RESEARCH

Two-party Quantum Key Agreement with Six-particle Entangled States Against Collective Noise

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Abstract

Quantum key agreement (QKA) is an advanced technique that allows multiple parties to share a secret key through cooperation. At present, most QKA protocols have the problems of weak anti-noise ability and low qubit efficiency. In this paper, two improved two-party QKA protocols are proposed using two sets of special logical qubits, which are immune to the collective noise. The main idea of these two protocols is that frst, through the measurement correlation of the six-particle entangled states, the communication parties can fairly build a common key. Then, decoy logical qubits and delayed measurement technology are employed to prevent eavesdropping in quantum channels. Security analysis indicates that both protocols are unconditionally secure and capable of resisting internal and external attacks. In addition, compared with existing protocols, both protocols improve the efficiency because they transmit longer qubits.

Keywords Six-particle entangled states · Collective noise · Quantum key agreement · Qubit efficiency \cdot Logical qubits

1 Introduction

With the advent of the Shor algorithm [\[1\]](#page-14-0) and the further development of quantum computing, the RSA encryption algorithm [[2\]](#page-14-1) based on large integer factorization can be easily cracked. There has been an increasing interest in quantum cryptography, a type of encryption that can ensure data security $[3, 4]$ $[3, 4]$ $[3, 4]$. Quantum cryptography makes use of superposition, entangled state, measurement collapse, and other theories in quantum mechanics to truly realize unconditional security. It can generate dynamic random keys [\[5](#page-14-4), [6\]](#page-14-5) and detect eavesdropping with high probability during communication [[7\]](#page-14-6). QKA is an essential subfeld of quantum cryptography. It aims to solve the problem that communication parties negotiate a shared key without the participation of a third party. Unlike quantum key

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distribution (QKD) $[8–10]$ $[8–10]$ $[8–10]$ $[8–10]$, fairness and security are two critical requirements of QKA. In the QKA protocol, each party is required to contribute equally to the ultimate key and cannot decide independently in advance.

Zhou et al. $[11]$ $[11]$ $[11]$ first put forth the QKA protocol in 2004. Since then, numerous QKA protocols have been proposed $[12–15]$ $[12–15]$ $[12–15]$. Nevertheless, the early QKA protocols were all implemented through ideal quantum channels without noise. In real applications, noise typically has an impact on particles, and attackers can launch malicious attacks under cover of it. Therefore, when designing the QKA protocol, noise must be taken into account. In 2003, Walton et al. [[16\]](#page-14-12) found that qubits in decoherencefree subspaces (DFS) are not afected by collective noise, which is an ideal strategy to combat noise. In light of Walton et al.'s theory, Huang et al. [[17,](#page-14-13) [18\]](#page-14-14) raised two corresponding variables in the QKA protocol for the frst time to immunize collective noise. In 2016, He et al. [[19](#page-14-15)] designed an ingenious QKA protocol against collective noise using logical *χ states* and logical Bell states. Subsequently, in order to improve the qubit efficiency, Gao et al. $[20]$ $[20]$ suggested QKA protocols that are immune to collective noise based on the four-particle entangled GHZ state. Meanwhile, Yang et al. [\[21](#page-14-17)] proposed a QKA protocol based on logical Bell states, which is robust to collective noise and superior to most current QKA protocols concerning qubit efficiency and quantum resource cost. In [[22\]](#page-14-18), Wang et al. utilized decoy logical qubits to devise a QKA protocol against collective noise, significantly improving qubit efficiency. Due to quantum entanglement swapping technology, Zhou et al. [[23\]](#page-14-19) suggested a QKA protocol in 2020 that is resistant to collective noise. Later, qubit efficiency was further enhanced by Guo et al. [[24](#page-14-20)], who presented novel QKA protocols on account of logical GHZ states and their measurement correlation.

In recent years, some researchers have focused on multi-party quantum key agreement (MQKA). Wang et al. [[25\]](#page-14-21) proposed a three-party QKA protocol using quantum Fourier transform. Later, Yang et al. [[26\]](#page-14-22) proposed a tree-type MQKA protocol, which increased the number of participants to N parties. This year, Zhao et al. [\[27](#page-14-23)] established a MQKA protocol using non-maximally entangled states with unknown parameters for the frst time, which is more suitable for real-world situations. However, the research on MQKA protocol is still in the initial stage due to its low efficiency and inability to resist collective noise.

The scheme described in this essay can further boost qubit efficiency while resisting collective noise. This scheme utilizes six-particle entangled states, decoy logical qubits [[29–](#page-15-0)[32](#page-15-1)], and delayed measurement technology [[13,](#page-14-24) [28](#page-15-2)] to provide two QKA protocols immune to diferent types of collective noise. Both protocols are based on the measurement correlation of six-particle entangled states, allowing two participants to establish a shared key fairly. Eavesdroppers cannot successfully carry out Trojan horse attacks [[33–](#page-15-3)[35](#page-15-4)] since each particle is sent only once in our protocols. Internal and external attacks have shown our two QKA protocols to be secure. Furthermore, both protocols have excellent qubit efficiency.

The remainder of this essay is arranged as follows. The second section introduces theoretical knowledge of our protocols, including the four unitary operations, six-particle entangled states, and collective noise. Our protocols are fully explained in the next section. The security and efficiency analyses are the main topics of Sections 4 and 5 , respectively. Last but not least, we draw a conclusion in Section [6](#page-13-0).

2 Theoretical Knowledge

2.1 Unitary Operations and Quantum Entangled States

The Z-basis is well known to consist of $\{10\}$ $\{11\}$, and the X-basis is known to consist of $\{\vert +\rangle \vert -\rangle$, where $\vert +\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(\vert 0\rangle + \vert 1\rangle)$ and $\vert -\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(\vert 0\rangle - \vert 1\rangle)$. The four unitary operations are denoted as $U_{00} \equiv I = |0\rangle\langle 0| + |1\rangle\langle 1|$, $U_{01} \equiv X = |0\rangle\langle 1| + |1\rangle\langle 0|$, $U_{10} \equiv Z = |0\rangle$ $\langle 0|$ −| 1 \rangle (1|, and *U*₁₁≡*iY* = |0) $\langle 1|$ −| 1 \rangle (0|. Then we introduce four Bell states which are described as $|\Psi^{\pm}\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|01\rangle \pm |10\rangle)$ and $|\Phi^{\pm}\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle)$. After a unitary operation $U_{i_1 i_2} (i_1, i_2 = 0, 1)$ is applied to a Bell state's second particle, it will change into another Bell state. The results of the transformation between four Bell states are shown in Table [1](#page-2-0).

