

## RECENT TRENDS IN FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION IN EUROPE

Nico KEILMAN \*

*Netherlands Interuniversity Demographic Institute, The Hague, The Netherlands*

*Abstract.* During the past few decades profound changes have taken place in European households and families. The role of the traditional family has become weaker and new living arrangements have gained importance. Consensual unions are now widely accepted; one-parent families now originate more in divorce than in widowhood; and solitary householders have become more common. The traditional family has also witnessed changes. The number of 'others' belonging to the family household (relatives, servants) has fallen, as has the number of children. Moreover, young adults have started to leave the parental home at an earlier age (except in the last few years). Average family size has thus dropped considerably. However, simulations indicate that household structures contain considerable inertia. Although a substantial increase in non-traditional living arrangements may be expected, marriage is not likely to lose its dominant position in many European countries before the turn of the century.

### *Résumé. Tendances récentes de la composition des familles et des ménages en Europe*

Au cours des dernières décennies, de profonds changements ont affecté les ménages et les familles en Europe. Le rôle de la famille traditionnelle s'est affaibli, et de nouveaux styles de vie ont pris de l'importance. Aujourd'hui, les unions consensuelles sont largement acceptées, les familles monoparentales sont l'effet du divorce plus que du veuvage, et les ménages d'une personne sont devenus plus fréquents. Mais la famille traditionnelle a, elle aussi, changé. Au sein du ménage, le nombre des 'autres personnes' (apparentés, domestiques) a diminué, de même que le nombre des enfants. En outre, l'âge auquel les jeunes adultes quittent le foyer de leurs parents s'est abaissé (sauf ces toutes dernières années). Aussi la taille moyenne de la famille a-t-elle considérablement diminué. Les simulations présentées ici montrent cependant que les structures des ménages sont dotées d'une très grande inertie. Dans la plupart des pays européens, même si on peut s'attendre à une montée sensible des styles de vie non traditionnels, le mariage traditionnel ne semble pas devoir perdre sa position dominante avant le tournant du siècle.

\* *Author's address:* Netherlands Interuniversity Demographic Institute, P.O. Box 11650, NL-2502 AR The Hague, The Netherlands

## **1. Introduction**

Profound changes have taken place in European households and families during the last few decades. The role of the traditional family has become weaker, and new living arrangements, such as consensual unions and households headed by divorced mothers, have gained considerable importance. Behind these demographic trends in the West have been changes in behaviour and attitudes, which might be characterized as a declining motivation for parenthood and a growing search for individual status. The latter often implies that families or individuals desire privacy, which leads to falling average household sizes. Indeed, the growing importance of the solitary householder is one of the most striking features of recent household structures in Europe. In general, one notes a growing diversity of life styles, producing a much more complex picture of the European household and family than, say, forty years ago. Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (1986) consider the shift from family orientation toward an emphasis on the individual as the onset of a 'second demographic transition'. The fall of fertility to far below replacement level since the 1960s, the increased acceptance of consensual unions and divorce in the 1970s and the prospects for population decline are important demographic aspects of this second demographic transition.

This article attempts to give a broad overview of trends in family and household composition in Europe during the last few decades. The focus is on Western Europe. We look at the decreasing average size of the household and the family (section 2) and its demographic causes. The changing role of the traditional family is reviewed in section 3, while section 4 contains a discussion of non-traditional household types: one-parent families, consensual unions and one-person households. Future trends in living arrangements are explored in section 5, where simulation results of a dynamic household model, applied to the Netherlands, are presented. The projections suggest that, although a substantial increase in non-traditional living arrangements may be expected, traditional marriage is not likely to lose its dominant position in many European countries before the turn of the century.

Most of the data we use stem from census counts. It is a well-known fact that an analysis of households and families, comparing trends over time and space, poses severe difficulties as to definition, classification and accuracy. Nevertheless, the trends we observe in European coun-

tries are consistent, despite lack of uniformity in definitions and classifications.

## **2. Decreasing average size of households and families**

For decades, the average size of households in Europe, as well as that of families, has been decreasing. Most European populations increased much slower than their numbers of households. Several demographic reasons can be given:

- the fall of fertility during the last twenty years or so induced smaller numbers of children per family;
- processes of individualization and ‘nuclearization’ of the family household led to diminishing numbers of families with more than two generations, and/or ‘others’ (grandparents, servants, lodgers, etc.);
- an increase in the number of households consisting of an elderly couple, together with male excess mortality, led subsequently to increasing numbers of elderly women living alone.

### *2.1. Average household size*

Schwarz (1987) and Hall (1986) have given useful overviews of the distribution of households by size in European countries over a period starting around 1960 and ending around 1980 (table 1). Scandinavian countries had small households, both in the 1960s and the 1980s, Finland showing a remarkable decrease. Western Europe and Eastern Europe show a much greater diversity than Scandinavia. Ireland, with its relatively high fertility, displays an average household size very much like that of Southern Europe. The Soviet Union is the outlier of Eastern Europe. Its high (and in fact increasing) average household size is due to its growing proportion Asian.

Differences in age structures of populations make comparisons of average household size over time and space difficult. Burch (1980) therefore proposed an index of overall headship, which standardizes for the age distribution. The index gives the ratio of the observed numbers of households to the expected numbers that would result if certain maximum (‘natural headship’) ‘rates’ were to apply. The higher the

Table 1  
Private households by size, around 1960 and 1980.

Country	Year	Population in private households (1,000s)	Private households (1,000s)	Average size of private households	Distribution of private households by size (%)				
					1	2	3	4	5+
<i>Northern Europe</i>									
Denmark	1960	4,483	1,544	2.9	20	27	20	18	15
	1981	4,951	2,029	2.4	29	31	16	16	8
Finland	1960	4,396	1,315	3.3	22	19	18	16	25
	1980	4,780	1,782	2.7	27	26	19	18	10
Norway	1960	3,525	1,139	3.1	18	24	21	19	19
	1980	4,046	1,524	2.7	28	26	16	18	12
Sweden	1960	7,341	2,582	2.8	20	27	22	18	13
	1980	8,132	3,498	2.3	33	31	15	15	6
<i>Western Europe</i>									
Austria	1951	6,857	2,205	3.1	18	27	22	15	18
	1980	7,410	2,669	2.8	26	26	17	16	14
England and Wales	1966	45,750	15,360	3.0	15	31	21	18	15
	1981	47,806	17,706	2.7	22	32	17	18	11
FRG	1961	56,012	19,460	2.9	21	26	23	16	14
	1980	61,481	24,811	2.5	30	29	18	15	8
Ireland	1966	2,754	687	4.0	13	20	17	14	36
	1977	3,270	841	3.9	16	22	15	15	32
Netherlands	1960	11,199	3,130	3.6	12	24	19	18	27
	1985	14,243	5,565	2.6	28	29	15	19	9
<i>Eastern Europe</i>									
Czechoslovakia	1961	13,638	4,398	3.1	14	27	22	20	17
	1980	15,199	5,376	2.8	22	—	66	—	12
Hungary	1960	9,583	3,079	3.1	15	26	24	19	17
	1980	10,377	3,719	2.8	20	28	22	19	11
Poland	1960	28,799	8,253	3.5	16	19	19	20	27
	1978	34,095	10,948	3.1	17	22	23	21	17
Soviet Union <sup>a</sup>	1959	186,881	50,333	3.7	—	26	26	22	26
	1979	262,436	66,307	4.0	—	30	29	23	19
<i>Southern Europe</i>									
Greece	1951	7,309	1,778	4.1	9	16	18	19	39
	1979	9,450	2,492	3.8	11	21	21	24	22
Italy	1961	50,624 <sup>b</sup>	13,747	3.6	11	20	22	20	27
	1981	56,557 <sup>b</sup>	18,632	3.0	18	24	22	21	15

