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An analysis of public opinion toward undocumented immigration

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Abstract. Public opinion toward illegal migration to the United States varies considerably across different segments of the population, but little is known about why some individuals hold more liberal attitudes than others. Several hypotheses are scattered throughout the research literature, but they have not been brought together in one place and tested using a common data set. Nor have the limited tests been satisfactory from a methodological standpoint. Instead of using multiple regression, typically analysts have relied on cross-tabulations of the data. This paper tests five hypotheses about attitudes toward illegal immigration and undocumented migrants using public opinion data from southern California. Only weak support is found for a labor market competition hypothesis. There is firmer evidence for hypotheses relating to cultural affinity between respondents and undocumented migrants and to the role of education. Respondents' evaluations of tangible costs and benefits to themselves also influence their assessments of illegal immigration. Finally, the results of this analysis provide additional support for a symbolic politics model of opinion formation when the model is extended to the issue of undocumented migration to the United States.

Key words: California, Immigration, Opinion, Undocumented, USA

Introduction

Immigration to the United States is an important and increasingly conspicuous component of overall US population growth. In an average year, more than 600,000 legal immigrants and 100,000 refugees are admitted (US Immigration and Naturalization Service 1990b) together with perhaps an additional 200,000 net undocumented or illegal migrants (Woodrow & Passel 1990). By some estimates the United States accepts for permanent resettlement twice as many immigrants and refugees as the rest of the world combined (Lamm & Imhoff 1985), and the excess of total immigration over emigration now accounts for one-third of annual US population increase (Bouvier & Gardner 1986; O'Hare 1992).

Public attitudes toward immigration are especially important to consider because immigration is the only component of population change over which the US Congress seeks to extend direct and complete supervision. When public opinion is firmly held and consistently applied, it can move representative democracies to act often in decisive ways. Such was the case with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the major purpose of which was to reduce the flow of undocumented immigration into the United States. However, despite the protracted and often heated nature of

the five-year debate leading to IRCA's final passage, social scientists have not closely analyzed any of the relevant public opinion data on illegal US immigration. The failure to do so is of more than academic consequence because the flow of undocumented migrants to the United States has been largely undeterred by IRCA and continues at high levels. This omission is also surprising given the large literature on attitudes toward immigration and the number of important and testable hypotheses yielded by this literature. Part of the problem is that available hypotheses are widely scattered across the research literature and have not been collected in one place or tested on the same data. Another is that existing hypotheses have not been adequately examined using appropriate multiple regression techniques. Instead, analyses generally rest on cross-tabulations of the data, and studies report marginal distributions of attitudes by one respondent characteristic or another. Our understanding of the demographic, socioeconomic and other factors affecting opinions toward undocumented US migration is incomplete as a result.

The purpose of this paper is to reformulate extant research hypotheses that are distributed across diverse literatures connecting public opinion with immigration and to test these hypotheses using a common set of data. There has been remarkably little convincing empirical work examining the relevance of these hypotheses. We test a set of five propositions about attitudes toward undocumented immigration using public opinion data collected in southern California, the section of the United States with the largest concentration of illegal migrants. As the recent reaction to incidents surrounding Zoe Baird, the World Trade Center bombing, and the arrival of numerous ships from China carrying illegal human cargo has vividly revealed, undocumented immigration continues to be a matter of intense concern to the American public.

The next section reviews the history of immigration sentiment in the United States. It shows that negative attitudes toward recent migrants have deep roots. Attitudes toward undocumented immigration are especially important, both because this phenomenon engenders the most adverse public reaction and because the flow of illegal immigration into the United States continues, despite IRCA's call for stepped-up enforcement along the US Mexican border and the implementation of sanctions against employers who knowingly hire undocumented migrants.[1] The subsequent section of the paper develops a theoretical framework and discusses specific hypotheses that are later tested. Data for this study come from a survey of southern Californians' attitudes toward the consequences of illegal immigration and undocumented migrants. These data and the methods used to evaluate them are described in the next two sections. Finally, we present the results and discuss the main implications of our findings.

Background

Restrictionist immigration laws in the United States were first enacted in 1875 and the ensuing years, a period in which beliefs about the negative effects of immigrants gained prominence (Simon 1985). A substantial increase in the volume of immigration – especially by 'new' immigrant groups from southern and eastern Europe – together with an economic recession in the early 1880s helped fuel negative perceptions of immigrants. So, too, did the emerging popularity of new ideologies promoting theories of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority (Polyzoi 1986). By decade's end an organized restrictionist movement was well under way.[2] The first quantitative restrictions on US immigration were implemented during the 1920s with the effect of imposing quotas on the basis of national origins and favoring migrants from northern and western Europe.

Following World War II the American public adopted a somewhat more liberal attitude toward foreign immigration, as evidenced by smaller proportions of respondents in opinion surveys who felt immigration levels should be either zero or reduced from current levels (Morris 1985; Simon 1985). This more tolerant attitude lasted throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s and was reflected in the 1965 amendments to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act that substituted a system of allocating immigrant visas on the basis of family reunification principles for one based on country of origin. Several factors contributed to a relaxation of restrictionist pressures, including a growing acceptance of America's newfound role as a world superpower which entailed a responsibility to accept more refugees, post-war economic prosperity, and reduced religious and racial prejudice especially among the better-educated segments of the population (Harwood 1986).

This liberalization of American public opinion toward immigration proved to be short-lived, however, and a new wave of 'neo-restrictionist' sentiment emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Two-thirds of respondents to a 1981 NBC survey and to a 1982 Roper poll said they wanted legal immigration levels reduced, a proportion twice as large as that detected in a 1965 Gallup survey (Harwood 1986). More than three-fourths of the general public surveyed in a 1990 Roper poll believed that US immigration levels should not be increased, and nearly one-half felt that the level should be lowered.

Several reasons have been advanced for the rise in neo-restrictionism during the 1970s and 1980s, including fears associated with economic insecurity (Day 1990; Moehring 1988; Pear 1986) and concerns over immigrants' undesirable cultural traits (Day 1990). Another unmistakable part of the explanation, however, is the concern over illegal immigration. Commenting on the situation in the early 1980s, Passel (1986: 181) noted, 'One important characteristic that distinguishes contemporary immigration from previous waves of immigration is the presence of significant numbers of undocumented, or illegal, immigrants'. Illegal immigrants are convenient scapegoats

for a wide variety of societal ills. Politicians wonder whether undocumented migrants will perpetuate their 'private cultures' thereby threatening mainstream American culture, and the general public worries that a new wave of illegal immigration will lead to more crime in the streets (Cornelius 1982).

Undocumented immigration has been implicated in other ways as well, especially as it relates to US national sovereignty, integrity of US borders, and Americans' general dislike for law breaking of any kind (Harwood 1986; Moehring 1988). For example, Day (1990) has noted that respondents to a 1986 survey who believed that most recent US immigrants are in the country illegally were three and one-half times as likely to express anti- versus pro-immigrant views. In addition, a variety of alleged economic ills has been associated with undocumented migrants, including anxieties that illegal workers take jobs away from American workers and depress wages (Harwood 1983) and contribute to high unemployment (Reimers 1985).

Survey respondents continue to believe that illegal immigration is an important issue. Prior to IRCA's passage, large numbers of Americans viewed undocumented immigration as a problem and supported measures by the federal govemment to stop the influx. In a 1982 poll, 84 percent of the public expressed concerns about the number of illegal aliens in the country. And in Gallup surveys taken between 1977 and 1983, the proportion of respondents agreeing that penalties should be imposed on employers of illegal aliens rose from 72 to 79 percent (Harwood 1986). Again in June 1990, three-quarters of respondents in the national Roper Poll believed that undocumented migration is a serious problem that requires federal attention (Federation for American Immigration Reform 1990). Regional polls in California and in Texas have come to similar conclusions (Polinard et al. 1984; Tarrance et al. 1989a, b).

