A Genealogy of Business Ethics:
A Nietzschean Perspective

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ABSTRACT. This article approaches the field of business ethics from a Nietzschean vantage point, which means explaining the weakness of the field by means of providing an etiological account of the values esteemed by the decadent business ethicists therein. I argue that such business ethicists have wandered from their immanent philosophical ground to *act* as scientists, businesspersons, and preaching-moralists as a way of evading their human self-contradictions. In actuality, this fleeing exacerbates them into a *sickness* of self-idolatry and self-loathing. I bring in Nietzsche's approach to the value of truth and his ascetic priest figure to get to the origin of this problem. Moreover, I attend throughout to delimiting the field of business ethics as that branch of ethics that can be taught in business schools. Indeed, the article itself is a movement in this direction, being inherently and intentionally *philosophical*.

KEY WORDS: Christianity, egoism, equality, justice, morality, Nietzsche, religion, science, stakeholder

Introduction

One could easily be excused for considering the field of political theory to be an oxymoron within the political *science* discipline, which is in turn one of the social sciences.[1] Whereas other fields of political science, such as American government, international relations, and comparative politics, conform to social *science*, political theory is essentially political *philosophy*. For example, while an "Americanist" may be found tabulating statistical data on voter characteristics in a recent US election, a scholar in political theory could well be poring over Hobbes' *Leviathan* without any regard for any particular *actual* political institutions or events. The political theorist *qua philosopher* is not oriented to relating Hobbes' text to the *actual* world of politics, much less to contemporary political events, and *testing* the relation;

rather, she would be apt to compare Hobbes' powerful sovereign with other relevant philosophical concepts, such as the communitarianism in Plato's *Republic*. To understand these philosophies on the polis and its politic, it is necessary to analyze their respective concepts *philosophically* rather than to subject them to scientific testing; to do otherwise would be to make a category mistake. In short, political theory differs appreciably in this way from *all* the other fields of political science and is thus *sui generis* therein, even as it is in the realm of politics and thus fully legitimate in political science.

I have introduced this essay with this cursory discussion of political theory as a means of situating my overall idyllic view of business ethics as strong and healthy. The field, *as correctly understood*, is related to the other fields of business as political theory is related to the other fields of political science. That is, I argue that business ethicists, like political theorists, are fundamentally *philosophers* rather than social scientists. Business ethics palpably *stands out* as *sui generis* from the other business fields not just because none of the others is based in philosophy, but because the business ethicist, *qua* philosopher in her inner constitution, stands out as a different species, even as she too is studying the phenomenon of business and is thus *academically* viable in schools of business.

Nietzsche's depiction of "the philosopher" can elucidate this discussion. "(T)he philosopher, being *of necessity* a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, has always found himself, and *had* to find himself, in contradiction to his today: his enemy was ever the ideal of today."[2] In the vale of *restless activity* in which the businessperson and scientific laborer are at home, the philosopher becomes purblind for lack of a *pathos* of distance permitting a sufficiently wide perspective by which with a creative hand he can reach for the future – his 'knowing' is *creating* values,

his will to truth *is* will to power.[3] To ask a philosopher to fall into sync with the ideals and related institutions of his day is to take away the "dangerous question marks" – the "bad conscience of their time" – and thus to undercut their secret: "to know of a *new* greatness of man, of a new untrodden way to his enhancement."[4]

We can apply Nietzsche's view as follows: just as political theorists naturally avoid the democratic chatter of the Ephesians, their politics, and their latest news of the "Empire,"[5] we business ethicists transcend as Nietzsche states the "market business of 'today' – for we philosophers need to be spared *one* thing above all: everything to do with 'today'" (Ibid.). Even so, political theorists study politics and we study business. Political theorists and business ethicists study *concepts* pertaining to politics and business, respectively, from the standpoint of philosophies using philosophical analysis. In performing this function of *explaining* such *concepts*, as distinct from trying to affect change in our objects of study (i.e., consulting), business ethicists are firmly within the academic mission to understand and explain even timely phenomena.[6]

In spite of the fact that political theory is taught in political science and business ethics is taught in business, to blur or conflate philosophy and the social sciences by seeking out (or constructing) their commonalities masks or ignores the philosophers' essential distinctness and that of our fields; moreover, it could inadvertently invite the desultory approach of a dilettante to pollute a field such as business ethics (or political theory) by eviscerating its boundaries with whatever extrinsic discipline is at hand.[7]

In this article, I focus on the business ethicists who have *fallen* from our native philosophical soil, losing their philosophical colors to become chameleons in likening themselves histrionically to other species – in particular, to scientists, business executives, and preacher-moralists.[8] It is surely not the case that *every* business ethicist has fallen this way; furthermore, it has involved multitudinous degrees and manifestations where it has occurred.[9] Indeed, in the methodology section below, I make occasional references to another variety of decadence impinging on the field – that sort wherein a social scientist decides he is a business ethicist, substituting social science methodology and content for philosophy. However, I concentrate here on the business ethicist philosophers

who have lost touch with their native soil, arguing *why* they have done so and that the field has come to reflect the squalid light of their compromised condition. The incursion of the social scientist epigones may well be an ancillary phenomenon made possible by that of the *fallen* philosophers.

Here I am principally concerned with *explaining* the field's decadence, using Nietzsche's approach to do so – that is, by constructing a psychological genealogy, or etiology, to get at the decay's origins in those *fallen* philosophers who have stained, or maculated, the field. Accordingly, our task will be to dig down to reach their latent philosophers within who have been buried alive. However, to reach them we must pass through the cadaverous perfume of their transmuted patinas – epigones serving as industrious scientific-employees and grandiloquent moralist-ideologues who simultaneously idolize and loath themselves in their respective costumes. It is these sordid figures who have permitted the squalid social scientists to wander over in spite of their lack of philosophical knowledge.

The internal contradiction in the *fallen* philosopher goes well beyond the self-contradictions that are inherent in the human condition, and is in fact an instance of the will turned against itself, which Nietzsche points to as the quintessence of weakness itself. I investigate why a person so weakened would desire that the war he *is* (in the human condition) should come to an end[10] – why he would flee it in such a way that it would intensify and in fact expand. At bottom, he steadfastly refuses to subject the value of truth itself to a critique while leading the charge as a moralistic ascetic priest of sorts against those who *do*.

The kernel around which this article implicitly revolves is the value of *truth* itself. According to Nietzsche, various drives and instincts differentially esteem truth in the form of certain normative values that can be undercut, or "revalued," relatively explicitly. Following a synopsis of Nietzsche's genealogy of morality and a discussion of the philosophical basis of business ethics, I apply these standpoints by investigating the methodology and selected theories of the field with an eye toward uncovering the origins of the decadence while delimiting the field accordingly.

The writing of this article alone (i.e., its style, method of analysis, and diction) is itself a step in the direction of delimiting the field back to its

philosophical foundation; that is, I intentionally orient not only my thesis, but my writing and analysis as well, to *philosophers* of that branch of ethics that is taught in business schools – providing them with a healthy *pathos* of distance from academic dilettantes, the fomites who interlard the field with their own spite under the palliatives of their scientific certainty and their coruscating moralism. These chameleons may regard this article as esoteric, while the (analytic) philosophers might find it a bit too exoteric, perhaps even a bit too poetic, as it is indeed far from "arid formalism" – but so too was old Kant. This is a Nietzschean project, after all. As such, Nietzsche's phraseology, which is a signate element of his "revaluing" project, must perforce be utilized. Because his diction is so well crafted for an iconoclastic effort to illumine the squalid origins of some decadent-although-esteemed values, my argument throughout will be peppered with admittedly large doses of quotes taken from his texts while minimizing needless circumlocutions and recondite pleonasms.[11] I turn first to brief discussions of Nietzsche's theory and the basis of business ethics being in philosophy. These discussions establish the basis from which I critique the methodology and subject matter of business ethics, which in turn leads to a discussion of the field's recuperation.

Toward a genealogy of morals

Because I adapt Nietzsche's strategy of constructing a psychological genealogy in my endeavor to explain the *fallen* business ethicists, a *précis* of his approach can serve as our launching pad. From a Nietzschean standpoint, the key to understanding any decadence in the field of business ethics would have to be to grasp the origin of the compromised *business ethicist's* motives. Nietzsche's genetic, originary, approach is pellucid in his discussion of the accounts of the history of morality made by English psychologists. Nietzsche starts out by asking, "These English psychologists – what do they really want? …what is it really that always drives these psychologists in just *this* direction?"[12] Nietzsche goes on to discuss the origin of these psychologists' motives in terms of their dominant instincts. Nietzsche takes the psychologists themselves as the object of his psychological investigation to *explain* their theories.

Nietzsche points to the English psychologists as a way to get at the origins of particular systems of moral values: "we need a *critique* of moral values, *the value of these values themselves must first be called into question* – and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew."[13] Of these circumstances, Nietzsche asks, "Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future?"[14] This question evokes a consideration of the dominant motives and instincts of certain person types, such as the philosopher and the ascetic priest. In identifying and assessing the relative health of the drives, Nietzsche critiques and rejects, or "revalues," the worth of hitherto societal dominant values in modernity. As a result, we can enjoy a freedom from "the imperious value judgments that have become part of our flesh and blood."[15] That is, we can recognize the extent to which our moralities oppress us.

Nietzsche's *own* values provide us with a thread of sorts to critique the field of business ethics. Nietzsche argues that the bad is everything "that is born of weakness," the good is simply everything "that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself," and happiness is "the feeling that power is *growing*, that resistance is overcome."[16] The feeling of power is at the center of Nietzsche's compass, with weakness *qua* decadence and sickness at the periphery.

Nietzsche places at the center of his paradigm drives such as exploitation that others may consider immoral. The essence of life, its will to power, entails the "essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions…"[17] Life itself "is *essentially* appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker."[18] Exploitation "does not belong to some corrupt or imperfect primitive society; rather, it belongs to the *essence* of what lives" (Ibid.). Privileging *becoming* over *being*, Nietzsche views life as efforts to impose one's own form on what is otherwise Heraclitan flux; life "simply *is* will to power," the "instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for *power*."[19] Moreover, Nietzsche views "*all* efficient force univocally as – *will to power*," whose nature it is to overcome resistance.[20] Moral systems that vituperate against certain forms of this will are decadent and dogmatic.

This is the harsh truth, according to Nietzsche, which many of the weaker among us, such as the self-eviscerating ascetics, are simply unable or unwilling to face. So they fabricate a moralism of selflessness and self-restraint to palliate their brain-sickness and seek to foist it on the rest of us via guilt. In contrast to the ascetics who seek escapism into a beyond, Nietzsche argues that strength "should be measured according to how much of the 'truth' one could still barely endure – or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would *require* it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified."[21] In general, strength is in having an un-abashed confidence in one's will to power. In contrast, weakness is in one's shame in the will to power, the will is in effect turned against itself and thereby enervated. Hence, the confident and un-ashamed noble is strong whereas the self-mortifying ascetic is weak. Whether it is a will to power or another is significant in the philosopher's work. According to Nietzsche, what has been at stake in all philosophizing has not been "truth" but other drives, including most principally the will to power.[22]

I argue that from their relative health (i.e., how they make use of their wills to power), we can get a sense for why *some* philosophers could lose their natural bearings and wind up without traction on quite rocky ground. "In some it is their deprivations that philosophize; in others, their riches and strengths. The former *need* their philosophy, whe-ther it be as a prop, a sedative, medicine, redemp-tion, elevation, or self-alienation."[23] Healthy philosophers – meaning those with a strong and unashamed perspective of themselves (i.e., an unblemished confidence in their will to power) – can engage their ratiocinations with passion and thereby be fecund. In contrast, nothing much of substance will come from the sicker.[24] The reason is that all great problems facing a thinker "demand *great love*, and of that only strong, round, secure spirits who have a firm grip on themselves are capable. It makes a telling difference whether a thinker has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them his destiny, his distress, and his greatest hap-piness, or an 'impersonal' one, meaning that he can do no better than to touch them and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious thought."[25] The healthy philosopher is engaged with his material; the sick one is not.

This diremption may undercut Nietzsche's own claim that *all* philosophers are "advocates who resent that name, …wily spokesmen for their prejudices which they baptize 'truths'."[26] Every philosopher, according to Nietzsche, "simply *cannot* keep from transposing his states…into the most spiritual form and distance: this art of transformation *is* philoso-phy."[27] However, I want to claim that the cold distance, which is of sickness rather than spirit or passion, pertains to the *fallen* philosopher – for example, to the bully-moralist. To this figure, I pose Nietzsche's question that typically concerns the psychologist: what becomes of "the thought itself when it is subjected to the *pressure* of sickness?"[28]

The decadence of a field can be explained by diagnosing the sickness of its *fallen* members in terms of their thoughts *qua* rationalized personas. The relative infertility of sick philosophers may explain why some would traverse into foreign terrains, in effect cutting themselves off from their native soil – going on to produce desiccated fruit that tastes bad. I contend that this condition pertains to the herd of business ethicists who have gone away from their basic discipline, philosophy, to play the roles of scientist and business manager, albeit vicariously. As the sickness and its underlying decay are uprooted and diagnosed, there undoubtedly will be resistance from among the gainsaying herd animals who are conveniently blind to their own unhealthy, squalid condition. However, they are not totality of the field. Accordingly, I address my argument to others in the field who may be change agents.

