

# Upside-Down Meta-Interpretation of the Model Elimination Theorem-Proving Procedure for Deduction and Abduction<sup>★</sup>

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**Abstract.** Typical bottom-up, forward-chaining reasoning systems such as hyperresolution lack goal-directedness, while typical top-down, backward-chaining reasoning systems like Prolog or model elimination repeatedly solve the same goals. Reasoning systems that are goal-directed and avoid repeatedly solving the same goals can be constructed by formulating the top-down methods meta-theoretically for execution by a bottom-up reasoning system (hence, we use the term upside-down meta-interpretation). This formulation also facilitates the use of flexible search strategies, such as merit-ordered search, that are common to bottom-up reasoning systems. The model elimination theorem-proving procedure, its extension by an assumption rule for abduction, and its restriction to Horn clauses are adapted here for such upside-down meta-interpretation. This work can be regarded as an extension of the magic-sets or Alexander method for query evaluation in deductive databases to both non-Horn clauses and abductive reasoning.

**Key words.** Caching, abduction, meta-interpretation, model elimination.

## 1. Introduction

Bottom-up, forward-chaining reasoning systems derive new facts from already established ones. The implication  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  is interpreted procedurally by such systems to derive the fact  $C$  from the facts  $A_1, \dots, A_m$ . Hyperresolution [41, 51] is a typical bottom-up reasoning system. Top-down, backward-chaining reasoning systems, on the other hand, derive new subgoals from existing goals. The implication  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  is interpreted procedurally by such systems to derive each of the subgoals  $A_1, \dots, A_m$  from the goal  $C$ . Ordered input resolution (for Horn clauses, used by Prolog) and the model elimination procedure [23, 24] (for arbitrary clauses, used by the Prolog Technology Theorem Prover (PTTP) [46]) are typical top-down reasoning systems. We assume the reader is already familiar with these inference procedures.

Both bottom-up and top-down methods have well-known weaknesses. Bottom-up reasoning is often not goal-directed. For example, if the initial goal is translated for refutation into a negative clause, hyperresolution can use the goal only in the final step of a proof. Nevertheless, simply using a bottom-up reasoning method is often

the right approach. For example, group theory or condensed detachment problems benefit little from a top-down approach, since irrelevant axioms are absent and top-down reasoning quickly produces very general goals that fail to constrain the search. On the other hand, in deductive database, logic programming, and artificial intelligence applications, the lack of goal-directedness of pure bottom-up reasoning is a crucial defect. In principle, such reasoning would require enumeration of all consequences of the axioms until a fact matching the query is derived, a foolish approach in the presence of many irrelevant axioms.

The major problem with top-down reasoning is that it often results in goals being derived and proved more than once, which may result in large, redundant search spaces. For example, when Prolog tries to prove  $P \wedge Q$ , backtracking search will cause it to try to prove  $Q$  once for every proof of  $P$  it finds. This repeated work can be extraordinarily costly. Intelligent backtracking (e.g., see ref. [22]) can reduce the problem but not eliminate it. Redundancy can also occur in bottom-up methods as facts are derived more than once. However, there the redundancy is controlled by subsumption, which deletes duplicate or less general facts. Although methods such as subsumption are costly and can drastically reduce the rate of inference, reduced size of the search space often compensates for the lower inference rate.

A second problem with top-down reasoning systems is that they typically have much less flexibility in specifying order of search than bottom-up reasoning systems. Prolog and PTTP, for example, use depth-first search with backtracking for an efficient implementation with minimal storage requirements by representing only the goals on a single branch of the search space at a time; this, however, makes it impossible to direct search by jumping to a more favorable branch. Hyperresolution, on the other hand, can maintain a list of facts in order of preference for inference. Lack of control over search is not a necessary limitation of top-down reasoning systems, but rather an observation about typical ones. It is thus possible to adapt either bottom-up or top-down reasoning methods to produce a goal-directed reasoning system with a nonredundant search space and a flexible search strategy. We choose to adapt bottom-up reasoning methods because their implementations appear to be closer to this ideal already. Hyperresolution is a prototypical bottom-up reasoning system for which there are effective methods for controlling redundancy (subsumption) and ordering the search space (merit-ordered search). As we shall see, it is feasible to make this bottom-up reasoning method more goal-directed.

The approach we adopt is basically an extension of the magic-sets [4, 49] or Alexander [42] method for query evaluation in deductive databases. We translate Horn clauses similarly to the magic-sets or Alexander method, and then extend the translation to abductive reasoning and non-Horn clauses.

The extension to non-Horn clauses is based on the model elimination theorem-proving procedure. Model elimination is a complete theorem-proving procedure for the full first-order predicate calculus that possesses the desirable properties of linear proofs, literal ordering, set of support, and no need for factoring. PTTP's

implementation of the model elimination procedure has a high inference rate with minimal storage requirements. The largest problem with model elimination and PTPP is the failure to control search-space redundancy. Here, we demonstrate how, while unfortunately sacrificing PTPP's implementation approach with its high inference rate and minimal storage requirements, we can make search much less redundant by means of upside-down meta-interpretation, that is, by executing the top-down model elimination procedure by a bottom-up reasoning system.

Our approach is to start with top-down, backward-chaining input resolution and translate the clauses for execution by a bottom-up reasoning system such as hyper-resolution. Instead of a goal-subgoal tree being created, literals of the form  $goal(G)$  are derived. Use of the implication  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  to derive the fact  $C$  from facts  $A_1, \dots, A_m$  is made dependent on the existence of  $goal(C)$  by use of the translated clause  $goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1) \wedge \dots \wedge fact(A_m) \rightarrow fact(C)$ . The translation is extended to impose a requirement of left-to-right solution, as in Prolog and the model elimination procedure. In many cases, this can substantially reduce the search space as solutions for earlier goals instantiate later goals.

The model elimination procedure augments input resolution with an additional inference rule that allows solving a goal by unifying it with the complement of an ancestor goal. For the model elimination procedure, goal literals are augmented with information about the ancestor goals of the goal; fact literals are augmented with information about what ancestor goals must be present to solve a goal that matches the fact.

Abductive reasoning (abduction) is becoming an important application of extended Prolog and model elimination systems. Abduction extends deduction to the case of partial proofs with assumptions that, if they could be proved, would allow a proof to be completed. We extend our translation method to abduction. The added possibility in abduction of assuming as well as proving formulas makes the search space for abduction problems larger than for deduction problems with the same axioms. This, plus the fact that many applications of abduction demand rich knowledge bases with many irrelevant clauses, means that there may be an even bigger payoff for this method in the case of abduction than deduction.

