Journal of Business Ethics (2010) 97:291–309
DOI 10.1007/s10551-010-0510-5

Obedience and Evil: From Milgram and Kampuchea to Normal Organizations

Miguel Pina e Cunha
Arménio Rego
Stewart R. Clegg

ABSTRACT. Obedience: a simple term. Stanley Milgram, the famous experimental social psychologist, shocked the world with theory about it. Another man, Pol Pot, the infamous leader of the Khmer Rouge, showed how far the desire for obedience could go in human societies. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled environment of the US psychology laboratory of the 1960s. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In this article, we discuss the process through which the Khmer Rouge regime created an army of unquestioningly obedient soldiers – including child soldiers. Based on these two cases, we advance a framework on how obedience can be grown or countered.

KEY WORDS: obedience, Khmer Rouge, children soldiers, organized violence, Pol Pot

> We the children of the revolution
>
> Make the supreme resolution to strive
>
> To increase our ability to battle,
>
> And make the stand of the revolution perfect.
>
> Lyrics of the song ''Children of the New Kampuchea,'' found in a Democratic Kampuchea songbook (Phim, 1998, p. 4)

Introduction

On April 17, 1975, Cambodian communist troops appeared in the boulevards of Phnom Penh, heading in the direction of the city center. They were described as ''heavily armed, silent, many of them alarmingly young'' (Chandler, 1999, p. 103). The onlookers crowding the streets also said that they looked like they had come from another planet. To these soldiers, the forefront of the Red Khmer army that would eventually control the country for almost the next 4 years (1975–1979), city dwellers were the enemies, the bourgeois and capitalists that their movement was fighting and now overthrowing. The urban world was also another planet for these soldiers. Some of these black-uniformed military drank cans of motor oil, others ate toothpaste or drank water from the toilet bowls, which they took to be the urban equivalents of their wells (Short, 2004, p. 269). They were peasant people, used only to rural ways, with no exposure to modernity.

These youngsters from deep rural Cambodia were the first-generation children of the revolution. In the future, every child would be one. In her firsthand account of life in Democratic Kampuchea (DK), the name of Cambodia during the years of Khmer Rouge domination, Denise Affonço (2007) describes how families were split and parents separated from their children. Parents were warned that they were no longer a family. Children were going to be educated by the *Angkar*, the revolutionary organization, according to the precepts of the revolution, rather than by some traditional, bourgeois, institution. Affonço also describes the suffering caused by this revolutionary measure. Suffering, however, was not a major concern for the power apparatus of the Khmer Rouge, who executed the policy with rigor.

These young people, who were separated from their families and educated as revolutionaries, were both victims and perpetrators of one of the most terrible pages in the history of the twentieth century. We are especially interested in two intertwining processes: (1) the way these people were recruited and indoctrinated to serve the Khmer Rouge and

(2) how their obedience was obtained and maintained. We aim to articulate three major literatures: the psychological literature on obedience (Milgram, 1965, 1974), the sociological literature on total institutions (Clegg, 2006; Goffman, 1961; Shenkar, 1996), and the historical literature on the Khmer Rouge (e.g., Kiernan, 2008).

We launched this project for a number of reasons. First, organizations learn from the consideration of substantively classical studies on psychology. Even today, in many organizational contexts, employees are expected to obey orders as a matter of course (Jacques, 1996). Second, Milgram's conclusions have been criticized for a number of reasons, including the limitations resulting from being a laboratory study (e.g., Blass, 2001). Third, the analysis of a case of extreme obedience in a naturally occurring setting may complement experimental studies, hence our choice of the Khmer Rouge regime. The Kampuchea case shows that Milgram's conclusions reflect real processes in some naturally occurring settings. Fourth, to gain control of the people and to command their obedience, the Khmer Rouge erected a total institutional space, with a panoptical trait. Fifth, we aim to explore the similarities between the processes taking place in these extreme cases and obedience-construction processes in normal organizations. We see our work as both a theoretical contribution and a call for ''consciousness raising'' (Blass, 1991, p. 409) on the potential evil contained in organizations and organizing processes. In a sense, we are opening a Pandora's box of organizational evil with the help of these three conceptual tools.

Given the above goals, we structured this article around four major sections. We start by introducing the topic of obedience to authority, namely as explored and investigated by Stanley Milgram in his famous experiments. Using Milgram as a point of departure, we will focus on the way children were used by the Khmer Rouge regime to fulfill its revolutionary mission. We will first consider how extreme obedience was created in the case of the total institutional space of DK. In the third section, we focus on the case of children, the purest bearers of the values of the new revolutionary order. We consider how revolutionary children were socialized to perform tasks involving, in some cases, extreme violence. Finally, we derive some implications for organizations in general. We contribute to several literatures that are situated in the interface between leadership, organization, politics, human rights, and ethics, through our discussion of the ethics of obedience and disobedience, the limits of indoctrination, and of how people can be instrumentalized in the name of organizational Utopias. We seek to learn from revolutions and revolutionaries, a path that has also been followed by other organizational researchers (De Cock et al., 2007). To date, the revolution of Cambodia has been ignored by organizational scholars. In line with Clegg's (2006) call for more research on total institutions, we suggest that it should not be ignored. We consider, in line with Chirot and McCauley (2006), that when large-scale killing goes beyond sporadic bloody episodes, it must be organized. The organization of systematic death should be of interest to organization scholars.

Total institutions and socialization for obedience

Stanley Milgram conducted a sequence of studies in the 1960s that are among the most well known in social psychology (e.g., Milgram, 1965, 1974). He developed several variations of his basic procedure, but the best known of his studies is possibly Experiment 5 (Burger, 2009; Milgram, 1974). In this, a participant and a confederate engaged in research that they presented as a study on the effects of punishment on learning, drawing on behavioral theories of operant conditioning. The participant played the role of the teacher and the confederate that of the learner. The experimenter strapped the learner to a chair in a contiguous room and attached electrodes to his arm. The teacher was instructed to read word pairs, and whenever the learner/confederate committed a mistake, the teacher was instructed by the researcher (the authority figure) to deliver an electric shock to the learner.

Teachers sat in front of a shock generator and were instructed to administer a shock every time the learner gave a wrong answer to a question. Shocks supposedly ranged from 15 to 450 volts in 15-V increments, with each incorrect answer leading to an increment in voltage.

To summarize the study, the learner actually received no shocks but reacted in a way seemingly congruent with an increase in intensity. After the 330-V shock there was no reaction, an indication that the learner was incapable of responding. The experiment was halted when one of two conditions was met: when the participant refused to obey the experimenter four times or when the highest switch was pressed three times. The reason why the results of these experiments were so surprising is that 65% of the participants administered shocks of the highest voltage.

Milgram's studies are not the only famous research into the topics of obedience to authority and social conformity. Other research, namely Philip Zimbardo's (1982, 2007), in which students role-played jailers and prisoners, has been equally influential. Here the experiment had to be called off after 4 days because of the "prisoners" being abused by the "guards." When subsequently asked whether most people are capable of inflicting torment or torture on others, this social psychologist stated (Monaghan, 2004, p. A11): "When people say, no way I would behave that way, you cannot say that. The best you can say is, I don't know. But the more reasonable answer is, if the majority of people did that, then it is probable that I would have done it, too." What these studies reveal is that "strong situations" tend to make people's behavior more predictable without eliminating the importance of dispositions and agency – as we will discuss below. We focus on the case of Milgram here because one of the reasons why he conducted the obedience studies (Milgram, 1974) was that he wanted to understand the process of destructive obedience that made the Holocaust possible (Benjamin and Simpson, 2009). Given our interest in the case of DK, the choice of this theoretical frame comes naturally.

