ROB T. GUERETTE AND RONALD V. CLARKE

BORDER ENFORCEMENT, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND DEATHS OF SMUGGLED MIGRANTS ON THE UNITED STATES – MEXICO BORDER*

ABSTRACT. In response to ever increasing numbers of illegal immigrants entering the United States from Mexico, the United States adopted a border enforcement strategy in the 1990s that sought to bring the problem under control. This strategy relied primarily on increasing the number of Border Patrol agents directly on the border, the erection of walls at heavy traffic areas, and insertion of electronic surveillance systems. While these efforts succeeded in making it more difficult for illegal migrants to gain entry into the United States undetected, it also resulted in an increased reliance on human smugglers. Thus, the nature of the problem has shifted from one of illegal immigration to one of human smuggling. In an effort to gain entry successfully, smugglers have continued to lead migrants through hazardous terrain along the border where surveillance is less intense. Anecdotal evidence is presented which suggests that smugglers' drive for profit often results in the abandonment and death of migrants. Implications for future border policing strategy and research are discussed.

KEY WORDS: human smuggling, illegal immigration, migrant deaths, migrant smuggling, organized crime, unauthorized immigration, undocumented immigration

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the early 1990s, the problem of illegal immigration along the U.S. and Mexico border was relatively uncontrolled. Migrants from throughout Central and South America and Mexico could travel to border towns and simply walk or run into the United States. Once there, they would quickly disappear into U.S. towns and cities. All that was needed to do this was to obtain a bus ticket from one's hometown to a border city, such as Tijuana or Ciudad Juarez, and then to choose the time and place to enter the United States. The difficulty of getting into the United States was minimal and no special smuggling services were needed for many migrants.

Those entering without authorization suffered little punishment if apprehended by U.S. border agents. As is current practice, illegal migrants were

*An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Organized Crime and Humanitarian Disasters at the initiative of the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (ISPAC) in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, December 3–5, 2004.

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2005) 11: 159–174

simply detained and later placed onto a bus and returned to the other side of the border where they could, and mostly would, simply re-cross into the United States. Yet, while illegal migrants escaped significant punishment, victimization from others on the Mexican side of the border was (and still is) common.

In response to Congressional directives calling for better management of illegal immigration, the U.S. Border Patrol implemented a series of enforcement campaigns to bring the border under control. Beginning with Operation Hold the Line in El Paso, Texas in 1993 the Border Patrol adopted a strategy of "prevention through deterrence" which fortified the border with physical barriers, larger numbers of agents, and electronic surveillance.

The consequence of these campaigns has been to change the nature of the problem along the United States–Mexico border from one of *illegal immigration* to one of *human smuggling*. As it has become more difficult to enter the United States illegally, illegal migrants have found it increasingly necessary to enlist the services of human smugglers[1] in order to enter successfully (Andreas 2001; Cornelius 2001; Reyes et al. 2002; Spener 2001). This paper describes in more detail the nature and consequences of the United States border enforcement strategy. Particular attention is paid to the emergent opportunity for smugglers to exploit the situation for profit. They have put illegal immigrants at risk by using increasingly hazardous routes and modes of transportation, which has resulted in many lost lives. The paper concludes by discussing the implications for border policing and future research.

Illegal Immigration along the United States–Mexico Border

Undoubtedly, the largest flow of illegal immigration into the United States takes place along the Mexican border. Estimates of the numbers of illegal migrants vary, but they indicate a sharp increase throughout the late 1990s. According to some calculations, the number of illegal immigrants reached 500,000 or somewhat higher per year during the late 1990s, almost twice as many as in the first half of the decade (Passel and Fix 2001; Bean et al. 2001).

