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Justice and Emotional Reactions to the Disadvantaged

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Various attitutidinal, cognitive, emotional, and actional reactions to problems and needs of less fortunate people (unemployed, poor people in the developing countries, foreign workers in West Germany) were assessed in a questionnaire study with 865 respondents. The external validity of self-report data was established by external ratings. The focus was on emotional reactions (existential guilt, sympathy, moral outrage because of unjust disadvantages, anger about the disadvantaged, contentment with one's own advantages, fear of losing these, hopelessness with respect to the fate of the less fortunate). Several justice-related variables (beliefs, views, appraisals) as well as responsibility-related variables and social attitudes were assessed as predictors of emotions. The importance of justice-related variables for the arousal of different social emotions was clearly shown. The use and usefulness of cognitive models of discrete emotions is discussed. The impact of emotions on the readiness to various forms of prosocial activities in favor of the less fortunate was also shown: Moral outrage and existential guilt proved to be much more salient predictors than sympathy. Crucial differences between these three prosocial emotions as well as the impact of justice-related variables on readiness to prosocial activities are discussed.

KEY WORDS: cognitive models of emotions; existential guilt; sympathy; outrage; equity; need; belief in a just world; prosocial behavior.

INTRODUCTION

The main focus of the research reported in this article is on emotional reactions upon being confronted with the problems and needs of several groups of persons who are less fortunate than oneself. Three groups of persons with

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their various needs and hardships were addressed in the present study as examples of a wide variety of humans living under conditions less favorable than the majority in a Western industrial state: the unemployed, poor people in developing countries, and foreign workers in West Germany.

When confronted with needs and problems of others, various emotions might arise. In the present study the following were assessed and analyzed: *sympathy* for the less fortunate, *existential guilt because of one's own relative advantages, moral outrage* because of unjust disadvantages of the less fortunate, *fear of losing one's own advantages, contentment* with one's own advantages, *anger about the disadvantaged,* and *hopelessness* concerning their future.

Various emotions (and reactions with an emotional touch) to the disadvantaged or to victims of crimes, accidents, or natural disasters have been observed and analyzed in previous research and theory. There is an especially rich literature on compassion or empathy for people in distress. Hoffman (1976, 1982) distinguished several levels of empathy ranging from a more egocentric affection to a mature other-centered concern considering the entire life situation of the person in distress. Batson et al. (1987) distinguished between personal distress and empathy, which he considered two qualitatively distinct emotions with different motivational consequences.

Guilt feelings are another category of emotions focused on in research. Again, several categories have been distinguished (Hoffman, 1987; Opp and Samson, 1989), e.g., guilt about having caused the distress of another person, guilt about own inactivity, existential guilt merely because one is better off than others suffering hardships (Monadat *et al.*, 1986), or survivor guilt (Lifton, 1967).

Hoffman (1987) mentioned two further emotions as reactions to people in distress: empathic anger which is to be expected when the subject perceives third persons to be responsible for the distress of others, and empathic injustice which might be experienced when a discrepancy is perceived between victims' plights and what they deserve without (yet) having identified a responsible agent. The first mentioned seems similar to what we call moral outrage in the present study.

In contrast to the emotions mentioned so far there are reactions that imply a critique of the disadvantaged: blaming the victims (Ryan, 1971) and derogating them implying that they caused their fate or else that they deserved it (Sorrentino, 1982; Shaver, 1985). In the present study, anger about the disadvantaged represented this type of reactions.

(Relative) contentment with one's own fate has been observed, for instance, as an outcome of downward comparisons by cancer patients who realize that other patients are in a worse situation or are coping less well than themselves (Taylor *et al.*, 1983; Wills, 1981).

We are not aware of any previous research on the fear of losing one's own advantages and on hopelessness when confronted with the misery of others. In the present article the following questions are asked:

1. Which variables permit the prediction of interindividual differences in emotional reactions to the disadvantaged? Several hypotheses about antecedents of these emotions were tested. Special attention was given to perceived justice and perceived responsibility.
2. What is the motivational impact of emotional reactions to the needs and problems of the disadvantaged on the readiness to make prosocial commitments to those less fortunate than oneself? More specifically: Which of the emotions assessed contributes independently to the prediction of the readiness to make prosocial commitments?
3. Since three of the emotions assessed were expected to motivate prosocial commitments (existential guilt, sympathy, and moral outrage because of perceived injustice), the question was raised whether or not they are equivalent in this respect. If not, what are the crucial theoretical differences between them?
4. What is the impact—direct or mediated—of justice beliefs and views on prosocial commitments?

Prediction of Emotional Reactions to the Needs and Problems of the Disadvantaged

Assuming that there are interindividual differences with respect to kind and intensity of emotional reactions to the disadvantaged, how can these be predicted? To be able to predict these emotional reactions a broad range of variables that might influence the arousal of emotions could be considered, including social attitudes toward the disadvantaged, the kind of social relationships, general value orientations, personality traits such as generalized empathy, control beliefs, role-taking ability, and, above all, various cognitive appraisals of the needs and problems of the disadvantaged. This study focused on several justice-related appraisals and on attributions of responsibility for the disadvantage.

Several hypotheses on the relationships between these predictors and emotional reactions could be derived from cognitive models of emotions such as proposed by de Rivera (1977), Epstein 1984), Frijda (1987), Montada (1989), Roseman (1984), Scherer (1984), Solomon (1976), and Smith and Ellsworth (1985). Cognitive models of emotions are based on the assumption that each discrete emotion presupposes specific appraising cognitions or else implies those as constituent elements (Brandtstädter, 1985). Several emotions assessed in the present study presuppose or imply appraisals of injustice and of responsibility for the existence or the reduction of problems and needs. Conceptually,

this is true for existential guilt, moral outrage, and anger about the disadvantaged. It is more questionable for sympathy with the disadvantaged and the fear of losing one's own advantages while hopelessness is, conceptually, unrelated to perceived injustice.

Particular attention was given to the impact of justice-related background variables including subjects' views on rules of fair allocation (e.g., the equity or the need principle), belief in a just world (Lerner, 1977, 1980), and social attitudes toward the disadvantaged. These background variables were expected to shape the appraisals of needs and problems encountered by the disadvantaged including appraisals of justice and responsibility.

The conceptual relations between the emotions and these predictors, as illustrated in Fig. 1, are briefly outlined.

On the basis of Hoffman's (1976) interpretation of the commitment of parts of the white middle-class academic youth to the civil rights movement in the 1960s, Montada *et al.*, (1986) proposed and corroborated empirically a cognitive model of *existential guilt.* Essentially, the same model was used to generate hypotheses guiding the present study. Existential guilt was anticipated as a consequence of two appraisals: (i) One's own advantages (relative to the less fortunate) are perceived as not being fully justified and deserved. Arguments minimizing the problems and needs of others, or suggesting that they are self-inflicted, or justifying one's own advantages as deserved, should interfere with the perception of injustice and, consequently, with existential guilt. (ii) One's own advantages are perceived to be interrelated with the disadvantages of others either in the sense of a causal connection, if they are considered to be based on the disadvantages of others, or in the sense that disadvantages of others could be reduced by giving away some of one's own advantages. Thus, existential guilt conceptually implies the perception of (i) profiting from advantages that are not fully deserved, and (ii) having at least some responsibility for the fate of the disadvantaged because of the interrelatedness of fates. These two appraisals were expected to depend partly on the background variables mentioned above: social attitudes toward the disadvantaged, belief in a just world, attitudes toward the rules of fair allocations. Positive attitudes and perceiving an allocation of goods according to the needs of recipients as just should dispose to guilt-related appraisals, whereas a preference for the equity principle and belief in a just world were expected to interfere with these.