Clauses used in Prolog and model elimination inference are translated for execution by a bottom-up reasoning system using meta-predicates  $goal$ ,  $fact$ , and  $cont$  (for 'continuations', which concisely encode what goals we are trying to solve, which of their subgoals have been solved, and which subgoals remain). New facts, goals, and continuations are derived by bottom-up inference in a faithful encoding of the Prolog or model elimination search tree, possibly in a different order depending on the chosen search strategy, and with redundant subtrees eliminable by the reuse of facts derived earlier and by subsumption. The time complexity in the worst case, when there is no eliminable redundancy, should be the same order as that of Prolog or model elimination when the model elimination search strategy is imitated (a three-fold increase in length of the proof may occur, as a single literal in the search tree may be represented by  $goal$ ,  $fact$ , and  $cont$  literals in the encoding). In the case of

Horn clauses, the procedure closely resembles hyperresolution in behavior, except that hyperresolution operations are allowed only if they derive a fact that matches a top-down derived goal.

Because this method is a new approach to implementing standard theorem-proving procedures (Prolog, model elimination, and their extensions for abduction) instead of a new theorem-proving procedure, we will omit soundness and completeness results. The benefit of the new approach in eliminating redundancy should be obvious. Gains from eliminating redundancy can be arbitrarily large.

In Section 2 we recount past approaches to the problem of redundancy in the model elimination procedure and cite their disadvantages, which are absent from the new approach. In Section 3 we describe upside-down meta-interpretation of Prolog-style deduction with Horn clauses. This, except for the remarks on generalizing subsumption and generalizing derived facts, is essentially the magic-sets or Alexander method. In Section 4 the method is extended to abduction by allowing conditional facts accompanied by assumptions sufficient to establish them. In Section 5 the method for abduction with Horn clauses is transformed by different handling of assumptions into a method for upside-down meta-interpretation of model-elimination-style deduction with non-Horn clauses. Deduction with non-Horn clauses is then extended to abduction with non-Horn clauses in Section 6. Related work is described in Section 7.

## 2. Other Methods for Eliminating Redundancy

There are several other approaches to eliminating redundancy in model elimination and similar procedures. Factoring is the earliest method for eliminating duplicate goals and is required for completeness in many resolution procedures, though not for Prolog or model elimination. It is clearly beneficial and can be made mandatory in the propositional case. However, in the first-order case, when goals must be unified during factoring, factoring must be optional, and proofs with and without the goals factored must both be sought. This results in an increase in the breadth of the search space; the depth of the search space is reduced in compensation only if a shorter proof can be found with factoring than without, which is too rarely the case. Unifying goals often results in clauses that are overinstantiated and not usable in a proof.

The graph construction procedure [44] adds the C-reduction operation to the model elimination procedure. C-reduction resembles factoring except that it unifies an unproved goal with a proved goal instead of another unproved goal. This is an improvement because unprovable goals are never factored. For example, if a pair of factorable goals do not happen to have a common provable instance, factoring them will ultimately result in failure. If, as in the graph construction procedure, it is necessary for one to be proved before being factored with the other, the goals will no longer be factorable after one of them is instantiated by its proof.

Both factoring and C-reduction affect only the descendants of the factored clause.

Information about provable goals is not made available elsewhere in the search space. Lemmas [23, 24] are extra clauses derivable by the model elimination procedure that contain proved goals. They are not required for completeness, but their use can shorten proofs by matching a goal with a lemma instead of reproving it. Unlike factoring and C-reduction, lemmas are available throughout the search space after they are derived, not just in descendant clauses. However, like factoring and C-reduction, lemmas increase the breadth of the search space, by allowing proofs from lemmas as well as axioms. Lemmas in the model elimination procedure save information about successful but not unsuccessful proof attempts. There nevertheless is the obvious notion of ‘failure lemmas’ – remembered goals that could not be proved. Lemmas have been used in database query evaluation [6, 13, 48] methods and in other theorem-proving procedures [14, 29, 34]. Use of lemmas has often been called caching, although we prefer to use that term for a slightly different concept.

Caching is the most complete approach for eliminating redundancy in top-down reasoning systems. By saving goals as well as solutions, caching can record information about both success and failure. In a depth-bounded reasoner like PTTP, the cache would contain goals and associated depth bounds asserting that the cache contains all solutions to the goal discoverable with that depth bound. When attempting to prove a goal with a depth bound, if the goal or a more general one with the same or greater depth bound is stored in the cache, solutions are retrieved from the cache instead of being searched for by backward chaining. The difference between lemmas and caching is that lemmas are treated as extra axioms and broaden the search while caching replaces the search for solutions of a goal by cache lookup. Only caching of the methods we have described uniformly replaces search instead of adding alternatives to it in the hope of finding a shorter proof. Caching can easily reduce the size of the search space even if the proof found is not shorter. Many successful experiments with lemmas and caching are reported on in [1, 2].

Caching will surely be more complicated and less effective for the full model elimination procedure than for the Prolog subset on which it has been successfully tested. In the full procedure, solutions to a goal no longer depend on the goal formula alone, but also on its ancestor goals. Even if goals recur frequently, they may rarely recur with a set of ancestor goals that can be found in the cache. A refinement of the model elimination procedure that uses negative but not positive ancestor goals may make looking up solutions in the cache succeed more frequently [35], but probably still not often enough. Although caching can eliminate redundant search, it can contribute little to solving the other problem of top-down reasoning systems, the inflexibility of their search strategy.

### 3. Deduction with Horn Clauses

A Horn-clause problem is composed of a set of facts  $F$ , a set of rules  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  with  $m \geq 1$ , and a goal  $G$ , where  $F$ ,  $A_i$ ,  $C$ , and  $G$  are all atomic formulas. Requiring the goal to be atomic is not a significant restriction. A

conjunctive goal  $G_1 \wedge \dots \wedge G_n$  can be converted into the rule  $G_1 \wedge \dots \wedge G_n \supset G$  for atomic goal  $G$ .

A rule  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  can be interpreted in top-down or bottom-up fashion. The top-down interpretation is

From the goal  $C$  derive the goals  $A_1, \dots, A_m$ .

A problem is solved when one can recursively derive from the goal  $G$  a set of sub-goals all of which match initial facts  $F$ . Input resolution, as in Prolog, is a standard top-down reasoning method. The bottom-up interpretation is

Derive the fact  $C$  from the facts  $A_1, \dots, A_m$ .

A problem is solved when a fact matching the goal  $G$  is derived from the initial facts  $F$ . Hyperresolution, for example, is a standard bottom-up reasoning method.

In the following, we assume a bottom-up reasoning system such as hyperresolution with subsumption. The rule  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \rightarrow C$  is interpreted as: if  $A_1, \dots, A_m$  are present, then  $C$  can be derived.<sup>1</sup> The separate roles of an atomic formula  $L$  as a fact or goal will be distinguished by putting  $L$  as an argument of the *fact* or *goal* metapredicate.

Top-down and bottom-up interpretations of  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  are expressed by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{goal}(C) &\rightarrow \text{goal}(A_1) \\ &\vdots \\ \text{goal}(C) &\rightarrow \text{goal}(A_m) \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\text{fact}(A_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{fact}(A_m) \rightarrow \text{fact}(C),$$

respectively.