The philosophical grounding of business ethics: toward a genealogy of the business ethicist

Some business ethicists conflate the field of business ethics with the social sciences, a trend that I find troubling. Norman Bowie (1991, p. 39), for exam-ple, claims that "some economists are disciplinary imperialists: they believe that every policy issue is at heart an economic issue." However, in what may be his own imperialist agenda, Bowie (1991, p. 40) claims at the end of his essay – as if a slapdash afterthought – that business ethics is interdisciplinary and "could well be enriched by the contributions of all the social sciences." He welcomes such contribu-

tions, claiming that philosophical ethics studies the data provided by sociologists and adds normative questions of right and wrong to them (Ibid., p. 33). Indeed, he claims that empirical testability is a *necessary* property of any theory (Ibid., p. 25). Even so, he interlards philosophical justification into a social science when he claims that the *philosophical* ethical theory of egoism is one of the fundamental theories of economics (Ibid., p. 39). Edward Freeman, another business ethicist, conflates the social sciences with philosophy as well, citing frameworks, theories, and decision techniques as *all* being valid integrative means for the field of business *ethics*.[29]

In contrast to these business ethicists, I argue that the imperialism *within the field of business ethics* must be faced to rid the field of its decadence. *Punctum saliens*, delimiting the contours of business ethics within the *terra* of philosophy is essential to this effort. For reasons to be discussed in the following section, ethical theory is not extracted from data from the social sciences or confirmed by means of empirical testability. This near-conflation of two fundamentally different branches of knowledge may be due to a desire to be both a philosopher and a social scientist, often without undertaking the necessary schooling in whichever one is the accretion – hence boiling down to a desire to have it both ways.

Bowie's effort to net the social sciences into his philosophical grasp represents the sort of disciplinary imperialism that can unintentionally provoke the discursive wandering of a dilettante who wants to invent a new field out of many. Bowie's (1991, p. 33) forays abroad contradict his own asseverations, which I take to be central in his work, that business ethics is simply the branch of ethics that is taught in business schools, that ethics and business ethics pursue the same fundamental questions (i.e., of meaning and justification), and finally that the "concepts of ethics have logical characteristics that irreducibly distinguish them from the concepts used in the social sciences." Accordingly, the accretion of the social sciences interlards business ethics, rarifying its distinguished content, which is properly delimited *as philosophical.*

We can avoid this pollution simply by apprehending the *prime facie* asseveration that business ethics is a branch of ethics, which is a field of philosophy, a discipline that is *not* a species of the social sciences. According to Bowie (Ibid., p. 33), ethics "has a definitive subject matter with a long history and a body of authentic texts." It is thus rich enough to reify business ethics as a discrete field, while providing vital links to the other fields of philosophy that can buttress its foundation (i.e., give it solid legs). Examples of this buttressing appear in both Freeman and Bowie. Freeman, for example, claims that political philosophy – in particular, the topic of distributive justice – is of "the first importance" to business ethics.[30] Secondly, Bowie (Ibid., p. 31) claims that the "business curriculum cannot be purged of epistemological, metaphysical and ethical assumptions." This would be all the more true for business ethics, a field that Bowie (Ibid.) claims is that branch of ethics that is taught in business schools and is thus inherently philosophical. Therefore, following this line of reasoning from these business ethicists, we can state definitively that business ethics is in fact grounded in philosophy, and that, with its ken being most akin to other fields of philosophy, it must be methodologically vivisected from the social sciences however painful this may be for some.

In the succeeding sections, I argue that too many business ethicists have cut off their own philosophical legs, wandering in their wheelchairs into other people's gardens while wondering why they can't walk. These moralists are responsible for their own condition, even as they point to *others'* responsibilities while proudly pronouncing their *own* agenda salubrious. In actuality, they are utterly unable to plumb themselves or our field, and yet how much we have allowed them to roughhew the field![31] Hence I come back to the vital need for a psychological genealogy to *explain* the field's decadence in terms of its sordid scholars whose decay has stealthily sullied the field immeasurably.

Methodology in business ethics: toward a genealogy of the business ethicist

The enervated condition of the field of business ethics manifests through its methodology in such a way that a genealogy of its *fallen* members can be extracted from it. In this regard, I highlight their scientific and managerial roles through which they have departed from philosophy to conform instead to the norms and practices of the other fields of business, ignoring thereby their inherent *pathos* of distance *within* business schools.[32] Thus transmuted,

these business ethicists have concatenated themselves with scholars in the other business fields in being all-too-willing sycophants of natural science and the business world – this in spite of the inherent subterranean tension, or unstable fault-line, that exists between the plates of science and management and is based on their respective stances on *truth*. Such business ethicists have nonetheless been all too willing to wear primped gray suits over astringent white lab coats instead of their native tweed. Is it even possible, one might ask, for a *philosopher, qua* free-spirit, to be in a uniform without breaking out in a severe rash? Surely he would become asphyxiated in such bad air. Nietzsche *insists* that people stop confounding scientists and laborers with genuine philosophers.[33] To comply, we need to look first at the inclusion of scientific empiricism in the field – an accretion that involves a category mistake in drastic need of transparency.

Taking business ethics as a branch of ethics, it seems strange to me that business ethics would be studied through *descriptive* surveys, as if what is ethical could be known through means akin to "customer feedback." Yet that is precisely one means by which *scientific empiricism* has come to be understood and practiced in business ethics. To be sure, the entire field does not hinge on surveys in particular and (scientific) empirical studies in general, but to the extent that it has, the field has been severely compromised – or rather, infected – by an alien methodology. Nietzsche claims that whoever tries "to place philosophy 'on a strictly scientific basis,' first needs to stand not only philosophy but truth itself *on its head*."[34]

One major problem ensuing from the application of scientific empiricism in business ethics is the naturalistic fallacy – the mistaken belief that one can get an "ought" out of an "is." From observations concerning human affairs or rationalist constructions of what God is, Hume observes the following:

> (I)nstead of the usual copulations of propositions *is* and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought* or *ought not*. … For as this *ought* or *ought not* expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained, and at the same time that a reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation

can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it.[35]

In nuce, from the *is* of scientific observation, one cannot deduce an *ought*. This fallacy warrants further elaboration, however, as it has gained such a foothold in business ethics that it may not otherwise be eviscerated from it any time soon. The fallacy can be understood through Kant's criticism of Utilitarianism. To eliminate Utilitarianism as a source for understanding the idea "ought," Kant holds that to take the *descriptive* data of human psychology for what *ought* to be involves a category mistake. In his *Principia Ethica*, Moore uses Sidgwick to charge Bentham with the fallacy insofar as the latter defines the general happiness as *right*, rather than taking the right to be a means to the general happiness, for which in turn reasons must be given to justify it being considered the sole or primary *good*. Description, in other words, does not go far enough in terms of *reasons*. "For it is the business of Ethics, …not only to obtain true results, but also to find valid reasons for them. The direct object of Ethics is knowledge and not practice; and any one who uses the naturalist fallacy has certainly not fulfilled this first object, however correct his practical philosophy may be."[36] This is sage advice, even (and especially) where the *concepts* being studied are relevant to practical affairs, such as business. The business of ethics is *philosophical*, and business ethics is a branch of philosophy. Surely a survey of what people think, how they decide, or even less what they actually do, would not reach such reasons as might *justify* taking an ethical principle as legitimate or foundational in depicting the good. Surveys are among the *descriptive* tools that can provide information on what is *actually* intended or practiced; they are *descriptive* of the world, rather than *foundational* for *ought* therein.

Perhaps one reason why the (scientific) empirical methodology has made inroads into business ethics is its *appearance* of relative certainty. I argue the veneer of certainty, along with what lies behind it, namely taking measurement as an end, aptly explains why there have been business ethicists who have conflated themselves not only with the natural scientist, but with the corporate executive or manager as well. Compositing and vicariously embodying these two roles puts a business ethicist out of reach of her

innate philosopher within and renders her contribution nugatory and jejune.

The desire for certainty might prompt the ethicist to select problems that would be anathema to any philosopher. Nietzsche points to the desire of scholars to pick only those riddles that can be solved without remainder as the great danger that comes with their desire for certainty.[37] It is the "skillful dwarf" who "sets aside everything that must in this sense remain incomplete" (Ibid.). The quantification of ethics, as in the analysis of survey results, could be such an attempt to "reduce" ethics to problems of such apparent certainty without remainder. Such efforts involve an illusion of certainty.[38]

Applying scientific empirical methods to applied ethics glosses over the latter's inherent "remainder" by means of a mere patina of certainty exoteric to the humanities, being borrowed from another branch of knowledge, natural science.[39] Bowie claims that *none* of the business fields "have achieved the status of sciences the way natural sciences have."[40] He argues that almost no courses in the business curriculum are scientific, even though some faculties may want to label anything empirical as scientific. If this is so for the business fields that qualify as *social* science, it must certainly be so for the field that hails from the humanities. Hence, to criticize business ethics for not being sufficiently verifiable or "objective" is to make the category mistake wherein philosophy is taken as another natural science. Business ethicists unwittingly commit the same mistake when we take the bait.

It is likely that the actual certainty achieved in business ethics' empirical studies is less than typically sought or claimed – and certainly less than that of the natural sciences. Take, for example, Fraedrich's use of a quantitative survey to approach the import of moral philosophy in ethical behavior. *Measuring moral philosophies using a "MCT scale"* – the notion of which alone would be emetic to any philosopher, he gets a paltry survey response rate of 27%.[41] In spite of noting a statistical non-response bias making his results only "tentatively generalizable" or "exploratory in nature," he goes on to conclude that rule deontology (Kant's formalism preened into a paragraph) is the ethical theory closest to the most ethical behavior because "rule deontologist managers rank higher than any other philosophy type *tested*."[42] The false certainty here is

evident, given Fraedrich's earlier avowal of the bias, and yet he portrays his results as though *scientific* (i.e., tested) anyway! Furthermore, that managers can apparently *self-descriptively* view themselves as esteeming particular ethical constructs and *describe* themselves as behaving ethically or unethically – according to survey statements deemed to delineate ethical from unethical conduct as if what is ethical conduct has already been determined – is not justification for *why* the behavior is ethical or not, and for *why* their ethical principles have normative value.

McDonald and Pak (1996), for example, note the danger in relying on self-reported survey data and urge further study on the *why* behind their results. However, their hypothesis intimates or presumes that the question of which ethical theory (which they call "cognitive framework") is *most prevalent* or dominant has bearing on moral justification. There is a pernicious democratized equality combining here with the naturalist fallacy that undercuts any philosophical legitimacy for these studies and yet they claim to be studying ethics.[43] Why not simply take a poll and conclude that whatever the majority says is the most ethical principle for ethical conduct? Why not presume that it is so *and ought to be so* simply because it *is* – such that *reasons* need not be given? To use Nietzsche's vocabulary, the herd-animal mentality has assumed control over the determination of ethics and is using it for its squalid purposes.

An ethical theory's *worth* and *justification* must be given by *a priori reasons* rather than *a posteriori* statistics. My question is this: how can one have deviated from philosophy so substantially and yet still claim to be talking about *ethics* (now, however, as though it were a species of science to be *tested*)? Perhaps business ethics has been infected with business social scientists who presume a license to engage in philosophy, and their paucity of education in it leaves them no choice but to utilize their scientific methodology with which to paint over the philosophical basis with their own colors – while the innate philosophers in business ethics either look the other way or join in as though scientists themselves, as if willingly or indifferently submitting their queen to prostitution by men with fat ruddy hands.[44]

Why might certain business ethicists, whether undisciplined social scientists or *fallen* philosophers, be motivated to provide a veneer of certainty through empirical means in a field whose basic

discipline is philosophy? The luster of certainty to the aspiring business ethicist comes not only from the actual certainty achieved in the natural sciences, but from its purported utility and value in the business world as well. In other words, I contend that there have been business ethicists motivated to dissemble themselves as natural scientists *and* business practitioners, a concretion conducive to the glittering rubric slippers of certainty. It is as if their schools were aggregates of white lab coats and gray suits *producing* certainty as if according to a linear production process; this would undoubtedly be enough to nauseate any genuine philosopher.

Behind the value of certainty, deeper down, the defining value of empirical research in business ethics may well be *mensuration* itself, owing to the salience of measurement as a value not only in science but also in the world of business. In uncovering this kernel, we may thus explain why business scholars, including the ethicist who ironically moralizes against business, would want to vicariously play the role of the business executive in business *schools*.

According to Nietzsche, it is in "the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor" that "one person first encountered another person, that one person first *measured himself* against another."[45] That is, the genealogy of *measurement* finds its origin in business *activity*, which in turn is "older even than the beginnings of any kind of social forms of organization and alliances" (Ibid.). In the setting of prices, determining values, contriving equivalences, and exchanging – activities that "preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent that in a certain sense they constitute thinking *as such*" – "man designated himself as the creature that measures values, evaluates and measures, as the 'valuating animal as such'" (Ibid.). Mensuration could constitute thinking *per se* in the business world, as well as in business schools.[46] According to Nietzsche, the "truly efficient and successful scholars could one and all be described as 'employees'."[47] In other words, "scholars" who prize efficiency and utility may well be inclined view conform themselves in their thinking, and indeed their very identity, to the world of business rather than academia.

This "perfect storm" of certainty and mensuration forming over science and business is particularly

pernicious to those business ethicists who are innately philosophers (i.e., not the social scientists who have claimed ethics for their own) because it flies in the face of their nature *qua* philosophers. Behind the value of mensuration, we find esteem for the "rule" as over and against the "exception." Not only does this contradict the fact that "the condition that gives birth to the rule is different from the condition the rule gives birth to,"[48] it scapegoats, in effect, the philosopher whose free spirit is inherently an exception in the world contemporary with him. As if he were warning philosophers in particular, Nietzsche remarks that it typically "ranks you far beneath him that you seek to establish the exceptions while he seeks to establish the rule."[49] As a philosopher, you "perish like houseless birds" if you are "prevented from constructing [your] own nest."[50] In contrast, the scientist and business manager perish, as though panicked birds flying into a window, if they are prevented from conforming.