The continuing importance of undocumented migration

Interest in the extent of undocumented US migration remains strong, even in the wake of IRCA. Some observers were skeptical that IRCA could exert a long-term impact on the flow of undocumented migrants into the United States (Espenshade et al. 1990). Subsequent research has tended to corroborate this early pessimism. Researchers at the US Bureau of the Census estimate that the size of the undocumented alien population grew during the period from 1980 to 1983 by an average annual amount somewhere between 100,000 and 300,000 (Passel 1986). Based on estimates of the number of undocumented aliens included in the June 1986 and June 1988 Current Population Surveys and also on the number of former illegal aliens known to have been legalized under IRCA's general and special farmworker amnesty provisions, Woodrow and Passel (1990) conclude that IRCA has not shut off the flow of undocumented migrants to the United States, although it is more difficult to say whether IRCA succeeded in reducing the flow below pre-1986 levels.

Other research has analyzed US Immigration and Naturalization Service time-series data on the number of apprehensions of illegal migrants along the US-Mexico border (Bean et al. 1990; Espenshade 1990). It concludes that IRCA may have reduced the flow of undocumented migrants by as much as 40 to 50 percent in the two years following its passage. However, this research also shows that IRCA had its greatest impact in the first year after adoption and that its influence over the undocumented flow substantially waned in later periods. In contrast, ethnographic survey data suggest that IRCA has had little effect in checking the flow of illegal aliens from Mexico. Massey et al. (1990) and Donato et al. (1990) estimate the probability that undocumented Mexican males without prior US experience will undertake an initial trip to the United States.

These probabilities change very little between the pre- and post-IRCA periods. Field research by Bustamante (1990) and Cornelius (1990) comes to similar conclusions.

This overview has shown that the general public continues to be concerned about the problem of undocumented migration and that, despite recent policy reforms, the influx of illegal aliens into the United States persists largely unabated. It is not surprising, therefore, that the situation has prompted renewed calls for the federal government to tighten the border against undocumented migration (Johnston 1992). In this context it is important to look more closely at factors influencing Americans' attitudes toward illegal immigration.

Theoretical framework

We examine a number of hypotheses about the correlates of public opinion toward illegal migrants. Several of these express linkages between respondent characteristics and overall opinions toward undocumented migration. Others focus on the potential influence of more specific attitudinal factors. There may be attitudes held by the American public about particular aspects of US immigration that are instrumental in shaping their views about the more general implications of undocumented migration. Some of the hypotheses are derived from previous opinion poll research. Others invoke theoretical frameworks from allied areas and adapt them to the phenomenon of undocumented migration.

Labor market competition

One of the most common complaints voiced about immigrants is that they take jobs away from native workers, contribute to unemployment, and reduce wages and working conditions in selected occupations. Typically, the poorer native workers are, the greater are their fears that these consequences will materialize (Simon 1987). Associations between attitudes toward immigrants

and the socioeconomic status (SES) of respondents are usually explained by a labor market competition hypothesis. Persons at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder are likely to be least receptive to increased levels of immigration, because it is generally believed that low-wage, low-skill workers are the most vulnerable to economic competition from most of today's immigrants (Abowd & Freeman 1991; Borjas & Freeman 1992). Some researchers have found that respondents with higher incomes, more education, and more prestigious occupations are more receptive to immigration than persons from lower SES backgrounds (Hoskin & Mishler 1983; Simon 1985, 1987; Starr & Roberts 1982; Tarrance et al. 1989a, b; Day 1989, 1990). Others find few differences across socioeconomic categories (Morris 1985; Peterson & Kozmetsky 1982). Moore (1986) concluded that the more expertise a person has on immigration, the more pro-immigrant their views are likely to be.

According to the labor market competition hypothesis, one should expect that US residents having higher incomes and higher status occupations will be more sanguine about the implications of undocumented immigration, because most illegal migrants have poor education and few job-related skills (Bean, Lowell & Taylor 1988). In contrast, to the extent that union members are disproportionately drawn from the lower end of the skills distribution, one would expect union membership to be correlated with a more restrictionist outlook toward immigration. Organized labor in the United States historically has opposed increased immigration in an effort to protect the jobs and wages of its members.

Cultural affinity

Mexico sends more legal immigrants to the United States than any other nation (US Immigration and Naturalization Service 1990b), and the vast majority of undocumented migrants in this country are from Mexico and other parts of Latin America (Passel 1986). It may therefore not be too surprising that Hispanics display more pro-immigrant views than non-Hispanics (Cain & Kiewiet 1986; Miller, Polinard & Wrinkle 1984; Harwood 1983, 1985; Day 1989). For example, being Hispanic, speaking Spanish at home, believing that Latino values benefit the United States, and feeling that it is important to preserve Latino holidays, language, and music have all been linked with more positive attitudes about the fiscal contributions of undocumented migrants and whether they take jobs away from American workers (Day 1989). These relations are usually explained by a cultural affinity hypothesis. Cultural and ethnic ties to immigrants promote pro-immigrant attitudes and support for a more open immigration policy (Day 1989, 1990). The growth of migrant social networks strengthens kinship ties between the United States and Mexico (Massey 1980). These networks spur immigration by lowering the costs of migration and providing would-be migrants with information about job opportunities and social support services in the United States. They also serve the function of keeping Mexican Americans in touch

with family and friends in Mexico, thereby contributing to a greater sense of cultural affinity with migrants and to pro-immigrant attitudes among Mexican-Americans.[3] Accordingly, we expect Hispanics to be more optimistic than Anglos or African-Americans about the impacts of undocumented immigration to the United States and less restrictive in their attitudes about US immigration policy.

Role of education

Several studies have found evidence that negative attitudes toward immigrants decrease with more education (Day 1989, 1990; Hoskin & Mishler 1983; Moore 1986; Starr & Roberts 1982; Tarrance et al. 1989a, b). Education also is a classic variable in numerous other analyses of intergroup attitudes, although the precise meaning that attaches to education's influence is a subject of much debate. One interpretation is the 'education as liberation' hypothesis. An advanced formal education bestows a more enlightened perspective that is less vulnerable to the narrow appeals of intergroup negativism (Apostle, Glock, Piazza & Suelzle 1983; Lipset 1981; Martire & Clark 1982; McClosky & Brill 1983; Sniderman, Brody & Kuklinski 1984).

An alternative perspective is that education produces a more sophisticated cognitive style that may inject education-related response biases into many commonly used measures of attitudes. Education fosters an appreciation for nuance and the need for appropriate qualification. Thus, better-educated respondents are likely to be turned off by simplistic, categorical, or value-laden questions, whereas persons with less education are more likely to be taken in by such questions because the available response categories may seem close enough (Jackman & Senter 1980). Others have argued that, while education does produce some substantive changes in people's attitudes, these changes are limited or superficial and not internalized (Jackman 1978; Merelman 1980; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus 1982). Finally, Jackman & Muha (1984) are critical of many existing theories and propose that advanced education simply allows individuals to construct more sophisticated ideologies to protect dominant group interests. This theory predicts that attitude differences between the well educated and the poorly educated will in general not be dramatic. However one chooses to interpret existing education-attitude links, extant theories usually predict that persons with more education will have more liberal views about the consequences of undocumented migration.

Cost-benefit calculus

Each of the hypotheses identified above invokes postulated relationships between respondents' own demographic or socioeconomic characteristics and their opinions about illegal immigration. Opinion research on matters unrelated to immigration has shown that beliefs about narrower issues frequently are also powerful determinants of more general attitudes. Feelings about

parochial issues can become important predictors of generalized attitudinal orientations if the specific concerns touched upon by these feelings are interwoven with assessments of tangible costs and benefits (Kinder & Sears 1985; Citrin & Green 1990). In the realm of ethnic politics, for example, it has been suggested that the pursuit of self-interest means that negative attitudes toward cultural minorities derive from concerns about one's material well-being; competition for jobs and housing, fear of higher taxes, or anxiety about the quality of the public schools (Citrin, Reingold & Green 1990: 1125). In this sense, labor market competition may be one aspect of cost-benefit calculations, though the latter are inclusive of a broader range of material concerns. According to this hypothesis, similar fears about the implications of undocumented migration could be expected to engender negative attitudes. On the other hand, perceptions that illegal migrants have direct economic benefits to consumers, say, might be expected to elicit more positive responses.