This paper uses the six-particle entangled state [[36\]](#page-15-5) as the quantum resource, defned as

$$
|\psi\rangle_{ABCDEF} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{32}} (|000000\rangle + |111111\rangle + |000011\rangle + |111100\rangle + |000101\rangle + |111010\rangle + |000111\rangle + |111000\rangle + |000110\rangle + |111001\rangle + |001001\rangle + |110110\rangle + |001111\rangle + |110000\rangle + |010001\rangle + |101110\rangle + |010010\rangle + |101101\rangle + |011001\rangle - |001100\rangle - |110011\rangle + |010100\rangle + |100110\rangle + |100100\rangle + |100100\rangle + |101011\rangle + |010101\rangle + |010111\rangle + |101000\rangle + |011110\rangle + |100001\rangle)_{ABDEF}
$$

=
$$
\frac{1}{8} [(|000\rangle_{ABEF} + |0110\rangle_{ABEF} - |1001\rangle_{ABEF} - |1111\rangle_{ABEF}) | \Phi^{-} \rangle_{CD} + (|0001\rangle_{ABEF} - |0111\rangle_{ABEF} - |1001\rangle_{ABEF} + |1110\rangle_{ABEF}) | \Psi^{+} \rangle_{CD} + (|0010\rangle_{ABEF} - |0100\rangle_{ABEF} + |1011\rangle_{ABEF} - |1101\rangle_{ABEF}) | \Psi^{-} \rangle_{CD} + (|0011\rangle_{ABEF} + |0101\rangle_{ABEF} + |1010\rangle_{ABEF} + |1100\rangle_{ABEF} + |1100\rangle_{ABEF}) | \Phi^{+} \rangle_{CD}]
$$
(1)

If Bob performs the *ZZZZ basis*{∣0000〉,∣0001〉,∣0010〉,∣0011〉,∣0100〉,∣0101〉,∣0110〉,∣0 111〉,∣1000〉,∣1001〉,∣1010〉,∣1011〉,∣1100〉,∣1101〉,∣1110〉,∣1111〉} measurement on particles *A*, *B*, *E* and *F*, and Alice carries out the Bell measurement on particles *C* and *D*, the state $|\psi\rangle_{\text{ABCDEF}}$ will collapse to the states $|0000\rangle_{\text{ABEF}} |\Phi^{-}\rangle_{CD}$, $|0110\rangle_{ABEF} |\Phi^{-}\rangle_{CD}$, $|1001\rangle_{ABEF} |\Phi^{-}\rangle_{CD}$ $\left(\frac{1}{2} \sum_{\text{CD}} |1111\rangle_{ABEF} | \Phi^{-} \rangle_{CD}, |0001\rangle_{ABEF} | \Psi^{+} \rangle_{CD}, |0111\rangle_{ABEF} | \Psi^{+} \rangle_{CD}, |1000\rangle_{ABEF} | \Psi^{+} \rangle_{CD}, |1110\rangle_{ABEF} | \Psi^{+} \rangle_{CD}$ $\big \rangle_{ABEF}|\Psi^+\big \rangle_{CD},|0010\big \rangle_{ABEF}|\Psi^-\big \rangle_{CD},|0100\big \rangle_{ABEF}|\Psi^-\big \rangle_{CD},|1011\big \rangle_{ABEF}|\Psi^-\big \rangle_{CD},|1011\big \rangle_{ABEF}|\Psi^-\big \rangle_{CD}$ $(10011)_{ABEF}$ $|\Phi^{+}\rangle_{CD}$, $|0101\rangle_{ABEF}$ $|\Phi^{+}\rangle_{CD}$, $|1010\rangle_{ABEF}$ $|\Phi^{+}\rangle_{CD}$ and $|1100\rangle_{ABEF}$ $|\Phi^{+}\rangle_{CD}$ with the probability of 1/16, respectively. As we can see, Alice and Bob's measurement results have a distinct correlation.

2.2 Collective Noise

According to the literature [\[16\]](#page-14-12), collective noise can fall into two categories: collectivedephasing noise and collective-rotation noise. Next, we use the evolution of quantum states to illustrate the efects of these two noises on the Z-basis. Qubits ∣0〉 and ∣1〉 in the frst type of noise evolve as follows:

$$
U_{dp} | 0 \rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{i\varphi_{(i)}} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = | 0 \rangle
$$

\n
$$
U_{dp} | 1 \rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & e^{i\varphi_{(i)}} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = e^{i\varphi_{(i)}} | 1 \rangle
$$
 (2)

where U_{dp} represents the matrix form of collective-dephasing noise, and $\varphi_{(t)}$ represents the phase noise parameter that varies with time. Similarly, qubits ∣0〉 and ∣1〉 in collective-rotation noise undergo the following evolution:

$$
U_r | 0 \rangle = \begin{pmatrix} \cos \theta_{(t)} & \sin \theta_{(t)} \\ -\sin \theta_{(t)} & \cos \theta_{(t)} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} = \cos \theta_{(t)} | 0 \rangle + \sin \theta_{(t)} | 1 \rangle
$$

\n
$$
U_r | 1 \rangle = \begin{pmatrix} \cos \theta_{(t)} & \sin \theta_{(t)} \\ -\sin \theta_{(t)} & \cos \theta_{(t)} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = -\sin \theta_{(t)} | 0 \rangle + \cos \theta_{(t)} | 1 \rangle
$$
 (3)

where U_r represents the matrix form of collective-rotation noise, and $\theta_{(t)}$ represents the rotation noise parameter that varies with time.

3 The Two‑Party QKA Protocols Against Collective Noise

3.1 The QKA Protocol Against Collective‑Dephasing Noise

Two logical qubits, $|0_{dp}\rangle = |01\rangle$ and $|1_{dp}\rangle = |10\rangle [16]$ $|1_{dp}\rangle = |10\rangle [16]$, as well as their superposition states $| +_{dp} \rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|0_{dp}\rangle + |1_{dp}\rangle)$ and $| -_{dp}\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|0_{dp}\rangle - |1_{dp}\rangle)$ are unaffected in the collective-dephasing noise channel.