Milgram's studies were disquieting because they suggested that people could be obedient to authority in an extreme and unquestioning way. As he put it himself, "obedience comes easily and often" (Milgram, 1963, p. 372). As a result, ordinary people could be led to commit major atrocities with the justification that they were simply executing their orders. Referring to "normal" organizations, Card (2005) stated: "there is something special about the nature of organizations themselves that leads to the loss of moral responsibility on the part of individual actors" (p. 397). Milgram's experiences were widely discussed for both their scientific and ethical implications; Blass (2004) subsequently described him as the man who shocked the world.

The processes of obedience and the training of the masses to obey are well known in the social sciences, from Foucault's studies on the construction of disciplinary societies (Clegg et al., 2006; Foucault, 1979) to the representation of the worker as employee, i.e. as expert in obedience (Jacques, 1996). A recent partial replication of Milgram's experiment [see Burger (2009) and Elms (2009) for criticism] indicates that obedience to authority may still be a prevalent phenomenon, a finding that suggests that the topic is as important today as it was when Milgram decided to investigate it. Followers frequently commit "Crimes of obedience" (Kellerman, 2004; Kelman and Hamilton, 1989) even in "normal" organizations. In this section, we discuss how organizations and, in particular, the type of organizations known as total institutions, socialize their members to make them obedient.

Milgram's study of obedience has been critical for contemporary understanding of the construction of obedience. Let us briefly dissect the implications of this experiment to the obedience process. Milgram demonstrated the power of the situation. He showed that the influence of situational effects tends to be underestimated – which does not mean, as will be discussed below, that disposition or agency is not relevant to the process (Blass, 1991). In fact, paradoxically, people's decision to obey reveals a grain of agency. And once they decide to obey, they can express an active obedience, an observation that suggests that there can be more to obedience than automatic following, an observation that is congruent with the explanations advanced, for example, by Blass (1991, 1996, 2000) and Zimbardo (2007).

Four reasons have been advanced to explain why people conform to obedience in the experiments (Burger, 2009). The first reason refers to the inclination to obey authority which exists in most cultures: people are socialized to obey a number of authority figures, namely parents, police officers, teachers, and so on. A second reason was the gradual increase in demands. Participants in the experiment were not asked to inflict severe shocks at the very beginning of the process: the intensity of the shocks increased gradually. A gradual increase in the size of

demands tends to facilitate attitudinal and behavioral change. Third, sources of information were limited and the situation was novel. This may characterize the situation as threatening to the individuals participating in it, which, in turn, may increase obedience to the only source of information available, i.e., the authority figure. Finally, people obeyed because authority was not assigned to them or because it was diffused. Absence of responsibility is the reason why people tend to say that they were just following orders to avoid being held responsible and accountable for their actions. However, as the following discussion suggests, obedience can come in different shapes: some people may accept obeying because of a belief in the goodness of a given cause, whereas other people may obey because they see no alternative. In practice, these two forms may be difficult to separate and may lead to ethically equivalent consequences.

Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled laboratory environment in the 1960s, a cause of criticism given the artificiality of the setting (Bower, 2004). If Milgram shocked the world with theory in his laboratory, another man was about to shock the world in a more terrible way by showing, in practice, how far obedience could be led, by experimenting on a whole country, making it his laboratory. Pol Pot experimented with a murderous Utopia (Yathay, 1989) in the totalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. In the next section, we describe the case of DK, a state built upon the foundations of extreme obedience.

An experimental Utopia: Democratic Kampuchea

In this section, we discuss events in Cambodia during the years in power of the Communist Party, when the country became known as Democratic Kampuchea. DK is a suitable experimental situation in which to discuss elements of organizational analysis for reasons clearly stated in Um's (1998) analysis.

First, after the Communists took power, the country was sealed from outside scrutiny. In this sense, the entire country served as a controlled, relatively closed system, akin to the fictional Oceania of *1984* (Orwell, 1949; Tan, 1984) or the East Campus of *Giles Goat Boy* (Barth, Barth 1967). But, not a fiction, it was a social reality. The country was so extremely closed that even the entry of outside reporters was denied. Entry continued to be denied even when it would have been in the regime's best interest to grant international media access to the parts of Kampuchean territory that suffered Vietnamese attacks (Jackson, 1979). Kampuchea was described as a prison without walls (Hinton, 1998a, b, c). Second, the revolution was an experiment that was also well demarcated in time. The regime lasted between April 17, 1975, and January 7, 1979. Third, as also pointed out by Vickery (1984), the nature of the communist revolution in Cambodia was so short-lived, unique, and radical, that it offers a rare total societal institutional event unlikely to be repeated. Unfortunately, its singularity with respect to the organization of genocide seems not to be so rare. Fourth, DK offers a field in which Milgram's effects were implemented with other methods, using the power of force in compelling human behavior to obey, rather than the assumption of authority *per se*. The Khmer Rouge soldiers' behavior has been often described in terms such as ''robotic obedience,'' ''killing machines,'' and others that suggest that such behavior was an outcome of training and education focused on alienation and obedience or, as described by Um (1998, p. 148), on creating ''cowering obedience.''

The radical experiment was neither devoid of a past nor was it totally unpredicted. In fact, as early as 1955, Prince Sihanouk, the monarch of Cambodia, alerted the people to what could happen if the communists seized power in the country:

> There will be no happiness. Everyone will work for the government. No one will ride cars or cyclos, or wear nice clothes; everyone will wear black, exactly alike. There would be no delicious food to eat. If you ate more than allowed, the government would learn about it from your children in secret and you would be taken out and shot. (Chandler, 1999, p. 47)

With a terrible prescience, Sihanouk's description captured what was about to happen in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge rule. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a general description of DK, i.e., the country's existence under the Khmer Rouge [for that purpose, see, for example, Kiernan (2008) or Jackson (1989)], but some aspects should be considered in order to set the context for

discussion about the role of young Khmer Rouge comrades which will constitute an important part of the discussion. Among the possible aspects that might be discussed, we briefly stress three: a utopian vision, the system of management by terror, and the role of the family. Other dimensions could also be considered but these three capture the particular ethos of the Khmer Rouge and help to explain how its ideology and functions underpinned the creation of an army of obedient children and peasants.

Utopia

Pol Pot's vision for Cambodia was "to plunge the country into an inferno of revolutionary change where, certainly, old ideas and those who refused to abandon them would perish in the flames, but from which Cambodia itself would emerge, strengthened and purified, as a paragon of communist virtue" (Short, 2004, p. 288). Even after being removed from power, Pol Pot continued to consider that "April 17" was the greatest revolutionary event in history, with the exception of the Paris Commune of 1871 (Margolin, 1999). In the newborn country of DK, the reason for living would no longer be "to have" but "to be," being in a "society without desire, without vain competition, without fear for the future" (as described in Short, 2004, p. 314). The goal of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) was the construction of a "clean, honest society" (Short, 2004, p. 247), freed of every form of exploitation, a society with no classes and no differences. The case of Kampuchea can therefore be viewed as a recent example of the Robespierrian duality of virtue and terror, aligned in a nationally organized crusade of social leveling.

Management by terror

To implement the utopian vision, a system of totalitarian control through terror was designed. As noted by Robin (2004), totalitarian organized terror aims at eliminating spontaneity and freedom and turning people into transmission belts of history. The system was centrally controlled by the *Angkar*, "the Organization," actually the central committee of the CPK, and supported by a nation-wide judicially sanctioned extermination system, organized around provincial prisons operated at the local level. S-21, in the Tuol Sleng area of Phnom Penh, the central extermination center, was the apex of this terror system. Only seven people survived this Kafkaesque site of inhuman violence (Chandler, 2000).