Ultimately, it is the stance that science and business take on the value of truth that rankles and haunts the genuine philosopher, yet it is simultaneously the source of a deep fissure in the science-business amalgam that is to the philosopher's advantage. According to Nietzsche, science has as its presupposition the faith that nothing is needed more than truth.[51] It follows that truth itself is not permitted to become a problem. This applies as well to the world of business, where subjecting truth itself to a critique is typically deemed un-util, or an early sign of senility. However, whereas science places truth above utility, business does not. Because truth is not always more useful than untruth, science cannot be based on a calculus of utility; in contrast, business is. This difference points to a deep fissure running between science and business, making its compromise unstable for the business "scholar" and "fair game" for the philosopher.

Mirroring this fissure may be a self-contradiction in the business ethicist herself – a cleft that might also be sourced in a tension between truth and usefulness. This inner dilemma of the moralist-businessperson may be at the root of the business ethicist's decay. It can be expressed as: "how could I ever get free of myself? And yet – I *am sick of myself*!"[52] In other words, the business ethicist moralizes against the business executive even as she preens her grizzled suit. She cannot get free of herself – meaning the condition of her simultaneous self-loathing and

self-idolatry – and yet she is sick of herself. Her self-loathing springs from her desire to mimic that which she moralizes against.

Her self-idolatry may be more complicated to explain from a Nietzschean perspective. Besides the idolatry that is entailed in refusing to subject her virtues (or truth itself) to criticism, she would also be subject to the idolatry of Man as measurement – as machine – as rule – as *restless activity*, all of which are in want of the higher activity: that of the individual, the philosopher. According to Nietzsche, idolatrizing oneself as *being active* – whether as an official, businessperson, or scholar – is to take oneself as a "generic creature" as per a *role* rather than as a distinct and unique individual.[53] In other words, the content of her self-idolatry eviscerates her innate philosopher, which is her authentic and free self. While useful, her idolatry is not based on truth. Her loathing of it is not due to its untruth – nor is it based on her moralism against its content; rather, it is ultimately based on her weakness, which keeps her from being free and authentic – strong enough ultimately to view truth itself as a problem.

Playing the scientist/executive role does seem to her to ameliorate her weakness as though it were "objectified" and thus "exportable"; however, her choice of roles involves the fissure just described and two very basic category mistakes: in the case of the scientist, it involves treating the philosophical as scientific, and in the case of the manager, it involves the conflating the investigator herself with her object of study. The nature of her decay renders her sicker.

If the business ethicist idolizes herself *qua* scientist and manager, she is apt to idolize her concepts as well (i.e., taking ideology for scholarship, the academic moralist's fodder). Notable examples I discuss below in the upcoming theory section are "corporate social responsibility" and "stakeholder." According to Nietzsche, when idolaters of concepts worship something, "they kill it and stuff it."[54] In this case – meaning of a *fallen* philosopher – that which is killed and stuffed is ultimately the business ethicist herself, *as she simultaneously idolatrizes and sickens herself.* This inner conflict is at the heart of my etiology of the business ethicist who trespasses into science and the world of business, forsaking her innate nature as a philosopher. It also applies to the social scientist dilettantes who want to claim ethics as their own. That either of these species would devise

and test managerial tactics, taking them for theory rather than instances of concept-idolatry, should come as no surprise. In the next section, I overview this decadence, following which I analyze the stakeholder approach as a case in point.

Tactic as theory: Academic bankruptcy

A particularly feckless result of the business ethicist living vicariously in the world of business has been her utterly squalid arrogation that tactics can serve as theory. This miasma has rendered business ethics far too intellectually barren to be of interest to any genuine philosopher. Reducing its theory to managerial technique is perhaps business ethics in its most gruesome guise from intellectual and psychological standpoints – emaciated in its utter lack of shame for its squalid condition. It has juxtaposed its domain of study (i.e., the world of business, where tactics are indeed appropriate to *its* task) with itself as an academic field. Indeed, it testifies to the extent to which these *fallen* philosophers have drifted from their native soil. Such business ethicists are *working* as virtual employees, having essentially become business practitioners devising *tools* rather than scholars constructing explanations.

Questions leading to the conflation of theory and managerial tactic involve *how* business managers make ethical decisions, for example, or *how* companies address the ethical dimension in their strategic decision-making processes. Instead of approaching the field by asking *why*, such business ethicists ask *how*. They skip over *why* to get to the *how*, even though the latter *depends* on the former. Other questions, deeper ones, touching on the basis of the normative dimension in the business realm of activity would then be necessarily *relegated* to philosophy, as if it were a foreign nugatory territory.

Situated around "why," business ethicists can draw upon their native soil of philosophy rather than duplicate what would be better done in a corporate setting – namely, *training*. Business ethics is an *academic* field, which asks *why*, rather than a course of training, which asks *how*. The latter orientation is quite in line with the interest of middle-level managers whose task it *would otherwise be* to conduct such *training*. I would argue, however, that enlightened corporate chairmen and their boards would

favor the re-emergence of the *academic* field at the expense of the current training-orientation. "We can train, but we can't educate – so we want you to do that," they might well tell business school deans who have been listening to the recruiters too much.[55] What sort of pathology in academia loses his soul to the lowest bidder? A business technician! Certainly not a scholar.[56] As a result of business schools in general becoming what they think corporations want from them (i.e., corporate toadies), it may well be that business schools have become in effect extension services of universities rather than academic units *or* corporations – that is, corporate training and consulting rather than education or real corporate strength being their bread and butter.

As an example of the sort of tactic showcasing itself as theory that can manifest in the midst of a training orientation, I want to discuss what has come of the *prima facie* ideological "topic" of "Corporate Social Responsibility." CSR is a platform that was first enunciated by moralists as though a chic wish list of the have-nots for spending the surfeit corporate wealth then accruing in the middle of the twentieth century.[57] The moralists were intent "to show how egoism in theory and in practice is destructive of business itself" (Bowie, 1991, p. 39). Note here the tacit anti-intellectual presumption that the field *ought* to be oriented to *improving* rather than *explaining* business practice. Furthermore, note that these ideologues *presumed* that egoism is destructive. Nietzsche can be used to decimate the second point.

He argues that in the anti-egoism claim lies the *great* danger to mankind, its sublimest enticement and seduction. Here is the *herd instinct*: "the prejudice that takes 'moral,' 'unegoistic,' '*désintéressé* as concepts of equivalent value already rules today with the force of 'fixed idea' and brain-sickness."[58] "Selflessness," according to Nietzsche, "has no value either in heaven or on earth."[59] Egoism is simply "the law of perspective applied to feelings: What is closest appears large and weighty."[60] Here Nietzsche is appealing to nature over any morality to the contrary.

It was not long before the void left open by the dearth of philosophical (or intellectual) substance behind the lurid ideological stance of corporate responsibility furnished an opening for "Corporate Social *Responsiveness*," or CSR2 – otherwise known

as "managerial tactic as theory," an intellectual abortion akin to seed thrown down on dry rock; only a lapidary could make that façade fecund.[61] This second movement is predicated on, and indeed runs away with, the assumption that the field's purpose is to improve business practice, and thus that theory *just is* efficacious tools that people can be trained to use.

Besides objecting to the training orientation in CSR2, one could object that responsiveness in itself is a descriptive construct lacking in normative content. Carroll (1979), for example, *labels* different degrees of responsiveness as "reaction," "defense," "accommodation," and "proaction." These are simply borrowed terms or neologisms standing in for strategies. Does such jargon represent *theory* simply because the tactics have different degrees of responsiveness? Furthermore, does it contain *moral theory*? From a normative standpoint, the first question is: *why be responsive?* Even if utility is the rationale, this principle must be justified *philosophically* to serve as a legitimate *normative* basis.[62] Standing as a societal norm does not furnish us with such a basis. Furthermore, such a basis lacks intellectual depth if cut off from its epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical legs.

In summary, the vacuous turpitude of "tactic as theory" can be viewed as a symptom of the business ethicist simultaneously embracing the antipodal desires to hold a moralist-ideologue agenda that is critical of business while vicariously *acting* out the role of a business practitioner. The self-loathing/self-idolatry contradiction can be seen here as the moralist champions against the prerogatives of the executive – both in this case being in the same person, the *fallen* business ethicist. The stakeholder approach is a prominent example of this contradiction in the guise of a tactic as theory.

The ascetic priest and its stakeholders: The domination of *Ressentiment*

The self-contradiction plaguing the business ethicist is particularly salient in the stakeholder approach, which is said by its inventor to comprise a large body of the literature in business ethics (Freeman, 1991, p. 5). Donaldson and Preston claim that the approach spans the trichotomous descriptive, instrumental,

and normative orientations. Although they claim that the "central core of the theory is normative,"[63] its normative legitimacy may well be undercut by its instrumentalist dross. A perusal of the stakeholder approach will highlight its advocates' intention to supply it with a justifying philosophical principle that from a Nietzschean perspective can be interpreted as a mere a subterfuge for their poisonous envy and resentment. I argue that at the core of this pernicious charade is the business ethicist's self-idolatry/self-loathing contradiction, which billows out not only in the stakeholders' moralist advocate but in the closely aligned contradictions existing within Nietzsche's ascetic priest figure as well. In fact, I suggest that the business ethicist-moralist is simply the latest incarnation of Nietzsche's ascetic priest figure, which he claims is in every age.

Freeman argues that the basis of the "stakeholder" approach is the stakeholder concept, which he defines in terms of an entity "affecting or being affected by" a focal organization.[64] He originally relied on instrumental premises, treating stakeholder management as a basis for enhanced performance based on viewing the environment in terms of a number of bilateral relationships that could be managed.[65] Regarding stakeholder "theory," he went on to emphasize a *normative* dimension, noting that the "very idea of a purely descriptive, value-free, or value-neutral stakeholder theory is a contradiction in terms" (Freeman, 1999, p. 234). Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 74) pick up on this point, asserting that the central core of the stakeholder approach is normative, meaning that it *drives* the approach. Accordingly, I view attention to the problematic nature of the attempted justification of this *normative* claim on philosophical grounds as being far more important than working out additional descriptive relationship-oriented managerial tools; in fact, only the former is worthy of philosophers in business ethics – that branch of ethics that can be taught in business schools – whereas the latter is of use only to sycophantic scientific-employees who are managed by (the interests of) mid-level corporate managers.

To be sure, the normative rationale is problematic. Underlying the stakeholders' normative claim of having a right to participate in the focal firm's decision-making process based on "affecting or being affected by" the said firm is a "sleight-of-hand" too smooth for the naked eye. In going from the *descriptive*, or actual, external "affecting or affected by" to notions such as *right* and *duty* involves the naturalist fallacy, which declares it invalid to get "ought" out of "is," as if from a melon.[66] Simply defining as stakeholders "groups who have a stake in or claim on the firm"[67] would merely beg the question: why do they have a claim?

Evan and Freeman (Ibid., *italics* added) propose a Kantian basis, citing Kant's teleological derivation of his categorical imperative: "each stakeholder has a right to be treated as an end in itself, and not as means to some other end, and *therefore must* participate in determining the future direction of the firm in which it has a stake." Donaldson and Preston articulate this Kantian approach in terms of stakeholder interests having "intrinsic value."[68] However, the question of whether a stakeholder *entity* is a rational being, and hence is worthy of respect as such, is a complex problem going beyond the scope of this essay. It may well be anthropomorphist to consider an institution or organization to have worth *as a rational being* unless an organization "just is" its human occupants. Furthermore, treating rational nature as an end in itself does not *in itself* imply or mandate having a share of power in someone else's decision-making process, even if that process impinges on that rational nature.

For one thing, what would this power look like? According to Rhenman (1968), the stakeholder conception of the firm can lead to a theory of industrial democracy. Others intimate multifiduciary obligations, or slowly converting private corporations into public institutions via a "new" conception of property.[69] Even if private property itself is not eviscerated in the process, Nietzsche's remarks on socialism are relevant to Freeman's project. Socialism, according to Nietzsche, represents not a problem of justice, with its "ludicrous and feeble question: 'how far *ought* one to give in to its demands?', but only a problem of power: 'how far *can* one exploit its demands?'"[70] To *demand* equality of economic rights, say through a forced redistribution, as stakeholders might do, is "never an emanation of justice but of greed."[71] The non-possessors have "no moral prerogative over the possessors," such as might justify a forced redistribution.[72] Surely, alternative means *sans* such a pernicious underbelly can be found for conveying the respect due a rational being where that is warranted. Why, then, would Evan and Freeman portray one peremptorily and without regard to its latent fastidiousness?

In line with Nietzsche's etiological approach, we can anatomize their motives, drives, and instincts and ask how it is that these forces led these philosophers astray from completing their philosophical analysis of Kant. I argue from a Nietzschean standpoint that the stakeholder approach is a manifestation of the business ethicist's invidious motive that makes use of "the moral conceptual world" of "guilt," "conscience," "duty," and "responsibility" as a preachment of sorts against corporations.[73] The preachment not only draws their advocates from doing philosophy but is also a seemingly salubrious subterfuge that belies its advocates' resentment and envy of the focal organizations' preponderance of power and strength. In fact, the moralists' terms have their origin historically in one of the stakeholder relationships, so it is *kein Zufall* (no accident) that the preachment would readily fall on amenable ears among the stakeholders.