Table 1 (continued).

Country	Year	Population in private households (1,000s)	Private households (1,000s)	Average size of private households	Distribution of private households by size (%)				
					1	2	3	4	5+
Portugal	1960	8,777	2,233	3.9	8	19	22	19	32
	1981	9,794	3,427	2.9	-	-	-	-	-

<sup>a</sup> Data refer to family households only.

<sup>b</sup> Total population.

Sources: U.N. Demographic Yearbook, various years, and Golini (1987).

index, the smaller the average number of adults per household. Klijzing (1984) has compiled an overview of the index of overall headship for selected European countries between 1960 and 1980 (table 2).

Klijzing suggested that in many countries the systematic increase in the index of overall headship over time is partly explained by the rise in one-person households. But in Eastern European countries, at least during the 1960s, quite the opposite took place. Remarkably, these

Table 2  
Index of overall headship, c. 1960–1980.

Country	c. 1960	c. 1970	c. 1980
<i>Northern Europe</i>			
Denmark	84 1960	91 1970	93 1981
Norway	77 1960	81 1970	87 1980
<i>Western Europe</i>			
Austria	79 1961	84 1971	85 1981
England and Wales	75 1961	81 1971	85 1981
FRG	83 1961	87 1970	92 1981
France	77 1962	81 1975	85 1981
Netherlands	75 1960	81 1971	88 1981
<i>Eastern Europe</i>			
Bulgaria	76 1965	75 1975	-
Czechoslovakia	83 1961	81 1970	87 1980
Hungary	79 1963	78 1970	82 1980
Poland	84 1960	79 1970	81 1978
<i>Southern Europe</i>			
Italy	68 1961	73 1971	79 1981

Source: Klijzing (1984).

countries are all situated to the right of Hajnal's dividing line from Leningrad to Trieste separating 'European' from 'Eastern European' marriage patterns. Klijzing proposed standardizing the index for marital status as well, which would probably further enhance comparability of results. This, however, is beyond the scope of this article.

The trend toward a more independent, individual life style may be interpreted as indicating that people are more prepared than they were in the past to pay the price of loneliness in return for privacy and greater independence. Schwarz (1988) notes that several developments have played an important part here:

- the improved health of the elderly, which enabled them to live on their own until a very advanced age;
- the improved material situation of young people and of the retired elderly population;
- changing economic structures in general and the unfavourable employment opportunities in the agricultural sector, as a consequence of which households nowadays hardly ever include servants;
- the process of urbanization, which led to housing conditions generally unsuitable for extended families.

## *2.2. Average family size*

The typical European household still comprises a married couple with or without children, or an adult with one or more children. But the average size of these families is shrinking. The most recent information on the distribution of families in Western Europe according to the number of co-resident children stems from the 1970s [Eurostat (1982, pp. 42–43)]. Families without children made up the largest proportion in the distribution of families. The UK and the FRG formed one extreme with roughly twice as many families with no children (around 50%) as with 1 child (around 25%). The other extreme is formed by the Benelux countries, with approximately equal shares of zero children and one child (24–36%).

In all countries, over 50% of the families have at most one child present in the household. The proportion of families with four or more children is diminishing almost everywhere, although even in 1970 it was still quite substantial in Belgium and in the Netherlands (around 10%). For the latter country, this may very well be due to its relatively high

Table 3  
Average number of children<sup>a</sup> per household, by age of household head, 1977.

Country	Age of head					Total
	18-24	25-34	35-49	50-59	60+	
Belgium	0.47	1.20	1.05	0.18	0.03	0.57
France	0.30	1.17	1.11	0.22	0.04	0.58
FRG	0.20	0.84	0.93	0.17	0.02	0.44
Great Britain	0.57	1.29	1.16	0.21	0.03	0.58
Ireland	0.45	1.54	2.18	0.76	0.17	1.07
Italy	0.77	1.22	1.31	0.28	0.07	0.67
Luxemburg	0.31	0.98	0.94	0.19	0.03	0.50
Netherlands	0.15	1.06	1.26	0.24	0.02	0.64

<sup>a</sup> Includes all children up to the age of 13 years, and schoolchildren or students above that age.

Source: Eurostat (1982, p. 76).

fertility rates until the mid-1960s [see, for instance, Van de Kaa (1980), and Calot and Blayo (1982)]. Similarly, the extremely high average number of children in households in Ireland (as shown in table 3) may be explained by the high fertility in that country in recent decades. Eversley (1983) suggests that the fertility reduction in Britain may account for half the drop in household size between 1970 and 1980.

Fertility is one factor that influences average family size, but a second important factor is the home-leaving behaviour of young adults. There is, however, as Kiernan (1984) noted, a dearth of information on the timing of the departure of children from the parental home. Including relatively simple questions in general-purpose national surveys would permit the study of variations over time and space.

Schwarz (1988, section 6.3.1) reports on the presence of single persons living with their parents in West Germany between 1961 and 1982 (table 4). The propensity to leave the parental home has increased considerably between 1961 and 1982 in the FRG. Women who are still single at ages between 20 and 30 live independently more frequently than do men of the same age. Several factors influencing these phenomena may be mentioned:

- during the 1960s, the average age at marriage decreased in many European countries, indicating a growing tendency towards independence among young adults;
- improved economic conditions made it less necessary for young persons to contribute to the family income;

Table 4

Percentage of single persons living with their parents, by age: Federal Republic of Germany, 1961 and 1982.

Age	1961		1982	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
15–19	95	96	98	95
20–24	95	96	77	63
25–29	89	81	51	38
30–34	72	60	43	36
35–39	56	22	41	37

*Source:* Schwarz (1988, section 6.3.1).

- housing shortages were less severe after 1960 than they were immediately after World War II;
- prolonged education and military service may account for differences in home-leaving behaviour between single men and women.