Moral outrage because of unjust deprivations of the less fortunate also presupposes appraisals of injustice. In contrast to existential guilt, moral outrage does not represent a self-accusation but rather a reproach toward others who are blamed for the existence of the perceived injustice or who are held responsible for (re-)establishing justice. Again, a positive attitude toward the disadvantaged and a preference for the need principle are expected to be disposing



Fig. 1. Path model for the prediction of emotional reactions: Multiple effects of the predictors from one column to the next are hypothesized. Hypothetical paths are explained in the text but not illustrated in order to avoid confusion.

factors, preference for the equity principle and belief in a just world to be interfering ones.

Social attitudes expressing social distance or closeness and possibly perceived injustice of disadvantages may be considered potential predictors of sympathy for the needy. Conceptually, the perception of injustice is not a necessary antecedent for feeling sympathy with the distressed. However, if the needs and problems are perceived as self-inflicted, they would seem to be deserved, and that might interfere with the arousal of sympathetic distress; a hypothesis corroborated empirically (e.g., Piliavin *et al.*, 1969).

Anger implies an affective reproach (Averill, 1983) for having deviated from a social norm or disregarded an entitlement of the subject. Anger at the disadvantaged becomes likely when they are perceived as having self-inflicted their problems and needs or as not having tried hard enough to improve their lot (while claiming support). Negative attitudes toward the disadvantaged were considered background factors disposing to blame them and a preference for the equity principle providing arguments in support of the justice of the disadvantages. Belief in a just world was considered as a third background factor which is defended when the disadvantaged are blamed for having self-inflicted their lot.

Fear of losing one's own advantages presupposes at least two cognitive appraisals: perceiving that a danger or a loss is impending and that one's own capabilities are not sufficient to reliably avoid or master this danger (Lazarus *et al.*, 1970). While appraisals were not assessed explicitly in the present study, the perceived interrelatedness of one's own advantages and the disadvantages of others can be interpreted as the perception of an impending danger to lose some of one's own advantages when claims for reallocation are gaining ground. Negative social attitudes towards the disadvantaged may also function as a background variable since this kind of fear implies an egocentric concern.

Reacting with contentment when confronted with the hardships of others also reflects an egocentric perspective. It neither indicates problems with the perception that one is better off (as guilt does), nor does it indicate that the subject is affected by the misery of others (as sympathy and outrage do). A more elaborate cognitive model of this emotional reaction has yet to be proposed and none was tested in the present study. Social attitudes toward the disadvantaged were considered background variables: The more positive the attitudes the less contentment was anticipated.

Hopelessness was expected to result from the appraisal that there is no agent capable and/or willing to improve the fate of the disadvantaged, neither the disadvantaged themselves, nor the subject, nor others. These appraisals were not assessed in the present study. Nonetheless, hopelessness was included in order to explore its impact on prosocial commitment relative to the other emotional reactions assessed.

Motivational Impact of Emotions on Prosocial Commitments

The second research question concerns the motivational impact of the emotions on the readiness to make prosocial commitments to the disadvantaged. It is well documented throughout the research literature that various emotional states may have positive or negative effects on the probability of prosocial behavior (Rosenhan *et al.*, 1982). Far less evidence is available on whether different emotions are differentially predictive for prosocial commitment. In most previous studies emotional states were induced experimentally and, in many of them, not by confronting the subjects with the needy person who was the target of prosocial behavior. In the present questionnaire study, emotional reactions were assessed after having been confronted with the problems and needs of disadvantaged persons who were also the target of prosocial commitment.

At least three of the emotions assessed were expected to be positive predictors of prosocial commitment to supporting the disadvantaged and to improve their lot: guilt, sympathy, and moral outrage. There is much empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis: for sympathy as related to sympathetic distress (Hoffman, 1982) or empathy (Batson *et al.*, 1987) and for guilt (see Rosenhan *et al.*, 1982, Tobey-Klass, 1978). To our knowledge there are no empirical studies on the effects of moral outrage on prosocial commitment to the unjustly disadvantaged. Conceptually, it might seem self-evident that outrage may motivate altruistic actions, because it implies acknowledging the fact that there are victims whose entitlements are being violated. However, the target of outrage is not the victim but the transgressor who is responsible for the existing injustice, and, therefore, outrage might rather dispose a person to blaming the transgressor than to contribute to a compensation of the victim's disadvantage.

Further emotions assessed were also expected to interfere with the readiness to perform prosocial behavior. Anger at the disadvantaged disposes to blame and derogation and, consequently, should interfere with prosocial activities. In an attributional analysis, Ickes and Kidd (1976) argued that persons in need should be given less support if they appeared to have caused their misery themselves. Piliavin *et al.* (1969) reported empirical evidence in line with this hypothesis. Meyer and Mulherin (1980) tested the hypothesis that the attribution of self-infliction evokes anger at the victims instead of sympathy with them, and Bandura *et al.* (1975) observed that the derogation of victims disposes persons to punishment and interferes with prosocial commitment.

The effects of the fear of losing one's own advantages and of contentment with one's own situation are not easy to derive from the conceptual meaning of both of these emotions. Both reflect a dominant egocentric concern with one's own fate which may well interfere with other-centered altruistic actions. Rosenhan *et al.* (1982) summarized several pieces of evidence for the negative effects of negative emotions on prosocial behavior that may be understood as

effects of aroused self-concern. However, contentment could be viewed as a positive affect and positive affects (as induced, for instance, by success, good luck, reading "elating" books, etc.) dispose persons to prosocial activities compared to neutral moods or sadness (Isen, 1970; Rosenhan *et al.*, 1982). Fear of losing one's advantages could also mean a fear that a reallocation might be claimed by the disadvantaged and, thus, could also motivate some commitment in order to avoid a more radical social change. Thus, there are contradictory hypotheses and, therefore, the effects of these two emotions have to be tested empirically.

The premise that hopelessness interferes with prosocial commitments follows from basic assumptions of the theory of reasoned action: Actions are not expected to be initiated as long as there is no hope for at least some success.

Differential Impact of the Three Prosocial Emotions: Existential Guilt, Sympathy, and Moral Outrage

To our knowledge there are no studies comparing the relative impact on prosocial activities of the three prosocial emotions, sympathy, existential guilt, and moral outrage, as responses to unjust disadvantages. The present study contributes an answer to this question in the case of needy persons who the subject personally does not know and with whom the subject has no direct contact. Evidence of a different impact on prosocial commitment provides an opportunity to accentuate conceptual differences and to search for empirical indicators related to them.

Conceptually, the three prosocial emotions differ (i) in focus and (ii) with respect to appraisals of injustice and responsibility. The focus of sympathy is the distressed person, the focus of existential guilt is one's own advantage relative to the needs of others, and moral outrage focuses on the agent responsible for the unjust disadvantages. These differences in focus were formulated in the items used to assess these emotions. Thus, they were part of the assessment and could not be tested empirically. This could be done only by exploring their differential associations to appraisals of injustice and responsibility.