Estimates of illegal immigration flows are most commonly derived by taking the difference between estimates of the illegal population residing in the country at different times. Estimates of those residing in the country illegally are referred to as stock estimates and are usually based on population estimates such as the U.S. Census. However, because of the considerable variation of estimates using these methods their accuracy

[1]Most commonly referred to as 'Coyotes' along the United States–Mexico border.

is uncertain. Thus, they can only provide a general picture of the illegal immigration problem.[2]

While the number of illegal immigrants entering the United States annually can only be estimated, data on apprehensions are more reliably collected. During 1999, the then Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and its patrol division, the U.S. Border Patrol, apprehended over 1.7 million aliens who entered the country illegally or who had overstayed the terms of their visas. Of those apprehensions 90% were made along the United States–Mexico border. Table I provides the number of yearly apprehensions from Fiscal Year 1994 to 2003 for each Border Patrol sector[3] along the United States–Mexico boundary. Over this 10-year period the number of apprehended illegal migrants ranged from 900,000 in FY 2003 to more than 1.6 million in FY 2000. As discussed later, the apprehension figures also reveal a shift in illegal migration activity over the course of the decade. That is, apprehensions began to decrease steadily in the San Diego sector after 1995 at about the same time as enforcement was strengthened in the sector. Concurrently, apprehensions steadily increased in the Arizona sectors until FY 2000, and thereafter the Arizona sectors remained the most active compared to the other sectors.

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Beginning in the mid 1980s, the U.S. Congress passed a series of acts designed to enhance the capacity of government agencies to enforce immigration laws (see Figure 1). In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) created sanctions for employers who knowingly hired undocumented aliens, increased enforcement along the United States borders, and legalized the status of illegal aliens already residing in the United States. In 1990, the Immigration Reform Act stipulated that all immigrants were subject to numerical restrictions, restricted criteria for entry and broadened conditions for exclusion.

In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. These acts expanded the powers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) by allowing for the detention and deportation of any immigrant (legal or not) who has been charged with or convicted of a drug offense, or who otherwise possessed a criminal record. They also strengthened measures to control United States borders and augmented

[2] For other estimates of unauthorized immigrant flows see Passel and Woodrow (1987), Woodrow et al. (1987), and Warren (1990).

[3] The Border Patrol has divided the just over two thousand miles of border into nine operational jurisdictions which they refer to as sectors.

TABLE I

U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions of Illegal Migrants along the United States–Mexico Border, Fiscal Year 1994 to Fiscal Year 2003.

Border Patrol Sector	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03
California										
San Diego	450,152	524,231	483,815	283,889	246,092	182,248	151,681	110,075	100,681	111,515
El Centro	27,654	37,317	66,873	146,210	226,580	225,290	238,126	172,852	108,273	92,099
Total	477,806	561,548	550,688	430,099	472,672	407,538	389,807	282,927	208,954	191,847
Arizona										
Yuma	21,211	20,894	26,310	30,177	76,195	93,386	108,747	78,385	42,654	56,638
Tucson	139,473	227,529	305,348	272,397	387,406	470,449	616,346	449,675	333,648	347,387
Total	160,684	248,423	331,658	302,574	463,601	563,835	725,093	528,060	376,302	404,025
Texas										
El Paso	79,688	110,971	145,929	124,376	125,035	110,846	115,696	112,857	94,154	88,816
Marfa	13,494	11,552	13,214	12,692	14,509	14,953	13,689	12,087	11,392	10,319
Del Rio	50,036	76,490	121,137	113,280	131,058	156,656	157,178	104,875	66,985	50,145
Laredo	73,142	93,305	131,841	141,893	103,433	114,004	108,973	87,068	82,095	70,521
McAllen	124,251	169,101	210,553	243,793	204,257	169,115	133,243	107,843	89,927	77,749
Total	340,611	461,419	622,674	636,034	578,292	565,574	528,779	424,730	344,553	297,550
Total SW Border	979,101	1,271,390	1,507,020	1,368,707	1,516,680	1,537,000	1,643,679	1,235,717	929,809	893,422

Source: U.S. Border Patrol.