We now connect the *goal* and *fact* rules. The *fact* rule can be modified and used in conjunction with the *goal* rules to provide bottom-up execution with top-down filtering:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{goal}(C) &\rightarrow \text{goal}(A_1) \\ &\vdots \\ \text{goal}(C) &\rightarrow \text{goal}(A_m) \\ \text{goal}(C) \wedge \text{fact}(A_1) \wedge \dots \wedge \text{fact}(A_m) &\rightarrow \text{fact}(C) \end{aligned}$$

Goals are generated in simulated top-down fashion, but bottom-up reasoning is constrained: *fact*( $C$ ) can be derived only if *goal*( $C$ ) is present. The clauses resulting from this translation and all the extensions we present are Horn clauses. Thus, a bottom-up reasoning system such as hyperresolution will derive only unit clauses using them.

Subsumption is used to eliminate duplicate or less general facts or goals. Facts, once derived, can be used again in the solution of other goals. The *goal* derivation rules employ upside-down meta-interpretation, since the meaning of the rules is

the top-down generation of subgoals, but the rules themselves are executed bottom-up. Each initial fact  $F$  is translated to  $fact(F)$  and the initial goal is translated to  $goal(G)$ . Proofs are completed by deriving instances of  $fact(G)$ .

This translation of the problem is often sufficient. However, it is sometimes better in the case of clauses with more than one antecedent literal to create subgoals sequentially, e.g., to generate (an appropriate instance of)  $goal(A_i)$  only after goals  $A_1, \dots, A_{i-1}$  have been solved. This is especially important in logic programming, in which some subgoals compute values used as inputs to later subgoals. For example, the rule  $fib(x, y) \wedge fib(s(x), z) \wedge plus(y, z, w) \supset fib(s(s(x)), w)$  for computing Fibonacci numbers could be used to create the subgoals  $fib(3, y)$ ,  $fib(4, z)$ , and  $plus(y, z, w)$  from the goal  $fib(5, w)$ . It would be better to delay creating the subgoal  $plus(y, z, w)$  until after  $fib(3, y)$  and  $fib(4, z)$  are solved, thus instantiating  $y$  and  $z$ .

To impose a left-to-right execution order for subgoals so that  $goal(A_{i+1})$  is not introduced until a solution to  $goal(A_i)$  has been found, the rule  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  with  $m \geq 2$  can be translated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 &goal(C) \rightarrow goal(A_1) \\
 &goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1) \rightarrow goal(A_2) \\
 &goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1) \wedge fact(A_2) \rightarrow goal(A_3) \\
 &\quad \vdots \\
 &goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1) \wedge \dots \wedge fact(A_{m-1}) \rightarrow goal(A_m) \\
 &goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1) \wedge \dots \wedge fact(A_m) \rightarrow fact(C)
 \end{aligned}$$

Continuation predicates [42] can be used to encode the state of matching antecedent literals of a rule to eliminate the repeated matching of  $goal(C)$ ,  $fact(A_1), \dots, fact(A_{i-1})$  at the cost of deriving additional literals that represent intermediate results. Let  $k$  be a unique number for the rule  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  with  $m \geq 2$ , and let  $V$  be a term that contains variables of the rule except those in the head.<sup>2</sup> The rule is translated as follows:<sup>3</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
 &goal(C) \rightarrow goal(A_1) \\
 &goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1) \rightarrow cont_{k,2}(C, V) \wedge goal(A_2) \\
 &cont_{k,2}(C, V) \wedge fact(A_2) \rightarrow cont_{k,3}(C, V) \wedge goal(A_3) \\
 &\quad \vdots \\
 &cont_{k,m-1}(C, V) \wedge fact(A_{m-1}) \rightarrow cont_{k,m}(C, V) \wedge goal(A_m) \\
 &cont_{k,m}(C, V) \wedge fact(A_m) \rightarrow fact(C)
 \end{aligned}$$

The literals  $cont_{k,i}(C, V)$  identify which subgoal is being solved with what substitution.

This method will be generalized to abduction with Horn clauses and to deduction and abduction with non-Horn clauses in Sections 4, 5, and 6. For brevity, only the

translation to the form with continuation predicates will be shown in detail there. Simpler translations that introduce goals in left-to-right order without using continuation predicates or that introduce all the subgoals at once are always possible.

A classic example of poor, highly redundant, top-down execution behavior is the computation of Fibonacci numbers. The computation can be defined by

- a.  $plus(0, x, x)$
- b.  $plus(x, y, z) \supset plus(s(x), y, s(z))$
- c.  $fib(0, 0)$
- d.  $fib(s(0), s(0))$
- e.  $fib(x, y) \wedge fib(s(x), z) \wedge plus(y, z, w) \supset fib(s(s(x)), w)$

which can be translated into<sup>4</sup>

1.  $fact(plus(0, x, x))$
2.  $goal(plus(s(x), y, s(z))) \rightarrow goal(plus(x, y, z))$
3.  $goal(plus(s(x), y, s(z))) \wedge fact(plus(x, y, z)) \rightarrow fact(plus(s(x), y, s(z)))$
4.  $fact(fib(0, 0))$
5.  $fact(fib(s(0), s(0)))$
6.  $goal(fib(s(s(x)), w)) \rightarrow goal(fib(x, y))$
7.  $goal(fib(s(s(x)), w)) \wedge fact(fib(x, y)) \rightarrow$   
 $cont_{e,2}(fib(s(s(x)), w), y) \wedge goal(fib(s(x), z))$
8.  $cont_{e,2}(fib(s(s(x)), w), y) \wedge fact(fib(s(x), z)) \rightarrow$   
 $cont_{e,3}(fib(s(s(x)), w), y, z) \wedge goal(plus(y, z, w))$
9.  $cont_{e,3}(fib(s(s(x)), w), y, z) \wedge fact(plus(y, z, w)) \rightarrow fact(fib(s(s(x)), w))$

whose execution is substantially less redundant because Fibonacci numbers do not need to be recomputed.

### 3.1. GENERALIZING SUBSUMPTION

Subsumption is the principal mechanism for eliminating redundancy in bottom-up reasoning. If  $fact(L)$  and  $fact(L\sigma)$  are both derived, then  $fact(L\sigma)$  can be deleted. Likewise, if  $goal(L)$  and  $goal(L\sigma)$  are both derived, then  $goal(L\sigma)$  can be deleted. Similarly for  $cont_{k,i}(C, V)$  and  $cont_{k,i}(C\sigma, V\sigma)$ . These deletions can be accomplished by ordinary subsumption.

