I disagree with the practice of defining romantic jealousy in terms of other emotions, on the grounds that it is circular and redundant. Moreover, it appears implausible to me that the variety of private motives for protecting a relationship against an interloper can be accounted for by a unitary source of motivation, such as an emotion of romantic jealousy. I propose that the words romantic jealousy, *instead of identifying an emotion of jealousy, refer to the situation characterized by the potential, or actual, loss of a loved one, or a mate, to a real or imagined rival. Reactions in such a situation, whatever they may be, are labeled as jealousy. On the basis of the assumption that individuals create culture to satisfy personal goals and are, in turn, affected by their cultural creations, I identify particular cultural factors as increasing the likelihood that an individual will be threatened by a jealousy event. The individual makes use of culturally sanctioned coping strategies for dealing with the threat. These concepts are discussed in the context of appraisal processes.*

CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF JEALOUSY

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A Samoan wife, upon discovering that a woman had had an affair with her husband, used to seek out the rival woman and bite her on the nose (Turner, 1884). An American wife is unlikely to cope with her husband's infidelity in a similar manner. The variation in coping style is attributed by many writers on romantic jealousy to cultural differences. In this context, culture is used as an explanatory concept. It presumably explains the behavior of the wives in some unspecified way.

It is the purpose of this article to take the mystery out of the concept of culture[1] by specifying the conditions which lead

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members of different societies to perceive jealousy events differently. Members of some societies are easily threatened by romantic jealousy events, whereas in other societies they notice the events but are not alarmed by them. How do such different evaluations arise? What forces operate in a culture to make jealousy events utterly distasteful in one society but not in another? I proposed that the attitudes expressed in the cultural values[2] toward property ownership, progeny, pairbonding, and sexual activity are the major determinants of the potential for feeling threatened in a jealousy situation. That is to say, I hypothesize that societies with cultural values which put a premium on personal ownership of property, require personal descendants for old age insurance, make marriage a prerequisite for guilt-free sex, and require a mate in order to survive economically and to be accepted as an adult, create the conditions in which an individual is easily threatened by a jealousy event.

Culture is created by human beings to serve their needs and goals. The first portion of the article deals with the consequences of those creations. The latter portion draws attention to the ways that human beings make them work to their advantage. I will start by defining romantic jealousy.

WHAT IS ROMANTIC JEALOUSY?

ROMANTIC JEALOUSY AS AN EMOTION

The reactions of individuals to the transgression of their dating partner or mate vary enormously (Bryson, 1976, 1977). I am going to focus only on emotional experiences and ignore the variety of behavioral reactions in this section of the article. Reports of individuals experiencing anger and depression (Bryson, 1977; Gesell, 1906), fear (Beecher and Beecher, 1971), anxiety, grief and hatred (Gesell, 1906) in jealousy situations are not uncommon.

Reports of this type create difficulties for anyone who defines romantic jealousy. How can one emotion have so many qualitatively different expressions? Two solutions to this dilemma predominate in the literature. Namely, romantic jealousy is defined in terms of another emotion or in terms of several emotions. Let's

consider some of the issues raised by the use of these definitions.

Jealousy is another face of anger, according to Janov (1970). Descartes (Morris, 1971), on the other hand, considers it to be a form of fear. Yet it is not very useful to define the emotion of jealousy in terms of another emotion because it is redundant and circular. If jealousy is a type of fear, then what is fear? Is jealousy a component of fear? We may as well speak of fear, and the sundry ways it may be expressed, rather than use a word which stands in its stead. Unfortunately, as we shortly shall see, no one yet has been able to avoid the issue of circularity.

Many scholars prefer to conceive of romantic jealousy as a mixture or aggregate of many emotions. Thus, romantic jealousy is thought of as a compound emotion consisting of other, presumably more basic, emotions. But which emotions are part of the compound? Scholars do not agree with each other. Some of the combinations which have been proposed are: grief and enmity (Freud, 1924), anger and fear (Hurlock, 1973; Miller et al., 1972; Plutchik, 1980); anger, grief, and self-pity (Gesell, 1906), fear and rage (Davis, 1936), hate and aggression (Klein and Riviere, 1964), anger, fear, and love (Vernon, 1969), apprehension, anxiety, suspicion, and mistrust (Spielman, 1971), and aggression, depression, and envy (Podolsky, 1961).

For the sake of argument, let's assume we had reached an agreement for a particular combination of emotions. We are then faced with the issue of deciding whether the components of the romantic jealousy mixture are individually recognizable, or whether the mixture is qualitatively different from the component emotions. In other words, if we had agreed that romantic jealousy consists of anger and fear, do we wish to assert that the jealous individual may recognize each of these two emotions separately, or are we claiming, as does Plutchik (1980), that romantic jealousy differs, in its nature and characteristics, from its constituent emotions? Perhaps it is experienced as a new emotion, analogous to the phenomenon of obtaining the color brown when blending red with green.

Most scholars take the position that the separate emotions are individually recognizable. This raises another issue. Why does not everyone experience all of the emotions listed in the mixture, and why are some of the emotions experienced sequentially, separated by a timespan of minutes, days, or years? These questions

are seldom answered directly by scholars. But the answer may be inferred from the general tenor of their narrative. The emotion one experiences, so the argument goes, depends upon which aspect of the dilemma one is pondering. Jones (1948), for example, writes that one may experience fear at the thought of losing the loved one, hatred when one thinks of the rival, and grief if the rival succeeds.

But now we have come full circle and we are once more confronted with the folly of defining the emotion of romantic jealousy in terms of another emotion. We are, in effect, still claiming, like Descartes, Janov, and others, that romantic jealousy is actually fear, or anger, or grief, but with the added caveat that the emotion to be experienced depends upon which aspect of the predicament is being weighed by the individual at a particular moment. It is not clear to me in what manner the emotion of romantic jealousy is transformed into another emotion. Implied in this approach of using primary emotions like the links of a chain, is the assumption reminiscent of the ideas expressed in the nineteenth century, that an emotion such as anger represents an immediate, unanalyzable, internal state similar to a sensation which itself need not be explained or analyzed. More to the point, why speak at all of romantic jealousy? Why not describe the individual as experiencing fear, anger or grief, since these are the emotions he or she is experiencing? As far as I have been able to ascertain, no scholar has answered these questions. Therefore, in an attempt to answer them myself, I raised the following question: What information do we communicate when we use the words romantic jealousy instead of fear, anger, and so on? I believe that we communicate the reason for the fear and anger. Therein lies the means to breaking the circularity in the definition of romantic jealousy: Some words of emotion refer to emotional states, whereas others refer to the social situations which serve as the setting for emotions.

ROMANTIC JEALOUSY AS A SITUATION

I propose that the words romantic jealousy refer to a social situation in which the individual is embedded, rather than to a particular emotion in the tradition of Descartes or the sequential transformations of the combinationists, such as Jones. For ex-

ample, if an individual is angry upon discovering that the mate had had an extra-marital affair with a neighbor, I am proposing that the words romantic jealousy identify the particular situation or predicament in which the jealous individual finds himself or herself, rather than the anger. The word anger is sufficient to describe anger. There is no need to replace it with romantic jealousy, but there is a need for a label to identify the situation in which the anger is expressed. We experience anger for many reasons in the course of running our affairs. I am proposing that words such as jealousy, resentment, and others identify the situation in which we are angry. These words justify or explain the reasons for our anger.

For the purpose of clarification, let us assume that we are observing a woman excitedly yelling at a man. The verbal outpouring, combined with an angry expression on her face, lead us to infer that she is angry. But we do not know the reason for her anger. I propose that as soon as we know the cause of her anger, we no longer speak of her anger; instead, we use a word that identifies the social situation in which she is embedded, thereby explaining the visually evident, but heretofore inexplicable, anger.

For example, if we overhear the woman complaining about her husband's sexual liaison with another woman, we conclude that she is jealous. On the other hand, if we overhear the woman complaining bitterly about the husband's refusal to let her pursue a career in medicine, we conclude that she is resentful of his chauvinistic attitude. We are more likely to conclude that she is holding the man in contempt if we infer from her diatribe that they are strangers to each other and the man took the unwarranted liberty of pinching her on the buttock. The woman expresses anger in each of our illustrations. Merely by changing the social situation we explain the anger with a different label. Thus, the words jealousy, resentment, and contempt refer to social situations rather than to emotional states. They place the anger into a social context that justifies, or clarifies the cause of, the anger. The expression of anger is basically unchanged; only the social context or situation varies.

The assumption that emotions are identified by the situation in which they occur is not new. It is present in some form, each theory describing a different process, in many theories (e.g., Carr, 1925; Kemper, 1978; Lazarus, 1966; Mandler, 1975; Schachter

and Singer, 1962; Young, 1943). Nevertheless, although not all of them speculate specifically about romantic jealousy, a logical extension of their approaches leads to the conclusion that the word jealousy is perceived as referring to an emotion and not to a social situation. In other words, the situation is seen as a source for generating a descriptive terminology for emotional states, but not for generating terms referring to the social situations—not even to those situations whose social and psychological dynamics are of such great importance that they generate emotions. Lund (1939: 113) is an exception. He writes that emotion words "are not descriptive of so many internal or organic states. They are descriptive, in most cases, of objective situations and of accepted modes of handling and dealing with these."