Figure 1. Selected Developments in the U.S. Response to Illegal Immigration.

enforcement of laws, prohibiting businesses from employing illegal aliens.

In response to the directives from Congress, the Border Patrol implemented several focused and later expanded operations in select border areas aimed at preventing and detecting illegal entry along the border.[4] The first of these operations was carried out in El Paso, Texas, where Border Patrol agents were stationed in vehicles parked in close proximity to one another along the Rio Grande River that forms the border with Mexico. This approach departed from past practices that kept agents back from the actual border, waiting to detect and apprehend illegal entrants once inside the United States. The apparent deterrent success of this tactic – as indicated by a 76% drop in apprehensions – led to its replication in other problematic places along the border. This and other changes made at the same time resulted in:

- The addition of thousands of agents stationed on the border.
- New road construction to give agents more mobility and greater access to the border.
- Installation at high-risk places of high intensity lights, ten-foot steel fences and motion detection sensors.
- Use of remote video surveillance cameras and night vision and thermal imaging devices.

The intent of this border strategy was to close routes most frequently traveled by migrants and smugglers so that they would: (1) be deterred

[4]Operation Hold the Line in El Paso, Texas in 1993; Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego Sector and Operation Safeguard in Tucson Sector, 1994; Operation Rio Grande Valley in south Texas, August 1997.

from entry, (2) shift their attempts to ports of entry where inspection is systematic, or (3) alter their routes to more remote terrain where Border Patrol agents would have the tactical advantage (GAO 2001). Also during this time they began collecting information about apprehended migrants with the creation of the "IDENT" database system.

Consequences of the Border Strategy

The border strategy did succeed in making it more difficult to enter into the United States along the Mexican border illegally. This is evidenced both by an alteration of migration routes and the duration of stay among migrants once they successfully gain entry.[5] The increased difficulty of crossing the border has prompted many illegal migrants in the United States interior to stay longer, rather than returning to Mexico and risking not being able to regain entry. Reyes et al. (2002) found that from 1987 to 1992 (before the increased border enforcement) 54% of an immigrant sample returned to Mexico after entering the United States illegally, whereas only 25% returned during the time period of 1995 to 2000 (after the increased enforcement). In addition, illegal migration routes have clearly shifted away from cities and towns along the border into more remote terrain – largely uninhabited desert and mountainous areas (Cornelius 2001; Eschbach et al. 2001; GAO 2001; Reyes et al. 2002).

However, there have been two other unanticipated consequences of the border strategy – an increase in human smuggling and in migrant deaths. In an effort to successfully enter the United States illegally, migrants have sought to escape detection by crossing the border where surveillance is less intense. The consequence of this, however, has been a growing demand for the services of human smugglers as migrants seek their assistance in gaining entry into the United States through unfamiliar territory.[6]

The Increase of Human Smuggling

By several accounts the demand for human smuggling has increased along the United States–Mexico boundary (Andreas 2001; Cornelius 2001; Reyes et al. 2002; Spener 2001). The evidence for this can be seen both in terms of the number of migrants who report using the services of a smuggler

[5] It is still largely debated as to whether or not the border strategy has deterred migrants from crossing (see Reyes et al. 2002).

[6] It has been suggested that the border strategy has also incited vigilante groups whose members come to the border to patrol and apprehend smugglers and migrants (Conover 1997; Cornelius 2004; Thorpe 2004). However, there is no evidence that the border strategy is responsible for such developments.