Symbolic politics

In contrast with theories that stress the role of tangible costs and benefits, the symbolic politics model emphasizes a commitment to enduring values as sources of public opinion (Sears, Tyler, Lau & Allen 1980; Sears & Citrin 1985; Sears & Huddy 1987). According to this theory, latent value orientations about what it means to be an American can influence public opinion on specific issues when triggered by relevant cues. Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990) extend the symbolic politics model to attitudes toward cultural minorities and conclude that the way people define themselves as Americans influences their outlook on issues ranging from the voting rights of non-English speakers to affirmative action and bilingual education. They find that the two most important symbols of American nationality are 'speaking and writing English' and 'treating people of all races and backgrounds equally' (or what Feldman, 1988, and others have called egalitarianism). For example, in describing a string of recent state ballot successes to promote English as the official language, they comment:

> When voters were presented with the opportunity to translate attitudes into action, there was no doubt that in America, as elsewhere, language is a powerful symbol of national identity among most social and political groups. Symbolic challenges to the status of English and to the status of the dominant culture in general inevitably arouse hostility among the majority (p. 1149).

In this paper we extend the symbolic politics model further to opinions about illegal immigration. This theory then predicts that respondents most concerned about possible future threats to the English language by non-English speakers are likely also to have the most negative views about undocumented migrants. One may also hypothesize that the strongest adher-

ents to egalitarian principles will be least likely to view illegal immigration in negative terms.

Data

Testing these hypotheses requires data that contain (1) responses to questions about general attitudinal orientations toward undocumented migration, and (2) information on the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of survey participants as well as on answers to a range of questions on specific attitude dimensions (for example, whether respondents feel that undocumented migrants are more likely to receive welfare or commit crimes than natives). We use data from a June 1983 survey of public attitudes toward undocumented immigration conducted in the six urban counties of southern California. The survey data were collected by the Field Research Corporation as part of a larger investigation of the impacts of Mexican immigration to southern California (Muller & Espenshade 1985). A total of 1,031 interviews was completed. These data contain the most complete set of respondent characteristics and other attitudinal information relevant to an assessment of opinions about undocumented US migration ever assembled, including public opinion surveys carried out in the 1990s.

Responses are drawn from persons living in the region of the United States where illegal migrants are most densely concentrated, and therefore where issues surrounding undocumented migration are likely to be most salient. California has had the largest undocumented population of any state. There were more than one million undocumented aliens who were estimated to be included in the 1980 census in California, or almost one-half the estimated US total of 2.1 million (Warren & Passel 1987). Most of these illegal residents (763,000) were born in Mexico and comprised two-thirds of the national total of Mexican-born undocumented migrants. Nearly 80 percent of California's undocumented alien population in 1980 (or 810,000 persons) entered the United States during the 1970s. When compared with the 968,000 legal immigrants who entered between 1970 and 1980 and settled in California, undocumented migration accounted for nearly one-half (46 percent) of net immigration to California during the 1970s (Passel 1986).[4]

California has also had more undocumented US residents legalized under IRCA than any other state. A total of more than 3 million legalization applications was filed following IRCA's passage; 1.76 million represented applications for the general amnesty program that extended eligibility to undocumented migrants who could prove they had been in the United States since 1982. Another 1.28 million applications originated with Special Agricultural Workers (SAWs), most of whom needed to show that they had worked at least 90 days in perishable crop agriculture in the year prior to May 1986. Of the pre-1982 legalization applicants, 54 percent were living in California;

53 percent of the SAW applicants were California residents (US Immigration and Naturalization Service 1990a).

Survey items

The five hypotheses outlined earlier are tested using responses to two related survey questions. One deals with general attitudes toward illegal immigration:

> How serious a problem do you believe the illegal immigration situation is in Southern California at the present time?
>
> Do you see it as a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, not too serious a problem or not at all a serious problem?

A second question concerns opinions about undocumented migrants:

> Do you feel that the influx of illegal or undocumented immigrants into Southern California has an overall favorable or unfavorable effect *on the state as a whole*? Would you describe this as very or somewhat (favorable) (unfavorable)?

The marginal and joint distributions of these dependent variables are shown in Table 1. A majority of respondents clearly hold a negative view of illegal immigration: 87 percent indicated that illegal immigration was either a very serious or somewhat serious problem, while 68 percent said that the influx of undocumented immigrants would have either very unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable effects on the state. In addition, the responses to the two questions are highly correlated, with 65 percent falling into the top two response categories on both questions. Nevertheless, there is a significant cluster of respondents in the lower left-hand corner of Table 1 who believe both that illegal immigration is a serious problem and that undocumented migrants have favorable effects on California.

This last observation suggests that the two response questions, though related, are measuring somewhat different attitudinal dimensions. In particular, the first question refers to an abstraction – illegal immigration, whereas the second one concerns a more tangible phenomenon – immigrants themselves. Other researchers have noted this paradox, expressed in terms of negative attitudes toward immigration as a general phenomenon but sympathy for the immigrants we know. For instance, despite exhibiting generally negative feelings toward immigration, majorities of those polled by Kane, Parsons, and Associates, Inc. (1984) supported admitting each of 10 imaginary individuals whose profiles match those of typical entrants to the United States. The authors call attention to the duality: hostility toward groups versus humanitarian impulses toward individuals. The situation for undocumented migrants is similar. Harwood (1986: 209–210) observes: 'Such inconsistencies in attitude and conduct suggest that Americans respond very differently to illegal *immigration*, which is an issue in which the immigrant is faceless and unknown, from the way they do to illegal *immigrants* . . . . Many who will tell a pollster that illegal aliens have no right to work in this country

Table 1. Crosstabulation of responses to questions on the problem and effect of illegal immigration

Effect of undocumented migrants	Problem of illegal immigration						
	Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not at all serious	Don't know/ No answer	Total	(%)
Very unfavorable	345	42	4	2	5	398	(38.6)
Somewhat unfavorable	129	154	16	5	2	306	(29.7)
No effect	14	20	14	6	1	55	(5.3)
Somewhat favorable	43	41	31	7	4	126	(12.2)
Very favorable	56	7	4	10	1	78	(7.6)
Don't know/ No answer	28	23	11	1	5	68	(6.6)
Total (%)	615 (59.7)	287 (27.8)	80 (7.8)	31 (3.0)	18 (1.7)	1031	(100.0)

are certain to want to make an exception for the maid who works for their next-door neighbor or the cook at their favorite Chinese resturant' (emphasis added).

Predictor variables used in the analysis include respondents' demographic and socioeconomic background characteristics (age, employment status, education, ethnicity, race, household income, union membership, nativity, gender, and whether the respondent has had recent contact with an undocumented worker). In addition, the survey instrument includes a large number of questions about respondents' attitudes toward the economic impacts of illegal immigrants, toward the future demographic and social impacts of undocumented migrants, and about several policy issues surrounding IRCA. Survey items that relate to specific attitudes investigated by other researchers include:

On welfare use:

> As you may know, illegal aliens are not eligible to receive welfare assistance, food stamps or free health care. However, some people believe that illegal aliens *are* receiving these benefits in California. What do you think? Do you believe that illegal aliens, despite their status, are more likely or *less likely* to receive such assistance than are citizens and legal aliens in this country?

On job competition:

> Do you think that illegal or undocumented immigrants are taking jobs away from other Southern California residents and contributing to the state's unemployment problem, or do you think they are mostly taking jobs other Californians don't want?

On crime:

In your opinion, how likely or unlikely are undocumented workers to commit crimes here in Southern California, compared with the population as a whole? Would you say they are more likely or less likely to commit crimes or is it about the same as for the population as a whole?[5]

Methods of analysis

The way hypotheses in the theoretical framework section are framed argues for treating as natural dependent variables the global or overall attitudinal assessments of the effects of undocumented migration and not the opinions respondents might hold about specific and more narrowly defined issues. Accordingly, our statistical methodology will comprise an ordered-probit analysis (McKelvey & Zavoina 1975; McCullagh 1980) of responses to two general questions about the problem and effect of illegal migration. Responses to the first question dealing with general attitudes toward the *problem of illegal immigration* are coded 0 (not at all serious), 1 (not too serious), 2 (somewhat serious), and 3 (very serious). Responses to the question concerning opinions about the *effect of undocumented migrants* on the state of California are coded 0 (very favorable), 1 (somewhat favorable), 2 (no effect), 3 (somewhat unfavorable), and 4 (very unfavorable). For both dependent variables, more unfavorable attitudes are coded with larger numerical values. Cases for which 'don't know' or 'no answer' was the recorded response are dropped from the analysis.[6]

An ordered-probit model accounts for the relative ranking of responses without attaching any significance to the absolute magnitudes of differences between numerical codes assigned to each category. Ordered-probit regression analysis is an extension of the binary probit model and is preferable to linear regression whenever the response data are measures on a discrete ordinal variable having more than two rank-ordered categories. Investing the integers used to code the ordinal responses with either an interval- or ratio-scale interpretation and then proceeding to apply a linear model to the data introduces a bias into the parameter estimates that can cause linear regression analysis to underestimate severely the relative impact of certain predictor variables (McKelvey & Zavoina 1975). The coefficient estimates represent the impact of a one-unit change in each explanatory variable on the mean of an underlying continuous latent stadard-normal random variable representing an index for attitudes regarding illegal immigration. Threshold parameters, given by $0 < \delta_1 < \delta_2 < \ldots$, are the values on an underlying attitude scale at which the observed responses change from one category to the next higher or lower category.

