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Memorials and Marching: Archaeological Insights into Segregation in Contemporary Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT

Since the Belfast Agreement was signed in 1998, marking the official end of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, analysis has mainly focused on compromising politicians and the moves towards normalization. Whilst high-level political resolutions are significant, this article argues that there is a need to explore how the more mundane but insidious materializations of societal abnormality have been ignored by politicians, but are meaningful in understanding the post-conflict context. The continuing material presences of segregation in working-class communities, which commonly take the form of ethnic enclaves divided by abandoned interfaces and monumental walls, reveals a longstanding lack of engagement with this repercussion of the Troubles. Of particular interest are evolving commemorative and memorialization practices in Nationalist and Loyalist communities that demonstrate the impact of physical segregation on sustaining singular understandings of the recent past.

Introduction

Recent interest in the cardinal points of north, east, south, and west reveals how conceptions of geographical directions have moved beyond location to considering how they relate to wider perceptions, prejudices, and expectations. In an increasingly global world, “north/south” divides have often been conceived in socioeconomic and political terms, with the most developed parts of the world defined as the “Global North” (in Brandt’s [1980] visualization this included prosperous “southern” nations, such as Australia and New Zealand). However, the north can also be conceived as a cold, liminal, and marginalized place disenfranchised from the central core. In Ireland, a small but diverse island troubled as much as shaped by its history, the characteristics of the cardinal points have been important in oral storytelling traditions. Each province has traditionally aligned with a cardinal point, with the

northern province, Ulster, being characterized in the *dinnseanschar* (meaning “lore of place”) poem *Ard Ruide* as haughty, warlike, and the seat of “battle valour.” This article aims to explore the north of Ireland as a place that has transitioned from one conception of north to the other—being central to conceptions of the global north in the 19th century, when it was an engineering and shipbuilding node in the British Empire, to an increasingly Othered and liminal entity due to the shifting locales of the industrial world and a long-term sectarian conflict. This article will argue that, far from drifting from one conception to another, the province has been reconceptualized in ways to marginalize it from both its Irish and British contexts. This has been done in order to allow official detachment from its complicated, sectarian conflict and its increasingly peripheral post-industrial, post-Cold War role. The repercussions of this Othering continue today, with societal problems still largely unaddressed and materially manifest in a faltering peace process.

The Northern Irish Troubles (ca. 1968–ca. 1998) have been predominantly characterized by violent conflict, often taking the form of bombings and gun attacks against individuals, groups, and communities. In contrast, one of its ongoing consequences—increasing societal segregation based on religious/ethnic identity—has been a secondary concern, both during the conflict and since its official end in 1998 (*Belfast Agreement* 1998). Whilst the “two communities”—broadly identified as Loyalist/Unionist/Protestant and Republican/Nationalist/Catholic—have traditionally separated at times of instability, the separation increasing “more in bad times than it eases in good times” (Hepburn 2001:93), working-class segregation became the de facto norm during the Troubles. This situation has continued into the immediate post-conflict context, with segregated enclaves—often physically marked by substantial dividing walls, derelict interfaces, and identifying murals—enduring, if not expanding, in urban working-class areas. Indeed, the districts that evidence the most complete segregation are often those of government-funded social

housing, highlighting that segregation is not only officially recognized but also funded (Jarman and O'Halloran 2001:4). Such a state of affairs shows that, despite high-level political narratives of societal moves toward normalization, there is a lack of publically articulated acceptance that a segregated working class is a form of abnormality that can be solved.

Conceptions of "the North"—a shorthand not only for Northern Ireland but also its position as abnormal and peripheral compared to the normalized core of the UK and Irish states—are central to understanding how and why it was marginalized. As a cultural and social entity, Northern Ireland is an anomaly. Simultaneously British and Irish, its placement—at the northeast corner of the island of Ireland—ensures it is the only part of the UK sharing a land border with another sovereign state, the Republic of Ireland. While being physically isolated from the larger island of Great Britain, there is also the issue of contested sovereignty, as a substantial minority of the population continues to self-identify as Irish, despite being partitioned from the rest of the island in the 1920s. Conversely, from an Irish perspective, one can argue that Northern Ireland is equally an oddity. As well as having strong links to Great Britain dating back at least to the Plantations of Ulster in the 17th century, Emyr Estyn Evans has argued that due to topographical factors, Northern Ireland has always been isolated and marginal within the island (Evans 2005). Therefore, it can be suggested that Northern Ireland has dual peripherality and, as such, is a "North" that is doubly Othered from both a British and Irish perspective.

The peripherality of Northern Ireland has been multifaceted and has increased over time to include social, cultural, economic, and geographical aspects. Since the waning of its historically strong industrial base and the strategic importance of its location during the Cold War, Northern Ireland has become an economically and strategically peripheral "Irish" part of Britain. Likewise, the increasing years as a separate political entity with a pronounced, if partial, antipathy to the republic has resulted in it becoming a conceptually isolated, "British" part of Ireland. The complexity inherent in its existence ensured that on partition it was allowed internal self-government within the UK with little external interference until the outbreak of the Troubles.