Although perceived injustice may facilitate the arousal of sympathy, it was not assumed to be a necessary component or prerequisite of sympathy whereas it definitely was necessary for existential guilt and moral outrage. And, although it is crucial for existential guilt to feel personal responsibility for the needy, this is not so for sympathy and moral outrage. Since perceived injustice as well as perceived responsibilities were assessed independently from the emotions, the present study can contribute empirical evidence regarding these conceptual differentiations. Responsibility was assessed (i) for the existence of

disadvantages, and (ii) for reducing these by supporting the needy and by helping to improve their lot.

The association between moral outrage and these appraisals of responsibility cannot be predicted definitely. Moral outrage implies the attribution of responsibility to a third party, an agent or an agency who is to blame for incorrect behavior or for having neglected a duty, e.g., to support the needy. However, moral outrage may also be associated with feeling a responsibility to engage personally in political actions aimed at reducing the disadvantages and to point to those who have the political responsibility and where resources to help the disadvantaged may be obtained. Thus, the relationship between outrage and responsibility had to be explored empirically.

Justice and Prosocial Commitments

As mentioned above, there are some hypotheses (Hoffman, 1987) and a few empirical findings (e.g., Piliavin *et al.*, 1969) indicating that perceived injustice motivates prosocial activities. Since several justice-related variables were assessed to help answer the question of what the impact of perceived justice or injustice on prosocial commitments is and how appraisals of justice are constructed, the present study could contribute empirical evidence on this issue.

The following justice-related variables were included in the study: appraisals of injustice; appraisals representing arguments to reduce injustice (self-infliction of the misery, minimization of disadvantages, justification of one's own advantages); background variables such as belief in a just world and perceived principles of just allocations (e.g., according to equity or need); and justice-related emotions (moral outrage, existential guilt, sympathy, and anger). Thus, we were able to attempt some empirical clarifications of the relations between these various levels of conceptualization and to test whether all of these contribute independently to the willingness to make prosocial commitments.

METHOD

Subjects

We attempted to recruit subjects with a privileged status with respect to education, wealth, or social security. Objectively, subjects should have been in a socially more favorable position than the three groups of disadvantaged persons addressed in the study.

The study was done in West Germany with 865 subjects. About 40% of the subjects were university students from various departments. The remaining

60% were selected randomly from registers with respect to wealth and social security (civil servants with tenure, business people and employers, and citizens living in relatively prosperous neighborhoods The age of the subjects ranged from 18 to 86 (mean: 36 years); 59% were male, 41% female; subjects with higher education were overrepresented (68% graduated from high school). The large sample permitted multivariate analyses of the large number of variables assessed.

Demographic Categories

Aside from the psychological variables described in this section, a large number of demographic variables were assessed. These included income and wealth, educational and occupational status, religious affiliations, attitudes toward political parties, memberships in political parties, etc. Although there were many meaningful differences between subjects belonging to different demographic categories, by and large the proportion of variance of the psychological variables bound or explained by demographic variables was not high. Since demographic variables are not the focus of this article, with one exception for the purpose of illustration, their content and assessment is not reported here.

Operationalization of Concepts

Variables Assessed with the Existential Guilt Inventory (ESI)

Many of the core variables were assessed by the Existential Guilt Inventory (ESI; Montada *et al.*, 1986). This inventory measures several appraising cognitions and emotional reactions by confronting the subject with written scenarios describing the problems and the misery of the disadvantaged. These included scenarios of (i) people out of work and unemployed adolescents who never had a job or received vocational training, (ii) poor people in the developing countries, and (iii) Turkish foreign workers living in West Germany. The problems presented included financial problems, insecurity concerning the future, bad and exploitative working conditions, inadequate medical care, poor housing, and loss of personal and social status. Three different scenarios were included for each group of disadvantaged persons.

One of the three scenarios describing problems and needs of the unemployed is given as an example:

> Imagine, that quite by chance you tune into a radio report on the consequences of unemployment. The reporter describes how bad most of the unemployed people feel about their situation. For example, a man approximately 40 years old stated: "I have learned my trade, I can take it up with anybody. But now I got pushed aside like a piece of mud. Friends and acquaintances shun me. After all, I have become a nobody. I cannot stand it any longer to hang around the house all day long. My wife, too, is nagging at

me constantly. The children no longer respect me. I think that everybody considers me a washout. The worst thing is having to go to the unemployment office again and again. It makes you feel like a beggar."

After presentation of each scenario in varying sequences, emotional and cognitive variables were assessed by preformulated statements expressing specific thoughts or feelings about the problems described in each scenario. Using 6-point rating scales, the subjects were asked to rate the degree to which these statements expressed their own thoughts or feelings ranging from *that is exactly what I'm thinking or feeling (1) to that is not at all what I'm thinking or feeling* (6). The items for the scenarios dealing with the unemployed are listed as examples.

Emotional reactions: *existential guilt* about one's own privileges relative to the privation of the disadvantaged ("Comparing my situation to that of the unemployed my conscience starts to bother me."); resentment of *moral outrage* because of the injustice of relative disadvantage for others ("I resent the fact that people have to suffer unjustly the consequences of unemployment."); *sympathy* for the disadvantaged ("Considering the situation of these people, I really feel sympathy for them."); *anger* at the disadvantaged ("I get angry at the fact that many unemployed people do absolutely nothing to solve their problems themselves."); *fear of losing one's own advantages* or about a possible deterioration of one's own situation ("Hearing about unemployment, I am afraid that someday my own situation could deteriorate, too."); *contentment* with one's own situation ("Realizing these problems I can really be satisfied with my own situation."); *hopelessness* concerning the likelihood that the situation of the disadvantaged will improve ("I have no hope that there will ever be any improvement in the problems of unemployment and its consequences.").

Cognitive appraisals: *perception of disadvantages* as self-inflicted ("Many of the unemployed people have caused their situation themselves."); *minimization of the disadvantages of the needy* ("I do not think one can generalize. Many unemployed people manage their situation pretty well."); *justification of one's own advantages* ("It is not just because of luck that I am better off, I really deserve what I have."); *perceived injustice of differences* between the quality of one's own life and the life of the group of disadvantaged people described in a scenario ("I think it is not fair that unemployed people should be that much worse off than myself."); *perception of an interrelatedness of fates*, that is, between one's own advantages and the problems of the disadvantaged ("My better situation and the situation of the unemployed are not really independent of one another."). This variable may mean the perception of implicit responsibility for the existing disadvantages of others.

Perceived responsibility to help the needy: Subjects were asked to rate how much they *felt own responsibility* to help ("Whenever I hear things like this, I feel it is somehow up to me to help solve the problems."); how much

they perceived powerful others and institutions to be responsible for help, e.g., state, government, trade unions (*attribution of responsibility to others*) ("It is the responsibility of governments and the economy to do more to reduce unemployment than they have done so far.").

Since there are three scenarios for each of the three disadvantaged groups in the ESI, the scores for each variable could be aggregated across the three items concerning each problem group or across all nine items. Psychometric criteria, including factor analysis and reliability estimates, were used to assess the adequacy of the aggregation of scores across items (Schneider, *et al.*, 1986).

Scales to Measure Background Variables

Aside from the ESI, additional variables were included in the study. They were assessed by several newly developed scales (Schneider *et al.*, 1986) including the following that were introduced above as background variables. Once again, the usual psychometric criteria were employed to establish homogeneity and internal consistency of the scales which were deemed adequate with respect to these criteria.