The nature of the hypotheses structures our data analysis. Because the hypotheses explicitly invoke a respondent's demographic characteristics and

socioeconomic attributes along with their opinions on specific issues to explain attitudes on more global questions, we use the specific attitudes as predictors and the global responses as dependent variables. In particular, we model respondents' attitudes toward the general implications of undocumented migration as a function of their own demographic and socioeconomic background characteristics and their opinions about a series of more parochial or domain-specific issues (e.g., the economic impacts of undocumented migrants, the future demographic and social consequences of illegal immigration, and an array of social policy matters). The basic model is shown in Figure 1. Similar specifications are used for both the problem and effect regressions.[8]

Our empirical strategy is to introduce the explanatory variables sequentially in groups, including first demographic and socioeconomic background characteristics and then those attitudinal factors related to specific economic and social impacts of illegal immigration. This approach has the advantage of permitting tests for whether the inclusion of particular clusters of related variables improves the fit of the regression. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 report regression estimates for responses to the two global opinion questions.[9] All explanatory variables have been recoded as dummy variables. Because of the attention that respondent's age and education have received in prior opinion studies of legal immigration, we first estimated models that include only age variables, then models that simply include education variables, and lastly models that include both age and education variables. These results are reported in the first three columns of Tables A1 and A2.[10] Age and education variables are statistically significant, alone and in combination.

We next incorporate additional socioeconomic and demographic background factors, including gender, employment status, race/ethnicity, union membership, nativity, household income, and recent contact with an undocumented worker. Finally, we include (1) a series of parochial attitudinal items capturing respondents' opinions about the economic impacts of undocumented migration: job and wage competition, illegals' receipt of welfare, crime, consumer prices, business profits, and the fiscal burden of illegal immigrants; (2) a group of variables measuring respondents' assessments of illegal immigrants' future impacts in particular demographic and social domains; and (3) a set of responses relating to such social policy issues as English language education for immigrants, access to public education, and eligibility for unemployment compensation, among others. Starting with the addition to the model of the socioeconomic and demographic background factors (column 4 in Tables A1 and A2), we carry out a series of tests to examine the significance of the most recently added group of variables. In each comparison of two adjacent (nested) models, the likelihood-ratio χ^2 test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that we may reject the hypothesis that the true coefficients of the sequentially included variables are jointly equal to zero.



Figure 1. Model for public opinion regarding the consequences of illegal immigration.

Results

Because of the large number of variables involved in the analysis, the main findings have been summarized in a series of figures. We consider just two of the models reported in Tables A1 and A2: one that includes all of the socioeconomic and demographic background variables (column 4) and the fully populated model that includes additional explanatory variables for responses to questions on specific economic issues, the future demographic and social impacts of illegal immigration, and policy issues related to language training, taxation, and public services (column 7). A positive (negative) coefficient estimate means that a respondent possessing the corresponding trait or belief is more (less) likely than a member of the reference group to view illegal immigration in negative terms, either as a serious problem or as having an unfavorable effect. Figure 2 compares the results of these two models for responses to the question on the *problem of illegal immigration*; Figure 3 contains the estimates for the *effect of undocumented migrants*.

In Figure 2 the tendency to view illegal immigration as a serious problem increases with age (up to age 65) and is stronger for persons who have had recent contact with illegal immigrants, even when the attitudinal predictors are added. When only respondents' background characteristics are included (model 1), the results indicate that the more education respondents have, the less likely they are to view illegal immigration as a serious problem. Hispanic and foreign-born respondents are also less likely to be concerned about illegal immigration, while blacks are more likely to report that it is a problem. The education, race, and nativity variables lose statistical significance when the other issues variables are included as predictors (see model 2). This suggests that observed racial, ethnic, or educational differences in the distribution of responses are correlated with economic interests and positions on specific issues.

Regarding basic economic issues, respondents who believe that undocumented immigrants compete for US jobs or lower wages in some occupations are not statistically more likely to report that illegals are a problem. Variables capturing other non-job-related dimensions of an individual's material level of living play a more important role. For example, persons who believe that illegal immigrants are more likely to receive welfare, commit crimes, or add to taxpayers' fiscal burdens are also more likely to view illegal immigration as a serious problem. The relative magnitudes of the coefficients suggest that the crime issue exerts a particularly strong influence on the outcomes. On the other hand, respondents who believe that undocumented workers contribute by lowering consumer prices are less likely to view illegals as a problem.

Language issues also are a dominant concern underlying a negative attitude toward illegal immigration. Those who expect the number of individuals with little or no English to increase or who feel that growth in the non-English-speaking population will have a bad effect on ethnic relations are more likely to report that illegal immigration is a problem. The less personal issues of



Figure 2. Whether illegal immigration is a serious problem comparison of coefficient estimates.



Figure 3. Whether undocumented migrants have an unfavorable effect comparison of coefficient estimates.

whether firms will leave southern California if they cannot find undocumented workers to hire and whether illegal immigrants eventually return home do not appear to be important. Respondents are significantly less likely to view illegal immigration as a serious problem if they believe that civic and business groups should provide English language training to illegals or that illegals who pay taxes should be entitled to send their children to public schools and to collect unemployment compensation.

The results in Figure 3 for whether undocumented migrants in southern California have an overall favorable or unfavorable effect on the state as a whole often mirror those for the first response variable. Older respondents, especially persons over age 65, are more likely to feel that undocumented migrants have an unfavorable effect on California. On the other hand, higher education is associated with more favorable views of undocumented migrants. Respondents with more than a college education have the most sanguine attitudes toward illegal migrants. Finally, Hispanics are more confident than other ethnic or racial groups that undocumented migrants have a benign effect on the state.

There are nevertheless some interesting differences between the results in Figures 2 and 3. Employment status and gender, which had no effect on responses to the first question, have a statistically significant effect in model 2 of Figure 3. An employed or female respondent is somewhat more likely to state that the overall effect of undocumented migrants is unfavorable. Some background variables that tended toward statistical insignificance when additional explanatory variables were added to the model in Figure 2 now remain significant. For example, although the absolute value of the coefficient for Hispanic ethnicity declines, it remains negative and statistically significant. The same is true for individuals identified as having a college degree or post-graduate education. Union membership consistently has a positive and statistically significant coeffficient estimate. Recent contact with an illegal immigrant does not seem to influence responses regarding the effect of undocumented migrants, although it was strongly and persistently associated in Figure 2 with more negative general attitudes about illegal immigration. This last finding is consistent with an interpretation suggested earlier that the two response variables measure somewhat different attitudinal dimensions, and it agrees with the view that individuals respond more sympathetically to undocumented migrants they know personally than they do toward the more abstract concept of illegal immigration (Harwood 1986).

Another difference between Figures 2 and 3 involves the consequences of beliefs that undocumented workers tend to bring down the overall level of wages in some occupations. This belief is associated with a more negative outlook on undocumented immigrants using either response variable. Yet among respondents who hold such beliefs, those in Figure 3 who also believe that wages are lowered in one's own occupation are significantly *less* likely to view undocumented migrants as having an unfavorable effect on California as a whole. On the other hand, those who are married and believe that

wages are lowered in their spouse's occupation are significantly more likely to indicate that they believe that undocumented migrants have an unfavorable effect.[11]

Whether a respondent believes that illegals are more likely to receive welfare or commit crimes does not have a statistically significant influence on the response to the question on the effect of undocumented migrants. Persons who view illegal immigrants as adding to taxpayers' fiscal burdens and those who believe that tax money should be spent to teach English to adult *legal* immigrants are, nevertheless, more likely to view undocumented migrants as having an unfavorable effect on the state. On the other hand, respondents who believe that the presence of illegal immigrants lowers consumer prices, that Spanish should be encouraged in the high schools, and that tax money should be used to provide English language courses to adult *illegal* immigrants are less likely to hold a negative attitude about undocumented migrants.