The system of state-organized terror tried to locate and eliminate those viewed for some reason, real or imaginary, as enemies of the revolution. Widespread suspicion and paranoia guaranteed that enemies were located everywhere, even at the topmost of the party and, in the case of office S-21, even among the guards. In July 1978, a party publication warned: "there are enemies everywhere, within our ranks, in the center, at headquarters, in the zones, and out in villages" (Chandler, 1991, p. 298). The Khmer Rouge soldier was urged "to kill ten friends rather than keep one enemy alive" (Yathay, 1989, p. 237). Nobody, in fact, was safe from the vigilance of "the Organization." The party was actually said to have as many eyes as a pineapple (Chandler, 1999; Ly, 2003).

Hunger was used as a powerful controlling mechanism, a tool for destroying autonomous thinking and resistance. As suggested by Margolin (1999), people did not hesitate to kiss hands that fed them, no matter how bloody they were. As a result of this combination of revolutionary zeal, unlimited paranoia, and massive use of organized violence, the *Angkar* acquired a terrible reputation: It was said of the *Angkar* that it "kills but does not explain" (Short, 2004, p. 368). The "ten security regulations," reproduced in Table I, help to understand the spirit of S-21. As remarked by Margolin (1999), the "revolution" became "mad" and threatened to devour the last Cambodian. He stressed that it is difficult to define accurately the kinds of offences punished with death penalty because it is difficult to find a "fault" that could not imply death.

The role of the family

The new collectivistic paradigm renounced the old bourgeois family as no longer tenable, and the notion of family was redesigned to adhere to the new logic. The Khmer Rouge soon realized that traditional family bonds represented a potential for strong spontaneous resistance to the totalitarian project that

TABLE I

The "10 security regulations" at S-21

1. You must answer accordingly to my questions. Don't turn them away
2. Don't try to hide the facts by making pretexts about this and that. You are strictly prohibited to contest me
3. Don't be a fool, for you are a man who dares to thwart the revolution
4. You must immediately answer my questions without wasting time to reflect
5. Don't tell me about either your immoralities or the essence of the revolution
6. While getting lashes or electrification you must not cry at all
7. Do nothing, sit still, and wait for my orders. If there is no order, keep quiet. When I ask you to do something, you must do it right away without protesting
8. Don't tell us how much you hate people from Kampuchea Krom in order to hide your Vietnamese ancestry
9. If you don't follow the above rules, you shall get many lashes of the electric wire
10. If you disobey any point of my regulations, you will get either ten or five electrical shocks

These rules can be found at the Tuol Sleng museum, Phnom Penh, and are reprinted in papers such as Ly (2003).

sought to reform Cambodians so that they were fit to live under the *Angkar* (Margolin, 1999). In Khmer Rouge dominated areas from the summer of 1976, children were separated from their families and educated in the regime's schools to be incorporated in the army as comrades, clean of the vices of the old order. Mothers were advised not to establish deep emotional bonds with their children, which was dismissed as a form of bourgeois egoistic self-interest. In some cases, to make sure that primordial ties were severed, the Khmer Rouge forced relatives to witness the execution of family members. On top of this, the total collectivization of society saw communal eating imposed. People were dispossessed of their now unnecessary cooking utensils and meals took place in collective spaces.

The result of the revolution was summarized as follows by Chou Chet, a senior cadre, in his confession at S-21/Tuol Sleng:

> [I said that] the current regime was a highly dictatorial one, too rigid and severe, one that overshot the comprehension and consciousness of the people. Therefore a lot of people were muttering and moaning about how they were doing a lot of work and getting little back for it, how they couldn't get together with their families, couldn't rest, never had any fun, and so on." (Chandler, 1999, p. 142)

The search for Utopia resulted in four nightmarish years and a country set apart from the rest of the world, even from the Maoist People's Republic of China, whose Cultural Revolution had been partly inspirational (Meng-Try, 1981). With this context in mind, we now focus our discussion on how the regime used child soldiers with the purpose of making the revolution possible.

Children of the revolution: Khmer Rouge young comrades

The use of child soldiers in Cambodia is well documented. Children were used in the country in military functions before, during, and after the Khmer Rouge regime (Seaman, 1999). They were also used as spies who sneaked under the houses to listen to private conversations and/or to search out forbidden food reserves (Margolin, 1999). In this article, we will focus on the way the Khmer Rouge recruited and utilized children for diverse military and paramilitary purposes, including combat, transport of ammunition and supplies, checkpoint controls, service in village militias, and spying.

There is evidence that the Khmer Rouge developed a deliberate policy of using units of young soldiers to implement its utopian vision of a classless society. As we now know, the utopian ideals behind the societal re-education project would eventually lead to a dystopian reality. Rummel (1994) qualifies the Khmer Rouge as the most lethal regime of the twentieth century. While this might not be true in absolute terms it certainly is in relative terms, given the size of the population before the experiment and after it. Ideologically, the Khmer Rouge saw children as least corrupted by bourgeois sentiments and the most malleable to re-education. Thus, in DK,

children were used not only for practical or functional reasons but also for ideological ones because of their lack of contamination by any form of bourgeois influence, therefore constituting the most adequate force for the implementation of a pure, radically new, radically different communist state. These young people were, in Maoist terms, "the poor and blank" pages where the revolution would be inscribed. Children and young adults are more malleable than adults. Young people are yet to identify themselves with the political *status quo* of their respective societies. Such groups can be more easily attracted to alternative and sometimes extreme (i.e., "pure") ideologies for which brainwashing may be the most powerful way of maintaining "purity" (Taylor, 2004). The idea of ideological purity may be especially attractive to alienated and anomic individuals, whom children seized from their families are likely to be.

Families, as a building block of the old bourgeois logic, were split apart. Children were made into young soldiers. These child soldiers, some of them aged six, were separated from their families and organized into groups with an adult leader, brainwashed with propaganda against the enemies of the revolution, including antifamily propaganda, and were prepared to do everything they were told to do. The indoctrination process circulated slogans such as "kill for development" (Seaman, 1999, p. 6), a message that in this case should be read literally, because these young soldiers were used for multiple purposes, including executions.

In its effort to efface the past, the Khmer Rouge regime empowered illiterate young people and previously disempowered farmers to execute its mission. And so they did: "In the rural areas, most of the killings occurred when young cadres enforced what they understood to be the will of the organization. Some of these executions, perhaps most, were impulsive overreactions" (Chandler 1999, p. 160).

Four building blocks were foundations for the creation of extreme obedience in DK: a pre-existing culture of obedience, strong institutional control, intense indoctrination, and the banalization of violence. Figure 1 depicts the model relating the four blocks:

- The Khmer Rouge's murderous Utopia promoted violence as a means to implement the revolution in search of a "new world" [1].
- Such a purpose was carried out through several mechanisms, namely strong institutional control [2] and intense indoctrination [3].



Figure 1. The blocks of the creation of extreme obedience – the Khmer Rouge case.

- Institutional control and intense indoctrination also worked as facilitators in translating Khmer Rouge policies and practices into violence [4].
- The banalization of violence reinforced institutional control and intense indoctrination [5], giving rise to spirals of violence.
- A context characterized by a culture of obedience fostered and/or facilitated all these mechanisms and effects.

Cultures of obedience

Scholars of Cambodia tend to note that Khmer culture displays a marked trait of ancestral obedience to authority, leading to a form of extreme hierarchy that inculcates an assumption of ''natural inequality'' (Hinton, 1998a, p. 98). Chandler (1999, p. 168), for example, pointed out that Khmer people received an education that inclined them to be 'stoic on resentful acceptance of hierarchies that paid no attention to ''lesser'' people except insofar as they could serve and feed the rich and powerful'. According to the same author, ''the pervasiveness of patronage and hierarchy in Cambodian thinking, politics, and social relations'' (Chandler, 2008, p. 2) is evident historically. Propensity for obedience to hierarchy, therefore, was cultivated as the right thing to do. Language demonstrates this propensity for hierarchy: hierarchical terms are abundant in the Khmer language (Hinton, 1998a, b, c). As Milgram (1974) observed, obedience to authority has little to do with the authority figure's style and more with its legitimacy. In other words, people will follow if they see their leader as legitimate. If obedience is cultivated as the right thing to do in the face of authority, then disobedience may be taken as illegitimate.