(or "coyote") to enter the United States and in the charges that smugglers make for their services. Throughout most of the 1980s an estimated 70% of those crossing used the services of a smuggler; by 1997, 89% hired a smuggler to cross the United States–Mexico border (Reyes et al. 2002, p. 61). The fees charged by smugglers doubled between 1993 and 1998, reaching $1000 (Cornelius 2001). Other estimates for crossings originating closer to the border are lower, but still indicate a sharp increase from around $200 in 1993 to $700 by 1998 (Reyes et al. 2002).[7]

Little is known about the smugglers themselves though Spener (2001) and Lopez Castro (1998) identify four types of smugglers found along the Texas–Mexican border, as follows:

1. *Pateros* refers to those who take migrants across the border along the Rio Grande River, but who do not organize travel into the United States interior. They frequently loiter around international bridges and around bus stations in Mexican border cities and towns. They are not affiliated with larger smuggling organizations but may routinely provide services to such groups on a contract basis.
2. *Local interior coyotes* are natives of interior towns and villages of Mexico who provide smuggling services to others in their communities. They operate with one or more assistants to smuggle groups of five or six migrants on an occasional basis. They have gained their knowledge of entering the United States illegally from their own experiences as migrants and generally accompany their groups to the interior destination.
3. *Friends and relations* of migrants also assist in smuggling. Migrants often rely on friends and relatives to organize their entry and pick them up in vehicles on the United States side after crossing the border with a guide (e.g. Patero). In some cases, friends and relatives may accompany the migrant on the journey across the border.
4. *Border commercial smugglers* are believed to be responsible for the majority of migrant smuggling along the border. These smugglers operate in groups that might be large or small and loose or tightly knit. They may work in other employment and provide smuggling services on the side. They may smuggle migrants only from specific Mexican communities or provide such services to anyone wishing to enter the United States illegally.

[7]The fee paid to smugglers varies according to starting point of travel, crossing location, and United States destination.

TABLE II

Migrant Deaths by Type, FY 2003

$N = 400$	Frequency (%)[a]
Exposure-Heat	134 (34%)
Exposure-Cold	3 (1%)
Drowning	57 (14%)
Motor Vehicle Accident	65 (16%)
Train	11 (3%)
Confined Space	3 (1%)
Other	15 (4%)
Unknown	112 (28%)

Source: U.S. Border Patrol BSI Incident Tracking System.
[a]Does not equal 100 due to rounding.

Migrant Deaths

Smugglers have increasingly subjected their clients to hazardous conditions during border crossings. Some 300–400 migrants are found dead each year along the border and Border Patrol agents rescue many more. Analysis of migrant deaths has indicated that deaths have risen in the wake of the border enforcement campaigns. For instance, Eschbach et al. (2001) found that the number of migrant deaths had been at their lowest in the early 1990s and then began to rise during the mid 1990s after the border enforcement increase.

Researchers have also identified a shift in the types of migrant deaths. Eschbach et al. (1999) found that migrant deaths caused by environmental factors (e.g., heat exposure and drowning) increased fivefold between 1993 and 1997, while deaths from migrants getting struck by cars decreased by almost two-thirds. Cornelius (2001) found an increased incidence of death from dehydration, hypothermia, and heat stroke after the implementation of the border strategy.

In FY 2003, the increased deaths from heat and cold exposure remained at a high level as smugglers have continued to lead migrants across desert areas along the border (see Table II).[8] Most deaths are attributable to exposure-heat (34%) followed by motor vehicle accidents and drowning (16 and 14%, respectively). Exposure-cold, train, and confined space deaths occur less frequently with each contributing no more than 3% of migrant

[8]The numbers presented here in Tables II and III may not match those released by the U.S. Border Patrol. This is because the Border Patrol retrospectively edits the BSI Incident Tracking system in keeping with their methodological protocols as more information about each death is assembled after the incident is initially recorded.

TABLE III

Distribution of Migrant Deaths by Sex, Age and Ethnicity for FY 2003

$N = 400$	Frequency (%)
Sex[a]	
male	296 (82%)
female	66 (18%)
Age[b]	
<18	20 (11%)
18 to 30	95 (53%)
31 or >	64 (36%)
Nationality[c]	
Mexico	302 (76%)
U.S.	9 (2%)
Brazil	3 (<1%)
El Salvador	3 (<1%)
Honduras	2 (<1%)
Nicaragua	2 (<1%)
Guatemala	1 (<1%)
Slovenia	1 (<1%)
Unknown	77 (19%)

Source: U.S. Border Patrol BSI Incident Tracking System.
[a]Valid $n = 362$.
[b]Valid $n = 179$.
[c]Does not equal 100 due to rounding.

deaths. Those who die (see Table III) are mostly male (82%), young (64%, <30 years of age), and Mexican nationals (76%).[9] These numbers are consistent both with apprehension data demographics and distributions found in the federal justice system for those prosecuted and sentenced for illegal immigration offenses (see Scalia and Litras 2002).