It is one thing to suggest that the words romantic jealousy refer to a social situation in which one may experience and express any negatively toned emotion, or other cognitive, physiological and instrumental responses; it is another matter to prove it. As a starting point we did a study in which we constructed four reasons why a husband did not return to his wife after work. The reasons were expected to induce grief ("he was killed in a traffic accident"), fear ("he was kidnapped and threatened to be killed unless Mary can pay the ransom"), anger ("he went to a bar, got drunk, and gambled away his paycheck"), and romantic jealousy ("he went to the apartment of his secretary and had sexual intercourse with her"). Following each of these episodes was a list of sixteen reactions which the wife (Mary) experienced (e.g., There is a lump in my throat. I keep thinking of getting even, of revenge). The reactions were taken from Davitz (1969). He had asked respondents to describe their emotional experiences during fifty emotional states. We selected two reactions from each of eight emotions (anger, anxiety, depression, fear, grief, guilt, hate, jealousy). Our volunteers were to indicate which of these eight emotions the wife was experiencing after each of the sixteen reactions. If the volunteers were labeling the reactions on the basis of internal criteria of how it feels to be angry, jealous, and so on, we would expect their labeling of each reaction to be similar to the definitions reported by Davitz (1969). However, if the volunteers were labeling the reactions on the basis of the nature of the episode (i.e., the situation) then we would expect to find little differentiation among the sixteen reactions and for most of them

to be labeled either anger, grief, fear, or jealousy reactions, depending on the episode.

Our statistical analyses of the experiment are not yet completed. Preliminary analyses indicate overwhelming support for the hypothesis that labels of emotion are assigned on the basis of situational characteristics. Thus, the sixteen reactions were indicated as reflecting anger in the anger situations, and fear in the fear situations. The label of jealousy was typically used only in the jealousy situation. On the other hand, when we did not give a reason for an individual to be experiencing the reactions, the labeling of each reaction was similar to the definitions reported by Davitz. I interpret our finding as providing partial support for the suggestion that the words romantic jealousy refer to a particular situation rather than to a particular emotional experience.

DEFINITION OF THE ROMANTIC JEALOUSY SITUATION

The romantic jealousy situation is defined by the potential, or actual, loss of a loved one, or a mate, to a real or imagined rival. By the use of the word situation I do not wish to imply necessarily a concrete location where one is informed of the overtures of an interloper. Nor is the situation time-limited. Frequently the threat to, or the dissolution of, a relationship occurs over an extended period. This identifies the situation with a social-psychological process—a change in the relationship from day to day as evaluated and judged by the interested parties. Likewise, the loss of a loved one may be more psychological than real. An individual may become upset upon discovering that the partner had been unfaithful some time ago, despite their amicable relationship since then. It is not an issue of an actual loss, but a symbolic loss of some quality which the person values. When we add to these considerations the possibility that the rival may be imagined, or represent the increasing interest of the loved one in his or her career, or something of that nature, and we keep in mind that the meaning of the relationship is based on such factors as the culture, one's motives, and personal history, it becomes evident that the romantic jealousy situation is a cognitive, psychological, and social phenomenon. It is a state of mind based on ideas of how individuals should act with respect to each other, on cultural norms and personal motives.

Several implications follow when the words romantic jealousy are accepted as referring to a particular social situation rather than being restricted to a particular invariant emotion.

(1) It points to the acknowledgment that there are more indicators of a romantic jealousy event than just a single emotion (Bryson, 1977). An individual may react in any of several cognitive, physiological, and behavioral modes. Thus, the individual may express emotions of anger, fear, surprise, disgust, sadness, and so on, or use defense mechanisms. Physiological reactions may range from sensations of numbness to more active autonomic nervous system responses. Behaviorally, the individual may seek a friendly termination of the relationship or engage in verbal or physical aggressive acts. All internal and external responses by someone who is losing a mate or loved one to a rival are classified as romantic jealousy behavior because it is the situation which defines the experience and the behavior as romantic jealousy. For example, the expression of anger, in and of itself, is not jealousy. However, the expression of anger in a jealousy setting provides a specific explanation for the anger. It is the social context which leads one to define the anger as a jealousy reaction. Consequently, any number of cognitive, physiological, and behavioral responses may be classified as jealousy behavior. Weeks (1914) recorded that the husband in Bakongo, Africa demanded a large sum of money from the lover upon discovering that his wife had had an affair with him. The Italian peasant husband of the nineteenth century accused his unfaithful wife of ruining the honor of his family. Each individual behaved differently in a similar situation. Yet, by definition, they all were engaging in jealousy behavior. We are, in effect, frequently attending to different internal experiences and overt behavior in individuals within the same society and across many societies in order to observe the same phenomenon. The words romantic jealousy refer not to uniformity but to diversity, with each internal and external response having its own etiology and function.

(2) It opens the way for researchers to determine the conditions which are most likely to induce any one of the many ways of responding in a jealousy situation—questions which cannot be asked if one assumes that the words romantic jealousy refer to a particular, invariant emotional state. It allows for determining the conditions which lead individuals to differ with respect to the type

of reaction they have, toward whom it is directed, and the intensity of their reaction. Some individuals, for example, do not appear to have an emotional reaction, or if they do, it is too brief to be noticed; instead, they immediately seek to repair the relationship, whereas others focus on licking their wounds, so to speak, and take care of themselves first rather than the relationship.

(3) When the words romantic jealousy are taken as referring to a particular emotional state, then romantic jealousy frequently is used as an explanation for a specific action. For example, the assertion, "He killed him because he was jealous," assumes that jealousy is a motivator, if not a motive, for murder. I am suggesting that jealousy as a particular, invariant emotion or motive, should not be seen as an explanation. Instead, the behavior in a jealousy situation, such as murder, itself needs explanation. There is no single motive, or source of motivation, for the way we react in a romantic jealousy situation. The reactions may have multiple causation, multiple goals, multiple forms of expression in individuals within a specific culture and across cultures. This perspective makes room for different eliciting stimuli, or motives, for our reaction, such as the loss of self-esteem, frustration of our goal to maintain an interpersonal relationship, threat to our property, social status, or means of survival, or whatever else is important to us. The Yanomamo husband, for example, becomes enraged upon discovering a tryst, not so much because of the sexual intercourse but, in contrast to the potential motive of an American husband, "because the adulterous male should have compensated the husband with gifts and services" (Harris, 1974: 85). It is difficult for me to conceive how romantic jealousy, as seen from the perspective of jealousy-as-a-particular-emotion, can be used to explain motives as diverse as those of the American and Yanomamo husbands.

In summary, the words romantic jealousy refer to a particular situation in which an entire class of subjective and overt responses may occur. In that situation, individuals react in ways which allow them to create, maintain or modify phenomena of importance to them. This process may involve emotions, the making of appraisals, decisions, and judgments, coping strategies, or whatever other terms social scientists have found useful for describing human experiences and behavior. In this sense, the concept of a romantic jealousy situation is an umbrella concept, or a gloss, as

Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) would say, for a class of subjective responses and processes of coping, interpreting, and constructing meaning in such a situation. The variety of eliciting stimuli, motives, modifiers of our reactions, and so on, makes untenable the notion of one global jealousy emotion that can account for all possible reactions.

Before I proceed I want to inform the reader of my intention, henceforth, to use the shorter term jealousy, with the understanding that I am referring to romantic jealousy. By romantic jealousy I do not wish to restrict myself to the connotations of love and romance, since most societies base pairbonding on reasons other than romance. I use the words in a general sense to refer to the type of events which threaten a dating or a pairbonding relationship, by reason of the action of an interloper or the interest of one of the partners in the interloper, or some activity which reduces the partner's attentiveness to the relationship.

Why do individuals differ in their reaction and behavior in a jealousy situation? Undoubtedly there are many reasons. Perhaps one of the most important is how the individual evaluates the event. Some of the variables which may influence the individual's appraisal process are the cultural values of his or her society, the psychological, physical and social determinants operating in the jealousy situation, the occupation of the individual, the personality characteristics of the jealous one, the mood of the individual, and cognitive factors, such as the intention to end or maintain the relationship. I am restricting the scope of this article to a consideration of the influence of the culture on the subjective reaction and overt behavior of the individual. I mention the other variables to prevent the possibility of the reader forming the impression that I consider the cultural variable to be the sole determinant of jealousy behavior. In order to see the effect of the cultural milieu, I will first describe the structure of romantic jealousy.

THE STRUCTURE OF ROMANTIC JEALOUSY

The environment which we respond to and act upon is not the real environment, but the perceived environment. We respond to an event on the basis of the meaning that it has for us. Therefore, all of us respond differently to an adulterous mate within the

range of reactions permissible in our society. Our reaction is based on our evaluation of the event in relation to what is important to us. We may change our evaluation in response to the comments of our mate, friends, parents, or a therapist. Or we may disagree with their opinion and possibly win them over to our point of view. Moreover, our evaluation is affected to some extent by our knowledge of how adultery is viewed in our culture. An individual seeking political office, for example, may evaluate the extramarital affair of the mate differently, depending on the likelihood of the news media discovering the affair. In short, the meaning that a tryst has for us is partly due to the interpretation we give it for reasons unique to ourselves, and partly due to the meaning that a tryst has in our culture.

Cognitive psychology focuses on the fact that human beings interact with their environment on the basis of the meaning that it has for them. In sociology this emphasis is found in symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969). Many variations on this theme have been proposed. I prefer the approach of Lazarus and his colleagues because they have supported it with empirical observation, and the clarity of their conceptualizations allow for empirical manipulations (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus et al., 1970, 1980).

According to their conceptualization, the individual "is an evaluating organism, searching the environment for cues about what is needed or desired, and evaluating each input as to its relevance and significance" (Lazarus and Averill, 1972: 242). For the purpose of illustrating this concept, consider the event of a man praising the beauty of his neighbor's wife. The husband may evaluate the praise as a compliment and feel elated and proud or, as was the case among the Dahomey of Africa (Ellis, 1890), he may evaluate it as threatening his social rank and feel offended and enraged. Thus cognitive processes mediate between the particular event and the reaction to it. An event in and of itself cannot induce a response without our first evaluating the significance it has for us. I turn now to a consideration of this decision process.