In the interim, Northern Ireland was effectively a one-party state, self-conceived as a Protestant entity, which legislated in order to protect the majority's position (Bew et al. 1979:vii). By the 1960s the predominantly Catholic civil-rights movement increasingly demanded changes to what they perceived to be a sectarian state. As violent clashes grew more pronounced—and society more unstable—direct rule from the UK was eventually imposed in 1972. Northern Ireland was already marginalized within both national identities and, with the onset of serious conflict, was quickly categorized as an unexplainable, illogical, and irresolvable problem. With no foreseeable end to the conflict, the unexplainable "North" narrative grew, allowing high-level politics to focus on limiting violent conflict, rather than engaging with the less spectacular, but equally troubled, societal relations.

Emphasizing moves toward societal normalization is a central feature of contemporary Northern Irish politics and is often directly linked to effective peace maintenance and economic prosperity (Portland Trust 2007). However, for a society to move toward "normal," there is an inbuilt presumption that previous relations were "abnormal," and this was not always explicitly expressed in the language used about the Northern Irish conflict. Although the violence was not portrayed as normal, it was not presented as abnormal in a way that was logical, explainable, and, ultimately, resolvable. As Neil Jarman (1997:1) has commented, the Northern Irish conflict has been too easily accepted as unsolvable, due to the conception of the society as "a primitive or backward state that in turn perhaps makes their irrational, bottomless memory understandable." The Troubles have been portrayed, particularly through government statements and the British media, as an irreparable "two community" issue that accepts the inevitability of conflict. Following the work of Nick Vaughan-Williams (2006:513–526), I suggest that there is a need to move beyond this acceptance of an unavoidable clash between two irreconcilable communities. Instead of following a narrative that "reproduces rather than unravels sinews of conflict," there is a need to explore why abnormal societal relations were accepted and allowed to proliferate.

This article will initially explore the Othering of Northern Ireland by examining how the early stages of the conflict were presented in the British media—often emphasizing its position as an aberration within the UK state, with a tendency toward unexplainable, internecine violence—before taking a more contemporary perspective and exploring ongoing materialization of societal abnormalities that have developed due to segregation that remain into the peace process. Two case studies—on memorialization and commemoration of divisive public memory—will be used to explore how abnormal societal relations have allowed singular and exclusive responses to the past to occur in the post-conflict context. This article aims to move analyses of the Northern Irish Troubles and peace process away from political rhetoric and instead focus on how narratives of “normalization” have ignored the material repercussions of officially sanctioned and continuing segregation.

This is not a normal society
—Mervyn Rees, Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland

Despite pronouncements by the British government and media that Northern Ireland was an abnormal society (*Guardian* 1974b)—thereby acting as justification for irregular judiciary and governance—the causes and possible resolutions of this abnormality were infrequently discussed or dissected in any detail. Newspaper reports from the time—which are an important means of exploring how the government presented its actions and general-public conceptions of the conflict—show a reticence in discussing the historical trajectories, contemporary nature, or the multiple facets of the Northern Irish Troubles. That the violence was rooted in a religious conflict of long vintage, rather than having any ongoing ethnic, social, economic, or political aspects, was generally accepted without further consideration of its evolving and multidimensional nature. This inability, or unwillingness, to engage with the complicated nature of the society, the uneven impacts of increasing peripherality both economically and politically, and historical legacies of dual identities in Northern Ireland, ensured that the conflict was often presented as an

unfathomable and even unrelated selection of random violent acts.

One example of this treatment is evident in the reporting of the burning of Long Kesh Internment Camp by Republican inmates after a sustained period of prisoner protests in October 1974. This culmination of rising tensions at the prison—following months of protests relating to irregular judicial procedures, use of internment, and poor living conditions—was reported by the UK-based media as a decontextualized, random event. Reports in the London-based *Telegraph* (1974) dealt with the burning of the internment camp as separate from external conflict. Escalations at the prison were presented as almost farcically irrational: “There have been several threats to burn down the camp because visiting has been banned after disturbances by prisoners complaining about their food.”

During the election campaign of 1974, the then Manchester-based *Guardian* newspaper argued that the Troubles were not an electoral issue, due to the cross-party consensus that “the days when an English politician could credibly claim to have a neat solution have passed” (*Guardian* 1974a). While the media are naturally more interested in the spectacular—“in burning buses [more] than building bridges” (Douglas 1998:171)—these editorials provide insights into how the conflict was popularly perceived. It is clear from the broadsheet media that the Northern Irish conflict was treated with little more than bemusement that tried not to challenge the readership, but rather to confirm their misconceptions that there was an inherent irrationality to the violence. Liz Curtis (1984) has highlighted what she saw as ongoing flaws in the British media’s treatment of the Northern Irish conflict, stating that the British media did not contextualize the Troubles for the British public, nor report incidents in an unbiased way, due to a number of factors. She specifically highlighted their desire to avoid accusations of “helping the terrorists,” to show support for the army and administration, to maintain their popularity by reinforcing existing public perceptions, and the desire of the national newspapers to follow government policy (Curtis 1984:53,69,93,136).