Institutional control

The notion of ''institutionalized'' individuals is usually applied to cases where people do not have the means to care for themselves, are contagious, or judged to be dysfunctional citizens in either mental or juridical terms and are therefore placed under total institutional control by the state. To be institutionalized is an exception to the norm in most societies. But in Cambodia, everybody was institutionalized.

There were two stages in the total institutionalization of DK: (1) volunteering, and (2) forced conscriptions. Before the regime took power, young recruits volunteered to serve the revolution. They were motivated by a number of reasons. These included hatred of Lon Nol's regime and its American supporters, who, over the span of 3 years (1970–1973), dropped three times the quantity of bombs on Cambodia that they dropped on Japan during World War II (Shawcross, 1979) in a secret and undeclared war that was never publically admitted by President Nixon or Secretary of State Kissinger. These 450,000 tons of bombs killed 150,000 people (Vannak, 2003). The terror that rained down from the skies persuaded many to offer their services to the Khmer Rouge (who at the time supported Prince Sihanouk rather than being opposed to him as a communist party. That the Khmer Rouge was a communist party was actually concealed well beyond their seizure of power.). Consider the case of Kuong San, a member of the elite 703rd Division, who volunteered at age 14: ''In late 1971 aircraft bombed my house and killed my mother. In early 1972 sub-district cadres came in to recruit for the army. Because of my pain over the bombing, I volunteered to join.'' (Vannak, 2003, p. 11)

To understand the adherence of people to the revolutionary army, one needs to consider the implosion of the Cambodian state, after decades of institutional degradation. When existing social institutions collapse, new institutions jostle to occupy their space. Joining an influential revolutionary movement may offer, especially to the youth that constituted the largest and most fanatical faction of the Khmer Rouge, a sense of belonging and control over their lives (Um, 1998). In extreme conditions, when violence becomes endemic, loyalty may spring not from the belief in the superiority of the leaders' project but from the belief that to stay alive the best option is to align with those who command the most powerful forms of organizing violence.

Another face of the Red Khmer army was revealed in the second phase of the existence of the CPK. As volunteers receded in number, forced conscriptions became the norm. Once in power, the Khmer Rouge pressed children into service as the purest agents of the revolution, the guardians of a new order. Traditional

institutions, including the schools, were destroyed (Clayton, 1998). Schools were actually demolished or refitted to serve other purposes: for instance, one of these schools became the S-21 extermination site. Children taken from their families, which were themselves dismantled, were socialized to view the *Angkar* as their new family. The children were of extreme importance to the revolution.

Due to the lack of a firm ideological basis and in the absence of the political infrastructure necessary to enforce its extremist program, the Khmer Rouge resorted to organized violence as the alternative means of administration. Their administrative philosophy, when in charge, was basically guerilla warfare in pursuit of permanent revolution. Lacking adequate state mechanisms of control, the CPK instituted a system of informants, called the *schlop* (Um, 1998), which reproduced the clandestine experience of the party, amplified the social climate of terror, and led to the panoptical representation of the *Angkar* as having as many eyes as the pineapple.

Intense indoctrination

Young comrades, regardless of their age, were submitted to intense ideological work. As a result, ''the Khmer Rouge transformed these children, who had never held a weapon, into gun-lovers and nationalists, and filled them with hatred and a desire for revenge'' (Vannak, 2003, p. 12). The process of indoctrination took several forms. It operated through formal mechanisms such as national party publications, the educational system, and the party's youth organizations. It also used informal means. In DK, songs were forbidden, except those allowed by the *Angkar*, songs that extolled the virtues and values of the revolution. Songs for children were created because children, as discussed, were at the center of the revolution, given their lack of ideological pollution by the past. There was an entire repertoire of songs specifically composed for children, which revealed both the nature of the revolution and the place of infants in it (Phim, 1998).

This pure, blank past was the ideal *tabula rasa* to imprint the ''twelve moral precepts'' that should characterize pure revolutionaries, those able to carry out all the necessary missions for the party, the people, and the nation. The 12 moral precepts were the following (Vannak, 2003, p. 17):

1. Love, respect, and serve the people, workers, and farmers forever.
2. Wherever you are, serve the people there with your entire heart.
3. Never do anything to negatively impact the people, even one pepper or one spoken word.
4. If you commit any misdeed against the people, apologize to the people. If you cause damage to the people, repay them.
5. In speech, sleep, walking, standing, sitting, eating, dressing, and joking, follow the way of the people.
6. Do nothing to violate the female sex.
7. Don't drink anything non-revolutionary in nature.
8. Do not gamble.
9. Don't touch common currency or property, even one riel, one can of rice, or one pill of medicine.
10. Be absolutely polite to the people, but always be hot-tempered toward the enemy.
11. Love constant labor.
12. Combat the enemy and combat obstacles with bravery, and dare to make all sacrifices for the people, workers, farmers, the Party, and revolution without conditions and at all times.

Soldiers were, in summary, prepared to serve the people and the values of the revolution by whatever means, to combat enemies with bravery, and to make all sacrifices without conditions. Rather than individuals, they were anonymous members of a revolutionary army that was radically transforming an entire society in which there were several layers of anonymity that facilitated the creation of anomic personalities (Hinton, 1998a) that in turn facilitated ''heartless'' behavior (Goffman, 1967).

The banalization of violence

These children of the revolution were used, as we discussed above, to accomplish many different tasks, some involving extreme violence. The process of

transformation of ordinary individuals into perpetrators of organized/organizational violence against strangers has been discussed in several literatures. Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros (1986) studied the education of Greek torturers and concluded that what we might take to be monstrous behaviors are often acts of faithful obedience to an ''authority of violence'' (Haritos-Fatouros, 1988). As Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros (1988, p. 52) have noted, ''the horror is that torturers are probably not freaks – just ordinary people.''

Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros (1988) also discuss how some organizations, namely military ones, are designed to create obedient followers. Such obedience includes the execution of orders that require members to commit acts that might have been viewed as repugnant before training – an aptitude that may not be absent from the business world. Such training incorporates adherence to superior moral values but also to the importance and experience of organizational contexts, especially structurally integrated cohesive primary groups, such as the squad, that exert significant amounts of pressure over members. Individuals are incorporated in these organizations through initiation rites and, once initiated, they are expected to uphold the values of the primary group and support each other.

As Popkin (1970, p. 162) noted, for revolutionaries to achieve major objectives they have to focus first on ''local goals and goods with immediate payoffs,'' and then gradually orient recruits toward central goals. Through these processes, primary group members accept the executives as authorities, and consequently the executives can mediate disjunction, though they will not be likely to close it completely (Scott 1979, p. 127). Such a process is tenuous and difficult, requiring skilled leadership. Yet, it is most likely to produce normative bonds. Additionally, Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros (1986) observe, members of these organizations lived in panoptical worlds, spying on one another, living in fear, and accepting that suffering is part of their world: ''you will learn to love pain,'' one officer warned. The world of the Khmer Rouge was expressed by the pineapple metaphor, as a panoptical system with many watchful eyes regulated by ''the principle of an unconstrained and omnipresent gaze'' (Sewell, 2008, p. 1215). Hence, there was a combination of inducements, camaraderie, and control used to convince members to accept the new rules of the new game.