It is beneficial to generalize this. The following instances of generalized subsumption are possible:

- $fact(L)$  subsumes  $goal(L')$ , where  $L' = L\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ . Goals can be deleted if they are the same as or more specific than a fact.<sup>5</sup>
- $fact(L)$  subsumes  $cont_{k,i}(C, V)$ , where  $C = L\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ . Continuations can be deleted if they lead only to the derivation of facts the same as or more specific than an existing one.



A stronger deletion strategy would also delete subgoals of deleted goals. Goal-subgoal relationships would have to be recorded so that a subgoal is deleted only if all the goals of which it is a subgoal have been deleted.

### 3.2. GENERALIZING DERIVED FACTS

Although unnecessary recomputation of Fibonacci numbers is successfully eliminated in the example, bottom-up execution unfiltered by goals could yield a still shorter proof that uses fewer, more general, derived facts. The problem is that facts derived with top-down filtering can be overly specific.

It is possible to derive  $plus(1, y, s(y))$  from clauses a and b, and it is likewise possible to derive it from 1-3 when given the general goal  $goal(plus(1, y, z))$ . However, if more specific goals such as  $goal(plus(1, 1, z))$ ,  $goal(plus(1, 2, z))$ , and  $goal(plus(1, 3, z))$  are given, as they are when these rules are used to compute Fibonacci numbers, only the more specific facts such as  $fact(plus(1, 1, 2))$ ,  $fact(plus(1, 2, 3))$ , and  $fact(plus(1, 3, 4))$  will be derived. Computing larger Fibonacci numbers results in many more repeated instances of computing  $x + y_1$ ,  $x + y_2, \dots$ . The length of each of these derivations is linear in the size of  $x$ .

When  $goal(L)$  leads to the derivation of  $fact(L\sigma_1)$ , the problem of possible over-specificity of  $fact(L\sigma_1)$  can be overcome by reexecuting the same inference steps starting with  $goal(x)$  – i.e., with a free variable as goal formula – instead of  $goal(L)$  and ending with  $fact(x\sigma_2)$ , which is stored instead of  $fact(L\sigma_1)$ . The result  $fact(x\sigma_2)$  is an equally valid conclusion that is either a generalization of or equivalent to  $fact(L\sigma_1)$ . There is no danger in deriving these more general facts. They are more easily used, but top-down filtering still prevents their use except in the presence of a relevant goal.

The problem of deriving overly specific facts is not universal. From ground facts and range-restricted rules (those in which every variable in a positive literal also appears in a negative literal), which are customary in databases, bottom-up reasoning can derive only ground facts, and top-down filtering cannot result in anything more specific. Thus, there is no need for fact generalization for range-restricted databases.

### 3.3 GENERALIZING GOALS

It is always sound to use more general goals than this method specifies. It may be beneficial to do so in order to reduce the number of goals at the possible cost of deriving more facts since bottom-up reasoning is less constrained. Term depth abstraction [48, 43] automatically generalizes goals that exceed a specified depth by replacing subterms that are too deep by variables; it thus restricts the set of possible goals to be finite. Without generalizing goals somehow, upside-down meta-interpretation may have an infinite search space, even when bottom-up execution has a finite one. For example,  $goal(p(a))$  and  $goal(p(x)) \rightarrow goal(p(f(x)))$  can

be used to derive an infinite set of goals of the form  $p(f^n(a))$ , although only a finite set of facts might be derivable from the other clauses.

#### 4. Abduction with Horn Clauses

We shall now extend the method to abduction with Horn clauses. First, we give a general description of abduction, not restricted to Horn clauses. We then extend the method in Section 3 to a method for abduction with Horn clauses. Section 6 describes abduction with non-Horn clauses.

Abduction is the form of reasoning that allows us to hypothesize that  $P$  is true if we know that  $P \supset Q$  is true and we are trying to explain why  $Q$  is true [33]. It can naturally be viewed as an extension of deduction. Instead of requiring us to prove a formula, abduction allows us to identify sets of hypotheses that, if they could be proved, would allow a proof of the formula to be completed. This style of reasoning has been applied to diagnosis [9, 31, 32, 38], design synthesis [16], theory formation [37], default and circumscriptive reasoning [37, 39], and natural language interpretation [8, 18, 30, 47].

A widespread approach for implementing abduction is top-down, backward-chaining reasoning, with some literals being allowed to be assumed instead of proved [9, 18, 19, 37, 38, 39, 45, 47], i.e., an inference rule that assumes a literal is added to Prolog-like inference (in the case of Horn clauses) or the model elimination procedure. Standard top-down reasoning can be viewed as operating on a list of goals, removing goals when they match facts, adding subgoals when a goal matches the head of a rule, and succeeding only when the list becomes empty. Abductive reasoning allows this process to skip certain goals [19]. An abductive proof or explanation is found when only skipped goals remain. These are the assumptions that would allow completion of the proof.

The presence of an additional inference rule that allows literals to be either assumed or proved makes the search space for abduction even larger than that for deduction. This provides a strong motivation for upside-down meta-interpretation of the top-down inference rules for abduction in order to eliminate search-space redundancy. Recent work on using an ATMS [10, 11] to cache results of abductive reasoning [28] has the same objective as ours of eliminating redundant work on duplicate goals and has already demonstrated significant improvement. This is done for the case of Horn clauses with some limitation on unification as a result of using an ATMS.

For some theory  $T$  and goal  $G$ , abduction consists of finding sets of assumptions  $H$  and substitutions  $\theta$  such that  $G\theta$  is a consequence of  $T \cup H$ , that is,  $H \supset G\theta$  is a consequence of  $T$ . We require that  $H$  consist of *assumable* atomic formulas with designated predicate symbols.

We focus on only one element of abduction here, namely, finding  $H$  and  $G\theta$ . It is a nearly universal requirement that  $H$  be consistent with  $T$ , but this must be determined by some other means (e.g., by attempting to refute  $T \cup H$  and failing) and

is undecidable in general. Many abductive proofs can usually be found, and selection of a preferred abductive proof is a vital part of abduction. One criterion is that an abductive proof that requires a subset of the assumptions required by another proof is preferred. Generalized subsumption of derived facts allows us to discard less general proofs. Assigning costs to assumable formulas is a popular method to help choose among alternative proofs and is the focus of much recent work on abduction [7, 18, 47]. We believe the top-down meta-interpretation approach for abduction can be adapted to such cost-based abduction, but this is outside the scope of the present work.

To support abductive reasoning, the meta-theoretic predicate *fact* is extended to two arguments: an atomic formula and a set of assumptions sufficient to prove it. The bottom-up interpretation of the rule  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  can be expressed by

$$fact(A_1, H_1) \wedge \dots \wedge fact(A_m, H_m) \rightarrow fact(C, H_1 \cup \dots \cup H_m)$$

If each  $A_i$  is true, assuming  $H_i$ , then  $C$  is true, assuming the union of the assumptions. Each initial fact  $F$  is translated to  $fact(F, \emptyset)$ . If atomic formula  $L$  is assumable,  $fact(L, \{L\})$  is included in the initial facts; its meaning is that  $L$  is allowed to be proved by assuming  $L$ . Thus,  $fact(X, \{X\})$  is a tautology, that is,  $L \supset L$  or  $L \vee \neg L$ .

