

Solidarity and Cosmopolitanism

Simon Derpmann

Accepted: 9 December 2008 / Published online: 24 December 2008
© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract The review article examines the relation of solidarity and cosmopolitanism in contemporary political, philosophical and sociological debates. In some contexts, solidarity and cosmopolitanism are closely related, in others they are understood to be incompatible. The main body of the report is divided into three parts displaying a tentative classification of the reviewed literature on the subject. The first part serves to outline a general account of solidarity, the communal obligations that follow from it, and its opposition to the moral arguments grounding cosmopolitan obligations. The second part deals with the actual development and realization of solidarity and cosmopolitanism, as well as the tension between both within the European Union. The third part considers some arguments for the extension of solidarity relations beyond state or nation towards cosmopolitan affiliations, obligations and institutions. Finally, a reading of solidarity and cosmopolitanism is offered in which both are compatible with each other.

Keywords Solidarity · Communal obligations · European Union · Universalism · Human rights · Cosmopolitanism

1 Introduction: Approaching the Subject

Recent literature in philosophical, social and political theory contains a manifold discourse on social obligations. One strand of this discourse concerns an apparent opposition between what is subsumed under the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’. This is an opposition between obligations originating in the membership to communities and obligations equally owed to everyone. On the one hand, the recognition of social and moral cohesion within communities has been central in the development of modern political theory and practice, especially in the justification and genesis of civil rights and social justice. On the other hand, the question to what extent limited moral obligations need to be supplemented or even replaced by universal obligations is eminent in contemporary debates.

S. Derpmann (✉)
Philosophisches Seminar, Universität zu Köln, Albertus-Magnus Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany
e-mail: derpmann@hotmail.com

The aim of the present report is to suggest one reading of the described opposition as it appears in philosophical, political and social theory.¹ Based on this, it is possible to locate and analyze the reasons for special moral significance of communal obligations, as well as the arguments that—at least in some contexts—speak against the moral relevance of membership to a community. The scope and range of the discussed forms of social relatedness and moral obligation are both wide and crucial for understanding other debates in moral and social philosophy.

The report is divided into three parts that display a tentative classification of the reviewed literature on the subject. The first part serves to outline a general account of solidarity, the communal obligations that follow from it, and its opposition to the moral arguments grounding cosmopolitan obligations. The second part deals with the actual development and realization of solidarity and cosmopolitanism, as well as the tension between both within the European Union. The third part considers some arguments for the extension of solidarity relations beyond state or nation towards cosmopolitan affiliations, obligations and institutions.

2 Moral Cohesion and Universality

Naturally, different theories of moral and political obligation have different conceptions of ‘solidarity’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, as well as their subsequent theoretical roles. Nonetheless, there are some commonalities that offer a conceptual frame for the characterization of the terms. Both ‘solidarity’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ describe ideals of human thought and action. They refer to the care and the moral responsibility for the rights or welfare of others. However, they differ decisively in the requisite scope of consideration. Obligations of solidarity imply the concern for a particular delimitable community, while cosmopolitanism contains an unconfined orientation towards humanity. The focus of cosmopolitanism is—as the etymology of the term indicates—a single, all embracing moral community. Both terms denote normative reasons describing a source of moral obligation, as well as motivating reasons inherent in the attitude of a person towards others in general, and towards her community in particular.

The concepts have to be dealt with bearing different references, *viz.* *moral* obligations, *social* phenomena, and their *institutional* implementations. Accordingly, one could distinguish between moral, social and institutional forms of solidarity and of cosmopolitanism, prescribing what members of a community *ought* to do from a moral point of view, referring to what they are personally *inclined* to do, or indicating what they are *compelled* to do. In the discussion of their moral relevance it is important to be aware of these different aspects.

2.1 Solidarity

‘Solidarity’ is a term that is widely used, but notoriously hard to define². This is due to the fact that there exists no explicit and coherent theoretical tradition of its use as a systematic term. In his recently translated book on solidarity Hauke Brunkhorst gives a detailed

¹ The reviewed literature does not deal exclusively with this opposition, and the contributions do not form a clearly delimitable discourse. Nonetheless, one can identify one core issue which is relevant in all the contributions. To do this, the literature is selected on the basis of whether or not it makes a contribution to the discussion of the relation of solidarity and cosmopolitanism.

