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THREE VIEWS OF DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE

ABSTRACT. Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: 'contextual', 'intentional', and 'quasi-intentional'. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are 'criterial' in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) are rejected as implausible; the third (originally proposed by Kaplan in 'Dthat') is argued to be highly plausible.

1. PRELIMINARIES

Over a dozen years ago, David Kaplan proposed an intuitively plausible view as to the role played by speaker intentions in determining demonstrata.[1] According to this view, sketched briefly in the final pages of 'Dthat' (Kaplan, 1979), intentions play a role – albeit a limited one – in such determination.

The intuitive plausibility of this 'quasi-intentional' view of demonstrative reference was borne out by a consideration of two sorts of cases: cases where an accompanying demonstration seemed quite clearly to override a conflicting intention; and cases where it seemed necessary to invoke intentions in order to account for the fact that a particular object or individual – the intended demonstratum[2] – was secured as the actual demonstratum. Cases of the first sort appeared to show that the role played by speaker intentions in demonstrative reference was, at most, a limited one, while cases of the second sort seemed to show that there was indeed some such role played by intentions.

With respect to cases of the first sort, Kaplan imagined a scenario in which he wrongly supposed himself to be pointing to a picture of Carnap (the intended demonstratum), while uttering, "Dthat is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century".[3] We were to suppose that Kaplan wasn't looking where he was pointing, and that he was actually pointing to a picture of Spiro Agnew. (The picture of Carnap had recently been replaced with one of Agnew, unbeknownst to Kaplan.) The intuition was that Kaplan had just said something

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about the picture of Agnew – despite his intention to say something about the picture of Carnap. For the intuition was that Kaplan's utterance was false, and that it was false on account of the fact that the picture of Agnew did not picture "one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century". This was supposed, not implausibly, to lend credence to the view that the role played by speaker intentions in securing demonstrata was, at most, a limited one. For in the case in question, the intended demonstratum – the object the speaker intended to demonstrate, and say something of – failed to emerge as the actual demonstratum – the object the speaker actually succeeded in saying something of.

In order to show that intentions did indeed play some role in determining demonstrata, Kaplan went on to draw attention to two sorts of cases: cases where the demonstrative utterance was accompanied by a vague gesture in the general direction of the intended demonstratum; and cases where the demonstrative utterance was accompanied by a more focused demonstration. Both sorts of cases seemed to show that intentions occasionally needed to be invoked in order to explain demonstrative reference.

Let's look at the cases involving vague demonstrations first. Suppose, for instance, that I issue a vague demonstration – say, a casual wave of the hand – in the general direction of a particular dog (my intended demonstratum), while uttering, "That is Fido". And suppose that, in so doing, I simultaneously gesture in the general direction of a host of other things: a clump of clover, a nearby pond, a neighbor's cat. Surely none of this is going to prevent the dog in question from emerging as the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in my utterance. For surely the truth or falsity of what I have said is going to depend upon whether or not the intended demonstratum is in fact Fido. (What I have said is not going to be rendered false on account of the fact that neither the clump of clover, the nearby pond, nor the neighbor's cat is identical with Fido. Nor will what I have said be rendered 'indeterminate' on account of the fact that my gesture was as much in the general direction of those other things as it was in the general direction of the intended demonstratum.) One natural way to account for this phenomenon would be to suppose that my intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the dog in question – as opposed to the clover, the pond, or the cat – has the effect of 'disambiguating' my vague demonstration,[4] and thus securing that dog as the demonstratum.

In fact, as Kaplan suggested in 'Dthat', any case where a demonstrative utterance is accompanied by ostension – whether vague or focused – tends to support the view that intentions play at least a limited role in determining demonstrata.[5] For whenever you gesture at one thing, you simultaneously gesture at other things as well – from the 'surveyor's point of view'.[6] Ostension thus appears to be invariably indeterminate: no gesture, by itself, can 'pick out' a unique object or individual. Suppose, for instance, that while uttering "That is Fido", I point directly at a particular dog (my intended demonstratum). Now when I point at that dog, I also point (from the 'surveyor's point of view') at his coat, at a section of his coat, perhaps at a flea on that coat, etc. Nevertheless, the intuition is surely that the dog in question – the intended demonstratum – emerges as the actual demonstratum. For it would certainly appear as though the truth or falsity of what I have said is going to depend upon the properties of that dog – and not upon those of his coat, a section of his coat, a flea on that coat, etc. And a natural way of accounting for this apparent fact would be to suppose that my intention to demonstrate, and say something of, a particular dog – and not any of those other things – serves to 'disambiguate' my gesture and thus fix that dog as the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in my utterance. Indeed, it is not easy to see how else one could account for the dog's emerging as the demonstratum. Thus, regardless of whether an accompanying demonstration is vague or focused, intentions would appear to be required in order to account for the fact that a particular object or individual – the intended demonstratum – manages to get secured as the actual demonstratum.

At the very least, then, the view of demonstrative reference sketched in 'Dthat' – according to which intentions play a limited role in such reference – has intuitive plausibility in its favor. Recently, however, there has been a marked tendency to reject such a view in favor of an 'all or nothing' picture of the role played by intentions in determining demonstrata. There have been several philosophers, including Kaplan (1989) and Donnellan,[7] who have argued that intentions play a 'criterial'[8] role in the determination of demonstrata: being the intended demonstratum is the 'criterion' for emerging as the actual demonstratum. These Gricean-minded philosophers view accompanying demonstrations as playing no more than the pragmatic role of facilitating communication: of assisting the hearer in identifying the intended demon-

stratum. Because the import of demonstrations is viewed as merely pragmatic, a wayward demonstration can never (on the view in question) override a conflicting intention. If the speaker intends to demonstrate and say something of x, then even if he mistakenly demonstrates y, x will nevertheless emerge as the actual demonstratum: the object or individual about which something has been said. Of course, in the event that the speaker demonstrates y, the hearer might naturally take y to be the intended demonstratum. Thus, while failed communication may well be a consequence of wayward demonstration, failed reference can never be.

There have also been a number of philosophers who have taken the opposite view, arguing that intentions play no role whatsoever in the securing of demonstrata. Several of these Wittgensteinian-minded philosophers, including McGinn (1981) and Wettstein (1984), have contended that demonstrata are determined entirely by certain contextual (as opposed to 'speaker internal') features of the demonstrative utterance.[9] Different versions of the same basic view emerge as a result of disagreement over just what the relevant contextual features are. According to McGinn's version of the contextual view, the only contextual feature relevant to the determination of the demonstratum is the ostensive gesture.[10] According to Wettstein's version of the contextual view, the relevant contextual features are certain publicly accessible[11] 'cues', exploited by the speaker in his attempt to communicate about a particular object or individual. Wettstein (like McGinn) regards accompanying demonstrations as playing a genuine semantic role in demonstrative reference. For such gestures constitute publicly accessible cues of the sort in question. However, Wettstein regards ostensive gestures as constituting just one of several types of semantically significant cues. Other such cues (discussed in Section 2 below) have to do with relations obtaining between the words comprising the sentence uttered, and particular features of the context.[12]. But according to either version of the contextual view, if x is the object or individual indicated by the relevant contextual features, then x is the demonstratum – even if y is the intended demonstratum. That a demonstratum may be secured despite the indeterminacy of ostension is accounted for (on Wettstein's view[13]) by appealing not to speaker intentions but to other (speaker external) features of the context. (In Section 2 below, we shall see just what these other features are supposed to be.)