Two kinds of cognitive processes, also called appraisal processes, are differentiated by Lazarus (1966, 1975). Primary appraisal refers to the process of evaluating an event for its significance to the individual's well-being. Three evaluations are possible, according to Lazarus et al. (1980): The individual may

evaluate the event as irrelevant to his or her well-being, as benign-positive, or as stressful. Stressful events may take the form of harm-loss (if an injury already has occurred), of threat (if an injury is anticipated), or of challenge (if the individual perceives the event as having the potential for positive gain, mastery, or growth).

Applying this concept to a romantic jealousy situation, the primary appraisal entails the judgment by, let's say, the husband, that the love affair of his wife with another individual is harmful and threatening to him. Later we will consider the role of the cultural heritage in sensitizing the husband to evaluate such an event as a threat and as representing a harm-loss to him.

Secondary appraisal is a judgment by the individual about the kind of alternatives that are available for dealing with the situation. In other words, secondary appraisal involves evaluations by the individual of how to cope with the situation, as well as evaluating the adequacy of the available coping alternatives. For instance, the king among the Plateau tribes in northern Rhodesia (now called Zimbabwe) exercised only two options in coping with adultery in his harem. The male lovers of his numerous wives were executed, and the wives were subjected to atrocious mutilations, such as cutting off the hands, breasts, nose, and slitting the ears (Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911). The extent to which an individual is threatened by a jealousy event in contemporary American society depends, in addition to cultural conditioning, upon his or her estimate of how effective the available options are in coping with the predicament.

The structure of romantic jealousy consists of a particular evaluation (e.g., threat) of a social event which is perceived by the threatened one as revealing that he or she has lost, or may lose, a desired partner to a rival. Up to this point I have been elaborating on the evaluation process. Equally important is the social composition of the event. How many people are involved and what is their relationship to each other? The romantic jealousy event generally involves three individuals: the jealous one, the rival, and the mate or loved one with whom the jealous individual is trying to maintain a relationship in the face of the encroachments of the rival (or the interest of the loved one in the rival). The interloper may be a figment of the imagination or, as is the case on occasion, consists of a newly acquired, or intensified interest in a hobby or career.

In summary, the word jealousy refers to a particular situation which is evaluated by the individual as having harmful or threatened implications for his or her well-being in connection with a valued relationship, and in which the individual may experience and act out any number of negatively-toned emotions and other cognitive, physiological, and behavioral responses. All three components, primary appraisal, secondary appraisal and a three-person situation, are necessary parts of the structure of romantic jealousy. Any component by itself does not represent the phenomenon to which the word jealousy refers. An altercation involving three persons need not necessarily be due to amorous conflicts. Likewise, a primary appraisal by itself, such as a judgment of threat or harm-loss, may be made in response to events unrelated to the loss of a valued person to a rival. Nor is an isolated instrumental action pattern identified as jealousy behavior in the absence of the other two components. If we observed an infuriated Samoan husband cutting out the eyes of a man, or biting off his nose and ears, we are likely to judge him insanely enraged, whereas he feels psychologically supported by the society as he uses one of the cultural solutions available in pre-twentieth-century Samoa (Turner, 1884) for dealing with the lover of one's wife. Alternatively, what may appear to an outside observer as an event requiring a threat appraisal may not be evaluated as such by the individual because the components of the event fail to comprise a potential or actual jealousy situation. For example, when a wife sees her husband kissing a woman, she may not evaluate it as a threat to her well-being for a number of reasons (e.g., the woman is her husband's sister). However, if the woman is a co-worker in his occupation as a traveling sales representative, the wife may appraise the kiss as a threat, insofar as she interprets the event as having the potential of leading to the loss of her husband to a rival.

Any combination of two of the components underlying the structure of romantic jealousy is not sufficient to identify it as a jealousy reaction. A primary appraisal of threat by one person followed by an act of aggression against another person may be an example of sundry things unrelated to jealousy, such as a vivid illustration of what might happen when epithets are carelessly hurled at someone. Any other combination of two components are non sequiturs. Given that a primary appraisal of threat has been

made to an event, which in a particular culture is taken as an indication that the individual is about to lose, or already has lost, a beloved to a rival, then any response, whether internal or external to that event, is defined as jealousy behavior. An external response, of course, may be delayed. The Warau Indian male was expected to control the expression of his emotions to the extent that he appeared apathetic. However, he was free to express his displeasure when inebriated (Brett, 1868).

CULTURE AND PRIMARY APPRAISAL

We are not born with the desire to evaluate the interaction of our mate with another person as a threat to our well-being. We learn when we should become concerned, why we should interfere, and how we can stop them. What we look for, how we appraise it, and why we appraise it in the manner that we do, involve cognitive processes which are influenced by the cultural milieu in which we live. These ideas are discussed in the context of looking at the contribution of the cultural heritage to the making of a primary appraisal of threat or harm-loss in a jealousy situation.

To facilitate communication of my ideas, I make use of examples drawn arbitrarily from the available ethnographic literature. Whenever possible, I select examples from the oldest ethnographic reports, in the hope of obtaining illustrations of societies when they were not yet influenced by European values. It is my belief that such a selection procedure yields examples of behavior which are most removed from those found in our own society, thereby serving as the most convincing evidence of the effects of cultural milieu on behavior.

Some of the ways in which our cultural programming influences the primary appraisal process are by (a) designating particular events as an indication that the individual may lose or already has lost the mate, or loved one, to a rival, (b) specifying the conditions which permit the individual to conclude that the event has occurred, (c) creating the conditions which dispose the individual to make the primary appraisal and (d) perpetuating inconsistent values.

EVENTS THAT MAKE US FEEL THREATENED

It is generally accepted that the eliciting events for an emotion, or behavior in general, are culturally determined. As we become acculturated we learn the cues for triggering a threat or harm appraisal. To illustrate this point, let's consider a fabricated vignette. The event takes place in a primitive society of approximately 100 members. On her return trip from the local watering well, a married woman is asked for a cup of water by a male resident of the village. Her husband, resting on the porch of their dwelling, observes his wife giving the man a cup of water. Subsequently, they approach the husband and the three of them enjoy a lively and friendly conversation into the late evening hours. Eventually the husband puts out the lamp, and the guest has sexual intercourse with the wife. The next morning the husband leaves the house early in order to catch fish for breakfast. Upon his return, he finds his wife having sex again with the guest. The husband becomes violently enraged and mortally stabs the guest.

At what point in the vignette may one expect the husband to evaluate the interaction between his wife and the man as a threat to his well-being? It depends, of course, in which culture we place the husband. A husband of the Pawnee Indian tribe in the 19th century bewitched any man who dared to request a cup of water from his wife (Weltfish, 1965). An Ammassalik Eskimo husband, on the other hand, offered his wife to a guest by means of the culturally sanctioned game of "putting out the lamp." A good host was expected to turn out the lamp at night as an invitation for the guest to have sexual intercourse with the wife. The Ammassalik, however, became intensely jealous when his wife copulated with a guest in circumstances other than the lamp game or without a mutual agreement between two families to exchange mates, and it was not unusual for the husband to kill the interloper (Mirsky, 1937b).

The Toda of Southern India, who were primarily polyandrous at the turn of the century when Rivers (1906) observed them, would consider the sequence of events described in the vignette to be perfectly normal. That is to say, the husband would not have been upset to find his wife having sexual relations again in the morning if the man were her *mokhthodvaiol.* The Toda had the custom of

mokhthoditi which allowed husbands and wives to take on lovers. When, for instance, a man wanted someone else's wife as a lover, he sought the consent of the wife and her husband or husbands. If consent was given by all, the men negotiated for the annual fee to be received by the husband(s). The woman then lived with the man just as if she were his real wife. Or, more commonly, the man visited the woman at the house of her husband(s) (Rivers, 1906).

It is evident from these illustrations that the culture of a society is a more potent variable than characteristics of the individual in predicting which event someone will evaluate as a threat. No doubt, individuals may violate the cultural norms (Mann, 1980; Wallace, 1947), perhaps more in some societies than others, but the deviation is an act of defiance, or of individualism, only in relation to the norms of a society. Therefore, even the behavior of the deviant is interpretable and predictable with respect to the culture of the society. Events have meaning only in the context of the culture. And the event that is identified as requiring a threat appraisal is not selected arbitrarily, since the identification process is embedded in the structure of the culture.

TO SEE OR NOT TO SEE

Cultures vary in what is acceptable evidence for concluding that a primary appraisal of harm or threat is warranted. The Saora of India required the husband to see his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with her lover before he could accuse her of adultery (Fawcett, 1886). The Dobu, on the other hand, relied on personal suspicion (Benedict, 1961). The Zuni wife was in no hurry to evaluate the evidence of her husband's sexual liaisons as a threat to herself. Instead, it was the gossip of the villagers about her husband that compelled her to confront him (Benedict, 1961).

Rather than depending on personal observation, intuition, or gossip, some cultures relied on the woman to identify her lover. As can well be imagined, this is not a foolproof procedure for establishing culpability. In the 1790s over 5000 women were imprisoned in the various royal palaces of the kingdom of the Dahomey in West Africa. Sexual activity with someone other than their king was punished with death for the women and enslave-

ment for their lovers. Dalzel (cited by Ellis, 1890) reported that some of the women of the king, Adanzu II, were found to be pregnant. Upon being questioned, the women accused over 150 young men in the neighboring villages. All of them were sold as slaves, but most of them were afterward found to have been innocent.

The Plateau tribes of Northern Rhodesia placed some women, and the men they named, in an especially perplexing predicament. The tribes assumed that the birth of a stillborn child or the death of a mother in childbirth ipso facto was due to the actions of an adulterer. Husbands, or other causes, were not considered capable of bringing about such tragedies. Therefore, the woman, as she lay dying or attempting to cope with the death of her baby, was requested to name her lover, whether she had one or not, and whomever she named was held guilty without further proof (Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911).

