the amount of harm that is relevant to judging an act to be evil. Therefore victim approaches to conceiving of evil are inadequate.

Perhaps, then, perpetrator approaches will prove to be more adequate. According to David Pocock, truly evil actions are “not explicable by reference to ‘normal’ motives such as greed or lust.”<sup>16</sup> Hannah Arendt, in

early work, held the view that perpetrators of, at least, radical evil act from incomprehensible motives.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, Garrard argues that the evildoer is one for whom the considerations that tell against committing an evil act are silenced. The evildoer has an inability to “hear the victim’s screams as significant.”<sup>18</sup> Similarly, Mary Midgley claims that evildoers are not motivated by the presence of evil motives, but by the absence of other motives that ought to kick-in to stop the evildoing.<sup>19</sup> Morton argues that a person’s act is evil when “it results from a strategy or learned procedure which allows that person’s deliberations over the choice of actions not to be inhibited by barriers against considering harm or humiliating others that ought to have been in place.”<sup>20</sup>

These different perpetrator approaches can be divided into two broad groups. On the one hand, there are theoreticians, such as Pocock and Arendt, who claim that it is the presence of some sort of incomprehensible, abnormal, or diabolical motive in the evildoer that differentiates him from a wrongdoer. On the other hand, there are theoreticians, such as Garrard, Midgley, and Morton, who claim that it is the non-presence or non-effectiveness of some normal motive, reason, or barrier in the evildoer that differentiates him from a wrongdoer.

The first group of perpetrator accounts are inadequate when it comes to accounting for cases where evil is perpetrated from relatively normal and comprehensible motives. For example, greed is an inclination that we have all felt at one time or another. But sometimes acting from greed can be evil. If a person’s greed leads the person to steal a small sum of money from a very rich man, then that act is presumably wrong, though surely not evil. However, if a person’s greed leads the person to sadistically torture hundreds of children in order to extract ransom money from their terrified parents, then the act is presumably not just wrong, but evil. Similar sorts of problems arise when we examine what we might call, to slightly modify Arendt’s phrase, cases of banal evil. A case of banal evil is one where the perpetrator of an evil act is thoughtlessly motivated by very banal and everyday human motives, such as a desire to fit in and do a good job. However, in certain situations, as Arendt illustrates in her later work through the example of Adolf Eichmann, the most banal human motives combined with a certain amount of thoughtlessness, can lead to even the most radically evil acts.

The second group of perpetrator accounts are inadequate when it comes to handling cases where evil is perpetrated from particularly sadistic motives, or where evil is diabolically perpetrated for evil’s sake. Let us consider the example of Sade, the sadistic torturer, who far from failing to hear his victim’s screams as significant, gains a certain erotic pleasure precisely from extracting and hearing those screams. While Sade

is subject to all the normal reasons, motives and barriers that speak against torturing others, this does not stop him doing so because part of the erotic thrill he seeks arises from consciously violating such “sacred” boundaries.<sup>21</sup> If the pursuit of such sadistic thrills leads Sade to torture hundreds of people for the mere pleasure of it, presumably we would judge his acts to be evil, even though there was no silencing on his behalf of normal motives, barriers or reasons. Indeed, part of what we find so abhorrent about Sade’s actions is precisely this complete lack of silencing.

As should be clear, both groups of perpetrator accounts, due to their psychological thickness, make it difficult to deal with the fact that there are many roots of evil. Furthermore, both suffer from yet another problem. As Russell notes: “people can mildly insult bus drivers out of malice and can shoplift out of a defiant desire to do what is morally wrong, but neither of these actions are evil.”<sup>22</sup> Such acts, whether diabolically motivated or achieved through a process of silencing, are not evil because they inflict trivial amounts of harm. All perpetrator approaches must require that any act perpetrated in a particular fashion, no matter how small and trivial the harms inflicted, must be evil. But surely in the cases of the bus driver and the shoplifter the fact that there are only negligible amounts of harm involved is at least relevant to a judgment about whether or not the acts are evil. This being so, it follows that it is not only the perpetrator’s psychology that is relevant to judging an act to be evil. Therefore, perpetrator approaches to conceiving of evil are inadequate.

#### **4. The Three Parts of a Combination Conception of Evil**

As victim approaches are inadequate, because they lack a perpetrator component, and as perpetrator approaches are inadequate, because they lack a victim component, and as bystander approaches are inadequate, because they lack both victim and perpetrator components, it follows that a combination approach is the only viable way, if there is a viable way, to conceive of evil acts. There are, at least, three main components of any plausible combination conception of evil. First, there must be a perpetrator component, which identifies what it is about the way evil acts are perpetrated that makes them deserving of our very strongest moral condemnations. Second, there must be an unjustifiability component, which identifies what it is about evil acts that make them morally unjustifiable. Third, there must be a victim component, which identifies what it is about the amount of harm that evil acts inflict that makes them so morally abhorrent. We shall examine these three components in turn, before the theory is presented in full.