According to reports of migrant deaths maintained by the Border Patrol, smugglers often leave behind or abandon individuals who are unable to keep up with the group (Guerette 2004). In some instances, smugglers have prevented medical attention reaching the distressed migrant by either refusing to look for help or by instructing the migrants to wait a period

[9]Nationality data might not be reliable because it is common for illegal migrants coming from Central and South America to obtain fictitious Mexican citizenship documents. This means that if they are apprehended they will be returned just across the border in Mexico where attempting reentry is easier.

of time before seeking to notify authorities. In these cases, at least, the migrants would probably not have died had they received prompt medical attention. The following narratives from Border Patrol incident reports provide examples of these types of cases:

- . . . Information received from the female traveling with the other now deceased individual is as follows. The deceased . . . was traveling from the state of Mexico, Mexico with her sister . . . They arrived at the bus station . . . [and] met up with an unknown individual who agreed to guide them into the United States. They then walked on foot . . . where they then continued walking westbound, entering into the United States of America . . . [Subject] reported that the unknown individual was being paid two thousand dollars (U.S.) each to guide them into the United States. The total number of the group being brought into the United States consisted of 10 individuals. The deceased female's sister stated that they traveled from the . . . bus station with 2 liters of water, and 1 liter of Gatorade each. The deceased female's sister also reported that she believes that her sister did not die of dehydration, as she was complaining of chest pains prior to her death. She also stated that the guide of the group refused any action which would have lent itself to obtaining help. She stated that she argued with the guide to try to take them out to the highway, but that he adamantly refused, and told them that he would leave them both behind to fend for themselves. This was ultimately the case, as the rest of the group was led away by the guide . . .
- . . . agents were flagged down by a person standing on [the side of the road]. The person led the agents to a deceased female . . . The person who flagged down the agents is identified as the deceased's aunt . . . the deceased and her aunt were part of a group of approximately 69 Honduran nationals. The aunt stated she was told by the guides to wait for two hours in the brush prior to trying to flag down help for the deceased. The aunt stated that she believed the deceased was still alive when they were left behind. The aunt informed agents that the deceased and others in the group were given a white powder to inhale by the guides prior to and during their trek from the border.
- . . . agents encountered two male subjects [on a trail] at about 12:30 am. Both of the male subjects were lawfully admitted permanent residents . . . [Subject] stated that his wife, . . . , had crossed [the] trail near their present location a few days ago and was subsequently left behind by the group because she felt ill and could not keep up. [Subject] claimed that he and his cousin had found her deceased north of [the] trail, by using a map drawn by one of the members of the group that had abandoned his wife. [Subject] stated that the members of the group were apprehended and voluntarily returned to Mexico by the Border Patrol sometime after

> they had left his wife behind. [Subject] said that his friend told him that members of the group had failed to mention the abandonment of [deceased] when the Border Patrol arrested the group . . .

These kinds of reports suggest that smugglers' mistreatment of migrants is not uncommon. Recognizing this, the Mexican government recently distributed a guide to would-be migrants warning them of the risk of being victimized by smugglers. In part of the guide they write, "Be Careful with 'Polleros' [a word for smuggler along the border] . . . They may try to fool you with assurances that they will take you across in a few hours through mountains or deserts. This is not true! They can risk your life leading you across rivers, irrigation canals, desert zones, train lines or high-speed highways" (McKinley 2005).