² As Kurt Bayertz remarks, solidarity has "seldom been the object of an elaborated theory", but has often been employed in "wavering, inexact and also suggestive" ways (Bayertz 1999, p. 4).

account of the development of the concept of solidarity and its manifestation in different attitudes, norms, and institutions throughout history.³ Brunkhorst, presenting sociological elements as well as normative political theory, identifies the main lines of development that are influential to the modern understanding of solidarity in the Greek and the Roman tradition of republican civic friendship and in the Christian ideal of charity. He follows these ideas to the concept of fraternity as a central idea of the French revolution, which is considered to be the origin of the relatively young term *solidarité*.

The term ‘solidarity’ allows for narrower and wider definitions, which is why most authors do not argue for a correct, but rather for a sound, use of the term.⁴ The following will be guided by the general understanding of solidarity as referring to *one type* of communal relatedness, which can be found in social cohesion, a corresponding moral obligation originating in the membership to a community, or the institutions of a community.

The difference between the factual attitude of solidarity and the corresponding moral obligation is not very clear-cut. Although Carol Gould distinguishes a descriptive and a normative treatment of the concept, she sees that one may “foreground key features of solidarity relations that are normatively describable by reflecting on facets of certain actually existing relationships” (Gould 2007, p. 149). Solidarity as a form of communal cohesion originates from the identification of individuals with certain community-constituting properties, convictions, capabilities or needs that are meaningful to them. The commonality of significant attributes or convictions—such as gender, class, faith, and political orientation—lays the foundation for communities, when individuals recognize a solidarity relation with a particular community. The reason and motive for solidarity is neither pure affection nor sole self-concerned rationality, but solidarity must be “based on the motivating conception that agents have a political, moral or legal *obligation* towards other agents” (Offe 2004, p. 35). When we speak of solidarity, members of a group *are*, or they at least *feel* obliged to promote the well-being of other members, even incurring significant sacrifices for themselves. Further, they might be sanctioned, if they forego obligations of solidarity.

It is distinctive about obligations of solidarity that they do not only *imply*, but *are essentially about* the inequality of moral concern for those who do belong to a community and those who do not. One could say that obligations of solidarity are not *universal*, but *communal* in the sense that not everyone, but only the members of a community have these obligations. And not everyone, but only members of a community can make the corresponding claims. Based on this, relations of solidarity can be distinguished regarding the types of communities they are directed towards, be it a tribe, a religious group, a union or a nation, and correspondingly different grounds of solidarity can be named.⁵ The task of moral philosophy is to formulate criteria that help to determine which of these forms of solidarity are morally justified—i.e. permitted and possibly morally demanded—and which are not.

As mentioned in the beginning, ‘solidarity’ is a term that is referenced in moral and also in political philosophy. Independent of its alleged intrinsic moral value, solidarity is

³ For the historical development, see also Stjerno (2005), and Wildt (1999).

⁴ Jean Harvey argues that solidarity applies paradigmatically to moral obligations within communities in the face of oppression, rather than to communal obligations in general. Harvey (2007).

⁵ Bayertz (1998) distinguishes between human solidarity as a universal care for humanity, social solidarity as a general form of cohesion, civic solidarity as it is expressed in social policies, and political solidarity emerging against injustice or oppression. Franz Xaver Kaufmann gives four types of reason and motivation for solidarity, which are loyalty, reciprocity, orientation towards the common good, and altruism (Kaufmann 2004, pp. 55 ff.).

ascribed instrumental value in the realization of vital political functions. Herfried Münkler thinks that, although there is no real *theory of solidarity*⁶, it is an ideal of growing importance, especially regarding the social cohesion underlying democratic societies (Münkler 2004, pp. 15ff). Brunkhorst identifies the existence of solidarity as central to the success of modern democratic societies, providing an essential bond between their members. In his view, modern democracy has not made solidarity dispensable, but on the contrary it rests upon the existence of solidarity, even though it might occur in different forms.

One form of solidarity related to a distinct group finds expression in the institutions of social policies, insofar as parts of the individual resources are redistributed to the benefit of indigent members of a community (Bayertz 1998, pp. 293–296). Kaufmann emphasizes the close connection of these forms of solidarity to rights: “The most important basis of the legitimation of these interventions is the warranty of basic social rights” (Kaufmann 2004, pp. 61–62). Thus conceived, the norms of solidarity are *formulated* as legal claims and in universal terms, but they *find application* only to the members of a defined nation or state. This form of solidarity may originally be based on the commonality of culture and language, but it has widely been replaced by formal citizenship. Correspondingly, Brunkhorst’s conception of solidarity depends less on *ascriptive* characteristics like ethnicity than on *civic* identifications.