Combination conceptions of evil have been defended by John Kekes, Johan Vetlesen, and Marcus Singer. Kekes, in his recent book *The Roots of Evil*, argues that “the evil of an action ... consists in the combination of three components: the malevolent motivation of evildoers; the serious, excessive harm caused by their actions; and the lack of morally acceptable excuse for the actions.”<sup>23</sup> Unfortunately, Kekes’s own examples, which illustrate how “faith, ideology, ambition, honor, envy and boredom” can all be “active motives” for perpetrating evil, undermine the perpetrator component of his theory.<sup>24</sup> A person whose motivation for perpetrating evil is faith, or arguably even ambition, honor, or boredom, is not malevolently motivated, under any normal understanding of malevolence. Vetlesen, who bases his account on work by Thomas Cushman, holds the view that “to do evil ... is to *intentionally inflict pain and suffering on another human being, against her will, and causing serious and foreseeable harm to her.*”<sup>25</sup> Singer argues that evil acts “are acts that are horrendously wrong, that cause immense suffering and are done with an evil intention or from an evil motive, the intention or motive to do something horrendously wrong causing immense unwarranted suffering.”<sup>26</sup> However, while Vetlesen and Singer avoid the trap of conceiving of evil in terms of the presence or absence of a particular motive or type of motive, both their theories still prove to be inadequate because, as we shall see, they are unnecessarily restrictive in relation to the perpetrator component.

On Marcus Singer’s account it is not only intention, as in Vetlesen’s account, but also motive that is relevant to our assessment of an evil act. But we may ask why we should stop at just intention and motive. Might not other factors be relevant to our assessment of an evil act? There are indeed a number of factors that are relevant, but neither necessary nor sufficient, for judging an act to be evil. These factors include: the directedness of the perpetrator’s intention; the type and strength of the motive; the effect the harmful action has on the perpetrator; the degree and nature of the harm intended; the nature of the situation in which the act was undertaken; and the details of the perpetrator’s circumstances. While all these factors are relevant, they are not uniformly relevant in all cases. In different cases different sets of factors may be more or less relevant.

But why are all these factors relevant? In order to answer this question we shall examine each factor in turn and, by so doing, illustrate the relevance of each factor, in at least some cases. First, let us consider the directedness of the perpetrator’s intention. Let us imagine the cases of an SS camp guard and an SS bureaucrat such as Eichmann. The SS camp guard directly intends to harm the people he sadistically tortures, abuses and murders in his day to day tasks, whereas Eichmann directly intends



to efficiently organize the transportation of as many selected people as possible to such camps. The bureaucrat knows very well what awaits the people he transports, but he does not let this worry him. Given that we might judge both the camp guard and the bureaucrat to be perpetrators of evil, it follows that an evildoer need not directly intend to inflict harm. It is enough that an evildoer intends to act in a way such that harm is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act. In general, an evildoer who acts intentionally can purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently perpetrate evil.<sup>27</sup> While the bureaucrat's case would be one of knowingly perpetrating evil, most evildoers, like the camp guard, purposely perpetrate evil, although even cases of extreme recklessness or negligence may potentially, depending on other factors, be considered evil. Thus it is clearly relevant to a judgment of evil whether the sole intention is to purposely and directly inflict harm, or whether harm is knowingly, recklessly or negligently brought about.

Furthermore, let us assume that the SS bureaucrat actually believes his acts to be not evil, but morally obligatory. However, the mere fact that the bureaucrat has managed to convince himself, perhaps through a process of self-deception and rationalization, that such blatant acts of genocide are somehow justifiable, is not enough to excuse him from being an evildoer. As such, an evildoer need not believe their acts to be evil. For example, let us suppose that Hitler genuinely believed, as a result of rationalizing his hatred for Jews by way of ideology, that he did the right thing in ordering the genocide of Jews. Does this make it impossible for his acts to be evil? It would be intuitively plausible, in this case, to call Hitler's acts evil in spite of this. But it is clearly relevant to a judgment of evil whether agents believe their acts to be evil, and carry on in spite of this, or even because of this, or whether, as the result of self-deception and rationalization, they have come to believe that blatantly evil acts are somehow justifiable. We would judge agents who believe their acts to be evil more harshly than agents who believe their acts to be justifiable.

The perpetrator's motive is a particularly important factor. Stephen de Wijze has written of a person who kills his or her spouse and his or her lover "in a fit of jealousy."<sup>28</sup> Wijze's intuition is that the actions of the person, which result in two deaths, are very wrong, but not evil. To understand the basis of this intuition, we can turn to Kant's proposal that the degree of viciousness of an act is inversely proportional to the strength of the temptation to perform that act. Drawing on this proposal, the reason that we might be reluctant to judge the actions of the jealous spouse to be evil is because the perpetrator is, in some sense, provoked, and acts in the heat of the moment during a fit of jealousy. In such a case

it would require a certain amount of strength of will to not act in this way, given the spouse's jealous and violent rage. This is asking something, though very little, of radically frail beings such as ourselves.<sup>29</sup> Wijze also offers the example of "the Nazi who humiliates a religious Jew by forcing him to spit or urinate on the Torah and other holy artifacts."<sup>30</sup> Here Wijze's intuition is that the actions of the Nazi are not just wrong, but evil. Again, drawing on Kant's proposal, we might judge such acts to be evil because the perpetrator is not provoked, and does not act in the heat of the moment under the powerful influence of an emotional fit. This is a case, not of mere frailty, but of a perpetrator who goes well out of their way to gratuitously harm and humiliate others. As such, the strength of the motive is clearly relevant to a judgment of evil.