If Nietzsche is correct, the basis of words such as "guilt" and "responsibility" is far different from what contemporary moralists would have us believe (i.e., what they have *imposed* on us). Accordingly, Nietzsche intends to revalue their esteemed virtues by uncovering the true origins of their normative terms. He argues that the consciousness of the "major moral concept *Schuld* (guilt) had its origin in the very material concept *Schulden* (debts)" – that is, in "the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor, …which in turn points back to the fundamental forms of buying, selling, barter, trade and traffic."[74]

Taking the focal organization to be the debtor and the "stakeholder" as its creditor, Nietzsche would say that the stakeholder-creditor who has been "injured" by his debtor – who might have used his relative bilateral bargaining power to extract better terms on the loan – assumes equivalence between its injury and the pain that it can inflict on the "*Schuldige*" (culprit). In prehistory, according to Nietzsche, "the creditor could inflict every kind of indignity and torture upon the body of the debtor."[75] It is "a recompense in the form of a kind of *pleasure* – the pleasure of being allowed to vent his power freely upon one who is powerless" (Ibid.). This could allow him to participate in a right of the masters: "being allowed to despise and mistreat someone as 'beneath him'" – the license of cruelty that power gives (Ibid.).

If Nietzsche is correct, then the "stakeholder" concept, which implies that a creditor has a *valid* stake in a more powerful entity simply by virtue of being "affected," is a descriptive façade masking an opaque resentment bent on revenge through "ought" and its accompanying *Schuld*. To the extent that *Schuld's* origin still has bearing, *responsibility* is actually a ruse that is utilized by weaker parties to be able to feel a little power by making a relatively strong party suffer – as if the pleasure from their suffering were equivalent to the injury that they had suffered. The creditor "stakeholder," seeking to participate in the right being enjoyed by the focal (i.e., relatively powerful) organization, exacts an equivalent in *pain* in exchange for having been "affected" adversely (i.e., injured) by that organization. The pain in that organization is felt in allowing stakeholder participation; it is endured on account of the duty or responsibility emanating from the infection of guilt impelled by the moralist's stinger. Herein is the "will of the weak to represent *some* form of superiority, their instinct for devious paths to tyranny over the healthy," through a delusion whose origin eviscerates its value.[76]

One of the great mysteries to Nietzsche is how the strong could ever drop their rightful pathos of distance and thereby allow themselves to be traduced and debauched, as if degraded to an instrument of the moralist's gaunt delusion. The "pathos of distance *ought* to keep their tasks eternally separate!" (Ibid., p. 561). No "greater or more calamitous misunderstanding is possible than for the happy, well-constituted, powerful in soul and body, to begin to doubt their *right to happiness* in this fashion" (Ibid., p. 560). The strong must be subject to a sort of vulnerability to be such ingenuous and incredulous dupes daunted in the face of such guile and fatuous malignity, for the weak have in fact "succeeded in *poisoning the consciences* of the fortunate with their own misery" as if to say, "it is disgraceful to be fortunate: *there is too much misery*!" (Ibid.). They have done it by convincing the strong that they monopolize virtue, these "weak, hopelessly sick people" (Ibid., p. 559). Such tartuffery!

So Nietzsche concludes that the "*sick* are man's greatest danger; *not* the evil, *not* the 'beasts of prey'."[77] It is they, the weakest, who want to *represent* justice by monopolizing virtue, saying 'we alone are the good and just,' "as if health, well-constitutedness, strength, pride, and the sense of power were in themselves necessarily vicious things

for which one must pay some day."[78] These vengeful moralists are disguised as judges, "who constantly bear the word 'justice' in their mouths like poisonous spittle."[79] Yet what they really seek is not to judge, but to *kill*. How "ready they themselves are at bottom to *make* one pay; how they "crave to be *hangmen*" (Ibid.). They want to extirpate the strong simply because the strong are strong – as if they had a choice in the matter.

However, the weakest do not have sufficient will-to-dominate to act as judge and executioner on their own – the polyphonic herd animals do not have sufficient strength among themselves to interlard their fat venom into the strong. A herd needs a pastor, though in this case this means a steel dove. These herd animals must turn to a new bird of prey, who is sufficiently weak and sick to be acceptable to them, yet also strong, with sufficient will-to-dominate *in this world* to dominate suffering.[80] He alters the direction of the herd's *ressentiment* from bearing down on the herd itself, redirecting it against the strong to make them agree to *pay* on account of their strength – as if they had any choice in being strong (Ibid, pp. 562–563).

This is Nietzsche's ascetic priest figure, an inherently self-contradictory person-type who is ashamed of his dominating nature even as he does not resist his instinct to engage it. In trying to get around his pallid state of tedium by exercising his will to power, he becomes *sicker* as a result because he is ashamed of himself for *wanting* to dominate. He is "a virtually new type of preying animal," sowing not only discord but also self-contradiction, the latter actually a projection of his own inner constitution (Ibid., p. 562).

I argue that his innate self-contradiction and its rippled manifestations form the template for the business ethicist-moralist's self-idolatry/self-loathing internal contradiction and its external reverberations. Essentially, both figures contain a dominating subterranean will to dominate that is frustrated by the kind of weakness that is based on the will having turned against itself (which is inherently weakening to the will).

Both have also appointed themselves as normative judges having a "right to lie."[81] Unable to match the force of the strong head-on, the ascetic priest uses "care, patience, cunning, simulation, great self-control, and everything that is mimicry."[82] Hence, he is a new kind of preying animal having a vulpine

ferocity that manifests itself more like the fox than the lion. His virtues, such as "turn the other cheek," are simply rationalizing covers for his weakness. His will is thus turned against itself in shame; he both idolatrizes his virtues *qua* virtues and loathes them for delimiting his dominant instinct. I argue that this description fits the business ethicist-moralist as well.

Each is using moralism to flee from his respective inner self-idolatry/self-loathing contradiction, which is in turn an inflammation of any number of the ordinary contradictions brewing in the human condition.[83] Whether from its decay or the ensuing sickness, neither figure can brook ordinary human psychic contradictions; in fact, each gets sicker from continuing to perpetrate or chase after the externalized self-idolatry/self-loathing contradictions that manifest in the form of moralism.

The ascetic priest flees from its own inner conflict by projecting it outward. In feeling shame at man, he participates in "the morbid softening and moralization through which the animal 'man' finally learns to be ashamed of all his instincts" – "life itself has become repugnant" to him.[84] He is, in effect, enervating life's will by taking the value of morality to be the value of the unegoistic – "the will turning *against* life" (Ibid.). The self must in its very life turn against itself, *deny itself*.[85] The ascetic life is thus inherently a self-contradiction, "life *against* life" – the protective instinct of a degenerating life.[86]

Similarly, the business ethicist diverts the stakeholder herd's self-loathing from the herd itself, aiming it instead at the focal organization to make it *pay* for its puissance; this payment is in the form of redistributive justice blood letting under the façade of the moralist's superiority. Herein is the delusion perpetrated on the strong: that the moralist is superior by *virtue* of his own impervious edict! This "ethicist" exploits the strong's vulnerability to "ought" by stealth and cunning. Like the ascetic priest, he is allowed to participate, thereby, in the "right of masters" who dominate by befogging the strong with his categories of moral driveller rather than through outright force.[87]

By virtue of his alleged *higher* epistemology – as if it were based in his drive for knowledge ruling his other, more squalid, instincts – this business ethicist *falls* into the self-contradiction that inheres in the acetic priest's feeling: "'I am accountable,' but equally in that antithesis 'I am not, but somebody has to be'."[88] That

is, the moralist must believe like Hume that people are subject to moral accountability, and yet have you ever seen a business ethicist-moralist point the finger at herself? It is the focal business firm! – and yet she *wants to play* corporate in her grizzled suit. Herein manifests her inner contradiction.

Relatedly, the duplicity of the business ethicist's actual and apparent roles bears some similitude to that of the ascetic priest. The business ethicist-moralist can be viewed as an ascetic priest using guilt to "guide" the strong under his delusion in order to hang them from their own ropes of shame. For example, Wu, the Chinese business ethicist referred to in a footnote in the methodology section above, cavils against the Chinese managers who reject or neglect the "guide of an ethicist"; he claims that he wants to "communicate and cooperate" with them, even as he chastises them for reporting a lack of interest in business ethics (Wu, 1999, p. 547). From a Nietzschean perspective, his stated desire to cooperate is merely a moralist's subterfuge fronting for a desire to tell them what they *should* do, relying not on *reasons* but on their survey responses with which to hang them using ropes held taught by stakes on the ground below. Such stake-holding, by the way, is the true meaning of a "stakeholder" once the moralizer's patina has been scraped off.

There is indeed a feeling of power in being a "guide" – creating, in effect, the world in one's own image. Philosophy, according to Nietzsche, "is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 'creation of the world,' to the *causa prima*."[89] This may well be the power-payoff in the business ethicist-moralist's vicarious pursuit of *justice* on behalf of stakeholders. As though their pastor, she shares in the stakeholder herd's resentment of the focal organization's power and has found a crafty way of dominating the organization by infecting the corporate dwellers with guilt under the cloak of being their "guide." Like the ascetic priest, the self-proclaimed moralist "savior"[90] gets a power pay-off by surreptitiously hurling her ideological missiles at the behest of "stakeholders" who are meanwhile drowning themselves in the backwash of their own acerbic *ressentiment* and revenge. If those "stakeholders" knew any better (i.e., their own true best interest), they would be shouting: "Save us from our redeemers!"[91]

The moralists' *dominant* motive is masked by Bowie's "sensitivity function," which he claims is central to the business ethics field in the form of tempering egoism by making students aware of "how certain business decisions have a negative impact on the interests of others" (Bowie, 1991, p. 34). Shame and guilt are directed to those in the corporation through this "sensitivity" to their negative impacts. Meanwhile, the "ethicists" convince the stakeholders that their "take" is *legitimate*, given the "undeserved" negative impacts; all this is really a mask borne of resentment that camouflages the underlying power-grab under the rubric of a normative delusion that projects their self-loathing outward in an act of arrogation. They resemble the ascetic priest figure both by having such an urge (i.e., to dominate) and by covering it up in moralist terms, as though they could monopolize virtue.

The naked reality of the business ethicist-moralist's *dominating* motivation and the related monopolization of virtue can be grasped by noting the disproportionate force with which such a person makes his "demands." Even though Boatright (1994) points out that no argument exists for the special nature of stakeholder claims, Evan and Freeman peremptorily arrogate that the rights of stakeholders "*must* be insured and, further, the groups *must* participate, in some cases, in decisions that substantially affect their welfare."[92] The moralists' bias, which intimates their true identity as herd animals seeking to dominate, is evident in their impertinent descriptions of stakeholders as "*constituents* who have a legitimate claim on the firm,"[93] or as "groups to whom the corporation *is* responsible,"[94] with "claims, rights and expectation that *should* be honored."[95] This "should" is portrayed as so irrefragable that it is *lied* as a fact. It is in actuality passive aggression, or pent-up weakness forcing itself in utter self-contradiction.

Implicit in these moralists' claims I hear the sonorous sirens of Nietzsche's ascetic priest figure, whose ideal "permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms, and sanctions solely from the point of view of *its* interpretation;…it submits to no power, it believes in its own predominance over every other power, in its absolute *superiority of rank* over every other power."[96] I take it that those business-ethicist moralists are a product of this "closed system of will, goal, and interpretation," rendering the field presumptuous and squalid (Ibid.).

The moralists' monopoly on virtue is actually their feckless will to dominate, or push over, the corporate resistance on behalf of *their own* constituents – the herd of stakeholders (conveniently) crying for justice. This is similar to the "will of the weak to represent *some* form of superiority, their instinct for devious paths to tyranny over the healthy…the will to power of the weakest!"[97] Like the ascetic priest, the *fallen* philosopher in business ethics is a pastor in sheep's clothing – and yet the corporate *strong* give him lip service as "the moral authority." "Moral masturbator" would be a more fitting epigram, as he is utterly unfit for social intercourse (Ibid.).

For example, like the ascetic priest, the business ethicist-moralizer is utterly unfit to judge and yet he does it. The business ethicist who judges as if he were just while being quite jaundiced in favor of the stakeholders mimics a similar contradiction in the ascetic priest, and in this connection both the ethicist-moralist and the ascetic priest can be viewed in contradistinction to the philosopher. Firstly, in having contempt for reason while dogmatically asserting a reason-excluded domain of truth, the ascetic priest is utterly at odds with the philosopher.[98] Secondly, whereas the philosopher, being a spirit free of morality and his most cherished virtues, has to say "judge not!" – and thus desires to be just, the ascetic priest desires to be a judge and is thus not just.[99] *All* the means by which moralists, including the priests, have hitherto sought to make mankind moral have been "through and through *immoral.*"[100] Because they "dissect morality" under a lie, the moralists must now be content to be "upbraided as immoralists."[101] Justice, in other words, is "so often a cloak for weakness."[102]

Just as the inner self-contradiction of the ascetic priest has a moral-immoral manifestation involving judging, so too does the contradiction living in the ethical-moralist. Freeman (1984, p. 45), for example, avers that the "stakeholder" concept itself "connotes 'legitimacy'" in terms of the stakeholders' "ability to affect the direction of the firm." *Reasons* are apparently superfluous in this moralist's crusade against capitalism via a "theory" that is inherently ideological rather than *philosophical.* He has essentially judged in favor of the stakeholders, using his verdict itself as the case having been made. In effect, it is a sophistic claim for a domain of truth apart from reason.