The crucial question is how solidarity within a community like the nation-state can be brought in accord with the forms of solidarity that are incongruent with it, insofar as they either refer to a wider—possibly cosmopolitan—community or to one that is narrower.⁷ It is at least debatable whether the existence of moral obligations towards others might depend on characteristics like ethnicity, confession, gender, class or nationality. Two questions are related to this. First, it can be asked to what extent there exist moral obligations towards those who are not members of the communities in question, possibly obligations that might weigh heavier than the communal ones. Beyond that, having accepted the moral argument against communal obligations, the human capacity of affiliation might not allow for complete neutrality regarding community-making features and the complete disposal of partialities. Universal concern could—considering what humans are capable of—ask too much of a person, or conflict with other moral values such as integrity and the right to self determination. But the apparent opposition between solidarity and cosmopolitanism lies in the first question, which will be dealt with in the following.

2.2 The Opposition to Cosmopolitanism

Growing interdependence between communities and nation-states perpetually reinitiates a debate about the moral responsibilities and demands generated by this interconnectedness. Cosmopolitanism concerns the obligations of states and individuals towards foreign states and towards their individual citizens. It reveals the practical self-understanding that underlies these obligations. Hayden develops his concept of cosmopolitan politics by looking at its roots in philosophical conceptions of natural law and human rights. He gives an overview of the theoretical history of cosmopolitanism, discussing mainly its Stoic and its Kantian origins. In his approach “[...] cosmopolitanism refers to the idea that all human beings have equal moral standing within a single world community” (Hayden 2005, p. 3).

⁶ This may be partly explained by the dominance of moral theories that emphasize negative and universal duties (See Bayertz 1998, p. 13). At this point the debate about ‘thick’ norms such as solidarity points at a more general problem in ethical theory.

⁷ See the last chapter of Brunkhorst (2005), *From Civic Friendship to a global legal Community* in which he identifies the problem of the erosion of “democratic solidarity”.

He makes a conceptual distinction between moral and legal aspects of cosmopolitanism, since not all moral norms have to find expression in legal regulations. Both forms of cosmopolitanism share the commitments to what Hayden refers to as *individualism*, *universality*, and *generality*: that the individual human being is the ultimate object of moral concern, that all individuals have an equal moral status, and that no one can elude from the obligation to this universal recognition. The basic moral principles of cosmopolitanism then have an influence on the design of cosmopolitan political practices and institutions. Hayden defines three guiding principles in contemporary cosmopolitanism: *moral universalism*, supposing equal membership in one moral community, *juridification*, urging the implementation of universal moral claims through the codification and enforcement of legal human rights, and *institution building*, manifesting these rights in institutions that are effective beyond the boundaries of nation-states.

The central question in the present discourse is to what extent cosmopolitan identities and obligations can—or should—compete with national identities and obligations of solidarity. The assertion that there are important cosmopolitan obligations requires the subsequent examination of moral conflict between cosmopolitan obligations and communal responsibilities. This concerns global justice and national duties, human rights and state sovereignty. Furthermore, one has to distinguish between the *practical conceivability* of a feeling of cosmopolitan affiliation, its *ethical desirability*, and the *political institutions* that would be adequate to meet cosmopolitan obligations.

Some philosophical arguments that are brought forward to resolve some of the tension inherent in these questions are examined in the third part of this report. Before this is done, part two will examine incidents of solidarity and cosmopolitanism within the development of the European Union. This is especially interesting, because here communal obligations are extended beyond national borders, but nonetheless remain connected to a well-defined political community.

3 Transcending Borders: The Case of the European Union

As shown above, the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ have to be dealt with from different perspectives, being concerned with the moral obligations, the corresponding social virtues⁸, and the institutions of communities. The development of the EU is a paradigmatic example for the institution of supra-national social policies and the promotion of solidarity in order to overcome differences and to find commonalities that can fulfill the function of identification and moral cohesion on a political and social level.

3.1 European Social Policies

European solidarity has to be based on a common understanding of the obligations of the EU and its member states. Mainly this concerns social policies⁹, since “for the moment the

⁸ Of course, there is not necessarily a single direction from *moral obligation* to the evaluation of a *social practice*. The latter may with good reason be understood to have an influence on which options are considered to be plausible in the former.

⁹ One could say that the legal arrangements of the welfare state reduce the possibility of disappointment caused by violations of obligations of solidarity, because they do not allow the opportunism of individuals to damage the good will of the majority. The welfare state contains something like an ‘administered’ solidarity. One can argue that this form of solidarity reduces ‘exercised’ solidarity, which is considered to be an important characteristic of the civil society.

national welfare state still remains the main source of social solidarity for people” (Delanty and Rumford 2005, p. 186). Indeed, the commonalities concerning the understanding of the welfare-state are central to political and social cohesion within the EU.