Significance of findings for the main hypotheses

How do the results reported in Figures 2 and 3 relate to our five principal hypotheses? To reiterate, these include: (1) a labor market competition hypothesis which suggests that persons having the lowest levels of socioeconomic status attainment are likely to have the most to fear from job competition with new immigrants, and therefore will exhibit the most negative attitudes toward illegal migration and undocumented migrants; (2) a cultural affinity hypothesis that predicts that individuals whose own cultural attributes are most similar to those of undocumented migrants will possess the strongest pro-immigrant attitudes; (3) an education hypothesis which predicts that educational attainment and pro-immigrant attitudes will be positively correlated; (4) a utilitarian calculus hypothesis emphasizing perceived costs and benefits of migration, which predicts that negative attitudes toward undocumented migration are associated with anxieties over one's material well-being; and (5) a symbolic politics hypothesis according to which challenges to important symbols of American nationality may evoke anti-immigrant attitudes.

There is only weak support in our data for a labor market competition hypothesis. Household income is unrelated to attitudes about either the problem of illegal immigration or the effect of undocumented migrants. The results for employment status are contradictory; employed persons are less inclined to believe that illegal immigration is a serious problem, but more likely to have unfavorable attitudes toward undocumented migrants. Associations with union membership are consistent with the hypothesis. Respondents in households containing a labor union member exhibit stronger anti-immigrant sentiments than other respondents, but these effects are statistically significant only in the effects equation.

The results provide greater support for the cultural affinity hypothesis.

Hispanic respondents are significantly more likely than non-Hispanics to express favorable attitudes toward undocumented migrants, and these outcomes persist in the effects equation even when all other issue-oriented variables are included. Blacks, on the other hand, are significantly more likely to view illegal immigration as a serious problem. The fact that foreign-born persons have a smaller tendency to be concerned about the problem of illegal immigration than native-born respondents is further evidence for a cultural affinity hypothesis. These results parallel other findings showing that first- and second-generation migrants typically have more pro-immigrant sentiments and are more likely to support liberalizing US immigration policy than individuals whose ancestors have been in the United States for several generations (Day 1989, 1990; Miller, Polinard & Wrinkle 1984; Cain & Kiewiet 1986).

Some of the strongest associations in the data are with educational attainment. Respondents with any amount of college education have significantly more favorable attitudes toward undocumented migrants than persons who have not gone beyond high school, and the more education respondents possess, the less they appear to be concerned about potential problems associated with illegal immigration. These results are consistent with other findings by Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990) who show that the college educated, relatively young, and those at the upper end of the income distribution are among the least likely to embrace an ethnocultural or exclusionary conception of American identity. Related studies of the correlates of political and racial tolerance come to similar conclusions (McClosky & Brill 1983; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus 1982; Schurnan, Bobo & Steeh 1985). In summarizing this research, Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990: 1134) suggest that 'distinctive socialization experiences and differential capacities for learning societal norms have led the young and better-educated to support the rights and aspirations of political, racial, or religious minorities more strongly than the rest of the population'.

Two additional respondent characteristics that are associated with attitudes toward illegal immigration are age and gender. Older respondents, typically those beyond age 35 or 45, have a more pessimistic outlook than younger persons regarding the consequences of illegal immigration to California. These effects are among the most conspicuous in our data and endure when groups of attitudinal variables are added to the model. They are also consistent with other studies suggesting that older individuals typically have more negative attitudes toward immigrants than younger respondents (Hoskin & Mishler 1983; Tarrance et al. 1989a, b; Citrin, Reingold & Green 1990).[12]

The importance of age is open to interpretation. In particular, it is not clear whether the influence reflects an age effect or a cohort effect. If an age effect is the proper interpretation, then our results suggest that age is partially correlated with conservative propensities (Lipset et al. 1954) and that people become more conservative as they grow older. Starr and Roberts (1982) found that politically conservative respondents in California and three sou-

thern states expressed more negative attitudes toward Indo-Chinese migrants than their liberal counterparts. On the other hand, others have concluded thal public opinion appears to be nonpartisan on the immigration issue. Day (1990) found no differences between Democrats and Republicans or among liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Another possible explanation for an age effect is that, in response to immigration, older people sense a greater amount of social change from their youth and are more apprehensive about a change in the status quo. It could also be that older respondents are less secure in their jobs and have more fear of job competition from immigrants.

An alternative interpretation is offered by the generational/persistence model of attitude formation, which suggests that the results reveal cohort effects. According to this view, developed by Sears (1981, 1983) and supported by recent research by Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb (1991) on the stability and change of sociopolitical attitudes among Bennington College graduates in the 1930s and 1940s, young people are highly impressionable and vulnerable to new ideas. This stage is then followed by a long period of increasing persistence and stability in attitudes over the remainder of the life course. This interpretation of the significance of age variables in our models suggests that age differences are less a reflection of life-course changes than of intercohort variation.

Finally, the fact that females have somewhat more negative attitudes toward undocumented migrants than males corresponds to recent findings concerning the characteristics that define 'a true American'. Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990) have shown that, holding other factors constant, females are significantly more likely than males to value such traits as believing in God, standing up for one's country, economic self-reliance, speaking English, and voting in elections.

Our data also provide evidence that cost-benefit considerations influence respondents' attitudes toward illegal immigration in California. They manifest themselves in many instances as salient pocket-book issues related to fears of higher taxes or to expectations of lower prices for consumer goods and services. Persons who believe that illegal migrants are more likely to receive welfare benefits, more likely to commit crimes, or more likely to impose a fiscal burden on other taxpayers are themselves significantly more likely to feel that illegal immigration is a serious problem. On the other hand, pro-immigrant views emerge when individuals perceive that their personal well-being is directly enhanced. Respondents in southern California who believe that the presence of undocumented migrants results in lower consumer prices consistently have more favorable evaluations of illegal immigration.

Finally, our evidence suggests that illegal immigration to southern California elicits normative reactions related to strong attachments to the use of English and to egalitarianism as symbols of American identity. Respondents who believe that the number of non-English-speaking persons in southern California will grow or who feel that an increase in the number of such

persons will have a bad effect on ethnic relations are significantly more likely to be concerned about illegal immigration as a serious problem. These findings are consistent with what Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990) call a more restrictive or ethnocultural version of American nationality. Moreover, there is support for the existence of egalitarian norms that are part of a more liberal conception of civic identity. One might interpret believing any of the following statements as symbolizing egalitarian principles: undocumented migrants who pay taxes should be able to send their children to public school and receive unemployment compensation; English-language lessons should be provided for adult illegal immigrants and be paid for by private businesses and civic organizations or by general tax revenues; and students should be encouraged to take Spanish while in high school. In our data, respondents who hold any of these views are significantly less likely than others to feel that illegal immigration is a serious problem or that undocumented migrants have an unfavorable effect on California. When our results on English language use and egalitarianism are considered together, they provide preliminary evidence for a symbolic politics model of opinion formation as a useful analytic device for understanding attitudes toward illegal immigration.

Discussion

In this paper we have provided evidence that the characteristics of survey respondents and their perceptions of migrants' behavior affect the way residents in southern California view both undocumented migrants and the overall impact of illegal immigration. The most salient respondent traits are age, education, and ethnicity. Older survey participants are more likely to see illegal immigration in negative terms, whereas having more education and being Hispanic are each associated with greater optimism about undocumented migrants and illegal migration. At the same time, respondents who cast immigrants as poor and welfare dependent or as making little effort to learn English have some of the most unfavorable rankings of undocumented immigration and its impacts. Opinions that immigrants are more likely to be on welfare, to commit crime, or to impose a fiscal burden on other taxpayers by receiving social services whose value exceeds the taxes migrants pay are consistently associated with more negative general attitudes about undocumented immigration. So, too, are views that the number of people with little or no English-speaking ability is likely to increase and that this growth will have a bad effect on ethnic relations.