Then exploiting this, we provide a two-party QKA protocol with logical six-particle entangled states resistant to collective-dephasing noise. The protocol works as follows.

Step 1 Each of Alice and Bob produces 4*n*-bit keys at random:

$$
K_A = K_A^1 \parallel K_A^2 \parallel \cdots \parallel K_A^n
$$

$$
K_B = K_B^1 \parallel K_B^2 \parallel \cdots \parallel K_B^n
$$

where K_A^i , $K_B^i \in \{0000,0001,0010,0011,0100,0101,0110,0111,1000,1001,1010,1011,11$ 00,1101,1110,1111}, *i*=1, 2…, *n*.

Alice is going to prepare *n* logical six-particle entangled states $|\psi_{dp}\rangle_{ABCDEF}$. Step 2

$$
|\psi_{dp}\rangle_{ADCEF}
$$
\n
$$
=1/\sqrt{32}(|0_{dp}\rangle|00\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|0_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle+|1_{dp}\rangle
$$

These logical states are separated into six ordered sequences S_A , S_B , S_C , S_D , S_E , and S_F , consisting of logical qubits A, logical qubits B, particles C, particles D, logical qubits E and logical qubits F , respectively. Among them, the logical qubits A , B , E , and F are made up of two physical qubits, namely A_1 and A_2 , B_1 and B_2 , E_1 and E_2 , and F_1 and F_2 , respectively. Alice randomly selects logical qubits from $\{|0_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle|+_{{dp}}|_{{-dp}}|$ as decoy states and inserts them into S_A , S_B , S_E , and S_F to obtain S'_A , S'_B , S'_E , and S'_F . Afterwards, Alice sends them to Bob and holds the sequences S_C and S_D .

Step 3 After confirming that Bob has received sequences S'_A , S'_B , S'_E , and S'_F , Alice announces the decoy logical qubits' locations and the measurement basis ($\{ |0_{dp}\rangle | 1_{dp}\}$) or $\{ |+_{dp}\rangle |$ $-\frac{1}{dp}$ }). Bob uses the correct measurement basis to measure these decoy logical qubits

Table 2 Measurement results and corresponding values

> and notifes Alice of the results. Thus, Alice can calculate the error rate. If the error rate is lower than predetermined threshold, go to Step 4. Otherwise, there exists eavesdropping in quantum channels. Abort the protocol and restart from Step 1.

Step 4 After removing the decoy logical qubits, the sequences S'_{A} , S'_{B} , S'_{E} , and S'_{F} revert to S_A , S_B , S_E , and S_F . Bob executes the CNOT operations on the logical qubits *A*, *B*, *E*, and *F*, respectively. Particles A_1 , B_1 , E_1 , and F_1 serve as control qubits, while particles A_2 , B_2 , E_2 , and F_2 serve as target qubits. After four CNOT operations, each logical quantum state $|\psi_{dp}\rangle_{ABCDEF}$ is converted to

$$
|\Lambda_{dp}\rangle_{ABCDEF} = U_{CNOT}^{A_1A_2} \otimes U_{CNOT}^{B_1B_2} \otimes U_{CNOT}^{F_1F_2} \otimes |\psi_{dp}\rangle_{ABCDEF}
$$

\n
$$
=^1/s \left[\left(|01_{A_1A_2}|01_{B_1B_2}|01_{E_1E_2}|01_{F_1F_2} + |01\rangle_{A_1A_2}|11\rangle_{B_1B_2}|11\rangle_{E_1E_2}|01\rangle_{F_1F_2} - |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|01\rangle_{B_1B_2}|01\rangle_{B_1E_2}|11\rangle_{F_1F_2} - |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|11\rangle_{B_1B_2}|11\rangle_{E_1E_2}|11\rangle_{F_1F_2}| \otimes \gamma_{CD} + (|01\rangle_{B_1B_2}|01\rangle_{E_1E_2}|11\rangle_{F_1F_2} - |01\rangle_{A_1A_2}|11\rangle_{B_1B_2}|11\rangle_{E_1E_2}|11\rangle_{F_1F_2} - |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|01\rangle_{B_1B_2}|01\rangle_{E_1E_2}|01\rangle_{F_1F_2} + |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|11\rangle_{B_1B_2}|11\rangle_{E_1E_2}|01\rangle_{F_1F_2} + (|01\rangle_{B_1B_2}|11\rangle_{E_1E_2}|01\rangle_{F_1F_2} + |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|11\rangle_{B_1B_2}|01\rangle_{E_1E_2}|01\rangle_{F_1F_2} + |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|01\rangle_{B_1B_2}|11\rangle_{E_1E_2} - |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|11\rangle_{B_1B_2}|01\rangle_{E_1E_2}|11\rangle_{F_1F_2} + |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|01\rangle_{B_1B_2}|11\rangle_{F_1F_2} + |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|11\rangle_{B_1B_2}|01\rangle_{E_1E_2}|11\rangle_{F_1F_2} + |11\rangle_{A_1A_2}|
$$

Later, Alice applies the Bell measurement to each pair of the corresponding particles in sequences S_c and S_p , and Bob applies the *ZZZZ basis* measurement to the corresponding particles A_1 in S_A , B_1 in S_B , E_1 in S_E , and F_1 in S_F . The encoding scheme agreed upon by Alice and Bob is

$$
|0000\rangle \rightarrow 0000, |0001\rangle \rightarrow 0001, |0010\rangle \rightarrow 0010, |0011\rangle \rightarrow 0011, |0100\rangle \rightarrow 0100, |0101\rangle \rightarrow 0101, |0110\rangle \rightarrow 0110, |0111\rangle \rightarrow 0111, |1000\rangle \rightarrow 1000, |1001\rangle \rightarrow 1001, |1010\rangle \rightarrow 1010, |1011\rangle \rightarrow 1011, |1100\rangle \rightarrow 1100, |1101\rangle \rightarrow 1101, |1110\rangle \rightarrow 1110, |1111\rangle \rightarrow 1111
$$
 (6)

Afterwards, all the Bob's measurement results are coded as $M = M^1 || M^2 || \cdots || M^n$, where M^i is the code of Bob's *i*th measurement result $(i = 1, 2, \dots, n)$. Table [2](#page-5-0) displays the measurement results and corresponding values.

When Bob finally publishes the measurement results for particles A_1 and B_1 , Alice and Bob will know each other's results. As a consequence, they share a classic bit string *M*.