Some have argued that it is in the smugglers' interest to get their clients safely to the other side in order to receive payment and gain a good reputation for referrals (Andreas 2001). However, this is not always the case. In many instances, migrants cross the border in groups, generally seven or more, led by the smuggler (Reyes et al. 2002). Stopping to help someone who falls behind becomes counter productive for smugglers because it increases the chances that they will miss their pick up time[10] and be apprehended by border agents. If the group fails to make it to their destination successfully the smuggler could lose payment for the entire group. The sacrifice of one or two for the successful crossing of the larger group is therefore in the best interest of the smuggler.

In sum, the border strategy has changed the nature of the migration problem. That is, the problem has been transformed from one of illegal immigration to one of human smuggling. This has important implications both for the evolution of border policing and future research.

Implications for Border Policing and Research

Most of the resources allocated to controlling illegal immigration are focused directly on the border (Hostettler 2004; Stana 2003),[11] but the strategy

[10] Based on field visits and discussions with agents it was learned that a common method of gaining entry into the United States is to travel on foot through the desert and/or mountains and then be collected by a vehicle once in the United States at a predetermined time and place. Pickup vehicles cannot stay too long at the pick up location because they will attract patrolling border agents.

[11] In a statement before the U.S. House of Representatives, the Director of Homeland Security and Justice noted that Congress and INS have historically devoted more than five times the resources to border enforcement than to interior enforcement (Stana 2003, p. 1).

has not yet properly adapted to the changing nature of the problem.[12] This could be because there is no clear understanding of the human smuggling problem along the United States–Mexico boundary. In particular, little is known about the level of organization of the smuggling groups. Government sources claim that these have become highly structured and organized enterprises with connections to international criminal syndicates (Baldauf 2000; INS 1997; Regan 1997; Stana 2003) and, as result, the U.S. government has begun to employ wiretaps and undercover agents in an effort to dismantle these smuggling networks, much like the tactics employed by the FBI against mafia organizations (Baldauf 2000). However, these tactics will not be successful if the smuggling groups consist of small groups of independent entrepreneurs, which, according to a variety of research studies (Andreas 2001; Finckenauer 2001; Natarajan and Clarke 2004; Spener 2001), is the pattern for most contemporary smuggling operations.

Without more knowledge about the smuggling groups and the ways that they operate, the success of any future border policing strategy will be in question. In particular, it is important to know what proportion of migrant deaths is attributable to the malicious or negligent practices of smugglers. If the majority of deaths are caused by smugglers, then better understanding of smuggling groups and increased enforcement efforts against them, could save many migrant lives. This understanding could be assisted by studying migrant deaths that occur elsewhere. Remarkably, migrant deaths that take place in the Caribbean off the United States' southeast coast receive little national (and no scientific) attention compared to those along the Mexican border, despite their routine occurrence (Chardy 2005). Migrant deaths also routinely occur off the coasts of Spain, Italy, France and Australia. More comprehensive understanding of migrant deaths and of the role of smugglers in these deaths elsewhere in the world could benefit future prevention efforts.

Research on the smuggling groups could benefit from more collaboration between government agencies and academic and other outside researchers. Too often, government agencies rely on their own in-house resources to gather and analyze information. Enlisting researchers provides agencies with research skills that are not cultivated within the agency and, at the same time, gives them the capacity to analyze the rich data that they collect. However, research should not rely exclusively on these records, but should make use of other sources of data, independent of government, including interviews and surveys undertaken with smugglers and migrants.

[12] In any case, the idea of reducing resources (both manpower and technology) where the border has recently been fortified would be unacceptable to residents and their representatives (Cornelius 2004).

