A Heideggerian Perspective on the Relationship Between Mintzberg's Distinction Between Engaged and Disconnected Management: The Role of Uncertainty in Management

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ABSTRACT. In the context of uncertainty and anxiety regarding the role of leadership and management, this article explores the relationship between Mintzberg's concept of the distinction between the engaged and disconnected manager, Heidegger's notion authentic and inauthentic being and Benner and Wrubel's distinction between two forms of professional practice attunement: an attunement to technique and an attunement to lived experience. It argues that while Mintzberg outlines the distinction between engaged and disengaged management, he does not develop an understanding of the conditions which lead a manager to be either engaged or disconnected. The role of anxiety in Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic being and the role of stress and worry in Benner and Wrubel's distinction between an attunement to technique and an attunement to the lived experience of professional practice provides the basis for understanding the relationship between engaged and disconnected management. After developing the theoretical perspectives of Mintzberg, Heidegger, Benner and Wrubel, two examples are presented: one of the way in which an engaged manager experiences anxiety as an opportunity for greater attunement to lived experience and one who experiences anxiety as a condition for disconnection and detachment from the lived experience of his leadership practice.

KEY WORDS: care, anxiety, coping, listening, engaged, disconnection, authentic, inauthentic, technique, lived experience, leadership, managing, resolve

In this article, I would like to explore the relationship between parts of the thinking of Martin Heidegger and Henry Mintzberg as the basis upon which to develop a framework for managing and leading under conditions of uncertainty. It is often said both in the popular literature and in the academic literature that we are living, managing and leading in times of uncertainty. The question that we need to raise is: what kinds of frameworks enable us to lead effectively in times where not only the political and organisational worlds are uncertain but also leaders themselves feel quite uncertain and often detach or disengage themselves from the uncertainty to manage and appear to lead. Describing the nature of uncertainty today, Ramo has said 'As much as we may wish it, our world is not becoming more stable or easier to comprehend' (2010, p. 8). We live in a world in which the unexpected has come to be expected. We cannot expect the future to repeat the past. Leaders who make plans based on the assumptions that the future repeats the past are doomed to fail. Describing the uncertainty that leaders experience in such situations Ramo has said that our leaders have 'little comprehension … of our financial and security order' (2010, p. 8). He points to leaders like Alan Greenspan who have admitted that the Global Financial Crisis took them by surprise and were more than a little perplexed by this crisis: 'I have found a flaw. I don't know how significant or permanent it is. But I have been very distressed by it'.

We would be mistaken to think that Greenspan is an anomaly in this regard. For many other global leaders have shown perplexity in the face of uncertainty: 'You probably don't need to hear it from Greenspan to have a sense of the confused navigation

of our leaders' (2010, p. 6). Yet, it is not only national but also corporate leaders themselves who are finding the need to lead in the face of uncertainty. Describing this once, AOL Time Warner Chairman Stephen M. Case said: 'I sometimes feel like I'm behind the wheel of a race car ….' He also said: 'One of the biggest challenges is there are no road signs to help navigate. And in fact … no one has yet determined which side of the road we're supposed to be on' (2001).

We could take the same point down to the level of leaders and managers within corporations who find that both learning the craft of leadership and even being in the practice of leadership or management is filled with moments of surprise, perplexity and uncertainty. This is the theme of Linda Hill's work called *Becoming a Manager* where she writes of the way in which moments of surprise, shock and perplexity are central to becoming a manager. What we also know from the work of Henry Mintzberg is the way in which management is an inevitable messy activity that cannot be neatly ordered, and Tony Watson, in his ethnographic study of leaders, writes of uncertainty and anxiety as being the inevitable parts of managing: 'The more I saw of managers at Ryland, the more I became aware of the extent of human angst, insecurity, doubt and frailty among them' (2002, p. 178).

Perhaps what we do know is that traditional scientific management approaches are not effective in embracing uncertainty for they have been designed to wall out uncertainty and insecurity as much as possible. Indeed Mintzberg has argued that the traditional scientific management style leads to detached and disengaged managers who are numb to the nuances of the lived experience of situations of insecurity and uncertainty. They have not developed the art and discipline of being able to read situations from within the situation only from a detached distance. Mintzberg carries his critique into the field of management education, maintaining that both theory and case study-based approaches to management are not appropriate forms of education for the lived experience of managers. Instead of preparing students to read real-time lived experience, management education prepares students to analyse and critique already formulated and abstracted conceptual representations of situations. Unlike cases and theories in which reality is packaged in advance, in everyday reality, a manager is not given a problem or pressure all neatly packaged up in the form of a case; rather, the manager needs to be able to turn the experience of the problem into language and concepts so that he can deal with it. This process of languaging of a problematic experience is itself an art and discipline that needs to be cultivated.

Therefore, given that we live in a world that is inevitably uncertain, how can we think about leadership and management under conditions of uncertainty? Is there anything creative or positive that we can learn from uncertainty? At the heart of Heidegger's philosophy in *Being and Time* is the view that learning to listen to uncertainty and insecurity is the basis for questioning and opening up new possibilities, new ways of being, doing, seeing and thinking. Uncertainty, from this perspective, is the way in which being or human existence poses questions to us. To listen to uncertainty is to listen for the way in which human existence poses questions to us. And to listen for the questions being posed to us, is the basis for opening new possibilities and visions for the future. Listening to uncertainty is the basis of personal, professional and institutional transformation.

At the same time, however, Heidegger warns that because uncertainty is unnerving, we tend to disavow uncertainty, and thus are not present to the nuances of the lived experiences, the kinds of questions that emerge in times of uncertainty and are thus not present to the possibilities that it discloses or opens up for seeing, doing and being in new ways. Heidegger calls this response to uncertainty – inauthenticity. In the context of management, Henry Mintzberg has called it disconnected management, a management that makes decisions regarding a situation without being involved with the contingencies of the lived presence, and thus the uncertainties of the situation. Disconnected managers disconnect from uncertainty and draw up 'battle plans' in detachment from the uncertainties of the situation. As Mintzberg documents in detail, this creates an almost barbaric approach to management.

