

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN A SOUTHERN CITY: The Effects of a Mandatory Arrest Policy on Male-versus-Female Aggravated Assault Incidents†

TRUC-NHU HO††

University of North Carolina at Pembroke

ABSTRACT: *Studies attempting to measure the effects of a mandatory arrest policy in domestic violence situations have yielded somewhat contradictory results. This study examines the effects of such a policy in one southeastern city. It utilizes police records from 1993-1997 to generate a proportionate stratified sample of 442 aggravated assaults cases committed by male partners on female victims. Logistic regression was used to model arrest determinants before and after the new policy was adopted. Results show that while there was an increase in the number of domestic violence reports after the pro-arrest policy went into effect, the total number of reports continued to decrease. A comparison of arrest determinants before and after the new guidelines became effective indicates this policy did not affect arrest decisions.*

INTRODUCTION

The 1980s witnessed the enactment of mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence in many jurisdictions. This change meant police officers were not allowed to exercise discretion in domestic cases. Victim advocates and police administrators expected this new stance would result in higher arrest rates for spousal violence. While a number of studies have attempted to measure the effect of such mandatory arrest policies, the results are contradictory at best. Some researchers have found increased arrests (Feder, 1998; Jaffe, Wolfe, Telford, & Austin, 1986; Victim Services Agency, 1988) and others have not (Balos & Trotzky, 1988; Ferraro, 1995; Lanza-Kaduce, Greenleaf, & Donahue, 1995). The purpose of the present study is to examine the impact of the

† An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Toronto, Canada, 1999. The author would like to thank Rick Hines, Dean Hinnen, the anonymous reviewers, and the editor for their valuable comments on the previous draft.

†† *Direct all correspondence to: Truc-Nhu Ho, University of North Carolina at Pembroke, Department of Sociology, Social Work and Criminal Justice, Pembroke, NC 28372. E-mail: hotruc@sassette.uncp.edu.*

adoption of a mandatory arrest policy for domestic violence on incident reporting, the rates of victim preference for an arrest, arrest rates, and determinants of arrest in one southeastern city before and after the new guidelines went into effect.

THE MANDATORY ARREST POLICY

Prior to the 1980s, legal intervention in domestic violence was rare. Police officers practiced mediation and exercised discretion to minimize arrests because domestic violence was considered a private matter rather than a crime (Garner & Fagan, 1997). In the 1970s, feminists and women's rights activists recognized the plight of battered women. Grassroots efforts assisted abused women by opening shelters (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996). A new agenda advocating more aggressive use of arrest was put forward as a way to break this "cycle of violence." The movement gained momentum on the heels of an increasing number of shelters and news of celebrities engaged in domestic violence incidents.

This publicity made policy makers more aware of the need to protect battered women and punish offenders. Traditionally, the police can make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest only if the offense was committed in the presence of the officer (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996). This restriction was loosened eventually. By 1980, 47 states had adopted legislation which permitted warrantless arrests for domestic simple assault if there was probable cause even though the officer did not witness the actual attack.

After the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (Sherman & Berk, 1984) concluded arrest was the most effective means of deterring domestic violence, the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence (1984) recommended state and local agencies adopt a pro-arrest policy toward domestic violence. Although replications of the Minneapolis study in five other cities did not confirm the benefit of arrest as a deterrence to domestic violence, an increasing number of police agencies continued to adopt a mandatory arrest policy for fear of being held liable for victims' injuries. Their precautions were not unjustified. In some states, civil court rulings set precedents for holding both the police department and the individual officer liable for not apprehending the suspect after repeated calls from the victim (Sherman, Smith, Schmidt, & Rogan, 1992).

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MANDATORY ARREST POLICIES

Many domestic violence studies have addressed the effectiveness of the mandatory arrest policy with conflicting results over the past two

decades. Mignon and Holmes (1995) found that two-thirds of all domestic violence offenders in 24 Massachusetts communities were not arrested in spite of the enactment of the mandatory arrest law. Though the number of arrests increased after the policy went into effect, the arrest rate stayed far below 100%. Ferraro (1989a) revealed that arrests were made in only 18% of all domestic violence incidents after enactment of the pro-arrest policy in Phoenix. Minneapolis police officers made arrests in less than 20% of domestic calls in 1986 even though their department had a strong pro-arrest policy (Balos & Trotzky, 1988). In Ohio, arrests materialized in only 14% of the incidents in which victims were injured or killed (Bell, 1984). Milwaukee figures showed police arrested only 14% of batterers, although 82% of victims preferred an arrest (Bowker, 1982). Other studies (Ferraro, 1995; Lanza-Kaduce et al., 1995; Lawrenz, Lembo, & Schade, 1988) also found that police in pro-arrest jurisdictions failed to practice the mandatory arrest policy.