Recent studies for a number of countries suggest a stagnation of the trend during the 1970s [see, for instance, Ploegmakers and Van Leeuwen (1986, pp. 158–159) for the Netherlands] and a reversal of the trend toward a longer stay in the household of their parents during the 1980s. Results from the 1984 Life-style Survey in the Netherlands are shown in table 5. The unfavourable economic conditions during the early 1980s, with their implications for unemployment, decreasing wages and decreasing social security payments for young adults, may have caused this reversal of the trend. Gulbrandsen and Hansen (1986) found that in Oslo in 1986, 60% of unmarried persons aged 20–21 lived with their parents – in 1982 the corresponding figure had been 45%.

Table 5

Percentage of persons living in parental household at age 20, and median age at departure, by birth cohort: the Netherlands.

Birth cohort	Percentage at home at age 20	Median age at departure (years)
1930–1939	76	23,7
1940–1949	54	21,5
1950–1959	52	21,2
1960–1966	67	23,0



Most of these persons gave financial considerations as a major reason for still being a member of the parental household. The same reasons might be given for the slightly increasing proportion of young adults living with their parent(s) in West Germany between 1972 and 1982; for males, the proportion rose from 63% to 67% for 20–24 year-olds during that period, and from 20% to 24% for 25–29 year-olds. For young women the increase was even more substantial: 33% of the women aged 20–24 lived with their parent(s) in 1972, 41% in 1982 [Schwarz (1985, p. 161)]. The same trend is exhibited by the figures derived by Brass for Great Britain [quoted by Young (1987, pp. 8–9)]. For males, the average age at leaving home rose from 22.6 to 23.2 years between 1971–1976 and 1976–1981. For females Brass observed a rise from 20.6 to 21.1 years in that period. Recent studies for the United States [e.g. Heer et al. (1985), and Glick and Lin (1986)] also show an increase in the proportion of young adults living with their parents. Among the reasons mentioned by these authors are the increase in college enrolments, the rapid increase in the divorce rate (resulting in adult children returning home) and, here too, the high unemployment level.

One should be aware of the fact that most (official) statistics are likely to provide a distorted picture of reality. For convenience's sake (e.g. taxation) young people officially say they live in the parent's household, although they have actually left it. Other considerations (e.g. study allowances) may create the opposite situation. And the phenomenon of young adults returning home (e.g. after a divorce) make a distinction between the first and the last time they left home important for correct interpretations.

### **3. The changing role of the traditional family**

#### *3.1. Decreasing dominance*

The proportion of households consisting of families with one or more children has not increased in those European countries for which data are available (see table 6). The trend that table 6 shows is caused by the same factors as are responsible for the fall of the average size of households and families, as noted earlier. One may argue that one of the main factors, notably the decrease of marital fertility, has been

Table 6

Percentage of households consisting of only a couple and one or more children, around 1960–1980.

Country	c. 1960	c. 1970	c. 1980
Austria	40 1960	40 1970	40 1981
Great Britain	38 1961	32 1971	32 1981
Sweden	36 1960	27 1970	27 1975

Source: Eversley (1984, p.95).

counteracted by another factor, viz. the legitimation of children born outside marriage. However, Rallu (1986, p. 518) states that the latter factor had only minor effects on the numbers of families with children.

Trends comparable to those in table 6 have been noticed by Hall (1986, p. 26) who showed a decrease in the percentage of households that are families (with or without children) (see table 7).

### 3.2. *The 'nuclearization' of family households*

One particular aspect of the changing character of the traditional family in many European countries is its 'nuclearization', i.e. the gradual shift from an extended family household to nuclear family. Urbanization processes and changing economic structures have had a great impact on family composition in Europe during the last decades. Nowadays, housing conditions in the cities are generally not suitable for households of more than one generation. And, as employment opportunities in the agricultural sector have fallen drastically, house-

Table 7

Percentage of households that are families. <sup>a</sup>

Country	Around 1970	Around 1980
Finland	75	68
France	77	72
Great Britain	65	62
Italy	86	82
Sweden	66	62

<sup>a</sup> Defined as couples with or without children and one-parent households with one or more children. All figures exclude cohabiting couples without children, except for Sweden (1981).

Sources: Hall (1986, p. 26) and Golini (1987, p. 707).

Table 8

Percentage distribution of household members by relationship to household head: Poland and Switzerland.

Country	Date	Relationship to head				
		Head	Spouse	Child	Relative	Other
Poland	1970	30	21	41	8	8
	1974	31	22	40	8	8
	1978	32	22	38	7	7
Switzerland	1920	24	17	42	6	11
	1930	26	18	39	6	11
	1960	31	22	34	5	7
	1970	34	23	34	3	6
	1980	40	24	31	2	3

Source: Wall (1984, p. 28).

holds nowadays hardly ever consist of a family and 'others', like servants, or employees of a business. In Germany in 1910, 17% of all households lodged non-relatives; in the upper class this was even the rule. Such households have almost disappeared. And three-generation households do not exist any longer either in the largest cities of West Germany [Schwarz (1988, section 6.2)].

Wall (1984, p. 28) has compiled data showing diminishing proportions of non-relatives (e.g. servants) as well as of relatives (e.g. aunts, uncles, cousins, brothers- and sisters-in-law) in some countries. We have taken the cases of Poland and Switzerland as examples (see table 8).

There is no evidence available to distinguish between the effect of particular individuals moving out and the equivalent population of later periods being able to form independent households. Therefore, the link between the exit of the household 'extras' and the growth of the household 'core' is only implicit [Wall (1984, p. 11)]. The declining proportions of 'relatives' in European households indicate that single women, widows and divorcees are no longer as dependent on the support of their parents or brothers and sisters as they were in the past. They are either employed, or else they are entitled to social welfare (or alimony) or a pension [Schwarz (1988, section 6.3.1)].

Still another aspect of the nuclearization of the family household is the decreasing importance of three- and four-generation households. Despite increased longevity [e.g. 3 out of 10 children born in the

Netherlands in 1981 will have a surviving great-grandmother at age 10 (see Langeveld (1985, p. 49)), the average number of great-granddaughters of a 95-year old woman in the Netherlands is estimated to have fallen from 2.8 in 1939 to 1.9 in 1984 [Bartlema and Winkelbauer (1986, table 1)]. Thus the decrease of fertility, together with the changing socio-economic conditions and urbanization processes noted earlier, has caused the number of three- or four-generation households to drop considerably – for instance in West Germany by about 50% between 1961 and 1982. No more than 5% of all West German children grow up in households containing both their parents and their grandparents. If the grandparents are very old, it is more common that they live with their (adult) children. In such cases, the grandchildren have generally already left the parental home [Schwarz (1988, section 6.3.1)].