However, sometimes it is the type of motive, whatever its strength, that inclines us to judge an act to be evil. Let us consider again the example of the sadist, who gets such intense pleasure from torturing innocent children that he has an overwhelmingly strong desire to engage in such acts. Indeed, every time he sees a vulnerable child, he is overcome by a fit of passion. While the sadist's acts of torture are not at all gratuitous, given his desires and passions, this does not reduce the reprehensibility of his motives. The sadist may have to go out of his way to not perpetrate evil, but given the type of motive that moves him, this would not stop us from judging his acts to be evil. Clearly then, the type of motive is relevant to a judgment of evil.

The effect of the harmful action upon the perpetrator is another relevant factor. Cases where an agent greatly enjoys inflicting harm, humiliation, and pain upon others, and where such acts bring a smile to the face, evoke merriment or laughter, are more likely to be judged evil. However, cases where the agent is coldly indifferent to his harmful actions are also likely to be judged evil. In contrast, cases where a perpetrator immediately feels unclean and physically sick with remorse and regret upon witnessing the horrible effects of their acts, is less likely to be judged evil.

The degree of harm intended is also a particularly important and relevant factor. While all evils inflict a certain minimum amount of harm, there is no upper limit to the amount of harm that can be inflicted. We would be more likely to judge the acts of an agent who intended to murder an entire group, or even all of humanity, more harshly than an agent who intended to murder only one person.

Finally, all the intricacies of the situation in which the act was undertaken and of the perpetrator's circumstances must be taken into account. People do not act in a vacuum. As such, the way people act is partly dependent, and sometimes very dependent, upon the situation in

which they find themselves.<sup>31</sup> The same person who perpetrates evil in one type of situation may not do so in another type of situation. Given that there is obviously some link between situation and behavior, it must be relevant that some situations strongly encourage evil, whereas other situations strongly discourage evil. For example, a person who acts in a situation where there is war, a shortage of resources to satisfy basic needs for things such as food and shelter, endemic violence, poverty and social upheaval, a general lack of education and opportunities, and grossly unjust, unresponsive and unrepresentative political leadership is more likely to perpetrate evil.<sup>32</sup> As in the case of strong motives, such as a fit of jealousy, such situations tend to, in some sense, provoke or encourage evil actions. For this reason, all things being equal, we would be less likely to judge an act evil where that act is perpetrated in a situation, such as during times of violent social upheaval, that encourage evil. For a similar reason, a perpetrator's circumstances, in particular his upbringing, are also relevant to a judgment of evil. Certain upbringings, such as upbringings that lack education, love, and nurturing, can sometimes tend to encourage evil in later life. For this reason, all things being equal, we would be less likely to judge an act evil where the act is perpetrated by an agent who has grown up in circumstances where there is violence, neglect, and abuse.

However, while the intricacies of situation and circumstance are relevant, in relation to the other relevant factors, they are the least important. To see why, we may consider the example of a person who directly intends to inflict great harm on a great many people from the most sadistic motives. The fact that the person acts in a tough situation and endured a difficult upbringing is relevant, but in comparison with other factors, such as motive, intention, effect, and degree of harm, it carries little weight. It carries little weight because many other people face similarly tough situations and suffer from similarly difficult upbringings, but do not perform such heinous acts.

There is little substantive disagreement to be found in the unjustifiability components that form part of the theories offered by Kekes, Vetlesen, and Singer. All agree that evil acts are unwarranted and lack a morally acceptable excuse. Card, however, offers a more expansive and broad unjustifiability component. For Card, an evil act is unjustified because serious harms are "brought about, seriously risked, sustained, aggravated, or tolerated by culpable wrongdoing."<sup>33</sup> Card is thus able to deal with cases where a person negligently or recklessly risks serious harms, or is a passive bystander or voyeur, who wrongfully sustains, aggravates or tolerates a serious harm, but does not actually directly intend or inflict harm upon others.

While Card's account, in drawing attention to such often neglected cases, is clearly important, there is a simpler way to capture the same sorts of cases. More simply, it is enough to state that an evil act is one where an agent perpetrates a moral wrong that makes him at least partly responsible for the harms others suffer. This allows the theory to remain neutral in regard to controversial questions about when, if ever, certain acts, such as torture, may be morally justifiable and therefore not morally wrong, and when, if ever, as passive bystanders or voyeurs, we can be held at least partly responsible for sustaining, aggravating, or tolerating a wrongdoing inflicted by others. This makes the theory not only more simple, but also more useful. A useful theory of evil should remain, as far as possible, compatible with many different independent theories of the right and the good, and theories of moral responsibility. Insofar as this unjustifiability component is explicitly able to meet this requirement, it is part of a useful theory of evil.

It is now possible to investigate the third component of a combination theory, the victim or harm component. Harm must be understood broadly to cover "all manner of physical and mental pains and injuries, frustration of interests, insults and affronts."<sup>34</sup> Harm can refer to everything from humiliation and sensory deprivation to physical beating. As has already been argued, the actions of the most maliciously or diabolically motivated shoplifter, who steals but a few items of little value from a wealthy merchant, are never going to be judged evil because the amount of harms inflicted are so very minor. But if a similar set of motives leads to, not shoplifting, but the torturing of small children, then such actions are likely to be judged evil, in part because the harms inflicted are so very significant. As such, evil acts seem to involve victims enduring a certain significant minimum amount of harm.