Justice-related variables: *Belief in a just world* was assessed on two levels of generality: General belief in a just world was assessed with a scale containing items which were formulated very generally (e.g., "I think that, in general, there is justice in the world."), while specific belief in a just world was assessed with a scale containing items specifically addressing the problems and needs of the three groups of disadvantaged persons in this study (e.g., "I think, there are no unjustified differences in wealth between the developing countries and the industrial nations."). These items also had to be rated on 6-point scales with the poles from *exactly* (1) to *not at all* (6). Data from several studies on the reliability and validity of both scales are summarized in Dalbert *et al.* (1987). As expected from both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence (Schmitt *et al.*, 1985), the area-specific scales for assessing belief in a just world as compared to the general scales and views on the equity and the need principle are more closely related to all other scales focusing the same areas and contents. Therefore, only the area-specific scales were included in the analyses for this article. Views on equity-related and need-related allocations were also assessed in both a general and a context specific form. Only the latter are reported here. Views on the equity principle of allocation were assessed with items like, "It is just that economy and government select the most efficient applicants when unemployment is high." Views on the need principle of allocation were assessed with items like, "It would be just if foreign workers were supported by an independent government office when looking for living quarters to avoid their being taken advantage of."

Social attitudes: Social attitudes were assessed in the form of attributions of positive and negative traits to each group of disadvantaged persons on 6-point rating scales, e.g., *Attribution of positive traits* to a group of disadvantaged persons ([e.g., "Among the Turkish foreign workers (1) almost all of them . . . (6) almost none of them are decent people."]; *Attribution of negative traits* to a group of disadvantaged persons [e.g., "Among the unemployed (1) almost all of them . . . (6), almost none of them are unwilling to work."].

Readiness to Make Prosocial Commitments

Questionnaires to assess respondent's readiness to make prosocial commitments included items concerning four categories of activities that would provide help to each of the three groups of disadvantaged persons. The categories were (i) spending money, (ii) signing a petition addressed to political leaders or institutions, (iii) participating in a demonstration, and (iv) joining an activity group. Each category was represented by two items for each of the three problem groups. Again, items were rated on 6-point scales.

Stability of Interindividual Differences

The analysis of empirical coefficients for interrelationships between variables requires information on the homogeneity and the internal consistency of the scales as well as on the stability of interindividual differences. Lack of stability of interindividual differences would have reduced relationships between variables. Stability of interindividual differences was assessed in a longitudinal replication of the study realized several months after the first one with about one half of the sample.

Establishing the External Validity of Self-Ratings

Since all data were based on self-ratings, it was necessary to test their external validity. Accordingly, a subsample was asked to name three persons (acquaintances, friends, relatives) who would be both willing and able to provide information about them. These raters were asked to imagine how the subject would answer some of the questions in the questionnaires. This way we were able to obtain external ratings on a selected set of core variables for 173 subjects. These were used to estimate the external validity of the self-ratings. Nearly 80% of the external raters (mostly friends and close relatives) stated that their acquaintance with the subjects was very good or good (on a 6-point scale ranging from very good to poor). Results are presented in Table I.

Table I. Correlations Between Subjects' Self-Report Scores and the Scores of External Raters ($173 \geq N \geq 75$; $p < 0.01$)

Variables	*r*
Selected ESI variables	
Existential guilt	.39
Minimization	.48
Self-infliction	.52
Perceived injustice	.49
Own responsibility	.51
Mean *r*	.48
Readiness to prosocial commitment in favor of	
Poor people in developing countries	.59
Turkish foreign workers	.29
Unemployed people	.35
Mean *r*	.41
Justice-related variables	
Belief in a just world (general)	.41
Belief in a just world (specific)	.36
Equity principle	.44
Need principle	.34
Positive attitudes toward the disadvantaged	.35
Negative attitudes toward the disadvantaged	.26
Mean *r*	.36

RESULTS

Stability of Interindividual Differences

The longitudinal replication revealed that the various emotional, motivational, cognitive, and behavioral variables were rather stable over time (Schneider *et al.*, 1987). Stability coefficients for the 15 variables assessed with the Existential Guilt Inventory ranged from $r = .73$ to $r = .85$ (mean: $r = .79$), for readiness to perform prosocial activities it was $r = .73$, for the background variables mentioned they were $r = .73$ (for general belief in a just world) and $r = .84$ (for specific belief in a just world), $r = .79$ for the need principle of allocation, $r = .90$ for the equity principle, $r = .68$ for positive attitudes toward the disadvantaged, and $r = .72$ for negative attitudes.

Although the overall stability was rather high, it was not perfect, indicating that there were subjects exhibiting more or less change on various variables. Analyses of these changes revealed meaningful patterns reflecting the dynamics of coping with relative differences in wealth and conditions of life (Montada *et al.*, 1989).

External Validity of Self-Report Data

Table I shows the correlations between subjects' scores on various scales and the scores external raters expected their reference subject to obtain. Even on an individual-item level of the ESI variables, correlations between self-ratings and external ratings ranged from r = .18 to .62, aggregrated over 6 items rated by each external rater and 9 items rated by the subjects correlations ranged from r = .39 ro r = .52. Correlations for the readiness to perform prosocial activities in favor of each of the three problem groups ranged from r = .29 to r = .59. The correlations for the background variables ranged from r = .26 to r = .44 (for more detailed information see Schneider *et al.*, 1987).

Considering the rather private nature of the feelings, attitudes, and cognitions assessed, the magnitude of these coefficients suggests that the self-rating scales had an adequate external validity, and allows the tentative conclusion that the responses were not entirely subjective and private but reflected a personal orientation that can be observed by others. Correlations between self-ratings and external raters were higher for poor people in the developing countries than for other groups on the variables assessing cognitions and feelings (r = .52) and the readiness to perform prosocial activities (r = .59), assumedly because there had been more occasions for external raters to observe subjects' opinions, emotions, and behaviors of such issues.

Moreover, taking external ratings as criteria and self-rating scores as predictors resulted in significant and meaningful patterns of relations (Montada and Schneider, 1989). Naturally, using subjects' self-report scores as criteria increased the total amount of explained variance: a mean of 49% for six criterion variables compared to a mean of 26% when external raters' scores were used.

Mean Ratings of Emotional Reactions, Group Differences, and Correlations Between Emotions

Mean ratings of emotional reactions are given in Table II. Note that the midpoint of all variables is 3.50. Scores higher than 3.50 indicate that the statements representing an emotion were more or less rejected as not reflecting the respondent's feelings. Values below 3.50 suggest that the item was rated as more or less corresponding to subject's personal feelings.

Ranking the different emotions according to mean ratings showed that contentment had the highest mean rating. This was followed by sympathy, moral outrage, hopelessness, guilt, and fear; anger at the disadvantaged was, on the average, the most rejected emotion.

Table II. Ranking of Emotional Reactions According to Mean Ratings for Subjects in the Whole Sample and in Three Subsamples with Different Political Orientation (According to Membership in Political Parties and Trade Unions)

Emotions (aggregated across items concerning all three groups of the disadvantaged)	Whole sample (862 > N > 823)		Members of conservative parties (42 > N > 41)		Members of the socialist party and the trade unions (40 > N > 37)		Members of "the Greens" (N = 13)	
	Rank	*M*	Rank	*M*	Rank	*M*	Rank	*M*
Contentment with own advantages	1	2.19	1	1.75	1	1.83	3	3.17[a]
Sympathy for disadvantaged people	2	2.35	2	2.37	2	2.19	2	2.53
Moral outrage about injustice	3	2.96	3	3.23[a]	3	2.61	1	2.32
Hopelessness with respect to the disadvantaged	4	3.15	4	3.24	4	2.94	4	3.27
Existential guilt	5	3.68	5	3.87	5	3.27	5	3.65
Fear of losing one's own advantages	6	3.79	6	4.12	6	3.67	6	3.81
Anger about the disadvantaged	7	4.40	7	4.21	7	4.60	7	5.02

[a]Significantly different from both of the other groups at the $p = 0.05$ level.