The conflict in Northern Ireland was, therefore, popularly presented outside the

province as a nonsensical, irresolvable series of largely unconnected, random acts of terrorist violence. This had a number of serious repercussions. Increasing perceptions of Northern Ireland as an Othered societal anomaly within the UK justified as a necessity the British government's introduction of highly contentious legislation, such as internment without trial. At the time the nominally left-wing *Guardian* (1971) newspaper reservedly supported the introduction of such legislation as "hateful, repressive and undemocratic. In the existing Irish situation, most regrettably, it is also inevitable." This "inevitable" north narrative influenced high-level politics, the judiciary, the media, and the general population by presenting the society as being unresolvably abnormal and thereby facilitating the maintenance of longstanding community divisions. The mass movements of working-class communities to form ethnic enclaves and the erection of so-called peace walls (monumental barriers erected between antagonistic communities; see McAtackney [2011]) facilitated material divisions. Although ethnic conflict had a long history in the province, the earliest official materializations of divisions took place alongside the Troubles. These walls were reinforced and broadened insidiously during the conflict as a direct result of government concentration on preventing violence, while simultaneously disengaging with the societal relations that created it. Their appearance and continued development reflect the authorities' passive policy that "responded to a divided community by giving way to its preferences" (Hepburn 2001:95); a situation that continues largely unchallenged into the post-conflict context.

Materialization of Societal Segregation: The Peace Walls of Belfast

"Wall Studies" is a growing, interdisciplinary field that explores walls as a manifestation that ideologically, as well as physically, divides people. This field has mainly focused on a number of high-profile political examples, such as Berlin, Nicosia, and, most recently, Israel/Palestine (Baker 1993; Hanafi 2004; Demetriou 2007), but also investigates the use of walls as a social control device in nonconflict situations

(e.g., Blakeley and Snyder [1997] and gated communities in the United States). Belfast is an atypical example, for, unlike many of the more famed case studies of divided cities, it has partitions that are partial, largely hidden, and do not appear on maps (in theory, they are temporary constructions). In keeping with the lack of engagement with the abnormal societal relations in Northern Ireland, the walls that divide Belfast have been historically ignored. While studied by a small number of researchers—in particular, Boal (1994, 2002), Hepburn (2001), and Jarman (1993, 2002)—their critiques have had little impact on official policy. Their physical presence has been largely ignored by those who do not live beside them, but gradually their "social weight and impact has increasingly overshadowed their physical might" (Marcuse 1994:41), which necessitates consideration.

The abnormal societal relations in Northern Ireland that peace walls symbolically materialize were allowed to fester silently and grow as a passive response to the increasingly violent intercommunity interactions of the late 1960s. The first peace walls to take material form were located at the meeting points between the Catholic/Nationalist Lower Falls and the Protestant/Loyalist Shankill Roads as a direct result of major civil unrest that lasted for a number of days in mid-August 1969 (Mulholland 2001:72–74). Thousands of families were forced to flee their burnt-out homes (an estimated 1,850 between July and late September 1969) (Coogan 1995:78), leaving behind a landscape of derelict houses and "walls of corrugated sheets of iron bolted to metal posts sunk in concrete" (Mulholland 2001:73). This inhospitable environment became a semipermanent liminal zone dividing the two areas to the present day. As these initially temporary divisions became de facto permanent, they altered the appearance and interactions of the interface and mixed areas in the Lower Falls/Shankill. More importantly, they also created a precedent for dealing with fracturing community relations. Since that time the peace walls have continued to grow—both in length and height—and now over 88 segments of wall stand in Belfast alone (Community Relations Council [2009]:3). Few of the peace walls have been taken down since erection, and they are

now the only infrastructure from the Troubles that has continued to grow in the post-conflict context (Jarman 2002:287).

The continued presence of peace walls is not only a physical manifestation of abnormal society relations; close examination of their material forms hint at the complexities of this abnormality. Peace walls do not take the form of a replicated template that has the same appearance or meaning through time and space; they are not a continuous, monumental wall like the Berlin Wall, or a uniform construction project like the Separation Barrier in Israel/Palestine. Their physical differences reflect not only their different origins, but also their varied functions and origins; they even influence interpretations about what constitutes a peace wall (Jarman 2002:285). The idiosyncratic materiality of peace walls highlights that difference is at the root of understanding them, as Margrethe Lauber (2010) suggests, they are a “particular type of barrier existing in very specific circumstances, meeting a variety of special needs and requiring a host of dedicated participants.”