However, we may ask what the minimum of harm is and why it is morally important and significant. Kekes argues that evils inflict an amount of harm that is "excessive," by which he means that the harm is "disproportionately greater than what is needed to achieve the evildoer's goal."<sup>35</sup> However, if one's goal is to destroy all of humanity using whatever means are available, then no act perpetrated in pursuit of that goal, no matter how harmful, can possibly count as excessive. But what matters is not whether the harm inflicted exceeds the evil perpetrator's own goals, but whether the harm inflicted upon victims is what we shall call life-wrecking. Indeed Kekes himself emphasizes this elsewhere in his book.<sup>36</sup> He does so as well in his earlier theory of evil, where he argues that the harm inflicted by evil is "serious," and it is serious "if it interferes with the functioning of a person as a fully-fledged agent."<sup>37</sup> Drawing on Kekes's work, evil acts are acts that involve the victims of the act

enduring, for a reasonable duration, a life-wrecking or ending harm. A life-wrecking harm is a harm that violates the minimum conditions of human well-being in such a way that it interferes with a person's ability to function as a fully-fledged agent. A life-ending harm is a harm that results in death.

Life-wrecking harms interfere with a person's ability to live a full and complete life. Such harms often bring about intense and prolonged suffering; inhibit one's ability to perform normal human activities; induce severe and debilitating trauma; undermine one's moral character; hinder one's ability to maintain, nurture, develop and begin new relationships with other persons; undermine one's ability to be autonomous and to cultivate a sense of dignity and self-worth; and are generally irreversible and beyond compensation.<sup>38</sup> As Jean Amery, a Holocaust survivor notes: "Whoever was tortured, stays tortured. Torture is ineradicably burned into him."<sup>39</sup> Life-wrecking harms are the sorts of harms that burn themselves into the victim. It is because of the burning effect that life-wrecking harms have the "power to alter, change or control [victims] in ways that devastate lives."<sup>40</sup>

While a life-wrecking harm may not be easily quantifiable, it is a level of harm that is morally significant and that we are fairly good at recognizing. It is morally significant because there is an important moral difference between mildly harmful acts, such as shoplifting, that do not wreck lives to the extent of significantly interfering with a person's very ability to function as a fully-fledged agent, and extremely harmful acts, such as torture, that do. When it comes to measuring harm there might not be, and perhaps there ought not to be, any hard and fast rules. Some cases are clearly cases where the harm is extreme enough to be life-wrecking, while others are clearly cases where the harm is not. Genocide, gang-rape, prolonged torture and murder are the sorts of acts that, because they inflict life-wrecking or ending harms, are potential candidates for evil, whereas acts such as shoplifting, lying or mild humiliation may be harmful, but they are not life-wrecking. Such a list is largely uncontroversial, and it is uncontroversial because, hard cases aside, it is not too difficult to judge what does and does not count as a life-wrecking harm. But, in all cases, judgment is needed. A useful theory of evil enhances and refines this capacity by giving focus to what is important in judging the severity of harms. While some cases may turn out to be borderline and require serious thought and acute judgment to determine whether or not they are life-wrecking, this simply reflects the complexity of the moral problems that we face in the world and the importance of judgment for dealing with it.

However, it would seem misguided not to call an act evil which inflicts a harm that would normally be life-wrecking but, in fact, due to a

particular victim's extraordinary resilience, is not life-wrecking. For example, Smith inflicts the same harmful tortures on one hundred people. For ninety-nine of the people, the inflicted harm is actually life-wrecking, but for one extraordinarily resilient victim the harm has the foreseeable, but not actual, consequence of being life-wrecking. Nonetheless, we would rightly judge Smith's actions to be evil in all one hundred cases. Thus, for an act to count as evil it need only be foreseeable that such harm would normally have a life-wrecking impact on the victim.

### **5. A Theory of Evil Acts**

Bringing the three components outlined in the previous section together, we arrive at the following combination conception of evil. An evil act is an act of wrongdoing in which the perpetrator of that act is at least partly responsible for other individuals suffering what would at least normally be a life-wrecking or ending harm, and where in so acting we judge the perpetrator, in the light of all the relevant factors, to be deserving of our very strongest moral condemnations. The relevant factors include intention, motive, effect, degree of harm, and the perpetrator's situation and circumstances. There are thus a number of factors involved in a judgment of evil that must be weighed in combination in order to reach an overall judgment about whether or not, all things considered, an act has gone beyond the pale of mere wrongdoing. A useful theory of evil cannot remove the need for judgment, but it can draw our attention to what factors are important and relevant to making the judgment. This theory of evil shows us that, far from acting like a black-box that shuts down thought, a judgment of evil should act as a magnet for careful and thorough moral reflection and judgment.