The previous description of Greek torturers is not much different from the case of the Khmer Rouge soldiers. They too learned that their jobs involved inflicting pain. And they lived in a state of fear: for every seven prisoners who were killed at S-21, there were also two prison guards killed. In this sense, extreme unquestioned obedience was vital for survival. Reasons for the execution of comrades could be trivial. Meng-Try and Sorya (2001) provide several cases. For example, two workers at the animal husbandry division of S-21 were executed because they caused the death of two sheep. Minor mistakes could be viewed as acts of treason and therefore as a motive for the death penalty. The result is clear: ''everyone was in a constant state of fear'' (Meng-Try and Sorya, 2001, p. 42).

As is normal in these cases, pain was presented as necessary, justified by considering the nature of the victims who had been dehumanized. They had failed the tests of the new revolutionary humanism. Blame, therefore, was attributed to the victims themselves. Personal responsibility was diffused because the punishment came from the revolution rather than being something done by one person to another. Victims were faulted for the punishment, and extraordinary circumstances were invoked to explain punitive actions (Bandura et al., 1975). Prisoners were presented as ''vermin'' or ''worms.'' In DK, the situation was not much different: the enemies of the Party were dehumanized: they were ''microbes'' or ''human vermin'' (Short, 2004, p. 254):

> Because the heat of the people's revolution and the heat of the democratic revolution were insufficient … we search for the microbes (*merok*) within the party without success. They are buried. As our socialist revolution advances, however, seeping into every corner of the Party, the army and among the people, we can locate the ugly microbes. (Chandler, 1999, p. 129)

The status of these people were clear since the moment of victory: ''new people'' or ''April 17 people,'' i.e., those from the cities who did not join the revolution, were less than human, without privileges or rights (Chandler, 1999, p. 103). As Chandler explains, victims were viewed as a ''strata'' rather than as human beings. Often, diabolical

parables were used for communicating such message to the victims:

> Watch this ox as it pulls the plow. It eats when it is ordered to eat. If you let it graze in the field it will eat anything. If you put it into another field where there isn't enough grass, it will still graze uncomplainingly. It is not free, and it is constantly being watched. And when you tell it to pull the plow, it pulls. It never thinks about its wife or children.... (Yathay, 1989, p. 305)

Stereotypes that diminish victims are a powerful technology of control (Fiske, 1993) and their usefulness tends to be well appreciated in totalitarian contexts. Killing, in this case, was a social imperative, a societal cure (Um, 1998). Once a person was labeled an enemy, he/she was supposed to be treated in an anomic fashion, as not belonging to the worthy ranks of the new society being constructed by the revolution. Visiting the anomie of violence on every single enemy was valid, including for one's parents, if they were insufficiently revolutionary.

The combination of the practices outlined potentially results in a mass of obedient people. These people have been described as robots: the robot-like behavior of both victims and executioners in the Nazi and Stalinist regimes has been pointed out (see Grey and Garsten 2002). The description is not much different from Short's (2004, p. 268) passage on the arrival of the Khmer Rouge to Phnom Penh: "worn and expressionless speaking not a single word and surrounded by a deathly silence." In conclusion, the creation of masses of obedient followers appears to be possible, but there is a price to pay: massive obedience thrives on a combination of indoctrination and fear, leading to the creation of either disengaged or excessively diligent followers, rather than responsible citizens. Table II contrasts the conditions for the creation of unconditional obedience in Milgram and in DK.

Implications for theory and practice

This discussion advances a number of implications for the creation and sustainability of ethical organizations. We extract these conclusions from the case of a total institution because these organizations make more salient processes that take place in subtler forms in other, normal, organizations (Clegg et al., 2006; Goffman, 1961). However, as Shenkar (1996, p. 886) argued "[i]t can be expected that other organizations, including commercial enterprises, will manifest some characteristics of a total institution, though to a lesser extent than the ideal type."

First, the case of how young soldiers in DK were socialized offers a number of points of reflection for organizational scholars, even for those not interested in total institutions. First, it indicates that organizational contexts do matter and that powerful socialization practices may lead "innocent" people to behave brutally. Just as the "pure" children were used to make sure that the Khmer revolution destroyed its enemies, some organizations and leaders select, socialize, and reward employees for being docile, loyal, and exemplary agents against the organization or leader's enemies. The more the organization invades the private life of its members, the more it comes close to totalizing and enveloping the whole lives of its members. When it happens, people become dependent and vulnerable.

TABLE II

Conditions for obedience in the laboratory and in DK

Milgram	Democratic Kampuchea	Common dimensions of unquestioned obedience
An inclination to obedience	Culture of obedience	Culture of obedience
Gradual increase in demands	Banalization of violence	Gradual increase in demands and making wrongdoing banal
Limited information in a novel situation	Total institutional control	Control of access to information
Diffused responsibility	Intense indoctrination	Collective responsibility

Ethically, to counter tendencies toward total institutions, one of the major tasks of managers is to create healthy, transparent organizational spaces (Bennis et al., 2008; Kets de Vries, 2001) where people view themselves as agents with a margin for contribution rather than as small and powerless cogs in a big machine. Regular organizational scandals indicate that the understanding of the power of situations is not as embedded in managerial mindsets as one might expect it to be. In some organizations, the leaders themselves are the main stimulators and feeders of cultures of silence and indoctrination (Bennis et al., 2008; Kellerman, 2004), refusing to listen to the inconvenient truths, ''killing'' the bad news messengers and thus harming employees, organizations, and communities.

Second, the discussion suggests that ordinary people may cause problems beyond expectation. Unethical behaviors may be less the result of ''bad apples'' than the result of pressure to conform to arbitrary power: ''absolute power kills absolutely,'' as Rummel observed (1994, p. 3). Following the same line of reasoning, Bar-On (1989, p. 440) pointed out that ''we cannot make a simple, clear-cut distinction between Holocaust perpetrators and the rest of society.'' In other words, decent people may be responsible for negative behaviors when pressed by their organizational and institutional contexts (Card, 2005). They blindly obey because they wish to survive in the organizational arena, to keep their job, or simply to satisfy safety/self-preservation, enjoy stability, or satisfy group needs (Kellerman, 2004). Paradoxically, ''[f]ollowers' dedication to bad leaders is often strongest when their leaders are very bad, as opposed to only somewhat bad'' (Kellerman, 2004, p. 25).

Third, pressures for obedience have a potential for dysfunction that organizations would do well to avoid. Among others, they may include excessive zeal, alienation, and lack of accountability. The panoptical environments found by Covaleski et al. (1998) in professional service firms help to explain the corporate scandals that affect this type of organization. For those managers wishing to control from the top down, the risks are significant but not obvious: people will obey in a disengaged way or with excessive zeal. When tightly controlled systems are founded on fear, the risks are even greater. People will adhere mechanically or strategically. Their alignment with vision and values will be superficial or, as discussed, they may accept that aligning with the powerful is the best strategy.

This last point is consistent with Hinton's (1998b) explanation of the collaboration of ordinary people in genocidal processes: when fear is widespread and prevalent, people may fear being moderate. Followers, in these contexts, may not only respond as ''disciplined'' (Foucault, 1979) automatons following orders, but rather as collaborators with a certain degree of agency within the parameters of the situation. They may choose to show an excessive zeal to demonstrate their alignment with ''The Organization,'' for example, with the *Angkar*, to use that Kampuchean term that actually means ''the Organization.'' Most often, this will be expressed not in some vague ideological commitments but will be experienced at the level of *mateship*, the primary group, the small, face-to-face communities within which people spend most of their time, which provide their prime identity, such as the cadre or squad. It is in such groups that we should expect to find social cohesion when all else has been destroyed or snatched away. These primary groups provide islands of solidarity in a sea of anomie and if that solidarity is founded on violence to outsiders to the group, then it serves to affirm group solidarity. Pressures for total obedience and degrees of agency may vary. Some literature indicates that it was admissible for cadres across DK to have some degree of agency, whereas comrades working in places such as S-21 were submitted to extreme pressure to comply. As described by Cheam Soeur, a guard, the place was ''extremely frightening'' (Vannak, 2003, p. 126). However, in normal organizations, a certain degree of agency always exists, a reason why a wide range of followership patterns may be found (Kellerman, 2004).