#### **4. The growing importance of non-traditional households**

The mirror image of the decreasing dominance of the traditional family is of course the growing importance of other types of households. Most notable are one-parent families, one-person households and consensual unions.

##### *4.1. One-parent families*

A one-parent family may be defined as a family consisting of only one adult and one or more dependent children. Table 9 shows an increasing prevalence of one-parent families in recent years, after a relatively high incidence of the phenomenon in the 1960s. Three combined factors are at work here: declining mortality, as a result of which the number of widows and widowers with dependent children is declining; the rising number of divorces, due to which an increasing number of children grow up with either the mother or the father; and the declining (re)marriage frequency among lone parents [Schwarz (1988, section 6.3.2)]. Table 10 shows the shift from widowhood to divorce as a major cause for the formation of one-parent families during the last few decades. The case of the Netherlands is particularly illuminating here.

Table 9  
One-parent families as a percentage of all families.

Country	c. 1960	c. 1970	c. 1980
Czechoslovakia <sup>a</sup>	—	5 1970	6 1980
FRG <sup>b</sup>	11 1961	9 1970	11 1982
Great Britain <sup>c</sup>	—	8 1971–73	11 1981–83
Hungary	13 1960	10 1970	11 1980
Netherlands	10 1960	9 1971	7 1985
Poland	—	13 1970	14 1984
Switzerland	—	5 1970	7 1980

<sup>a</sup> One-parent families with at least one child under 15, as a percentage of all family households.

<sup>b</sup> One-parent families with at least one child under 18, as a percentage of all family households.

<sup>c</sup> Only (one-parent) families with dependent children (persons under 16, or aged 16–18 and in full-time education) are considered.

Sources: Pavlík and Kalibová (1986) for Czechoslovakia, Schwarz (1986) for the FRG, Rimmer (1986) for GB, Kamarás (1986) for Hungary, Clason (1986) for the Netherlands 1960, 1971, NCBS (1987) for 1985, Kondrat (1986) for Poland, Blanc (1985) for Switzerland.

#### 4.2. Consensual unions

In most European countries the propensity to marry has fallen during the past decades. This has been compensated by increases in

Table 10  
Percentage distribution of lone fathers and lone mothers, by marital status.

Country	Date	Marital status								
		Never married		Married		Divorced		Widowed		
		M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
Czechoslovakia	1970	—	10	—	24	—	34	—	30	—
	1980	—	8	—	25	—	40	—	27	—
FRG	1961	—	20	13	9	25	24	63	46	
	1970	—	15	36	12	29	32	36	39	
	1982	—	16	28	16	33	45	33	24	
Netherlands	1960	—	3	7	12	7	14	85	71	
	1971	3	6	15	12	10	17	73	65	
	1983	10	13	—	6	48	60	41	21	
Switzerland	1970	1	5	14	10	13	23	73	62	
	1980	—	6	17	12	26	36	57	46	

Sources: See table 8; also Clason (1986) for the Netherlands 1983.

Table 11  
 Percentage of women living in a consensual union, by age.

Country	Date	Age			
		18–19	20–24	25–29	30–34
Denmark	1975	23	30	10	5
	1981	..	37	23	11
France	1975	1	4	3	3
	1982	3	10	8	5
Netherlands	1979	1	10	..	..
	1982	3	16	10	4
	1985	..	16 <sup>a</sup>	13	5 <sup>b</sup>
Norway	1977	6	12	5	2
	1986	12	28	16	9
Sweden	1975	16	29	15	5
	1981	..	44	31	14

<sup>a</sup> Applies to age-group 21–24.

<sup>b</sup> Applies to age-group 30–37.

*Sources:* NCBS (1984), Rallu (1987), Van de Giessen (1987) and Gulbrandsen (1987).

non-marital cohabitation: two persons live together as husband and wife without being formally married. However, the process has not occurred at the same time and speed everywhere. While in Sweden and Denmark cohabitation has become a social institution – a socially accepted type of personal living arrangement – this is much less the case in other European countries. Perhaps we can say that, roughly, the further south (and east?), the more cohabitation can be typified as social deviance (see table 11).

Why are Sweden and Denmark leaders in the trend towards cohabitation? Some explanations are the criticism of the institution of the nuclear family in these countries in the 1960s, and the changes in gender roles together with an increase in the labour-force participation of women. Of course, these factors have also played a role elsewhere in Europe. But they can be much more specific in one country than in the other. For instance, Trost (1986, pp. 11–13) pointed out that in Scandinavia behavioural norms were not against premarital sex, and that the Christian church has never completely replaced older marriage rituals. Therefore it is too much to say that other European countries will follow Denmark and Sweden in the same way.

Table 12  
Percentage of women living in a union, by age.

Country	Date	Formally married			Cohabiting or married		
		Age 20–24	Age 25–29	Age 30–34	Age 20–24	Age 25–29	Age 30–34
Denmark	1975	36	74	83	65	84	88
	1981	24	60	77	69	85	89
France	1975	48	79	86	51	81	87
	1980/81	41	73	83	49	78	85
Great Britain	1976	57	81	84	59	84	86
	1980	48	76	86	54	81	88
Netherlands	1982	37 <sup>a</sup>	72	82 <sup>b</sup>	54 <sup>a</sup>	83	86 <sup>b</sup>
	1985	27 <sup>a</sup>	64	80 <sup>b</sup>	43 <sup>a</sup>	77	86 <sup>b</sup>
Sweden	1975	24	60	76	53	77	84
	1980/81	15	47	67	59	78	81

<sup>a</sup> Applies to age-group 21–24.

<sup>b</sup> Applies to age-group 30–37.

Sources: Höpflinger (1985, p. 51), Van de Giessen (1987, p. 15).

One aspect of cohabitation is its location on the continuum from socially deviant to accepted behaviour. A second is the extent to which it is considered as a full alternative for rather than as a prelude to marriage. The available information is incomplete, but it suggests that, generally speaking, young people live together before they marry, whereas at advanced ages consensual unions are often formed after the break-up of a marriage, thereby quite often taking place of a new marriage. Höpflinger (1985, p. 51) has presented data with which we can illustrate cohabitation among young adults (table 12).

In all five West European countries for which we have data, the drop in the propensity to marry has largely been compensated by non-marital cohabitation. For some women (Denmark, ages 20–34; Great Britain, ages 30–34; Sweden, ages 20–29) there is even overcompensation. Yet the steeply rising proportions married by age, also in the early 1980s, indicate that young adults consider a consensual union as a trial marriage. When the woman is pregnant, or when the couple plans to have a child, the union is often legalized. For instance, two thirds of the unmarried young persons who were interviewed in the 1984 Life-style Survey in the Netherlands stated that the (planned) birth of a child

Table 13

Percentage of young people living with spouse and percentage in non-marital cohabitation, by age: Europe, <sup>a</sup> 1982.