A second important research need is to find ways to reduce migrant deaths. While some argue that the only way to reduce migrant deaths is to reverse the border strategy (Nevins 2002), deaths can potentially be reduced by proactive prevention measures. The U.S. Border Patrol has already done a great deal in an attempt to reduce deaths along the Mexican border, including the launching of the Border Safety Initiative (BSI) in June 1998. This initiative consists of:

- a public message campaign and posting of signs identifying the dangers of remote terrain crossings;
- search and rescue operations performed by volunteer, highly trained agents that comprise the Border Search, Trauma, and Rescue teams (BORSTAR);
- training line agents in initial life saving and rescue techniques; and
- creation of a data tracking system that records all rescues and deaths along the United States side of the southwest border. The data is intended to inform ongoing life saving measures.
- the Lateral Repatriation Program (LRP) undertaken in September 2003. The LRP lasted twenty-three days and consisted of the detention of apprehended migrants in the West Desert of Arizona, where a high proportion of deaths had occurred in the preceding months. Rather than returning the migrants immediately to the other side of the border, they were relocated to south Texas and then released into Mexico. The intention of the relocation was to remove the migrants from the dangerous desert terrain of Arizona during the hottest time of the year. Had the migrants been released into Mexico across the Arizona border, it was believed they would again attempt entry further exposing themselves to life threatening conditions. A similar (but volunteer) repatriation program was implemented the following summer.

The Border Patrol has commissioned the authors of this paper to evaluate these life saving efforts and to analyze the circumstance of deaths in order to develop further prevention measures. This work will be undertaken within the general framework of situational crime prevention, complemented by public health preventive models (Guerette 2004).

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has described the United States border enforcement strategy along the Mexico boundary developed during the 1990s and has documented some of the consequences. These include the increased difficulty of crossing the border illegally, the rise of migrant smugglers who have exploited the situation for profit and the change in the nature of migrant

deaths as smugglers have followed more hazardous routes. Evidence was presented to show that the smugglers' drive for profit sometimes results in the abandonment and death of illegal migrants. Finally, the implications were discussed for future border policing strategy of the shift from illegal immigration to human smuggling.

The circumstances giving rise to human smuggling on the United States–Mexico border are not unique. Indeed, on the basis of her United Nations-sponsored study of smuggled women, Aronowitz (2001, p. 6) argues that "the increased demand for migrant labour coupled with stricter entry controls or requirements and diminishing legal channels to enter destination countries . . . " creates the conditions leading to the emergence of illegal smuggling and trafficking markets. Nations with currently porous borders, which are faced with problems of illegal immigration, should therefore expect that human smuggling will increase when they tighten border security. Improved understanding of the nature of smuggling operations will help avoid this danger.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Some of the research findings presented here are the result of a project funded by the U.S. Border Patrol. The views expressed here, however, are solely those of the authors and may or may not be shared by the U.S. Border Patrol.

REFERENCES

Andreas, P., The transformation of migrant smuggling across the U.S.–Mexico border. In: D. Kyle and R. Koslowski (Eds.), *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 108–125. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

Aronowitz, A., *Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: The Phenomenon, the Markets that Drive it and the Organizations that Promote it*. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Turin, Italy, 2001.

Baldauf, S., U.S. tries spy tactics to stop human smugglers. *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 30, 2000, www.csmonitor.com.

Bean, F., R. Corona, R. Tuiran, K. Woodrow-Lafield, and J. van Hook, Circular, invisible, and ambiguous migrants: Components of difference in estimates of the number of unauthorized Mexican migrants in the United States. *Demography*, 38(3), pp. 411–422, 2001.

Chardy, A., Migrants stopped at sea most in 10 years. *The Miami Herald*, Immigration, Wednesday, January 19, 2005.

Conover, T., Border vigilantes. *The New York Times Magazine*, May 11, 1997.

Cornelius, W., Death at the border: Unintended consequences of U.S. immigration control policy. *Population and Development Review*, 27(4), pp. 661–685, 2001.

Cornelius, W., Controlling 'Unwanted' immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993–2004. *Paper presented as a public lecture under the auspices of the Centre for Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS)*, University of Oxford, London, June 10, 2004.