Other studies produced the exact opposite results, showing that arrest rates increased after the adoption of the new policy in some jurisdictions. Jaffe et al. (1986) reported a 2,500% increase in the arrest rate following a new mandatory arrest policy in London, Ontario. Although this increase seems impressive, the actual number of arrests still constituted only 9% of all domestic violence incidents. Washington experienced a 400% increase in the arrest rate after the adoption of a mandatory arrest policy (Victim Services Agency, 1988). Feder (1998) reported that Palm Beach sheriff's deputies were almost twice as likely to arrest when answering domestic compared to non-domestic calls. Thus, the evidence suggests the effectiveness of the new policy varies from one jurisdiction to the next. This observation sparks the need to conduct evaluations on male-versus-female felony domestic assaults in other jurisdictions (Fyfe, Klinger, & Flavin, 1997).

THE LOCAL LEGAL LANDSCAPE

This study was undertaken at the suggestion of the police chief in a southeastern city. This official was bothered by an alarming increase in the number of domestic violence reports in his jurisdiction. The agency employed 350 sworn officers and served a population of 98,052 inhabitants, 40% of whom were African-Americans. Whites constituted 59% of the sworn personnel, while blacks registered 39%, Hispanics 1%, and Asians 1%. The typical experience level ranged from 10 to 14 years and 41% of the officers fell into the 30-35 age category. Though the department had made efforts to recruit women, 16% of the officers were females.

In the early 1990s, the police department and the municipal court became frustrated over the increasing number of domestic violence cases where the victim either did not show up for a hearing or elected not to press charges. The City Council passed an ordinance authorizing police officer testimony on behalf of the victim regardless of her willingness to proceed. The ordinance also provided officers with options for determining who was the victim and who was the assailant for arrest purposes if the incident did not occur in the officer's presence. When the officer could not differentiate between the two roles, both parties were arrested and charged. The new policy mandated arrests in misdemeanor domestic violence cases involving injuries to the victim and instructed officers how to respond. The chief of police extended this policy to domestic aggravated assaults because officers often avoided making a felony arrest in family situations. Thus, the new policy aimed to decrease officer discretion in felony assaults and increase arrest powers in misdemeanor assaults.

Later, state legislators enacted a new law which contained similar provisions favoring arrest in incidents without injuries to the victim and mandating arrest in cases with victim injuries. It also relaxed the "in the presence of the officer" requirement when making a warrantless misdemeanor arrest for domestic violence charges.

A new category of crime entered the criminal code, criminal domestic violence, and it included misdemeanor and felony violations. Police officers began to inscribe the letters "CDV" on all cases involving violence between family members and common-law couples. They also received 8-16 hours of in-service training intended for annual certification by a team dispatched from the Governor's Office of Domestic Violence and Abuse.

Officers are required to document all domestic incidents. The agency's victim advocate reviews all incident reports daily and makes referrals to local shelters and service providers when necessary.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

The current study employs a quasi-experimental research design to examine the impact, if any, that these legal changes have had on how the police handle domestic violence cases in this location. The adoption of the mandatory arrest policy, the intervention, took place during the first quarter of 1995. That timing renders two years (1993 and 1994) as pretest observations and three years (1995, 1996, and 1997) as the post-test period.

The Sample

For the purpose of this study, domestic violence is defined as assaultive behavior which occurs between heterosexuals in a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, spouses, cohabitants, or ex-partners where the suspect is at least 17 years of age. The study excludes all other relationships, unfounded cases, cases where both parties were involved in mutual combat, and cases in which dual arrests were made.

A total of 1,098 domestic disputes were culled from the 5,613 aggravated assault reports deposited at the city police department between 1993 and 1997. The files included the original incident reports and any supplements. There were 885 cases where males assaulted females and 214 cases where females assaulted males during this period. The latter batch of cases was eliminated from further consideration because the current study focuses on violence against women.

