



Correction: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

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Correction: Erkenntnis
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In the original publication of the article, the corresponding author has misrepresented Benjamin Kiesewetter’s view in the first paragraph of section 2.2 and hence proposed to replace this first paragraph of section 2.2 with the following new version:

“One way of developing a background condition on (EN) that might preserve the normativity of evidence is presented by Benjamin Kiesewetter (2017: 184–185). He responds to Harman’s clutter-objection by proposing that epistemic rationality requires us to believe p if p is sufficiently supported by one’s evidence and if one attends to p . According to this proposal, if I attend to a specific disjunctive proposition for which I have sufficient evidence, then I would be criticizable (because irrational) if I do not come to believe it. Thus, Kiesewetter concludes, there is a sense in which I ought to believe it as soon as I attend to it. Analogously, we could propose a background condition on (EN*) by saying that if we lack sufficient evidence for p and we attend to p , we ought not to believe p : we would be criticizable if we were to believe p ; but we wouldn’t be criticizable for believing p if we never consciously considered p – we wouldn’t count as irrational for still believing p ” at the end of this paragraph, a footnote has been corrected as footnote 5.

For consistency, the second sentence of the next paragraph has also been updated and it reads as follows:

“There are cases where we attend to a proposition that is sufficiently supported by our evidence but where it would not, it seems, make much sense to regard us as blameworthy or criticizable if we, for whatever reason, do not believe it.”

The online version of the original article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00430-9>

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Furthermore, some typos and grammar errors have been corrected in the Introduction section: ‘have questioned that’ changed to ‘have questioned whether’ ‘newest celebrity gossip’ changed to ‘latest celebrity gossip’ and throughout the article. There is a typo in the quote of Steglich-Petersen/Skipper 2019: an ‘s’ is missing at the end of ‘contexts’.

Section 2.1:

The sentence “Arguably, this can promote our self-esteem (cf. Kelly, 2003) or our relationships (cf. Stroud, 2006)” under this section should read as “Arguably, this can promote our self-esteem (cf. Kelly, 2003) or benefit our relationships (cf. Stroud, 2006).”

Section 2.2:

“á la“ occurs twice on this section, should be “à la” (reverting the French emphasis-sign)

Section 3

“But this seems false.” has been changed to “But it is hard to see why we cannot be blameworthy for violating norms of permissibility.”

Footnote 21:

“might merely count as ways of holding responsible, but not of ways of blaming.” should read as “might merely count as ways of holding responsible, but not as ways of blaming.” (the second to last “of” replaced by “as”).

The original article has been corrected.

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