Our rules for Horn-clause deduction by bottom-up execution with top-down filtering and left-to-right solution of goals can also be easily adapted to Horn-clause abduction. The general case of the translation of  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  is

$$\begin{aligned} goal(C) &\rightarrow goal(A_1) \\ goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1, H_1) &\rightarrow cont_{k,2}(C, H_1, V) \wedge goal(A_2) \\ cont_{k,2}(C, H, V) \wedge fact(A_2, H_2) &\rightarrow cont_{k,3}(C, H \cup H_2, V) \wedge goal(A_3) \\ &\vdots \\ cont_{k,m-1}(C, H, V) \wedge fact(A_{m-1}, H_{m-1}) &\rightarrow cont_{k,m}(C, H \cup H_{m-1}, V) \wedge goal(A_m) \\ cont_{k,m}(C, H, V) \wedge fact(A_m, H_m) &\rightarrow fact(C, H \cup H_m) \end{aligned}$$

where  $H, H_1, \dots, H_m$  are variables whose values during execution will be sets of assumptions used in deriving a continuation or fact.

The procedure is complete: for any  $H$  and  $G\theta$  such that  $H$  is composed of assumable literals,  $H \supset G\theta$  is a consequence of theory  $T$ , and  $H$  is consistent with  $T$ ,<sup>6</sup> this procedure can derive some  $fact(G', H')$  such that  $G'\sigma = G\theta$  and  $H'\sigma \subseteq H$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ .

Subsumption can be further generalized to take account of assumptions. The following instances of generalized subsumption are possible:

- $fact(L, H)$  subsumes  $fact(L', H')$ , where  $L' = L\sigma$  and  $H' \supseteq H\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ .
- $fact(L, H)$  subsumes  $cont_{k,i}(C, H', V)$ , where  $C = L\sigma$  and  $H' \supseteq H\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ .

- $fact(L, \emptyset)$  subsumes  $goal(L')$ , where  $L' = L\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ .
- $cont_{k,i}(C, H, V)$  subsumes  $cont_{k,i}(C', H', V')$ , where  $C' = C\sigma$ ,  $H' \supseteq H\sigma$ , and  $V' = V\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ .

As an example, consider the following theory used to explain a bicycle's wobbly wheel [21]. Here, *broken-spokes*, *punctured-tube*, and *leaky-valve* are assumable predicates that can be used to create an explanation.

- a.  $flat-tire \supset wobbly-wheel$
- b.  $broken-spokes \supset wobbly-wheel$
- c.  $punctured-tube \supset flat-tire$
- d.  $leaky-valve \supset flat-tire$

The translation is

1.  $fact(broken-spokes, \{broken-spokes\})$
2.  $fact(punctured-tube, \{punctured-tube\})$
3.  $fact(leaky-valve, \{leaky-valve\})$
4.  $goal(wobbly-wheel) \rightarrow goal(flat-tire)$
5.  $goal(wobbly-wheel) \wedge fact(flat-tire, H) \rightarrow fact(wobbly-wheel, H)$
6.  $goal(wobbly-wheel) \rightarrow goal(broken-spokes)$
7.  $goal(wobbly-wheel) \wedge fact(broken-spokes, H) \rightarrow fact(wobbly-wheel, H)$
8.  $goal(flat-tire) \rightarrow goal(punctured-tube)$
9.  $goal(flat-tire) \wedge fact(punctured-tube, H) \rightarrow fact(flat-tire, H)$
10.  $goal(flat-tire) \rightarrow goal(leaky-valve)$
11.  $goal(flat-tire) \wedge fact(leaky-valve, H) \rightarrow fact(flat-tire, H)$

These rules can be used to explain a wobbly wheel. Explanations are found on lines 16, 19, and 21 below; for example, if there was a punctured tube, then there would be a wobbly wheel. The execution is as follows:

- |  |                         |
|--|-------------------------|
| 12. $goal(wobbly-wheel)$                     | initial goal            |
| 13. $goal(flat-tire)$                        | subgoal of 12 by 4      |
| 14. $goal(punctured-tube)$                   | subgoal of 13 by 8      |
| 15. $fact(flat-tire, \{punctured-tube\})$    | solution of 13 by 2, 9  |
| 16. $fact(wobbly-wheel, \{punctured-tube\})$ | solution of 12 by 15, 5 |
| 17. $goal(leaky-valve)$                      | subgoal of 13 by 10     |
| 18. $fact(flat-tire, \{leaky-valve\})$       | solution of 13 by 3, 11 |
| 19. $fact(wobbly-wheel, \{leaky-valve\})$    | solution of 12 by 18, 5 |
| 20. $goal(broken-spokes)$                    | subgoal of 12 by 6      |
| 21. $fact(wobbly-wheel, \{broken-spokes\})$  | solution of 12 by 1, 7  |

## 5. Deduction with Non-Horn Clauses

Using the method for abduction with Horn clauses as a starting point, we now extend our upside-down meta-interpretation method to deduction with possibly non-Horn clauses. Abduction will be added again in Section 6. Facts, goals, and rules can be written with literals instead of just atomic formulas. We require that contrapositives of the rules be present. That is, if  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  is a rule, then  $m$  other rules of the form  $B_i \supset \neg A_i$  must also be provided, where  $B_i$  is the conjunction of  $A_1, \dots, A_{i-1}, A_{i+1}, \dots, A_m, \neg C$ , and, for any literal  $L$ ,  $\neg L$  denotes its complement.

The model elimination (ME) theorem-proving procedure has a single inference rule in addition to Prolog's:

If the current goal is unifiable with the complement of one of its ancestor goals, then apply the unifying substitution and treat the current goal as if it were solved.

This added inference operation is the ME *reduction* operation. The normal Prolog inference operation is the ME *extension* operation. The two together constitute a complete inference procedure for the full first-order predicate calculus, not just the Horn-clause subset. Unless the unifying substitution (unifier) is empty (i.e., the goal and its ancestor goal are exactly complementary), the reduction operation is used as an alternative to, not a substitute for, solving the goal by extension or by reduction with a different ancestor goal.

As in abduction with Horn clauses, we begin by formulating the model elimination procedure in terms of deriving facts that follow from a set of assumptions.