Even the contradiction of the business ethicist *qua* executive in a business school can be likened to the ascetic priest's sort of internal contradiction. Even though such a business ethicist excoriates against corporations on behalf of "stakeholder" interests, he wears gray suits even as he must surely be ashamed of himself to the extent that he *enjoys* doing so. For example, Wu (1999, p. 547), whom I discussed above, summons his own will to power *as cunning* to convince the corporate executives that they should be ashamed of their power and thus feel guilty unless he bows to the altar of business ethics, and yet I wonder if Wu envies them enough to wear their grizzled uniform?

In general, the business ethicists who *desire* to conform to corporate culture in their schools suffer from the contradiction that pertains to mimicking executives while moralizing against them. Such a "socialist in pen-stripes" is the quintessence of the oxymoron that is known to the world as "business ethics" precisely because this creature simultaneously idolizes and loathes business – ashamed of his drive to profit, as it were, from blood money expunged from fatuous stakeholders even as he feels *called* to pastor the herd. This pretzel could be a manifestation in turn of the self-contradictory will of a self-loathing self-idolater. Perhaps deep down, this socialist wants to be a captain of industry even as he knows that he resents the corporate system and is fundamentally not such a creature. Owing to this internal contradiction of his will, he suspects that he does not have sufficient bearing and strength of will to dominate the corporate animal. So he furtively inflicts on it the wound of guilt in the only way he can: through chicanery – cunningly convincing the strong that they should be ashamed of their strength unless they make their offerings at his altar. As a result, he can dominate their suffering either way.

Even though this allows him to participate vicariously as if in their domain, in actuality he is not in the corporate realm or in the academic one either – but rather in a strange land as a new bird of prey. As currently self-constructed, the business ethicist who has strayed from his innate philosopher is not of business or academia, and thus he suffers from being in a foreign land as a "third-country person" while trying in vain to have it both ways. Is it not a sign of weakness – *of pathology* – to go to such lengths to have it both ways, while being so utterly blind that one is doing so? Such

a blind venture of utter convenience may well be an effort to escape the self-contradiction that is at the origin of his putrefaction. He is not corporate, and yet he acts and dresses corporate; he is not a scientist, and yet he views his field as a science. What is he, if not the modern ascetic priest eternally convoluted, now in a new guise?

In short, the business ethicists' stakeholder approach *seems* to provide business with a possible legitimating normative basis. However, likening its advocates to Nietzsche's ascetic priest figure permits us to peer behind the curtain, to view a phantas-magoria of revenge and cruelty – the seeking of the pleasant feeling of power by inflicting pain as if that could metaphysically undo the injury and equal the score. Such a power payoff may be described in terms that Nietzsche uses to describe the Stoics: "while you pretend rapturously to read the canon of your law in nature, you want something opposite, you strange actors and self-deceivers! Your pride wants to impose your morality, your ideal, on nature – …you would like all existence to exist only after your own image."[103] That is, such business ethicist-moralists can be seen as power-grabbing epigones bent on revenge rather than as the *improvers* they purport to be. How aloof these self-idolators remain from their native soil of philosophy as they operate as "academic" imperialists, black holes of sorts, sucking in various disciplines, ultimately viewing all of reality in their own image.

A prescription for business ethics: a Nietzschean direction

Providing a leitmotif throughout this article, I have argued that too many business ethicists have allowed themselves to be remade in the image of others; they have moved, in effect, onto other yards – whose soils are too arid for rich philosophical seeds. Yet such business ethicists typically then throw away their native seeds, concluding erroneously that they have somehow gone bad – when in actuality it is the ethicist himself who has developed the bad smell. Given that the basis of business ethics is ethics, which in turn is a field in philosophy, I assert that only by recovering this ground can the business ethicists who have gone astray recover their intel-lectual fecundity and shed their pale masks. Indeed,

one might say that it is *unethical* for business ethics scholars to portray themselves vicariously as scien-tists, businesspersons, and preacher-moralists rather than philosophers. Here again the fallen philoso-pher's inner contradiction manifests: the judging unethical ethicist claims authenticity while in a guise of sorts.

To *recover*, the field of business ethics must be pruned back so its growth will be within the purview of its nutritious philosophical roots. In his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Hume argues that moral philosophy, which in his day comprised all those subjects that have a relation to human nature, ought to "have a direct reference to action and society."[104] In contrast, the abstruse philosophy of metaphysics, "being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day."[105] To be sure, metaphysical theory *can* be relevant; Hume claims that the accuracy of mind compatible with metaphysics bestows "a similar correctness on every art and calling."[106] If this is so, consider how much more moral philosophy would be applicable!

Therefore, in line with having explained the decadence in the field in terms of the decay of certain of its members, I can now recommend that the business ethicists who have wandered off into the fauna of science, the business world, and the pulpit invigorate themselves intellectually by turning back to ethics, which in turn has roots in ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics. The internal intel-lectual discipline in these rich fields could check the business ethicist's moralist tendencies. In addition, it would remove him from the lab and the executive bathroom. I submit that both his self-idolatry and self-loathing would break up, and any remaining self-contradictions could then be endured, even proffering him a state of relative equanimity. Thus spoke Zarathustra, one of Nietzsche's characters: "One must learn to love oneself…so that one can bear to be with oneself and need not roam."[107] Such roaming "baptizes itself" in moralist terms – full of "the best lies and hypocrisies." In contrast, "a phi-losopher – alas, a being that often runs away from itself, often is afraid of itself – but too inquisitive not to 'come to' again – always back to himself."[108] That is, even though a philosopher has an innate urge to

flee, he also contains the countervailing force to resist it and feel at home as that quirky being known to the world as ''the philosopher.''

My recommendation would entail business ethicists leaving the empirical studies of actual managerial techniques or particular firms to the social scientists in favor of philosophical analysis of *concepts* relevant to the *phenomenon* of business, using particular firm or industry antidotes for illustrative purposes only. Consider, for example, the following: a business ethicist is interested in whether General Electric has an ethical corporate culture. The investigation might include surveys sent to the corporate managers, and perhaps also a random sample sent to managers of other companies for comparative purposes. It might also include interviews, as well as an examination of the firm's mission statement, ethics training program, and procedures for ethical decision making, including any relevant audit processes.

Unfortunately, such a firm-oriented focus has the tendency of keeping the business ethicist from attending to the philosophical legs of ethical principles. In philosophical language, a case study's *a posteriori* basis unduly eclipses the *a priori Quelle* (source) of ethical principles, leaning instead to the tactic as theory orientation discussed above. For example, suppose we conclude that GE has in fact an ethical climate, but that it need not suffer financially as a result because it can use its muscle (i.e., market power). In Brazil, it could refuse to pay bribes without losing any business there. A business ethicist focusing on GE would be likely to focus on the relationship between GE's strategic management, and its financial and ethical policies. She may well skip over the question of whether the value of GE's morality is lower than a firm of comparable morality that must lose business as a result of taking the moral route. From such a question, one could ask whether financial sacrifice *or sacrifice in general* contributes to moral value. But such questions are not self-evident from within a case study; they must be approached *a priori* as well.

Consider, for example, alternatively starting with the question: does sacrifice add value to moral worth? Starting with a particular company would not necessarily lead one to this question, as one could become preoccupied with the efficacy of particular corporate strategies. In contrast, the question of sacrifice and moral value suggests still

others, which could then be applied to actual cases. For instance, one could ask: what sort of sacrifice? What is the basis of moral worth? Can we equate moral value with selflessness? Whether there are actual corporate cases or not is not pertinent to the question of how these *concepts* are related, so the question of actual cases must first be bracketed (*epoché*). To be sure, if there are actual illustrative examples, they could fruitfully be brought in to illustrate the concepts, and students could go on to apply the concepts to their companies after graduation. But forsaking the concepts for strategies has left students without an ethical *understanding* to apply. Moreover, in taking the concepts to illustrate the cases rather than vice versa, business ethicists have lost their footing as though on slippery sand on stone – and what seed can grow on this?

Business ethicists who stress the *how* questions of strategy may counter that *concepts* are best left to the Humanities. But consider the concept of *justice*, for example, which Freeman (1991, p. 5) claims is ''of the first importance'' to business ethics. Does this concept come from strategies? Can its nature really be grasped from antidotes? Whereas Freeman cites contemporary theories of justice, I recommend tapping into historical ethical theories as well; they can be very rich soil indeed, as they have been tested or willowed by the winds of time that are capable of separating the wheat from the chaff.

To be sure, business ethics can indeed be approached *philosophically*, without the hypertrophy of any other organs that would evince the noxious self-idolatry/loathing contradiction that feels more secure in asking *how* than *why*. For those genuine business ethicists whose passion centers on the concept of justice, Hobbes' notion can be considered and contrasted with those of Plato, Cicero, or Leibniz. Any of these *conceptions* can be applied to notions of the industrial realm with intellectual fecundity. However, because this article is a Nietzschean piece, I will demonstrate how business ethics can be approached *philosophically* from a conception of justice by analyzing philosophically Nietzsche's alternative to the moralists' sort of justice and relating Nietzsche's justice to his concept of greatness – relating both to his *concept* of the industrial realm in the process, with links made to an *illustrative* case study as well. Indeed, *whether* Nietzsche's conceptions of justice and greatness *can* be applied at all to

business is itself a complicated matter worthy of attention.

Nietzsche maintains that the merchant's morality, being essentially to buy as cheap as possible and sell as dear as one can, is really only a "*more prudent* form of pirate's morality"; the essential thing for "justice" is that this "man of power" promises to maintain an *equilibrium* with the weaker parties, such as his "stakeholders," who must either band together as a community of sorts to provide a counter-balancing power or subject themselves to him.[109] Equilibrium amongst parties of corresponding power is the basis of genuine justice. Justice is simply good and prudent manners among those of approximately equal strength.

Nietzschean justice extends to a stronger power "seeking a means of putting an end to the senseless raging of *ressentiment* among the weaker powers that stand under it…taking the object of *ressentiment* out of the hands of revenge," and for this it can use the institution of law.[110] Business ethicists such as Freeman typically presume that *responsiveness* to "stakeholder" interests is *ethical* and good business. However, such "justice" of the moralists is according to Nietzsche "a will to the *denial* of life, a principle of disintegration and decay."[111] If Walmart gains sufficient market power such that it can lean on its suppliers for better terms, it should not feel *guilty* for having used its strength as if it could have done otherwise.

Nietzsche's conception of justice flows out of his notions of strength and greatness. To ask a relatively strong party not to impose upon weaker ones is to ask it to go against its nature. It would be as if a preponderance of puissance could be expressed as otherwise. "To demand of strength that it should *not* express itself as strength, that it should *not* be a desire to overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to become master, a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express itself as strength."[112]

The suppliers might like to convince us that Walmart should not be any stronger than themselves – as if power were only legitimate if equal. However, this chimera of equality would only be the delusion of a weak animal seeking revenge on the strong, as if the latter *should* feel guilty for *being strong*. The notion of equality, taken from "equal before God,"[113] Nietzsche takes to be an "essential feature of

decline" and the "termination of justice."[114] Where the notion of equality has prevailed, there has existed a tendency to envy those who exceed the common measure – but this is to impose a human illusion (i.e., equality) on nature, which does not admit to it.[115] Hume reminds us that even two sticks held to be equal are not strictly speaking so, and yet we impose our concept of equality onto them as if they were. Nietzsche concurs, adding that only when we "abjure the dogma of the 'equality of men'" will we find the "peculiar virtue of each man in the health of his soul."[116]

From a Nietzschean standpoint, Walmart should encourage its suppliers to be strong *even with its terms as given* – hence not premised on the chimera of equality. Nietzsche's brand of compassion is geared toward making the other *stronger*: "(I)f you have a suffering friend, be not a resting place for his suffering, but a hard bed as it were, a field cot: thus you will profit him best."[117] For the creditor, "how much injury he can endure without suffering from it becomes the actual *measure* of his wealth."[118] This is justice: Walmart hardening him sufficiently that he becomes impervious to his parasites too. Both Walmart and its suppliers could *profit* by pondering Nietzsche's depiction of strength:

> It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a *consciousness of power* that it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it – letting those who harm it go *unpunished*. 'What are my parasites to me?' it might say. 'May they live and prosper: I am strong enough for that!' … To be incapable of taking one's enemies, one's accidents, even one's misdeeds seriously for very long – that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate, and to forget.[119]

Here alone a genuine love of one's enemies is possible – being based on the luxury of reverence absent any worry of threat. What do my enemies matter to me? – in fact, their attention pays tribute to me! In fact, Nietzsche has Zarathustra say that he is a raiser, cultivator, and disciplinarian who says: "Become who you are!" to those below his height.[120]

In contrast, Schopenhauer, the self-ashamed ascetic, *needed* enemies, according to Nietzsche, to keep in good spirits – seducing him to endure existence amid his demonstrable suffering.[121] His moral prejudice in favor of "equal rights" and

"sympathy with all that suffers" is anathema to those persons of great *creativity*, who value "the power to form, to mold" – such persons Nietzsche understands as being great.[122] They are of the noble type of man, which experiences itself as determining, or creating, values in a feeling of fullness, of power that seeks to overflow – generous by an urge begotten by excess of power, including over himself, rather than of pity.[123]

Although he uses the artist as the paragon case, Reginster (2006, p. 192) claims that businesspeople can be great in this sense as well; in particular, they can be so in deliberately seeking "to confront and break boundaries, to expand the domain of human experience, to overcome limitations hitherto unchallenged, or to vanquish resistance perhaps once thought unassailable. If greatness is creativity, then greatness is power."