Eschbach, K., J. Hagan, and N. Rodriquez, Death at the border. *International Migration Review*, 33(2), pp. 430–454, 1999.

Eschbach, K., J. Hagan, and N. Rodriguez, *Causes and Trends in Migrant Deaths Along the U.S.–Mexico Border, 1985–1998*. Center for Immigration Research, March. Houston, TX: University of Houston, 2001.

Finckenauer, J.O., Russian transnational organized crime and human trafficking. In: D. Kyle and R. Koslowski (Eds.), *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 166–186. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

General Accounting Office, *INS' Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and impact issues remain after seven years*. Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-01-842. Washington, DC: Government Press, 2001.

Guerette, R.T., *Migrant Death and the Border Safety Initiative: An Application of Situational Crime Prevention to Inform Policy and Practice* (Doctoral dissertation). Newark, NJ: Rutgers University, 2004.

Hostettler, J.N., *Pushing the Border Out on Alien Smuggling: New Tools and Intelligence Initiatives*. Introduction of the Chair of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, Committee of the Judiciary, Tuesday, May 18, Washington, DC: House of Representatives, 2004.

Immigration and Naturalization Service, Cracking Down on Alien Smuggling: Progress Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1997.

Lopez Castro, G., Coyotes and alien smuggling. In: *Migration between Mexico and the United States*, volume 3, written and edited by the Mexico/United States Binational Study on Migration, pp. 965–974. Washington, DC: United States Commission on Immigration Reform, 1998.

McKinley, J.C., A guide for the illegal migrant. *The New York Times*, Week in Review, January 9, 2005.

Natarajan, M. and Clarke, R.V., Understanding and controlling organised crime: The feasibility of a situational approach. Paper presented at the annual meeting of Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis, July, Wellington, New Zealand, 2004.

Nevins, J., Time to End a Fatal Way of Life Along the U.S.–Mexico Boundary, Common Dreams News Center. Tuesday, June 18, 2002.

Passel, J. and M. Fix, U.S. Immigration at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Hearing on 'The U.S. Population and Immigration.' Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2001.

Passel, J. and K.A. Woodrow, Change in the undocumented alien population in the United States, 1979–1983. *International Migration Review*, 21, pp. 1304–1334, 1987.

Regan, G., Acting Associate Commissioner of Enforcement, Immigration and Naturalization Service. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, April 23, 1997.

Reyes, B., H. Johnson, and R. Swearingen, Holding the Line? The effect of the recent border buildup on unauthorized immigration. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California, 2002. www.ppic.org/publications/PPIC162/index.html.

Scalia, J. and M. Litras, *Immigration Offenders in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 2000*. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2002.

Spener, D., Smuggling migrants through south Texas: Challenges posed by operation Rio Grande. In: D. Kyle and R. Koslowski (Eds.), *Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 115–137. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

Stana, R., *Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy*. Director of Homeland Security and Justice. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Thursday, April 10, Washington, DC, 2003.

Thorpe, S., Border vigilantes scatter like roaches. *People's Weekly World Newspaper*. October 7, 2004. http://www.pww.org/article/articleview/5909/1/235/.

Warren, R., Annual estimates of nonimmigrant overstays in the United States: 1985 to 1988. In: F. Bean, B. Edmonston and J. Passel (Eds.), *Understanding Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s*, pp. 77–110. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1990.

Warren, R., *Annual Estimates of the Unauthorized Population Residing in the United States and Components of Changes: 1987 to 1997*. Washington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2000.

Woodrow, K., J. Passel, and R. Warren, Preliminary Estimates of Undocumented Immigration to the United States, 1980–1986: Analysis of the June 1986 Current Population Survey. Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section, San Francisco, CA: The American Statistical Association, 1987.

ROB T. GUERETTE
School of Policy and Management
Florida International University
University Park PCA-366B
11200 SW 8th Street
Miami, FL 33199
USA
E-mail: guerette@fiu.edu

RONALD V. CLARKE
Rutgers University
New Jersey, USA