To locate these divisions, the intrepid “dark tourist” (Lennon and Foley 2000) would often need to be guided to them. They are not in traditional tourist areas and do not always take an overtly physical form. Peace walls vary from being taller than the two-story houses that sit alongside them, to being gated, abandoned, liminal areas. Some are solid brick walls, or more commonly have a brick or concrete base with higher planes of corrugated iron or transparent fencing. Others may not immediately conform to expectations of dividing walls, being smaller structures with decorative elements that follow existing road layouts. They can simply be an abandoned interface between opposing communities or be wedged directly behind housing projects. They are not located in the city center, instead they divide mainly deprived, working-class areas of social housing.

Their landscaping can differ dramatically, depending on which side of the wall one resides (for example, the Shankill Graffiti Wall at Cepar Street in comparison with Bombay Street) (Figures 1 and 2). This difference in form can reflect the different agents who constructed them (including

the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, Belfast City Council, and Department of the Environment), their time of construction, and the reason for construction. For although sporadic intercommunity violence is usually the reason for these partitions being requested, they can also reflect a depopulating community attempting to prevent incursions by “the other side.” Peace walls do not simply prevent violent altercations, they channel *all* interactions and are fundamentally about power relations: the power to exclude and include. As such, they have multiple communications, and like all walls “their very existence bears evidence to the limitations, the insecurities, the fears that lead to their construction” (Marcuse 1997:104). However, the lack of acknowledgment and engagement with these manifestations of ongoing societal segregation has facilitated further materializations of division. Two case studies from the post-conflict context reveal how ignoring segregation has resulted in the growth of one-sided Nationalist memorials to the Troubles and the pretense of rebranding the Loyal Order commemorative parades as inclusive events in the Loyalist community.

Nationalist Memorialization of the Troubles

Although the Troubles in Northern Ireland officially ended in 1998 with the signing of the Belfast Agreement by all the province’s major political parties, how to deal with the recent past was not fully addressed. Indeed, it has been argued that one of the reasons that the agreement was signed by all the major parties and approved by the British and Irish governments was due to its lack of clear formulations regarding how this might be achieved (McGrattan 2009:168). However, the official lack of engagement with how society can move forward and how it deals with violent, internecine conflict in the recent past has left a significant question mark over a number of areas that relate to processes of normalizing society. Cillian McGrattan (2009:164) identifies the major unresolved issues as “how the north should be administered, how and indeed whether past injustices should be dealt with, how victims’ needs can be met and how the past should be remembered and explained.”



FIGURE 1. Shankill Graffiti Wall, Cepar Street, Belfast. (Photo by author, 2011.)



FIGURE 2. Clonard Martyrs Memorial Garden, Bombay Street, Belfast. (Photo by author, 2011.)

The latter issue, how the past is remembered, has evidently not stayed in a vacuum for long. Certainly, the desire to remember and memorialize the past has quickly become the subject of unofficial heritage in those areas most impacted by the conflict.

There is a long history of commemorating and memorializing past conflicts in Ireland that is not unique to the recent past or to the north of the island. The ongoing political nature of much of Ireland's modern history has ensured that remembering the past is a politically loaded gesture. As David Lowenthal has suggested: "The Irish do not 'live in the past'; rather, Ireland's history 'lives in the present'" (Lowenthal 1985:250). In recent years, there have been many commentaries and debates about the intentions and processes involved in more contemporary remembrances of the past, particularly those connected to violent conflict (e.g., the 1798 Uprising) or "natural" disaster (e.g., the Great Irish Famine). This has often been accompanied by scathing critiques of the evidence of "bad history" and "bad memory" (O'Grádá 2001), and overly enthusiastic commercialization (Beiner 2005) that have been implicated in the "heritagization" of events that were once too sensitive to be remembered collectively. The difference that can be seen in the post-Troubles context of Northern Ireland is that the impetus for memorialization comes solely from elements within the communities in which they are located and are often rigidly separate from—if not contesting—what Laurajane Smith (2006) has called "authorised heritage discourse." Furthermore, this desire to memorialize is occurring at a very early stage in the post-conflict context, rather than the traditional 50-, 100-, or even 200-year anniversaries.

Elizabeth Crooke (2005:223–235) has identified the use of unofficial heritage in Northern Ireland as a multi-method means of dealing with numerous contemporary communities' needs. She has suggested a number of factors behind the community impulse to "heritage-ize" their local past without official assistance or validation, including a long-term disconnection from official narratives, a vacuum left by the lack of official engagement with the recent past, flexibility of "community" identities and importance to "construct a sense of place, evoke shared memories and create a collective

identity" (Crooke 2005:225). While Crooke's case study explores the curation of a People's History Initiative, the creation of Nationalist memorials follows a similar disengagement with official narratives, but can not be so easily categorized due to the wide variety of creators, physical forms, objectives, and expected life-cycles. Even attempting to create a database of memorials is problematic due to their unofficial nature, the categorization of what constitutes a memorial, and the ever-increasing number of additions.