This understanding of evil can be said to avoid the difficulties that other theories face. Unlike victim approaches, it does not require us to consider the perpetrator as largely irrelevant to our assessment of evil acts. Unlike perpetrator approaches, it does not require us to consider the life-wrecking harms suffered by victims of evil to be irrelevant or incidental to our assessment of evil acts. Unlike other combination approaches, it allows us to deal with the fact that there are many roots of evil and that there are many different factors that are relevant to judging an act to be evil, some of which will be more or less important depending on the particular case. This theory is also robust and useful, as it leaves it up to us to use independent theories of wrongdoing and responsibility to adjudicate when an act is an example of wrongdoing and where one is responsible for a harm that one may or may not have directly inflicted. This allows the theory to

cover difficult cases where a person is partly responsible, by refusing to stop, voyeuristically observing, or even openly tolerating, supporting or ordering, harms inflicted by another person.

While evil is an essential and important part of our ethical discourse, it is not a foundational concept. The concept of evil is conceptually dependent on, and presupposes, theories of the right and the good, as well as an account of moral responsibility. As such, this account of evil is about as universally or objectively adequate as are our other moral concepts, such as our concepts of right or wrong.

“Evil acts” refers to a subclass of moral wrong. This is not the only time we carve up moral wrong into smaller subsets. We do something similar when we separate out wrongs that are also injustices or human rights violations. But why is it important to be able to clearly conceive of this subclass? Evils are an important subclass of moral wrongs because they deserve, over other wrongs, our very strongest moral condemnation; they deserve, over other wrongs, priority when it comes to preventing, minimizing and combating them; and they need to be responded to in different ways to other wrongs. Evils thus differ from other wrongs in three important moral ways, and these differences have practical implications. Evils, because of their life-wrecking impact on victim’s lives deserve, as Card argues, priority over other wrongs, including injustices, when it comes to resource allocation for preventing and combating wrongs.<sup>41</sup> Just as we find certain offences more grave than others and so assign them a more severe punishment, we can likewise hold some wrongs, namely evils, to be graver than others and so in need of being addressed, prevented, and combated first. Evils, again due to their life-wrecking impact on victim’s lives, leave behind a moral legacy which requires responses that go beyond those that may suffice for dealing with lesser wrongs. Evils, in particular large-scale evils where sizeable proportions of a population are implicated in atrocities, raise difficult questions concerning the scope and feasibility of punishment, the possibility of forgiveness and the necessity of reconciliation, that are rarely raised by mere wrongs. Because of this, evils need to be responded to in ways substantively different to the ways in which we respond to lesser wrongs.

To illustrate how this theory works in practice, let us consider the case of a pedophile who has very strong desires to sexually exploit children and regularly does so, even though he knows it is wrong. This looks, on the surface of things, to be a clear cut case of evil. But let us make the example more realistic. The pedophile may enjoy his harmful actions at the time, but very soon afterwards feels sick with remorse. This leads him to repeatedly seek psychological treatment, although to no avail. Failing this, he makes sure, as far as possible, to avoid the sorts of situations in

which he might come into contact with vulnerable children. Furthermore, like many pedophiles, he was himself repeatedly, and over a long period of time, sexually abused as a child. Add a history of depression and alcohol abuse to this sorry story, and our judgment on whether or not the pedophile's acts are evil is less clear cut. None of this to any degree justifies the pedophile's actions, or undermines his responsibility for them. But it is relevant to our assessment of whether or not the pedophile's acts deserve our very strongest moral condemnation. In this case, we might weigh the degree of life-wrecking harms inflicted upon innocent children more heavily than the perpetrator's obvious, but failed, attempts at reform. In any case, much critical reflection and careful judgment is required to decide the matter.

Other cases, such as those of Hitler and Eichmann, are clearer cut examples of evil. Hitler was primarily, although not solely, responsible for the murders of millions of people in a manner that at once stuns, cripples, horrifies, and completely overwhelms the imagination. Hitler's fanatical hatred of Jews, the sheer scale of his acts, his cunning deceitfulness, his complete lack of remorse, and his single-minded pursuit of the destruction of so many innocent men, women, and children gives us more than enough reason to judge his acts to be evil. Eichmann was partially responsible for sending millions of Jewish people to their inevitable and horrifying deaths. While Eichmann may not have been motivated by hate, the sheer scale of his acts, the grotesque and thoughtless efficiency with which he undertook the acts, and his cold indifference to the harms he inflicted, gives us more than enough reason to judge his acts to be evil. It is, unfortunately, neither difficult nor controversial to expand this list. Indeed, it is shameful that both history and present experience affords us with an almost inexhaustible wealth of clear cut examples of evil.