In what follows, I intend to argue that the currently popular 'all or

nothing' views concerning the role played by speaker intentions in demonstrative reference are wrong, and that a version of the quasi-intentional view proposed by Kaplan in 'Dthat' is more in line with the linguistic data. I do not intend to provide a fully worked out theory of demonstrative reference. What I do intend to do is argue that – whatever the details of the *correct* theory of demonstrative reference turn out to be – that theory will be a quasi-intentional theory of the sort sketched in 'Dthat'.

The format of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, after spelling out the details of the 'contextual' view of demonstrative reference, I consider the particular advantages and disadvantages of that view. I then do the same for the 'intentional' view. And then, after briefly reviewing the virtues of the quasi-intentional view of 'Dthat', I draw attention to a seeming difficulty with that view. The difficulty involves the apparent inability of the view to account for the fact that, in cases where a wayward demonstration overrides a conflicting intention, a determinate proposition is nevertheless expressed. In Section 3, I go on to sketch and argue for a modified version of the view proposed in 'Dthat', in which intentions are assigned a limited role in demonstrative reference. (The modifications result from attempting to accommodate the phenomena discussed in the previous section.) And finally, in Section 4, I conclude with a quick survey of what I take this paper to have established – and what remains (concerning demonstrative reference) to be established.

2. CURRENTLY AVAILABLE VIEWS OF DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE

2.1 *The Contextual View*

Common to any view of the sort which I have chosen to describe as 'contextual' is the idea that speaker intentions have nothing whatsoever to do with the determination of demonstrata. According to any such view, demonstrata are determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. So far as I am aware, the most thoroughly developed and persuasively argued version of the contextual view is that provided by Howard Wettstein in 'How to Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference' (1984).[14] For this reason, I will focus my analysis of the view in question on Wettstein's particular version of that view.[15]

Wettstein's contextual view is formulated in response to a well-known difficulty concerning the reference of demonstrative (and, more generally, indexical) expressions. Despite the 'meager lexical meaning' of expressions like 'this' and 'that', tokens of such expressions nevertheless manage to achieve determinate reference. A question thus arises: What factor(s) conjoin with the lexical meanings of demonstratives to determine demonstrata? What (in other words) 'bridges the gap' between the meaning and the reference of such expressions?

Before spelling out the details of his response to this query, Wettstein sketches a particular view of language, to which that response is designed to conform. The view is the well-known Wittgensteinian one, according to which language is properly regarded as a kind of social institution. Wettstein's solution to the problem of how to 'bridge the gap' between the meaning and the reference of demonstrative expressions coheres well with this Wittgensteinian picture of language. Wettstein argues that the 'gap' in question is to be 'bridged' by the "very features which make the reference available to the auditor" (Wettstein, 1984, p. 64). These features are appropriately labeled 'cues'. And the particular cues that fix the reference of a token demonstrative are those for which the speaker is "responsible, those that he, to all appearances, exploits. . ." in his attempt to communicate about a particular object or individual. For,

> [o]ne who utters a demonstrative is responsible, from the point of view of the natural language institution, for making his reference available to his addressee, and so is responsible for the cues that a competent and attentive addressee would take him to be exploiting. (Wettstein, 1984, pp. 72–73)

The particular cues that determine demonstrative reference – those which the speaker "to all appearances, exploits" – include more than just accompanying demonstrations. Several such cues have to do with relations obtaining between the particular expressions comprising the sentence uttered, and particular features of the context of the utterance. Consider an utterance (unaccompanied by ostension) of "That dog belongs to me", made in a context containing either a single or most salient canine. In either case, the common noun 'dog', conjoined with the uniqueness/maximal salience of a particular canine, would (according to Wettstein) provide a cue of the sort in question. For in the absence of any other helpful cues (such as a demonstration), it is natural to suppose that the speaker is relying, at least in part, on the common

noun 'dog' to convey to the hearer the identity of the intended demonstratum.

Wettstein also believes that the predicate contained in the sentence uttered might constitute a semantically significant cue, given the appropriate contextual circumstances. To see this, consider an utterance (unaccompanied by ostension) of "That is my dog", made in a context containing a single canine, situated amongst a number of felines. And suppose that, at the time of the utterance, the dog is no more salient than any of the cats. In such a case, the predicate "is my dog", conjoined with the contextual uniqueness of a particular canine, would (according to Wettstein) provide a cue that would contribute to determining that dog as the demonstratum. For given the absence of any other obvious cues that might enable the hearer to determine the identity of the intended demonstratum, it is natural to suppose that the speaker is indeed relying on the predicate to do so.

Given this rather wide range of semantically significant cues,[16] Wettstein has little trouble accounting for demonstrative reference in the face of ostensive indeterminacy. He is able to do so without having to invoke speaker intentions: he simply invokes additional cues, which serve to 'disambiguate' the ostensive act. To see how this might go, consider an utterance of "That is my dog", accompanied by an ostensive gesture in the direction of one of several equally salient canines. The question is: How is it that the demonstrated dog, and not, e.g., his coat, gets secured as the demonstratum of the token occurrence of 'that'? After all, in pointing to the dog, the speaker cannot but point to his coat as well. Furthermore, there is not, in this particular case, any common noun attaching to the demonstrative to assist in the disambiguation. According to Wettstein, the dog (and not his coat) gets secured as the demonstratum, because of the semantic significance of the predicate "is my dog". Since the predicate indicates that the speaker is speaking about the dog, and not, e.g., about the dog's coat, and since the absence of other helpful cues (apart from the indeterminate ostension) suggests that the speaker is indeed relying on that provided by the predicate, the predicate is what fixes the dog (as opposed to, e.g., his coat) as the demonstratum.

So much for exegesis. Now let's look at what reasons there might be for favoring such a view. Perhaps the most obvious attraction of a contextual view like Wettstein's is that – unlike the intentional view – it appears to have no difficulty accommodating cases where a wayward

demonstration overrides a conflicting intention. Consider the Carnap/-Agnew scenario described above. A straightforward application of the intentional view would yield the counterintuitive claim that when Kaplan uttered "Dthat is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century", while pointing at the picture of Agnew, he actually said something about the picture of Carnap (the intended demonstratum). A straightforward application of Wettstein's contextual view, on the other hand, would appear to yield the desired result: Kaplan said something about the picture of Agnew – the object indicated by the relevant cues – the most obvious of which was the pointing gesture. A less obvious, though no less significant cue, would be the predicate "is a picture . . .". For the predicate would serve to disambiguate the pointing gesture: to make it the case that the picture (of Agnew), and not (e.g.) the picture frame or the glass protecting the picture, emerges as the demonstratum.

Aside from its ability to handle these rather complex cases, are there any other reasons for favoring a contextual account like Wettstein's? Well, in the absence of any counterexamples, such a view would be rendered superior to a quasi-intentional view on account of its greater simplicity. After all, if all cases of demonstrative reference can be explained solely in terms of certain publicly accessible cues, then why complicate the picture? Why suppose that intentions interact with such cues to determine demonstrative reference?