In August 2006 Elisabetta Viggiani published an online survey of memorials in West Belfast and enumerated at least 30 forms of Nationalist memorial/plaque/commemorative mural existing in the area (Viggiani 2006). This number has undoubtedly increased significantly in recent years, not only due to the ongoing desire to commemorate a variety of events and people, but also due to the popularity of creation of these memorials to mark important anniversaries. 2011 was the 30th anniversary of the Hunger Strikes, which occurred in the Long Kesh/Maze prison in 1981. The prolonged nature of the Hunger Strikes and the deaths of 10 men who took part ensure that they remain a seminal event of the Troubles to many Nationalists and, as such, are widely remembered.

In commemorating the Hunger Strikes in 2011, Troubles memorials have appeared throughout the province, often conflating this event with other local deaths during the conflict, as well as other significant events. The memorials have taken a number of different forms, including, but not limited to, commemorative wall murals; "mural"-type printed boards, including representations of the dead; gardens of remembrance (often with associated sculptural elements); plaques; wooden crosses; and freestanding monuments. The swiftness of their appearance not only tells of a desire to remember those who died or were injured through the course of the conflict, but also of contemporary concerns with controlling narratives about how they are presented and remembered. Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all Nationalist memorials, however, one example will be used to reveal how memorials are being used to promote one-sided and deliberately partial memories of the conflict that reflect the longstanding and ongoing segregation.

Nationalist Memorialization: Clonard Martyrs' Memorial Garden

Perhaps the memorial that best reflects a segregated perspective of the Troubles is the Clonard Martyrs' Memorial Garden, which is located on Bombay Street in Nationalist West Belfast. This memorial is a significant presence in the street, occupying the only open space and taking the form of a brick, tripartite structure with two associated wall murals. It was created in 2000 by the Greater Clonard Ex-Prisoners Association, with memorial plaques added in March 2001 (during a commemorative event associated with the anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising). This memorial is significant for a number of reasons that are pertinent to this article, including the event that is being memorialized, the Ex-Prisoners Association's reasons for creating the memorial, and the location.

The Clonard Martyrs' Memorial Garden, like many that have appeared in recent years, is spatially specific. Bombay Street is significant not only in the Clonard area, but also because of the inadvertent role that it played in the origins of the Troubles. On 14–15 August 1969, rioting occurred in the general vicinity leading to the burning of this predominantly Catholic street by a Protestant mob. One teenager died during the disturbances, and many of the residents were forced to flee their homes. Although this was one of many events of its kind afflicting both communities at this time, it resonated with the Nationalist community for a number of reasons. It came to represent: (1) the realized threat of the Protestant mob, (2) evidence that the security forces were not going to protect them, (3) the long-repressed desire by Catholics for social justice, and (4) the resurrection of the use of physical force by Nationalists through the remobilization of the IRA (Mulholland 2001:88). It is also important in the history of segregation in the province, as it was this event that prompted the first semipermanent peace walls to be constructed between the Lower Falls and Shankill Roads. Since that time the street has been re-landscaped by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, so that, although the memorial marks the spot where the houses were burnt, the street no longer follows the layout that it did in 1969.

That a permanent memorial structure has been placed at this location within a very short time

of the 1998 agreement, indicates its importance to the local community—and more specifically to the Ex-Prisoners Association that built it. However, it also has more sinister undertones. The plaques and accompanying booklet created by the Greater Clonard Ex-Prisoners Association detail the consequences of the Troubles in the area through lost lives of both active combatants and ordinary residents. Nevertheless, they do not attempt to include or make any reference to those who lived on the other side of the wall, a group equally impacted by the Troubles. The only reference to the Loyalist community, which resides one street away, is as “Loyalist murder gangs” who were “surrogates” of the “state forces” (Greater Clonard Ex-Prisoners Association, [2010]). This singular interpretation of the impact of conflict on the area could only occur if those who lived literally side-by-side were physically—as well as mentally—removed from each other's vision. Likewise, members of the local community who were murdered by “their own side” as internal enemies, informers, or “British agents” are completely unrepresented, further skewing the accepted narratives of public memory of the recent turbulent past in this area.

The cultural references of the memorial are also important in revealing their aim to authenticate and legitimize Nationalist involvement in the prolonged conflict. The inclusion of “victims” beyond the timescales of the Troubles—from 1916 to 2004—adds longevity and links to previous, legitimized conflicts, such as the Easter Rising of 1916. The inclusion of traditional, Celtic iconography—such as Celtic crosses—and the deposition of a Catholic statue in the central memorial room (Figure 3) references pre-British Ireland and Catholicism. Interestingly, whilst these are traditional bedfellows in Irish nationalism, they sit rather uneasily with the pronounced socialism of the ex-prisoner group that created the memorial. Furthermore, the haunting images in the associated murals—of the street before it was burnt, a representation of it being burnt, and the faces of some of those who died in the area—add a localized, emotive, and human context to the memorial. On closer inspection, this selective collage of Troubles imagery is problematic. The tying together of active combatants who died alongside civilians who were injured or murdered through the conflict allows the creation and sustaining of narratives



FIGURE 3. Statue of the Sacred Heart, deposited on the floor of the central section of the Clonard Martyrs Memorial Garden, Bombay Street, Belfast. (Photo by author, 2010.)

that accept the IRA as guardians, all those who died as equal “victims,” Catholic communities as solely victims, and allows a single event in 1969 to act as justification for over 30 years of conflict. That this permanent memorial is placed against the peace wall, referencing its physicality and maintaining its integrity, aptly demonstrates the impact of segregation on allowing the creation of singular, victimized narratives of a complicated and messy inter-ecne conflict to exist unchallenged.