As these illustrations demonstrate, the rules for verifying and, in the case of the Plateau, for creating reality, are cultural prerogatives. Members of a culture will not support someone's claim to feeling threatened by the activities of the mate with another person unless the appropriate justification is given by the jealous one.

HOW CULTURE INFLUENCES A PRIMARY APPRAISAL OF THREAT OR HARM

The events which we interpret as indicating that we may lose, or have lost, our loved one to a rival depend to a large extent upon the society in which we live. But why do we feel threatened in such a situation? I propose that the conditions which lead us to evaluate as a threat the overtures of a rival or the interest of our mate in a rival are intrinsic to the organization of human beings into social units. Feeling threatened in a jealousy situation is a product of socialization. It stems from the choices that were made in the process of setting up the society. Every society has had to make decisions as to certain fundamental issues, such as the economics of feeding its members, mating behavior, and so on. Whatever the decisions or choices may have been, they have psychological consequences for the individual. Namely, the choices define for the individual what is valued and what must therefore be protected.

By way of a simplified illustration, consider a society that selects the nuclear family rather than the clan or extended family as the basic economic unit. The husband and wife, and later the children, are expected, as was the case among the Ammassalik, to be completely self-sufficient. The family produces everything that it needs in the form of food, clothing, utensils, shelter, and so on. The loss of the mate to a rival puts the remaining adult at a distinct disadvantage in the struggle for survival. Contrast this with an arrangement where the members of an extended family or clan, in which approximately twenty members take care of each other, form an economic unit. The loss of one member does not pose a major threat to the ability of the others to survive. Clearly, the psychological and economic consequences of the loss of one adult are far greater for the survivors in the nuclear family than in the extended family or clan. Therefore, it is far more likely for someone living in the former economic condition to appraise a jealousy event as a major threat. It is in this sense that the primary appraisal of threat in a jealousy situation is intrinsic to the organization of the society.

The Ammassalik, for example, was at a disadvantage, and seldom survived through a long harsh winter, without the assistance and cooperation of a mate (Mirsky, 1937b). That component of the culture which made survival dependent upon the possession of a competent mate made the Ammassalik especially vulnerable to evaluating a rival as a threat. The interloper was literally a potential threat to one's personal survival. The extent of the threat is perhaps indicated by the custom of wife-stealing. A man who had lost his mate might, among other solutions to his dilemma discussed later, carry away the wife of another husband (Mirsky, 1937b).

Because many factors enter into the judgment of threat in a jealousy situation, it is incorrect to infer from my example that cultures with nuclear families are more prone to feel threatened in a jealousy situation than clan cultures. The example focuses on only one of the variables which contribute to a threat appraisal in order to illustrate that it is fostered by cultural solutions to the challenges posed by organizing a group of individuals into a society. No society of the past or present has been able to eliminate the appraisal of threat in a jealousy situation. Each social design merely alters the situation in which it is induced.

To reiterate, each society has to come to grips with the fundamental issues of social life. An economic unit must be agreed upon (e.g., the nuclear family or the clan), a system of vesting property ownership needs to be established (e.g., either in the tribal chief, clan, family, or the individual), rules regulating propagation and sexual behavior must be decided upon, and so forth. According to the cultural value theory of jealousy, the solutions to these and other basic issues in regulating a society simultaneously create goals, needs, and values which the individual seeks to attain or satisfy. If a particular culture uses the nuclear family as the economic unit, then the members of that society will seek a mate. If the mate also is the means of sexual satisfaction and survival in old age, then they will be especially prone to evaluate the intrusions of a rival as a threat. The tendency to be threatened by a rival is in direct proportion to the number of goals or needs the mate satisfies by virtue of his or her role in the society. Cultural value theory applies to all types of jealousy. Romantic jealousy is a specific application of it. Those cultural values which contribute to the desire to be in a relationship with a mate, including those which influence the quality of that relationship, are the ones which apply to the romantic jealousy situation.

The major determinants of jealousy are the cultural customs associated with ownership rights, sexual behavior, progeny, evaluation of the individual, and provisions made for human contact. Specifically, it is hypothesized that societies whose members seldom are threatened by jealousy situations, or infrequently encounter them, are characterized by a culture which (a) either discourages individual property rights, or places no value on property; (b) makes sexual gratification and companionship easily available to anyone on demand, or does not engender in its members a desire for sex as a pleasurable pastime; (c) does not value personal descendants, or the need to know whether the children in the family are one's own progeny; and (d) does not require marriage for economic survival, companionship, or recognition of the individual as a competent adult member of the society. The converse of these four conditions characterizes societies in which the members are easily threatened by, and are subjected to a high frequency of, jealousy situations.

COMPARISON OF TWO CULTURES

Some evidence for the validity of the hypothesis may be found in a comparison of the Toda and Apache cultures. The Todas (Rivers, 1906) manifested almost no jealous behavior. The Apache Indians of North America, on the other hand were, according to the observations of Goodwin (1942) four decades ago, inclined to be easily threatened in relationships and likely to express considerable jealousy.

Property Rights

The ownership of property among the Toda generally was vested in the family. The family owned the house in which it lived. Household possessions and ornaments, although the property of the individual, were shared equally by all (Rivers, 1906). The material culture was meager, and material possessions were not highly valued. Thus, the Toda culture did not encourage the development of a strong sense of personal property rights in the individual.

The converse was true for the Apache when Goodwin observed them. Property was owned individually. The Apache child and adult placed great value on personal control of possessions. The property of an individual was not used without permission. A family would not think of allowing a possession of their, let's say, 8-year-old daughter to be sold unless she gave her consent and agreed to the selling price. Goodwin (1942: 376) writes that, "A youth given a horse by his father might even kill it for the meat if he wished. His father would not be likely to interfere." The Apache, needless to say, acquired a strong sense of personal ownership and an inclination to prevent loss of possessions.

Sexual Gratification

Sexual gratification was relatively easily obtained by the Toda. There were few restrictions of any kind on sexual intercourse before or after marriage (Rivers, 1906). Consequently, the Toda did not perceive sexual gratification as something to be fought for and then cautiously guarded against an interloper.

Sexual gratification was not freely available to the Apache. Coitus was restricted to married couples, since the Apache disapproved of premarital sexual intercourse for both sexes. Hence, for the Apache, sexual pleasure was a reward, something to be earned after a long period of deprivation, and to be jealously guarded thereafter against intruders.

Personal Progeny

The Toda, a polyandrous people, accepted children for their own sake. Parents displayed much fondness for their children, but there were no religious or social customs to require an adult to have children. They had a casual approach to personal progeny. The Toda male took little interest in knowing whether the child he was raising was his own. Fatherhood was a legal relation established by the *pursütpimi* ceremony and frequently did not mean physical paternity.

The pursütpimi ceremony entailed the man giving a bow and arrow to the woman. This made him the father of her child. If the husband was unable to attend to the matter, another man was requested to give the bow and arrow, and he became the father of the child. When an unwed woman was pregnant, "the father of the child is the man who is called in to give the bow and arrow, although he may have had nothing to do with the woman before the ceremony" (Rivers, 1906: 547). If a teenaged wife who had been married in infancy was pregnant before joining her husband, he was called upon to perform the ceremony and thereby became the legal father of the child, "even if he were still a young boy, or if it were known that he was not the father of the child" (Rivers, 1906: 531).

In contrast to the Toda, the Apache culture made the family and children instruments for gaining prestige and social status. The Apache placed great value on having personal descendants. When the husband was away for any length of time, he instructed a close blood relative "to watch his wife secretly and report on her conduct when he came back" (Goodwin, 1942: 340).

Children were a social asset to the Apache. Daughters attracted sizable marriage gifts, and after they were married her parents had access to free labor from the husbands and portions of the

game and booty that they brought home (Goodwin, 1942). Several married daughters in the family assured the parents of a supply of meat in old age when the father was no longer capable of hunting. Children were a form of social security.

Additionally, family size was a reflection of wealth. And the ability to support a large family indicated that the father was a competent hunter. Everybody sought the advantages of being aligned with a successful hunter and wealthy family. Family status was an important consideration in forming alliances and marriages. Thus, the family and children were the major vehicles for gaining high standing in the tribe.

Meaning of Marriage

The prevailing form of marriage among the Toda was fraternal polyandry. Upon marrying her husband the woman automatically became the wife of his brothers, even those not yet born. They all lived together as one family (Rivers, 1906). In the Toda culture matrimony was not a reward or a requirement for anything. Marriage had to serve as its own reward. Survival was assured for everyone through the community effort of the clan and the cooperative labor of the men in the family, and the desire for companionship was easily satisfied in such a large group of people. Recognition and acceptance of the individual by the community was bestowed on the basis of his or her personality characteristics, and not on the basis of personal achievements or entrance into matrimony. The salient feature of the Toda culture was that matrimony was not a necessary condition for the individual to function effectively as an adult.

In contrast, among the Apache, "marriage was essential for the mature man or woman" (Goodwin, [1942: 284]). He points out that, "Its importance is well indicated in folk tales where incidents relating to it are usually unduly stressed." An adult without a mate was only half socially and economically potent. It was a pitiable state to be in and to be avoided. Goodwin reports that failure "to marry was rare and considered decidedly abnormal." Marriage for the Apache was the key to recognition as an adult and the opportunity to participate more fully in adult life. The husband and wife were expected to be economically self-sufficient. In addition,

parents-in-law looked forward to reaping benefits from their son-in-law in the form of receiving portions of his game and booty from raids.

Looking at the Todas and the Apaches in terms of the variables in the hypothesis reveals that the two cultures differed in the frequency to which an individual encountered jealousy situations and the likelihood that the situation was judged as a threat or harmful. The Toda, in contrast to the Apache, was less inclined to approach life with a readiness to partition the material world into "my property" and "property to be acquired." Personal possessions were not a strong area of contention for the Toda. Likewise, sexual gratification was not experienced as a limited good which was won in competition with others. It was available to all with a minimum of effort. Matrimony, the key to so much for the Apache, was not a critical factor for the Toda in achieving acceptance by the community as a competent adult.

