



## Correction: The hard limit on human nonanthropocentrism

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Accepted: 19 July 2024

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**Correction:** *AI & SOCIETY* (2021) 37:49–65  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01182-4>

In the published article the following text was incorrectly formatted and processed as numbering section should be processed as special quotes in the following pages

In page 4

“Humans are thought of as members of the Earth’s community of life, holding that membership on the same terms as apply to all the non-human members. The Earth’s natural ecosystems as a totality are seen as a complex web of interconnected elements, with the sound biological functioning of each being dependent on the sound biological function of the others. Each individual organism is conceived of as a teleological center of life, pursuing its own good in its own way.

Whether we are concerned with standards of merit or with the concept of inherent worth, the claim that humans by their very nature are superior to other species is a groundless claim and, in the light of elements (1), (2), and (3) above, must be rejected as nothing more than an irrational bias in our own favor. (p. 518)”

In page 9

P1:If action A would involve so great a sacrifice that it is unreasonable to ask, and in cases of severe conflict of interest, unreasonable to require person X to abide by, then person X is not morally required to do action A.

P2:Action A would involve so great a sacrifice that it is unreasonable to ask, and in cases of severe conflict of interest, unreasonable to require person X to abide by.  
C:Therefore, person X is not morally required to do action

And last paragraph

It is not that Sterba sees no use at all for theory. For he thinks morality is rationally justified. It constitutes a reasonable compromise between the egoistic principle “each person ought to do what best serves his or her overall self-interest” and pure altruism, as in “each person ought to do what best serves the overall interest of others” (pp. 14–15). The rational approach to cases of conflict is to look for non-question-begging solutions, which means that neither egoistic nor altruistic motives are ruled out in advance. High-ranking altruistic reasons should have priority over low-ranking self-interested reasons and vice versa (p. 22). ... Similarly, in conflicts between anthropocentric and non-anthro58 pocentric reasons, one needs to find non-questionbegging compromises (p. 60). (pp. 189–190).15

The original article has been updated.

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The original article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01182-4>.

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