Peter Gussonne studies the implementation of solidarity in the legal structure of the EU.¹⁰ In this context solidarity is meant to establish an orientation towards the community that is compatible with the rational interests of its individual member states. Thus, the EU has a twofold task, because its policies are designed to guarantee economic collaboration, to increase productivity, and strengthen competition, while at the same time they are committed to support the economically less developed members. Gussonne assesses the principle of solidarity to be the basis of European cooperation which follows not the individual, but the common benefit. He declares this principle a necessary condition of European integration (Gussonne 2006, p. 244).

Enabling Social Europe, an interdisciplinary project of the Europäische Akademie, introduces into the conceptual foundations, contemporary challenges and requisite strategies of European social policies in the fields of health care, old-age pensioning, family support and poverty prevention. The aim is to describe an ethical and political framework adequate to *enable* a social Europe that, according to the authors, will have to be an *enabling* one. In this reading, the title of the book refers to what the authors conceive of as the model of European social policy. The principles of the *enabling welfare state* or the *enabling welfare society* are neither strongly liberal nor communitarian. Neither the individual nor the community has clear priority, but both have closely related roles in moral considerations.

Three ethical ideals are central to the European welfare state: *personal autonomy*, *social inclusion* and *distributive justice*. If personal autonomy is understood as the responsible development and realization of important capabilities of a person, then it is essentially related to social inclusion. Thus, autonomy requires more than the absence of restrictions and control, but fundamentally depends on social enabling conditions, since “human beings can exercise their autonomy and their individuality only within a community” (von Maydell et al. 2005, p. 56). Finally, a just distribution is based on different competing ideas, such as the recognition of rational self-interest, the consideration of universal moral claims, and also the principle of solidarity.

The authors see that a consensus concerning social values and aims does not necessarily have to lead to conformity in their political implementation. Diverging social policies, if they are meant to serve comparable aims, can thus be evaluated against the background of diverging social contexts. Still, according to Maydell et al. solidarity can be seen as a widely shared element of the social policies of welfare states within the European Union, despite the fact that it is implemented in differing ways according to different general social conditions.

What remains to be approached in the discussion about European solidarity is the understanding of solidarity that is European in the sense that it does not only take place *within* European states, but also *between* them. This would mean that the welfare states within the European Union could not only *each* be said to be based on a form of solidarity that is characteristic for the welfare state, but also on solidarity *with other* states of the union. In this sense European policies could be conceived to be cosmopolitan, i.e. being at least partly guided by a recognition of a moral responsibility beyond national borders,

¹⁰ The term 'solidarity' appears several times in the Treaty on the European Union and the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

which may find expression in a supranational protection of human rights or in redistributive efforts.¹¹

3.2 European Identification

Social policies are widely understood to be part of an institutionalized, rather than a socially implemented solidarity, or as Münkler puts it, an ‘administered’ instead of a ‘practiced’ solidarity (Münkler 2004, p. 24). In debates about the development of the EU, it is commonly understood that the success of the EU depends on the joint development of solidarity in its political and legal institutions and willingness to solidarity among European citizens.¹² Often it is hoped that the former will have a positive effect on the latter.

It is interesting that both types of solidarity can be understood as cosmopolitan. This allows for the identification of two lines of cosmopolitanism that can both be found within the EU. One lays emphasis on an idea of a cosmopolitan citizenship, which is the logical conclusion from the institutional accentuation and implementation of human rights beyond national borders.¹³ Another line of cosmopolitanism is based upon the description of a multiplicity of identifications and loyalties (see also Delanty and Rumford 2005, p. 193).

In *Rethinking Europe* Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford identify a cosmopolitan aspect in the development of European *policies*, but they also deal with solidarity understood as a *social phenomenon* in the form of moral cohesion. According to them, the sustainable success of the political changes in Europe depends on the formation of a European identity. Delanty and Rumford are aware of the problems concerned with the term ‘identity’, which they use as a “[...] default term for group consciousness [or] collective ‘we’ feelings” (Delanty and Rumford 2005, p. 51).