In the case of DK, the combination of a culture of ''natural inequality,'' the experience of fear and survival together with the need to show one's loyalty in order to keep face and gain honor, as well as ''role narcissism'' (Hinton, 1998a), all reveal how unconditional obedience may actually involve a dimension of agency and a space for the expression of individual dispositions (Blass, 1991). In fact, the Khmer Rouge ideology glorified violence, daring, and role narcissism, and comrades expressed their loyalty by showing these attributes. It should also be considered

that the Khmer Rouge built their ideology upon the foundations of a pre-existing resentment of peasants against urban populations. If many "blank and poor" recruits acted as fanatics (Hinton, 1998c), their fanaticism was built on something existentially real in terms of their experience. As noted by Clayton (1998, p. 2), "the anger of the oppressed, once roused, was difficult to contain."

In normal organizations, empowerment to achieve goals in the absence of clear accountability may lead to goal achievement in unexpected and not necessarily positive ways (Ordoñez et al., 2009). Good organizations require significant amounts of freedom, not strict control, and psychological safety rather than fear. Uses of fear may be subtler but may be no less effective in normal organizations. One recent episode from Sorkin (2009) illustrates the case. During a summer staff meeting at the US Treasury Secretary's home, his wife interrupted the gathering to offer refreshments. Hank Paulson responded for the others: "they don't want anything to drink." When she returned with water, nobody took any, for fear of countering the boss. A small and trivial example, perhaps, but indicative of a culture that is organizationally imbued. Differently, other leaders promote cultures where people feel free to speak truth to power (Bennis et al., 2008) – by fostering trust, motivating people to speak and to protect the organization from ethical perils, and stimulating ethical courage.

Work by authors such as Hamel (2007) and Carney and Getz (2009) shows that most organizations may be philosophically closer to the total institutions described here than one may have suspected or wished for [see also the Shenkar (1996) paper about Chinese State Enterprises]. They socialize their employees to obtain obedience and they are rewarded with obedience in return. The problem with organizational obedience of this type is that it often results in poor organizational contexts, i.e. contexts devoid of any spirit of community, organizational support, and psychological safety. As Leavitt (2007) put it, big organizations are often unhealthy environments for human beings. The creation of healthy environments requires the questioning of a number of assumptions about organizations and organizing. With this article, we have contributed to this discussion by considering the practices used by the Khmer Rouge to create unconditional obedience to authority and their strange similarities with common organizational practices that are at odds with the desired behaviors of contemporary leaders (Caldwell and Dixon, forthcoming). As discussed, some clear parallels, summarized in Table III, may be established between their extreme measures and their milder organizational equivalents.

Milgram's work and our analysis of DK's children of the revolution suggest, in summary, a framework for examining unquestioned obedience. The framework is depicted in Figure 2. It departs from the dimensions of unquestioned obedience drawn from Table II, which collapse the implications from Milgram and DK. We suggest that these dimensions may be attenuated or intensified. Attenuators include the existence of a culture of accountability, a system of checks and balances, psychological safety, authentic leadership, and an appreciation for diversity, sincerity, and transparency (e.g., Bennis et al., 2008; Edmondson, 1999; Pirson and Lawrence, forthcoming). Intensifiers include the strength of psychological distance between people and their leaders, bad or destructive leadership (Einarsen et al., 2007; Kellerman, 2004; Padilla et al., 2007), procedural opacity, a culture of fear, cynicism, and distrust, and the lack of a sense of community at work. The way these dimensions interact, we suggest, will contribute to the level of obedience that will actually be displayed in the organization. Leadership responses will in turn reinforce attenuators or intensifiers that will further reinforce or weaken the level of obedience. Our framework may be further tested empirically.

Final comments

If Milgram shocked the world with a theoretical experiment, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge regime shocked the world with a practical experiment by showing, in a specific societal context, how far unconditional obedience could go. Milgram conducted his experiments in the controlled laboratory environment of the 1960s and indicated that, while people obeyed, many showed signs of distress and psychological suffering. As Benjamin and Simpson (2009) have observed, Milgram's experiments can be described as *experimentum crucis*, i.e., experiments

TABLE III

Creating obedience: a contrast

	Total institutions: DK	Normal organizations
Cultures of obedience	*Explanation*: Extreme obedience is explicit and unquestioned. Disobedience shall be punished. It is cultivated through carrots and sticks *Illustration*: Khmer Rouge comrades were entitled to use violence against others, if they disobeyed, the same measure of violence would be used against them	*Explanation*: Members are expected to learn the ropes. Organizations expect obedience rather than disobedience *Illustration*: organizations exert strong pressures combining rewards and punishments, in order to establish conformity and obedience (Covaleski et al., 1998; Janis, 1982)
Institutionalization	*Explanation*: People belong to the institutional space. Their idea of happiness is defined by the institution. In this case happiness would result from egalitarianism among "the same great family" of Kampucheans, as Pol Pot put it (Pot, 1977) *Illustration*: The values of the revolution represented the idea of happiness for the whole nation	*Explanation*: The organizational space is a fundamental part of one's professional identity. One's happiness partly depends on the acceptance of the organization's view on happiness *Illustration*: the organization is a happy family whose future well-being will depend on the participation and dedication of all
Indoctrination	*Explanation*: Indoctrination relies on hard methods, is visible and often painful *Illustration*: Members are socialized to be able to stand the pain they will later inflict on others	*Explanation*: Indoctrination relies on soft methods, is mostly transparent and works through persuasion. It is potentially very intense. People are pressed to conform and to "duplicate" the organization within themselves (Covaleski et al., 1998, p. 294) *Illustration*: Control by hierarchies is replaced by mutual vigilance and soft forms of panoptical control (Barker, 1993)
Action	*Explanation*: Members are prepared to do whatever it takes *Illustration*: Vermin should be removed from society; violence is necessary and useful	*Explanation*: Members are prepared to do almost anything to facilitate success – as, sometimes, relaxing ethical imperatives, and bullying *Illustration*: Corporate scandals often involve people doing unethical or illegal things for the benefit of the organization

designed to respond to a question of major importance, in this case, the way blind obedience leads people to inflict severe pain on strangers. Pol Pot experimented with Utopia in the totalitarian and egalitarian Kampuchea of the 1970s. He showed that people obeyed, especially the "blank and poor," and built their identities around membership within the totalitarian organization that controlled their lives, an observation that has also been found with child soldiers in other wars, in different parts of the world (Singer, 2005).

Understanding Pol Pot's DK may be helpful to understanding attempts at radical change: "it doesn't seem to work without terror," point out Essers et al. (2009, p. 129). In this article, we explored how terror may be implemented by a mass of adherents to the revolution. The Kampuchean process also illustrates the fact that radical change agents may view fear as a necessary ingredient of rapid transformation, an observation that also exists in business firms – as indicated by the 2009 suicidal wave at France Telecom. Textbook "decaffeinated" models of



Figure 2. A framework of unquestioned obedience.

change (Contu, 2008) may not cover the full spectrum of change management in the "real world."

Despite the obvious differences, there are lines of continuity between the total institutional spaces of the psychology laboratory, DK, and corporate life. People can be compelled to inflict violence on others in the name of science, ideology, or profit. Necrocapitalist practices such as those denounced by Banerjee (2008) indicate that a potential for evil can be found in the business world (see also Kellerman, 2004). As he observed, contemporary forms of accumulation may "involve dispossession and the subjugation of life to the power of death" (Banerjee, 2008, p. 1541). The outsourcing of military forces (Singer, 2003) and the recourse to violence to gain and secure control of natural riches (Banerjee, 2008) are examples of how organizations can become exploitative and create total institutional spaces to protect themselves and their interests from citizens – a practice that eventually spoils the good name of management and organization, ignores the rights of citizens, and threatens democracy (Barley, 2007).