However, there is one sort of example that the combination conception of evil might seem unable to account for. This is the sort of example where significant harms are not suffered by the victim, but where we might think the act deserves to be judged evil nonetheless. In order to investigate this point, let us return to Wijze's examples of a person who kills his or her spouse and his or her lover in a fit of jealousy, and a Nazi who humiliates a religious Jew by making him spit or urinate on the Torah. Wijze suggests, and Garrard would agree, that the act in the first example, though wrong and very harmful, is not evil, whereas the act in the second example, though far less harmful, is not just wrong, but evil. This leads both Wijze and Garrard to claim that significant amounts of harm are not a necessary feature of evil acts.<sup>42</sup>

However, the combination conception of evil can account for such cases. The first example clearly involves a life-ending harm. Even so, the



perpetrator is, in some sense, provoked, and acts with frailty in the heat of the moment. All of these factors are of the sort that might lead us to judge that the spouse's actions are very wrong, but perhaps not evil. The harm in the second example, though more psychological than physical, is still life-wrecking. As Susan Anderson notes: "Mental anguish can involve as much suffering as physical torture; and the scars left, or harm done to the person, can be just as great."<sup>43</sup> Forcing a religious Jew to desecrate all that he holds sacred is an act that is immensely humiliating, insulting, degrading and traumatizing. It is the sort of act that burns itself into the victim. Such harm is life-wrecking because it undermines the victim's self-respect, dignity, sense of self-worth, and his crucially important relationship with his God. The actions of such a deeply hateful person, who directly intends life-wrecking humiliation, for reprehensible and sadistic reasons, in such an unprovoked situation, deserves to be judged evil.

## 6. A Theory of Evil Persons

In judging an agent to be a perpetrator of evil, we are merely correlating an agent with an act. In contrast, to judge an agent to be an evil person is to condemn that agent's character, not just his actions. It is to condemn who he is, not just what he does. From the above conception of evil acts, the following conception of evil persons follows fairly straightforwardly. An evil person is an unreformed person who repeatedly perpetrates, or at least intends to perpetrate, evil acts.

Almost all of the work in this conception of evil persons is performed by the prior conception of evil acts that it builds on. However, there are a number of parts in this conception that still need to be expanded upon. The "at least intends to" clause is needed as failed intentions are just as relevant as successful intentions when it comes to judging a person's character. For example, if both Jones and Smith repeatedly form the same sorts of evil intentions, it should not matter to our assessment of their respective characters that Jones's intentions are always effective, whereas Smith's intentions are always thwarted by events genuinely outside his control.

The "repeatedly" clause implies that evil acts are perpetrated by an evil person on multiple occasions, although the occasions need not come either regularly or persistently. Card uses the term "persistent" in her conception of an evil person.<sup>44</sup> But the term "persistently" makes it sound as if the evil person is always scheming or performing evil acts. The term "regularly" is also inappropriate, as it makes it sound as if an evil person cannot irregularly perpetrate evil acts. The term "repeatedly" thus seems

to strike the right tone. This clause is needed as a person who perpetrates an evil act in a one-off moment of weakness or emotional frenzy is not an evil person, as demonstrated by his otherwise unblemished moral record. In contrast, when an evil person perpetrates evil he is, by and large, not acting out of character. Such acts are part of a larger pattern of evil behavior. That an evil person repeatedly perpetrates evil acts is indicative of, and not incidental to, his character and this is why we judge such persons to be evil. From this conception, it follows that not all perpetrators of evil are evil persons.

The “unreformed” clause is needed to account for the fact that evil persons, unlike evil acts, can be reformed. A person who was once evil, but is reformed, should no longer be judged an evil person. A person’s long-term reactive attitudes and responses to his evildoing are crucial factors in our judgment about whether or not he is reformed. The emotions of guilt, shame and remorse are central here.<sup>45</sup> But remorse must be backed up by action. To illustrate this point, we shall consider the fictitious example by Laurence Thomas of Paul-Damascus, a Nazi who repeatedly perpetrates evil atrocities, but subsequently escapes to America, makes millions, and donates the money anonymously to Jewish charities, while himself living like a pauper for over fifty years.<sup>46</sup> The subsequent actions of Paul-Damascus show us that even a hardened evildoer can reform his character. If we had caught Paul-Damascus in 1945, we would have rightly judged him then to be an evil person, as he had repeatedly perpetrated evil acts, but after fifty years of commendable deeds we might think twice. We might think twice because Paul-Damascus has shown through his actions that he has recognized the evil that he has inflicted, felt the appropriate moral emotions of guilt, shame, and remorse, compensated the victims of the evil as well as he could, and reformed his character to such an extent that further acts of evil, in any situation, would now be out of character for him. For all these reasons, by 1995 we might judge Paul-Damascus to be reformed and thus no longer an evil person.

However, very few repeat perpetrators of evil have such commendable reactive attitudes to their evil, and for this reason, most repeat perpetrators of evil are evil persons. This is clear if we return our gaze to Hitler and Eichmann. Hitler, by ordering and approving the genocide, murder, torture, abuse, and humiliation of millions of people was repeatedly responsible for many acts of evil. Hitler, far from being reformed, maintained his fanatical and racist hatred of Jews until his suicide, and thus there is no difficulty in judging him to be an evil person. Likewise, Eichmann was responsible, though less so than Hitler, for literally countless acts of evil. Eichmann, unlike Hitler, had almost twenty years

after the war in which, like Paul-Damascus, to recognize the moral enormity of his actions, compensate the victims of his evil as well as he could, and reform his character. But Eichmann did none of these things. As such, we rightly judge Eichmann to be an evil person.