	Age											
	15-16		17-18		19-20		21-22		23-24		Total	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
With wife or husband	-	1	-	3	4	15	15	29	24	47	8	19
Cohabiting	-	1	1	2	2	6	8	7	13	8	4	5

<sup>a</sup> Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Source: *The Young Europeans*: Commission of the European Communities Survey, December 1982, quoted by Kiernan (1984, p. 6).

would be a reason for them to marry. Hence, the situation in which two cohabiting persons have one or more children in the same household is rather scarce. In West Germany, not more than 10% of couples in 'consensual unions' have children, only about a third of whom are the child of both parents [Schwarz (1988, section 6.3.3)].

Finally, it may be noted that young cohabiting people in Europe tend to show the same age difference between the partners (2-3 years) as married partners do (see table 13). This is confirmed by Gulbrandson (1987, p. 50) who uses Norwegian data at the individual level.

#### 4.3. One-person households

In contrast to the data situation for one-parent families and consensual unions, there is a wealth of information regarding one-person households, since national household statistics have always been subdivided by household size. This enabled Wall (1984) to give an extensive overview, both in time and in space, of trends in one-person households in Europe since World War II. Table 14 includes those countries for which recent data are available.

Before considering the figures in table 14, one should be aware that units identified as households in a particular country at a given date, cannot always be compared with households in other countries and/or at other dates. This usual disclaimer for household-trend studies was already made in general in section 1, but in the case of one-person



Table 14  
Percentage of one-person households, around 1946–1980.

Country	Approximate date							
	1946	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
<i>Western Europe</i>								
Austria	–	18	–	20	–	25	–	26
France	19	–	–	20	–	22	–	25
FRG	12	19	18	21	–	25	29	31
Ireland	11	–	–	13	13	14	–	16
Luxembourg	9	–	–	12	13	16	–	21
Netherlands	9	–	–	12	–	17	19	22
Switzerland	–	–	–	14	–	20	–	29
<i>United Kingdom</i>								
England and Wales	–	11	12	15	18	18 <sup>a</sup>	22	22 <sup>a</sup>
<i>Scandinavia</i>								
Denmark	–	14	–	–	17	–	–	31
Finland	–	18	–	22	–	24	26	27
Norway	–	15	–	18	–	21	–	28 <sup>b</sup>
Sweden	25	21	–	20	22	25	30	33
<i>Southern Europe and Turkey</i>								
Italy	–	10	–	11	–	13	–	18 <sup>c</sup>
Portugal	–	8	–	12	–	10	–	13
Turkey	–	–	4	4	–	3	3	6
<i>Eastern Europe</i>								
GDR	16	–	–	–	27	26	–	27
Hungary	–	–	–	14	–	18	–	20
Poland	–	–	–	16	–	16	16	17
Yugoslavia	12	–	12	14	–	13	–	14

<sup>a</sup> Great Britain: see Kiernan (1983, p. 18).

<sup>b</sup> Norway 1980: see Moen (1987, p. 5).

<sup>c</sup> Italy 1981: see Golini (1987, p. 706).

Source: Compiled by Wall (1984), unless otherwise stated.

households one should be particularly careful. For instance, the application of the housing concept (rather than the housekeeping concept) in Sweden and in Switzerland in 1970 seems likely to lead to an undercount of one-person households in these countries relative to a count based on the alternative household definition. This is because lodgers and other undertenants catering for themselves will appear as part of the principal household, not as householders in their own right [Wall (1984, p. 3)].

Bearing these qualifications in mind, we note an increasing importance of one-person households. Immediately after World War II, only Sweden recorded more than 20%. Since then, this level has spread over Europe – by the 1980s, in all Scandinavian countries, in all countries in Western Europe except one, and in some Eastern European countries at least every fifth household is headed by a solitary. Some Eastern European countries and the major part of Southern Europe, however, show only a very weak trend in this direction.

Several explanations have been put forward for the rising importance of one-person households. One group of factors are demographic: delayed marriage among young people; divorce without a new relationship at middle ages; and excess male mortality among the elderly [Schmid (1988, section 2.4.3), Schwarz (1988, section 6.3.4), Hall (1986, p. 27)]. Others are cultural and denote a shift in favour of the propensity to live alone [Roussel (1983, pp. 1005–1007), Pampel (1983), Wall (1984, p. 6)]. Finally, Wall (1984, p. 6) suggests an economic argument: increasing living standards during recent decades have made it easier for an individual to set up a solitary household. But the empirical evidence he finds is only very weak.

Roussel has pointed out that the group of persons living alone is very heterogeneous, but a breakdown by age and sex permits some general and very broad conclusions (table 15).

The 'isolation of the elderly woman' is not a very recent phenomenon, as Hall (1986, p. 27) suggested – table 15 shows that it existed in the early 1970s already, and that the proportion of elderly women among all one-person households has been quite stable. But the increasing share of young adults during the 1970s is noteworthy. This trend may very well be caused by increasing propensities among young adults to leave the parental household, as discussed in section 2.2. Hall (1986, p. 28) suggests the same phenomena for Finland and Greece.

A more detailed breakdown by age and region is given by Eurostat, but it applies to the year 1977 only [Eurostat (1982, pp. 88–89)]. Among the then eight members of the EC, the share of 18–24 year-old persons in one-person households ranged from a low of 1% in Italy and 2% in the UK, to a high of 8% in France and 12% in the Netherlands. The latter relatively high figure may be explained by the opportunities offered to young people to set up their own household even when they are still studying. In the other EC-member states an individual must probably be in paid employment before setting up a separate household.

Table 15  
Percentage distribution of one-person households by age and sex, around 1970 and 1980.

Age	c. 1970			c. 1980		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
<i>FRG</i>	<i>1972</i>			<i>1981</i>		
< 35	12	7	19	13	10	23
35-64	10	27	37	11	35	46
65+	7	37	44	7	24	31
Total	29	71	100	31	69	100
<i>France</i>	<i>1975</i>			<i>1981</i>		
< 35	10	8	18	11	10	22
35-64	13	18	31	9	17	26
65+	10	41	51	12	40	52
Total	33	67	100	33	67	100
<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>1971</i>			<i>1985</i>		
< 35	17	11	28	19	16	35
35-64	12	20	32	14	16	30
65+	9	31	40	7	28	35
Total	38	62	100	41	59	100
<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>1970</i>			<i>1980</i>		
< 35	12	12	24	16	15	31
35-64	13	24	37	14	19	33
65+	8	32	39	7	29	36
Total	32	68	100	37	63	100

Sources: NCBS (1987) for Netherlands 1985; Roussel (1983, p. 1001) for all other figures.

The largest share in each country consists of elderly persons: the proportion over 60 ranges from 53% in the Netherlands and 57% in Ireland to 68% in Italy and 74% in the UK. In contrast with the lower age groups (where the shares of females are more or less equal to those of males), there is a great imbalance between the sexes in the higher age groups. But males living alone predominate in the middle age group (both 25-34 years and 35-49 years), possibly as a result of the usual custody rules after divorce.