A proportionate stratified random sample was employed to allow the sample to be small enough to handle and still make it possible to compare variables by year. Each sample case represented two population cases (weight = 2). The computer randomly selected a row number by case number that was assigned to each incident report, resulting in 62 selections from 125 cases in 1993, 71 selections from 142 cases in 1994, 112 selections from 224 cases in 1995, 109 selections from 218 cases in 1996, and 88 selections from 176 cases in 1997.

Predictor Variables


Variables were grouped into characteristics pertaining to the incident, the suspect, and the victim. Consideration was given to the statutory elements officers must satisfy when deciding whether sufficient probable cause exists for an arrest and variables found to be determinants of arrest in previous research (Berk, Fenstermaker, & Newton, 1988; Berk & Loseke, 1980-81; Buzawa & Austin, 1993; Feder, 1996; Gondolf & McFerron, 1989; Smith & Klein, 1984; Smith & Visser, 1981; Worden & Pollitz, 1984). Arrest determinants are those predictors found significant ($p \leq .05$) in a logistic model.

RESULTS

Effects of the Mandatory Arrest Policy

Figure 1 graphs the percentage of domestic violence cases which resulted in arrest, the proportion of known incidents which were domestic aggravated assaults, and changes in victim preference for arrest. The expectation is the introduction of a mandatory arrest policy in 1995 should herald an upward trend in these three variables. In other words,

spouse abuse arrests should demonstrate an increase, as would victim reporting and victim expressions for a stronger case resolution.



The arrest line does show evidence of an upward trend. However, the lack of a sufficient number of data points does not allow one to determine whether the post-test changes result from the intervention or merely represent a continuation of the pretest tendencies. Victim arrest preferences exhibits a similar track, while the proportion of incidents which are domestic incidents flattens and then drops during the post-test period. In short, there is no dramatic empirical evidence which unequivocally isolates the implementation of a mandatory arrest policy as sparking any improvements.

The data suggest the new policy initially appeared to encourage women to report domestic violence to the police. However, a slight increase in the arrest rate during the post-test period indicates police officers are not any less lenient toward suspects than they had been prior to the new policy taking effect. This practice, perhaps, has discouraged women from calling the police because the number of reports continued to decrease by the end of the five-year period. In fact, the 1997 arrest rate is slightly lower than the 1994 arrest rate, although there were more reports in 1997 than in 1994.

Arrest Determinants Before and After the Policy Implementation

Table 1 presents the overall variable distributions for arrest determinants before and after the new policy went into effect. The police

TABLE 1
Variable Distributions Before and After
Implementation of the Mandatory Arrest Policy

Variable	Coding	Pre-Policy Period		Post-Policy Period			
		<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%		
Arrest	0 = No	86	64.7	196	63.4		
	1 = Yes	47	35.3	113	36.6		
Weapons	0 = Hands, Feet	32	24.1	28.1	130	42.1	36.2
	1 = Object	58	43.6	31.0	112	36.2	33.9
	2 = Knife, Gun	43	32.3	46.5	67	21.7	41.8
Complainant	0 = Other	13	9.8	76.9	33	10.7	93.9
	1 = Victim	120	90.2	30.8	276	89.3	29.7
Argument	0 = No	20	15.0	45.0	52	16.8	48.1
	1 = Yes	113	85.0	33.6	257	83.2	34.2
Witnesses	0 = No	115	86.5	33.0	250	80.9	33.2
	1 = Yes	18	13.5	50.0	59	19.1	50.9
Suspect Located	0 = No	60	45.1	31.7	143	46.3	20.3
	1 = Yes	73	54.9	38.4	166	53.7	50.6
Suspect Age	0 = Youth	68	51.1	27.8	130	42.1	27.7
	1 = Young Adult	36	27.1	30.6	103	33.3	35.9
	2 = Middle Age	29	21.8	58.6	76	24.6	52.6
Suspect Alcohol/Drugs	0 = No	90	67.7	32.2	188	60.8	31.4
	1 = Yes	43	32.3	41.9	121	39.2	44.6
Victim Race	0 = Non-Black	11	8.3	54.6	33	10.7	51.5
	1 = Black	122	91.7	35.6	276	89.3	34.8
Visible Injury	0 = No	47	35.3	25.5	33	15.0	51.5
	1 = Yes	86	64.7	40.7	276	85.0	34.8
Hospital Care	0 = No	90	67.7	33.3	173	56.0	30.1
	1 = Yes	43	32.3	39.5	136	44.0	44.9
Victim Preference	0 = None	76	57.1	27.6	168	54.4	29.8
	1 = Arrest	32	24.1	75.0	91	29.4	63.7
	2 = No Arrest	25	18.8	8.0	50	16.2	10.0