Step 5 Introduce the four unitary operations U_{00} , U_{01} , U_{10} and U_{11} . According to the key *K_A*, Alice lets $i_1 i_2 = K_{A12}^i$ and $i_3 i_4 = K_{A34}^i$ (*i* = 1, 2, ..., *n*). Then Alice executes the unitary operation $U_{i_1 i_2}$ on the *i*th particle in S_D to obtain the new sequence S_D^* . By matching two particles in S_C and S_D^* , a new Bell state is generated. Alice prepares the corresponding logical Bell state λ_{dp} $C_1C_2D_1D_2$ in accordance with the new Bell state. Then Alize gracultate the unitary constitution U and the ith position C^* to state. Then Alice executes the unitary operation $U_{i_3i_4}$ on the *i*th particle in S_D^* to obtain the new sequence $S_D^{*(1)}$. The matched two particles in S_C and $S_D^{*(1)}$ constitute a new Bell state. Similarly, Alice prepares the corresponding logical Bell state $\lambda^*_{dp\rangle_{C_1C_2D_1D_2}}$. The following are the definitions of the four logical Bell states [[37](#page-15-6)]:

$$
|\Phi_{dp}^{+}\rangle_{C_{1}C_{2}D_{1}D_{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle + |1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle)_{C_{1}C_{2}D_{1}D_{2}}
$$

\n
$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\Phi^{+}\rangle|\Phi^{+}\rangle - |\Phi^{-}\rangle|\Phi^{-}\rangle)_{C_{1}D_{1}C_{2}D_{2}}
$$

\n
$$
|\Phi_{dp}^{-}\rangle_{C_{1}C_{2}D_{1}D_{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle - |1_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle)_{C_{1}C_{2}D_{1}D_{2}}
$$

\n
$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\Phi^{-}\rangle|\Phi^{+}\rangle - |\Phi^{+}\rangle|\Phi^{-}\rangle)_{C_{1}D_{1}C_{2}D_{2}}
$$

\n
$$
|\Psi_{dp}^{+}\rangle_{C_{1}C_{2}D_{1}D_{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle + |1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle)_{C_{1}C_{2}D_{1}D_{2}}
$$

\n
$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\Psi^{+}\rangle|\Psi^{+}\rangle - |\Psi^{-}\rangle|\Psi^{-}\rangle)_{C_{1}D_{1}C_{2}D_{2}}
$$

\n
$$
|\Psi_{dp}^{-}\rangle_{C_{1}C_{2}D_{1}D_{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_{dp}\rangle|1_{dp}\rangle - |1_{dp}\rangle|0_{dp}\rangle)_{C_{1}C_{2}D_{1}D_{2}}
$$

\n
$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\Psi^{-}\rangle|\Psi^{+}\rangle - |\Psi^{+}\rangle|\Psi^{-}\rangle)_{C_{1}D_{1}C_{2}D_{2}}
$$

Alice divides the logical Bell state $\vert \lambda_{dp}\rangle_{C_1C_2D_1D_2}$ into two ordered sequences $S_C^{(1)}$ and C_1 and C_2 and C_3 and C_4 and C_5 and C_6 and C_7 and C_8 . $S_D^{(1)}$, consisting of logical qubits *C* (two physical qubits *C*₁ and *C*₂) and logical qubits *D*

(two physical qubits D_1 and D_2), respectively. Likewise, the logical Bell state $|\lambda_{Rr}^* \rangle_{C_1 C_2 D_1 D_2}$
is also divided into two ordered sequences $S_C^{(2)}$ and $S_D^{(2)}$. Then Alice performs a permutation
operator $\sum_{i=1}^{6} S_{D_i}^{(1)}$ \int ¹, S^{(2)∗}_C \int and $S_D^{(2)}$ the sequences $S_C^{(1)*}$, $S_D^{(1)'}, S_C^{(2)*'}$ and $S_D^{(2)'},$ in which the decoy logical qubits are randomly taken from the set $\{10_{dp}\}\{1_{dp}\} +_{dp}\}$. Alice sends the sequences $S_C^{(1)*}$, $S_D^{(1)'}$, $S_C^{(2)*'}$ and $S_C^{(2)'}$ $'$, $S_D^{(1)}$ \cdot *, S*^{(2)∗} en from the set $\left\{ |0_{dp}^{D}\rangle |1_{dp}^{D}\rangle |+_{dp}^{D}\right\}$. Alice sends the sequences $S_C^{(1)*}$, $S_D^{(1)'}, S_C^{(2)*'}$ and $S_D^{(2)'}$ to Bob.

- **Step 6** After Bob receives $S_C^{(1)*}$ $\frac{1}{2}$, $S_D^{(1)*}$ $\int_S S_C^{(2)*}$ \int and $S_D^{(2)}$ � , both parties conduct precisely the same eavesdropping check as the frst time.
- **Step 7** Bob announces the value $K'_B = K_B \oplus M = (K_B^1 \oplus M^1) \parallel (K_B^2 \oplus M^2) \parallel \cdots \parallel$ $(K_B^n \oplus M^n)$. Based on the classic bit string *M*, Alice can deduce the key K_B . Assuming that Alice and Bob's default negotiation rule is $K_{AB}=(K_A\oplus K_B)\parallel (K_A\oplus K_B\oplus M)$. Then they can calculate the shared key K_{AB} of both parties.
- **Step 8** Alice publishes the permutation operator \prod_n ; Bob performs its inverse permutation on the sequences $S_C^{(1)*}$ and $S_C^{(2)*}$ to obtain the sequences $S_C^{(1)}$ and $S_C^{(2)}$. Bob associates the sequence $S_C^{(1)}$ with the sequence $S_D^{(1)}$ to obtain *n* logical Bell states and then carries out the Bell measurements on the particles C_1 , D_1 and the particles C_2 , D_2 , respectively. That is, Bob is aware of the logical Bell state $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial q}$ c₁*C*₂*D*₁*D*₂ sent by Alice and the physical Bell state corresponding to each poin of portiologin S₀ and S^{*} Accord the physical Bell state corresponding to each pair of particles in S_C and S_D^* . According to the initial Bell states and the transformed Bell states, Bob is able to deduce the value K_{A12}^i . Bob combines the sequences $S_C^{(2)}$ and $S_D^{(2)}$ to obtain *n* logical Bell states. Then the Bell measurements are performed on the particles C_1 , D_1 and the particles *C*₂, *D*₂, respectively. Thus, Bob is aware of the logical Bell state λ_{dp}^* /_{*C*1}*C*₂*D*₁*D*₂ sent by Alice and the physical Bell state corresponding to each pair of particles in S_C and *S*^{∗(1)}</sub>. Based on the transformation from the corresponding physical Bell state of each D pair of particles in S_C and S^*_{D} to the corresponding physical Bell state of each pair of particles in *S_C* and $S_D^{*(1)}$, Bob can infer the value K_{A34}^i . Combining K_{A12}^i and K_{A34}^i , Bob is able to obtain the value K_A and produce the shared key K_{AB} .