We contributed to the business ethics and organizational literature by studying how the implications of Milgram's experiment help researchers to understand the events in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge regime. This article suggests that leadership may not only be necessary when dealing with extreme contexts (Hannah et al., 2009) but that, also, in some cases, it can itself cause extreme contexts.

There are several justifications for the importance of this discussion. First, it contributes to the analysis of blind obedience in a setting that is still poorly understood by organizational researchers. Scholars have approached the case of DK from several disciplinary domains but not from that of organizational research. The importance of the organization of extreme violence at the societal level, however, indicates that 1970s Cambodia is a space that deserves to be studied from an organizational viewpoint.

Second, the article combines a number of elements that are original to this case and that, for this reason, complement other cases of genocidal leadership and organization. The radicalism of the Kampuchean revolution was so extreme that it provides some original insights on the process of obedience. For example, the dismantlement of the family created an institutional context that is unique. As we discussed, this can lead the process of obedience to new heights, especially if, as was also the case, strong indoctrination was supported by a culture of fear and violence promoting anomic

behavior and a sort of role narcissism which indicates that blind obedience may actually involve a measure of agency within the field of constraints where agents operate, in which they form a new primary group solidarity. In other words, blind obedience in real world settings may be a complex combination of indoctrination, fear, anomie, role narcissism, and primary group formation. It is not simply "blind." We therefore tried to contribute to opening up the black box of unconditional obedience.

Third, we see in this endeavor a moral justification. Milgram's studies and Burger's (2009) recent partial replication suggest that people should be aware of the persisting dangers of blind obedience. Organization may require some voluntary acceptance of obedience, but there is a limit. As observed by Pfeffer (2009), an anti-authoritarian orientation among scholars has been historically a force for theory development. We aim to contribute to that lineage, with due modesty. Educating people on the risks, personal and collective, of passing this limit, may require the study and consideration of cases in which groups of people, for varied reasons, obeyed orders that violated the well-being and dignity of other human beings. The justification that they were only following orders may not provide a good explanation of the process. For Eichmann-type arguments to be avoided (Arendt, 1994), one needs to be aware of the process and to explore why so many people acted in the same way in different settings, from Nazi Germany to DK and beyond, including Abu Ghraib and the wars that child soldiers are still fighting as we write these words.

Finally, our discussion helps to understand why it is important to incorporate social psychological research into the teaching of business ethics courses (Card, 2005). Individuals may be caught in such strong contexts that their ethical reasoning is dissolved with the "erosion of agency." Ethical theory may not be enough to promote ethical behavior, because, in certain contexts, individuals lose autonomy (both psychologically and substantively) in decision-making. As Card (2005, p. 404) pointed out, "[e]thical theories are not decision-procedures: they are not algorithms for determining and carrying out a morally acceptable course of action." It is necessary, through appropriate corporate ethics programs, to help leaders and organizational members in general to understand how the features of the situation may capture their ethical reasoning – thus making them more aware of the situations conducive to the banalization of evil.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the Journal editorial team and to Sandro Mendonça for comments and suggestions. Miguel Cunha gratefully acknowledges support from Nova Forum.

References

Affonço, D.: 2007, *To the End of Hell: One Woman's Struggle to Survive Cambodia's Khmer Rouge* (Reportage Books, London).

Arendt, H.: 1994, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (Penguin, New York).

Bandura, A., B. Underwood and M. E. Fromson: 1975, 'Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims', *Journal of Research in Personality* **9**, 253–269.

Banerjee, S. B.: 2008, 'Necrocapitalism', *Organization Studies* **29**, 1541–1563.

Barker, J. R.: 1993, 'Tightening the Iron Cage: Concertive Control in Self Managing Teams', *Administrative Science Quarterly* **38**, 408–437.

Barley, S. R.: 2007, 'Corporations, Democracy, and the Public Good', *Journal of Management Inquiry* **16**, 201–215.

Bar-On, D.: 1989, 'Holocaust Perpetrators and Their Children: A Paradoxical Morality', *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* **29**, 424–443.

Barth, J.: 1967, *Giles Goat Boy* (Anchor, New York).

Benjamin, L. T. and J. A. Simpson: 2009, 'The Power of the Situation: The Impact of Milgram's Obedience Studies on Personality and Social Psychology', *American Psychologist* **64**, 12–19.

Bennis, W., D. Goleman and J. O'Toole: 2008, *Transparency: How Leaders Create a Culture of Candor* (Jossey Bass, San Francisco).

Blass, T.: 1991, 'Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interaction', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* **60**, 398–413.

Blass, T.: 1996, 'Attribution of Responsibility and Trust in the Milgram Obedience Experiment', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* **26**, 1529–1535.

Blass, T. (ed.): 2001, *Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm* (Lawrence Earlbaum, Mahwah, NJ).

Blass, T.: 2004, *The Man Who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram* (Basic Books, New York).

Bower, B.: 2004, 'To Err is Human: Influential Research on Our Social Shortcomings Attracts a Scathing Critique', *Science News* **166** (7).

Burger, J. M.: 2009, 'Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today', *American Psychologist* **64**, 1–11.

Caldwell, C. and R. D. Dixon: forthcoming, 'Love, Forgiveness, and Trust: Critical Values of the Modern Leader', *Journal of Business Ethics*. doi:10.1007/s10551-0814-z.

Card, R. F.: 2005, 'Individual Responsibility Within Organizational Contexts', *Journal of Business Ethics* **62**, 397–405.

Carney, B. M. and I. Getz: 2009, *Freedom Inc* (Crown, New York).

Chandler, D.: 1991, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution Since 1945* (Yale University Press, New Haven).

Chandler, D.: 1999, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Westview, Boulder, CO).

Chandler, D.: 2000, *Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison* (Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, Thailand).

Chandler, D.: 2008, *A History of Cambodia*, 4th Edition (Westview, Boulder, CO).

Chirot, D. and C. McCauley: 2006, *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder* (Princeton University Press, Princeton).

Clayton, T.: 1998, 'Building the New Cambodia: Educational Destruction and Construction Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979', *History of Education Quarterly* **38**, 1–16.

Clegg, S. R.: 2006, 'Why is Organization Theory so Ignorant?', *Journal of Management Inquiry* **15**, 426–430.

Clegg, S. R., D. Courpasson and N. Phillips: 2006, *Power and Organizations* (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA).

Contu, A.: 2008, 'Decaf Resistance: On Misbehavior, Cynicism and Desire in Liberal Workplace', *Management Communication Quarterly* **21**, 364–379.

Covaleski, M. A., M. W. Dirsmith, J. B. Heian and S. Samuel: 1998, 'The Calculated and the Avowed: Techniques of Discipline and Struggles over Identity in Big Six Public Accounting Firms', *Administrative Science Quarterly* **43**, 293–327.

De Cock, C., P. Fleming and A. Rehn: 2007, 'Organizing Revolution?', *Management and Organizational History* **2**, 107–114.

Edmondson, A. C.: 1999, 'Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams', *Administrative Science Quarterly* **44**, 350–383.

Einarsen, S., M. S. Aasland and A. Skogstad: 2007, 'Destructive Leadership Behavior: A Definition and Conceptual Model', *Leadership Quarterly* **18**, 207–216.

Elms, A. C.: 2009, 'Obedience Lite', *American Psychologist* **64**, 32–36.

Essers, J., S. Bohm and A. Contu: 2009, 'Corporate Robespierres, Ideologies of Management and Change', *Journal of Organizational Change Management* **22**, 129–140.