often abide by the victim's preference for an arrest because victim cooperation may increase the chances of prosecuting and getting a conviction. Therefore, one might expect a mandatory arrest policy would lead to an increase in officer compliance with victim requests for an arrest. However, the data show that although victim preference for an arrest increased after the adoption of the new policy, the actual arrest rate for this category decreased. In contrast, the percentage of victims who do not express an arrest preference decreased, but the arrest rate for this

category increased. This outcome suggests that investigating officers increased the exercise of their arrest powers. Still, post-test arrests were made only in 63.7% of the cases in which the victim expressed a preference for an arrest and in 10% of the cases in which the victim did not want the police to arrest her batterer. Clearly, the police abided by the victim's request for no arrest far more often than by the victim's request for an arrest.

Table 1 also shows the police made an arrest in only 40.2% of the incidents in which there were visible injuries and in 44.9% of the cases that involved hospital care for the victim. Reasons justifying their decisions not to arrest the suspect in the face of probable cause are not recorded because police officers are not required to do so.

The next step was to construct models of arrest determinants before and after the new policy went into effect. As Table 2 shows, there are six determinants of arrest during the pretest period compared to seven significant predictors during the post-test period. The logistic model for the pretest period discloses that police action depends heavily upon the victim's preference for an arrest. An arrest is almost 31 times greater when the victim makes it known that she wants the suspect taken into custody. In contrast, when a victim does not wish her assailant to be arrested, her preference has a significant negative effect on arrest and the odds of arrest are less likely than when her preference is not requested by the officer. An arrest is six times more likely when the victim sustains an injury and four times more likely when the suspect uses a knife or a gun. Another significant predictor is whether the police can locate the suspect immediately. The police are less likely to make an arrest when the call for help comes from the victim. It may be that police officers consider a third-party report more of a public disturbance than a private matter. An additional possibility may be that officers do not view the situation as "hot" or volatile if the victim is able to complete a call to the police without interruption from the suspect. The semi-standardized logit coefficients, which permit comparison of the relative strength of the net effect of independent variables (Kaufman, 1996), indicate the strongest predictor of arrest is victim preference, followed by injury, the presence of a knife or a gun, and whether the suspect is located. Victim race, suspect age, alcohol or drug use, argument between both parties, the presence of a witness presence, nor the need for hospital care do not affect the likelihood of arrest during the pretest period.

The post-test model shows victim preference continues to be the most significant determinant of arrest with the odds of arrest being eight times more likely than when her preference is not requested. However, when the victim prefers no arrest, her preference has a nega-

TABLE 2
Logit Estimates of Arrest Determinants Before and
After the Mandatory Arrest Policy

Predictor	Pre-Policy Period				Post-Policy Period			
	<i>b</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	β	Odds Ratio	<i>b</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	β	Odds Ratio
Weapon								
Objects	0.12	0.79	0.10	1.14	-0.09	0.37	-0.03	0.91
Knife, Gun	1.60	0.79	1.27	4.98*	0.24	0.45	0.11	1.28
Victim Complainant	-2.69	0.96	-2.56	0.07*	-3.84	0.81	-3.11	0.02*
Black Victim	-1.34	1.00	-1.34	0.26	-0.71	0.51	-0.36	0.49
Suspect Age								
Young Adult	-0.51	0.63	-0.32	0.60	0.00	0.39	0.00	0.99
Middle Age	0.51	0.77	0.38	1.60	0.87	0.41	0.36	2.39*
Alcohol/Drug Use	1.20	0.70	0.84	3.32	0.43	0.33	0.14	1.55
Yes Argument	-1.55	0.85	-1.33	0.21	-0.37	0.45	-0.17	0.68
Witness Present	1.33	0.75	1.01	3.81	1.46	0.41	0.36	2.40*
Suspect Located	1.27	0.67	0.85	3.59*	0.35	0.34	0.50	4.33*
Visible Injury	1.83	0.76	1.35	6.24	0.75	0.37	0.13	1.42
Hospital Care	-0.70	0.75	-0.53	0.49	2.06	0.35	0.26	2.12*
Victim Preference								
Arrest	3.42	0.77	2.65	30.64*	2.06	0.35	0.73	7.91*
No Arrest	-2.01	0.95	-1.93	0.13*	-1.31	0.61	-0.80	0.27*
Constant	0.73				1.28			
Log-Likelihood	-47.50				-122.87			