This ranking of emotional reactions to the problems of the disadvantaged turned out to be stable across many demographic categories. Yet, there were some meaningful and informative exceptions corroborating the validity of the assessment. Membership in political parties is given as an example for the purpose of illustration.

Members of the "Green" party, a rather radical party with an ecological orientation and left-wing concepts of justice, had a somewhat different mean rank order of emotional reactions to social deprivation than members of the established parties, the conservatives (CDU/CSU) and the socialists (SPD, trade unions). As Table II shows, contentment was significantly lower in the Greens compared to members of the established parties, and mean ratings of moral outrage were higher.

Note that the three prosocial emotions (existential guilt, sympathy, and moral outrage) are correlated substantially. Correlations between emotional reactions are reported in Table III.

Table III. Intercorrelations of the Seven Emotions (Aggregated Across All Groups of the Disadvantaged) Controlling for Social Desirability ($N = 779$, $p < 0.01$)

Emotions	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Existential guilt	–						
2. Sympathy	.50	–					
3. Moral outrage	.56	.66	–				
4. Anger at the disadvantaged	−.21	−.25	−.24	–			
5. Contentment	.14	.19	ns	.22	–		
6. Fear of losing one's own advantages	.29	.23	.30	.11	.10	–	
7. Hopelessness	.14	.09	.15	.11	.10	.30	–

Predicting Interindividual Differences in Emotional Reactions to the Disadvantaged

Data analyses were performed with the path model described in Fig. 1. Five appraisals of the problems and disadvantages of the needy were considered as proximal predictors: (i) perception of disadvantages as being self-inflicted (self-infliction), (ii) justification of one's own advantages (justif. advant.), (iii) minimization of the disadvantages of the needy (minim. disadvant.), (iv) perceived injustice of differences (unjust. diff.), and (v) perception of causal interrelatedness between one's own advantages and the disadvantages of the problem groups (causal interrel.).

The background variables were placed in the first column of the model as more distant predictors. These were the three justice-related variables: ratings on the justice of two allocation principles; the equity principle (equity) and the need principle (need); and belief in a just world (BJW); and the two attitudinal variables: positive attitudes towards disadvantaged (pos. attit.) and negative attitudes towards the disadvantaged (neg. attit.). Compared to the proximal predictors whose content was directly related to the problems described in the scenarios, the items for these predictors had more general content and were therefore placed before the proximal predictors.

Table IV presents the results of these path analyses. Individual scores were aggregated across all three groups of the disadvantaged in all variables; that is, analyses for each of the three problem groups are not reported individually.

Social desirability (assessed by a German version of the Crown-Marlowe Scale; Lück and Timaeus, 1969) was controlled by entering it as the first predictor in all path analyses. It had a few quantitatively small effects on some proximal predictors and on the emotions existential guilt and sympathy (see Tables IV and V).

The path analyses revealed that the predictors accounted for substantial parts of the variance of the seven emotions (ranging from $R^2 = .07$ for hopelessness to $R^2 = .73$ for anger at the disadvantaged). As most of the predictors

Table IV. Results of Path Analyses (Model Described in Fig. 1) for Predicting Seven Emotions (N = 783), Accepted Models ($p_{F_{total}} < 0.01$): Direct Effects of the Predictors ($p_{F_b} < 0.05$) Controlled for Social Desirability

Distal predictor	Proximal predictor	β	Unique determination[a]	Criterion (R^2)
Social desir.		.09	0.7	Existential
	Unjust diff.	.34	6.8	guilt (.32)
	Causal interrel.	.31	7.8	
Social desir.		.09	0.6	Sympathy
Equity		.23	2.0	(.43)
Need		.27	3.5	
Pos. attit.		.10	0.7	
	Minim. disadvant.	−.11	0.5	
	Unjust diff.	.36	6.4	
	Causal interrel.	.10	0.5	
Social desir.		.05	0.2	Moral outrage
Need		.16	1.2	(.49)
Pos. attit.		.11	0.9	
	Unjust diff.	.35	6.6	
	Causal interrel.	.24	3.2	
Social desir.		.03	0.1	Contentment
Equity		.16	0.8	(.30)
	Minim. disadvant.	.12	0.4	
	Justif. advant.	.33	3.0	
	Unjust diff.	.35	9.5	
Social desir.		.02	0.0	Anger (.73)
Equity		.13	0.5	
Need		.07	0.4	
BJW		.24	2.1	
Neg. attit.		.10	0.7	
	Self-infliction	.46	5.9	
	Justif. advant.	.08	0.2	
Social desir.		−.09	0.7	Fear (.17)
Neg. attit.		.09	0.5	
	Self-infliction	.22	3.1	
	Causal interrel.	.43	14.8	
Social desir.		−.03	0.1	Hopelessness
Equity		.12	0.5	(.07)
	Justif. advant.	.15	1.0	
	Causal interrel.	.26	5.2	

[a]Percentage of variance in criterion uniquely explained by each predictor (explained by the unique variance of this predictor not by the variance shared with other predictors), see text for methodological comments.

considered are related to justice, it was not surprising that the four emotions conceptually related to beliefs, views, and appraisals of justice (existential guilt, sympathy, moral outrage, and anger) were better predicted than the three that are unrelated to justice (hopelessness, contentment, and fear).

Table V. Results of Path Analyses (First Level of the Model Described in Fig. 1) for Predicting Five Proximal Variables (N = 783), Accepted Models ($p_{F_{total}} < 0.01$): Direct Effects of Predictors ($p_{F_b} < 0.05$) Controlled for Social Desirability

Predictor	β	Unique determination	Criterion (R^2)
Social desir.	.00	0.0	Self-infliction (.60)
Equity	.49	10.4	
BJW	.24	2.4	
Neg. attit.	.17	2.1	
Social desir.	.07	0.0	Justification of one's own
Equity	.56	13.0	privileges (.62)
BJW	.22	1.9	
Neg. attit.	.12	1.0	
Need	.07	0.4	
Social desir.	.04	0.0	Minimization of the dis-
Equity	.46	9.1	advantages (.64)
BJW	.30	3.9	
Neg. attit.	.13	1.3	
Social desir.	.13	1.2	Perceived injustice (.47)
Need	.45	13.8	
BJW	−.18	1.3	
Pos. attit.	.15	1.7	
Equity	−.10	0.5	
Social desir.	−.02	0.0	Perception of causal
Need	.48	17.5	interrel. (.44)
Equity	−.14	0.9	
BJW	−.15	0.9	

The information in Table IV and the following tables does not correspond to the usual pattern which informs one about R^2 change for each successively included predictor. Instead, we present the unique contributions of each of the significant predictors to the total variance of an emotion. The unique contribution of a specific predictor to the total variance of a criterion is given by the squared semipartial correlation coefficients (unique determination). This, however, is not necessarily identical to its total contribution to the prediction of a criterion variable.