Most solitary householders live in urban areas. In the commune of Ixelles (Brussels) 56% of households contain just one person; Ile-de-France shows a figure of 30%, rising to 48% in the Ville de Paris; 32% is observed for Inner London, and 39% in Amsterdam [Hall (1986, p. 28, 29)]. Do these solitary householders live in loneliness and isolation? It would be rash to conclude that, since parents, children or other close

relatives often live in the same city, in the same street, or even in the same house. Although relations between generations are often close, both sides prefer to live apart for as long as possible [Schwarz (1988, section 6.3.4)]. Dooghe (1985, p. 245) reports that among nearly 1,200 elderly people in Flanders who were interviewed in 1985 and who had children, 26% had their nearest living child at the same address, and 14% in the same street. Of the solitary elderly with surviving children, 87% had had a contact with them during the week previous to the interview. These and other findings lead to the conclusion that despite increased spatial mobility of the children, family ties with their parents have not weakened.

## 5. Future trends in living arrangements

In the previous sections we have seen profound changes in the European household over the last decades: a weaker role of the traditional family, and increasing significance of other household types, such as consensual unions and one-person households. What will be the future of the household? To what extent will rising divorce rates diminish the role of the traditional family? How does leaving home at a higher age affect future household structures? And what is the impact of prolonged durations that couples spend in consensual unions?

An exact answer to these and similar questions can only be given with a dynamic model that is able to simulate household events and household structures. Such a model goes beyond the traditional 'headship rate' model, which is static by nature and which only gives proportions of persons in the household states in question at distinct points in time. In that respect the 'headship rate' model is comparable to a model that projects proportions in each marital status; it does not consider nuptiality processes explicitly, as a dynamic model would do.

Using the so-called LIPRO-model (*Life-style Projections*) which was recently developed at the NIDI, one can project the dynamics of the living arrangements of the population in private households, by age and sex. An extensive methodological description of the model, accompanied by results of several simulations for the case of the Netherlands may be found elsewhere [Keilman and Van Dam (1987)]. Here we restrict ourselves to a few results.

The model projects the male and the female population in private households in the Netherlands, broken down by five-year age groups and by life style. Life style is operationalized by household status, and LIPRO distinguishes seven such statuses, two for dependent children and five for adults:

1. child living with two married parents;
2. child living in other family (including one-parent family);
3. living with a marriage partner;
4. living in a one-person household;
5. cohabiting;
6. other family (including one-parent family);
7. non-family household.

These household states define a  $7 \times 7$  household-event matrix, with 49 cells. The passage of an individual from one state to another identifies an event, in terms of an immediate change in household status.

The framework sketched above may be formalized in a Markov model. This was done for each sex/age category. A benchmark projection was carried out using the observed 1984 population of the Netherlands by age, sex and household status as an initial population, and applying observed household-status transition rates to describe future life-style dynamics. These observations come from the 1984 Life-style Survey in the Netherlands.

### *5.1. Results for individuals*

Fig. 1 gives the distribution by household position, of the population of the Netherlands living in private households for the years 1984, 1989, ..., 2009. It also gives the total population living in private households, which will rise from 14.1 million persons in 1984 to 15.4 million in 2009. The growth rate continues to decline. This agrees with the results of the official population forecast for the Netherlands, compiled by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics [NCBS (1986)]. The following changes in the distribution by household position are apparent:

- The percentage of children living at home will be more than 25% lower in 25 years time than it is now.
- The number of persons living alone will increase by more than a third in 25 years time.




Fig. 1. Percentage distribution of persons in private households, by household position: projection for the Netherlands, 1984–2009.

- The greatest increase will take place among the extramarital cohabitants: their share will double, their numbers will increase by 140% in 25 years time. This rise will be particularly strong in the coming 10 years.

Table 16  
Population aged 70 years and over, by sex and household position: projection for the Netherlands, 1984–1999.

Household position	1984		1989		1994		1999	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
	(1,000s)							
Living alone	111	414	145	515	182	606	216	677
Extramarital cohabitation	1	1	2	2	3	3	5	5
Marital cohabitation	273	197	325	232	382	278	416	305
Other family	0	0	0	0	1	7	2	17
Non-family household	2	2	5	8	10	16	14	23
Total	386	614	477	758	577	910	653	1027

- In 25 years time, married cohabitants will still occupy a dominant position. However, from the mid-1990s their share will start to decline.
- Persons in ‘other families’ will increase fairly rapidly, in particular in the coming few years. However, their share with regard to other household positions will remain insignificant.

What does the ageing process that can be expected for the Netherlands entail for the household situation of the elderly? Table 16 tells us more: the number of elderly persons living alone will increase sharply in the coming years – at a much faster rate than the number of elderly married cohabitants. There is a significant difference between males and females. The proportion of women living alone – for people over 70 years – is about twice as high as the proportion of men living alone; moreover, the situation among women is fairly stable, whereas there is a constant increase among men.

The results presented above throw light on the future household *positions* of individuals. However, they do not illustrate the *dynamics* of households over a given period of time. For example, what would be the probability that a child in a two-parent family will have moved to another type of household five years later? Table 17 presents some age-specific transition probabilities that provide the answer to the above question.

Males remain in their parental home until a later age than females. And they do not set up a one-person household as often (except youths aged 20–24 years who still live in their parental home). This, of course,

Table 17

Percentage distribution by household position in 1989 for children living with two married parents in 1984, by age and sex: projection for the Netherlands.

Age in 1984	Household position in 1989				
	Child with parents	Child in other family	Living alone	In consensual union	Living with spouse
	<i>Females</i>				
10-14	63	3	2	17	16
15-19	43	3	12	10	24
20-24	13	2	9	7	67
25-29	0	40	23	5	31
	<i>Males</i>				
10-14	90	3	2	2	1
15-19	70	4	6	7	8
20-24	31	2	13	14	36
25-29	1	3	7	5	70

may be attributed to factors such as military service and further education. Males who leave their parental home do not start living with somebody else as frequently as females do. And if they marry at an advanced age, they quite often marry directly from their parental home.

### 5.2. Projection variants

When deriving the parameters from the available data, we made a number of assumptions. Moreover, the assumption that the observed 1979-1984 household dynamics will also apply to future living arrangements, is only a first approximation to reality. We have, therefore, examined the sensitivity of the projection results by changing the values of a number of crucial parameters. In the process, we can also gain a deeper insight into the possible range of future household trends. Four variants will be discussed here:

- (1) The main variant, a few results of which have already been given.
- (2) A variant in which all age-specific rates for leaving the parental home have been lowered by 10%.
- (3) A variant in which all age-specific rates for the transition from 'marital cohabitation' to 'other family' were raised by 10%. This simulates the effect of increased divorce rates.