The meta-theoretic predicate *fact* has two arguments: a literal and a set of assumptions sufficient to prove it. The bottom-up interpretation of the rule  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C$  can be expressed by

$$fact(A_1, H_1) \wedge \dots \wedge fact(A_m, H_m) \rightarrow fact(C, (H_1 \cup \dots \cup H_m) - \neg C)$$

If each  $A_i$  is true, assuming  $H_i$ , then  $C$  is true, assuming the union of the assumptions, excluding  $\neg C$ . This description is accurate for the ground case. In the non-ground case, it is necessary to consider unifying  $\neg C$  with other assumptions to derive alternative results. In that way, different instances of  $C$  can be shown to follow from different sets of assumptions. For example, suppose  $\neg C$  is not a member of  $H_1 \cup \dots \cup H_m$ . We conclude that  $C$  is true, assuming  $H_1 \cup \dots \cup H_m$ . If  $\neg C$  is unifiable (by unifier  $\sigma$ ) with a member of  $H_1 \cup \dots \cup H_m$ , we can also conclude that  $C\sigma$  is true, assuming the smaller set  $(H_1\sigma \cup \dots \cup H_m\sigma) - \neg C\sigma$ .

Single-literal facts  $F$  are translated to  $fact(F, \emptyset)$ . The single literal  $fact(x, \{x\})$  is also included. Its interpretation is that any literal  $x$  is a consequence of its own assumption. Again,  $fact(x, \{x\})$  is a tautology, that is,  $x \supset x$  or  $x \vee \neg x$ .

This differs from upside-down meta-interpretation of abduction with Horn clauses because all literals are treated as assumable (because any literal might be solvable by

reduction with a complementary ancestor goal) and because  $\neg C$  can be omitted from the set of assumptions used.

Top-down filtering by goals along with left-to-right execution order for subgoals can be accomplished almost exactly as in the case of abduction for Horn clauses:

$$\begin{aligned}
& goal(C) \rightarrow goal(A_1) \\
& goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1, H_1) \rightarrow cont_{k,2}(C, H_1, V) \wedge goal(A_2) \\
& cont_{k,2}(C, H, V) \wedge fact(A_2, H_2) \rightarrow cont_{k,3}(C, H \cup H_2, V) \wedge goal(A_3) \\
& \vdots \\
& cont_{k,m-1}(C, H, V) \wedge fact(A_{m-1}, H_{m-1}) \rightarrow cont_{k,m}(C, H \cup H_{m-1}, V) \wedge goal(A_m) \\
& cont_{k,m}(C, H, V) \wedge fact(A_m, H_m) \rightarrow fact(C, (H \cup H_m) - \neg C)
\end{aligned}$$

Note the use of  $\neg C$  in the final clause.

Performance of this code is likely to be very poor. Assumptions can be made easily but can be removed only in the presence of a complementary ancestor goal; a proof is complete only when the assumption-free  $fact(G\sigma, \emptyset)$  is derived for  $goal(G)$ . It is apparent that more control over the generation of facts is required. Top-down filtering is done above using only the form of the goal; we propose that top-down filtering also take account of the goal's ancestors, so that a fact will not be derived unless a goal exists whose ancestor list includes all the fact's assumptions.

For top-down meta-interpretation of the model elimination procedure for deduction, we include another argument,  $P$ , in goals and continuations that specifies the set of assumptions (obtained from negations of ancestor goals) that are permitted to be made in the solution of a goal. Siegel likewise replaced model elimination's representation of goal-subgoal relationship in chains by directly associating a goal with its set of ancestors [45]. The following translated rules will not be able to derive facts that require assumptions outside the permitted set:

$$\begin{aligned}
& goal(C, P) \rightarrow goal(A_1, P \cup \{\neg C\}) \\
& goal(C, P) \wedge fact(A_1, H_1) \wedge H_1 \subseteq P \cup \{\neg C\} \rightarrow \\
& \qquad cont_{k,2}(C, H_1, P, V) \wedge goal(A_2, P \cup \{\neg C\}) \\
& cont_{k,2}(C, H, P, V) \wedge fact(A_2, H_2) \wedge H_2 \subseteq P \cup \{\neg C\} \rightarrow \\
& \qquad cont_{k,3}(C, H \cup H_2, P, V) \wedge goal(A_3, P \cup \{\neg C\}) \\
& \vdots \\
& cont_{k,m-1}(C, H, P, V) \wedge fact(A_{m-1}, H_{m-1}) \wedge H_{m-1} \subseteq P \cup \{\neg C\} \rightarrow \\
& \qquad cont_{k,m}(C, H \cup H_{m-1}, P, V) \wedge goal(A_m, P \cup \{\neg C\}) \\
& cont_{k,m}(C, H, P, V) \wedge fact(A_m, H_m) \wedge H_m \subseteq P \cup \{\neg C\} \rightarrow \\
& \qquad fact(C, (H \cup H_m) - \neg C)
\end{aligned}$$

A single-literal goal is translated to  $goal(G, \emptyset)$ , that is, an assumption-free proof of  $G$  is sought. Unification of members of  $H_i$  and  $P \cup \{\neg C\}$  may be necessary to make  $\subseteq$  hold and unification of members of  $H \cup H_m$  with  $\neg C$  may be necessary to derive

facts with fewer assumptions. If this rule is invoked by  $goal(G, P)$ , it will derive literals of the form  $fact(G', H)$ , where  $G' = G\sigma$  and  $H \subseteq P\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ . Derived facts include only assumptions that are used (those in  $H_i$ ), not all those that are permitted to be used (those in  $P$ ). Thus, equally general facts can be derived even if  $P$  has extra members.

The following instances of generalized subsumption are possible:

- $fact(L, H)$  subsumes  $fact(L', H')$ , where  $L' = L\sigma$  and  $H' \supseteq H\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ . Facts that are less general or require more assumptions can be deleted.
- $fact(L, H)$  subsumes  $goal(C, P)$  or  $cont_{k,i}(C, H', P, V)$ , where  $C = L\sigma$  and  $P \supseteq H\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ . Such facts solve the goal without instantiating it.
- $cont_{k,i}(C, H, P, V)$  subsumes  $cont_{k,i}(C', H', P', V')$ , where  $C' = C\sigma$ ,  $H' \supseteq H\sigma$ ,  $P' = P\sigma$ , and  $V' = V\sigma$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ . Continuations that are less general or have made more assumptions can be deleted.

In addition, standard model elimination pruning rules imply that

- $goal(C, P)$  or  $cont_{k,i}(C, H, P, V)$  can be deleted if  $C \in P$ ,  $\neg C \in P$ , or  $P$  contains complementary literals.