Mintzberg contrasts the disconnected manager with the engaged manager who is present in situation and sees and acts out of his or her commitment to the situation in which they are present. Yet, Mintzberg does not discuss in any degree of detail the effects of uncertainty in the context of

engagement and the way in which uncertainty may lead leaders and managers to disconnect from the situation. Heidegger offers a way of understanding both the way in which uncertainty offers an opportunity for re-imagining or visioning our world and how uncertainty is also an occasion for disconnection. The question that will be asked in terms of Heidegger is, what enables a leader or manager, operating under conditions of uncertainty, to move from a disconnected to an engaged view of management, from an inauthentic to an authentic way of responding to the challenges of uncertainty?

In this article, I will explore the link between, on the one hand, Mintzberg's distinction between disconnected and engaged management and Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic being as the basis upon which to develop a framework for responding effectively to conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that while Mintzberg's notion of the distinction between engaged and disconnected management brings us to the brink of understanding the role of uncertainty in enabling managers to read experience from within the real time lived experience of managers, it is in the writing of Heidegger that the role of uncertainty and, as he calls it, anxiety is clearly articulated as the basis upon which to develop the attunement so central to management practice of being able to read and respond in the context of the temporal flux of the practice of being a manager. Thus, I will be answering two questions that Mintzberg, by and large leaves unanswered in his book *Managers: Not MBA's*. Firstly, there is the question of how do we account for the difference between engaged and disconnected managers and I will be arguing that it is the way in which a manager deals with the uncertainty that is central to both engaged and disconnected management. Secondly, I will be showing that it is what Heidegger calls a resolute attunement to uncertainty that is central to learning to read and respond to situations from within lived experience. To be fair to Mintzberg, he does speak about the role of the teacher in using unfamiliar and disruptive theorising to disturb management students taken for granted assumptions in ways that they come to see and question them (2004, p. 250). But this begs two questions: How do we disrupt students who experience the value of and are willing to embrace disruptive theorising in the first place? And secondly, it

is less in the classroom and more in the 'rough and tumble' of management practice that the reflective practice of reading and notice needs to be situated (not only in the classroom). What then are the kinds of occasions which lend themselves to noticing and reading situations, and how then can managers be prepared for the practice of noticing and reading situations both in the classroom and in the context of the pressures of everyday practice?

The logic of this article will begin by outlining Mintzberg's position on the disconnected and engaged manager. In a series of sections, it will then unpack Heidegger's notion of care, his notion of reflexivity and possibility through anxiety, and the importance of listening in anxiety. It will then apply the Heideggerian insights that Benner and Wrubel have developed in the context of nursing to Mintzberg's distinction between engaged and disconnected managers. Examples of a Heideggerian reading of an engaged and disconnected manager will then be presented. A concluding statement will then be made.

Mintzberg's perspective on the disconnected and the caring manager

Mintzberg's book *Managers: Not MBA's* (2004) is a critique of the one dimensional nature of most management education. He claims that most management education focuses on the techniques and methods of calculation. While not wanting to undermine the importance of techniques of calculation in management, Mintzberg claims that the learning of techniques is not a sufficient basis upon which to become a well-rounded manager. Part of the problem with learning techniques is that it does not in itself enable a management student to identify the problem or concern to which the technique would be a response that could enable an adequate solution. Indeed Mintzberg maintains that while management schools emphasise the development of problem solving analysis and skills, they do not give much attention to learning how to identify problems in the first place: '....technique applied with nuance by people immersed in a situation can be very powerful. But technique taught generically, out of context, encourages the ''rule of the tool'': Give a little boy a hammer and everything looks like a nail.

MBA programs have give their graduates so many hammers that many organisations now look like smashed-up toys' (2004, p. 39).

In the classroom, the problem is given in advance by the teacher or lecturer. The student then sets about solving the already formulated problem. However, Mintzberg maintains that in the messiness of the everyday reality of management experience, problems do not present themselves as already formulated. Rather in everyday reality, a manager often needs to become attuned to the fact that there is a problem before they can even begin to formulate what the problem is, let alone begin to solve it. Furthermore, a problem very rarely presents itself in an already formulated form to be solved. At best it presents itself in a vague sense as an alarm bell ringing. The manager needs to determine which alarm bell is ringing, where it is and how to describe it as part of the process of solving it.

For Mintzberg, identifying problems is not only a concern with management education. It is also a problem with management practice. For he maintains that a calculative style of management practice is based on principles of detachment and disengagement from a situation or context. In the disengagement of detachment, calculative managers apply methods that are insensitive to the nuances of the context. Only that which shows up in terms of the method is deemed to count as a problem worthy of being analysed and strategised. Anything that does not show up in terms of the method is not worthy of being considered. In general, this means that anything that does not show up as being measurable is not worth considering in a calculative style of analysis – in fact is not available to be considered. He gives Robert Strange McNamara method of strategic analysis during the Vietnam War as an example of a manager who because of his style of calculative management could not even begin to identify major 'soft' dimensions of problems in the Vietnam War (2004, p. 97). Only that which could be processed by his calculative style of analysis could count as an information worthy of being considered. Anything that was not measurable, anything that was, in management terms 'soft' was seen as irrelevant, and thus not worth taking into account in developing a strategy for the Vietnam War (2004, p. 101). According to Mintzberg, the United States of America paid a heavy price for McNamara's detached

and disengaged style of management by calculative method.

Mintzberg (2004, p. 98) is clear in pointing out that he is using the case of McNamara as an example of a practice that is wide spread in strategic management, namely, the practice of reducing strategic management to a method that is abstracted from the experience to which it is providing direction, that regardless of the specificity and context of the experience, applies a 'one size fits all' method of strategic 'analysis' to the experience and that only the one which fits in with the frame of the method is considered as useful information for processing and consideration.

In opposition to the dominance of this calculative style of management, Mintzberg suggests that management is an engaged practice that cannot be abstracted from experience. He maintains that what is crucial about management is being able to think, make decisions and act under the tensions and pressures of 'real-time' conditions. Managers do not have the luxury of standing back or outside of a situation in a way that affords them the opportunity to first think and then act. Managers are challenged to think in the context of action. Action itself is characterised by contingencies that managers are often not able to foresee in advance. Managers need to be able to identify, articulate and respond to unforseen contingencies in situation. As far back as in 1975, Mintzberg observed that 'No organisation can be so well run, so standardized that it has considered every contingency in the uncertain environment in advance. … Good managers cannot possibly anticipate all the consequences of the action that they take' (1976, p. 13).