* Denotes significance at the .05 level.

tive effect on arrest and the odds of arrest are less likely than when her preference is not requested. An arrest is over four times more likely when the suspect is located, almost two-and-a-half times more likely when there is a witness, more than twice as likely when the suspect is a young adult (ages 31-40), and over two times more likely when the victim's injury requires hospital care. Like the post-test model, when the complainant is the victim (89.32%), the odds of the suspect getting arrested are less than when the complainant is another person.

A comparison between the pretest and post-test models reveals that while victim preference for an arrest is the most significant predictor of arrest in both periods, the odds of arrest are over four times greater before the policy enactment. In addition, while visible injury is a determinant of arrest in the pretest period, arrest is likely only if the

victim's injury requires hospital care in the post-test period. It appears that police officers are circumventing the new policy by making it harder to arrest the suspect.

DISCUSSION

The implementation of a mandatory arrest policy in this southeastern city did not result in more arrests. Officers skirted the new policy by making arrests largely on their own discretion. This behavior kept post-test arrest rates consistent with arrest rates before the policy went into effect. This practice was found in Phoenix where police officers condoned the idea that police circumvent the new policy, resulting in a dismal arrest rate of 18% (Ferraro, 1989a). Similarly, an evaluation conducted two years after the enactment of a pro-arrest domestic violence policy in the District of Columbia found officers were not enforcing the new guidelines. Instead, they continued to mediate domestic disputes which held arrests to a minimum. Only 5% of the cases were closed through an arrest (Baker, Cahn, & Sands, 1989). This noncompliance may be related to individual officer's ideological, political, and legal considerations (Ferraro, 1989a). It may also reflect more practical considerations (Smith & Klein, 1984). Many officers perceive new policies as an unwarranted intrusion upon their discretion (Steinman, 1988) and resent what appears to be an order based on political pressure (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996). Officer characteristics may shed light on the circumvention of new policy. In the present study, the high percentage of older male officers with many years of experience may have contributed to their resistance to change. While most male police officers in Phoenix disliked that city's new pro-arrest policy, most female officers were either neutral or frustrated (Ferraro, 1989b).

Certainly, a police chief cannot reprimand every single patrol officer who sidesteps a controversial policy unless that office-holder wishes to be a very unpopular chief. But the agency head can make it more difficult not to comply with directives by requiring officers to justify their decision not to arrest in a supplementary incident report. Most officers detest report writing and consider this task non-police work. The chief can also adopt a policy that officers will comply with the victim's preference for police action and mandate an arrest in the presence of visible injury as long as probable cause exists.

In spite of evidence indicating the introduction of a mandatory arrest policy did not affect police arrests in this southeastern city, one should interpret the results with caution. While the quasi-experimental research design represents a decided advantage over many previous studies, it does lack an independent control group. In addition, the

logit models derive from small samples. Another weakness is the small number of reports from non-black couples. The study group includes 89% African-American couples. Furthermore, 57% of the domestic violence reports came from high poverty areas even though spouse abuse knows no racial nor socioeconomic boundaries (Gelles, 1997). Future researchers need to address the present study's shortcomings and explore officer opinions and attitudes toward the new policy. This focus may provide clues to better implementation strategies.

CONCLUSION

The effective implementation of any new policy requires support from those workers charged with its enforcement. Circumvention of mandatory arrest policies reflects not only line officers' resentment of restrictions on their discretion, but also their disapproval of the criminalization of a long-standing patriarchal privilege. Without an underlying conviction that spouse abuse is a crime, the new policy will continue to meet with resistance from the very people responsible for its implementation. Therefore, it is incumbent upon police administrators to institute effective strategies which encourage officer compliance with any policy that conflicts with the status quo.