According to Delanty and Rumford, collective identity as the basis of solidarity is a practical term, since solidarity arises through some form of collective action. Furthermore it has a narrative dimension, i.e. it is tied to a discursive self-understanding. It contains the awareness of difference to others, and finally it consists of a plurality of identities that may coexist or overlap (See also Gould 2007, p. 158 and Pensky 2007, p. 168). Delanty and Rumford argue that Europeanization is a case of cosmopolitanization, which concerns both, the nation-state *and* the society. Pensky poses the question whether such a “[...] cosmopolitan form of solidarity [could] compete effectively with more proximate forms of solidarity, such as national or cultural belonging” (Pensky 2007, p. 168). He emphasizes that “the question of whether societies require ‘thick’ [...] ethical resources [...] is an empirical question [...] distinct from the normative question whether such thick ethical substance is justifiable to those whom it excludes” (Pensky 2007, p. 172). The relation between practical conceivability and normative validity is difficult to determine. Still, European identity is one possible instance of a detachment of affiliations and loyalties from the nation-state, making them cosmopolitan, or at least *more* cosmopolitan. In Delanty’s and Rumford’s words, “European identity is a form of post-national self-understanding that expresses itself within, as much as beyond, national identities” (Delanty and Rumford 2005, p. 23).¹⁴

¹¹ Such are the instruments of economic support that can be found in the European structural funds and the cohesion funds. If they were to be understood as cosmopolitan in the way Hayden defines it, they would not only need to be directed towards the support of *regions* or member *states*, but towards *individual* citizens.

¹² It is criticized that compared to the progresses in economic and political cooperation there is still a lack of reference points that would allow for a normatively meaningful identification as a European citizen.

¹³ Those rights are stated in the *Charter of Fundamental Rights* and the *European Convention on Human Rights*.

¹⁴ See also Delanty (2005).

What makes the discussion of solidarity within the EU particularly interesting is the disclosure of two opposed characteristics of the concept of solidarity. The ‘exclusive’ character of solidarity relates its moral and social relation to a *delimited* community. But at the same time solidarity is an ‘inclusive’ principle *expanding* social and moral relations beyond the moral status quo. For Pensky, this is why solidarity—already on a national level—is a modern political norm, because it is “[...] binding among subjects who have been released from traditional modes of affiliation and mutual obligation” (Pensky 2007, p. 170). Accordingly, the social and moral virtues solidarity and cosmopolitanism do not necessarily exclude each other, if—in accordance with Delanty and Rumford—some forms solidarity can be described as cosmopolitan.

3.3 Towards Cosmopolitanism

At this point the cosmopolitan might ask why, if there are reasons and aspirations to expand solidarity beyond national borders, these forms of solidarity should remain tied to delimitable albeit supranational institutions. According to this argument European solidarity is cosmopolitan only at first sight. It replaces national borders confining solidarity with the borders of the EU. Regarding the development of cosmopolitan forms of solidarity Kaufmann argues that the integration within the European community allows for a “multiplication of the horizons of solidarity, which poses a problem to the conventional understanding of the state, and which enables the citizens to refer to different identities” (Kaufmann 2004, p. 67). This is very close to what Rumford and Delanty have in mind describing a “[...] vision of a singular social model or aspirational community [that] has to accommodate the reality that ethnicity, religion, neo-liberalism, social movements, environmental awareness, and human rights all generate new expectations of living in the world, new social formations, new narratives of connectivity, and new imaginings of family, community, and individuality” (Delanty and Rumford 2005, p. 187).

Also on the institutional level, some of the ideas Delanty and Rumford refer to as European rely on universal reference points expressing cosmopolitan ideals. Although some institutions might be considered to be typically European, they are not necessarily *directed* towards Europe, and thus have impact beyond the EU, such as the promotion of human rights. This orientation constitutes the starting point for the conceptual development of moral and institutional cosmopolitanism. These institutional developments and new forms of identification within the EU could be understood to be cosmopolitan not in a universal, but at least in a “post-national” way.

4 Cosmopolitanism: Displacing or Redefining Solidarity

The commitment to human rights is essential to what institutional cosmopolitans understand by a global civil society. Cosmopolitan principles influence the self-understanding of individuals, but they are also parts of multilateral legal institutions of the European Union or the United Nations.¹⁵ According to Habermas, the conception of the UN as securing a global implementation of the constitution of human rights is an institutional expression of the “shared moral indignation about evident offenses against the

¹⁵ One could argue that there is a difference between the UN as an institution that is meant to promote human rights and the EU that, as Delanty and Rumford also criticize, is still widely seen as a community which follows economic ends.

prohibition of the use of force and massive violations to human rights” which is sufficient for a “solidarity among cosmopolitans” (Habermas 2004, p. 231). As shown, there are two expressions of moral cosmopolitanism. It is understood to be a multicultural, open and tolerant attitude, but also as a moral ideal for political institutions. In this sense cosmopolitan ideals are, again, governed by an institutional and a social understanding of a “[...] global civil society [which] should not be reduced to human rights, [since] the foundations upon which human rights have been imagined have encouraged a political culture within which the idea of global civil society has developed” (Delanty and Rumford 2005, p. 177).