Putting it in the form of a paradox, it is precisely in the contingencies of the unforseen of 'real-time' lived experience that managerial insight is crucial. Managers need to be able to read experience in the face of the unexpected, the uncertain and the unknown. In 2004, Mintzberg argues that it is precisely where organisational practices cannot be reduced to routine or habit that management is important. Management is about that form of judgment required for thinking in the face of unpredictable and uncertain contingencies: 'Most work that can be programmed in an organisation need not concern its managers directly. … That leaves the managers with the

messy stuff – the intractable problems, the complicated connections' (2004, p. 13).

The ability to think on 'one's feet' in the context of the real-time conditions of lived experience requires more than a set of techniques of a scientific approach to management. It requires what Mintzberg sees as the art and a craft of management (2004, p. 92). The craft of management refers to the experiential dimension of management. It is through experience that the craft of management is honed and developed. Through experience, managers develop an ability to 'sense things' (2004, p. 52) and a 'feel of the situation' (2004, p. 53) which is a virtue in enabling managers to 'weave their way through complex phenomenon' (2004, p. 52). It is the basis upon which they come to develop what Mintzberg calls the 'big picture' (2004, p. 52), and thus it is the basis upon which they come to develop insight and foresight into and for the organisation, and thus it is the basis of the development of the artistic dimension of management. For art, as Mintzberg understands, it is concerned with 'vision' which involves various dimensions of sight including the ability to 'see a different future' (2004, p. 99), insight into people within the organisation and insight into the culture or the way in which things get done in the organisation.

Mintzberg is insistent in his belief that the techniques and calculative mindset of a scientific manager are not only not sufficient for vision or insight but also on their own, they cut a manager off from being able to feel his way through complex phenomenon reducing management to what he sees as 'an often-fatal tendency to pursue a formula … in disregard of nuance and in spite of … those people and execution problems' (2004, p. 118).

It is not that Mintzberg does not see technique as a central dimension of management. It is that he sees it as one of the three; the other two being art and craft. All three dimensions are integrated for Mintzberg in what he calls the 'engaged manager'. Describing the engaged manager he says that 'They are less inclined to deem from detached offices. They dig out impressions beyond reading facts, by listening more than talking, seeing and feeling more than sitting and figuring'. Continuing his description he says that 'such managers favour care over cure; they do not act as surgeons who slice left and right so much as caregivers intent on avoiding surgery in the first place' (2004, p. 274).

Mintzberg does acknowledge that he was describing an ideal view of the engaged manager. What he does not consider in detail is what I shall call the 'existential' obstacles to becoming an engaged manager. While always acknowledging that uncertainty is a central phenomenon in management, he touches on but does not develop, is the way in which uncertainty or the insecurity of managers (2004, p. 39) can blind a manager to the contingencies of the everyday realities of management, producing what he calls 'mindless' and 'disconnected' managers (2004, p. 119) who are unable to sense and feel their way around the organisation. For managers find security in formulae but the price paid for this security is lack of vision and breakdown of the art and craft of management. Furthermore, Mintzberg does not articulate the way in which uncertainty forms the basis of questioning, and thus the basis of reading, insight into and opening up new possibilities in a situation.

Existential obstacles are all those obstacles that arise as a response to the uncertainty and anxiety that is often experienced in the contingency of lived experience. In order to move from a disconnected and mindless management attunement to an engaged management attunement, it is crucial that a manager need to learn to deal with the uncertainty and anxiety of contingency effectively. It is at this point that I would like to turn to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger for his philosophy provides a framework for appreciating how responses to, what he calls, existential anxiety is the basis of both the engaged and disconnected manager.

Martin Heidegger: the role of care in being and time

At the centre of Heidegger's ontology, in his major book *Being and Time* is the notion of the human being or, as Heidegger calls it *Dasein* as a being-in-the-world. The hyphenated phrase is intended to convey the idea that being and world are not ontologically separate from each other in the way that subject and object are in Cartesian philosophy (Heidegger, 1985). Rather than being ontologically distinct entities the human being is already situated in the world. This means that the human being can never get 'outside' of its world for, for Heidegger,

being on the 'outside' is a way of being alongside and in a certain way of relating to the world (1985, pp. 80, 170–171).

For Heidegger, this already being situated in a world is not to be understood in a physical sense as, for example, tea may be in a tea cup but it is to be understood existentially (1985, p. 80). This means that Dasein or the human being finds itself always and already 'in' and within a network of moods and concerns (1985, pp. 83, 173). This is why the human being is called Dasein – being-there. To be 'there' means not a physical proximity of one entity to another but means to be located in a set of concerns. 'World' for Heidegger does not have the ontological status of an object. The human being never discovers itself outside of a set of concerns. It always finds itself amidst a set of concerns. It is always and already 'in' love or in its worrying or 'in' anger, pain, wonder enjoyment and so on. There is no state of being human before that of being attuned. We find ourselves 'always and already' attuned or absorbed in the world.

Concerns are neither within nor outside of us. We are beings-within-concern (1985, p. 174). Thus, it may be said that for Heidegger Dasein or the human being is defined as what I shall call a 'being-in-care'. This awkward and jarring way of describing the human is quite intentional. It is intended to jolt us into rethinking the nature of the human being and its relationship to the world. To be in the world means to be always and already 'in' a set of concerns. We awake and go to sleep in a set of concerns. We do not first wake up and then decide to choose what will concern us. Paradoxically, the one choice we do not have as humans is the choice of being concerned. For choosing not to be concerned is for Heidegger a way of being concerned.

Heidegger adds to his understanding of 'being-in-care' by saying that care is characterised by moods of 'mattering'. What distinguishes the human beings from, for example, computers are that while computers can compute, things do not matter to the computer. Nothing is at stake or in question for the computer. Computers cannot care, whereas the human being, from a Heideggerian perspective cannot care; cannot be in a horizon of mattering. In its very essence, from a Heideggerian perspective, the being of the human is in question (1985, pp. 67, 68) and 'at stake' (1985, p. 68). This means that even

''not caring'' is a form of caring, for not caring is a mood and response to being at stake or in question (1985, p. 83). Even 'zoning out' is a way of being in a mood, and thus attuned within the world. Being engaged and being detached or even disassociated are both forms of moods or caring for Heidegger. They are both responses to being in question and at stake. For the same reason, even knowing is a form of attunement for Heidegger, for it is a way of being attuned to the world – a theme that Foucault picks up in his discussion of Socrates in *History of Sexuality*. However, to be more precise, it is not only the case that things matter to the human being but also that the human being is always and already located within an horizon of 'mattering'.