But can people in the business realm embrace Nietzsche's conception of greatness (which in turn permits his type of justice) given the nature of their domain? In analyzing this question philosophically, I intend to demonstrate a possible conduct of business ethics as a branch of ethics. In this task, Nietzsche's *concepts* of greatness and of the industrial realm must be fleshed out and related.

Nietzsche's conception of greatness highlights the creation of new values, which involves an overcoming of resistance (i.e., a feeling of power). Accordingly, Nietzsche writes that the "highest type of free men should be sought where the highest resistance is constantly overcome."[124] What is this highest resistance? One clue is that to be free is to have the obedience to accept criticism and contradiction – indeed, even and especially within. Nietzsche writes: "the ability to contradict, the attainment of a good conscience when one feels hostile to what is accustomed, traditional, and hallowed – that is still more excellent and constitutes what is really great, new, and amazing in our culture; this is the step of steps of the liberated spirit."[125] Rather than pretending that one's character and occupation are unchangeable and of an *instrumental nature*, as where society is dominated by the herd instinct, seek the "good will of those who seek knowledge to declare themselves at any time dauntlessly *against* their previous opinions and to mistrust everything that wishes to become *firm* in us."[126] Therefore, those "who have greatness are

cruel to their virtues."[127] Thus moralizers, not uncommon in the field of business ethics, can be spotted as weak in how seriously they take their virtues.

Nietzsche claims that a person who affirms overcoming his own otherwise most tyrannical instinct is at his most autonomous and powerful level, as one's own most tyrannical instinct *is* one's highest resistance. He claims that we must not "remain stuck to our own virtues."[128] Instead, we would do better shining refulgent sunlight on our inner storm's saturnine clouds of virtues so their true nature may be finally seen in order that we may be free of their spell. Reginster interprets Nietzsche as claiming that the deliberate quest of resistance to overcome will necessarily spawn "an ever new widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, more remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states" in which consists "the continual 'self-overcoming of man'."[129] As one is drawn to overcome resistances in one's soul as manifested in the creation of new values, one risks contradicting instincts hitherto firmly established – the drives of which must be mastered by one's "more comprehensive states" for one to obtain the feeling of power. The great health is the ideal of a spirit who, thus freed in self-mastery, makes time for play, "not deliberately but from overflowing power and abundance – with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine"; such a human, or superhuman, well-being and benevolence will often appear inhuman when it confronts earthly seriousness (such as the restless activity of moralists esteemed seriously).[130] Indeed, this is the fertile ground for creating values, which in turn is the highest manifestation of power; exploiting or cruelty for its own sake belongs to the weak in their insecure attempts with power.

A firm populated by such persons as have freed themselves from the values of the weak and their own most tyrannical instincts would be a situs of noble manners that would dissipate the envy and resentment of their firm's stakeholders. The "stakeholders" – now holding a stake in support of their own strength rather making a claim on that of the firm – could then accept the overflowing strength being generated by the firm, as when the sea can welcome the sun's aureole that naturally overflows from its own surfeit of light as it sets on the

shimmering water. Indeed, it is in the nature of the creators of such overflowing strength to "go down," or set. Hence Nietzsche has Zarathustra say: "I love him who wants to create over and beyond himself and thus perishes."[131] Even amid their graciousness and generosity, it is in their very nature to be overcome; indeed, humankind overcomes itself – "man is something that must be overcome," being a bridge between the beasts and the over-man, rather than an end.[132] Everything by nature (i.e., given the will to power) overcomes itself.

In the case of the creators, the culprits are the good, who *must* be Pharisees as they are utterly too weak to create so they *must* instead crucify those who breaks old tablets to invent their own values – writing new values on new tablets. The "good" *must* crucify them; the moralists are not strong enough to tolerate or welcome the free spirit among themselves. Even so, the strong *want* to perish. Zarathustra says from his mountain: "I want to go under; dying, I want to give them my richest gifts. From the sun I learned this: when he goes down, overrich; he pours gold into the sea out of inexhaustible riches, so that even the poorest fisherman still rows with golden oars" (Ibid.).

Might it be that just as the sun sets and rises again, the strong perishes, or sets, in the sense that the strong person's own reigning tablets are broken? Might it be that Nietzsche's strong person will *rise* again the next morning to create and perish himself yet again? Nietzsche points to the necessity of "self-overcoming" in the nature of life: "All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming."[133] But by "going under," which I take to be a Nietzschean virtue, they actually "cross over."[134] This is not to imply a Buddhist sense; they shed their latest outer skin rather than destroy *themselves* as a nihilist would. Nietzsche had shed his Schopenhauerian skin. But note the Christian overtones – dying to an old self, even if crucified, to rise, albeit not into a beyond as Paul had surmised.[135] Thus Zarathustra "left his cave, glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains",[136] having formerly said "let yourselves be overthrown – so that you may return to life, and virtue return to you."[137] Such a person would be the *sovereign individual*, "like only to himself, liberated again from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral…, the man who has his own indepen-

dent, protracted will…a consciousness of his own power and freedom, a sensation of mankind come to completion."[138] Although he excoriates Jesus for being insufficiently taken with this life and disavows Paul's sense of resurrection as a metaphysical state after death, Nietzsche praises Jesus for his life "such as he *lived* who died on the cross"; that is, Nietzsche esteems Jesus' "Yes-saying" experience *sans ressentiment* even as he perished on the cross.[139] So I take it that a Nietzschean resurrection is anti-metaphysical, being instead the *practice of life* wherein one is freed from one's own latest tablet of values that has been smashed in willingly going under to the jealous herd.[140]

How many people in business today are in fact willing to *risk* this kind of resurrection? Would its overflowing surfeit of "inexhaustible riches" be worth the inevitable crucifixion by the "good" – those petty stakeholders? Business executives might be more apt to be deluded by the herd's conception of justice as enunciated as the herd's mouthpiece, the ascetic priest manifested as the business ethicist-moralist. How many executives are sufficiently *secure* in their awareness of their *strength* – being aware that such strength *must* involve "the reciprocal dependence of the 'good' and the 'wicked' drives"[141] – to feel unashamed, nay, even *confident*, in the face of their parasites' resentment as manifested in their moralists' massive guilt missiles? To get to the point of any kind of genuine victory over the enemies of their wealth and comfort, the people in the focal organizations must first conquer themselves. That is, they must move from a pleasure of wealth in terms of *contrast* (i.e., that the stakeholders don't have as much) to that of a sense of a fulfillment and emanation of one's powers.[142] The strong, or noble, define the good in terms of their own strength rather than by way of contrast, so they regard the weak as merely and secondarily *bad*. In contrast, the weak first define the strong as *evil* and then can only accept themselves as good by way of contrast, for they cannot find good in their weakness directly.

Can we expect the nobility of manner – that is, of *hoch Kultur* – to grow from the dank industrial realm, which, after all, lies below those of the kings and warriors in the Hindu caste system? Can a love of even competitors be possible? That is, can fat ruddy hands keep from swatting at anything that bites? This might be akin to expecting the newly rich used-car

dealer to *belong* to an *established* Country Club, even if he has managed to buy his way in. Nietzsche maintains that the "so-called industrial culture" of his day was "altogether the most vulgar form of existence that has yet existed."[143] Indeed, he writes of his time: "our modern, noisy, time-consuming industriousness, proud of itself, stupidly proud" has dissolved the religious instincts by educating us for 'unbelief.'[144] Far from the noise and buzzing of the "poisonous flies" of the market place have the creators of values always dwelt.[145] Any claim the industrial realm might have to being "culture" is extirpated, according to Nietzsche, by the salience of brute need that it caters to – whereby workers sell themselves to those "unknown and uninteresting" persons, luminaries of industry, who "probably have been too deficient so far in all those forms and signs of a *higher race* that alone make a *person* interesting."[146] Nietzsche is not pointing here to greed; rather, he is pointing to a lack of "higher manners," as well as of "notorious vulgarity." Industrialists, with their "fat ruddy hands," have kept themselves from legitimizing themselves as higher – as born to command.[147] Gallant debonairty cannot be bought or improvised; "one has to honor in it the fruit of long periods of time" (Ibid.). In short, the corporate gray suit (i.e., uniform) is a long way from the gentleman's blue sports coat.

The notion of something lying beyond the reach of *being managed* – thus, not being a commodity – must strike the luminaries of industry as odious indeed, especially if their legitimacy in being taken as *born* to command rather than having acquired their position by their more profane *utility* depends upon it. It is the relative arbitrariness in the industrialists' legitimacy that gives birth to the socialistic impulse, according to Nietzsche (Ibid.). In addition, I would wager it is this question of legitimacy that fuels their stakeholders' envy and resentment. It is only when the wealth of endless striving by fat ruddy hands is the basis of the focal organization that stakeholders can fail to recognize the mask as a mask and thus envy the focal organization.[148]

To the extent that Nietzsche is correct concerning "so-called industrial culture," people in focal business organizations will not be able to muster sufficient self-discipline to conquer themselves – for this the obedience of nobility would be necessary. Without it, they may well be in actuality stake-

holders of a hidden genuine nobility, the owning elite, who stand apart from mere managers at such a *pathos* of distance as would dwarf the number of light-years from the furthest star to Earth.[149]

In contrast to the nobility, the manufacturers and entrepreneurs of business view work as a means rather than an end in itself, fearing boredom more than work without pleasure; lesser natures cannot bear boredom: "to ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar, no less then work without pleasure."[150] Hence, they are apt to find in their work restless activity rather than an objective end (i.e., an end in itself) – using themselves, and perhaps others (i.e., managing), in effect. One must have sufficient spirit to know how to make use of the free time that one's wealth can purchase for oneself without succumbing to ennui; otherwise, one will always *continue* to strive after possessions – as a slave! – having this as one's strategy and entertainment in one's war against boredom.[151] It is only up to a certain point (i.e., a moderate amount) that possessions make men independent and free.[152] Beyond that point, wealth is in fact a mask: the product of spiritual dependence and poverty.[153] To be truly strong, according to Nietzsche, those in a focal organization must be of noble strength – being obedient to something higher than their own drive of restless activity. From the perspective of the noble spirit leading a firm, the firm's surfeit wealth overflows in strength rather than as an inducement to further endless striving after still more or to go after still more competitors, as though in a servile fashion. That is, to be noble, one must be *free*. Indeed, Nietzsche refers to coming philosophers, whose eugenic "great ventures" make use of whatever economic institutions are at hand.[154]

Conclusion

In *Reason in History*, Hegel argues that a moral whole is limited in that it must have above it a higher universality, which makes a moral whole disunited with itself. This means that any particular moral whole, and indeed all existing reality, is unstable and disunited. In world history, the succession of moral wholes involves the destruction of each preceding one. Hegel characterizes this process in terms of "momentous collisions between existing, acknowl-

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edged duties, laws, and rights and those possibilities which are adverse to this system, violate it, and even destroy its foundations and existence.''[155] Hegel construes historical individuals as catalysts in this process. They are able to see the very truth of their age and their world, and it is theirs to know the necessary next stage of their world, to make it their own aim through an inner spirit ''still hidden beneath the surface but already knocking against the outer world as against a shell, in order, finally, to burst forth and break it into pieces; for it is a kernel different from that which belongs to the shell'' (Ibid., p. 40).

Some will undoubtedly *react* with asperity to the collisions, while others will ''feel the irresistible power of their own spirit embodied'' in this harbinger of an as-of-yet *potential* moral whole (Ibid., p. 41). To be sure, future Nietzschean free spirits will undoubtedly break our then-to-be-old tablets to create still newer values. My intent has been to jar loose hitherto unquestioned precepts and assumptions that have been appreciably over-valued in the business ethics marketplace; I have sought to subject to critique even the value of *conviction* itself in our field – subtly exposing in the process our notion of truth *as a problem* – a notion that Nietzsche takes great pains to make transparent. He asks, ''what meaning would *our* whole being possess if it were not this, that in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a *problem*?''[156] That is, by revaluing downward our esteemed convictions, ''a *new problem arises:* that of the *value* of truth.''[157] Nietzsche claims that science and industrious restless activity, guises of the *fallen* philosopher, both rest on the same foundation – overestimating the value of truth in the belief that truth is ''inestimable and cannot be criticized'' (Ibid.).: Moralizers too, in barring their truth from *truth as a problem*, overestimate the value of truth. Therefore, I suggest that the *fallen* philosopher *qua* moralist and scientific-employee ultimately self-idolizes and loathes herself because she takes the value of truth as a given rather than as a problem. That she holds too dearly to her normative convictions, and indeed to the value of truth itself, and seeks to impose her ideology in the guise of science and industriousness are merely her palliative symptoms. She is far from being a free spirit, for she still has faith in truth (Ibid., p. 586).

Nietzsche claims that until modern times, the ascetic priest type has provided ''the repulsive and gloomy caterpillar form in which alone the philosopher could live and creep about.''[158] Nietzsche may well be over-generalizing, supposing *all* philosophy hitherto as necessarily world-denying, hostile to life, and suspicious of the senses. However, it does apply to those *fallen* philosophers who still cling to the ascetic priest figure, manifesting their subterranean will to power in white lab coats and grizzly suits, refusing all the while to metamorphose. Can those business ethicists who have crawled off *from* philosophy as ascetic priests *perish* and then *rise* from their stygian cocoon as winged philosophers in the fresh morning air? Can they overcome yet again their own apotheosis of the day and face instead a landless horizon on the open sea – free to *become who they are*: ratiocinating creators of values freed from even the *truth* of their most tyrannical instincts?

> ''Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you.''[159] Thus spoke Zarathustra.