4.1 Cosmopolitan Identification

In his latest work *Identity and Violence* Amartya Sen examines the sources and extension of identity and the obligations that are constituted by identification with a community. His main aim is to argue for the liberty of the individual to embrace his or her identities and the claims that come along with them, but also for the permanent possibility of a critical examination, a new interpretation or a rejection of these identifications. The main ideas of *Identity and Violence*¹⁶ are not only elaborated in a philosophical investigation, but are made plausible using a variety of examples from Uganda, Bangladesh, Japan, Italy, etc. illustrating both the perils and benefits of the identification with communities. Sen emphasizes that identity is both a matter of choice and a matter of self-realization. He emphasizes that there “is a critically important need to see the role of choice in determining the cogency and the relevance of particular identities which are inescapably diverse” (Sen 2006, p. 4).

Sen’s concern is that the concept of identity, as it is used in public and scientific discussions, is subject to simplification and misunderstanding. According to Sen, there are two forms of reductionism concerning obligations of identity. Sen refers to the first mistake as *identity disregard*, which is found mostly in economic theory, when persons are reduced to rational and self-interested individuals. It consists in the ignorance of the importance and value of shared identities. The second mistake is that of *singular affiliation*. Sen identifies several problems in classifying people according to civilizations or cultures. The main objection is that there is neither a single nor an overriding culture or civilization that allows for a concluding classification of individual persons. “The illusion of singularity draws on the presumption that a person not be seen as an individual with many affiliations, nor as someone who belongs to many different groups, but just as a member of one particular collectivity which gives him or her a uniquely important identity” (Sen 2006, p. 45). The two mistakes in the ascription of cultural identity consist in the “misdescription of people belonging to a targeted category, and an insistence that the misdescribed characteristics are the only relevant features of the targeted person’s identity” (Sen 2006, p. 7). The mistake of identifying a particular civilization as belligerent is independent of the mistake of classifying people using the concept of civilization.

Sen’s analyses and observations show that the identification with a community may be of moral importance, but that it coexists with a variety of identifications, for which Sen develops an ideal that is cosmopolitan insofar as it impairs the exclusivity of cultures or nation-states. This again leads to the idea that communal and cosmopolitan obligations need not contradict one another, but that communal obligations compete with cosmopolitan ones.

¹⁶ The underlying philosophical arguments are already outlined in his Romanes Lecture *Reason before Identity* (Sen 1991).

Anthony Appiah's book on cosmopolitanism bears some resemblance to Sen's treatment of the issues although it has a different impetus. Appiah also illustrates his argument with a variety of historical, literary, and autobiographic examples that give some insight into his own cosmopolitan background. His essays advise against cultural narrow-mindedness and outline the option of a cosmopolitan attitude, which he himself calls a 'partial' cosmopolitanism, acknowledging that "loyalties and local allegiances [...] determine who we are" (Appiah 2006, p. xviii). This cosmopolitanism calls for a 'kindness to strangers' without asking for strict universality. It entails constraints concerning the extension of political institutions, and concerning the burdens that it expects individuals to bear. Most importantly, it lays emphasis on the importance of diverse partial relations connected to personal identification.

Different approaches to the idea of cosmopolitanism draw different institutional conclusions from a shared understanding of what cosmopolitanism means. One has to be aware of the difference between cosmopolitanism understood as a social relation and cosmopolitanism understood as a claim about moral obligation. Both have to be evaluated independently concerning their moral and practical implications.

4.2 Cosmopolitan Institutions

Patrick Hayden embarks on his conception of cosmopolitanism from the observation that while "it may be difficult to identify with or cultivate a sense of solidarity with humanity as a whole, impartial recognition of the rights and welfare of all persons constitutes a potent ethical perspective [...]" (Hayden 2005, p. 34)¹⁷. According to Hayden cosmopolitan global politics, as an alternative to a mere cosmopolitan attitude, is based on a universal understanding of human rights and the different norms and institutions that promote their protection. Cosmopolitanism "should focus first on the interests or welfare of persons wherever they may reside rather than on the interests of states as such" (Hayden 2005, p. 3).¹⁸ His cosmopolitan approach postulates strong supranational institutions, since the national *commitment* to human rights and their global *implementation* are two distinct enterprises.