As an example, consider the proof that  $a \wedge b$  follows from  $a \vee b$ ,  $\neg a \vee b$ , and  $a \vee \neg b$ . The problem is formulated with contrapositives as

- a.  $\neg a \supset b$
- b.  $\neg b \supset a$
- c.  $a \supset b$
- d.  $\neg b \supset \neg a$
- e.  $\neg a \supset \neg b$
- f.  $b \supset a$
- g.  $a \wedge b \supset q$

and the translation is

- 1:  $fact(x, \{x\})$
- 2:  $goal(b, P) \rightarrow goal(\neg a, P \cup \{\neg b\})$
- 3:  $goal(b, P) \wedge fact(\neg a, H) \wedge H \subseteq P \cup \{\neg b\} \rightarrow fact(b, H - \{\neg b\})$
- 4:  $goal(a, P) \rightarrow goal(\neg b, P \cup \{\neg a\})$
- 5:  $goal(a, P) \wedge fact(\neg b, H) \wedge H \subseteq P \cup \{\neg a\} \rightarrow fact(a, H - \{\neg a\})$
- 6:  $goal(b, P) \rightarrow goal(a, P \cup \{\neg\})$
- 7:  $goal(b, P) \wedge fact(a, H) \wedge H \subseteq P \cup \{\neg b\} \rightarrow fact(b, H - \{\neg b\})$
- 8:  $goal(\neg a, P) \rightarrow goal(\neg b, P \cup \{a\})$
- 9:  $goal(\neg a, P) \wedge fact(\neg b, H) \wedge H \subseteq P \cup \{a\} \rightarrow fact(\neg a, H - \{a\})$
- 10:  $goal(\neg b, P) \rightarrow goal(\neg a, P \cup \{b\})$

- 11:  $goal(\neg b, P) \wedge fact(\neg a, H) \wedge H \subseteq P \cup \{b\} \rightarrow fact(\neg b, H - \{b\})$   
 12:  $goal(a, P) \rightarrow goal(b, P \cup \{\neg a\})$   
 13:  $goal(a, P) \wedge fact(b, H) \wedge H \subseteq P \cup \{\neg a\} \rightarrow fact(a, H - \{\neg a\})$   
 14:  $goal(q, P) \rightarrow goal(a, P \cup \{\neg q\})$   
 15:  $goal(q, P) \wedge fact(a, H) \wedge H \subseteq P \cup \{\neg q\} \rightarrow cont_{g,2}(q, H, P)$   
 16:  $cont_{g,2}(q, H, P) \rightarrow goal(b, P \cup \{\neg q\})$   
 17:  $cont_{g,2}(q, H, P) \wedge fact(b, H_2) \wedge H_2 \subseteq P \cup \{\neg q\} \rightarrow fact(q, (H \cup H_2) - \{\neg q\})$

Execution of these rules leads to the following proof:

- 18:  $goal(q, \emptyset)$                     initial goal  
 19:  $goal(a, \{\neg q\})$                 subgoal of 18 by 14  
 20:  $goal(b, \{\neg a, \neg q\})$         subgoal of 19 by 12  
 21:  $fact(b, \{\neg a\})$                 solution of 20 by 3, 1  
 22:  $fact(a, \emptyset)$                     solution of 19 by 13, 21  
 23:  $fact(b, \emptyset)$                     solution of 20 by 7, 22  
 24:  $cont_{g,2}(q, \emptyset, \emptyset)$         continuation of 18 by 15, 22  
 25:  $fact(q, \emptyset)$                     solution of 18 by 17, 23, 24

Derived facts correspond exactly to lemmas in the model elimination procedure: they are conditionally solved goals, where the conditions are negations of ancestor goals used in their solution. Contrapositives of derived facts are also valid consequences, so facts like  $fact(\neg b, \{a, c\})$  can be automatically derived from  $fact(a, \{b, c\})$ , or the procedure can be reformulated to use a neutral clause form  $fact(\{a, \neg b, \neg c\})$  instead (this is done in Demolombe's similar method [12]).

## 6. Abduction with Non-Horn Clauses

The case of abduction with non-Horn clauses is nearly identical to that of deduction. The only change required is that assumptions are no longer restricted to those listed in goals as being permitted because their negations appeared in ancestor goals. This restriction is imposed by the test  $H_i \subseteq P$ . The test is modified in the case of abduction to apply only to literals that are not abductively assumable:  $nonass(H_i) \subseteq P \cup \{\neg C\}$ , where  $nonass(H_i)$  is the largest subset of  $H_i$  that cannot be abductively assumed (those with nonassumable predicate names). In other words, any abductively assumable literal in  $H_i$  need not appear in  $P \cup \{\neg C\}$ , but others must.

We summarize the treatment of assumptions in these procedures. In the Horn case of abduction,  $fact(L, \{L\})$  exists only for abductively assumable literals, so only they can be assumed. In the non-Horn case of deduction,  $fact(x, \{x\})$  exists and any literal can be assumed, although top-down filtering permits only assumptions that match negated ancestor goals to be used. In the non-Horn case of abduction, we again allow any literal to be assumed, but omit the requirement to match



assumptions with negated ancestor goals in the case of abductively assumable literals.

Derivation of  $fact(G\sigma, H)$  is an abductive proof of  $G$ , provided  $H$  consists entirely of abductively assumable literals. The procedure is complete: for any  $H$  and  $G\theta$  such that  $H$  is composed of abductively assumable literals,  $H \supset G\theta$  is a consequence of theory  $T$ , and  $H$  is consistent with  $T$ , this procedure can derive some  $fact(G', H')$  such that  $G'\sigma = G\theta$  and  $H'\sigma \subseteq H$  for some substitution  $\sigma$ .

## 7. Related Work

Demolombe [12] also developed an upside-down meta-interpretation of the model elimination theorem-proving procedure. His method resembles the procedure in Section 5, but differs in that

- It uses literals like  $goal(a \vee \neg b \vee \neg c)$  and  $fact(a \vee \neg b \vee \neg c)$  instead of  $goal(a, \{b, c\})$  and  $fact(a, \{b, c\})$ ; contrapositives of facts are thus always available.
- It uses rules like  $goal(C) \wedge fact(A_1) \wedge \dots \wedge fact(A_{i-1}) \rightarrow goal(A_i)$  to generate subgoals, instead of using more concise continuation predicates.
- It does not keep track of which permitted assumptions are actually used, so  $goal(a \vee b \vee c)$  can lead only to instances of  $fact(a \vee b \vee c)$  being derived, instead of the more general  $fact(a)$ ,  $fact(a \vee b)$ , etc., that can be derived if not all permitted assumptions are used.

Plaisted and Greenbaum [36] developed an upside-down meta-interpretation method for non-Horn clauses that is not based on the model elimination procedure. It does not require contrapositives and represents clauses by  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C_1 \vee \dots \vee C_n$ , where  $A_1, \dots, A_m, C_1, \dots, C_n$  are all atomic formulas. However, only negative clauses are used as initial goals. A key difference between their method and ours is that our translation yields a Horn set of clauses. The advantage of this is that if hyperresolution is used to execute the clauses, only single-literal results will be derived (although these single-literal facts or goals may contain multiple literals from the problem and thus would still have a clause interpretation). Plaisted and Greenbaum's method requires derivation of nonunit positive clauses, such as  $fact(a) \vee fact(b)$ . They also developed an extension for equality, based on Brand's modification method [5].