Care is made up of three integrated dimensions: mood, understanding and throwness into a particular time and space (1985, pp. 171–172). For Heidegger, this means that thinking, mood and situatedness are co-constitutive of each other. From a Heideggerian perspective, there is no form of reasoning that is moodless and conversely there is no mood that is reasonless. To each and every mood there belongs a state of reasoning and all reasoning is conducted in the framework of a mood. As Heidegger expresses it, a mood 'always has its understanding' and 'understanding always has its mood' (1985, p. 182). Furthermore, both understanding and mood occur in the spacio-temporal context in which Dasein is thrown.

Although it may sound logically empty to define every activity in terms of the notion of care, there are, as already indicated, a range of ways of caring; the way, for example, of a Mother Teresa and a corporate 'Machiavellian'. The point is that each way of caring defines the way in which the world shows up for Dasein or the human being. Different ways of caring allow the world to be revealed in different ways. Caring can take on many particular forms, for example, fascination, curiosity, fear, wonder, anxiety, boredom and indifference. Each particular form of care discloses the world in a different way (1985, p. 180). When, for example, we are in attunement of boredom the world is revealed as boring; when in a state of anxiety, the world is revealed as threatening. Jim Morrison expresses this colloquially in the lyrics of a song when he says that 'When you are a stranger everything seems strange'. Being a stranger frames the strangers' attunement to

the world and defines how things will show up or be disclosed for this person. For when I am a stranger I notice things through the attunement of strangeness. In this lyric being a stranger shapes our attunement to the world. It is also important to point out that being a stranger or in a mode of care or concern is not a property of a subject. It is neither in me nor outside of me but I as Dasein am always and already 'in' a concern. For Heidegger, Dasein finds itself always and already 'in' a mode of being concerned. 'When I am in anxiety, the world appears to me through my anxious attunement. When I am depressed or excited the world appears to me through these modes of being attuned'.

Also, therefore, from the Heideggerian perspective, the way we are within our concerns shapes the way in which we see, notice, cope with, create and respond to the world. Each way of caring or being attuned both opens up certain possibilities and closes down other possibilities. It is important to understand that Heidegger is not offering an ethics but ontology of care. Care is in itself neither good nor bad. Both Machiavelli, in the popularised image of him as lusting after power and Mother Teresa as 'caring' for the well being of people are exemplars of different ways of being attuned to the world. Each lives in and out of their ways of being attuned to the world. Care, concern, mattering and attunement are not to be identified with empathy. Empathy is, from the Heideggerian perspective, (1985, p. 162) only one form of care or attunement; hate is just as much a form of attunement or caring as is empathy; so too is resentment, envy, indifference, wonder and joy. All of these are different ways of being attuned to the world. They are different ways in which the world matters and appears or is disclosed to us.

Reflexivity and inauthenticity through the existential anxiety of being-in-situation

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger does privilege one form of concern, one mood of mattering above all others. This is the mood of what he calls anxiety (1985, p. 229) and in order to distinguish it from clinical forms of anxiety, it shall be called existential anxiety. Existential anxiety is a reflexive mood. It is a mood in which Dasein comes what Heidegger calls 'face to face' (1985, p. 233) with its moods, its forms

of concerns, and thus its ways of being-in-the-world. Although the being of the human in terms of the phenomenon of care and concern in its everyday activities within the world, it is neither explicitly aware of its being as a being of concern nor is it explicitly attuned to the particular form that its concern takes. Both its being as care and the particular form that care takes are in its everyday dealings within the world, in the background rather than the foreground of its awareness. Heidegger expresses this by saying that *Dasein* is for the most absorbed in or preoccupied with the everyday tasks of practical coping and not with the mode of attunement in terms of which it is absorbed in its practical coping. It is too busy coping to be concerned with the form of concern that defines the way in which it is attuned to the world and the way in which the world is disclosed to it.

According to Heidegger, the experience of existential anxiety ruptures or disrupts data set's absorption and involvement in the everyday world. In anxiety, Dasein cannot continue as usual (1985, p. 232). In general terms, think, for example, of a 'mid life crisis' in which no matter how much a person wants to just continue with their everyday activity, the sense of emptiness and meaningless that characterises such crises, distracts one from the everyday world and one finds oneself withdrawing from the everyday world. It is in these moments of withdrawal that, Heidegger argues, Dasein comes face to face with itself as being-in-the-world. It comes to catch a glimpse of the way in which it 'is' in the world: 'Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious' (1985, p. 232).

The way in which Dasein responds to anxiety is crucial for its way of living out its concerns. Heidegger makes a distinction between an authentic and an inauthentic form of responding to the anxiety of being. A general outline of the logic of this distinction is grounded in the following: Dasein is always 'at stake' in its concerns. This means that its existence is in question (1985, pp. 67–68) in its concerns. To say that its existence is in question in its concerns is to say that its identity or enacting of its 'potential' (1985, p. 235) or its 'individualising' (1985, p. 233) of itself cannot be taken for granted. It does not automatically and inevitably become itself. Unlike material things in the world, Dasein does not have assurance of being something solid. Because its

existence is in question in its concerns, 'anxiety is always latent' (1985, p. 234) in data set. When experienced, anxiety is a terrifying moment of helplessness in which a person can take neither fight nor flight and has nowhere or no one to turn to (1985, p. 231).

Heidegger believes that in the face of anxiety, Dasein has one of two responses: either to embrace the anxiety with what he calls resolve (1985, p. 344) or to flee into inauthenticity. Facing anxiety with resolve opens the way for reflection on being-in-the-world and is connected with being present and engaged in situations. He sees Socrates as exemplary of facing the anxiety of being in question with resolve: 'All through his life and right into his death, Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current, and maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest thinker of the West. This is why he wrote nothing' (1968, p. 17).

Inauthenticity, on the other hand is a refusal of engagement and reflection. It is a practice of getting lost in the busyness of everyday living and expresses itself as being disconnected – or what Heidegger calls 'distantiality' (1985, p. 164) – and divorced from being present in situations. It expresses itself as a 'tranquilized familiarity' in which data set's attunement gets 'dimmed down' (1985, p. 234). In this state 'its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it' (1985, p. 222) and it is 'cut off' from an authentic presence towards others, the world and towards itself (1985, p. 214). What Dasein says and does in this state is not 'grounded' in its own struggle to become (1985, pp. 212–213) but is based on what is passed on by others or by what Heidegger calls the 'they' (1985, p. 164). It produces a 'levelling down' (1985, p. 165) and an 'averageness' (1985, p. 164) which numbs data set's attunement to the world in which it is situated. This dumbing down is expressed by Heidegger as an 'idle talk' which is a jargon-based form of talking that 'feeds upon superficial reading' (1985, p. 212).