However, it is not difficult to find counterexamples to Wettstein's view, as it is not difficult to come up with cases where the actual demonstratum is the intended demonstratum though not the object or individual indicated by the relevant cues. The most compelling cases of this sort occur in situations where the predicate – one of the cues 'exploited' by the speaker – leads the hearer to misidentify the intended demonstratum. Consider a scenario involving two equally salient canines: Fido and Spot. And suppose that the speaker mistakes Spot for Fido. (Perhaps the two dogs look quite similar at a distance.) Suppose further that the speaker says to the addressee (Fido's owner, who can recognize her dog at any distance) "That's your dog Fido", intending to say something of the dog mistaken for Fido. Finally, suppose that no more than a vague nod in the general direction of the two canines accompanies the demonstrative utterance. (It would be natural to assume, then, that the speaker is relying, in large part, on the predicate "is your dog Fido", to convey the identity of the intended demonstra-

tum.) Intuitively, the utterance was false, as the speaker seems quite clearly to have said falsely of Spot that he was the addressee's dog Fido. Yet Wettstein's view would have it that the utterance was true. For Wettstein's view would have it that Fido was the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in the utterance in question. After all, Fido – and not Spot – was the dog indicated by the relevant cues (which included, most notably, the predicate "is your dog Fido"). And so again, Wettstein's view predicts that the utterance in question was actually true. But that just doesn't seem right. The intuition that the utterance was false seems too strong to allow for such a possibility.

There are a number of ways in which someone favoring an approach like Wettstein's might respond to the foregoing. First, one might simply dismiss cases of the sort in question – cases where there is a divergence between the intended demonstratum and the entity indicated by the relevant cues – as 'abnormal'. One might further point out that the theory appears to have no difficulties handling the 'normal' cases – cases where the intended demonstratum and the entity indicated by the relevant cues converge. One might accordingly argue that the proponent of the contextual view has a right to dismiss (as potential data) the intuitions surrounding the 'abnormal' cases, and to then legislate: to stipulate that, in cases of the sort in question, the entity indicated by the relevant cues is indeed the demonstratum – despite what the intuitions surrounding such cases might appear to suggest.[17]

Second, one might attempt to account for the intuitions surrounding the cases in question by invoking Kripke's speaker's reference/semantic reference distinction. Consider the Spot/Fido scenario described above. One might argue that, while it is certainly true that the speaker referred to Spot, and said of Spot that he was the addressee's dog Fido, the semantic referent of 'that', in the speaker's utterance of "That's your dog Fido", was in fact Fido. That the speaker referred to and said something false of Spot is what generates the mistaken intuition that the actual utterance was false.

A third, more radical response would involve modifying the contextual view by excluding the predicate as a semantic determinant. In this way, one would simply be eliminating the especially embarrassing cases by making appropriate changes in the theory. Were this sort of approach adopted, one could then say that, in the Spot/Fido scenario, the speaker's failure to convey the identity of the intended demonstratum by means of the appropriate cues (which would include an ostensive

act as well as an appropriate demonstrative description) resulted in his failure to say anything determinate. The intuition that something determinate (and false) was in fact said, could then be accounted for by appealing, once again, to the speaker's reference/semantic reference distinction. Though there was no semantic referent (the demonstrative was vacuous), there was a speaker's referent – an individual who was falsely claimed to be Fido.

One difficulty with the first of the three proposals is that, by excluding the 'abnormal' cases (cases where the intended demonstratum and the entity indicated by the relevant cues diverge), the theory's range of application is significantly narrowed. The theory would have to be restated as (something like): in the 'normal' cases (cases where there is a convergence between the intended demonstratum and the entity indicated by the relevant cues), the actual demonstratum will be the entity indicated by the relevant cues. One problem with this restricted version of the theory is that it has the effect of robbing that theory of any advantage it might have had over the intentional theory. For the latter theory can also, by excluding certain 'abnormal' cases (like the Carnap/Agnew case), account for all of the 'normal' ones. Further, by excluding cases of the sort in question, the contextualist thereby excludes the Carnap/Agnew case – a case which appears to provide considerable evidence for his theory. More importantly, the cases excluded by the restricted version of the contextual theory – the 'abnormal' ones – are the natural test cases for that theory (as well as for the intentional theory). For they represent cases where the intended demonstratum and the object or individual indicated by the relevant cues diverge. In such cases, intuitions about which (if either) of these two entities is the actual demonstratum will constitute crucial data that both 'all or nothing' views must somehow manage to accommodate. Thus, for the proponent of either 'all or nothing' view to simply disregard the intuitions in question – on the grounds that the cases that generate them are 'abnormal' – would be ad hoc. Hence, neither proponent is in any position to legislate here: to declare by fiat that the 'abnormal' cases are to be analyzed in accordance with the theory in question – despite the intuitions surrounding such cases.[18]

The second proposal suggested above doesn't look much more promising. The difficulty here is that intuitions go directly against making the distinction in a way favorable to the Wettsteinian picture. Consider the utterance (described above) of "That's your dog Fido", where the

demonstrative is used by the speaker to 'pick out' a particular dog who, unbeknownst to the speaker, is not Fido, but his look-alike companion Spot. Spot, surely, is the speaker's referent – there's no doubt about that. This fact would indeed account for the intuition that something false seems to have been said; for the speaker referred to Spot and said falsely of Spot that he was the addressee's dog Fido. But to suppose that the semantic referent of the demonstrative was actually Fido would be to suppose that, when the speaker uttered "That's your dog Fido", what he said was – strictly speaking – true. But surely the intuitions go the other way here; surely the intuition is that, strictly speaking, the speaker's utterance was false. And such intuitions would suggest that the semantic referent – not just the speaker's referent – was Spot.[19]

The third proposal faces difficulties as well. By excluding the predicate from the class of semantically significant cues, the proponent of the contextual view is going to wind up with countless cases of referential indeterminacy – where, intuitively, there are none. For often, when one utters a sentence of the form "That is such and such" or "This is such and such", one is relying largely on the predicate to convey the identity of the intended demonstratum. If the predicate is not a semantic determinant, then the contextualist is going to have a difficult time accounting for the fact that determinate reference does seem to be achieved in many such cases. Consider utterances of sentences like "That's a nice tie" or "This is such a humid day". Surely, it is possible for the demonstrative expressions occurring in such utterances to achieve determinate reference. But it is hard to see just how the contextualist can account for this without appealing to the cue provided by the predicate.[20] To attempt to account for this apparent referential determinacy in terms of speaker's reference (as suggested above) would be implausible. For utterances of the sort in question (utterances of sentences like "That's a nice tie") are surely capable of expressing determinate propositions. But that would not be possible if the demonstratives in such utterances were without semantic referents.

2.2. *The Intentional View*

So much for the contextual view of demonstrative reference. Now let's turn to the intentional view. The central idea behind any view of the sort that I have been describing as 'intentional' is that the demonstratum of a demonstrative expression is determined entirely by the speaker's

intention to demonstrate, and say something of, a particular object or individual. (This entity is sometimes described as the entity that the speaker – in some intuitive, unanalyzed sense – 'has in mind'.[21]) According to any such view, if the speaker intends to demonstrate and say something of x, then ipso facto, x is the demonstratum – even if y is the object indicated by certain publicly accessible 'cues'.

Kaplan, Donnellan, and Bertolet[22] all appear to adhere to something like this view. Bertolet, however, seems to want to restrict his remarks about demonstratives to speaker's reference, and Donnellan (apparently) has expressed his views on demonstratives only in personal correspondence (and not with the author of this paper). I will therefore direct my remarks in this section toward Kaplan's particular version of the intentional view.