If predictor variables are correlated, proportions of the variance in a criterion variable *uniquely* explained by each of the predictor variables do not add up to the total explained variance. This can be seen from Table IV. For example, 32% of the variance of existential guilt could be explained by its significant predictors, whereas the sum of their unique contributions amounted to 15.3% (0.7 + 6.8 + 7.8). This is because part of the variance a criterion shares with its predictors is common among the predictors themselves. In other words: The criterion correlates not only with the specific factors of the predictor variables but also with their common factor(s). There is no simple way to dis-

tribute this *common* predictive potential among the predictors, e.g., there are only theoretical but not methodological reasons for attributing this common predictive potential to just one of the predictors.

The occasionally striking differences in relative values between unique determination coefficients and beta coefficients (e.g., concerning the predictor "self-infliction" for the criterion "anger" in Table III) can be understood by remembering that semipartial correlation coefficients are based on the total variance of the criterion, whereas beta coefficients are based on the residual variance of the criterion after having partialled out all other significant predictors.

In general, the proximal predictors (appraisals) had higher betas and higher unique determination coefficients than the distal ones, but that distal predictors nonetheless had significant effects.

Moreover, they had indirect effects insofar as a significant portion of the variances of the proximal predictors was explained by the distal predictors (from $R^2 = .44$ to $R^2 = .64$). Belief in a just world as well as both allocation principles were salient background variables whereas the attitudinal variables had relatively little additional impact (see Table V).

Overall, the prediction patterns were as expected. The three prosocial

Table VI. Multiple Regression From Readiness to Perform Prosocial Activities on the Emotions (Aggregated Across All 9 Situations for All Three Groups of Disadvantaged People (N = 807))

Predictors	r_{crit}	β	b	F_b	Unique determination
Moral outrage	.53	.41	.36	135.99	11.4
Existential guilt	.44	.24	.20	47.97	4.0
Contentment	−.06	−.10	−.10	10.60	0.9
Hopelessness	−.01	−.10	−.10	10.53	1.3
(intercept)			2.57		
Multiple r =	.57				
R^2 =	.33				
F_{total} =	98.71	$p_F < 0.001$			

Contentment with one's own situation also seemed to have a somewhat contradictory set of predictors: Perceived injustice of differences combined with justfication of one's own advantages and preference for the equity principle which may have provided convincing arguments to consider one's own better life situation as deserved. These latter predictors may have represented the egocentric perspective implied in the emotion of contentment with one's own situation vis-à-vis the misery of others.

Conceptually, hopelessness is not related to the set of predictors used in this path analysis. Empirically, it is related significantly to justification of one's own advantages, interrelatedness of fates, and the equity principle. However, the amount of variance explained was very low (7%).

Predicting Willingness to Make Prosocial Commitments

The next question concerns the motivational impact of emotional reactions to disadvantages on prosocial commitments. In a first step, overall readiness to make prosocial commitments was predicted by the emotions assessed. The results of the multiple regression analyses of prosocial activities on all emotions are presented in Table VI.

An interpretation of Table VI reveals that moral outrage was the most powerful emotional predictor of readiness to prosocial commitment. This was followed by existential guilt. Sympathy did not contribute significantly to the prediction of the criterion variable. The prediction patterns for each of the three groups of disadvantaged were analyzed separately. These findings are not presented here. Basically, the prediction pattern did not change across the three groups.

Table VII presents corresponding data with respect to the four forms of activity (spending money, signing a petition, etc.). The data revealed that ex-

Table VII. Multiple Regression From Different Forms of Prosocial Activities on the Emotions (Aggregated Across All 9 Items for All Three Groups of Disadvantaged People; $791 \leq N \leq 799$), Accepted Models ($p_{F_b} \leq 0.01$)

Criterion	Predictors	r_{crit}	β	b	F_b	Unique determination
Spending money	Moral outrage	.42	.26	.26	34.84	3.4
	Existential guilt	.39	.25	.22	40.52	3.9
	Hopelessness	−.04	−.11	−.13	10.71	1.0
	Fear	.05	−.09	−.10	7.20	0.7
	Sympathy	.35	.09	.11	4.30	0.4
	(intercept)			2.80		
Multiple $R = .49$; $R^2 = .24$; $F_{total} = 49.35$; $p_{F_{total}} < 0.01$						
Signing a petition	Moral outrage	.50	.39	.44	114.79	10.2
	Anger	−.28	−.14	−.15	18.67	1.7
	Existential guilt	.38	.15	.15	16.31	1.4
	Contentment	−.09	−.08	−.11	6.78	0.6
	(intercept)			2.43		
Multiple $R = .54$; $R^2 = .30$; $F_{total} = 83.39$; $p_{F_{total}} < 0.001$						
Participation in a demonstration	Moral outrage	.44	.35	.39	84.02	8.1
	Contentment	−.13	−.16	−.21	26.54	2.6
	Existential guilt	.33	.14	.15	13.18	1.3
	Fear	.20	.07	.09	4.00	0.4
	(intercept)			2.67		
Multiple $R = .48$; $R^2 = .23$; $F_{total} = 60.35$; $p_{F_{total}} < 0.001$						
Activity within a group	Moral outrage	.38	.26	.28	45.24	4.7
	Existential guilt	.35	.20	.20	25.21	2.6
	Hopelessness	.01	−.09	−.12	6.93	0.7
	Fear	.19	.08	.09	4.64	0.5
	(intercept)			2.27		
Multiple $R = .43$; $R^2 = .19$; $F_{total} = 44.91$; $p_{F_{total}} < 0.01$						

istential guilt, compared to moral outrage, was more salient for the less political activities (spending money and participating in an activity group) than for the typically political activities of signing a petition or participating in a demonstration. The opposite is true for moral outrage: This had the highest unique determination coefficients predicting the two political activities.

Sympathy gained a higher predictive value only when moral outrage and existential guilt were not included in the analyses. However, in this case, the proportion of explained criterion variance was substantially lower, indicating that sympathy could not replace outrage and guilt as predictors.

Table VIII. Partial Correlation Coefficients of the Three Prosocial Emotions Existential Guilt, Sympathy, and Moral Outrage with Three Responsibility Variables ($N = 818$)

Prosocial emotion[a]	Causal interrelatedness of fates	Attribution of responsibility for support of the needy	
		To oneself	To powerful others
Existential guilt	.26	.43	$-.04^b$
Moral outrage	.32	.26	.20
Sympathy	$.02^b$	.16	.20

[a]The other two prosocial emotions are partialled out.
[b]$p > 0.01$.

Differential Responsibility Associations of the Three Prosocial Emotions

Conceptually, the three prosocial emotions (existential guilt, sympathy, and moral outrage) have a different focus (on oneself, on unfortunate other, or on a third agent). They were also expected to differ with respect to the attribution of responsibility (i) for the existence of disadvantages and (ii) for supporting the disadvantaged and improving their lot. This latter assumption could be tested with three of the ESO variables: (i) causal interrelatedness of fate and (ii) attribution of responsibility to provide support for the needy to oneself or to powerful others (Table VIII).

Since guilt, sympathy, and outrage are intercorrelated, zero-order correlations are less adequate than partial correlations between each emotion and the responsibility variables after the other two emotions have been partialled out.

As expected, existential guilt and moral outrage were substantially related to causal interrelatedness of fates, whereas sympathy was not. Also as expected, existential guilt was substantially related to the tendency to attribute responsibility for support to oneself. It was not related to attributions of responsibility for support to others, while both sympathy and outrage were.