It needs to be added that inauthenticity is for Heidegger still a form of Care. For it is still a way of being attuned to the world but it can take the form of 'not caring' or detaching or disconnecting of Dasein from its involvements. 'Not caring' is still a way of relating to the world as, for example, when a child says 'I do not care about x' but is nevertheless heavily invested in talking about x or it's not caring about x. Similarly, ways of responding to anxiety by disconnecting or disassociating from lived experience are still ways of being attuned to the world. Being detached or disconnected are ways of being-in-the-world: 'Such a Dasein keeps floating unattached; yet in so doing, it is always alongside the world, with Others, and towards itself' (1985, p. 214).

Anxiety, facticity and possibility in being and time

The experience of anxiety is an occasion in terms of which the distinction between a dialectical tension at the essence of its existence becomes explicit to it; the 'facticity of its being' (1985, pp. 56, 174) and its being as 'being-possible' (1985, p. 232). The term facticity is used by Heidegger to indicate that the human being does not first choose its way of being and then enact it. Rather it discovers itself as already and always thrown into a way of being (1985, p. 174). It finds itself speaking a particular language, thrown into a particular cultural and historical context. Being thrown into means being born into a particular way of doing things that Dasein does not choose and it does not even know that it is thrown into this context. For it tends to believe that the way in which it does things are natural rather than the product of being governed by the facticity of its throwness.

The experience of anxiety is an unsettling, or as Heidegger calls it 'uncanny' (1985, p. 233) experience. Dasein comes face to face with the way in which it is thrown into the world. It comes to see that its way of doing things is not natural or the God given way of doing things (1985, p. 233) but is the product of being absorbed or involved in the world in a particular way. This is potentially both a terrifying and liberating experience. It is terrifying because it destabilises the ground upon which Dasein stands. Dasein can no longer take its ways of doing things for granted. They are called into question. But precisely because they are called into question, Dasein is no longer limited by its facticity. In questioning its facticity it begins to become unstuck from its facticity. It can be other than what it has been. Because it is freed from the constraints of its facticity, it can begin to open up new possibilities for itself.

But Heidegger takes this a step further; not only does Dasein discover that there are other possible ways of being. Heidegger maintains that in anxiety, Dasein discovers its being as a 'being possible' (1985, p. 232). Being-possible does not mean that Dasein now finds itself 'having' possibilities as though possibilities were a property added onto Dasein. If Dasein were not a being-possible, it would not have this, that or any other possibility. It is because possibility is a part of the existence of Dasein that Dasein has this, that or any other possibility. This is a frightening experience because, in anxiety, it dawns on Dasein that its way of being is not simply given and it has no-where, no-one and no-thing to turn to or to rely on for the particular possibilities that it will take up. Heidegger expresses this by saying that in anxiety Dasein is 'individualised' (1985, p. 232) as being-in-the-world. To be individualised means, in the moment of anxiety Dasein is alone, without a God, other people or a set of conventions to guide it.

Embracing the uncertainty of possibility is the basis for creating the future rather than being a victim of the past. Kierkegaard expresses the excitement of possibility well when he says that 'whoever is educated by anxiety is educated by possibility' (1980) and whoever is educated by possibility is educated in a way that takes them out of the particular finite context and petty concerns of the day such that they can see and create beyond their immediate horizon. Kierkegaard goes onto add that there is wine more sparkling than that of possibility. For just as wine frees us from the here and now of our immediate concerns, so intoxication through possibility excites us into seeing beyond the horizon of the here, now and the past.

In his later study, Heidegger comes to express the educative and transformational power of anxiety in a more poetic and general way when, quoting Holderlin he says 'But where danger is, grows The saving power also' (1954, p. 27).

What Heidegger is saying is that the coping options – the saving power – reveal themselves in being able to stay with uncertainty, stress or anxiety of a situation with which we are concerned. It is important to note that Heidegger's interpretation of Holderlin is claiming that the danger needs to be apprehended as the danger. This means being able to embrace or 'dwell' in the danger rather than reacting to the danger. To embrace the danger means to al-

low it in a way that one is not dominated by it but can turn it into an opportunity for insight. It is a moment of 'dwelling' in the 'eye of the storm'. This is an important point in psychotherapy in general; providing a 'dwelling' space for a client or a patient to bring the anxiety, panic or depression to the surface in such a way as to work with the meaning of the phenomenon such that new possibilities for living are opened up for the patient or client. Furthermore, it is also important to understand that Heidegger does not mean saving in a religious sense but in the sense that he sees the opening of possibilities as a saving experience. For when we can see possibilities in a situation this is saving in that it gives us new ways of coping creatively with the situation.

Heidegger calls the willingness to stay with rather than react to the danger 'resolve' (1985, p. 277). In a paradoxical sense, Heideggerian resolve is the power of powerlessness in a situation of danger or stress. As Dreyfus puts it resoluteness 'is the experience of transformation that comes from Dasein's accepting its powerlessness' (1993, p. 319) in the face of anxiety. Continuing he says: 'The ultimate choice… is no choice. Accepting such powerlessness is the basis of becoming clear sighted' (1993, p. 317). The more we can accept the more we can begin to open possibilities for ourselves.

Heidegger: listening for the question in uncertainty

For Heidegger, what is crucial is the art of listening to anxiety or uncertainty. In listening to anxiety, Dasein allows the question of the meaning of being to emerge and surface itself. It is through uncertainty that questioning emerges. To question, from the Heideggerian perspective is to be in question. Questioning is not just a cognitive process but is a state of being; that state in which our being is in question, and it is as we allow questioning to emerge out of being in question that new possibilities for coping effectively with situations arise. For as we allow for questioning, we also allow for conceptualising and taking perspective on situations. This is a theme that Heidegger develops in what is metaphysics, where he maintains that it is only as we allow the strangeness that is experienced in anxiety to dawn on us that questioning emerges: 'Only when the strangeness of what-is forces itself upon us

does it awaken and invite our wonder. Only because of wonder … does the ''Why?'' spring to our lips' (1948, p. 353).