These findings have implications for US immigration policy and for immigrant policy. It is no longer novel to call attention to rising ethnic tension and anti-immigrant sentiment in many of the world's countries. What is new in these places, however, is the challenge to incorporate new-comers successfully and to lower friction among groups socially separated by ethnicity, language, and skin color. Because we found a strong association

between attitudes toward illegal immigration and perceptions that the number of non-English speakers in southern California will continue to grow and have a unfavorable effect on ethnic relations, our results suggest that lower levels of US immigration could help to reduce anti-immigrant feelings in this country.

More importantly, perhaps, our findings imply that greater effort should be made to promote the economic and social integration of migrants who are already here. The United States has an explicit immigration policy whose purpose serves largely a gate-keeping function of determining who is and who is not eligible for permanent residence. Nevertheless, once immigrants are admitted the federal government acts as though its responsibility to them has ended, and the subsequent job of 'making it' in America is left to the newcomers and their families, to voluntary agencies, and to a patchwork of state and local government service agencies whose budgets are ill equipped for the task. What is needed to complement US immigration policy is an explicit immigrant policy at the federal level, the purpose of which is to reduce barriers to immigrant adjustment and to smooth the transition of new immigrants into the mainstream of US society (Espenshade 1987). Our analysis of the public opinion data suggests that ethnic tensions can be reduced not only if the volume of immigration is relatively low, but also if established residents believe that immigrants are making a determined effort to become integrated into their host country. Signs of successful acculturation that are particularly important in the United States context are learning English and acquiring upward economic mobility to reduce anxieties that migrants will overtax the welfare system or otherwise become a drain on public treasuries.

Finally, how likely is it that the United States will soon emerge from this latest episode of neo-restrictionist sentiment? Our results suggest that rising levels of educational attainment in the general population should by themselves instill more liberal attitudes toward immigration. On the other hand, much depends on how one interprets the negative age effects. In the short run, the concentration of new immigrants in such states as Florida and California that have large elderly populations might predict a less hospitable welcome. In the longer run, the outcome may hinge on whether the significance of age variables reflect an age or cohort effect. If individuals have a tendency to become more conservative as they age, then the anticipated future aging of the US population that accompanies the movement of the baby boom generation through the age distribution suggests a prolonged period of apprehension over immigration. But if the results regarding age variables are more consistent with a cohort view, then there is room for greater optimism. According to this view, younger cohorts are likely to display more tolerant immigrant attitudes throughout their lifetimes, and each ensuing cohort may become progressively more liberal. Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify from only one cross-sectional sample which interpretation of the age coefficients is more appropriate. What is needed is the ability

to follow the same groups of respondents in successive waves of public opinion surveys.

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Notes

1. IRCA is a major piece of immigration reform legislation, but it also contains important employment, civil rights, welfare, and federal reimbursement provisions. In addition to employer sanctions, legalization, and enforcement policies, special new programs mandated by IRCA include antidiscrimination safeguards, state legalization impact assistance grants, and a program to check the welfare eligibility of noncitizens. Additional details about the legislation and its subsequent implementation can be found in Goodis (1986) and in Bean, Vernez & Keely (1989).
2. Henry Cabot Lodge became a leader of anti-immigration forces in the US Senate, and in 1894 the Immigration Restriction League was formed in Boston to curtail the number of foreigners who could come to the United States (Kaufman 1982). Perhaps typical of the prevailing anti-immigrant feeling was an article by Kenneth Roberts in the *Saturday Evening Post* in February 1920: 'If the United States is the melting pot, something is wrong with the heating system, for an inconveniently large portion of the new immigration floats around in unsightly indigestible lumps' (quoted in Simon 1985: 83).
3. De la Garza (1985), on the other hand, argues that feelings of cultural affinity for Mexico and examples of romanticizing the old country are not particularly strong among Mexican-Americans.
4. Undocumented aliens in California are highly concentrated in just a few metropolitan areas. Los Angeles County contained an estimated 658,000 undocumented aliens in the 1980 census (Passel 1986). This figure was two-thirds of California's total and almost one-third of the US total. Nationwide more than 100,000 undocumented migrants were estimated to be included in only two other metropolitan area – New York City (212,000) and Chicago (127,000). Thirteen metropolitan areas, each with more than 20,000 illegal residents, altogether accounted for nearly three-fourths of the undocumented population. Including Los Angeles, six of the thirteen were in California.
5. Day (1990) concluded from an analysis of a 1986 national survey that respondents who believed immigrants eventually land on welfare rolls had more negative attitudes toward immigrants. At the same time, Harwood (1986) contends that poll data, at least those dealing with undocumented migration, fail to support the view that the public is concerned over welfare. Worries about the consequences of undocumented migration in the American southwest have been laid to fears of job competition, especially in the economically stricken Texas economy (Tarrance et al. 1989a, b. Moreover, Day (1990) concluded that although

'. . . perceptions of immigrants' illegality, cultural inferiority, and negative effects on the economy all contribute to general anti-immigration feelings, the anxiety about Americans' jobs being taken away stands out above the rest' (p. 27). Finally, previous studies have failed to confirm a link between the public's fears of added crime and more immigrants (Harwood 1986), although this possible connection has not been thoroughly explored.

6. These restrictions reduced the size of the sample from 1,031 to 940. One additional case was lost due to a failure to report a value for age, reducing the sample used in the analysis to 939. To prevent further sample attrition, missing data resulting from the responses 'don't know' or 'no answer' for the items used as explanatory variables are assigned to the zero category for each of the dummy variables. For example, if a respondent believes that illegal immigrants take away jobs and increase unemployment this variable is assigned a value of one. All other responses result in a value of zero.
7. This approach is also supported by social-psychological research on attitude formation (Kinder & Sears 1985; Chaiken & Stangor 1987; Fishbein & Ajzen 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein 1980).
8. Following prior research on opinion formation, we assume that causality runs from positions or attitudes on specific issues to responses to more general questions about the problem and effect of undocumented immigration. This is consistent with specifying a recursive model in which the general opinions do not have a direct effect on the specific issues and where the random disturbances for the general and specific responses are uncorrelated (see Maddala 1983: Ch. 5). If the random disturbances are correlated (for example, if the two types of responses are jointly determined or if causality runs in the other direction), then identification of the model will require exclusion restrictions on the explanatory variables in the form of explanatory variables that appear in one equation and not the other. To the extent that these restrictions cannot be satisfied with the data set one is analyzing, the estimated parameters will be biased as a structural explanation of attitude formation. Even in this case, however, the model is still valid as a purely statistical description of the sample distribution of responses, and it may nonetheless be a useful guide to subsequent investigations.
9. The estimation is conducted using the econometric software program LIMDEP, Version 5.1/386.
10. The results of preliminary regressions to determine which of the available age and education variables were statistically significant are not reported. For the question on the problem of illegal immigration the age categories 18–24, 25–34, and 35–44 were collapsed to form the omitted group. For the question on the effect of undocumented migrants the age categories 18–24 and 25–34 were collapsed to form the omitted category. For both questions the education categories less-than-high-school and high-school were collapsed to form the omitted category. Other exploratory regressions that included interactions between age and education variables produced no statistically significant findings.
11. The direction of the own-wage effect is unexpected because the survey item bears directly on the respondent's personal economic welfare. However, in separate analyses of males and females, we discovered that the significant effects in Figure 3 of lowering respondent's wages and lowering spouse's wages are found only in the female regressions. Why women would evaluate their own economic prospects differently from those of their husbands is difficult to know, but it may partially be due to the customary earnings differential between men and women. If wives' financial contributions to the household are substantially less than their husbands', women may perceive potential declines in their spouses' wages as more damaging to the family's economic well-being than reductions in their own wages.
12. It may seem that these conclusions are contradicted by recent attacks on immigrants in Germany by skinhead and neo-Nazi groups, which draw a disproportionate share of their membership from youths and young adults. But the reticence of many older people in Germany to participate in anti-immigrant activities may substantially be influenced by lingering memories of the origins of Nazi Germany prior to World War II.