Justice and Prosocial Commitment

The impact of justice on prosocial commitment can be derived from a joint inspection of Tables IV, V, VI, and VII evidencing that justice-related appraisals, beliefs, views, and emotions had either direct or indirect effects on the readiness to perform prosocial activities. The relative impact of these variables was tested more directly by a multiple regression analysis from prosocial

Table IX. Multiple Regression From Prosocial Commitment on All Emotions and All Variables Used as Predictors of Emotions Represented in Fig. 1. (Aggregated Across All Groups of the Disadvantaged) ($N = 770$, $p_{F_b} < 0.01$)

Predictors	r_{crit}	β	b	F_b	Unique determination	F_{total}	R	R^2
Moral outrage	.50	.25	.21	38.22	3.2		.501	.251
Need principle	.47	.21	.29	32.28	2.8		.549	.301
Positive attitudes	.36	.13	.18	14.23	1.2		.562	.315
Existential guilt	.41	.14	.11	14.11	1.2	< 0.01	.573	.328
(intercept			1.28					

Table X. Multiple Regression From Willingness to Execute Prosocial Activities on Justice-Related Appraisals, Beliefs, and Views and to the Justice-Related Emotions Existential Guilt, Moral Outrage, Anger, Sympathy (Aggregated Across Items Concerning All Three Groups of Disadvantaged people) ($N = 807$, $p_{F_b} \leq 0.05$)

Predictors	r_{crit}	β	b	F_b	Unique determination
Moral outrage	.53	.24	.20	34.66	2.7
Need principle	.48	.16	.21	16.44	1.3
Existential guilt	.45	.17	.14	24.53	1.9
Equity principle	−.33	−.21	−.21	28.63	2.2
BJW	−.22	.16	.18	16.93	1.3
Perceived injustice	.49	.13	.16	10.32	0.8
(intercept)			1.78		

Multiple $R = .62$; $R^2 = .38$; $F_{total} = 81.84$; $p_{F_{total}} < 0.01$.

activities on all these variables. To test the relative impact of justice-related variables and of social attitudes, the latter were also included in the set of predictors. The results are reported in Table IX.

Four variables had significant, independent, positive effects. Three of these were justice-related: moral outrage and existential guilt as well as views on the need principle. Positive attitudes toward the disadvantaged also had positive effects. However, justice-related variables had a greater weight.

To test the relative contribution of justice-related appraisals, beliefs, and views vs. justice-related emotions (moral outrage, existential guilt, sympathy, and anger at the disadvantaged), a multiple regression analysis was performed on these predictors. Table X shows that all kinds of variables (appraisals, background variables, and emotions) contributed to the prediction.

Interestingly, the effect of belief in a just world was a positive one, in spite of the fact that the bivariate correlation was negative ($r = -.22$). Thus, when other predictors were partialled out, the residual of BJW had a positive effect on prosocial commitment. This was a stable result which was replicated in the longitudinal follow-up (Montada and Schneider, 1988).

DISCUSSION

The findings from the present multivariate study are discussed under the following headings: (i) the usefulness of cognitive models in the analysis of emotions, and (ii) the impact of (in)justice on prosocial emotions and on the willingness to engage in prosocial activities on behalf of various groups of disadvantaged persons. The first is a comment on the way the analysis of emotions was approached, the second is a discussion of some findings of the present study that are not trivial.

Using Cognitive Models of Emotions

How have we used cognitive models of emotions? In the cognitive modeling of emotions, it is assumed that specific emotions depend (or presuppose or imply) specific cognitions. For instance, existential guilt presupposes (i) the perception of one's own relative advantages that are (ii) not perceived as fully justified and deserved. Other components of a cognitive model may also be conceived: (iii) There is an interrelatedness between one's own advantages and the disadvantages of others, e.g., the wealth of the industrialized world is partly a result of the exploitation of the Third World; (iv) a reallocation is possible, e.g., prices for raw materials imported from the developing countries could be raised; (v) the disadvantaged are members of one's own community (Deutsch, 1985) in which rules of justice and solidarity have to be observed (Montada *et al.*, 1986).

In what respect are such models useful? The cognitive model draws the attention to every component and generates questions to these. We can ask, for instance, as we did in the present study: Who are the subjects, who will have difficulty in justifying their own advantages as deserved? It is unlikely to be those who believe the world is a just one where everybody gets what they deserve (Lerner, 1977) but most likely those who prefer the need principle for a just allocation of goods. Or let us ask another question: Relative to which group of disadvantaged people does a subject experience existential guiltcertai? It is most likely to be those who are close to the subject, or, in Lerner's terms, who are in an identity relation (Lerner and Whitehead, 1980). Social attitudes or social distance scales might give hints to the closeness or distance, or even answer the qustion who is inside or outside one's own community or solidarity group. Another question could be: Which goods are likely to generate existential guilt? There are goods that are easy to reallocate, e.g., money, others where more restraints can be observed, e.g., jobs, and still others, e.g., beauty, charm, or ethnic or familial background which cannot be distributed at all.

Cognitive models are a mine of empirically testable hypotheses, and, moreover, of ideas on how to arouse and how to change emotions (Montada, 1989).

Justice and Emotions Toward the Disadvantaged

It has to be admitted that for the present study we did not use a complete cognitive model of any of the emotions assessed. We only used some of the components of the models for existential guilt, for moral outrage because of unjust disadvantages, and for anger about the needy. Aside from the attribution of responsibility, we were mainly interested in the impact of appraisals of justice and injustice and in the background principles that are assumed to shape these appraisals: belief in a just world and views about different allocation principles.

The findings support our opinion that cognitive models are useful, and they correspond to the hypotheses derived from these models:

1. Appraisals of injustice, self-infliction of needs, deservedness of one's own advantages, denial or minimization of needs, and stating an interrelatedness of fates substantially depend on belief in a just world and views on the equity and the need principle of allocation (see Table V). The effects of social attitudes are surprisingly weak and they do not add much to the prediction of these appraisals.

2. Justice-related appraisals predict a substantial proportion of the variance of those emotional reactions to the needs of the disadvantaged that are related conceptually to justice (existential guilt, moral outrage, sympathy, and anger). Other emotions, which conceptually do not have a compelling relation to justice (hopelessness, fear of losing one's own advantages, and contentment), are predicted far less well.

3. The sets of predictors are meaningful: For example, it makes sense for existential guilt to be predicted by the perceived injustice of differences and by the perceived interrelatedness of one's own advantages and the disadvantages of others, and it makes sense that fear of losing one's own advantages is equally associated with the perceived interrelatedness of fates; but when such a fear exists, this predictor is not combined with perceived injustice but with perceiving needs as being self-inflicted by the needy.

4. The justice-related background factors not only have indirect effects on emotions mediated by appraisals of the situation but also have some direct effects. Again, social attitudes do not add as much to the variance of emotions as criterion variables.

Predicting Prosocial Commitment

Concerning the impact of emotions on prosocial commitment the discussion focuses on the unexpected finding that sympathy contributes hardly any-

thing to the prediction of prosocial commitment: The salient predictors are moral outrage because of unjust disadvantages and existential guilt.

The finding that sympathy is not a particularly powerful predictor of prosocial commitment for the disadvantaged is surprising, since everyday experience and common sense, as well as experimental research on prosocial behavior, emphasize the importance of empathy. Why is this not supported in the present study?

Considering differentiations made between real empathic concern for others and personal distress aroused by the observation of distress (Archer *et al.*, 1981; Batson and Coke, 1981) one could ask whether sympathy as assessed in this study corresponds to the first or the second of these concepts. Only the first is related to helping and caring.