3.2 The QKA Protocol Against Collective‑Rotation Noise

In the collective-rotation noise channel, two logical qubits, $|0_r\rangle = |\phi^+\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$ and $|1_r\rangle = |\psi^{-}\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle)$ [[16](#page-14-12)], as well as their superposition states $| +_r \rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|0_r\rangle + |1_r\rangle)$ and $| +_r \rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(|0_r\rangle + |1_r\rangle)$ are not affected by the collectiverotation noise.

Now, we present a two-party QKA protocol immune to the collective-rotation noise with the logical six-particle entangled states. It consists of the following steps.

Step 1 Each of Alice and Bob generates 4*n*-bit keys at random:

$$
\begin{array}{c} K_A = K_A^1 \parallel K_A^2 \parallel \cdots \parallel K_A^n \\ K_B = K_B^1 \parallel K_B^2 \parallel \cdots \parallel K_B^n \end{array}
$$

where K_A^i , K_B^i ∈{0000,0001,0010,0011,0100,0101,0110,0111,1000,1001,1010,1011,1 $100,1101,1110, 1111$, $i=1, 2..., n$. They adopt precisely the same rule of negotiation as the frst protocol.

Alice prepares *n* logical six-particle entangled states $|\psi_r\rangle_{ARCDEF}$. Step 2

$$
W_r)_{ABCDEF} = \frac{1}{4\sqrt{2}}(|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle+|1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle|1_r\r
$$

These logical states are broken up into six ordered sequences, S_A , S_B , S_C , S_D , S_E , and S_F , consisting of logical qubits A, logical qubits B, particles C, particles D, logical qubits E and logical qubits F, respectively. Among them, logical qubits A, B, E , and F are made up of two physical qubits, namely A_1 and A_2 , B_1 and B_2 , E_1 and E_2 , and F_1 and F_2 . Alice randomly selects logical qubits from $\{|0_r\rangle, |1_r\rangle, |+_r\rangle, |-_r\rangle\}$ as decoy states and inserts them into S_A , S_B , S_E , and S_F to obtain S'_A , S'_B , S'_E , and S'_F . Later, Alice sends them to Bob and saves the sequences S_C and S_D .

Step 3 After Bob has received the sequences S'_A , S'_B , S'_E , and S'_F , Alice announces the locations and the measurement basis $({|0_r\rangle}, |1_r\rangle)$ or ${|+_r\rangle}, |-, \rangle)$ of the decoy logical qubits. Bob uses the correct measurement basis to measure the corresponding decoy logical

Table 3 Measurement results and corresponding values	Alice's measure- ment result	Bob's measurement result	M^i
	$ \Phi^-\rangle$	$\langle \Phi^+ \rangle_{A_1 A_2} \langle \Phi^+ \rangle_{B_1 B_2} \langle \Phi^+ \rangle_{E_1 E_2} \langle \Phi^+ \rangle_{F_1 F_2}$	0000
	$ \Phi^{-}\rangle$	$\langle \phi^+ \rangle_{A,A_2} \Psi^- \rangle_{B,B_2} \Psi^- \rangle_{E,E_2} \Phi^+ \rangle_{F,F_2}$	0110
	$ \Phi^{-}\rangle$	$\left \Psi^{-} \right\rangle_{A,A_2} \left \Phi^{+} \right\rangle_{B,B_2} \left \Phi^{+} \right\rangle_{E,E_2} \left \Psi^{-} \right\rangle_{F,F_2}$	1001
	$ \Phi^{-}\rangle$	$\ \Psi^{-}\rangle_{A_1A_2} \ \Psi^{-}\rangle_{B_1B_2} \ \Psi^{-}\rangle_{E_1E_2} \ \Psi^{-}\rangle_{E_1F_2}$	1111
	$ \Psi^+\rangle$	$\langle \Phi^+ \rangle_{A_1 A_2} \langle \Phi^+ \rangle_{B_1 B_2} \langle \Phi^+ \rangle_{E_1 E_2} \langle \Psi^- \rangle_{F_1 F_2}$	0001
	$ \Psi^+\rangle$	$\langle \phi^+ \rangle_{A_1 A_2} \langle \phi^- \rangle_{B_1 B_2} \langle \phi^- \rangle_{E_1 E_2} \langle \phi^- \rangle_{F_1 F_2}$	0111
	$ \Psi^+\rangle$	$\langle \Psi^{-} \rangle_{A_1 A_2} \cdot \langle \Phi^{+} \rangle_{B_1 B_2} \cdot \langle \Phi^{+} \rangle_{E_1 E_2} \cdot \langle \Phi^{+} \rangle_{F_1 F_2}$	1000
	$ \Psi^+\rangle$	$\ \Psi^{-}\rangle_{A,A_{2}} \ \Psi^{-}\rangle_{B,B_{2}} \ \Psi^{-}\rangle_{E,E_{2}} \ \Phi^{+}\rangle_{F,F_{2}}$	1110
	$ \Psi^{-}\rangle$	$\langle \phi^{+} \rangle_{A,A_2} \phi^{+} \rangle_{B,B_2} \Psi^{-} \rangle_{E,E_2} \Phi^{+} \rangle_{F,F_2}$	0010
	$ \Psi^{-}\rangle$	$\langle \ket{\Phi^+}_{A_1A_2} \Psi^- \rangle_{B_1B_2} \Phi^+ \rangle_{E_1E_2} \Phi^+ \rangle_{F_1F_2}$	0100
	$ \Psi^{-}\rangle$	$\left \Psi^- \right\rangle_{A_1 A_2} \left \Phi^+ \right\rangle_{B_1 B_2} \left \Psi^- \right\rangle_{E_1 E_2} \left \Psi^- \right\rangle_{F_1 F_2}$	1011
	$ \Psi^{-}\rangle$	$\langle \Psi^{-} \rangle_{A_1 A_2} \langle \Psi^{-} \rangle_{B_1 B_2} \langle \Phi^{+} \rangle_{E_1 E_2} \langle \Psi^{-} \rangle_{F_1 F_2}$	1101
	$ \Phi^+\rangle$	$\langle \ket{\Phi^+}_{A,A_2} \ket{\Phi^+}_{B,B_2} \ket{\Psi^-}_{E,E_2} \ket{\Psi^-}_{F,F_2}$	0011
	$ \Phi^+\rangle$	$\langle \ket{\Phi^+}_{A,A_2} \ket{\Psi^-}_{B,B_2} \ket{\Phi^+}_{E,E_2} \ket{\Psi^-}_{F,F_2}$	0101
	$ \Phi^+\rangle$	$\langle \Psi^{-} \rangle_{A_1 A_2} \cdot \langle \Phi^{+} \rangle_{B_1 B_2} \cdot \langle \Psi^{-} \rangle_{E_1 E_2} \cdot \langle \Phi^{+} \rangle_{F_1 F_2}$	1010
	$ \Phi^+\rangle$	$ \Psi^{-}\rangle_{A,A_{2}} \Psi^{-}\rangle_{B,B_{2}} \Phi^{+}\rangle_{E,E_{2}} \Phi^{+}\rangle_{F,F_{2}}$	1100