The Toda was also less likely to evaluate a jealousy situation as a threat because of the support of the cultural customs. Sexual intercourse of the mate with a stranger was not necessarily appraised as a threat by the Toda. More likely, the event was judged benign-positive by the individual because a fee, in accordance with the mokhthoditi institution, had been arranged. In contrast, some pre-reservation Apache husbands coped with infidelity by killing the lover and cutting off the end of their wife's nose so that she was too ugly for anyone to want her again. One infuriated wife, upon discovering her husband's infidelity, dealt with the crisis by arranging a tribal party, and in the presence of all, grabbed hold of his penis and held on so tightly in the struggle that the husband eventually had to lie down in exhaustion (Goodwin, 1942). Another illustration of how cultural organization and customs minimized threat appraisals for the Toda is the way the husband dealt with his wife's pregnancy. The pregnancy was appraised by him as a challenge, or of relevance to him, not because of the possibility that the child may have been sired by another man, but in order to insure that the pursütpimi ceremony would be performed. The casualness with which fatherhood was established through the ceremony conveyed to everyone that physical fatherhood was not valued in the community, thereby assuring that the desire to have personal offspring did not become an important motive for the Toda.

EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS

Societies differ in many ways. The etiology of the differences is irrelevant to the purpose of the present treatise. The prime movers and shapers of a culture may well be, as Berry (1971, 1975, 1976) suggests, ecological forces. It is equally plausible to argue that the development of a culture is largely a chance process, or perhaps that it is the result of a logical extension of basic religious premises subscribed to by the founders of a society.

Whatever the reason may be for the differences among societies, I propose that the differences in particular values are related to the degree of threat experienced in a jealousy situation. Specifically, the likelihood of members of a society evaluating a jealousy situation as a threat is related to the attitudes they hold toward pairbonding, progeny, property, and sex. Societies with values similar to those of the Apaches are far more likely to have their members encounter many jealousy situations and to judge them as a threat, than are societies with values similar to those of the Toda.

My student and I (Hupka and Ryan, 1981) tested the hypothesis by rating 92 cultures in the Human Relation Area Files on the severity of the responses of men in a jealousy situation and correlating them with the ratings of the attitudes of the cultures on pairbonding, progeny, property, and sex. We found that the severity of the men's responses in a jealousy situation correlated positively with pairbonding (0.43), property (0.37), and sex (0.33). These variables accounted for 29 percent of the variance. The correlation with progeny (0.28) was minimal and accounted for only one percent of the variance. Thus, the severity of the responses of the men in the jealousy situations in our cross-cultural sample intensified not only as the importance of pairbonding increased, but also with an increased emphasis on personal ownership of property, and an ever more limited possibility for sexual gratification. The cultural attitude toward progeny, on the other hand, was not systematically related to the reactions of men in jealousy situations. Insufficient information was available in our sample on the responses of women to determine whether these findings apply also to women.

In summary, we have found empirical support for three cross-cultural variables which may contribute to the making of a threat

appraisal in the jealousy situation. Variables which are unique to a culture also may be involved. When these are coupled with the variables and motives contributed by the individual, the etiology for threat appraisals becomes enormously complicated.

VALUE INCONSISTENCY

A threat appraisal in the jealousy situation is not due solely to the conditions proposed by the cultural value theory and personal values and motives. Occasionally, it is the result of conflicting demands being made upon the individual.

The creation and evolution of a culture is not a rational process. Many values are evolved. Some of them conflict with one another. Value clashes make demands on the individual's adaptive capabilities. They compel attention. But the individual is not always sufficiently prepared to cope with the inconsistencies. A testimonial to that is provided by the aborigine tribes of New Zealand a century ago. The women were free to choose the man they wanted to marry. The more suitors a woman could interest in herself, the more valuable she was perceived by others, and her prestige climbed accordingly in the community. Women had sexual intercourse with whomever they pleased (Thomson, 1859). Not unexpectedly, the women developed an independent mind in these circumstances.

However, the culture possessed two customs which were in direct collision with female autonomy. First, girls were occasionally betrothed by their parents during infancy (Thomson, 1859). Second, men were also free to select their own mate. The conflict arose when a man selected a woman who had her heart set on another man. The cultural custom was to let the strongest one win. Carrying the woman away by force was an accepted mode of acquiring a wife. If she and her friends objected to the union, they resisted the man, and the woman was frequently severely, and at times mortally, injured. Women were known to have committed suicide to avoid living with a man they disliked (Thomson, 1859).

The Ammassalik had a similar custom of letting the strongest one win. A man who dared to enter the home of a family and carried away the wife in the presence of her husband and got away with his brazen behavior, was considered a powerful person and his status increased in the community (Mirsky, 1937b).

CULTURE AND SECONDARY APPRAISAL

When an appraisal of threat or harm-loss is made, the task for the individual becomes one of eliminating the threat or recuperating from the loss. The cognitive process involved in evaluating the available coping resources and deciding how to handle the event is referred to by Lazarus (1966) as secondary appraisal.

Becoming inebriated or berating the mate are recognized by most people as coping strategies. However, it is less frequently recognized that the subjective experience of an emotion, which is not actively expressed, also may serve as a coping strategy with manipulative effects on others. Before I describe the role of the cultural milieu in the secondary appraisal process, I am going to (1) address the phenomenon of silent suffering and the expression of emotions as tools for controlling others, and (2) present the two interpretations of culture which are used in this article.

EMOTIONS AS COPING STRATEGIES

The expression of emotions can be as much of a strategy for controlling the behavior of an individual as is the use of commands. The experience of an emotion, which the person chooses not to express, also may serve the purpose of influencing others. Likewise, the deliberate fabrication of an emotion-arousing crisis serves a similar purpose. White (1980) reports of individuals involued in romantic relationships who intentionally contrive jealousy situations in order to gain specific rewards.

In our research on romantic jealousy we gave our volunteers the task of writing on the topic, "How I get my way in a jealousy situation." Since most of the volunteers did respond and have identified a total of 23 strategies to date (e.g., coercion, moralizing, retaliation, and so on), it is evident that they are aware of employing a particular strategy. This is even more apparent in the report of some volunteers that they switched strategies when they did not achieve the desired goal.

More relevant to the issue of using emotions as coping strategies is the identification of two strategies which we call catastrophe and subterfuge. The former is characterized by the expression of anger or tears, and the latter by the deliberate hiding of a negatively toned emotion. Related to the latter strategy is the coping technique of withdrawing sociableness. Contact is maintained with the individual in resentful silence, sullenness, and

unwillingness to be sociable. One may wonder how subterfuge can be an effective strategy since there is no external response. One possibility is the communication of nonverbal cues, such as the communication of discomfort and anxiety (Mahl, 1959), or tension through postural cues, eye movements, and the position of the hands (Mehrabian, 1971). In fact, nonverbal behavior has been shown to outweigh the importance of the verbal message (Mehrabian and Ferris, 1967; Mehrabian and Wiener, 1967).

It is doubtful that people consciously ponder the pros and cons of a set of strategies while in a heated dispute before selecting one. More likely, each person has settled upon a select group of favorite strategies early in life, to which strategies are added and others subtracted as the individual acquires a record of their success rate, and which are brought into play instantly.

Whereas the Yanomamo husband always is angered by the actual or suspected trysts of his wife (Chagnon, 1968), some Americans react with sadness or fear. These reactions are immediate, and probably are experienced as natural and without choice; nevertheless, the difference in reaction between the Yanomamos and the Americans suggests that the reaction is influenced by cognitive factors. The tryst is perceived as a threat by members of both societies. But that which is threatened, or the implications of the event on which the person focuses, and the beliefs that are endorsed, differ in the two societies. We can change the nature and intensity of our emotional reaction by altering our beliefs and focus of concern; at least, that is the contention of cognitive behavior therapists, such as Ellis (1962), Beck (1971), Meichenbaum (1977), and others. Thus, what appears to us as a natural emotional reaction to a tryst is under control. We have choice over our beliefs.

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF CULTURE

I interpret the Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) definition of culture, which is used in this article (see Note 2), in two ways. Like Wallace (1970: 24), I regard culture as "policy, tacitly and gradually concocted by groups of people for the furtherance of their interests." Over a period of time individuals create laws, customs, norms, and institutions, which enable everyone to pursue personal interests. Each individual makes use of the cultural achievements to attain personal goals. In this context, notes Wallace (1970), it is fallacious to speak of the culture as molding or having

impact on individuals. Culture no more molds individuals than a bus forces people to ride on it. People use buses when they need them; buses do not use people. It is this meaning of culture that I use primarily in discussing the role of culture in the secondary appraisal process. That is to say, people create culture to satisfy their personal needs and goals.

Something is missing in our interpretation of culture. At this point, the conception of culture is analogous to a grocery store from which people select items as they need them. But human beings do not live in a vacuum. They are affected by their creations. The invention of cars, public transportation, supermarkets, computers, and so forth, alter the human environment and affect everyone, even those who choose not to take advantage of them. Human beings have no choice but to contend with the psychological consequences of their material and social creations. It is primarily in this sense that I use culture when I discuss its contribution to the primary appraisal process.

We turn now to a discussion of the role of the culture in the secondary appraisal process with special attention to (a) the function of behavior in the jealousy situation, (b) justification for the behavior in the jealousy situation, and (c) jealousy holidays.

THE FUNCTION OF BEHAVIOR IN THE JEALOUSY SITUATION

Why do we cope?

Almost all theories of emotion ascribe a function to emotions. The diversity of functions, many of them not of the same logic type (e.g., Adler, 1928; Izard, 1980; Pillsbury, 1928), points to the need to establish the function through research rather than speculation. With that acknowledged, I contribute my speculations on the function of behavior in the jealousy situation.