The contents of the items used in the questionnaires represent the first concept of other-centered empathic concern, and a glance at the bivariate correlations between sympathy and readiness to make prosocial commitments supports the usual view and expectation: partial $r = .37$ (social desirability partialled out). This coefficient is not much lower than the coefficients for existential guilt ($r = .41$) and moral outrage ($r = .51$). In contrast, multiple regression from readiness to make prosocial commitment on all emotions as predictors shows that the independent, additional contribution of sympathy is not significant (see Table VI). Why is this so? To our knowledge, there are no other studies that include independent assessments of sympathy (or empathy) as well as of guilt and moral outrage. Consequently, it has not been possible so far to discover the independent contributions of these emotions to prosocial behavior. As they are correlated (see Table III), the effect of any of these emotions may be understood as representing not only its own unique effect but also the effect of that proportion of the variance shared with the two other emotions. Usually only empathy is assessed. The impact of the unique variance of sympathy may only be tested after the shared variance of existential guilg and moral outrage has been partialled out.

The rather low independent contribution of sympathy to the variance of readiness to make prosocial commitments may be considered a valid result that was replicated in the longitudinal study.

Differentiation of the Three Prosocial Emotions: Sympathy, Existential Guilt, and Moral Outrage

Interestingly, and unexpectedly, moral outrage turns out to be a better predictor of prosocial commitment than existential guilt. Based on our conceptual analysis, we expected that outrage would primarily motivate the blaming of agents who have deviated rules or justice or who have neglected their respon-

sibilities toward the needy. However, at least half of the prosocial activities we asked for in the questionnaire actually have a political orientation: claiming support for the disadvantaged, blaming political and economic leaders, etc. Outrage was expected to motivate such political activities. But moral outrage also predicts the spending of money for charitable goals only.

We expected that existential guilt would contribute most to the prediction of prosocial commitments. However, this was only true for another set of prosocial commitments asked for in a different questionnaire that was used for exploring subjects' appraisals of unemployment and their willingness to contribute to the creation of new jobs by sacrificing a few hours of their own work each week without a full compensation of wages or by agreeing to freeze wages for a certain period of time (Montada and Schneider, 1988). For these sacrifices, existential guilt toward the unemployed was the only emotion reaching significance in multivariate analyses (r = .23).

In general, justice-related emotions as well as justice-related appraisals, beliefs, and views make up the largest part of the explained variance of prosocial commitment. Two emotions (moral outrage and existential guilt), views on the need principle, and positive social attitudes have significant effects in multiple regression analyses of the readiness to make prosocial commitments on all emotions as well as on the appraisals and background variables represented in the path model in Fig. 1.

The justice-related predictors explain far more of the variance of prosocial commitment than social attitudes.

The last comment is an *apercu* for belief in a just world, as this changes its relation to prosociality when moving from a bivariate to a multivariate analysis.

What does it mean? Belief in a just world either motivates a cognitive interpretations of the world to make it more just, or it motivates a behavioral commitment to restore justice. If the cognitive restructuring is partialled out, the residual of the variable has this positive effect on prosocial commitment. This is very very much in line with the analysis of motivational construct given by Lerner (1977).

Why does sympathy fail to gain more independent predictive power? Explanations can be derived from (i) analyses of the relation between sympathy and the perceived entitlements of the needy and (ii) analyses of the relation between sympathy and felt responsibility for the disadvantaged.

Although both existential guilt and moral outrage conceptually depend on recognition of unjust allocations (and, by implication, recognition of the entitlements of the needy), the concept of sympathy does not. Conceptually, sympathy may be aroused even when the needy are not preceived as having a right to get help. Although the conceptual assumptions are clearly supported for guilt and outrage, there are only some hints that the conceptual difference

between these emotions and sympathy may be valid. Sympathy, like guilt and outrage, correlates with the perception that differences are unjust. However, in contrast to existential guilt and moral outrage, sympathy related positively not only to the need principle but also to the equity principle (see Table IV). This may mean that some individuals with high scores on sympathy are experiencing a conflict when they apply both the need and the equity principle, with the latter disposing to a view about (in)justice that counterbalances the former. Whereas applying the need principle should lead to the acceptance of an entitlement of the disadvantaged, applying the equity principle does not.

Moreover, perception of interrelatedness betwen one's own advantages and the disadvantages of the needy is not predictive for sympathy (provided that guilt and outrage are partialled out from the variance of sympathy, see Table VIII). This was further corroborated by LISREL analyses (Montada and Schneider, 1988). We propose the following interpretation: Unlike guilt and moral outrange, sympathy is not based on perceiving one's own advantages as contributing to the existence of needs and problems of the disadvantaged. Consequently, their entitlements are less likely to be perceived as addressed to oneself.

To this line of interpretation the fact fits well that sympathy compared to existential guilt is far less closely related to felt own responsibility for supporting the disadvantaged. Instead, it is somewhat more strongly related to attributing responsibility to powerful others (see Table VIII).

This pattern for sympathy is corroborated by a factor analysis of all items of the Existential Guilt Inventory not reported here in detail (see Schneider *et al.*, 1987). In a six-factor solution, sympathy formed one factor with the variable "attribution of responsibility to others." This factor remained stable and was even more pronounced in the longitudinal replication. In summary, sympathy seems to be associated with a tendency to attribute responsibility to support the disadvantaged to others rather than to oneself. If entitlements are acknowledged at all, they are perceived as addressed more toward powerful others than toward oneself. This interpretation of sympathy was even more clearly corroborated empirically in a previously study (Montada *et al.*, 1986).

This interpretation may explain the relatively small independent contributions of sympathy to the variance of the readiness to perform prosocial behavior. In contrast to existential guilt and moral outrage, sympathy does not seem to imply a personal norm in the sense of felt obligation (Schwartz, 1977) to be committed to more justice or a reallocation of goods. Readiness to perform prosocial activities substantially depends on the appraisal of the rights and entitlements of the needy.

It is not sympathy but the "moral" emotions of moral outrage and existential guilt that predict prosocial commitment. These seem to be much more urging in terms of motivating the reduction of injustice.

Maybe this finding cannot be generalized to needy people in closer relationships. The needy in the present study are not personally known or personally contacted. This may be why granting help or support is more a matter of morality than of sympathy. In very close relationships we do not expect appraisals of justice to play a dominant role in helping, sharing, and caring. Sympathy and love may be sufficient.

CONCLUSION

Emotional reactions to social differences depend on one's definition of a social situation. Definition of social life as competition between all members of society or giving priorty to "justified" self-interest should probably lead to satisfaction with the attainment of a privileged status. When the less fortunate are included in one's own community of responsibility, then a privileged status can be expected to be perceived as problematic.

Although the study was conceived broadly, many questions were either not addressed or could be addressed only partially. For example, we could gain only marginal information on the influence of traitlike variables, such as generalized control beliefs or generalized anxiety.

More broadly conceived value systems were not included. Apart from general belief in a just world, we have no information on a subject's world views. It should make a difference, e.g., when applying allocation principles, whether the leading world view is one of competition between states, groups, and individuals, or one of solidarity (Deutsch, 1985), or whether one's environment and fate seem to be controllable or not, or whether the future is perceived optimistically or pessimistically.

Thus, we might consider that further background variables have an impact on the construction of a concrete view of social situations. But to us it seems clearly evidenced in the present study that cognitive and emotional appraisals of justice and resonsibility are important facets of such constructions.

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