Table 3

qubits and then notifes Alice of the results. In this way, Alice can calculate the error rate. If the error rate is lower than predetermined threshold, go to Step 4. Otherwise, quantum channels are bugged. Abort the protocol and restart from Step 1.

Step 4 After removing the decoy logical qubits, the sequences S'_{A} , S'_{B} , S'_{E} , and S'_{F} are restored to S_A , S_B , S_E and S_F . Alice carries out the Bell measurement on each pair of the corresponding particles in sequences S_C and S_D , and Bob carries out the Bell measurements on particles A_1 and A_2 in S_A , B_1 and B_2 in S_B , E_1 and E_2 in S_F , F_1 and F_2 in S_F . The encoding scheme agreed upon by Alice and Bob is

$$
|\Phi^{+}\rangle_{A_{1}A_{2}} |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{B_{1}B_{2}} |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{E_{1}E_{2}} |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{E_{1}F_{2}} \rightarrow 0000, |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{A_{1}A_{2}} |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{B_{1}B_{2}} |\Psi^{-}\rangle_{F_{1}F_{2}} \rightarrow 0001, |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{A_{1}A_{2}} |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{B_{1}B_{2}} |\Psi^{-}\rangle_{F_{1}F_{2}} \rightarrow 0010, |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{A_{1}A_{2}} |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{B_{1}B_{2}} |\Psi^{-}\rangle_{F_{1}F_{2}} \rightarrow 0011, |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{A_{1}A_{2}} |\Psi^{-}\rangle_{B_{1}B_{2}} |\Psi^{-}\rangle_{E_{1}E_{2}} |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{E_{1}E_{2}} |\Phi^{+}\rangle_{E_{1}E
$$

Like the frst protocol, all the Bob's measurement results are coded as $M = M^1 \parallel M^2 \parallel \cdots \parallel M^n$, where *Mⁱ* is the code of Bob's *i*th measurement result (*i* = 1, 2, ···, *n*). Table [3](#page-9-0) shows the measurement results and corresponding values.

When Bob finally publishes the Bell measurement results for A_1 and A_2 in S_A , B_1 and B_2 in S_B , Alice and Bob can deduce each other's results. That is, they share a classic bit string *M*.

Step 5 According to the key K_A , Alice lets $i_1 i_2 = K_{A12}^i$ and $i_3 i_4 = K_{A34}^i (i = 1, 2, ..., n)$. Then Alice performs the unitary operation $U_{i_1 i_2}$ on the *i*th particle in S_D to obtain the new sequence S^*_{D} . By matching two particles in S_C and S^*_{D} , a new Bell state is produced in this manner. In accordance with the new Bell state, Alice prepares the relevant logical Bell state λ_r , C_1 , C_2 *D*₁, D_2 . Then Alice performs the unitary operation $U_{i_3i_4}$ on the *i*th particle in S_D^* to obtain the new sequence $S_D^{*(1)}$. The corresponding two particles in S_C and $S_{D}^{*(1)}$ constitute a new Bell state. Similarly, Alice prepares the corresponding logical Bell state λ^* _r, C_1 , C_2 , D_1 , D_2 . The four logical Bell states [[37](#page-15-6)] are described as follows:

$$
|\Phi_r^+\rangle_{C_1C_2D_1D_2} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle + |1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle)_{C_1C_2D_1D_2}
$$

\n
$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\Phi^+\rangle|\Phi^+\rangle + |\Psi^-\rangle|\Psi^-\rangle)_{C_1D_1C_2D_2}
$$

\n
$$
|\Phi_r^-\rangle_{C_1C_2D_1D_2} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_r\rangle|0_r\rangle - |1_r\rangle|1_r\rangle)_{C_1C_2D_1D_2}
$$

\n
$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\Phi^-\rangle|\Phi^-\rangle + |\Psi^+\rangle|\Psi^+\rangle)_{C_1D_1C_2D_2}
$$

\n
$$
|\Psi_r^+\rangle_{C_1C_2D_1D_2} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle + |1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle)_{C_1C_2D_1D_2}
$$

\n
$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\Phi^-\rangle|\Psi^+\rangle - |\Psi^+\rangle|\Phi^-\rangle)_{C_1D_1C_2D_2}
$$

\n
$$
|\Psi_{dp}^-\rangle_{C_1C_2D_1D_2} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0_r\rangle|1_r\rangle - |1_r\rangle|0_r\rangle)_{C_1C_2D_1D_2}
$$

\n
$$
= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|\Phi^+\rangle|\Psi^-\rangle - |\Psi^-\rangle|\Phi^+\rangle)_{C_1D_1C_2D_2}
$$

\n(10)