REFERENCES

- Baker, K., Cahn, N., & Sands, S. J. (1989). *Report on District of Columbia police response to domestic violence*. Washington, DC: C. C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence and the Women's Law and Public Policy, Georgetown University Law Center.
- Balos, B., & Trotzky, I. (1988). Enforcement of the domestic abuse act in Minnesota: A preliminary study. *Law and Inequality*, 6, 82-125.
- Bell, D. J. (1984). The police response to domestic violence: An exploratory study. *Police Studies*, 3, 23-30.
- Berk, S. & Loseke, D. (1980-81). Handling family violence: Situational determinants of police arrest in domestic disturbances. *Law & Society Review*, 15, 317-346.
- Berk, R., Fenstermaker, S., & Newton, P. (1988). An empirical analysis of police responses to incidents of wife battering. In G. T. Hotaling, D. Finkelhor, J. Kirpatrick, & M. A. Straus (Eds.) *Coping with family violence: Research and policy perspectives* (pp. 158-68). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Bowker, L. H. (1982). Police service to battered women: Bad or not so bad? *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 9, 476-486.
- Buzawa E., & Austin, T. (1993). Determining police response to domestic violence victims. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 36, 610-23.
- Buzawa, E. & Buzawa, C. (1996). *Domestic violence: The criminal justice response*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Feder, L. (1996). Police handling of domestic calls: The importance of offender's presence in the arrest decision. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 24, 481-490.

- Feder, L. (1998). Police handling of domestic and nondomestic assault calls: Is there a case for discrimination? *Crime and Delinquency*, 44, 335-349.
- Ferraro, K. J. (1989a). Policing woman battering. *Social Problems*, 36, 61-74.
- Ferraro, K. J. (1989b). The legal response to women battering in the United States. In J. Hanmer, J. Radford, & E. Stanko (Eds.), *Women, policing and male violence* (pp. 155-184). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Ferraro, K. J. (1995). Cops, courts, and woman battering. In B. R. Price and N. J. Skoloff (Eds.), *The criminal justice system and women: Offenders, victims, and workers* (pp.262-271). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Fyfe, J., Klinger, D., & Flavin, J. (1997). Differential police treatment of male-on-female spousal violence. *Criminology*, 35, 455-473.
- Garner, J., & Fagan, J. (1997). In R. Davis, A. J. Lurigio, & W. G. Skogan (Eds.), *Victim of crime* (pp. 53-87). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Gelles, R. (1997). *Violence in the family*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Gondolf, E. & McFerron, R. (1989). Handling battering men: Police action in wife abuse cases. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 16, 429-439.
- Jaffee, P., Wolfe, D. A., Telford, A., & Austin, G. (1986). The impact of police charges in incidents of wife abuse. *Journal of Family Violence*, 1, 37-49.
- Kaufman, R. (1996). Comparing effects in dichotomous logistic regression: A variety of standardized coefficients. *Social Science Quarterly*, 77, 91-109.
- Lanza-Kaduce, L., Greenleaf, R., & Donahue, M. (1995). Trickle-up report writing: The impact of a proarrest policy for domestic disturbances. *Justice Quarterly*, 12, 525-542.
- Lawrenz, F, Lembo, J. F., & Schade, T. (1988). Times-series analysis of the effect of a domestic violence directive on the numbers of arrests per day. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 16, 493-498.
- Mignon, S. I., & Holmes, W. M. (1995). Police response to mandatory arrest laws. *Crime and Delinquency*, 41, 430-442.
- Sherman, L. W., & Berk, R. A. (1984). The specific deterrent effects of arrest for domestic assault. *American Sociological Review*, 49, 261-272.
- Sherman, L. W., Smith, D. A., Schmidt, J. D., & Rogan, D. P. (1992). Crime, punishment, and stake in conformity: Legal and informal control of domestic violence. *American Sociological Review*, 57, 680-690.
- Smith, D., & Klein, J. (1984). Police control of interpersonal disputes. *Social Problems*, 31, 468-81.
- Smith, D., & Visher, C. (1981). Street-level justice: Situational determinants of police arrest decisions. *Social Problems*, 29, 167-177.
- Smith, D., Visher, C., & Davidson, L. (1984). Equity and discretionary justice: The influence of race on police arrest decisions and notions of chivalry. *Criminology*, 21, 5-28.
- Steinman, M. (1988). Anticipating rank and file police reactions to arrest policies regarding spouse abuse. *Criminal Justice Research Bulletin*, 4, 1-5.
- U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence (1984). *Final report*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Victim Services Agency (1988). *The law enforcement response to family violence: A state by state guide to family violence legislation*. New York: Victim Services Agency.
- Worden, R., & Pollitz, A. (1984). Police arrests in domestic disturbances: a further look. *Law and Society Review*, 18, 105-119.