Kaplan's recently adopted intentional view, which he discusses rather briefly in 'Afterthoughts' (Kaplan, 1989), purports to account for the reference of a particular class of demonstratives – 'perceptual demonstratives'. Perceptual demonstratives are demonstratives employed in situations where the intended demonstratum is a perceived object or individual on which the speaker has 'focused'. The demonstratum of such an expression is determined by what Kaplan refers to as the 'directing intention': the intention of the speaker to demonstrate, and say something of, the 'perceived' object or individual on which he has 'focused'. If (e.g.) the speaker utters, "That is Fido", while harboring such an intention with respect to a particular dog (a perceived dog on which he has 'focused'), then – and only then – will that dog emerge as the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in that utterance. Any accompanying act of demonstration will be entirely without semantic significance. Its only significance will be pragmatic, its sole function being the facilitation of communication. Kaplan sums up his view as follows:

> I am now inclined to regard the directing intention, at least in the case of perceptual demonstratives, as criterial, and to regard the demonstration as a mere *externalization* of this inner intention. The externalization is an aid to communication, like speaking more slowly and loudly, but is of no semantic significance. (Kaplan, 1989, p. 582)

One of the most obvious attractions of a view like Kaplan's is that it provides a rather convincing analysis of those cases that prove problematic for a contextual view like Wettstein's. With respect to the Spot/Fido scenario described above, the intentional view predicts what seems

intuitively clear: the utterance of "That's your dog Fido" was false on the grounds that the speaker said falsely of Spot that he was the addressee's dog Fido. Moreover, this prediction is based on the intuitively plausible claim that the demonstrative expression had Spot and not Fido as its demonstratum, because it was the former and not the latter that the speaker intended to speak of.

Apart from these particular advantages, are there any other reasons to favor the intentional view? In the absence of difficult cases, the intentional view would be preferable to the quasi-intentional view, on the grounds of its greater simplicity. There are, however, troubling cases for the intentional view. In particular, Kaplan's view appears to give an incorrect analysis of cases where the speaker's intention is overruled by a wayward demonstration. As we saw above, a straightforward application of the intentional view to the Carnap/Agnew scenario yields the counterintuitive claim that Kaplan said something about the picture of Carnap – and not about that of Agnew.

However, in fairness to Kaplan, it ought to be pointed out that his theory of 'perceptual demonstratives' does not purport to account for cases like the Carnap/Agnew case. For in that case, the intended demonstratum (the picture of Carnap) is not a 'perceived' object or individual on which the speaker has 'focused'. Moreover, in a footnote Kaplan describes the Carnap/Agnew case as 'complex and atypical', as it surely is. For surely in the 'simple and typical' cases, one does perceive the object or individual that one demonstrates. Neither of these factors, however, is of much help to Kaplan. First, it is not difficult to come up with cases that Kaplan's theory does purport to account for, but cannot. Second, although the Carnap/Agnew case is indeed 'complex and atypical', it does provide evidence for those competing theories of demonstrative reference that are able to accommodate it. Kaplan's theory thus loses some plausibility on account of its comparatively narrow range of application.

Let's take these two points in turn, beginning with the first. The particular counterexamples to Kaplan's view that I have in mind have been discussed by me at length elsewhere.[23] I will therefore be brief. Consider the following scenario. You realize that you have left your keys on a colleague's desk. You return to her office, and spot your keys on her desk (which happen to be alongside her keys). And then, while reaching for your keys (on which you have 'focused'), you come out with an utterance of "These are mine". However, when you look

at the keys in your hand, you see that they are not yours – but your colleague's. Though you perceived and 'focused' on your keys – the keys which you intended to demonstrate, and say something of – your demonstration was slightly off-target, resulting in the unexpected acquisition of your colleague's keys.

Kaplan's 'directing intention' view predicts that what you have said is true; for you said truly of your keys (the intended demonstrata) that they were your keys. However, surely your utterance was false – on the grounds that you said falsely of your colleague's keys that they were yours. And surely your colleague would not have been out of line had she responded to your assertion by uttering, "No, you're wrong. Those keys belong to me". But if Kaplan's view were correct, then such a response would have indicated that the speaker simply hadn't understood what you actually said (on account of your slightly off-target demonstration). And on Kaplan's view, it would have been appropriate for you to rejoin, while returning your colleague's keys: "Yes, these are your keys, but I never said they were mine".

What cases like the foregoing seem very clearly to show is that, contrary to Kaplan's 'directing intention' view, ostensive gestures – at least in certain cases – are capable of overriding conflicting intentions. Such gestures would thus appear to be semantically significant. The semantic significance of ostensive gestures is also borne out by the Carnap/Agnew case. Again, it is true that this particular case does not, strictly speaking, constitute a counterexample to Kaplan's view – as the intended demonstratum is not a perceived object or individual on which the speaker has 'focused'. But it clearly does cast doubt on a central idea underpinning Kaplan's 'directing intention' view – that ostensive gestures are entirely without semantic significance.

Moreover, the fact that such gestures are sometimes semantically significant, when coupled with verbal demonstratives, surely tends to support the view that they are always, or at least generally, semantically significant, when coupled with such expressions. This brings us to the second of the two points raised above. Because the contextual and quasi-intentional views attribute semantic significance to ostensive gestures, they ought to have no difficulty accommodating cases of the sort in question: cases where it seems clear that such gestures do indeed contribute to the determination of the demonstratum. Their greater range of application thus gives them a clear advantage over the 'directing intention' view of Kaplan.

Finally, because cases of the sort in question represent cases where there is a divergence between the intended demonstratum and the object or individual indicated by certain publicly accessible 'cues', they constitute natural test cases for a view like Kaplan's – a view according to which it is the intention, and not the 'cues', that determines the reference of a demonstrative. Rather than being relegated to a footnote (where they are dismissed as 'complex and atypical'), cases of this sort should receive especially close attention by the intentionalist.

2.3. *The Quasi-intentional View of 'Dthat'*

At this point, it would appear that the only plausible view of demonstrative reference would be a quasi-intentional one: one according to which intentions play a limited role in determining demonstrata. For there appear to be cases where it is necessary to appeal to intentions in order to explain demonstrative reference – and yet there also appear to be cases where intentions are simply not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to explain such reference. The natural (and logical) conclusion to draw is that a quasi-intentional view of demonstrative reference (of the sort proposed in 'Dthat') is not unlikely to be a correct view of such reference.

However, despite its apparent ability to handle certain cases that prove difficult for the 'all or nothing' views, the view proposed in 'Dthat' is not without its problems. In fact, it is not all that clear that the view is equipped to deal adequately with cases where a wayward demonstration overrides a conflicting intention. Specifically, it is not clear that the view is able to account for the fact that, in such cases, a determinate proposition may be expressed. The determinacy of the proposition expressed poses a problem for the view in question, as it appears to be at odds with Kaplan's remarks (in 'Dthat') about the indeterminacy of ostension. Because ostension is (according to Kaplan) invariably indeterminate, an intention is needed to disambiguate any act of ostension.[24] (For this reason, Kaplan is led to the view that intentions do play some role in demonstrative reference.) But if the intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture of Carnap is overruled by the accompanying demonstration, that intention will presumably not figure in the determination of the demonstratum. But in that case, what intention (if any) serves to disambiguate the demonstration: to make it the case that it is a pointing at the picture of Agnew

– and not, e.g., a pointing at the picture frame, the glass protecting the picture, a section of the picture, etc.? More generally, in cases of the sort in question – cases where the intended and actual demonstrata appear to diverge – what intention (if any) will serve to disambiguate the accompanying demonstration?

If the quasi-intentional view is to be considered a plausible theory of demonstrative reference, it must provide some way of dealing with this problem.