Alice divides the logical Bell state $\vert \lambda_r \rangle_{C_1 C_2 D_1 D_2}$ into two ordered sequences $S_D^{(1)}$ and $S_D^{(1)}$, consisting of logical qubits *C* (two physical qubits C_1 and C_2) and logical qubits $D_D^{(1)}$, consisting of logical qubits *C* (two physical qubits C_1 and C_2) and logical qubits *D* (two physical qubits D_1 and D_2), respectively. Likewise, the logical Bell state $\left| \lambda^*_{r} \right\rangle_{C_1 C_2 D_1 D_2}$ is also divided into two ordered sequences $S_C^{(2)}$ and $S_D^{(2)}$. Then Alice performs a permutation operator \prod_n on $S_C^{(1)}$ and $S_C^{(2)}$ to get two random sequences $S_C^{(1)*}$ and $S_C^{(2)*}$ $\frac{1}{2}$, $S_{D}^{(1)}$ $\frac{1}{2}$, $S_C^{(2)*}$ \int and $S_D^{(2)}$ \overline{C} , in which the decoy logical qubits are randomly taken from the set $\{|0_r\rangle, |1_r\rangle, |+_r\rangle, |-_r\rangle\}$. Alice sends the sequences $S_C^{(1)*'}$, $S_D^{(1)'}, S_C^{(2)*'}$ and $S_D^{(2)'}$ to Bob. $\frac{1}{2}$, $S_D^{(1)}$ \cdot *, S*^{(2)∗} \int_{a}^{b} and $S_D^{(2)}$ \prime to Bob.

Step 6 These steps resemble steps 6-8 of the protocol against collective-dephasing noise.

3.3 Correctness Analysis of Two Protocols

Reference [[38](#page-15-7)] proved that logical states $|0_{dp}\rangle$ and $|1_{dp}\rangle$ can resist collective-dephasing noise, while logical states $|0_r⟩$ and $|1_r⟩$ can resist collective-rotation noise. Afterwards, Kwiat et al. [\[39\]](#page-15-8) verifed the noise resistance of logical qubits in DFS through experiments. Walton et al [\[16\]](#page-14-12) first proposed the use of logical qubits to implement quantum key distribution under collective noise.

Take the frst protocol as an example, we replace the qubits to be transmitted with the corresponding logical states, that is

$$
|0\rangle \rightarrow |0_{dp}\rangle, |1\rangle \rightarrow |1_{dp}\rangle
$$
 (11)

Therefore, the quantum source, decoy states, and Bell states undergo the following transformation in the protocol:

$$
|\psi\rangle_{ABCDEF} \rightarrow |\psi_{dp}\rangle_{ABCDEF}
$$

\n
$$
\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |+\rangle, |-\rangle} \rightarrow \{|0_{dp}\rangle, |1_{dp}\rangle, |+_{dp}\rangle, |-_{dp}\rangle\}
$$

\n
$$
|\Phi^{+}\rangle \rightarrow |\Phi_{dp}^{+}\rangle | \Phi^{-}\rangle \rightarrow |\Phi_{dp}^{-}\rangle | \Psi^{+}\rangle \rightarrow |\Psi_{dp}^{+}\rangle | \Psi^{-}\rangle \rightarrow |\Psi_{dp}^{-}\rangle
$$
 (12)

These transformed quantum states are unafected in noisy channels. Among them, the logical six-particle entangled states and the logical Bell states can transmit information through entanglement swapping, and the logical decoy states can be used as eavesdropping checks. Consequently, our protocols are working.

4 Security Analysis

Since all the transmitted particles are logical states, the above protocols can resist collective-dephasing noise and collective-rotation noise, respectively. Next, we analyze the impact of malicious attacks on protocols. QKA protocols are mainly involved in two types of attacks: internal and external attacks. In order to demonstrate the security of the protocols, we will discuss both types of attacks separately.

4.1 Internal Attack

Because of delayed measurement technology, Bob can only infer K_A after announcing $K'_B = K_B \oplus M$. As a result, he is unable to use the key K_A to manipulate the key K_B , which prevents him from carrying out the internal attack. Before sending the encoded message qubits, Alice is unaware of the key K_B ; therefore, she would not alter K_A depending on it. So Alice's internal attack is invalid.

4.2 External Attack

External attack can be subdivided into the Trojan horse attacks, the intercept-resend attack, and the entangle-measure attack. Supposing Eve is an external attacker, she must eavesdrop on the values of M and K_A to acquire the shared key. The following is a detailed analysis of three primary attack strategies.

Trojan horse attacks Since these two protocols are unidirectional QKA protocols, all particle sequences are transmitted just once in quantum channels. No opportunity exists for Eve to retrieve spy photons from particle sequences. In other words, the two protocols can immunize Trojan horse attacks without using any specifc detection device. *Intercept-resend attack* Eve intends to execute an intercept-resend attack on the sequences S'_A , S'_B , S'_E , and S'_F transmitted in quantum channels. She has to intercept these sequences and send pseudo-random sequences to Bob. Nonetheless, Eve is uninformed

of the decoy logical qubit's position and matched measurement basis before the eavesdropping check. Therefore Eve has only a 25% probability of successfully measuring the value of the decoy logical qubit. Assuming that the number of decoy logical qubits prepared for each sequence is λ , the probability of detecting eavesdropping is $1-(3/4)^{\lambda}$, which shows that the participant can easily detect the eavesdropper' presence when λ is large enough. Once the eavesdropper is detected, this protocol is terminated and restarted. As a result, it is almost impossible for Eve to get the fnal key via the intercept-resend attack.

Entangle-measure attack Assuming Eve is motivated to make an entangle-measure attack on the two QKA protocols with her prepared auxiliary photon $|p\rangle$, she is likely to perform the unitary operation *U* on the intercepted qubit to entangle it with the auxiliary photon. Taking the QKA protocol immune to collective-dephasing noise as an example, the evolution process of the quantum system is as follows:

$$
U|0_{dp}\rangle|p\rangle = a_{00}|00\rangle|p_{00}\rangle + a_{01}|01\rangle|p_{01}\rangle + a_{10}|10\rangle|p_{10}\rangle + a_{11}|11\rangle|p_{11}\rangle,
$$

\n
$$
U|1_{dp}\rangle|p\rangle = b_{00}|00\rangle|p'_{00}\rangle + b_{01}|01\rangle|p'_{01}\rangle + b_{10}|10\rangle|p'_{10}\rangle + b_{11}|11\rangle|p'_{11}\rangle,
$$

\n
$$
U|+_{dp}\rangle|p\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(U|0_{dp}\rangle|p\rangle + U|1_{dp}\rangle|p\rangle)
$$