I make the assumption that human beings have an innate propensity to avoid or resist whatever they have learned may cause physical pain to themselves. I make the additional assumption that this propensity generalizes to threats and harm embedded in symbolic meaning. Thus, as soon as children learn that public nudity is frowned upon, they are more likely to resist the intention of their mothers to undress them on a public beach.

The children, by resisting their mothers, are not seeking to protect the cultural norm of wearing bathing suits. Their motives basically are self-oriented. They are protecting themselves. The

function of their techniques of resistance is to protect their self-esteem. The children are unable to verbalize the reason for their resistance; therefore, they invoke the cultural norm. By succeeding in remaining dressed, they are indirectly maintaining the norm. Nevertheless, their acquiescence to the norm is based on personal motives which have no relation to the conditions that gave rise to the norm of wearing bathing suits. Their sense of satisfaction stems from their success in having satisfied personal needs and goals, not from their having preserved a cultural norm.

A similar argument applies to the appraisal of threat in the jealousy situation and coping with the event. That is to say, the function of the coping strategies is to protect the interests of the individual, and not the cultural values and attitudes which contributed to the making of the primary appraisal of threat or harm-loss. The impetus for coping in a jealousy situation stems from personal needs and not cultural or social needs.

What is Jealousy Behavior?

Every society has a range of acceptable strategies for coping with events that are perceived by the members of the society as a threat to their self-interests. The strategies are available, not for the sole purpose of dealing with jealousy events, but to cope with all conflicts.

The strategy of verbal coercion, such as, "If you do that, I'll see my lawyer and sue you for everything you've got," may be used in many situations. It may be used by the tenant in reply to the warning of the landlord to impound the tenant's car for being in arrears with the rent payments. It also can be addressed to one's mate who is seeking a divorce because of the desire to marry another person. The individual uses coping strategies to ward off threat and to satisfy personal needs and goals. When the strategies are used in the jealousy situation they are labeled as jealousy responses or behavior.

The jealousy situation is the means for labeling the strategies. The label reflects the nature of the situation. There is nothing unusual about people defending themselves against a source of threat and striving for the attainment of personal goals in jealousy situations or other situations. The difficulty arises as soon as we assume that the coping strategies in the jealousy situation have an existence of their own, so that we no longer think of them as coping strategies which happen also to be usable in the jealousy

situation, but think of them as expressions of the emotion of jealousy. I will recapitulate before proceeding.

It is unlikely, in the illustration of the tenant and the landord, that anyone would construe the verbal threat of the tenant as a sign of jealousy. And yet, the same reply generally is attributed to jealousy when given by the mate in our illustration.

What is the basis for the shift? Whereas I propose that the change in situations alone accounts for the relabeling of the strategy, the alternative, traditional explanation makes the assumption that the change in situations is accompanied by a switch in emotion. Accordingly, the jealousy situation is not used as a source for labeling the strategy, but as a source for identifying an emotion of jealousy. The strategy is considered an expression of the emotion of jealousy.

Several issues are raised when we assume there is an emotion of jealousy. What is the function of jealousy? What purpose does it serve? No matter which function we ascribe to jealousy—for example, to protect our property (Davis, 1936)—we are faced with the question of why jealousy was picked to fulfill the function and not resentment, envy, or love. Without a reply to that question we have a problem of circularity. We are explaining the emotion of jealousy according to the function it serves. But the function that jealousy performs does not explain its existence any more than the bows and arrows made from the branches of a tree explain the existence of the tree. The existence of the tree is a phenomenon which is separate from the function that it serves for human beings.

I avoid the issue of circularity by assuming that human beings (1) have an innate propensity to avoid pain and symbolic threat stimuli, (2) basically are selfish and seek to satisfy their needs and goals, and (3) make use of a wide array of coping strategies to avoid pain and to meet their needs. When such strategies are experienced and expressed in a jealousy situation, they are known as jealousy. To avoid the connotation of jealousy-as-an-emotion, I prefer to speak of jealousy behavior. In summary, the issue of circularity is avoided by placing the source of motivation for coping inside the organism rather than in an emotion of jealousy.

The remainder of the article consists of descriptive illustrations of the various cultural institutions and policies which the people of different societies have evolved to serve their needs and goals and which in turn affect them.[3]

Jealousy behavior is what the members of the society have agreed it should be. It may be a showing of hurt and anger in the jealous one, or an instrumental act directed at the rival, and so on. All of these are cultural strategies for influencing the behavior of the mate and rival. In other words, no distinction is made, as we are wont to do in Western cultures (see Averill, 1974), between so-called emotional behavior and instrumental actions (also called rational actions). Both serve the function of controlling the behavior of others. In some cultures the people advocate the use of the former, while in others they use the latter, and in many cultures, like our own, they use both if one is not sufficient. The range of jealousy behavior is as varied as the cultures on the earth. It can span from doing nothing at the moment to inflicting severe physical abuse or death. The Zuni wife, for example, tended not to say anything to her philandering husband at the time of uncovering him. Later, however, especially if he continued the affair or it became tribal gossip, she refused to wash his laundry. At this point he knew that he had been found out and he had better mend his ways (Benedict, 1961). The Antakerrinya culture, on the other hand, promoted immediate action. The husband either cut his straying wife across the hams, or he burned her (Taplin, 1879).

The controlling role of jealousy behavior is evident in its function to (a) prevent the loss of the mate or privileged position, (b) punish the rival and the mate, and (c) compensate the jealous one when reconciliation is ruled out by the persons involved or the community.

Prevention

The preventive, or controlling, function of jealousy behavior is known to everyone who has ever been at the receiving end of it, or used it to his or her own advantage. The form of the controlling process is prescribed and regulated via the cultural policies and equivalent structure. Whatever the form, its intention is to enable the individual to meet the situational demands and to influence the outcome. For example, the Warau Indians were polygynous. The first wife, however, guarded her privileged position with fierce determination. When the husband attempted to bring a new wife into the household the first wife gathered her relatives and all of them assaulted the intruder until she departed (Brett, 1868). The aborigines of New Zealand of the 19th century also practiced polygyny. The women of a household did not get along very well.

When a woman was in fear of losing her desired level of favoritism she invented all kinds of lies of her rival. In this manner she attempted to negate the qualities of the rival woman. Infanticide was another way for her to draw attention to an intolerable situation. Mothers were reported to have strangled their children in response to a jealousy event, casting the body to the sea, or throwing it to the dogs and pigs (Yate, 1835).

Turning now to a consideration of a monogamous relationship, the jealousy behavior in response to the threat of a rival has a specific aim, namely, to prevent the loss of the mate and to restore the relationship to its previously predictable state. There are two reasons for this goal. One of them was illustrated in the comparison of the Toda and Apache cultures. Relationships, by virtue of their function in the society, grant benefits to the individual which are jeopardized by the activities of the interloper. The Ammassalik, for example, might not have survived through the winter if the interloper were to have been successful, and the Apache lost, among other things, status and self-esteem. Second, an interloper creates stress by disrupting the mutually agreed upon, or culturally programmed, duties in the relationship. The smooth operation of family life depends upon routine. Imagine the chaos if discussions were required each day to determine whether the mate intended to continue being a functional parent and lover, earn money and cook, remain heterosexual, and so on. An additional difficulty is that decisions no longer can be reached in relation to the mate because it is not certain whether the mate will reciprocate, or instead, reach a decision on the basis of planned activities with the new lover. Planning a vacation, as an example, is an exceptionally difficult task when the interloper, directly or indirectly, influences the deliberations of the mate.

Punishment

Punishment is a monument to defeat. Resorting to punishment in a jealousy situation implies temporary or permanent loss of control over the activities of one's mate. The individual failed to conquer the environmental threat posed by the rival. That is to say, the mate had an affair with the rival or eloped with him or her. Great variation is found among cultures in dealing with the aberrant mate and the illicit lover. Five variables stand out as cultural determinants of the form of punishment that is chosen. They are the (a) model used for assigning culpability, (b) locus of

authority for dispensing the punishment, (c) range of alternative solutions to the crisis, (d) options open to men, and (e) options open to women.

Who is to blame? Who is accountable for the occurrence of an illicit liaison? Almost all cultural solutions direct the jealousy behavior at the rival and the aberrant mate. In most cultures these two individuals are held responsible for the disruption. In other words, the jealousy situation is conceptualized as involving a victim and two victimizers.

An alternative model is promoted by psychologists, especially those involved in the personal growth, humanistic psychology movement. The victim model is replaced by the accountability model. Rather than attributing responsibility to the aberrant mate and rival, each person is held accountable for his or her own actions. The model does not allow for random events. Whatever happens in life is due to one's own creation. Thus, a husband who lost his wife to a rival may have, let's say, consciously or unconsciously pushed her away from an intimate relationship with himself.

The Maori of New Zealand, like other cultures, used the victim model for meting out punishment. But they also applied the accountability model in certain circumstances. The Maori applied the victim model when the wife was discovered with her lover. The wife's family was required to compensate her husband with a land settlement. But if she eloped with her lover, the husband was held accountable, and the community plundered him of his property (Mishkin, 1937). The Maori felt that the husband should have been aware of the affair and used preventative measures in the interest of the collective good.

Who does to whom? The social fabric of the community, especially in primitive societies in which the membership typically numbered in the low hundreds, would quickly be torn asunder if the stability of the family were constantly in jeopardy. The drastic, and often abhorrent, jealousy behavior sanctioned in many cultures is an indication of the intensity of the threat that the activities of the rival posed to the family and the community. In almost all cultures the aggrieved mate is supported and the transgressors of the social code are condemned. Nevertheless, the meting out of punishment is not a random event.