3. A MODIFIED QUASI-INTENTIONAL VIEW

There are several ways in which the proponent of a quasi-intentional view might respond to the foregoing. First, he might deny (contra Kaplan's position in 'Dthat') that a determinate proposition is in fact expressed in cases where a wayward demonstration appears to override a conflicting intention. He might do so on the grounds that the demonstration remains ambiguous, due to the absence of an appropriate disambiguating intention. One would then need to account for the intuition that a determinate proposition was in fact expressed – that proposition being (in the Carnap/Agnew case) that a certain picture of Agnew was a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. Such an account could perhaps be provided by appealing to the fact that, in interpreting an utterance, there is a natural inclination to assume that conditions are 'normal'. In the case in question, this would involve assuming that Kaplan was aware of the fact that the picture he was pointing at was one of Agnew, and that he therefore had an appropriate 'disambiguating' intention – an intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture of Agnew.[25] The general view would then be that, in cases of the sort in question, there is no actual demonstratum – as there is no intention available to disambiguate the demonstration, and to thus secure a demonstratum.

Alternatively, one might argue that, in cases of the sort in question, a determinate proposition is in fact expressed. But one might go on to deny that the speaker's intentions have anything to do with what that proposition is. Specifically, one might claim that, in cases where the appropriate disambiguating intention is absent, the demonstratum is determined entirely by publicly accessible 'cues' of the sort discussed by Wettstein. The determinate proposition expressed would then coincide with whatever proposition the attentive and linguistically com-

petent hearer would take to have been expressed. With respect to the Carnap/Agnew case, the proposition expressed would be one to the effect that a certain picture of Agnew pictured one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. (And this, of course, is exactly the result one wants.) The basic idea would then be that, when no disambiguating intention is available, the contextual 'cues' exploited by the speaker take on the entire burden of determining reference.

The main drawback of the first of these two proposals is that it relies on external explanatory mechanisms to 'explain away' intuitions contrary to what the theory itself would lead one to expect. The main drawback of the second proposal is that it fails to unify those cases of demonstrative reference involving ostension. For it claims that intentions come into play only in the 'normal' cases – cases where the speaker's intention is capable of disambiguating his demonstration. From the point of view of the theorist who is able to provide a unified account of demonstrative reference which accommodates cases of the sort in question without the assistance of external explanatory devices, both of the foregoing analyses would appear ad hoc.

There is, fortunately, just such an account: one which suffers from neither of the problems infecting the other two accounts. According to this third and, to my mind, more plausible analysis, Kaplan's pointing gesture is indeed disambiguated by one of his intentions – contrary to what might initially appear to be the case. This intention is not, however, the 'primary' one: it is not the intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture of Carnap. Rather, it is a 'secondary' intention: an intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture in the general direction of the gesture – a picture which (unbeknownst to Kaplan) is not the picture of Carnap. This intention is a 'secondary one', as it is derivative, being the natural outcome of conjoining the 'primary' intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture of Carnap with the (mistaken) de dicto belief that the picture in the direction of the gesture is that very picture. On this view, the picture of Agnew – and not the picture frame, the glass protecting the picture, etc. – gets secured as the demonstratum, because the secondary intention concerns the picture (in the range of the gesture) – and not any of those other things. The idea, more generally, would be as follows. In cases where the intended and actual demonstrata diverge, the demonstration is indeed disambiguated by an accompanying intention – only this intention will not be the 'primary' one. Rather, it will be a

'secondary' intention (to demonstrate the *F* in the direction of the demonstration) which results from conjoining the primary intention with certain belief(s) the speaker has about the object of the latter intention. (As we shall see below, the relevant beliefs will be those that connect the object of the primary intention with the demonstrative act.)

The foregoing notions of 'primary' and 'secondary' intentions can be spelled out a bit more as follows. Associated with any demonstrative utterance will be a singular proposition (representing a certain de re belief) that the speaker intends to communicate by means of that utterance, and that is such that its successful communication will result in the speaker's communicating precisely what he intends to communicate. When the demonstrative utterance is accompanied by an ostensive act, there will be an accompanying intention to demonstrate the 'constituent' of the singular proposition. The intention to demonstrate this individual, and to predicate something of it (thereby expressing a singular proposition), is what I mean by the 'primary' intention. Thus, consider the Carnap/Agnew case. Here, the primary intention would be the intention to demonstrate a certain picture of Carnap, and to say of that picture that it is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.[26]

Now, the author of a demonstrative utterance will ordinarily have a host of beliefs concerning the object of his primary intention: the 'constituent' of the singular proposition he intends to communicate. Certain of these beliefs will play a crucial semantic role in cases where the intended and actual demonstrata diverge. The relevant beliefs will be those that connect the intended demonstratum (the object of the primary intention) with the demonstrative act. In the Carnap/Agnew case, the relevant belief would be Kaplan's (de dicto) belief that the picture in the direction of the gesture is identical to the particular picture of Carnap he 'has in mind'. When conjoined with Kaplan's primary intention, the result is a secondary intention: an intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture in the direction of the gesture. And this intention amounts (more concisely) to an intention to express a singular proposition of the form "*x* is a picture . . . ", where *x* is instantiated by the picture in the direction of the demonstration – which, unbeknownst to Kaplan, happens to be a certain picture of Agnew. Because this secondary intention is predicated on Kaplan's mistaken belief that the picture pointed to is the picture he 'has in mind', communication of the intended (secondary) proposition will

not result in Kaplan's communicating precisely what he intended to communicate. In fact, there is no reason to suppose that Kaplan even has the de re belief which the (secondary) proposition would ordinarily be taken to express: the belief that *x* is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, where *x* is the picture of Agnew pointed to. (Contrast the foregoing with the case of Kaplan's primary intention, where communication of the intended proposition – which has a certain picture of Carnap as a 'constituent' – would result in Kaplan's communicating precisely what he intended to communicate.)

Kaplan's belief that the picture of Carnap – the picture 'he has in mind' – is one and the same as the picture in whose direction he is gesturing seems quite likely to be relevant to demonstrative reference. For its conjunction with Kaplan's primary intention yields a secondary intention, which is able to do the job of disambiguating Kaplan's pointing gesture. In this way, a demonstratum – the picture of Agnew – gets secured. And this, of course, accords with our intuition that a demonstratum is indeed secured, and that the demonstratum is a certain picture of Agnew. It further accords with the more specific intuition that the picture of Agnew gets secured as the demonstratum, because Kaplan intended to demonstrate the picture in the direction of his gesture – a picture which he failed to realize was not the object of his primary intention – the picture he 'had in mind'.

It is important to note that the secondary (disambiguating) intention needn't be the result of conjoining the primary intention with a de dicto belief about 'the *F* in the range of the demonstration'. The belief conjoined with the primary intention is sometimes a de re belief about that *F*. To see this, suppose that Kaplan was looking where he was pointing but wasn't looking carefully. Suppose further that he mistook the (perceived) picture of Agnew for the object of his primary intention: a certain picture of Carnap. In such a case, it would seem that the (secondary) disambiguating intention – the intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture in the range of the demonstration – would be the result of conjoining the primary intention with the de re belief, concerning the picture in the range of the demonstration, that it is the picture of Carnap that Kaplan 'has in mind'. In fact, it would seem that, in all cases where the demonstratum is perceived by the speaker, the secondary (disambiguating) intention will be formed from conjoining the primary intention with a de re belief about 'the *F* in the range of the demonstration'. (The perception of that entity would

enable the speaker to form a de re belief about it.) Only in cases where the demonstratum is not perceived by the speaker will the secondary (disambiguating) intention be derived from the conjunction of the primary intention and de dicto beliefs about 'the *F* in the range of the demonstration'. After all, in such cases, there would ordinarily be no reason to suspect that the speaker even has a de re belief concerning the *F* in the range of the demonstration, that it is the *F* he has in mind. In the original Carnap/Agnew scenario, for instance, there seems no reason to suppose that Kaplan has a de re belief concerning the picture in the range of the demonstration, that it is the picture he 'has in mind'. For this reason, it is natural to suppose that – in the original Carnap/Agnew scenario – the disambiguating intention is formed from a de dicto belief about 'the picture in the range of the demonstration'.