Loyalist Post-Conflict Commemorative Practices

Nationalists are not alone in perpetrating singular visions of the past in their reaction to the post-conflict context; similarly singular commemorations can be found within post-Troubles Loyalist memorial practices. In contemporary Loyalism, one of the most popular and widespread means of commemorating the past is

through participating in or being a spectator at the parades of one of the Loyal Orders. The Loyal Orders are a number of lay organizations that have existed since the 1790s to celebrate and defend (British) Loyalist tradition in Ireland. Their commemorations often take the form of parading along traditional routes throughout the province. Currently, the most popular organizations are the Orange Order, Royal Black Institute, and the Apprentice Boys of Derry, but there is also considerable support for the Independent Orange Order, Junior Orange Order and Women’s Orange Order, and the Royal Arch Purples. Membership is determined by age and gender, with membership of most Loyal Orders restricted to adult males of the Protestant faith. An increasingly significant, although institutionally unconnected, element of the parades is the use of marching bands as an accompaniment. Although independent of the orders, these are likewise fundamentally Loyalist, Protestant bodies that add spectacle

and sound to marches and are perceived as being particularly threatening and hardline by the “other” community (MacDonald 2010:17).

Public commemorations have been popular in Northern Ireland since the 18th century, and have, at times, been performed across the political and religious divides (Jarman and Bryan 1996:4). While they have largely fallen out of popular practice in Nationalist communities—with the exception of organizations such as the Ancient Order of Hibernians and a number of annual Republican marches—they have maintained, if not grown in, popularity within Loyalism. There are a number of reasons for this, including the majority Unionist government facilitating marching by Loyalist organizations, while usually denying this privilege to Nationalists, since the formation of the Northern Irish state (Jarman 1997:26). Ultimately, the ability to “perform” Loyalist identity through commemorative practice in a newly created, but fragile, Unionist state was used to help reaffirm its existence. Through the course of the 20th century the right to commemorate historical events has become entwined with a number of contemporary political issues facing the Loyalist community, including the (1) maintenance of tradition, (2) performance of identity and loyalty, (3) fear of “Irish” integration, and (4) ongoing contemporary tensions and political situations (Bryan and Jarman 1997:211).

While the ability to parade wherever and whenever the Loyal Orders wished was largely upheld through the early decades of the Northern Irish state, it had been increasingly questioned by Nationalists prior to the Troubles. Increasingly, the conflicting claims for the “right to march versus the right to not have to suffer a march” have ensured that the annual “Marching Season” is a common catalyst for any violent clashes in the post-conflict context. The marching season runs from Easter to late September and includes around 2,600 “Loyalist” and 300 “Nationalist” marches (Jarman and Bryan 1996:26,336–340). The confrontation on the right to parade to Drumcree Parish Church, Portadown, by the Orange Order, which reached its climax in the mid-1990s, was particularly damaging to the reputation of the Loyal Order and all those who supported the right to march. In what Brian Kennaway

(2006:115–117) called the “Drumcree Debacle,” the hijacking of the protest to facilitate violent attacks on the security forces, as well as Catholic “targets,” lead to the Orange Order being highly criticized for its lack of leadership and, indeed, integrity.

In the years since these high-octane parade disputes, it has been noticeable that the Loyal Orders have been attempting to rebrand their organizations to distance themselves from these criticisms. While parade disputes are still an annual event—although less explosive than during the 1990s—the Loyal Orders have attempted to project a less-divisive image. This can be seen in the recent renaming of the 12th of July parades by the Orange Order to “Orange Fest” (since 2008), and the Apprentice Boys of Derry’s traditional commemoration of the lifting of the Siege of Derry being rebranded the “Maiden City Festival” (since 1998).

Loyalist Commemoration: The Maiden City Festival

The Apprentice Boys of Derry are unique in the Loyal Orders as being the only organization that is fundamentally rooted to a specific place. The organization was created to commemorate the role of apprentices in preventing the plantation city of Londonderry from being overrun by the armies of Catholic King James II of England during the Williamite Wars in Ireland (1688–1690). Commemorative parades in the city have a longevity dating back to the late 18th century; the current organization was established in 1814 (Jarman and Bryan 1996:11). Derry—as it is largely known and has been officially called since 1984, although some contention continues to exist regarding the replacement of its previous official name, Londonderry—has a special place in Loyalist identity. Protestants in the city, and the province, have linked the hardship endured and resilience displayed in their loyalty to the Protestant William of Orange during the siege of 1688–1689 to steadfastness against perceived Catholic aggression and the erosion of their position since that time. Bryonie Reid (2005:486) has highlighted the perceived link between Loyalism and cities in Northern Ireland due to their longstanding control of

these environments, creating “deep significance for their senses of identity and belonging.”