Particular individuals or groups are designated as the primary source of punishment. Generally the aggrieved mate is expected

to deal with the offenders. However, it also may be the family of the philandering mate who administers the punishment, or it may be the representative of a social institution, such as the tribal chief, judge, and so on, who attends to the matter. At times the community takes matters into its own hands. These points are illustrated by the Plateau tribes. It was the duty of the chief to flog the male lover in cases where the adultery was between persons of equal rank. The wife was left alone on her first offense. If she had another affair she was returned to her parents, who dealt with her as they thought fit, and had to replace her. If the husband caught his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse he was expected to slay them. If he chose not to punish them and the wife was caught again in an illicit affair, then the community decreed the punishment. This consisted of impaling the illicit lovers on sharp stakes. The villagers taunted and jeered them until death stilled their writhing agonies (Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911). The actions of the villagers show that in their cultural set-up they demanded jealousy behavior. The husband was not allowed to appraise, or perhaps reappraise, the particular situation as nonthreatening, or to use intrapsychic modes of dealing with the event, such as defense mechanisms. The example of the Plateau points to another aspect of punishment. Whereas some cultures punish both offenders with death, others kill only one of them and either let the other go free or inflict physical abuse, torture, or barbaric mutilations.

Range of cultural solutions. Considerable latitude has been established in most cultures in jealousy behavior, thereby giving the individual the freedom to choose alternatives to fit the personality. For example, when the wife of a Hidatsa Indian of North America in the nineteenth century eloped with another man, the estranged husband could choose from among several culturally sanctioned plans of action. He was permitted to slay his faithless wife. He also had the right to seize all the property that he could lay his hands on which belonged to the lover and the lover's friends. The legitimacy of property seizure was self-evident to all Hidatsas. The lover's friends often voluntarily gave the injured husband the opportunity of doing so by bringing the property to him. The possibility of losing one's property due to the behavior of a friend undoubtedly led the Hidatsa to select friends carefully. Moreover, the pressure on everyone not to seduce a married person must have been substantial for fear of losing one's friends.

Another alternative for the husband to pursue, and considered the most praiseworthy of all, was to invite the runaways to his lodge and formally present the wife to her new lover. He might even include a horse or some other valuable gift in the bargain. The husband was expected to "treat the whole affair as if he had had a good riddance" (Matthews, 1877: 54). Thus a variety of alternatives, ranging from killing his wife to giving gifts to her lover, had the force of moral sanctions and were approved solutions for husbands to deal with a traumatic personal crisis.

Jealousy behavior of men. In most cultures the men have different solutions to a jealous event than the women. In this section we look into the ways men deal with it, and in the following section we look at what women do.

It is apparent when we consider the ways that jealousy events are handled that there are cultural variations in the purpose to which the punishment aspect of jealousy behavior is put. The emphasis may be on compensating the aggrieved party (discussed later), allowing the injured husband to regain his stature without the community losing one of its citizens, preventing a repeat occurrence, or reestablishing community peace with minimum disturbance. In most cultures, as mentioned previously, several solutions are available which give the husband the opportunity to choose the method of punishment best befitting his disposition. Here we are looking primarily at the preferred method for dealing with the interloper.

Two ways of resolving a conflict between the husband and the rival, without granting them the right to kill, are to let them fight or let them debate about it. The end goal is the same: the husband wants to regain his stature by making the rival wrong and himself right in the eyes of the community. There are many ways of fighting and debating. Let us look at one illustration of each.

The husband of the aborigine tribe of New Zealand, observed by Thomson (1859), had the choice of severely beating his wife, divorcing her, or killing her. The husband had only two options for dealing with her lover. He could seek compensation or satisfaction. If the two men decided on the latter, they proceeded with a pro forma duel. Both men were armed with a light spear and were accompanied by several relatives. The "husband commenced the attack by rushing at the paramour's breast with his spear, who received the thrust in a position between sitting and standing, holding an erect spear in front by both hands, prepared to ward off the thrust. . . . After the third thrust the debt is paid . . . and both

fight on even terms. The first wound, if slight, ends the combat" (Thomson, 1859: 178). If one of the combatants was mortally wounded, the relatives sought satisfaction and the quarrel ceased only when one party was beaten.

The controlled nature of the duel, especially the requirement that only a slight wound be inflicted, and the presence of relatives to safeguard against escalation, suggests that the ritualized engagement was a mechanism for the husband to regain stature rather than serve as a means for him to achieve revenge.

The Ammassalik Eskimo had the choice of divorcing an adulterous wife, beating her, stealing his wife back if she eloped, or stealing the wife of another husband. Jealousy behavior toward the interloper entailed killing him or challenging him to a public drum song. The drum match, like the pro forma duel, is a ritualized form of resolving conflict. The match was not settled in one encounter and frequently was carried on for years. New songs were created for each new meeting in which the crime was vastly exaggerated. The singer mocked his opponent by snorting, breathing in his face, and butting him with his forehead. The listener laughed mockingly to show the audience his indifference. The match could last all night, each man taking turns in beating the drum and singing. Initially each competitor strove to gain a definite point in the eyes of the audience which followed every word of the singing debate. "But from this competitive start the drum matches, after a long inconclusive series of events in which the initial hostility gets lost in a pleasant social pastime, degenerate into a cooperative act in which the two principals and the onlookers all enjoy the 'show'" (Mirsky, 1937b: 69-70).

Some cultures were more interested in putting the interloper temporarily out of commission, and in the process also compensate the husband. The Bakongo husband, as an example, demanded a heavy fine from the adulterer. If he could not pay it, he was required to work in the husband's fields without wages until the debt had been paid (Weeks, 1914). To assure himself of a food supply the adulterer had to work in his own fields at the end of the day. This left him no time for pursuing women.

The society loses twice when it condones murder in the jealousy situation. Two citizens are dead, and the newly established rancor between the husband and the relatives of the deceased ones, in response to his actions, is an additional liability to the society. Therefore, some cultures forbade killing as a means of dealing with an illicit affair. Mirsky (1937a) reported that

among the Dakota Indians of North America the brothers, sisters, parallel cousins, cross cousins, their spouses and children lived together in a group. When one of these men had an affair with the wife of another, the husband scolded or whipped his wife, but there was no openly expressed hostility toward her lover. "The only graceful thing for the injured man to do is to step aside and let the intruder have the woman. He says, 'Take her, my brother, since she means more to you than our relationship'" (Mirsky, 1937a: 395). The true feeling of the Dakota male was held inward. The relationship between the husband and rival subsequently was strained. Although the husband did not reproach the offender with words, the censure of the whole group was clearly evident, and the newly formed couple had to flee to another group (Mirsky, 1937a). The group censure, like murder, had the effect of removing the offenders, but unlike murder, it minimized further disruption to the group.

Jealousy behavior in women. Divorce and desertion are the most common means for a woman to escape from an unfaithful man, or to use as a tool for controlling his behavior by threatening to leave him unless he discards his lover. The Melanesians, for example, made divorce available to the wife. The husband had no right to stop her or take vengeance on the people of her hamlet. The Dahomey attached a conditional refund policy to marriage. "A wife can, with her husband's consent, leave him at any time by refunding the head-money (bride-price), and the amount of all the expenditure he has ever incurred on her behalf; but, if she has been grossly neglected, or ill-treated by him, she can, on proving the facts before the head-men of the community, leave him without making any payment" (Ellis, 1890: 206). The children always accompanied the wife who reimbursed the husband for what he had paid for their maintenance.

Apache wives living on reservations responded to an adulterous husband as middle-class Americans tend to do. They withdrew from the relationship and divorced the husband, or attempted to get the husband to give up the rival (Goodwin, 1942).

In no culture, past or present, are cultural policies established which allow its women as much freedom of choice as the Ammassalik. The wives had the full support of the community to run away, divorce the husband, verbally and physically assault him and his lover, or permit herself to be stolen by another man. Frequently the theft was encouraged by the wife or her parents.

Wifestealing, however, also occurred without the wife wanting to be stolen (Mirsky, 1937b).

The Murngin of Australia did not allow wives to divorce their husbands. If a discontented wife ran away, her father and brothers searched for her and returned the hapless woman to her husband who then gave her a beating. The only recourse a wife had in her attempt to control the husband's infidelity was vituperative abuse of him in public (Warner, 1937).

Most likely because predominantly the men have the power to establish cultural policies, in only a few cultures is physical aggression against the husband by wives in jealousy situations condoned. Combat between women, however, is frequently sanctioned. Whereas the Dakota husband could not take direct actions against his rival, the wife of an adulterous husband had the full approval of the group to physically assault the rival woman (Mirsky, 1937a). The Toba Indians of Bolivia easily abandoned an unfaithful husband. But the wife also could choose to fight the rival woman. Karsten (1925: 19-20) reported that, "The one tries to kill the other, which however, of course, she rarely succeeds in doing. Such fights are continued for several hours, often for a whole night, during which the two enraged women beat each other with their hands, scratch each other with nails or with big cactus thorns which they have tied at the wrists."

Compensation

There are several ways of regaining stature when the rival is successful. In the previous sections we looked at ways of seeking satisfaction. The individual and the community castigated the offenders. The orientation was punitive. In this section we look at compensation as a form of punishment for the offenders, and as a means for the aggrieved one to recover lost honor.

Some of the Ewe-speaking tribes of West Africa gave husbands the choice of continuing the marriage or ending it. If the husband chose the former, he castigated the wife and extracted a large fine from the adulterer. If the latter, the lover was free to marry the husband's wife as long as he refunded the husband the money originally paid for her and all the expenses incurred on her behalf. Under this agreement the adulterer paid no fine (Ellis, 1890).

The Plateau tribes believed in inflicting double jeopardy. If the husband discovered his wife during sexual intercourse with her lover, he slew both of them. Afterward, the wife's family had to

return the dowry, or was compelled to find another daughter for him (Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911).