Such considerations suggest the following generalization concerning the particular class of 'abnormal' cases in question: cases where the intended and actual demonstrata diverge. In cases where the speaker has a de re belief that would yield a disambiguating intention when conjoined with the primary intention, that is how the disambiguating intention will be derived. Only in cases where no such de re belief is available will a de dicto conjoin with the primary intention to form the disambiguating intention. Such considerations in turn suggest the following generalization. With respect to the class of cases where there is a divergence between the intended and actual demonstrata, the 'normal' cases will be those in which the disambiguating intention is formed from a de re belief about 'the *F* in the range of the demonstration'. For it appears as though de dicto beliefs concerning 'the *F* in the range of the demonstration' come into play only when no de re belief about that *F* is available.

Not only does the proposed quasi-intentional view account for these 'abnormal' cases, it accounts equally well for the 'normal' cases: cases where the intended and actual demonstrata converge. Let's look briefly at cases of the latter sort – which were discussed in some detail in the opening section of this paper. In the scenarios described in that section, the speaker accompanied her utterance of "That is Fido" with an ostensive gesture in the direction of the intended demonstratum: a particular dog. It seemed plausible to suppose that the speaker's intention to demonstrate the dog (in the direction of the gesture) disambiguated her demonstration, thus securing that dog as the demonstratum. And this analysis is, of course, perfectly in line with the proposed view.

For in the case in question, the disambiguating intention will be an intention to demonstrate the dog in the (general) direction of the gesture. In this particular case, however, the disambiguating intention would be the primary one: the intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the dog the speaker 'has in mind' (Fido). For in the 'normal' cases – cases where the particular *F* the speaker 'has in mind' is in fact the *F* in the range of the demonstration – the primary intention will suffice to disambiguate the demonstration. There will accordingly be no need to invoke secondary intentions.

It should be clear that the view sketched above is really nothing more than an elaboration of the view proposed by Kaplan in 'Dthat'. In that essay, Kaplan suggested that the demonstrata of token demonstratives[27] (which were accompanied by demonstrations) were determined partly by the demonstrations and partly by speaker intentions. The general idea seemed to be that the demonstrations would narrow the range of possible demonstrata, and the intentions would then 'disambiguate' the demonstrations, thereby narrowing the range to just one. In this way, a demonstratum was determined. What the proposed view adds to Kaplan's view is a characterization of the disambiguating intentions. It starts off by acknowledging the existence of a plurality of intentions (primary and secondary) associated with any demonstrative utterance accompanied by an ostensive gesture. It then singles out the disambiguating intention: the intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the particular *F* in the general direction of the demonstration. In this way, one is able to account for the fact that there can be a divergence between the intended demonstratum – the object of one's primary intention – and the actual demonstratum. In such cases, the demonstration is, as usual, disambiguated by an intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the *F* in the general range of the demonstration. Only this intention will not be the primary intention, but a secondary intention, which arises from the conjunction of the primary intention, with certain (false) beliefs concerning the object of the latter intention. Only by acknowledging the existence of intentions other than the primary one is the proponent of the quasi-intentional view able to adequately account for what happens when the actual and intended demonstrata diverge.

In concluding this discussion of the quasi-intentional view of demonstrative reference, I would like to address two objections that have recently been leveled against it.[28] One of these objections is indirect,

as it purports to be a defense of the intentional view. The defense runs as follows. Whenever contextual cues (demonstrations, in particular) appear to override the speaker's intention, the conflict is not actually between the former and the latter; rather, it is between various intentions ascribable to the speaker. In the Carnap/Agnew case, the conflict is between the intention to refer to Carnap's picture, and the intention to refer to the picture in the range of the demonstration (which, unbeknownst to Kaplan, is a certain picture of Agnew). The contextual cues play a significant role in determining the reference only to the extent that they are backed by some intention. Thus, without the intention to refer to the picture in the range of the demonstration, Kaplan's pointing to that picture would have been without semantic significance. That is, it would not have contributed to securing the picture of Agnew as the demonstratum.

The second objection is more direct, casting doubt on the proposed analysis by claiming that one of the central cases motivating it – the Carnap/Agnew case – is 'derivative'. The author of this objection argues as follows. Normally, the speaker would have a perception of the demonstratum. In the Carnap/Agnew case, this would of course be the picture of Agnew. But this condition is not present in that particular case. What then does this do to the example? Doesn't it make the example derivative from the normal case where the demonstratum is perceived (by the speaker)? And so, wouldn't it be plausible to suppose that the perception's content plays a role in determining demonstrative reference – and that any other mental states of the speaker are in fact semantically irrelevant? After all, when the speaker sees the picture – which is what happens in the 'normal' case – he simply intends to demonstrate what he sees.

Let me begin with the first of these two objections. My main concern with this purported defense of the intentional view is that it strikes me as more a defense of a quasi-intentional view. After all, the former view states that 'contextual' cues are of pragmatic significance only, while the author of the objection in question admits that such cues have semantic significance – though only if they are backed by some intention.

In fact, I am inclined to agree with the view in question. That is, I agree that when it appears as though contextual cues override the speaker's intention, this does in general reflect a conflict between various intentions of the speaker. Let's look at the Carnap/Agnew case

again. Here, contextual cues (specifically, a pointing gesture) do appear to override Kaplan's primary (though not secondary) intention: his intention to demonstrate, and say something of, a certain picture of Carnap. And this does indeed reflect a conflict between Kaplan's intentions: between his primary intention, and the disambiguating intention – the intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture in the range of the demonstration. For Kaplan's 'wayward' pointing gesture does indeed reflect his intention to refer to the picture in the range of the demonstration – a picture which is not (unbeknownst to Kaplan) the object of his primary intention.

Moreover, I tend to agree that the pointing gesture would not be of semantic significance, unless it were backed by an intention. In fact, it seems clear that an outstretched arm, with index finger extended, would not even be a demonstration unless it were intended as such: as a means of drawing the hearer's attention to some object/individual. (Without such an intention, the 'gesture' would simply be an outstretched arm, with index finger extended.) Further, whenever there is such an intention – an intention to employ some gesture as a demonstration – there will also be a (more specific) intention to demonstrate some particular object/individual. But none of this shows that contextual cues are semantically irrelevant, as the intentionalist claims. All that it shows is that such cues are semantically relevant only insofar as they are accompanied by certain intentions.[29] And again, this is a view with which I agree.

Let me now turn to the second of the two objections. My response to this objection is threefold. First, while it is certainly true that in the majority of cases involving a demonstrative act the demonstratum is perceived by the speaker, this does not mean that perception has anything to do with the necessary and sufficient conditions for demonstrative reference.[30] Indeed, I would have thought that the Carnap/Agnew case clearly showed that the speaker's perception of some entity is not a necessary condition for that entity to emerge as the demonstratum. Moreover, it is easy to see the speaker's perception of an entity is likewise not a sufficient condition for that entity's emerging as the demonstratum. Suppose that while Kaplan was pointing to the picture behind him, he was staring at a picture in front of him. Clearly, that would not mean that the perceived picture was the demonstratum.