Notes

[1] As a Nietzschean critique, this essay continues Nietzsche's use of *italics* as a stylistic dimension of argumentation using emphasis.

[2] F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 212, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 327).

[3] Ibid., Section 211, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 326).

[4] Ibid., Section 212, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 327).

[5] F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 8, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 545).

[6] Whereas the prudential rationale for business ethics being legitimate in schools of business has typically been based on the claims that the students will be more ethical in business or that any skills gained will enhance business performance, the business schools' criteria ought to conform with those of the college or university, and thus be based on *knowledge of*, rather than *efficacious skills for*, the phenomenon of business. The business ethics *philosopher's* viability in business schools is based on her philosophical knowledge (via ethical theories) of concepts pertaining to the phenomenon of business and her proficiency at philosophical analysis; she must thus demonstrate using philosophical analysis that her philosophical knowledge contributes to the general

knowledge by which we can *explain* (not merely describe!) the phenomenon of business. Furthermore, from the *external* standpoint of success *in* business activity (as well as consulting!), an explanatory knowledge of the phenomenon of business may well be far more *beneficial* in the long run than are the typical power-point presentations on skills oriented to "success." For an example of the prudential claim's typical assumptions, see Norman E. Bowie, Business ethics as a discipline: the search for legitimacy, in Freeman (1991, p. 35). Bowie goes so far as to suggest that it is proper to ask of *any* university course what *skills* it provides (p. 31). He cites the need for the "skill" of critical thinking (i.e., problem-solving), omitting the *higher* analytic and synthetic types. Bowie in effect reduces (or transposes) education (in)to vocation (i.e., a category mistake), projecting and inflicting his view on the entire university! That this intellectual illness has become nearly ubiquitous in the field of business ethics can be seen by noting the dearth of graduate (or even undergraduate!) ethics seminars in philosophy required in business ethics doctoral programs. Something is very, very wrong here. The plight of business ethics' troubled legitimacy in business schools has been brought on by the field itself – and yet how easily have its "ethicists" been able to point the finger *elsewhere* with *normative* impunity while they have mistakenly conflated their own academic field with *skills* in an effort to "fit in." Their business colleagues sense that they don't fit, without understanding why. Paradoxically, a chameleon never really belongs anywhere. The skills-trainers should follow Nietzsche's advice: become who you are.

7   Therefore, I take as dangerous Frederick's prescription of a search for "common elements that allow a bridging between the philosopher's evaluative insights and the empirically verified data base of the social scientist." To avoid a conflation of the two, it must be stressed that a bridge runs through the *distance* between two non-contiguous points. Essentially, in delimiting the field of business ethics *as a branch of ethics*, I point to the distance, which I shall argue dwarfs any common elements, between philosophy and the social sciences. See Frederick (1991, p. 59).

A related problem involves the unintended (or even worse, deliberate) coalescence of the fields of business ethics and business, government, and society. Note, for instance, the following textbook title: *Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management* (Carroll, 1996). This title implies that ethics reduces to societal norms and, moreover, that philosophy and social science are inherently enmeshed. This coalescence has been eventuated by reducing or fusing ethics to "society" in such ideological notions as corporate *social responsibility*. For example, Freeman depicts the societal level of business ethics as consisting of "questions of the relationships among the chief institutions of society." This error implies that "*ought*" consists of societal norms or mores, or, even worse, in descriptive accounts of economic, political, and social systems, rather than of philosophical principles. R. Edward Freeman, Introduction, in 1991, p. 4. While going beyond what can be done in the present paper, a clear delineation between the two fields is desperately needed, given such blatant disregard for boundaries.

8   Nietzsche notes the tendency of philosophers to "go astray" in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 5, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 202).

9   A literature review would be necessary to assess the extent to which the decadence has distended to endemic proportions. For purposes of the present essay, it is sufficient that the examples cited instantiate it. For surveys of the more salubrious work wherein more formal normative justifications are based on broad theories of philosophical ethics, see Brummer (1991) and Donaldson (1982). How fully the theories cited by these two authors are in fact based in philosophical analysis (including having epistemological and metaphysical legs) is a question worthy of further research. In the present essay, I critique Freeman's Kantian "foundation" for his stakeholder "theory," arguing that even such a philosopher drawing upon his native soil may well be doing so in a truncated fashion when engaged in business ethics. Why such otherwise strongly rooted philosophers would do so is the question at the core of this essay's project.

10   Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 200, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 301).

11   I have already intentionally exposed (infected?) you with a flavor of Nietzsche's writing. For example, he uses "cadaverous perfume" to refer to Schopenhauer, whose nihilism he came to find nauseating (another Nietzschean turn-of-phrase). Nietzsche uses olfactory and gustatory metaphors commonly and I would add "strategically," given his project of revaluing hitherto esteemed values by uncovering their squalid origins. My intent is to give a faithful rendering of how *Nietzsche* would critique some pernicious tendencies in our field; to expurgate some of his more acerbic language to palliate squeamish readers would detract from this aim because Nietzsche's choice of diction is salient to his method and goal, and thus to mine here. Smile, my *lieber* reader, this medicine is bitter though it too will be broken after it has done its salubrious duty. Also, remember that *essay* as coined by Montaigne comes from *essayer*, to try or experiment. Where it is too painful, it is my hope is that you will construct a sufficient distance, or perch, from which to *observe*

Nietzsche's breaking of old tablets at my hand, keeping in mind that the ultimate intent is to make us creators of our own values; open minds, free spirits, *new* philosophers, autonomous individuals – these are what Nietzsche strives toward, and for this new values must be created and old ones, undoubtedly sacred cows, must first be decimated via linguistic bombs that unsettle the pallid stomach. This essay is such a linguistic bomb, to which laughter is perhaps the best shelter. "Laughter I have pronounced holy; you higher men, *learn* to laugh!" Hence, Nietzsche's *Gay Science*.
F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, IV in Kaufmann (1982, pp. 407–8).
[12]   F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, I, Section 1, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 460).
[13]   Ibid., Preface, 6, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 456; see also Bk 5, Section 344, p. 284).
[14]   Ibid., Preface, 3, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 453).
[15]   F. Nietzsche (1974, Bk 5, Section 380, p. 342).
[16]   F. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, Section 2, in Kaufmann (1982: Penguin Books, p. 570).
[17]   F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, II, Section 12, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 515).
[18]   F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 259, in Kaufmann, (1968, p. 393).
[19]   Ibid., Section 259, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 393); F. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, in Kaufmann (1982, Section 6, p. 572).
[20]   F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 36, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 238).
[21]   Ibid., Section 39, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 239).
[22]   Nietzsche (1974, Preface, Section 3, p. 35).
[23]   Ibid., Section 2, p. 33.
[24]   Ibid., Bk 3, Section 120, p. 177.
[25]   Ibid., Bk 5, Section 345, p. 283.
[26]   F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 5, in Kaufmann (1968, pp. 202–203).
[27]   F. Nietzsche (1974, Preface, Section 3, p. 35).
[28]   Ibid., Section 2, p. 34.
[29]   Indeed, Freeman claims that the separation of the social sciences from philosophy leads to "arid pseudoscience or an unworkable political ideology." I argue in contrast that the conflation of these qualitatively different disciplines has led to precisely these results in the case of business ethics. R. E. Freeman, Introduction, in Freeman (1991, p. 5).
[30]   R. Edward Freeman, Introduction, in Freeman (1991, p. 5). In fact, Nietzsche claims that "the initial character of justice is the character of a trade," justice being "repayment and exchange on the assumption of an approximately equal power position." F. Nietzsche, *Human, All-Too-Human*, Vol. I, Section 92, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 148).

[31]   This scenario is similar to Nietzsche's depiction of the discrediting of the Abrahamic deity: this act has not yet dawned on us even though we ourselves have already done it by revaluing "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord" as pathological weakness (i.e., *ressentiment*) rather than divine fiat.
[32]   This Nietzschean phrase can be glossed as: the "will to be oneself, to stand out – what I call the *pathos of distance*, that is characteristic of every strong age." F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Skirmishes", Section 37, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 540).
[33]   F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 211, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 325).
[34]   F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 24, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 588).
[35]   Hume (1978, Bk III, Part I, Section 1).
[36]   Moore (1929, p. 20). For Moore's treatment of Bentham's use of *right*, see pp. 17–18.
[37]   F. Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part II (*Wanderer*), Section 179, p. 352–353).
[38]   This would involve an illusion of certainty, however, similar to when a weatherman says it will be 69 degrees next Tuesday (not 70!) or when a pilot says upon takeoff that the plane from New York to Paris will land at 5:57 p.m. Would it kill the weatherman to say "around 70", or the pilot to say "around 6"? – though perhaps even these *estimates* would *present* a façade of certainty. What sort of psychology *insists upon* and *believes in* such exactitudes, even where they are not justified?
[39]   Hume points to Plato and Leibniz as having an illusion of certainty in positing the existence of eternal moral verities having geometric certainty that even God must include in his Understanding. One could view this rationalist construal, as well as Hobbes' replacement scheme wherein a sovereign must have sufficient power to set down just what justice is, as sufficient evidence that the normative realm has been fought over *immer wieder* without any sense of resolution that might intimate an underlying substratum of certainty that could apply to quantitative analysis.
[40]   Bowie (1991, p. 31) includes economics as well. So it may be asked, moreover, whether it is not an excessive stretch to treat the social sciences as *sciences* at all.
[41]   There is also a MEV, or "Measure of Ethical Viewpoints" instrument, which can measure ethical theories *qua* character traits. See Brady and Wheeler (1996). Schminke et al. (1997) use it for a moderating variable having to do with the perceived fairness of decisions. Is that to say that fairness is justified or established through *descriptive* perception as influenced by *actual* character traits – as though *ought* is derivable from

psychological data? Hume might be resting in peace, but Kant is definitely spinning in his grave.

[42] Fraedich (1993, p. 215, see also p. 213).

[43] As another example, Wu ran a survey of Chinese managers' approval or disapproval of ethics in business (as if their approval would *justify* ethics) in spite of the fact that ''the respondents did not have a clear and right conception of business ethics.'' Perhaps we too need not even understand the content of our field to make judgments about it. Indeed, Hunt and Vitell see in the business ethics literature ''attempts to develop normative prescriptions before adequately understanding the research field itself.'' The business ethicist and the manager here may well be a case of the blind *attempting* to lead the blind even as their vicious circle is published *as knowledge*. See Wu (1999, p. 547) and Hunt and Vitell (1986).

[44] This is Nietzsche's expression for industrialists, whom he argues cannot be noble. Here I am using the expression to point to the social scientists in business schools, such as those in the field of business and society, whose dearth of nobility can be seen in their forays into business ethics without any philosophical knowledge (having in fact distain for it, as if it were ''the dark side''). Such hypocritical herd animals are in effect projecting their own meandering stygian nature, which they refuse to face head-on. ''Keep your quills within your own pens,'' the philosophers should tell them, ''and leave your fat ruddy hands off ethics, as you have not even bothered to study philosophy.''

[45] F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, II, Section 8, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 506).

[46] This may well explain why critical thinking (i.e., problem-solving) is often treated as the zenith of thinking in business schools even though analytical and synergistic thinking are in fact higher types.

[47] F. Nietzsche, (2005, Vol. II, Part II, Section 171, p. 350).

[48] Ibid., Part I, Section 392, p. 297.

[49] Ibid., Section 362, p. 293.

[50] Ibid., Vol. I, Section 279, p. 131.

[51] In other words, a faith in the unconditional will to truth; truth at any price (Nietzsche, 1974, Bk 5, Section 344, p. 281). The problem with such a faith, according to Nietzsche, is that it does not subject truth itself to criticism (i.e., take it as a problem). Hence, an adherent cannot be free of his or her conviction regarding truth itself or anything else.

[52] F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 14, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 558).

[53] Nietzsche (2005, Vol. I, Section 283, p. 132). One could turn to Sartre's theory of the anxiety of freedom to explain why a person would want to view his identity solely in terms of his vocation. Even though a waiter, for example, is in a sense a waiter, he also constitutes himself beyond that role in being able to make a judgment about it. He can make a judgment not to get up at 5 am to go to work, for example. He has that freedom by virtue of being human. Thus, he can only play at being the waiter. Anything more would be to deny the fact that he must constitute himself as being beyond his condition. Human beings are inherently both being-in-itself (in the vocational role) and being-for-itself (beyond that role), with a *nothingness* between them. Why would the waiter be tempted to ignore his own being-for-itself? Ignoring it avoids the anxiety that inheres in the sort of freedom in being-for-itself that allows him to simply walk away from his tasks, and indeed, from his very life at any moment. It is this ever-present *possibility* that creates the anxiety for him and his customers as well, who are counting on being served and do not want to think of the possibility that he might realize his being-for-itself and walk out after submitting their orders. This ever-present possibility can be masked by reducing his identity to his vocational role.

This account is in line with the genealogical origin I am proposing concerning the business ethicist who identifies herself excessively and inaccurately with the scientist and executive roles. This business ethicist ignores her being-for-itself, which she could otherwise use to cleave her identity from her (inappropriate) vocational roles. Her awareness of her being-for-itself is requisite for her to question the suitability of those roles for her, but she is afraid of it because it shows her the power she has to end her own existence – a power that is dangerous for her on account of her *ressentiment*. Her vicarious identification (being-in-itself) with others' roles keeps her rage from turning inward and decimating her. See J.P. Sartre (1992, pp. 102–103). For a positive account of identity from *doing* something, such as hammering nails, see Heidegger's (1962) *Being and Time*.