JUSTIFICATION

So far we have been considering the manner in which jealousy behavior is used to influence the mate and rival. We also have seen that the type of jealousy coping responses vary transculturally. And we have established through a series of descriptive illustrations that the members of a culture select a particular range of jealousy coping responses and prohibit others. There is an additional cultural variable affecting the secondary appraisal process. Namely, the belief system which supports the jealousy response. I touched on this topic parenthetically when I discussed the formulation of the cultural policies.

One may well ask why the recipient of the jealousy behavior, the interloper, accepts the punishment. Why, for instance, did the Hidatsa adulterer and his friends had over their property to the jealous husband when he claimed it? An American adulterer would neither anticipate such a request nor agree to the demand. The answer is that the sanctioned jealousy responses are supported by an elaborate system of justifications which everyone in the society learns, and which are incorporated into equivalent structures.

The particular jealousy behavior of any one culture is an integral part of the religious, moral, and economic values of the society. The system of justice, hence, the jealousy behavior which is sanctioned, is embedded in the religious, moral and economic beliefs. The jealousy behavior is justified at every level of the structure of the society. Three simplified examples illustrate the integration of jealousy behavior with the cultural belief system.

When a Bakongo husband demanded a heavy fine from the adulterer, he justified his demand on the basis that the adulterer used his wife and must pay for having rented his property (Weeks, 1914). His demand is understandable only within the context of his own culture. Everyone in the Bakongo society, including the adulterer, accepted his demands as a rational, legitimate, self-evident course of action.

The Plateau tribes authorized the husband to slay his wife and her lover if he should surprise them while having sexual intercourse. He then returned the blood-stained spear to his father-in-law. No reprisals were taken and the unfortunate family of the

wife had to forfeit the dowry or find the husband another daughter. The justification for the killing, at least of the lover, was incorporated into the marriage ceremony. The father of the bride handed his future son-in-law an arrow during the ceremony with the words, "With this you shall pierce the seducer of your wife" (Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911: 161). The father therewith provided the justification for the killing of the lover and possibly contributed to the potential murder of his daughter.

The Pomo Indians of California came the closest of any society to making jealousy behavior an institution. Powers (1877) reported that it seemed to be almost the sole object of the government to keep women from having affairs. They had a peace chief, who was a retired war chief, and a secret society of men to attend to the matter. On solemn occasions the peace chief delivered harangues on the necessity of female virtue. All the terrors of superstitions, threats of prophets, vivid descriptions of dreadful calamities, devil-raising, sorcery and frightful apparitions were invoked to terrify the women into virtue and to prevent, as Powers (1877) called it, "smock-treason."

The sole purpose of the secret society of men was to raise the devil, so to speak, and to devise demoniacal terrors, accompanied by dreadful whooping and yelling, in order to frighten the lascivious women. Once every seven years this secret society of women-tamers held a grand devil dance in an assembly house built for only this purpose. About thirty men made themselves hideous with paint and put vessels of pitch on their heads with the aim of personifying the devils. Then they secretly went into the mountains. At night they returned with the pitch flaming on their heads and making a frightful noise. The village men engaged the bloodthirsty devils in a mock battle in the assembly house with much bravado and hullabaloo, thereby creating a terrific spectacle which resulted in much screaming and fainting among the women. At the conclusion of the farce the men banished the devils from the village. As though this were not enough, the peace chief then brought forth a rattlesnake which, unbeknown to the audience, had been tamed and defanged. The snake represented the incarnation of the dreaded chief devil. As the peace chief preached to his audience in the assembly house of morality and chastity, he brandished the horrid, slithering reptile in his hand and over the heads of his shuddering audience. Understandably, some terrified women fainted (Powers, 1877). The devil dance and the duties of the peace chief are lucid illustrations of how

jealousy behavior, with its controlling and preventive functions, was an integral part of the cultural value and belief systems.

JEALOUSY HOLIDAYS

As we have seen, powerful coping responses are used in many societies in jealousy situations. But events occur in every society which require their suspension. Some suspensions appear on a calendar basis. In contemporary American society spouses may kiss guests at a New Year's party at midnight under the mistletoe without eliciting jealousy behavior.

Other suspensions take place when certain events combine to require temporary inhibition of the jealousy responses. Particular individuals are generally designated by the culture with the power to temporarily suspend the jealousy behavior. In the pre-reservation era the Apaches had war dances where many women were needed to dance with the warriors before they left on the warpath for several weeks. Frequently it was necessary to call upon married women. "To avoid jealousies, the dance leader, local chiefs, and instigators of the dance, while speaking to the crowd, stressed the fact that men seeing their wives dancing with other men, laughing and having a good time, should not be angry, for their women would be returned to them undamaged" (Goodwin, 1942: 340). In effect, the leaders encouraged the husbands to reappraise the situation by providing them with culturally sanctioned reasons or public motives for so doing.

Similar to the Apache preparing to go on the warpath, the Bathonga of Africa suspended jealousy behavior, and in this case also the incest taboo, before going on a hippopotamus hunt. The father had sexual intercourse with his daughter before he went on a hippopotamus hunt because he believed this act, in addition to the requirement of anointing himself with drugs, and respecting particular taboos, provided him with magical powers which would increase his chances of successfully killing the animal (Goldman, 1937). Ostensibly the intercourse was not for sexual pleasure but for magic; it was a ritual liaison.

In most cases the individual reappraises the jealousy situation for personal reasons. An example is provided by the Bakongo. Upon completion of the marriage ceremony the village elders entered the house of the newly married couple to see, among other things, whether the bridegroom was able to consummate the marriage. If he was unable, the marriage was broken off.

"Sometimes, on account of the shame, the marriage is not dissolved, but the husband finds a suitable young man and permits him to have intercourse with his wife, and should there be a child, it is treated by the husband as his own" (Weeks, 1914: 146). A similar custom was practiced by the Plateau tribes. A sterile or impotent husband might ask his brother to have sexual intercourse secretly with his wife in order that she might bear him a child (Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911).

The presence of jealousy holidays demonstrates that through the enforcement and relaxation of moral sanctions, representatives of a culture can bring about marked shifts in the tendency to be threatened in a jealousy situation. The determinants of human jealousy behavior, therefore, lie in cognitive processes and social practices.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

I propose that the words romantic jealousy refer to a particular situation rather than to an emotion of jealousy because it appears impossible to me to demonstrate empirically that the variety of private motives for protecting a relationship against the interloper can be accounted for by a monolithic source of motivation, such as an emotion of jealousy. Nor does it appear reasonable to expect the variety of reactions of the individual in different interloper encounters to stem from a global, unidimensional jealousy motive. More likely, the reactions derive from conceptually different causes. Therefore, the common thread is the jealousy situation. One may respond for any number of reasons and in any number of ways, within the limits of the norms of the culture, in the jealousy situation. Whatever we feel and do in that situation is labeled as jealousy behavior.

Our reaction is determined by our primary appraisal of a particular event as a threat or harm-loss. Which event we perceive as an indication that we are, or may soon be, in a jealousy situation, depends upon the culture in which we live. How we respond to the event depends upon our (secondary) appraisal of the available coping strategies. Accordingly, the words romantic jealousy refer to a particular situation which is characterized by appraisal processes, events indicative of a jealousy situation, and the availability and execution of culturally appropriate coping strategies.

It is impossible to completely eliminate feeling threatened in a jealousy situation, because as long as we value someone, we will respond, in some manner, to the loss of the valued individual to a rival. The statement, "I am never jealous," implies that the individual has never valued anyone. The Toda have come close to minimizing the occurrence of jealousy situations by making the group the focus of their lives rather than the individual. The individual is part of a group which owns property, raises children, takes care of the individual for a lifetime, and accepts him or her without restrictions or demanding sacrifices.

The Toda experience cannot be duplicated in another society because the tendency to feel threatened in a jealousy situation is a byproduct, or a consequence, of the selection of particular economic systems, family units, and so forth. It takes a revolution or gradual changes spanning several generations to alter the disposition to make a threat appraisal in a jealousy situation. Therefore, for Americans, whose culture is more similar to the one of the Apaches than the Todas, to take psychotherapy for the purpose of feeling less threatened in a jealousy situation is an exercise in learning how to deny one's feelings and cultural influences, or to devalue the importance of others to us. At best, one should hope for no more than learning how to cope with a jealousy situation.

NOTES

1. The Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952: 181) definition of culture is used. "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other hand as conditioning elements of further action." Culture differs from a society in that the latter refers to a unit of people who organize themselves and create culture.

2. "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action" (Kluckhohn, 1954: 395).

3. My position on the operation of cultural factors in the interaction of the interloper and mates is not to be confused with Averill's (1980: 308) conception of emotions as transitory social roles. He defines a role "as a socially prescribed set of responses to be followed by a person in a given situation." The rules that govern the selection of the responses are the "social norms or shared expectancies

regarding appropriate behavior." We differ in that I do not believe in the existence of a jealousy emotion and that my position incorporates instrumental responses as well as emotions, although I am in agreement with most of what Averill says with respect to emotions. Whereas Averill contends that emotions are responses which the individual interprets as beyond self-control, I claim that people are more aware of their selection of emotions as coping strategies than is apparent in Averill's conceptualization. Moreover, the attribution of positive events to oneself and negative events to external factors (i.e., beyond self-control) is learned. Fry and Ghosh (1980) report that Asian Indians assumed more personal responsibility for failure and attributed success to luck, whereas the reverse pattern was found for Canadian Caucasians. From this standpoint, then, it does not appear prudent to tie the definition of emotion to the unwillingness of people to take responsibility for their behavior, since in some societies the socialization training provides impetus for assuming personal responsibility for all behavior, and yet the range of emotions appears not to be different from that in societies like our own, where the socialization training encourages the disowning of responsibility for some behavior.

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