Second, there is a serious problem with any view of demonstrative reference that claims that, in the 'normal' cases, the demonstratum – intended and actual – will simply be the entity perceived. For there is

a sort of indeterminacy that infects perception as much as it does ostension. Consider an utterance of "That is a beautiful coat", where the intended demonstratum is Fido's freshly washed coat. Suppose that the speaker is currently perceiving the coat in question – and that the case is therefore a 'normal' one. Well, in that case, the speaker is also perceiving Fido, parts of Fido (e.g., his tail), parts of the coat in question, etc. Now, what makes it the case that the coat – and not any of those other perceived things – gets secured as the demonstratum? The proponent of the perceptual view in question would seem to be at a loss here. For what the considerations in question show is that perceptual content, by itself, is not sufficient to 'determine' an individual, and is therefore not sufficient to determine a demonstratum. And surely, a plausible alternative to the perceptual view would be the view that the speaker's intention to point to the coat is a determining factor: a factor which 'conspires' with the gesture in Fido's direction to determine a demonstratum: Fido's coat. Whether or not Fido's coat is being perceived by the speaker at the time of the utterance would seem to be semantically irrelevant.

Third, while the Carnap/Agnew case is indeed 'abnormal', this really does nothing to undercut the proposed view. For one of the chief advantages of that view is that it accommodates all of the cases – 'normal' (where the demonstratum is perceived) as well as 'abnormal' (where the demonstratum is not perceived). For in both sorts of cases there will be an intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the particular *F* in the range of one's gesture. And this intention can then be invoked to account for the fact that in both sorts of cases an entity may be secured as the demonstratum, despite the indeterminacy of ostension. In contrast, the perceptual view under consideration will, at best, account only for the securing of demonstrata in the 'normal' cases – cases where the demonstratum is perceived. And yet the natural test cases for that view would, of course, be the 'abnormal' ones: those in which the demonstratum was not perceived.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In light of the foregoing, the general conclusion to draw seems clear: whatever the details of the correct theory of demonstrative reference turn out to be, that theory will be a quasi-intentional one: one that

attributes a limited role to intentions in the determination of demonstrata.

A more specific conclusion can be drawn as well: in certain cases, speaker intentions will play the role of 'disambiguating' demonstrations, thereby securing demonstrata. This was, of course, the view sketched toward the end of 'Dthat'. However, the ways in which intentions 'conspire' with demonstrations to determine demonstrata appear to be more subtle and complex than suggested in 'Dthat'. For in order to account for referential determinacy in cases where the intended and actual demonstrata diverge, it appears necessary to invoke what I have referred to as 'secondary' intentions: intentions derived from conjoining the 'primary' intention with certain beliefs the speaker has about the object of that intention. In such cases, the secondary intention will do the work of disambiguating the demonstration.

The cases motivating the proposed quasi-intentional view primarily involved scenarios where the demonstrative utterance contained a demonstrative pronoun, and was accompanied by an ostensive gesture. For it is cases of this particular sort that seem to best bring out the plausibility of the view that intentions play a role – albeit a limited one – in demonstrative reference. Little attention was given to cases where the demonstrative expression was a demonstrative description – like 'that dog'. Nor was much attention given to cases where the demonstrative utterance was unaccompanied by ostension. Clearly, any full-blown theory of demonstrative reference will have to deal with such cases.[31] But whatever the correct analysis of such cases turns out to be, I think that the considerations adduced in this paper show that the analysis will have to cohere with a view that ascribes to intentions a limited role in at least some cases of demonstrative reference.

One final point. In light of the clear advantages that a quasi-intentional view would seem to have over an 'all or nothing' type of view, one might wonder why the view proposed in 'Dthat' never gained favor. One possible explanation for this has to do with the way in which philosophers seem to approach the problem of demonstrative reference. Often, it seems, philosophers approach the problem armed with a certain ideology: a certain picture of what they suppose language to be. (Wettstein is explicit in taking this approach.) The data are then interpreted in accordance with this picture. Wittgensteinian-minded philosophers (such as Wettstein) are going to view 'what is said' (by way of a demonstrative utterance) as, roughly, what the speaker would

normally be interpreted as having said. In contrast, Gricean-minded philosophers are going to view 'what is said' as, roughly, what the speaker intends to say (communicate). With these two simplistic pictures of language looming in the background, it is not difficult to predict the views of demonstrative reference that will emerge. The Wittgensteinians will develop a contextual view; the Griceans, an intentional view.

If, instead, one left one's ideologies aside, and focused on the pre-theoretical intuitions surrounding the natural test cases for the 'all or nothing' views – cases involving a divergence between the intended demonstratum and the entity indicated by the relevant 'cues' – one might begin to appreciate the plausibility of the quasi-intentional view.[32]

NOTES

[1] By the 'demonstratum' (of the expression), I mean what might equally be called the 'referent' or 'denotation' of an expression traditionally classified as a demonstrative. I take such expressions to include 'this', 'that', their plural forms, as well as expressions of the form 'this *F*', and 'that *F*', together with their plural forms. The demonstratum of such an expression can thus be thought of as (roughly) the object or individual whose properties are relevant to the truth conditions (and value) of the utterance in which the demonstrative expression occurs. In an intuitive, pre-theoretical sense, the demonstratum is the object or individual the demonstrative utterance is 'about'. (I realize now that this use of 'demonstratum' is perhaps not in accordance with the standard usage of that term, and that it might have been more accurate to have spoken of the 'referent' or 'denotation' in those place where I speak of the 'demonstratum'.)

[2] By 'intended demonstratum', I mean the object or individual about which the speaker intends to say something, by means of a demonstrative utterance: an utterance containing a demonstrative expression. When the demonstrative utterance is accompanied by a demonstration, the intended demonstratum will be the object or individual the speaker intends to demonstrate, and say something of. However, as I argue in Section 3, the notion of 'intended demonstratum' is ambiguous, for associated with any one demonstrative act is a plurality of speaker intentions.

[3] 'Dthat' is Kaplan's word for the demonstrative use of 'that'. An expression is used 'demonstratively', according to Kaplan, "when the speaker intends that the object for which the phrase stands be designated by an associated demonstration" (Kaplan, 1979, p. 389).

[4] Although I follow Kaplan here in speaking of intentions as 'disambiguating' demonstrations, I think there is some inaccuracy in this way of speaking. I think it would be more accurate to say that, until intentions are brought into the picture, the demonstratum remains 'ambiguous' or 'indeterminate', on account of the fact that the accompanying

demonstration cannot, by itself, 'pick out' a unique object or individual. By invoking intentions, one is able to 'disambiguate' or 'determine' the demonstratum.

[5] Kaplan might have wished to have added a proviso specifying that the demonstrative expression be a demonstrative pronoun – like 'this' or 'that' – as opposed to a demonstrative description – like 'this cat' or 'that dog'. For where the demonstrative expression is a demonstrative description, it is not implausible to suppose that, at least in some such cases, the common noun might effect the desired 'disambiguation'. An appeal to intentions might not be required in such cases.

[6] From the speaker's point of view, all that is pointed to is the intended demonstratum.

[7] So far as I am aware, Donnellan has expressed his views on demonstrative reference only in personal correspondence – e.g., with Howard Wettstein.

[8] The locution is Kaplan's.

[9] Both McGinn and Wettstein are highly critical of other nonintentional theories of demonstrative reference – including those which make such reference dependent on causal relations obtaining between the speaker and the demonstratum. These particular theories will not be discussed in this paper, as the criticisms of McGinn and Wettstein strike the author as decisive. For details, see McGinn (1981) and Wettstein (1984).