Fiske, S. T.: 1993, 'Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping', *American Psychologist* **48**, 621–628.

Foucault, M.: 1979, *Discipline and Punish* (Penguin, Harmondsworth).

Gibson, J. T. and M. Haritos-Fatouros: 1986, 'The Education of a Torturer', *Psychology Today* **20**(11), 50–58.

Goffman, E.: 1961, *Asylums* (Penguin, Harmondsworth).

Goffman, E.: 1967, *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior* (Pantheon, New York).

Grey, C. and C. Garsten: 2002, 'Organized and Disorganized Utopias: An Essay on Presumption', in M. Parker (ed.), *Utopia and Organization* (Blackwell, Oxford), pp. 9–23.

Hamel, G.: 2007, *The Future of Management* (Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA).

Hannah, S. T., M. Uhl-Bien, B. J. Avolio and F. L. Cavarretta: 2009, 'A Framework for Examining Leadership in Extreme Contexts', *Leadership Quarterly* **20**, 897–919.

Haritos-Fatouros, M.: 1988, 'The Official Torturer: A Learning Model for Obedience to the Authority of Violence', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* **18**, 1107–1120.

Hinton, A. L.: 1998a, 'Why Did You Kill? The Cambodian Genocide and the Dark Side of Face and Honor', *Journal of Asian Studies* **57**, 93–122.

Hinton, A. L.: 1998b, Anthropologies of the Red Khmer, Part II: Genocidal Bricolage. Working Paper, Cambodia Genocide Program, Yale University.

Hinton, A. L.: 1998c, 'A Head for an Eye: Revenge in the Cambodian Genocide', *American Ethnologist* **25**, 352–377.

Jackson, K. D.: 1979, 'Cambodia 1978: War, Pillage, and Purge in Democratic Kampuchea', *Asian Survey* **19**, 72–84.

Jackson, K. D. (ed.): 1989, *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*. (Princeton University Press, Princeton).

Jacques, R.: 1996, *Manufacturing the Employee. Management Knowledge from the 19th to 21st Century* (Sage, London).

Janis, I. L.: 1982, *Groupthink* (Houghton Mifflin, Boston).

Kellerman, B.: 2004, *Bad Leadership* (Harvard Business Press, Boston, MA).
Kelman, H. C. and V. L. Hamilton: 1989, *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT).
Kets de Vries, M. F. R.: 2001, 'Creating Authentizotic Organizations: Well-Functioning Individuals in Vibrant Companies', *Human Relations* **54**, 101–111.
Kiernan, B.: 2008, *The Pol Pot regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia, Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT).
Leavitt, H. J.: 2007, 'Big Organizations are Unhealthy Environments for Human Beings', *Academy of Management Learning and Education* **6**, 253–263.
Ly, B.: 2003, 'Devastated Vision(s): The Khmer Rouge Scopic Regime in Cambodia', *Art Journal* **62**, 67–81.
Margolin, J.-L.: 1999, 'Cambodia: The Country of Disconcerting Crimes', in S. Courtois, N. Werth, J.-L. Panné, A. Paczkowski, K. Bartosek and J.-L. Margolin (eds.), *The Black Book of Communism: Crime Terror Repression* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA), pp. 577–635.
Meng-Try, E.: 1981, 'Kampuchea: A Country Adrift', *Population and Development Review* **7**, 209–228.
Meng-Try, E. and S. Sorya: 2001, *Victims and Perpetrators? Testimony of Young Khmer Rouge Comrades* (Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh).
Milgram, S.: 1963, 'Behavioral Study of Obedience', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* **67**, 371–378.
Milgram, S.: 1965, 'Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority', *Human Relations* **18**, 57–76.
Milgram, S.: 1974, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (Harper and Row, New York).
Monaghan, P.: 2004, 'Verbatim', *Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 4, p. A11.
Ordoñez, L. D., M. E. Schweitzer, A. D. Galinsky and M. Bazerman: 2009, 'Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting', *Academy of Management Perspectives* **23**, 6–16.
Orwell, G.: 1949, *1984* (Penguin, London).
Padilla, A., R. Hogan and R. B. Kaiser: 2007, 'The Toxic Triangle: Destructive Leaders, Susceptible Followers, and Conducive Environments', *Leadership Quarterly* **18**, 176–194.
Pfeffer, J.: 2009, 'Renaissance and Renewal in Management Studies: Relevance Regained', *European Management Review* **6**, 141–148.
Phim, T. S.: 1998, Anthropologies of the Red Khmer, Part I: Terror and Aesthetics. Working Paper, Cambodia Genocide Program, Yale University.
Pirson, M. A. and P. R. Lawrence: forthcoming, 'Humanism in Business – Towards a Paradigm Shift', *Journal of Business Ethics*.
Popkin, S. L.: 1970, *The Rational Peasant* (University of California, Berkeley, CA).
Pot, P. 1977, Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Speech delivered on September 29, 1977. http://padevat.info/2009/03/01/the-pol-pot-speech-introduction. Retrieved 30 September 2009.
Robin, C.: 2004, *Fear: The History of a Political Idea* (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
Rummel, R. J.: 1994, 'Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder', *Journal of Peace Research* **31**, 1–10.
Scott, J.: 1979, 'Revolution in the Revolution', *Theory and Society* **7**(1–2), 97–134.
Seaman, T.: 1999, *Briefing Paper on Child Soldiers in Cambodia* (Cambodian League for Promotion and Defence of Human Rights, Phnom Penh).
Sewell, G.: 2008, 'Panopticism', in S. R. Clegg. J. R. Bailey (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies* (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA), pp. 1215–1217.
Shawcross, W.: 1979, *Sideshow* (Touchstone, New York).
Shenkar, O.: 1996, 'The Firm as a Total Institution: Reflections on the Chinese State Enterprise', *Organization Studies* **17**(6), 885–907.
Short, P.: 2004, *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare* (John Murray, London).
Singer, P. W.: 2003, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY).
Singer, P. W.: 2005, *Children at War* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA).
Sorkin, A. R.: 2009, *Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of how Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System and Themselves* (Viking, New York).
Tan, L. H.: 1984, 'The Khmer Rouge: Beyond 1984?', *Index on Censorship* **13**(1), 3–5.
Taylor, K.: 2004, *Brainwashing: The Science of Thought Control* (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
Um, K.: 1998, 'The Broken Chain: Genocide in the Reconstruction and De-struction of Cambodian Society', *Social Identities* **4**, 131–154.
Vannak, H.: 2003, *The Khmer Rouge Division 703: From Victory to Self-Destruction* (Documentation Center of Cambodia, Phnom Penh).
Vickery, M.: 1984, *Cambodia 1972–1982* (Southend Press, Boston).
Yathay, O.: 1989, *L'Utopie Meurtrière: Un Rescapé du Génocide Cambodgien Témoigne* (Complexe, Bruxelles).

Zimbardo, P.: 1982, 'Pathology of Imprisonment', in D. Krebs (ed.), *Readings in Social Psychology, Contemporary Perspectives*, 2nd Edition (Harper & Row, New York), pp. 249–251.
Zimbardo, P.: 2007, *The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Bad* (Ryder, London).

Miguel Pina e Cunha
Faculdade de Economia,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa,
Rua Marquês de Fronteira, 20,
1099-038 Lisbon, Portugal
E-mail: mpc@fe.unl.pt

Arménio Rego
Departamento de Economia,
Gestão e Engenharia Industrial,
Universidade de Aveiro,
Campus de Santiago, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal
E-mail: armenio.rego@ua.pt

Stewart R. Clegg
Centre for Management and Organization Studies,
University of Technology, Sydney,
PO Box 123, Broadway,
NSW 2007, Australia
E-mail: s.clegg@uts.edu.au