In recent years, as Reid also highlights, the increasingly fragile nature of this longstanding control of urban environments by Loyalism has resulted in an exposure to the lack of total command and the need for redefinitions of these spaces (Reid 2005:486). Derry has been particularly affected by these changes, as it has moved from being a plantation walled city with a 100% Protestant and Loyalist population at its foundation in 1613, to now being a Nationalist city with a 75% Catholic/Nationalist population (Shirlow et al. 2005:5). This demographic swing has taken material form in an increasingly segregated urban geography. The Fountain area is now the only Protestant enclave in the Cityside west bank of the River Foyle, while the majority of the Protestant population resides in Waterside on the river’s east bank. In effect, the river acts as the equivalent of Belfast’s peace walls. With these changes in fortune, recent research has shown that the diminished Protestant population has feelings of alienation and marginalization (Shirlow et al. 2005:9–12). The creation of the Maiden City Festival by the Apprentice Boys of Derry can, therefore, be viewed as an attempt to recapture the past glories of a city that, for the rest of the year, is no longer a Loyalist stronghold.

The Maiden City Festival was created by the Apprentice Boys of Derry in 1998, with the intention that it would

help explain and educate on the history and heritage that the Apprentice Boys of Derry Association exists to promote. The festival was also established with the purpose of placing the Apprentice Boys of Derry Commemorations in the wider context of Protestant culture and to reduce alienation of Protestants within the Derry City Council area. (Maiden City Festival [2010])

These three aims underlie the perceived need to rebrand and re-present the Apprentice Boys of Derry, not only in response to the criticisms of the parade disputes at Drumcree, but also relating to the continued tensions regarding the use of the predominantly Nationalist Cityside of the city as the main location for this performance of Loyalist identity. This statement also ties into the use of the commemoration as a link to broader Protestant culture and

to reduce Protestant alienation locally, which are obviously contemporary issues. Therefore, while the Maiden City Festival publicly promotes itself as “politics-free, baggage-free” (Maiden City Festival [2010]:1), this is clearly contradicted by its mission statement.

Tradition is important in Northern Ireland and particularly to the Loyal Orders. It is frequently evoked as the reason for continuing annual parades and for insisting that the marches must follow historical routes at specific times. The maintenance of ethnic identity based on “permanence and unchangingness” (Jarman 2003:92) draws on longstanding cultural practice by the two communities that focuses on divided culture, history, and tradition. However, tradition is not a fixed concept. It is linked to constantly changing social and cultural practices, and identity and, as such, is continually being reimagined and reinvigorated as context dictates. This is particularly apparent in the commemorations of the Relief of Derry, which are simultaneously presented as unchanging, but have consistently evolved to serve the needs of the organizers and their audience. Whereas early commemorations of the Closing of the Gates and Relief of Derry in the late 18th century are discussed in local newspapers as being “observed with the usual marks of commemoration” of parading the encamped soldiers, a number of volleys shot, and then the officers being invited to dine at the corporation (*Derry Journal* 1796), this has changed greatly, particularly through the course of the 20th century. Changes include the inclusion of the World War I Memorial as the focus of the early morning parade, the use of the ramparts of the wall (depending on official permission—they were closed in the course of the Troubles), the change of date of the Relief of Derry parade to the closest Saturday (since 1986), and the extension of the day-long parade to a week-long festival (since 1998).

Despite the traditional parade now being showcased within a week of cultural and social activities, the presentation of this seminal event in Derry’s history is not only unreservedly Protestant in perspective, but, by many of those who participate or spectate, is perceived as having a contemporary message. Through the course of the week, at locations around the walled city and within the Fountain area, a

significant number of events take place that are closely tied to the Protestant heritage of the city. For example, the Siege Heroes Trail and Apprentice Boys Museum and Siege Exhibition are presented as “the perfect guide to the history within and around the historic Walls of Londonderry” (Maiden City Festival [2010]). The stories contain only fleeting references that are not from a Loyalist perspective, such as the character of one of James II’s soldiers, the “Jacobean Officer.” Ironically, this projected “identity of victory” (Cohen 2007:954) is very different from how the majority of Protestants in the city feel during the other 51 weeks of the year (Shirlow et al. 2005). For one week, the usually dilapidated Fountain area becomes a flurry of activity and color as bonfires are lit (usually covered with Irish tricolors and political posters of local Nationalist politicians); murals are reinvigorated; and red, white, and blue bunting and Union flags are unfurled along every street. With the arrival of up to 10,000 Apprentice Boys (Maiden City Festival [2010]) for the week-long festival, the Protestants of the city can parade their past superiority and openly proclaim their disenchantment with the contemporary situation. The continuing emphasis on the siege is loaded with contemporary parallels that are taken up by the Protestants of the city. Representations of a mural from the Fountain appears on spectators’ replica t-shirts: “Londonderry,” “West Bank,” “Loyalists,” “Still Under Siege,” and “No Surrender.”