Inauthenticity, on the other hand, is a refusal to listen to the questioning that is emerging in the face of anxiety. In inauthenticity, we flee from the uncertainty of the question of being and fall into the numbness of everydayness. As already been mentioned, we do not notice or begin to bring the question of being to presence. We are too busy protecting ourselves by taking either flight or fight.

Thus, from this Heideggerian perspective, it is in resolutely learning to listen to the uncertainty that arises under pressure or in problematic situations rather than by attempting to control, defend against or turn away from the uncertainty in a problematic situation that managers can learn to formulate the question in a problematic situation, and thus conceptualise and gain perspective on it.

This point is more simply demonstrated in the work of Wrubel and Benner. They claim that there are at least two kinds of responses to stress and pressure (1989, pp. 2–3). Traditional stress management, they claim teaches a person to relax themselves by gaining distance from the source of the stress experience. In contrast to this, they maintain that what is crucial for working with stress and pressure is the art of learning to listen for the question that is being posed by stress or pressure. They maintain that stress is a source of what matters to us. To listen to the stress or uncertainty that we may be experiencing is to listen and to learn about that which matters to us. To listen to that which matters to us is to listen to what we care about, and it is to listen to and for the values in terms of which we care. In other words, it is to listen to the values in which we are attuned to a situation.

Heidegger and management: command and control versus possibility views of management

The question that arises now is what does this Heideggerian philosophy have to do with management? I would like to argue that given the notion of a world that is in crisis and not stable, we need to move towards a view of management that is willing to embrace the uncertainty of possibility. It is this

sense of being able to open up new possibilities that is crucial to managers in an age of uncertainty. This point is well expressed by Holling quoted in Ramo who says: 'In contrast to an efficiency-driven, command-and-control approach, management that accepts uncertainty and seeks to build resilience can sustain social–ecological systems, especially during periods of transformation following disturbance' (2010, p. 196). Continuing his point he says: 'A management approach based on resilience would emphasize the need to keep options open' (2010, p. 178). Deepening the point further he says: 'flowing from this would not be the presumption of sufficient knowledge, but the recognition of our ignorance; not the assumption that future events are expected, but that they will be unexpected' (2010). This is counter intuitive to traditional theories and perspectives on management and management education.

To keep options open is to be able to resolutely embrace anxiety. However, on Mintzberg's view of dominant trends in management education and practice, this is far from the case. Managers, learning case studies, theories and techniques in detachment from the uncertainties of everyday practice are not being nurtured in the art of the possible. They are not being trained to read everyday experience. They are in fact escaping the contingencies of the everyday world. This point is made in a complementary way in the writings of Benner and Wrubel on nursing who maintain that medical professionals often escape into the world of technique to evade the uncertainty of the lived experience of medical situations (1989). However, the more they escape into technique, the less attuned they are, through the creative acceptance of uncertainty, to the nuances that are contained in a situation and thus the more difficult it is for them to read vital signs often in life threatening situations.

This is the same point that Mintzberg is making in the context of management: the more managers detach themselves from lived experience through the overemphasis on technique, the less attuned they become to the nuances of the lived experience dimensions of a situation. The crucial role of a creative acceptance of uncertainty is that it attunes professionals of whatever persuasion (nurses, doctors, managers, leaders, etc.) to the nuances of lived experience and thus improves their ability to read and act effectively in the situation.

Applying Benner and Wrubel's Heideggerian reading of nursing to Mintzberg's notion of management

A distinction between two forms of caring that parallel Mintzberg's distinction between engaged and disconnected managers can be found in the works of Benner and Wrubel; a care that is attuned to what they, following phenomenological philosophy, call 'lived experience' (1985) and a form of care that is detached from lived experience and is preoccupied with techniques, objects, numbers and facts. However, these two forms of care are not mutually exclusive – and indeed need to be integrated into a whole, they claim that in the realms of professional practices such as nursing and medicine in general, these two forms of caring have become decoupled from each other. They claim that there has been what Heidegger calls a 'forgetfulness' of the lived experience dimension of care and a dependency on technique to the exclusion of lived experience. As they claim, the danger of excluding an attunement to lived experience is that it numbs a practitioner to vital warning signs necessary to take effective action in a situation.

In order to clarify the limitations of an exclusion of lived experience in the name of technique, Wrubel and Benner use the example of a mother and her relationship to techniques of mothering. They claim that it is not good enough for a mother to have learnt skills of effective mothering without this being underpinned by an attunement to the lived experience of the child: 'Parenting techniques do not work unless a basic level of attachment and caring exists. In fact, parenting techniques are not even useful or possible unless the parent is already engaged in the parenting situation through caring' (1989, p. 4). Benner and Wrubel generalise this point to medicine whereby they note that learning technique is not a sufficient condition for effective medical practice; that medical practitioner's need to be attuned to lived experience because this is where the dangers and warning signs occur necessary to read and respond to the patient.

The same point can be made in terms of Mintzberg's distinction between the engaged and disconnected manager: whereas the disconnected manager is not attuned to but deaf to the vital signs of lived experience (Mintzberg's archetype in this context is

McNamara), the engaged manager is in the midst of the temporal flux of lived experience, and thus able to read and respond to lived experience. It is a caring attunement to lived experience that enables people to notice 'problems, to recognise possible solutions and to implement those solutions' (1989, p. 4).

While Mintzberg does not explicitly make this point, Benner and Wrubel allow us to see that engagement is not a 'soft' and 'fluffy' nicety but is the condition of effective noticing, and thus a precondition for effective coping in a situation. It is care in the context of lived experience that sets the alarm bells ringing such that a manager or professional practitioner begins to notice that there is a problem that needs to be clarified and defined as an essential part of solving or active coping. Engaged caring, as they put it: 'places the person in a situation in such a way that certain things show up as relevant' (1989, p. 4). This being engaged in the situation – rather than detached from it – is the basis of noticing the nuances of lived experience. They give the example of a mother with a new born baby: 'A common place example is a mother's awareness that her baby is crying. It is an everyday occurrence for someone other than the mother, to comment, "Is the baby crying? I didn't hear anything"' (1989, p. 87).

Because the mother is situated 'within' the concern, she hears the baby crying whereas someone who has nothing at stake in the baby, may not even notice it is crying, may be indifferent to it or frustrated with it. Through care and concern 'signs that are insignificant to others are filled with significance for us' (1989, p. 87). The implication of their statement is that someone who does not care for the baby is not attuned in a nurturing way to the crying baby. Indeed they say that everyone has the 'equivalent of many crying babies'. Everyone has concerns through which the world is revealed to them and through which they notice a problem that needs to be worked upon.