This theory, however, might be thought to strike intuitive difficulties with Haybron's example of "the vilest person you can imagine," who "wishes nothing more than the greatest suffering for her fellow creatures" but who is "a quadriplegic with no ability to communicate."<sup>47</sup> Haybron's intuition is that such a person is evil, even though she does not repeatedly perpetrate evil. Indeed, why should such a person's disability, which makes her unable to even genuinely intend to inflict harm, make her morally any better a person? The reason is that there is an important moral difference between merely wishing and fantasizing about evil, as the quadriplegic does, and actually intending and inflicting evil, which the quadriplegic does not and cannot do. Many of us engage in such fantasies at our meanest moments, but without ever acting upon them. Perhaps the quadriplegic may be similar and when push comes to shove, she may never choose to act upon her evil wishes. But in any case, while the quadriplegic remains a vile human being, she is not an evil person until she turns her evil fantasies into evil intentions and evil acts.

Haybron also challenges the type of theory that has been defended here on the grounds that there is no moral Rubicon between individuals who are and individuals who are not repeat evildoers, such that only repeat evildoers qualify as evil persons. Haybron's claim, though, is merely indicative of the fact that persons come in all degrees of moral badness. At a certain point, we judge persons who have repeatedly perpetrated evil acts to be evil persons because their patterns of evil actions are indicative of their moral character, which is of the sort to deserve our strongest preventative concern and moral condemnation. Persons who perpetrate evil, although not repeatedly, also deserve our moral condemnation and preventative concern, but to a lesser degree, and this means that there will be, not at all surprisingly, difficult borderline cases. That there are such borderline cases is simply reflective of the moral complexity of reality. Evil persons are not an utterly distinct class of beings, totally dissimilar to the rest of us, complete with red horns and pointy tails. They come from the same radically frail and impure human stock as the rest of us. This allows us to avoid the mistake of demonizing them, the evil ones, while monopolizing humanity for us, the good ones.<sup>48</sup> Evil persons are not inhuman monsters, but deeply flawed human beings who have developed the sorts of characters capable of repeatedly plaguing their fellows with life-wrecking harms. For this reason they are the sorts of persons who deserve our strongest moral condemnation and preventative concern.

An alternative theory is offered by Haybron, who argues that to “be evil is ... to be consistently vicious in the following sense: one is not aligned with the good to a morally significant extent.”<sup>49</sup> We are aligned with the good, according to Haybron, when we sometimes find that an act being good or right is a reason in itself for undertaking that act. Thus on this account anyone who has a good side, who is sometimes, even if not very often, motivated by the good for its own sake, who is a good friend to someone, or a good husband or father, does not count as an evil person, no matter how much or how often or for what reason he perpetrates evil. Haybron gives the example of television character Tony Soprano, and claims that “so long as he retains his better nature, I doubt that *anything* he could do would make it credible to regard him as evil.”<sup>50</sup> This is a very strong and arguably implausible account of the evil person, and, as Haybron himself admits, it may be the case that not even Hitler counts as an evil person on this view. But an account of evil persons that cannot accommodate even Hitler is deeply counter intuitive. Against Haybron’s account, we should judge Hitler to be an evil person, even if he did have a good side, since given the amount of evil that Hitler purposely brought about, the fact that he sometimes treated members of his inner circle with genuine respect, or that he treated his dog well, simply pales into complete moral insignificance. The presence of a good side in a person such as Hitler is not enough to redeem him from the charge of being an evil person.

We have critically examined the central meta-ethical assumptions of any theory of evil and detailed the only four possible approaches to a theory of evil, the perpetrator, victim, bystander, and combination approaches. As we have seen, of these approaches, only a combination approach is feasible as a theory of evil. There is reason to defend a theory of evil whereby an evil act is an act of wrongdoing in which the perpetrator of the act is at least partly responsible for other individuals suffering what would at least normally be a life-wrecking or ending harm, and where in so acting we judge the perpetrator, in the light of all the relevant details, to be deserving of our very strongest moral condemnations. There is reason to accept a theory of evil persons whereby an evil person is an unreformed person who repeatedly perpetrates, or at least intends to perpetrate, evil acts.<sup>51</sup>

## Notes

1. See Richard J Bernstein, *The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11* (Cambridge, England: Polity, 2005); Richard J Bernstein, *Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation* (Cambridge, England: Blackwell Publishers, 2002);