\n
$$
=1/2[|\Phi^{+}\rangle(a_{00}|p_{00}\rangle + a_{11}|p_{11}\rangle + b_{00}|p'_{00}\rangle + b_{11}|p'_{11}\rangle) +
$$

\n
$$
|\Phi^{-}\rangle(a_{00} - a_{11}|p_{11}\rangle + b_{00}|p'_{00}\rangle - b_{11}|p'_{11}\rangle) +
$$

\n
$$
|\Psi^{+}\rangle(a_{01}|p_{01}\rangle + a_{10}|p_{10}\rangle + b_{01}|p'_{01}\rangle + b_{10}|p'_{10}\rangle) +
$$

\n
$$
|\Psi^{-}\rangle(a_{01}|p_{01}\rangle - a_{10}|p_{10}\rangle + b_{01}|p'_{01}\rangle - b_{10}|p'_{10}\rangle)]
$$

\n
$$
U|-_{dp}\rangle|p\rangle = 1/\sqrt{2}(U|0_{dp}\rangle|p\rangle - U|1_{dp}\rangle|p\rangle)
$$

\n
$$
=1/2[|\Phi^{+}\rangle(a_{00}|p_{00}\rangle + a_{11}|p_{11}\rangle - b_{00}|p'_{00}\rangle - b_{11}|p'_{11}\rangle) +
$$

\n
$$
|\Phi^{-}\rangle(a_{00}|p_{00}\rangle - a_{11}|p_{11}\rangle - b_{00}|p'_{00}\rangle + b_{11}|p'_{11}\rangle) +
$$

\n
$$
|\Psi^{+}\rangle(a_{01}|p_{01}\rangle + a_{10}|p_{10}\rangle - b_{01}|p'_{01}\rangle - b_{10}|p'_{
$$

where $|a_{00}|^2 + |a_{01}|^2 + |a_{10}|^2 + |a_{11}|^2 = |b_{00}|^2 + |b_{01}|^2 + |b_{10}|^2 + |b_{11}|^2 = 1$, $a_{00}, a_{01}, a_{10}, a_{11}, b_{00}, b_{01}$, b_{10} and b_{11} denote the vector parameters of *U*, $|p_{00}\rangle, |p_{01}\rangle, |p_{10}\rangle, |p_{11}\rangle, |p_{00}\rangle, |p_{01}\rangle, |p_{11}\rangle, |p_{$ p_{10}^{10} and p_{11}^{11} denote the vector parameters of to, $p_{00}^{10}P_{01}^{10}P_{10}^{10}P_{10}^{10}P_{10}^{10}P_{10}^{10}P_{10}^{10}$
and $|p_{11}^{1}\rangle$ denote the states of the probe space. For the eavesdropping to go undetect Eve's operation *U* must meet three conditions: $a_{00} = a_{10} = a_{11} = 0$, $b_{00} = b_{01} = b_{11} = 0$, and $a_{01} | p_{01} \rangle = b_{10} | p'_{10} \rangle$. Clearly, Eve introduces no error only when the auxiliary photon and the target particle are product states. That is, she just gets meaningless information on K_A and K_B . These two protocols are resistant to external attacks.

5 Efficiency Analysis

Efficiency is an important factor limiting the large-scale application of QKA protocols. In the literature [[40](#page-15-9)], Cabello defines qubit efficiency as $\eta = \frac{\hat{n}_k}{n_q + n_c}$, where n_k , n_q , and n_c denote the length of the fnal generated key, the number of qubits used, and the number of classical bits used, respectively. In our two protocols, it is assumed that *n* is the number of

QKA protocol	Ouantum resource	Measurement basis	Efficiency(%)
Huang's $[20]$	EPR pairs	Z-basis and X-basis	16.67
He's $[21]$	Logical χ states	ZZ-basis and Bell basis	21.05
Yang's[23]	Logical Bell states	Bell basis	21.05
Zhou's $[25]$	Logical GHZ states	ZZ-basis and Bell basis	21.05
Ours	logical six-particle entan- gled states	ZZZZ-basis and Bell basis	22.22

Table 4 Comparison with other similar protocols

logical six-particle entangled states and *m* is the number of decoy logical qubits inserted in each transmitted quantum sequence.

Take the protocol immune to collective-dephasing noise as an example. According to Eq. ([5](#page-5-1)), each logical quantum state $|\psi_{dp}\rangle_{ABCDEF}$ is transformed into $|\psi\rangle_{A_1B_1CDE_1F_1}\otimes |1111\rangle_{A_2B_2E_2F_2}$, ultimately only six particles, A_1 , B_1 , C , D , E_1 , and F_1 , are used, totaling 6*n* qubits. In Step 5, Alice uses *n* logical Bell states $\frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x^2}$ and *n* logical Bell states $\frac{\partial^* u}{\partial x^2}$ totaling $(4n+4n)$ qubits. For the eavesdropping checks, Alice inserts *m* decoy logical states into each of the four sequences in Step 2, and the same applies in Step 5. Each decoy logical state consists of two particles, totaling (8*m*+8*m*) qubits. So the number of qubits used is $n_a = (6n + 4n + 4n) + (8n)^2$ $m+8m$). In Step 4 and Step 7, Bob publishes the measurement result for particles A_1 and B_1 , as well as the result for $K'_B = K_B \oplus M = (K_B^1 \oplus M^1) || (K_B^2 \oplus M^2) || \cdots || (K_B^n \oplus M^n)$, respectively. Therefore, the number of classical bits used is $n_c = (2n+4n)$.

Thus, the qubit efficiency of the protocols is $\eta = \frac{8n}{(6n+4n+4n+8m+8m+2n+4n)}$. Let $m = n$, we have $η = 22.22\%$.

Table [4](#page-13-1) compares our protocols with the current representative two-party protocols for immunity to collective noise, indicating that our protocols have higher qubit efficiency.

6 Conclusion

On the basis of logical six-particle entangled states, this study presents two QKA protocols against diferent types of collective noise. At frst, a signifcant advantage of proposed protocols is that only Bell or ZZZZ-basis measurements are required for quantum states. The equipment used in these two measurement methods is relatively simple and easy to realize under current conditions. In addition, security analysis demonstrates that the two protocols can also resist internal and external attacks. Lastly, we compute both protocols' qubit efficiency, and the results are relatively high.

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Declarations

Confict of interest The authors declare there is no confict of interest.

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