Appendix

Table A1. Ordered-probit regressions for responses to the question on the problem of illegal immigration[a,b]

Explanatory variables	Parameter estimates						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	1.7253	2.0899	1.9015	1.9372	1.3183	1.4021	1.6020
	(19.68)	(22.70)	(19.14)	(10.89)	(6.63)	(5.78)	(5.26)
I. Age variables							
Aged 45 to 54 years	0.4925		0.4869	0.4664	0.3888	0.3814	0.3657
	(3.89)		(3.82)	(3.42)	(2.68)	(2.60)	(2.38)
Aged 55 to 64 years	0.7128		0.6839	0.6683	0.8283	0.5573	0.6326
	(5.46)		(5.20)	(4.83)	(4.24)	(3.81)	(4.02)
Aged 65+ years	0.4328		0.3809	0.3172	0.3891	0.2991	0.3243
	(3.73)		(3.25)	(2.28)	(2.66)	(2.01)	(2.09)
II. Education variables							
Some college		−0.2114	−0.1599	−0.2072	−0.0506	−0.0702	−0.1468
		(−2.22)	(−1.85)	(−2.06)	(−0.48)	(−0 66)	(−1.31)
College degree		−0.3164	−0.2651	−0.3000	−0.0605	−0.0288	−0.1405
		(−2.74)	(−2.26)	(−2.33)	(−0.44)	(−0.21)	(−0.98)
Post-college education		−0.4394	−0.3678	−0.4161	−0.1807	−0.1600	−0.1952
		(−3.54)	(−2.91)	(−2.89)	(−1.20)	(−1.03)	(−1.17)
III. Other socioeconomic and demographic background factors							
Female				0.0611	0.0737	0.0677	0.1015
				(0.72)	(0.83)	(0.75)	(0.07)
Employed				−0.1029	−0.1147	−0.1043	−0.0916
				(−0.99)	(−1.04)	(−0.94)	(−0.80)
Hispanic				−0.3297	−0.3121	−0.2555	−0.1030
				(−2.64)	(−2.34)	(−1.88)	(−0.72)
Black				0.3028	0.1774	0.1244	0.2578
				(2.10)	(1.07)	(0.75)	(1.48)
Asian				−0.0158	−0.0657	−0.1162	0.0051
				(−0.06)	(−0.27)	(−0.48)	(0.02)
In household with labor union member				0.0748	0.0413	0.0379	0.0330
				(0.70)	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.29)
Foreign born				−0.2338	−0.1462	−0.1497	−0.0641
				(−1.88)	(−1.10)	(−1.13)	(−0.44)
Household income less than $10,000				−0.0338	−0.0614	−0.0394	−0.0185
				(−0.24)	(−0.42)	(−0.27)	(−0.12)
Household income $10,000–25,000				0.0599	0.0652	0.0811	0.0862
				(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.74)	(0.75)
Household income over $40,000				−0.0292	0.0638	0.0798	0.0401
				(−0.23)	(0.49)	(0.60)	(0.29)
Refused to report income				0.1749	0.2082	0.2096	0.2121
				(0.94)	(1.09)	(1.11)	(1.03)

Table A1. Continued

Explanatory variables	Parameter estimates						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Recent contact with undocumented worker				0.2957 (3.13)	0.2727 (2.74)	0.2792 (2.77)	0.2761 (2.57)
IV. Attitudes regarding job competition and economic impact of illegal immigrants							
Illegals take away jobs and contribute to unemployment					0.3116 (1.95)	0.3189 (2.00)	0.2343 (1.44)
Take jobs from Blacks[c]					0.2038 (0.97)	0.2189 (1.03)	0.2855 (1.27)
Take jobs from Hispanics[a]					− 0.0694 (−0.35)	−0.1217 (−0.60)	−01767 (−0.83)
Take jobs from Asians[c]					−0.0984 (−0.37)	−0.0839 (−0.32)	−0.1086 (−0.39)
Take jobs from Whites[c]					0.2861 (1.23)	0.2303 (0.98)	0.1955)0.78)
Illegals lower wages in some occupations					0.2199 (1.24)	0.2399 (1.33)	0.2521 (1.37)
Lower wages in unskilled occupations[d]					0.0009 (0.01)	−0.0311 (−0.18)	−0.1392 (−0.82)
Lower wages in respondent's occupation[d]					0.1443 (0.93)	0.1397 (0.89)	0.1150 (0.69)
Lower wages in spouse's occupation if married[d]					0.1174 (0.61)	0.0809 (0.42)	0.0887 (0.45)
Illegals are more likely to receive welfare benefits					0.3095 (3.26)	0.2321 (2.37)	0.2379 (2.32)
Illegals are more likely to commit crimes					0.4241 (3.87)	04040 (3.67)	0.3238 (2.80)
Illegals mean lower prices to consumers						−0.2922 (−2.72)	−0.2794 (−2.51)
Illegals mean higher profits to businesses						−0.0721 (−0.56)	−0.1120 (−0.81)
Illegals mean greater fiscal burden to taxpayers						0.3256 (3.37)	0.2348 (2.34)
V. Attitudes regarding future demographic and social impacts of illegal immigrants							
California faces a labor shortage							−0.2348 (−1.37)
Should get additional labor only from US[3]							0.3468 (1.12)
Without illegals manufacturing firms will leave							−0.1043 (−1.09)
Most illegals eventually return home							−0.0997 (−0.91)

Table A 1. Continued

Explanatory variables	Parameter estimates						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Inflow of illegals to increase next 5 to 10 years							0.095 (0.97)
Population with limited or no English will increase							0.2542 (2.67)
Lack of English has bad effect on ethnic relations							0.2882 (2.92)
VI. Attitudes regarding policy issues							
Taking Spanish in high school should be encouraged							0.0763 (0.68)
Taking Spanish in high school should be required[f]							0.0230 (0.21)
Tax money should be used to teach English to adult illegals							−0.0669 (−0.63)
Tax money should be used to teach English to adult illegals							0.0332 (0.29)
Private sector should pay for English for adult illegals							−0.1835 (−1.83)
Illegals who pay taxes should be able to send children to Public schools							−0.2442 (−1.83)
Illegals who pay taxes should be able to collect unemployment							−0.1716 (−1.70)
Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary							
δ_1	0.6271 (8.69)	0.6147 (8.60)	0.6270 (8.64)	0.6457 (8.53)	0.7161 (8.44)	0.7327 (8.48)	0.7725 (8.28)
δ_2	1.6281 (19.40)	1.5927 (19.03)	1.6356 (19.35)	1.6818 (19.07)	1.8625 (18.55)	1.9061 (18.32)	2.0032 (17.73)
Log-likelihood value	−866.77	−882.48	−861.57	−845.81	−782.31	−771.28	−745.31
Number of parameters	6	6	9	21	32	35	49
χ^2 (d.f.)	46.92[g] (3)	15.50[g] (3)	57.32[g] (6)	31.52[h] (12)	127.00[h] (11)	22.06[h] (3)	51.94[h] (14)
$\chi^2_{0.96}$ (d.f.)	7.81 (3)	7.81 (3)	12.6 (6)	21.0 (12)	19.7 (11)	7.81 (3)	23.7 (14)
N	939	939	939	939	939	939	939

[a] The dependent variable is the response to the following question: 'How serious a problem do you believe the illegal immigration situation is in Southern California at the present time?' The dependent variable values are: 0, not at all serious; 1 – not too serious; 2 – somewhat serious; 3 – very serious.

[b] Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. The omitted categories for the dummy background variables correspond to white, male, aged 18 to 44, high school or less education, born in the

United States, unemployed, no contact, non-union household, and house hold income between $ 25,000 and 40,000.

[c] For those who believe that illegal immigrants take jobs and contribute to the unemployment problem.

[d] For those who believe that illegal immigrants lower wages.

[e] For those who believe California faces a labor shortage.

[f] For those who believe taking Spanish should be encouraged.

[g] Chi-squared statistic for the test of joint significance of the slope coefficients (i.e., excluding constant terms and threshold coefficients). Degrees of freedom in parentheses.

[h] Chi-squared statistic for the test of joint significance of variables added to the model compared to previous model. Degrees of freedom in parentheses.