For Benner and Wrubel, such caring is not itself a technique or method of calibration or calculation but is, following the work of Heidegger, a fundamental way of being human. It presupposes that being matters to the human being. While techniques may help a person deal effectively with a situation, it is through concerned choosing that a specific technique is or is not chosen in a situation. The practice

of choosing a technique to respond to a situation is not itself a technique but requires situational judgement or concerned attunement to lived experience.

Benner and Wrubel maintain that while technique may be a necessary condition for effective practice, it is not a sufficient condition that underpinning technique a practitioner presupposes a particular form of caring. Specifically they maintain that knowledge of technique is not a sufficient condition to be attuned to, noticing and responding to 'lived experience'. Describing the ideal relationship between care in the context of lived experience and technical attunement they say: 'In the best nursing practice, science and technology are tools for caring' (1985, p. 372).

This last quotation fits in well with Mintzberg's critique of management and management education in which he charges both with emphasising science and technology in the absence of what he calls engagement or what Benner and Wrubel are calling caring attunement to lived experience. For, as Wrubel and Benner and Mintzberg claim, both science and technology are not sufficient conditions for effective practitioner knowledge. Caring or engagement is a necessary condition. Without a caring attunement to lived experience, from Mintzberg's perspective, we have disconnected management, managers whose horizon of noticing is limited to that which can be quantified and not grounded in a qualitative attunement to the lived experience of the day to day context of management. The quantitative attunement of the disconnected manager shapes what he does and does not notice; noticing numbers, things and objects, not people, relationships, histories and contexts – whereas the connected manager can embrace numbers and objects into the greater whole of an attunement to contexts, relationships and people.

Benner and Wrubel's insights into the relationship between care and noticing allow us to bring out another point central to Mintzberg who distinguishes between what he calls the 'will to manage' and the 'zest for the business'. He claims that the will to manage is characterised by 'fostering success in others' (2004, p. 16). The zest for the business, on the other hand is marked by 'getting the most out of resources' whereas the will to manage is 'about taping into the energy of people' (2004, p. 16).

Translating these into Benner and Wrubel's characterisation of the relationship between care and noticing, it can be said that the way in which the world shows up for the manager, and thus the way in which the manager will analyse and interact with others in his or her management environment is shaped by the way they care, that is, if they have a 'zest for the business,' then the world will show up as a series of business functions while if they have a will to manage, then the organisation will show up as a network of relationships in terms of which business functions take place. No amount of learning science, information, analysis, technique or theory on its own can alter the way in which the world appears through the attunement or way of caring. The zest for the business or the will to manage shapes the significance of theory, technique and science, and thus shapes the way in which a manager notices and copes in their particular lived experience. To enable managers to notice and cope more carefully as managers, management education needs to go beyond the dimension of theory, technique and science. It needs to bring out and discuss the way of caring implied in management; in the will to manage, as Mintzberg puts it.

An example of Benner and Wrubel's understanding of Heidegger in the context of management

As Benner and Wrubel notice and indeed as Max van Manen, the phenomenological educator, before them claimed, one of the dominant moods of mattering and care is a sense of stress or worry. It is in the mood of concern of worrying that the alarm bells go off such that concerns are noticed and worked with. Once again in the context of the relationship between parent and child, Van Manen expresses the relationship between care and worry by saying that: 'worry is the active ingredient of parental attentiveness'. Indeed he goes onto maintain that 'Worry – rather than duty or obligation – keeps us in touch with the one for whom we care. Worry is the spiritual glue that keeps the mother or father affixed to the life of their child' (2002, p. 266).

An example of the power of worry in, firstly, being a from caring attunement to the lived experience of an organisational context and, secondly

being the basis for an engaged rather than a dis-connected leadership style is given by Andrew Grove in his reflections on his own leadership style: 'Fear plays a major role in creating and maintain passion' (1996, p. 117). The central theme of his book Only *the Paranoid Survive* is the importance of the mood of worrying for his practice as a manager and leader. He makes the claim that technical rationality is not a sufficient condition for effective management; that underpinning technical rationality is the mood of worrying. He says that appropriate worrying was both the basis of being attentive to problems and possibilities within his organisation environment. It was both a sign of danger but it also pointed towards the coping options available in a situation: 'I worry about products getting screwed up, and I worry about products getting introduced prematurely. I worry about factories not performing well, and I worry about having too many factories. I worry about hiring the right people, and I worry about morale slacking off. …' (1996, p. 3).

Why is worry so important? It was Freud who over a century ago articulated for us the way in which fear and anxiety are states of heightened arousal in which we become more attentive to the situation in which we are. For Grove, it is his sense of worry that allows him to be constantly scanning his environment to see what is occurring: 'It is fear that makes me scan … searching for problems: news of disgruntled customers, potential slippage's … Simply put, fear can be the opposite of complacency. Complacency often afflicts precisely those who have been the most successful' (1996, p. 118).

Grove exemplifies one of the main points of this article: worry is central to seeing or noticing. But more than this, Grove believes that worry is also the source of seeing new possibilities and opening up new coping options. Grove believes that it is his ability to worry appropriately that allows him to see beyond the conventions of the day. For worry shakes him out of the complacency of conventions and encourages him to be alert to new possibilities: 'If we fear that someday, any day, some development somewhere in our environment will change the rules of the game, our associates will sense and share that dread. They will be on the lookout. They will constantly be scanning their radar screens' (1996, p. 117).

Thus, it is the mood of worrying that takes Grove beyond what Mintzberg calls a disconnected to an engaged manager. His worry is the way in which he hears what Benner and Wrubel called the 'crying babies' within his organisation and within the competitive environment in which his organisation is situated. Technique on its own, method or theory on its own is not going to allow him to listen for the 'crying babies'. For it is through the mood of worry that he is engaged in and attuned to the lived experience of management.

What is crucial for Grove is that managers learn to listen to their worry. For worrying appropriately is the source of managerial insight. In a way not dis-similar from Mintzberg, he speaks about how the attempt to rely only on technique or rationality cut managers off from the lived experience of their organisational reality: 'So, when your business gets into serious difficulties, in spite of the best attempts of business schools and management training courses to make you a rational analyser of data, objective analysis will take second seat to personal and emo-tional reactions almost everytime' (1996, pp. 123–124).