Table 18  
Population size and composition by household position, calculated using different variants:  
projection for the Netherlands.

Household position	1994				1999			
	Projection variant <sup>a</sup>				Projection variant <sup>a</sup>			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
<i>% distribution</i>								
Child with								
both parents	25.5	25.9	25.5	25.5	24.4	24.6	24.3	24.3
Child in other family	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.6
Living alone	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.1	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.8
Non-marital								
cohabitation	5.1	4.9	5.1	5.2	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.6
Marital cohabitation	49.7	49.4	49.6	49.6	49.6	49.4	49.5	49.6
Other family	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4
Non-family household	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9
<i>Total population (millions)</i>								
Total = 100%	14.87	14.84	14.87	14.87	15.15	15.09	15.15	15.14

<sup>a</sup> 1 = benchmark; 2 = 10% lower propensity to leave the parental home; 3 = 10% higher divorce rates; 4 = 10% lower marriage rates among non-marital cohabitants.

- (4) A variant in which the figures for the transition from 'extramarital cohabitation' to 'marital cohabitation' were lowered by 10%. This simulates what would happen if non-marital cohabitation became an alternative to marriage, rather than a preliminary to marriage.

Table 18 shows the influence of the differences between the four variants for the projected total population living in private households, and for its distribution over the different household types. The differences between the results of the main variant on the one hand, and of variants (2)–(4) on the other hand, are surprisingly small. Demographic inertia apparently plays a major role in household trends: the composition of the future population is strongly influenced by the structure of the present population. For example, if the tendency to get married falls by 10% (variant 4), the number of extramarital cohabiting couples will amount to about 390,000 in 1994, and 420,000 in 1999. In the standard variant these figures are about 380,000 in 1994 and about 410,000 in 1999. Compared with the present 195,000 extramarital cohabiting couples, this difference is negligible.

It should be mentioned that results for more specific population categories show larger differences than those noted above. For instance, variant (2) (low home leaving propensities) results in 403,000 children aged 20–24 living with two parents in 1999, as opposed to 376,000 in the benchmark variant. And since fertility rates for young adults who live with their parents are negligible, decreased home leaving results in 853,000 children aged 0–4 in 1999, or some 3% less than in the benchmark run. Another effect of young adults staying longer with their parents, is that the number of other families *increases*, because a parent in such a family has a lower chance of becoming a solitary householder or member of a consensual union.

The ‘increased cohabitation’ run (variant 4) predicts 2% more children aged 0–4 in other families in 1999 than the benchmark run does (despite unchanged fertility rates). But the extra number of unmarried cohabitants in 1999 is only small: +4% in the age group 20–24, +3% for the age groups 25–29 and 30–34, and +4% for those aged 35–39 or 40–44. For the number of non-marital cohabitants in the Netherlands to increase at a faster rate than what is generally expected on the basis of the present circumstances, there would have to be a drastic and prolonged decline in the tendency to get married. In other words, traditional marriage is not likely to cede its dominant position before the turn of the century.

## **6. Conclusions: The individual life cycle**

Despite regional diversity, a few general trends can be summarized for European countries. The focus will again be on Western Europe, and the statements are, of necessity, not very precise. We shall not concentrate here on macro-demographic trends regarding the household and the family, but attempt to describe the individual.

The individual has much weaker ties with traditional families nowadays than a few decades ago. Children are more often involved in a divorce; when they leave the parental home, they relatively often live on their own, or in non-marital cohabitation. Nevertheless, such a living arrangement is often a prelude to marriage, and only in Sweden and Denmark is it a full alternative to marriage for the majority of the cohabitants. In the rest of Europe, marriage usually occurs as soon as a child is desired or expected. Yet an increasing number of children are

born outside wedlock. The character of this non-marital fertility is, however, different from that of the 1960s: a shift has taken place from 'accidents' to 'planned' births.

The presence of children has a stabilizing effect on the living arrangement of the parents. This holds true for married parents as well as for consensual unions. But non-traditional living arrangements, with or without children, are much less stable than the traditional family. For young and the middle-aged adults, living alone is most often only a transitory living arrangement. But the elderly, in particular women, are often solitary householders. Women heading a one-parent family are much less inclined to search for a (marriage) partner than are lone fathers, or they have less opportunity to do so, especially if they are not working.

In the future we shall witness a substantial increase in the prevalence of non-traditional living arrangements. There will be fewer marriages, more voluntarily childless couples, and more consensual unions (also among the elderly). The high marriage propensities at young ages in the 1960s were replaced by consensual unions in the 1970s. Extrapolating this trend one might expect that an increasing number of cohabitants will view their life style as a full alternative to a legal marriage. However, marriage will probably not lose its dominant position in many European countries before the turn of the century.

## References

- Bartlema, J. and L. Winkelbauer, 1986, Modelling kinship with LISP – a two-sex model of kin-counts. Paper presented at the IIASA Conference on Aging and the Family, 3–5 September 1986, Sopron, Hungary.
- Blanc, O., 1985, Les ménages en Suisse – Quelques aspects de leur évolution de 1960 à 1980 à travers les statistiques de recensement, *Population* 40, no. 4–5, 657–674.
- Burch, T.K., 1980, The index of overall headship: A simple measure of household complexity standardized for age and sex, *Demography* 17, no. 1, 25–38.
- Calot, G. and C. Blayo, 1982, Recent course of fertility in Western Europe, *Population Studies* 36, no. 3, 349–372.
- Clason, C., 1986, One-parent families in the Netherlands, in: Deven and Cliquet, eds. (1986) 195–208.
- Deven, F. and R.L. Cliquet, eds., 1986, One-parent families in Europe – Trends, experiences, implications. Publications of the Netherlands Interuniversity Demographic Institute (NIDI) and the Population and Family Study Center (CBGS), Vol. 15 (NIDI/CBGS, The Hague/Brussels).
- Dooghe, G., 1985, Het gezin op oudere leeftijd (The family in later life), *Bevolking en Gezin* 1985, no. 3, 229–252.