Table A2. Ordered-probit regressions for responses to the question on the effect of undocumented migrants[a,b]

Explanatory variables	Parameter estimates						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Constant	1.2177	1.5971	1.3863	1.3783	0.8747	0.7788	1.0141
	(16.46)	(22.03)	(16.11)	(9.51)	(5.11)	(3.75)	(3.85)
I. Age variables							
Aged 35 to 44 years	0.2468		0.2598	0.2375	0.2697	0.2614	0.2422
	(2.34)		(2.45)	(2.18)	(2.29)	(2.21)	(1.98)
Aged 45 to 54 years	0.4296		0.4240	0.3572	0.2824	0.2824	0.2746
	(3.81)		(3.73)	(3.00)	(2.26)	(2.21)	(2.06)
Aged 55 to 64 years	0.4037		0.3717	0.3280	0.2703	0.2142	0.2568
	(3.75)		(3.45)	(2.90)	(2.33)	(1.84)	(2.10)
Aged 65+ years	0.4274		0.3789	0.3569	0.4075	0.3438	0.3777
	(3.83)		(3.36)	(2.77)	(3.01)	(2.49)	(2.60)
II. Education variables							
Some college		−0.1919	−0.1414	−0.1767	−0.0894	−0.1059	−0.1418
		(−2.25)	(−1.64)	(−2.00)	(−0.98)	(−1.13)	(−1.46)
College degree		−0.2762	−0.2398	−0.2943	−0.1773	−0.1512	−0.2151
		(−2.55)	(−2.22)	(−2.53)	(−1.45)	(−1.22)	(−1.68)
Post-college education		−0.4471	−0.4056	−0.4797	−0.3663	−0.3512	−0.3749
		(−3.92)	(−3.56)	(−3.80)	(−2.74)	(−2.60)	(−2.66)
III. Other socioeconomic and demographic background factors							
Female				0.0982	0.1001	0.0914	0.1486
				(1.27)	(1.25)	(1.13)	(1.75)
Employed				0.1202	0.1328	0.1521	0.1626
				(1.35)	(1.42)	(1.60)	(1.67)
Hispanic				−0.5176	−0.4954	−0.4350	−0.3350
				(−4.28)	(−3.97)	(−3.46)	(−2.51)
Black				−0.1560	−0.2514	−0.2994	−0.1923
				(−1.33)	(−1.94)	(−2.27)	(−1.38)
Asian				−0.4033	−0.4336	−0.4891	−0.3716
				(−1.43)	(−1.49)	(−1.68)	(−1.30)

Table A2. Continued

Explanatory variables	Parameter estimates						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
In household with labor union member				0.2300 (2.50)	0.2216 (2.37)	0.2055 (2.13)	0.2191 (2.22)
Foreign born				−0.0470 (−0.35)	0.0402 (0.29)	0.0502 (0.36)	0.0801 (0.58)
Household income less than $10,000				0.1134 (0.85)	0.1082 (0.78)	0.1532 (1.07)	0.1799 (1.20)
Household income less than $10,000–25,000				−0.0766 (−0.79)	−0.0907 (−0.90)	−0.0716 (−0.71)	−0.0736 (−0.70)
Household income over $40,000				−0.0615 (−0.51)	−0.0028 (−0.02)	0.0215 (−0.17)	−0.0035 (−0.03)
Refused to report income				0.1177 (0.72)	0.1560 (0.95)	0.1909 (1.13)	0.1580 (0.91)
Recent contact with undocumented worker				0.0746 (0.91)	0.0515 (0.61)	0.0524 (0.61)	0.0701 (0.78)
IV. Attitudes regarding job competition and economic impact of illegal immigrants							
Illegals take away jobs and contribute to unemployment					0.3053 (2.32)	0.3134 (2.35)	0.2492 (1.79)
Take jobs from Blacks[a]					0.1377 (0.92)	0.1377 (0.90)	0.1772 (1.10)
Take jobs from Hispanics[c]					−0.0553 (−0.38)	−0.0993 (−0.67)	−0.1446 (−0.93)
Take jobs from Asians[c]					0.0152 (0.09)	0.0304 (0.17)	0.0267 (0.15)
Take jobs from Whites[c]					0.1715 (1.21)	0.1336 (0.93)	0.1095 (0.72)
Illegals lower wages in some occupations					0.1761 (1.18)	0.1953 (1.28)	0.1711 (1.09)
Lower wages in unskilled occupations[d]					0.0756 (0.59)	0.0345 (0.26)	0.0077 (0.06)
Lower wages in respondent's occupation[d]					−0.2492 (−2.25)	−0.2598 (−2.29)	−0.2445 (−2.07)
Lower wages in spouse's occupation if married[d]					0.2778 (2.18)	0.2504 (1.93)	0.2618 (1.94)
Illegals are more likely to receive welfare benefits					0.1413 (1.72)	0.0686 (0.79)	0.0617 (0.68)
Illegals are more likely to commmit crimes					0.1157 (1.34)	0.0956 (1.09)	0.0425 (0.46)
Illegals mean lower prices to consumers						−0.2993 (−3.01)	−0.2434 (−2.33)
Illegals mean higher profits to businesses						0.1323 (1.19)	0.1223 (1.06)
Illegals mean greater fiscal burden to taxpayers						0.2647 (3.20)	0.2105 (2.43)

Table A2. Continued

Explanatory variables	Parameter estimates						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
V. Attitudes regarding future demographic and social impacts of illegal immigrants							
California faces a labor shortage							−0.1444 (−0.84)
Should get additional labor only from US[e]							0.1335 (0.57)
Without illegals manufacturing firms will leave							−0.1382 (−1.60)
Most illegals eventually return home							−0.0602 (−0.53)
Inflow of illegals to increase next 5 to 10 years							0.0160 (0.17)
Population with limited or no English will increase							0.0960 (1.11)
Lack of English has bad effect on ethnic relations							0.1075 (1.19)
VI. Attitudes regarding policy issues							
Taking Spanish in high school should be encouraged							−0.1713 (1.79)
Taking Spanish in high school should be required[f]							−0.0243 (−0.25)
Tax money should be used to teach English to adult illegals							−0.1810 (−1.82)
Tax money should be used to teach English to adult legals							0.1914 (2.15)
Private sector should pay for English for adult illegals							−0.0772 (−0.75)
Illegals who pay taxes should be able to send children to public schools							−0.0980 (−0.96)
Illeqals who pay taxes should be able to collect unemployment							−0.1084 (−1.19)
Ordered-probit threshold parameter estimates and estimation summary							
δ_1	0.6046 (11.93)	0.6001 (11.91)	0.6062 (11.98)	0.6151 (11.92)	0.6184 (11.80)	0.6232 (11.78)	0.6269 (11.45)
δ_2	0.7939 (14.61)	0.7884 (14.56)	0.7974 (14.68)	0.8096 (14.65)	0.8219 (14.42)	0.8308 (14.45)	0.8397 (14.10)
δ_3	1.6485 (25.85)	1.6378 (25.82)	1.6616 (26.11)	1.6950 (26.07)	1.7730 (26.70)	1.8011 (26.97)	1.8370 (26.97)

Table A2. Continued

Explanatory variables	Parameter estimates						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Log-likelihood value	−1263.6	−1269.0	−1256.7	−1238.9	−1197.0	−1184.9	−1168.1
Number of parameters	8	7	11	23	34	37	51
χ^2	28.2[g]	17.4[g]	42.0[g]	35.6[h]	83.8[h]	24.2[h]	33.6[h]
(d.t.)	(4)	(3)	(7)	(12)	(11)	(3)	(14)
$\chi^2_{0.96}$	9.49	7.81	14.1	21.0	19.7	7.81	23.7
(d.f.)	(4)	(3)	(7)	(12)	(11)	(3)	(14)
N	939	939	939	939	939	939	939

[a] The dependent variable is the response to the following question: 'Do you feel that the influx of illegal or undocumented immigrants into Southern California has an overall favorable or unfavorable effect on the state as a whole?' The dependent variable values are: 0 – very favorable; 1 – somewhat favorable; 2 – no effect; 3 – somewhat unfavorable; 4 – very unfavorable.

[b] Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. The omitted categories for the dummy background variables correspond to white, male, aged 18 to 34, high school or less education, born in the United States, unemployed, no contact, non-union household, and household income between $25,000 and $40,000.

[c] For those who believe that illegal immigrants take jobs and contribute to the unemployment problem.

[d] For those who believe that illegal immigrants lower wages.

[e] For those who believe California faces a labor shortage.

[f] For those who believe taking Spanish should be encouraged.

[g] Chi-squared statistic for the test of joint significance of the slope coefficients (i.e., excluding constant terms and threshold coefficients. Degrees of freedom in parentheses.

[h] Chi-squared statistic for the test of joint significance of variables added to the model compared to previous model. Degrees of freedom in parentheses.

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