Grove also quite explicitly argues that managers who do not cultivate this sense of worry risk losing their appreciation of the lived experience of the day to day reality of the organisations that they are themselves managing: 'An expert in market research once told me the chief executive watered down her fact-based research. ''I don't think they want to hear that'' was the byword by which bad news was eliminated … as her information was advanced along the management chain. Senior management in this company didn't have a chance. Bad news never reached them. This company has gone from great-ness to real tough times. Watching them from the outside, it seemed that management didn't have a clue as to what was happening to them. I firmly believe that their tradition of dealing with bad news was an integral part of the decline' (1996, p. 119).

This last quotation from Grove allows us to see that even facts are interpreted in a framework of concern. For, as the quotation makes clear, the chief executive interpreted the facts through his concern – his anxiety – that bad news should not be heard – and his unwillingness to hear bad news led, according to Grove, to the decline of the organisation.

For Benner and Wrubel, care is not only central to noticing of a problem or concern. It is also central

to coping with the problem or concern. As they claim, it is care that suggests the coping options that are available in any particular situation. As they say, 'caring is the essential requisite for all coping' (1989, p. 2). It is because Grove was able to listen to his worrying that, as he notes in his book *Only the Paranoid survive*, he played an instrumental role in opening up new possibilities for Intel, and thus saving it from collapse.

An example of a disconnected an inauthentic response to the anxiety of management practice

Of course not all worry is productive. It can be paralysing. Too much worry, as Freud and other psychotherapists can tell us, leads to a numbing of our attunement. This point is reiterated by Grove who says that an environment of excessive and uncontrolled fear will 'cut off the flow of bad news from the periphery', and as we have seen too little worry leads to complacency. But he who knows how to worry correctly is alive to that which is taken for granted in the complacency of routine. To be able to worry appropriately is a virtue and a sign of practical intelligence. As Kierkegaard puts it: 'Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate' (1980). For whoever has learnt to be anxious in the right way is not bogged down by threats but always sees possibilities in them.

An example of a disconnected and inauthentic response to anxiety experienced in a management situation is given by Watson in his book *Organising and Managing Work* (2002). In this book, he has a CEO describe the way in which he becomes 'inauthentic' in the face of a threat and disconnects himself from the threat by responding in an abstract and jargon written language. Describing the incident, Kurt Delnis, the CEO says: 'I think I was half aware that the sales people were looking less confident when I addressed them at our monthly meetings. And I was sort of conscious of the engineers being edgy with me at the team briefings. They seemed to have nothing to say and I found that I was more and more talking at people. But being the determined chap that I was, I brushed this off. However, I am told that my speeches... were becoming increasingly convoluted... I was using

more and more pseudo-business jargon' (2002, p. 162). Continuing he says: 'Looking back, it appears that as I got more anxious, the more I gabbled out the stuff'. Being able to acknowledge and understand his anxiety lead him into a different relationship to it and his colleagues. It leads him away from a controlling response to a listening response: 'I stopped thinking that I could mastermind all the engineering and all the marketing and I started to listen to my colleagues' (2002, p. 162).

The experience of Kurt is a clear example of the way in which an unreflexive response to anxiety can lead a manager into a disconnected rather than an engaged relationship to a situation of pressure. Rather than allowing himself to stop and notice what is triggering off his uncertainty he, as himself says, is a 'determined chap'. But what Heidegger, Benner and Wrubel are telling us is that there is a time for determination, and there is a time for listening to uncertainty. Traditionally, it seems that management has advocated an attitude of 'soldiering on' in the face of uncertainty rather than learning to listen to it. Yet, as is being argued in this article and as is evidenced in the examples given, learning to listen to uncertainty is a basis for learning to question, read and respond to a circumstance of stress, pressure or uncertainty. Yet, often the uncertainty is either so strong or it is seen as a sign of weakness of will. Thus, stopping to listen to the uncertainty, and thus the problem and question that is emerging through the uncertainty is ruled out in advance.

An interesting point to note regarding uncertainty and anxiety is that it is possible to both simultaneously see and disavow it. This is exemplified in the case of Kurt above. As he himself says, he was always 'sort of conscious' of an edginess in the engineers and he says that he was 'half aware' of his address to the sales people. Both of the phrases quoted indicate that he was both aware and yet turning away from what he was aware of. But at no time did he 'own' this anxiety himself, that is, he projected it outwards as though it was in the audience rather than in himself. The more frightened he became, the more he tried to protect himself by disconnecting himself through pseudo management speak and the more he tried to secure himself through disconnecting himself, the more insecure he felt thus setting motion a spiral of intensifying his anxiety while trying to protect himself. The more he was caught up in

himself, the less he was attuned to the situation that he was in.

It was only when his secretary provided him with a 'safe enough' emotional space in which to 'hold' his anxiety that he began to see the spiral that he was in and once he was able to see this, he was able to begin to free himself from trying to get rid of the anxiety and learn to listen to the uncertainty such that he could listen to his colleagues. The idea of a safe enough 'holding environment' is not a Heideggerian concept but is drawn from the British psychoanalyst, Donald Winnicott, who maintains that to deal with anxiety effectively, a psychoanalyst needs to provide a patient with an environment or space in which they can be safe enough to explore their insecurities. Kurt's secretary provided him with this space, for she held him in a relationship that embraced him: 'Jill has been the best management teacher I ever had. What I now realise is that… the more senior you are as a manager [the] more dependent on other people' you are.

However, the idea of a safe enough environment is a theme for a further article.

Conclusion

The works of Heidegger, Mintzberg and Benner and Wrubel demonstrate that there are at least two responses to the uncertainty and anxiety that occurs in the lived experience of management: an authentic and inauthentic response; a disconnected and a disconnected response. The difference between the two hinges on the way in which managers respond to anxiety: the attunement of being resilient and resolute in the face of anxiety allows for learning to listen to the questions being posed in anxiety, and thus opens up the opportunity for reading lived experiences from within and allows for new possibilities of coping with the situation. There is also the tendency to panic in the face of anxiety and this leads to disconnecting from the situation. In management it expresses itself as a style of management that relies on technique to the exclusion of lived experience. The point of this article is to eliminate technique but to argue for the belief that technique needs to be situated in an attunement of concern for lived experience. Being attuned to lived experience means being attuned to the nuances in a situation

and the willingness to open up possibilities in situation. It is crucial that managers learn to open up possibilities.

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