While the Maiden City Festival and the Relief of Derry commemorative parades claim to promote no political message and are presented as “celebrating diversity” (Maiden City Festival [2010]), the course of the parade is littered with material evidence of dissent. The parade starts from the Memorial Hall (the “Mem”), which is located close to the walls of the city as they face the Nationalist Bogside area. The empty “Walker’s Plinth” projected over the Bogside, which had previously been a 25 m pillar topped by a statue of the siege hero Rev. Walker, was bombed by the IRA in 1973. Both the plinth and relocated statue of Rev. Walker (Figure 4) were attacked and damaged in the nights before the parade took place in 2010. Despite the post-conflict context, security is tight: police and stewards are present in

significant numbers, barriers are placed around the streets between the parade and the spectators, while helicopters buzz overhead. As the parade begins, immediately beneath the shadow of the Mem, as viewed from the Bogside, are substantial Republican graffiti: “Support the POWs” and “End the Torture in Maghaberry [a Northern Irish prison] Now.” The graffiti acts to challenge—at least from the perspective of the Bogside—the performed loyalty of the marchers overhead.

As the marching Apprentice Boys and their accompanying bands wind their way along the walls and through the walled city to the cenotaph in the center, the parade passes shops that have windows boarded up for the occasion, and waste bins that have been taped up with black refuse sacks to discourage their use as hiding places for bombs. As the parade moves to the service in the cathedral and on to the pageant at the Carlisle Roundabout in the afternoon, more sturdy barriers, with plastic guards to the height of a grown man, are placed around their route back into the city center (Figure 5). These plastic guards prohibit an unrestricted view of the parade, but are considered necessary, as they prevent interactions between the marchers and the spectators that have, in the past, resulted in reciprocal spitting. Claims of a “celebration of diversity in Northern Ireland” (Maiden City Festival [2010]) do not appear to be borne out by the material evidence. High-level political support from the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (Northern Ireland), the European Union Regional Development Fund, and the Department of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Ireland) does not disguise the fact that, at street level, a lack of agreement and consent to this singular interpretation of the city and its history remain palpable.

Discussion

Northern Ireland’s position as a peripheral, marginal “northern” Other, for both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland—as a contested hybrid of both Britishness and Irishness—has a short but largely forgotten history. The transition from an imperial industrial powerhouse to a deindustrialized, sectarian embarrassment was a significant factor in explaining how societal segregation and



FIGURE 4. Statue of Rev. Walker with an arm missing due to an attack prior to the Apprentice Boys of Derry Parade, Maiden City Festival. (Photo by author, 2010.)



FIGURE 5. Perspex barriers placed around the Diamond, Derry, in preparation for the evening return of an Apprentice Boys of Derry commemorative march. (Photo by author, 2010.)

separation was allowed to occur and continue to exist throughout and beyond the Troubles. Northern Ireland's geographical location, on the peripheries of both nation states and their national identities, and increasingly irrelevant as the threats of the Cold War waned, ensured a lack of engagement with complicated and multidimensional tensions during the Troubles, including a lack of acknowledgment of both its historical and contemporary nature. Instead, an increasing marginalization and Othering of Northern Ireland, reflecting stereotyping commonly attributed to "northern" peoples by "southern" powerbrokers, allowed this situation to occur. Both governments concentrated solely on security issues and effectively disengaged from dealing with societal segregation that acted to strengthen increasingly separate identities, loyalties, and sovereignties. This situation has continued into the post-conflict context as the fracturing of society during the Troubles continues to be ignored, and singular identities and perspectives remain unquestioned and, therefore, unchallenged.

Exploration of the materiality of post-Troubles segregation reveals a growing gulf in understanding and remembrances of the recent and distant past of the province. While Nationalist communities memorialize their "war" dead and injured through unofficial but permanent memorials that physically reference and sustain divisive peace walls, Loyalist communities rebrand their performances of historical Protestant supremacy, on the walls of a city that is no longer a stronghold, as a politics-free family day out. It is evident that these attempts to fill a remembrance and reconciliation vacuum at the street level reflect a society that has been allowed to segregate and disengage with its multiple pasts with little hindrance. Rodney Harrison (2010:154) has stated that "the power to control heritage is the power to remake the past in a way that facilitates certain actions or viewpoints in the present." It follows that not only is there a need to engage with Northern Irish society in a meaningful way to question its prolonged acceptance of segregation, but also to accept that the way the past is remembered and "heritage-ized" is linked to power and control of the present. To present singular perspectives of a convoluted and complicated past is not only a manifestation of a divided

society, but is also an authoritative means of maintaining it.

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