- Claudia Card, *The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Phillip Cole, *The Myth of Evil* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006); Peter Dews, *The Idea of Evil* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008); Raimond Gaita, *Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception* (London: Macmillan Press, 1991); Eve Garrard and Geoffrey Scarre, eds., *Moral Philosophy and the Holocaust* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003); Jennifer L Geddes, ed., *Evil after Postmodernism: Histories, Narratives, Ethics* (London: Routledge, 2001); Daniel M Haybron, ed., *Earth's Abominations: Philosophical Studies of Evil* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002); Paul W Kahn, *Out of Eden: Adam and Eve and the Problem of Evil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); John Kekes, *The Roots of Evil* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005); Mary Midgley, *Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984); Adam Morton, *On Evil* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Susan Neiman, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Luke Russell, "Evil Revivalism Versus Evil-Skepticism," *Journal of Value Inquiry* 40, no. 1 (2006); Geoffrey Scarre, *After Evil: Responding to Wrongdoing* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2004); Alan D Schrift, ed., *Modernity and the Problem of Evil* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2005); Marcus Singer, "The Concept of Evil," *Philosophy* 79 (2004); Arne Johan Vetlesen, *Evil and Human Agency: Understanding Collective Evildoing* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
2. Eve Garrard, "Evil as an Explanatory Concept," *The Monist* 85, no. 2 (2002), p. 320.
  3. See Singer, op. cit., p. 186.
  4. See Hillel Steiner, "Calibrating Evil," *The Monist* 85, no. 2 (2002), p. 184.
  5. See Russell, "Evil Revivalism Versus Evil-Skepticism."
  6. See Garrard, "Evil as an Explanatory Concept"; Daniel M Haybron, "Moral Monsters and Saints," *The Monist* 85, no. 2 (2002); Luke Russell, "Is Evil Action Qualitatively Distinct from Ordinary Wrongdoing?," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85, no. 4 (2007); and Steiner, op. cit.
  7. See Christine M Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*, ed. Onora O'Neill (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 113.
  8. See Daniel M Haybron, "Introduction: Evil as a Philosophical Concern," in *Earth's Abominations: Philosophical Studies of Evil*, ed. Daniel M Haybron (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), pp. 7 & 15.
  9. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) p. 46.
  10. See Morton, *On Evil*, Russell, "Evil Revivalism Versus Evil-Skepticism."
  11. See Bernstein, *Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation*, p. 225 and Neiman, op. cit., pp. 286–287.
  12. See Kekes, *The Roots of Evil*, p. 236.
  13. Guy B Adams and Danny L Balfour, "The Mask of Administrative Evil: Remembering the Past, Forgetting the Present," in *Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide - Ethics and Religion*, ed. John K Roth and Elisabeth Maxwell (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave, 2001), p. 19.
  14. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
  15. Card, op. cit., p. 3.
  16. David Pocock, "Unruly Evil," in *The Anthropology of Evil*, ed. David Parkin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), p. 51.

17. See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967) p. 459.
18. See Eve Garrard, "The Nature of Evil," *Philosophical Explorations* 1, no. 1 (1998), pp. 53–54.
19. See Midgley, op. cit., pp. 22–24.
20. Morton, *On Evil*, p. 57.
21. See Paul Formosa, "The Problems with Evil," *Contemporary Political Theory*, forthcoming.
22. Russell, "Is Evil Action Qualitatively Distinct from Ordinary Wrongdoing?."
23. Kekes, *The Roots of Evil*, p. 2.
24. Ibid.
25. Vetlesen, op. cit., p. 21; see also Thomas Cushman, "The Reflexivity of Evil: Modernity and Moral Transgression in the War in Bosnia," in *Evil after Post-modernism: Histories, Narratives, Ethics.*, ed. Jennifer L Geddes (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 81.
26. Singer, op. cit., p. 205.
27. See L A Zaibert, "Intentionality and Wickedness," in *Earth's Abominations: Philosophical Studies of Evil*, ed. Daniel M Haybron (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), pp. 42–46.
28. See Stephen de Wijze, "Defining Evil: Insights from the Problem of 'Dirty Hands,'" *The Monist* 85, no. 2 (2002), p. 231.
29. See Paul Formosa, "Kant on the Radical Evil of Human Nature," *The philosophical Forum*, 38, no. 3 (2007).
30. See Wijze, op. cit., p. 231.
31. See John M Doris, *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
32. See Paul Formosa, "Understanding Evil Acts," *Human Studies* 30, No. 2, (2007).
33. Card, op. cit., pp. 3 & 18.
34. Scarre, op. cit., p. 4.
35. Kekes, *The Roots of Evil*, p. 200.
36. See Ibid. p. 130.
37. John Kekes, "The Reflexivity of Evil," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 15, no. 1 (1998), p. 217; see also John Kekes, *Facing Evil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
38. See Card, op. cit., p. 14.
39. Jean Amery, *At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities* (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), p. 34.
40. Wijze, op. cit., p. 222.
41. See Bat-Ami Bar On, "Politics and Prioritization of Evil," *Hypatia* 19, no. 4 (2004); Card, op. cit., p. 96; Adam Morton, "Inequity/Iniquity: Card on Balancing Injustice and Evil," *Hypatia* 19, no. 4 (2004).
42. See Garrard, "The Nature of Evil," p. 45.
43. Susan Leigh Anderson, "Evil," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 24, no. 1 (1990), p. 45.
44. See Card, op. cit., p. 21.
45. See Raimond Gaita, *A Common Humanity: Thinking About Love & Truth & Justice* (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1999), pp. 30–38.
46. See Laurence Thomas, "Forgiving the Unforgivable?," in *Moral Philosophy and the Holocaust*, eds. Eve Garrard and Geoffrey Scarre, (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003).

47. Haybron, "Moral Monsters and Saints," p. 264.
48. See Formosa, "The Problems with Evil."
49. Haybron, "Moral Monsters and Saints," p. 269.
50. Daniel M Haybron, "Consistency of Character and the Character of Evil," in *Earth's Abominations: Philosophical Studies of Evil*, ed. Daniel M Haybron (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), p. 67.
51. I would like to thank Thomas Magnell, the Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Value Inquiry*, an anonymous referee, and others who commented on earlier versions of this article for their help and assistance.