Upside-down meta-interpretation has been applied to Horn-clause theorem proving in Neiman's subgoal extraction method [27]. It closely resembles rewriting methods for query evaluation, as do the Horn-clause case in Section 3 and the Demolombe and the Plaisted and Greenbaum methods restricted to Horn clauses. Neiman describes special data structures for more efficient execution.

There is a vast literature on such upside-down meta-interpretation methods for query evaluation in Horn-clause databases. These methods generally resemble

each other abstractly, differing in details of the compilation and the extent to which the input rules are partially evaluated. Bry demonstrated that upside-down meta-interpretation (i.e., rewriting-based methods for query evaluation) and top-down evaluation with lemmas (i.e., resolution-based methods for query evaluation) are essentially equivalent instances of his backward fix-point procedure [6]. There has also been a lot of work that extends the magic-sets method to non-Horn deductive databases with negation as failure or the closed world assumption rather than classical semantics for negation – e.g., [3, 15, 20].

Our approach is to use bottom-up execution with top-down filtering. This is similar to the use of relevancy testing in the bottom-up SATCHMO [25] and MGTP [17] theorem provers that employ hyperresolution and case-splitting on nonunit derived clauses. The use of range-restricted clauses guarantees that positive clauses are ground and makes case-splitting practical, since no variables are shared between cases. The relevancy test requires that some [40] – or, better yet, every [50] – literal of a derived clause be relevant to the goal in order to be retained and split on; this can dramatically reduce the search space. A non-Horn magic-sets method has recently been developed for MGTP by Hasegawa, Ohta, and Inoue.<sup>7</sup> In their method, the implication  $A_1 \wedge \dots \wedge A_m \supset C_1 \vee \dots \vee C_n$ , where  $A_1, \dots, A_m, C_1, \dots, C_n$  are all atomic formulas, is translated to

$$\begin{aligned} & goal(C_1) \wedge \dots \wedge goal(C_n) \rightarrow goal(A_1) \\ & \vdots \\ & goal(C_1) \wedge \dots \wedge goal(C_n) \rightarrow goal(A_m) \\ & goal(C_1) \wedge \dots \wedge goal(C_n) \wedge fact(A_1) \wedge \dots \wedge fact(A_m) \rightarrow \\ & \qquad \qquad \qquad fact(C_1) \vee \dots \vee fact(C_n) \end{aligned}$$

or a variant that uses continuation predicates. This is a nice extension of the method for Horn clauses in Section 3 to non-Horn clauses that uses hyperresolution and case-splitting instead of model elimination. They prove their method is equivalent to relevancy testing in which every literal of a derived clause must be relevant, which is formulated quite differently. The SATCHMO/MGTP approach appears to work very well on naturally range-restricted problems – better than model elimination. Problems that are not range-restricted can easily be converted into those that are, but this entails adding clauses that can generate all the terms of the Herbrand universe, and the SATCHMO/MGTP approach is usually ineffective for such problems.

## 8. Conclusions

The model elimination procedure is an effective theorem-proving procedure whose principal defect is the redundancy of its search space. Despite this defect, it has been used effectively for theorem proving and recently for abductive and related inference. Model elimination is a highly restrictive inference procedure that includes compatibility with set of support. This goal-directedness is crucial in the presence of

many irrelevant axioms, as in deductive database, logic programming, and artificial intelligence applications.

Upside-down meta-interpretation, the execution of the top-down model elimination procedure by a bottom-up reasoning system such as hyperresolution with subsumption, can basically reproduce the model elimination search space while eliminating much of its redundancy. Four variants of the method have been shown. The basic method for deduction with Horn clauses resembles the magic-sets or Alexander method for query evaluation in databases. Extensions deal with non-Horn clauses and with abduction as well as deduction.

Upside-down meta-interpretation can be regarded as adding top-down filtering to a bottom-up reasoning system, thus making it more goal-directed. Its principal contribution is in applications with many irrelevant axioms, not for mathematical problems. Although non-goal-directed methods such as hyperresolution might seem naive even for mathematical problems, they can actually be quite effective: when all the axioms are accessible from the initial goal and general subgoals are quickly generated, the top-down filtering provided by upside-down meta-interpretation is able to offer little or no goal-directedness.

Deriving and storing goal literals allow liberalization of the search strategy of top-down reasoning systems. Literals can be ordered for preference in future inference operations by type (fact or goal), by size, by number of assumptions or ancestor goals, and other criteria. Upside-down meta-interpretation makes merit-ordered search feasible for top-down reasoning systems like input resolution and model elimination.

The high inference rate and low memory consumption of top-down reasoning systems such as Prolog and PTPP are lost in this move to upside-down meta-interpretation. This loss seems inevitable, since controlling redundancy requires storing more information about goals, solutions, etc., and the volume of information stored demands efficient, although slow, indexing. Efforts to make the inference rate of bottom-up reasoning systems more closely approach that of top-down reasoning systems will make the upside-down meta-interpretation approach more attractive. Writing a bottom-up reasoning system specialized to the rules used in upside-down meta-interpretation can also improve performance. Neiman did this in the case of deduction with Horn clauses when implementing his subgoal extraction method. The translated clauses for Horn-clause deduction are executable by standard hyperresolution reasoning systems such as OTTER [26]. Such systems need be extended only slightly to support generalized subsumption and generalizing derived facts as well; these features can significantly improve the method's behavior. More substantial extensions are necessary for the abductive and non-Horn cases; these require handling sets of assumptions in the fact and goal literals.

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<sup>1</sup> Note the use of  $\rightarrow$  for executable rules versus  $\supset$  for assertions.

<sup>2</sup> Not all variables need be included in every continuation. For  $cont_{k,i}$ , it is sufficient to include  $(Vars(\{A_1, \dots, A_{i-1}\}) \cap Vars(\{A_i, \dots, A_m\})) - Vars(C)$ , where  $Vars(X)$  is the set of variables appearing in literal or set of literals  $X$ .

<sup>3</sup> Some of these rules have multiliteral consequents  $cont_{k,i}(C, V) \wedge goal(A_i)$ , which means that both  $cont_{k,i}(C, V)$  and  $goal(A_i)$  are to be derived. If standard, clausal hyperresolution is used as the bottom-up reasoning system, they can be split into separate rules  $\dots \rightarrow cont_{k,i}(C, V)$  and  $cont_{k,i}(C, V) \rightarrow goal(A_i)$ .

<sup>4</sup> Instead of a variable-containing term  $V$ , we write all the variables as separate arguments of  $cont_{k,i}$ .

<sup>5</sup> Although derived facts are always instances of the goals that lead to them, an initial fact might be more general than a goal. It is also possible to modify the method to derive more general facts (see Section 3.2).

<sup>6</sup> Although the procedure may generate abductive proofs whose hypotheses are inconsistent with  $T$ , it is not guaranteed to do so, and we would not want it to generate all possible sets of inconsistent hypotheses.

<sup>7</sup> Personal communication from R. Hasegawa, 1993.

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