[54] F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, ''Reason'', Section 1, *in* Kaufmann (1982, p. 479).

[55] While a doctoral student at Pittsburgh, I took a seminar in the school of government on international political economy. The professor was an expert on the Japanese economy. He talked me into taking Japanese over the summer, as my one of my concentrations was environment of international business. However, the director of the business doctoral program replied to my request by observing that he doesn't let his school's doctoral students take things like golf over the summer. The professor of government mentioned this over lunch to the CEO of Unisis, who in turn was not at all

pleased, ironically, with the narrow "corporate" mentality at Pitt's business school. A business technician teaching in a business school is neither a scholar nor a businessman; rather, he is a herd animal with a bad smell. Why does arrogance often come with ignorance?
[56]   I was once left speechless after a veteran "professor" of Business at Wisconsin (Madison) told me that none of the faculty in his school reads books; instead, they read from the last ten years of their "*professional* journals." After the grizzled suit effectively admitted that he and his colleagues were not scholars, he went on to display his ignorance of what actual scholars do in fact do. He told me that the historians are the only faculty at his university who read books. Sadly, his university would be betting on its decadence that prides itself. Apparently professors there of philosophy, French, German, and English, among others, do not read books; perhaps their graduate students, who arrogantly and fallaciously view themselves as their professors' colleagues because they too teach, are the ones reading the books? To be sure, boundaries are problematic in a dysfunctional organization. So too is competence amid such arrogance.

After speaking with the grizzled suit, I wondered why he would refer to academic journals as "professional." I remembered that still another UW business "professor" had advised his doctoral students in his seminar that their empirical results should be acceptable to the firms surveyed so as not to interfere with future consulting opportunities. Perhaps their academic journals are in reality consulting advertisements. Such is the case at the Enron of Academia, at any rate.
[57]   See, for example, Abrams (1951), Bowan (1953), Eells (1960), and Chamberlain (1973). Indeed, it may well be that decadent business ethicists *reduce or transmute* ethical theories to "ethical ideologies," a lapse notable for what it may imply regarding the motive of the *fallen* business ethicist. The term is used in Schminke et al. (1997, p. 1192).
[58]   F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, I, 2, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 462).
[59]   Nietzsche (1974, Bk 5, Section 345, pp. 283). Accordingly, The most senile thing: "the ego is always hateful." Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part I, Section 385, p. 296).
[60]   F. Nietzsche (1974, Bk 3, Section 162, p, 199).
[61]   Representatives of this phase include Preston and Post (1975), Miles (1987), and Ackerman and Bauer (1976). Ackerman and Bauer discuss *how* managers can be *responsive* in managing problems in their external environment without losing power through social policy.
[62]   Admittedly, some business ethicists have picked up on this point, turning from the *responsiveness-tactic* emphasis to stress a philosophical principle. This is indeed a step toward their native philosophical ground, but these ef-

forts have not gone far enough because these ethicists have treated their respective principles as *prima facie* rather than as being in need of epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical support. For instance, if "justice" is to be used, is it of the Platonic/Leibnizian "eternal moral verity" sort known with mathematical certainty, or is it of the Epicurean/Hobbesian "artifice amid a natural moral vacuum" tradition? Is the "social contract" historical as in Hobbes or ideal as in Kant? Are "rights" Hobbesian or Lochean with respect to the state of nature? Simply stating a philosophical principle as if it were sufficient and then going off to strategize on social performance are not sufficient to make a business ethicist a philosopher.
[63]   Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 74).
[64]   Freeman (1984, p. 46). Even though Langtry points out that this could include practically anyone, Freeman (1984) characterizes entities such as banks, the media, environmental groups, governments, and unions as stakeholders. Freeman may have anticipated Langtry's objection, however. In 1983, Freeman had given besides this "wide" definition a "narrow" one as well, the latter stressing dependence for survival as being necessary for an entity to be considered a stakeholder. Either way, I argue that the vital point is the need for *justification* of any stakeholder's claim on the focal organization. See Langtry (1994), and Freeman and Reed (1983).
[65]   Freeman (1991, p. 5); Freeman (1999, p. 234). Freeman (1984, p. 43) states that his approach is "inherently 'managerial.' It is a 'theory'…about managerial behavior first, and organizational behavior, second."
[66]   Goodpaster's (1991, p. 62, *italics* added) thesis is a good example of this fallacy: "by expanding the list of those in whose trust corporate management must manage, we *thereby* introduce ethical responsibility into business decision-making." The "*thereby*" is meant to suffice as Goodpaster's claim (without support) that from a descriptive expansion we can get ethical responsibility.
[67]   Evans and Freeman (1988, p. 97).
[68]   Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 74). Jones and Wicks (1999, p. 209) echo them on this point.
[69]   Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 83) cite an "evolving notion of property" in denying the priority of fiduciary obligations to owners. Interestingly, Goodpaster and Holloran (1994) observe that we could legislate away the private sector status of the corporation – whether we would be morally justified in doing so would be the larger question.
[70]   F. Nietzsche (2005, Vol. I, Section 446, p. 163).
[71]   Ibid., Section 451, p. 165.
[72]   Ibid., Section 452, p. 166.
[73]   See F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, II, Section 6, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 501).

74 Ibid., pp. 498–499. In fact, *Schuld* can mean "debt," "fault," or "guilt." Furthermore, the English words "ought," "to own," and "to possess" come from the same root in Old English, "*agan*."

75 F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, II, Section 5, in Kaufmann (1968, pp. 500–501).

76 Ibid., III, Section 14, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 559).

77 Kaufmann (1968, p. 558). The weak view the strong (i.e., birds of prey) as evil. In contrast, Nietzsche argues that such 'evil' acts "are motivated by the drive to preservation, or, more exactly, by the individual's intention of procuring pleasure and avoiding displeasure; so motivated, however, they are not evil." Nietzsche (2005, Vol. 1, Section 99, p. 53).

78 F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 14, in Kaufmann (1968, pp. 558–559). They represent the greatest danger inasmuch as they say and feel "We already know what is good and just, and we have it too; woe unto those who still seek here!" F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, III, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 324).

79 F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 14, in Kaufmann (1968, pp. 558–559).

80 Ibid., II, Section 15, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 562).

81 Nietzsche refers to this psychology – that of such "improvers" of mankind – as the "great, the uncanny problem" that he has been pursuing the longest. How is it, for example, that they could come to dominate the strong *in any sense*? F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Improvers", Section 5, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 505).

82 F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Skirmishes", Section 14, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 523).

83 For instance, Nietzsche claims that the master and slave moralities can occur alongside each other in the same soul. F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 260, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 394).

84 F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, Preface, 5, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 455).

85 Ibid., III, 11, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 553).

86 Ibid., 13, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 556).

87 According to Nietzsche, the weak have more spirit – one must need it to acquire it – meaning care, patience, cunning, simulation, great self-control, and every sort of mimicry. F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Skirmishes", Section 14, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 523).

88 F. Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part I, Section 33, p. 223).

89 F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 9, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 206).

90 According to Nietzsche, the ascetic priest "enjoys feeling like a 'savior' and letting himself be reverenced as one." F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 17, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 565).

91 Regarding Christian priests and their Redeemer who has them in fetters, Nietzsche states: "Would that someone would yet redeem them from their Redeemer!" F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 203).

92 Evan and Freeman (1988, p. 103, *italics* added).

93 Hill and Jones (1992, *italics* added).

94 Alkafaji (1989, p. 36, *italics* added).

95 Carroll (1996, p. 72).

96 F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, 23, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 582).

97 Ibid., 14, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 559).

98 Ibid., 12, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 554).

99 Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part I, Section 33, p. 223). "Sitting in moral judgment should offend our taste." Nietzsche (1974, Bk 4, Section 334, pp. 266).

100 F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Improvers", Section 5, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 505). Nietzsche thus concludes that in having a great goal, one is superior to justice and one's judges. (Nietzsche, 1974, Bk 3, Section 267, pp. 219).

101 F. Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part II, Section 19, p. 310).

102 Ibid., Part I, Section 64, p. 228.

103 F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 9, in Kaufmann (1968, pp. 205–6).

104 Hume (1988, Essay I, *Of the Different Species of Philosophy*, p. 2).

105 Ibid., pp. 2–3.

106 Ibid., p. 5.

107 F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, III, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 305).

108 F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 292, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 420).

109 F. Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part II, Section 22, p. 311).

110 F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, II, Section 11, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 511). Nietzsche is thus in opposition to the views of Plato and Leibniz, who hold that justice is an eternal moral verity rather than being created by fiat by the powerful. To Nietzsche, justice proper is simply that the strong are more powerful than the weak. What we moderns typically think is justice is limited in Nietzsche's view to being between parties of roughly similar power. Such parties realize that devising just agreements that might hold them against their will is practical.

Nietzsche's view of justice thus fits with the tradition of Epicurus and Hobbes rather than Plato and Leibniz. Whereas the latter two risk reducing justice to mathematical certainty, the former two (and Nietzsche) risk making justice quite arbitrary. Perhaps justice does not have mathematical certainty, nor is it necessarily definable as the interests of the more powerful. It seems to me that

the major question to be answered regarding justice is whether it goes beyond giving what is due and not harming others to include *caritas sapientis seu benevolentia universalis* ("the charity of the wise, that is universal benevolence"). This definition, which Leibniz pulls from Cicero's highest level of Roman justice, fuses strands of Pauline "charity" (from I Corinthians xiii), Platonic "wisdom" (the rule of the wise), and Augustinian *bona voluntas* (from *De Libero Arbitrio*), according to Prof. Riley. This sense of justice cannot come from Nietzsche's (or Hobbes') justice of the stronger over the weaker or as a contract between two relatively strong parties. The key may well be whether and *why* human beings are deserving of the good-Samaritan sort of justice. Kant would cite our rational nature as being worthy as an objective end of not being treated merely as a means, and Leibniz would point to the degree to which we share in divine perfection as deserving of love. What, then, of Nietzsche's autonomous individual who has overcome his most tyrannical instinct and chosen to go under? Is such a person *deserving* only of justice as of power and contract? Yet Nietzsche does not give us the tools to sufficiently answer this question.

[111]	F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 259, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 393).
[112]	F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, I, Section 13, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 481).
[113]	F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 62, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 266).
[114]	"The cleavage between man and man, states and states, the plurality of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out – what I call the *pathos of distance*, that is characteristic of every strong age." Thus, "equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal" – *this* would be the "true slogan of justice." F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Skirmishes", Sections 37 and 48, in Kaufmann (1982, pp. 540 and 553).
[115]	F. Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part II, Section 29, p. 315).
[116]	F. Nietzsche (1974, Bk 3, Section 120, p. 177).
[117]	F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II 3, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 202).
[118]	F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, II, Section 10, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 508).
[119]	Ibid; Ibid., I, Section 10, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 475).
[120]	F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, IV, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 351).
[121]	F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 7, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 542).
[122]	F. Nietzsche, 1967, Section 957.
[123]	F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 260, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 395).
[124]	F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Skirmishes", Section 38, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 542).
[125]	Nietzsche (1974, Bk 4, Section 297, pp. 239).
[126]	Ibid, Section 296, p. 238.
[127]	Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, Walter Kaufmann, trans., NY (1974): Vintage Books, Bk 3, Section 266, pp. 219.
[128]	F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 41, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 242).
[129]	Reginster (2006, p. 192); F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 257, in Kaufmann (1968).
[130]	Nietzsche (1974, Bk 5, Section 382, p. 347).
[131]	F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 177).
[132]	Ibid., III 3, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 310).
[133]	F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 27, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 597).
[134]	F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 127).
[135]	This is quite an indictment on Nietzsche, who wrote "I do not like the 'New Testament,' that should be plain." F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 23, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 580). Further: "What is more harmful than any vice? Active pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity." F. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, Section 2, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 570).
[136]	F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, IV in Kaufmann (1982, p. 439).
[137]	Ibid., II, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 244).
[138]	F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, II, Section 2, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 495).
[139]	F. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, Section 35, in Kaufmann (1982): Penguin Books, pp. 608–609; see also Section 39, p. 612.
[140]	F. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, Section 41, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 616).
[141]	F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 23, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 221).
[142]	Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part I, Section 304, p. 282).
[143]	Nietzsche (1974, Bk 1, Section 40, p. 107).
[144]	F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 58, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 259).
[145]	F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I, in Kaufmann (1982, pp. 163–164).
[146]	Nietzsche (1974, Bk 1, Section 40, pp. 107–108).
[147]	*The Gay Science* (1974, Bk 1, Section 40, pp. 107–108).
[148]	Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part I, Section 310, pp. 283–284).
[149]	Ibid., Vol. I, Section 440, p. 162.
[150]	Nietzsche (1974, Bk 1, Section 42, pp. 108).

151 Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part I, Section 310, pp. 283–284).
152 Ibid., Section 317, p. 284.
153 Nietzsche (2005, Vol. II, Part I, Section 310, pp. 283–284).
154 F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Section 61, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 262).
155 Hegel (1953, III, 2b, pp. 38–39).
156 This problem entails revaluing the conception of God wherein God is truth, truth being divine. F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 27, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 597; see also Section 24, p. 588). Moreover, the ''will to truth requires a critique – let us thus define our own task – the value of truth must for once be experimentally *called into question*.'' (Ibid., III, Section 24, p. 589). This *essay* (i.e., *essayer*) is an experiment in this sense, using the topic of *fallen* business ethicists as a means for this ''meta-purpose.''
157 F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, III, Section 24, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 589).
158 Ibid., Section 10, in Kaufmann (1968, p. 552).
159 F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I, in Kaufmann (1982, p. 190).

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