Rooted in the concepts of natural law in the writings of Cicero, Aquinas, Grotius, and Locke, human rights find political and institutional expressions in the ideals of the British, the French and the American Revolution. Basic human rights meet the demands of cosmopolitan morals and they "have become the foundations of contemporary cosmopolitics in so far as the global regime integrates the three elemental characteristics of moral universalism, juridification and institution building" (Hayden 2005, p. 65). The modern manifestation of human rights can be found within the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights which is the vantage point of Hayden's analysis of cosmopolitanism. Hayden explores the connection and possible sources of conflict between the protection of human rights and national sovereignty. "According to cosmopolitanism respect for state sovereignty *per se* provides no

¹⁷ According to Heydt (2007), this conclusion could not be drawn concerning distributive justice. He understands solidarity as the basis for distributive justice which derives its legitimacy from hypothetical and actual contracts. If solidarity determines the scope of distributive communities, and if there cannot be something like a universal solidarity, a regime of global justice cannot be argued for.

¹⁸ Mohrs (2003) mostly gives an overview of the recent literature on the relation of politics and economics, in which he criticizes some consequences of an overly strong liberal individualism. Mohrs admits that communitarians might be right in emphasizing that a political theory solely based on individual human rights leaves out a meaningful understanding of social and moral order. The decrease of the importance of communal ties leads to an understanding of the state in which it only provides its citizens with the most basal frame of rights.

reason not to intervene when necessary” (Hayden 2005, p. 69). With this he argues against the modern paradigm of realism in the description of state relations in the Westphalian system, which emphasizes the importance of the sovereignty of states. Hayden argues that the protection of human rights understood in a rich capabilities approach is best pursued in a cosmopolitan framework, in which institutions can take effective action to secure these rights.

The moral argument against national priorities with the strongest political implications can be found in Louis Cabrera’s *Political Theory of Global Justice*, in which he postulates the cosmopolitan world state. Like the other theorists dealing with cosmopolitanism, Cabrera acknowledges that humans are partial in the sense that they feel to have special obligations towards the communities they are members of. But to him this is not a sufficient reason to justify the given moral priority. The question that needs to be answered is, whether there are moral reasons to be partial. Like Hayden’s version of cosmopolitanism, Cabrera’s approach is rights-based.¹⁹ His first step consists in the theoretical development of a system of human rights. The more difficult second task is the assessment of the feasibility of its implementation. Both Cabrera’s and Hayden’s general aim is to show that the ideals of cosmopolitan politics are morally justified and not naively utopian.²⁰ They do so by defending the core moral principles entailed in cosmopolitanism and by showing that cosmopolitan principles in fact have been implemented into a developing system of global governance.

From the departure of moral universalism, strong moral arguments can be brought forward for cosmopolitan institutions as Hayden and Cabrera envision them. With regard to the implementation of fundamental rights and elementary demands of distributive justice, the institutional framework they call for is morally well founded. But one could argue that Sen’s and Appiah’s versions of cosmopolitanism, which decisively emphasize the importance of identificatory relations and partiality, should find consideration within such an institutional framework.

5 Concluding Remarks

At first sight, the above discussion places solidarity and cosmopolitanism in an opposition concerning their respective range of moral consideration. But solidarity can be characterized by its potential to accommodate forms of moral inclusion. In this understanding solidarity relations meet an essential feature of cosmopolitanism, insofar as they transcend the moral relevance of national belonging. Habermas poses the question to what extent transnational solidarity relations are practically conceivable. He recognizes the development of what he calls a post-national consciousness that involves a shift from an orientation towards nation or state to universal principles. At the same time, he sees that the valuable concept of solidarity cannot be solely based on an idea of universal humanity. The mutual identification of membership to a community grounds in the consciousness that one’s own community differs from others.²¹

Probably the most important observation in the reviewed literature is that solidarity and cosmopolitanism do not have to be understood to exclude each other, but cover different fields of moral deliberation. If one distinguishes a universal understanding of cosmopol-

¹⁹ Like Hayden, Cabrera starts from a concept of universal individual human rights. It is a "cosmopolitan approach which at its root views individuals, not nation-states, as the primary unit of moral concern" (Cabrera 2004, p. 8).

²⁰ Concerning the suspicion of utopian thinking see also Pensky (2007).