[10] In those cases where no demonstration accompanies an utterance of ". . . that *F* . . .", due to there being just one *F* "in the immediate environment" (which would render ostension otiose), McGinn claims that "the location of the speaker's body is what serves as the para-linguistic determinant" of the demonstratum (McGinn, 1981, p. 183). So far as I can make sense of this remark, it strikes me as obviously false. Suppose that my dog Fido has just been viciously attacked by my neighbor's dog Spot. The neighbor has just removed his ill-behaved dog from the premises. I then say to my addressee, "That dog is the worst behaved dog that I have ever seen". Surely the fact that Fido is the only canine in the "immediate environment" is not going to make him the demonstratum of 'that dog', as that expression occurred in my utterance. And surely the fact that Spot is by this time several hundred feet away is not going to prevent him from emerging as the demonstratum. And yet that is precisely what McGinn's view would seem to predict.

[11] For Wettstein, the relevant 'public' is restricted to the audience.

[12] My inclination would be to treat ostensive gestures as cues of this sort. For the verbal demonstrative, when coupled with a demonstration – a contextual feature – indicates to the hearer that the intended demonstratum is the object or individual designated by the gesture. For a similar view, see, John Biro (1982).

[13] McGinn does not discuss the problem of ostensive indeterminacy in 'The Mechanism of Reference'. However, based on certain remarks made in personal correspondence with Wettstein (Wettstein, 1984, pp. 76–77), it is not difficult to predict what McGinn would say about this problem. McGinn, apparently, regards demonstrative pronouns like 'this' and 'that' as elliptical for demonstrative descriptions of the form 'this *F*' or 'that *F*'. Thus, with respect to an utterance of "That is Fido" accompanied by a pointing gesture in the direction of a particular dog, McGinn would presumably say that the tacit common noun (presumably 'dog') effects the 'disambiguation': that is, makes it the case that the utterance is about the dog and not, e.g., about his coat. For some persuasive criticisms of the view that demonstrative pronouns abbreviate demonstrative descriptions, see Wettstein (1984, pp. 76–78).

[14] Wettstein offers a number of compelling objections to McGinn's view in the final

section of his paper. One objection, not mentioned by Wettstein, concerns the rather obvious fact that McGinn's view is applicable only in cases where the demonstratum is perceived (if at all) visually. How would McGinn deal with utterances of sentences like "That smell is awful" or "That noise is driving me crazy"? Where the demonstratum is perceived other than visually, ostension is (at least generally) inappropriate, and McGinn's view is thus inapplicable. It would be of no use to claim that, in such cases, the location of the speaker's body will serve as the "para-linguistic determinant" of the demonstratum. For it is not clear that it makes any sense to specify exact locations of things like smells and sounds. Moreover, none of the views of demonstrative reference criticized by McGinn (including the 'classical description theory' and the 'causal-genetic theory') face this particular difficulty. Nor does the view of Wettstein, nor do the intentional/quasi-intentional views of Kaplan.

[15] For another version of the same basic view, see Charles Travis (1989). Travis argues in favor of a contextual view, using as a criterion 'what a reasonable judge would say'. For another hearer-oriented theory of reference, see Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson (1986).

[16] The range is even wider, according to Wettstein, who discusses other cues not discussed in this paper. Certain of these cues – described by Wettstein as 'extra-contextual' – have to do with previous speaker/addressee encounters. Such cues are nevertheless 'contextual' in the sense defined in Section 2: accessible to the public – and, in particular, to the audience. For details, see Wettstein (1984, pp. 71–72).

[17] I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

[18] I take for granted here, and throughout the paper, the importance of pre-theoretical intuitions in determining 'what is said'. For an interesting discussion of this point, see François Recanati (1989). See especially his discussion of the 'Availability Principle'.

[19] Contrast the utterance of "That's your dog Fido" with an utterance of "Her husband is kind to her", where the speaker's referent in the latter case is the woman's kind lover – to whom she has been driven by her husband's cruelty. (The example is from Kripke.) In the latter case, there is a strong intuition to the effect that – strictly speaking – the utterance was false, though the speaker referred to, and said truly of the lover, that he was kind to the woman. But in the former case, there is no similarly strong intuition to the effect that – strictly speaking – the utterance was true (though the speaker said falsely of Spot that he was the addressee's dog Fido). Kripke's application of the speaker's referent/semantic referent distinction to the kind lover/cruel husband case receives its plausibility largely from intuitions concerning what is 'strictly speaking' said. But these same intuitions, when applied to the Spot/Fido case, support the view – contrary to the Wettsteinian picture – that both the speaker's and semantic referent was Spot. For in that case, the intuition is surely that – strictly speaking – the utterance was false.

[20] With respect to an utterance (unaccompanied by ostension) of, e.g., "That's a nice tie", McGinn would presumably say that the demonstrative pronoun 'that' abbreviates some demonstrative description – e.g., 'that tie' – and that the demonstratum of the latter will be whatever tie stands in the appropriate spatiotemporal relations to the speaker's body. For Wettstein's criticisms of this view, see Wettstein (1984, pp. 76–78).

[21] See, for instance, Kaplan's remarks on the intended demonstratum in Kaplan (1979, p. 395).

[22] For Bertolet's views, see his (1980). For Bertolet's responses to criticisms of the views expressed in that paper, see his (1986–87).

[23] See Reimer (1991a, 1991b, 1992).

[24] This is so, at least in those cases where the demonstrative expression is a demonstrative pronoun like 'this' or 'that' – as opposed to a demonstrative description like 'this cat' or 'that dog'.

[25] It's not clear that this account would do the job. For even after being apprised of the fact that conditions were not 'normal' – that Kaplan's intentions concerned a picture which was other than where he thought – the intuition that a determinate proposition was expressed (one concerning the picture of Agnew) remains.

[26] Wettstein draws a somewhat similar distinction between primary and non-primary 'havings in mind'. See Wettstein (1984, pp. 70–71) for details.

[27] To be more precise, token demonstrative pronouns.

[28] Both of these objections were provided by anonymous reviewers.

[29] Here I am thus in disagreement with Wettstein, who wants to claim that – even without any sort of intention to back it – an outstretched arm might have semantic significance. See Wettstein (1984, p. 72).

[30] For compelling arguments in favor of the view that the speaker's perception of the demonstratum is semantically irrelevant, see McGinn (1981, pp. 160–63).

[31] Any such theory would also have to deal with the phenomenon of 'deferred ostension'. In cases of this sort, one object is demonstrated as a means of securing the reference of some other object – where the latter, in contrast to the former, is (typically) not in the perceptual field. What makes such a process possible is the existence of some uniquely identifiable relation obtaining between the demonstrated object and what I have called the 'demonstratum' – the referent of the demonstrative expression. For instance, consider a scenario where the speaker, pointing at a book, says, "She's great". In such a case, it is possible that the speaker is demonstrating the book as a way of referring to its author. (The uniquely identifiable relation obtaining between the book and its author is the relation that makes the deferred ostension possible here.)

It is not difficult to see that this phenomenon coheres well with the proposed quasi-intentional view of demonstrative reference. Consider the case just mentioned. What makes the book the demonstrated object is the gesture – which is in the direction of the book – in conjunction with the speaker's intention to demonstrate the book (as opposed to, e.g., the book's jacket). Because the referent of the demonstrative will be determined in part by what the demonstrated object is, it will likewise be determined (in part) by the gesture, in conjunction with a disambiguating intention. (And, of course, the securing of the author as the referent will depend as well upon the speaker's intention to demonstrate the book as a means of indirectly referring to its author – as opposed to, e.g., its publisher.) For an interesting discussion of deferred ostension, see Section IV of Geoffrey Nunberg (1979).

[32] I would like to thank two anonymous *Synthese* reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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