- Eurostat, 1982, Economic and social features of households in the member states of the European Community (Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, Luxemburg).
- Eversley, D., 1983, The family and housing policy, in: *The family*, Proceedings of the British Society for Population Studies Conference, 1983, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys Occasional Paper 31 (OPCS, London) 82–95.
- Eversley, D., 1984, Evolution de la composition des ménages et du cycle de la vie familiale, *Etudes démographiques* no. 11 (Conseil de l'Europe, Strasbourg).
- Glick, P.C. and S.-L. Lin, 1986, More adults are living with their parents: Who are they?, *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 48, no. 1, 107–112.
- Golini, A., 1987, Famille et ménage dans l'Italie récente, *Population* 42, nos. 4–5, 699–714.
- Gulbrandsen, O., 1987, Mot år 2000: bo alene eller sammen? (Towards the year 2000: living alone or in consensual union?) (Norwegian Building Research Institute, Oslo).
- Gulbrandsen, O. and Th. Hansen, 1986, *Boligetabling i Oslo* (Housing construction in Oslo) (Norwegian Building Research Institute, Oslo).
- Hajnal, J., 1965, European marriage patterns in perspective, in: D.V. Glass and D.E.C. Eversley, eds., *Population in history* (Edward Arnold, London) 101–143.
- Hall, R., 1986, Household trends within Western Europe 1970–1980, in: A. Findlay and P. White, eds., *West European population change* (Croom Helm, London) 19–34.
- Heer, D.M., R.W. Hodge and M. Felson, 1985, The cluttered nest: Evidence that young adults are more likely to live at home now than in the recent past, *Sociology and Social Research* 69, no. 3, 436–441.
- Höpflinger, F., 1985, Changing marriage behaviour: Some European comparisons, *Genus* XLI, nos. 3–4, 41–64.
- Kamarás, F., 1986, One-parent families in Hungary, in: Deven and Cliquet, eds. (1986) 155–172.
- Keilman, N. and J. van Dam, 1987, A dynamic household projection model – An application of multidimensional demography to life styles in the Netherlands, *Netherlands Interuniversity Demographic Institute Working Paper* no. 72 (NIDI, The Hague).
- Kiernan, K.E., 1983, The structure of the family today: continuity or change?, in: *The family*, Proceedings of the British Society for Population Studies Conference, 1983, Office of Population Censuses and Surveys Occasional Paper 31 (OPCS, London) 17–36.
- Kiernan, K.E., 1984, The departure of children, Paper presented at the IUSSP/DGBW seminar on the Demography of the later phases of the life cycle, 3–7 September 1984, Berlin.
- Klijzing, F.K.H., 1984, Household data from surveys containing information for individuals, Paper presented at the workshop 'Modelling of Household Formation and Dissolution', 12–13 December 1984, Voorburg, The Netherlands.
- Kondrat, W., 1986, One-parent families in Poland: Socio-demographic characteristics, in: Deven and Cliquet, eds. (1986) 209–219.
- Langeveld, H.M., 1985, Binding in vrijheid: Een studie naar toekomstige gezinnen, relaties en hulpverlening (Tied down in freedom: A study of future families, relationships and social aid), *Sociale en Culturele Studies* no. 6 (Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, Government Publ., The Hague).
- Lesthaeghe, R. and D.J. van de Kaa, 1986, Twee demografische transitities? (Two demographic transitions?), in: D.J. van de Kaa and R. Lesthaeghe, eds., *Bevolking: Groei en krimp, Mens en Maatschappij Boekaflevering* jrg. 61 (Van Loghum Slaterus, Deventer, The Netherlands) 9–24.
- Moen, B., 1987, Multi-household families, Paper presented at the European Population Conference, 11–16 June 1987, Jyväskylä, Finland.
- NCBS (Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics), 1984a, Niet-gehuwd samenwonen in Nederland en in enkele andere Europese landen (Non-marital cohabitation in the Netherlands and in some other European countries), *Monthly Bulletin of Population Statistics* 32, no. 2, 12–13.

- NCBS, 1984b, *Huishoudens 1981: Sociaal demografische cijfers (Households 1981: Socio-demographic data)* (Government Publ., The Hague).
- NCBS, 1986, *Bevolkingsprognose voor Nederland, 1985–2035 (Population forecasts for the Netherlands, 1985–2035)*, *Monthly Bulletin of Population Statistics* 34, no. 3, 15–29, 33–42.
- NCBS, 1987, *Huishoudens, oktober 1985 (Households, October 1985)*, Results of the 1985 Housing Survey.
- Pampel, F.C., 1983, Changes in the propensity to live alone: Evidence from consecutive cross-sectional surveys, 1960–1976, *Demography* 20, no. 4, 433–447.
- Pavlík, Z. and K. Kalibová, 1986, One-parent families in Czechoslovakia, in: Deven and Cliquet, eds. (1986) 125–139.
- Ploegmakers, M.J.H. and L.Th. van Leeuwen, 1986, *Huishoudens in Nederland: Twee decennia verandering: Een statistische analyse over de periode 1960–1981 (Households in the Netherlands: Two decades of change: A statistical analysis over the years 1960–1981)* (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, The Hague).
- Rallu, J.L., 1986, Projections des familles aux 1.1.1990 et 1.1.1995, *Population* 41, no. 3, 511–532.
- Rallu, J.L., 1987, La cohabitation dans les pays occidentaux. Paper presented at the European Population Conference, 11–16 June 1987, Jyväskylä, Finland.
- Rimmer, L., 1986, One-parent families in Great Britain: Financial and social aspects, in: Deven and Cliquet, eds. (1986) 317–336.
- Roussel, L., 1983, Les ménages d'une personne: l'évolution récente, *Population* 38, no. 6, 995–1016.
- Schmid, J., 1988, Principles from sociology for definitions and typologies of household structures, in: N. Keilman, A. Kuijsten and A. Vossen, eds., *Modelling household formation and dissolution* (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 13–22.
- Schwarz, K., 1985, Haushaltszugehörigkeit im Lebensablauf, in: H. Birg, ed., *Demographische Methoden zur Prognose der Haushalts- und Familienstruktur* (Institut für Bevölkerungsforschung und Sozialpolitik, Bielefeld) 155–205.
- Schwarz, K., 1986, One-parent families in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: Deven and Cliquet, eds. (1986) 141–154.
- Schwarz, K., 1988, Household trends in Europe after World War II, in: N. Keilman, A. Kuijsten and A. Vossen, eds., *Modelling household formation and dissolution* (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 67–83.
- Trost, J., 1986, Cohabitation and marriage: Transitional pattern, different life style, or just another legal form?, Paper presented at the workshop 'Life styles, Contraception and Parenthood', 25–27 September 1986, Amsterdam.
- Van de Giessen, G.J., 1987, Jongeren gaan later samenwonen (Youngsters start to cohabit later in life), *Monthly Bulletin of Population Statistics* 35, no. 1, 14–15.
- Van de Kaa, D.J., 1980, Recent trends in fertility in Western Europe, in: R.W. Hiorns, ed., *Demographic patterns in developed societies* (Taylor and Francis, London) 55–81.
- Wall, R., 1984, The development of the European household since World War II, Paper presented at the workshop 'Modelling of household formation and dissolution', 12–14 December 1984, Voorburg, The Netherlands.
- Young, C., 1987, Young people leaving home in Australia: The trend towards independence, *Australian Family Formation Project Monograph no. 9* (Australian Institute of Family Studies, Melbourne).