²¹ Habermas agrees with Münkler and Brunkhorst that some vital forms of solidarity are essential for democratic communities.

itanism, which is suitable for the definition of fundamental political standards, from a moderate understanding, which allows for moral partiality, then cosmopolitan forms of solidarity are theoretically sound and practically conceivable. Cosmopolitan forms of solidarity do not extend to the universal moral community, but still transcend ethnic or national delimitations and thus emphasize the inclusive, rather than the exclusive component of solidarity. These obligations have to compete with close communal, as well as strictly universal obligations. However, all of these forms of relatedness justifiably have their place in moral considerations. The crucial task is to develop criteria to govern moral deliberation in cases of conflict between these different forms of obligation.

The subsequent analogous question concerns the transition from morals to institutions, which requires a correspondingly balanced answer. This answer would combine an institutional cosmopolitanism resting on universal moral demands with the simultaneous recognition of the cohesive function of solidarity towards distinct communities. Some obligations concern only delimited social domains, others concern the human community, and all have to be institutionally represented. As in moral considerations, the most fundamental demands like the protection of human rights may not allow for a preference of kith and kind, and these claims urgently call for effectual answers. But beyond that, communal ties must be admitted to govern social practices. The moral and political realities require obligations and especially institutions to be strictly universal in some fields, while leaving enough room for various, partly cosmopolitan, forms of solidarity.

References

- Appiah KA (2006) *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York
- Brunkhorst H (2005) *Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community*. MIT Press, Cambridge
- Cabrera L (2004) *Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State*. Routledge, New York
- Delanty G, Chris R (2005) *Rethinking Europe Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization*. Routledge, New York
- Gould C (2007) Transnational Solidarities. In: Gould C (ed) *Journal of Social Philosophy*. Special Issue: Solidarity, 38 (1), pp. 148–164
- Gussone P (2006) *Das Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union und seine Grenzen*. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin
- Habermas J (2004) Solidarität jenseits des Nationalstaats. Notizen zu einer Diskussion. In: Beckert J et al (ed) *Transnationale Solidarität—Chancen und Grenzen*. Campus, Frankfurt (Main), pp 225–235
- Harvey J (2007) Moral Solidarity and Empathetic Understanding: The Moral Value and Scope of the Relationship. In: Gould C (ed) *Journal of Social Philosophy*. Special Issue: Solidarity, 38 (1), pp. 22–37
- Hayden P (2005) *Cosmopolitan Global Politics (Ethics and Global Politics)*. Ashgate Pub Ltd, Burlington
- Heydt D (2007) Justice and Solidarity: The Contractarian Case against Global Justice. In: Gould C (ed) *Journal of Social Philosophy*. Special Issue: Solidarity, 38 (1), pp. 112–130
- Kaufmann F-X (2004) Sozialstaatliche Solidarität und Umverteilung im internationalen Wettbewerb. In: Beckert J et al (ed) *Transnationale Solidarität—Chancen und Grenzen*. Campus, Frankfurt (Main), pp 51–70
- Mohrs T (2003) *Weltbürgerlicher Kommunitarismus. Zeitgeistkonträre Anregungen zu einer konkreten Utopie*. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg
- Münkler H (2004) Enzyklopädie der Ideen der Zukunft: Solidarität. In: Beckert J et al (ed) *Transnationale Solidarität—Chancen und Grenzen*. Campus, Frankfurt (Main), pp 15–28
- Offe C (2004) Pflichten versus Kosten: Typen und Kontexte solidarischen Handelns. In: Beckert J (ed) *Transnationale Solidarität—Chancen und Grenzen*. Campus, Frankfurt (Main), pp 35–50
- Pensky M (2007) Two Cheers for Cosmopolitanism. Solidarity as Second-Order Inclusion. In: Gould C (ed) *Journal of Social Philosophy*. Special Issue: Solidarity, 38 (1), pp. 165–184
- Sen A (2006) *Identity and Violence The Illusion of Destiny*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York
- Sjerno S (2005) *Solidarity in Europe—The History of an Idea*. MIT Press, Cambridge
- von Maydell B et al (2005) *Enabling Social Europe*. Springer, Berlin

Other References

- Bayertz K (1999) Four Uses of “Solidarity”. In: Bayertz K (ed) *Solidarity*. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 3–28
- Bayertz K (1998) Solidarity and the Welfare State. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 1, pp 293–296
- Delanty G (2005) The Idea of a Cosmopolitan Europe: On the Cultural Significance of Europeanization. *Int. Review of Sociology* 15:405–421
- Sen A (1991) *Reason Before Identity*. OUP, Oxford
- Wildt A (1999) Solidarity: Its History and Contemporary Definition. In: Bayertz K (ed) *Solidarity*. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 209–220