THE PUNITIVE CITY: NOTES ON THE DISPERSAL OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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> This, then, is how one must imagine the punitive city. At the crossroads, in the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or bridges built, in workshops open to all, in the depths of mines that may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment.
>
> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*

The study of social control must be one of the more dramatic examples in sociology of the gap between our private sense of what is going on around us and our professional writings about the social world. Our private terrain is inhabited by premonitions of *1984*, *Clockwork Orange* and *Brave New World*, by fears of the increasing intrusion of the state into private lives and by a general unease that more and more of our actions and thoughts are under surveillance and subject to record. Our professional formulations about social control though, reveal little of such nightmares and science-fiction projections. They tend to repeat bland structural-functional explanations about the necessity of social control or else simplistic comparisons of pre-industrial and industrial societies. There are, to be sure, powerful macro theories, especially Marxist, about the apparatus and ideology of state control and a great deal of Marcusean-like rhetoric left over from the sixties about "repression". And then there are those exquisite interactional studies about the social control dimensions in talk, gaze and gesture.

But for an overall sense of what the formal social control apparatus of society is actually getting up to, we have surprisingly little information. Those sub-fields of sociology most explicitly concerned with all this – criminology and the sociology of deviance – are not as much help as they should be, especially when trying to understand the major shifts in the ideology and apparatus of control over the last few decades. Thus writings about community control – the subject of this paper and, if my argument is

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correct, the key area in which to find transformations in social control — are usually of a very low level. They are either blandly descriptive or else "evaluative" only in the sense of using the pseudo scientific language of process, feedback, goals, inputs, systems etc., to decide whether this or that program "works" or is cost productive. Little of this helps towards understanding basic structural and ideological trends.

Some connecting bridges have, of course, been made somewhere here between private nightmare and sociological work. This is most evident in the current wave of disenchantment about benevolent state intervention in the name of welfare or rehabilitation [1]. The historical work by David Rothman on the origins of the asylum and (from a quite different tradition) Michel Foucault's series of great works on the history of deviance control have marked a major intellectual breakthrough. The extension of this work into the contemporary scene in Scull's analysis of the decarceration movement and in the less theoretically penetrating but polemically equally compelling formulations about the "Therapeutic State" (Kittrie), "Psychiatric Despotism" (Szasz) and the "Psychological Society" (Gross) are also important. But this work is surprisingly sparse and tends anyway to concentrate on psychiatry, only one limited system of social control.

On the whole, the promise of the new sociology of deviance to deal with the "control" side of the "deviance and control" equation, has not been fulfilled. Certainly there are enough good studies of specific control agencies such as courts, prisons, police departments, abortion clinics, mental hospitals, and so on. But the problem with this ethnographic work is not so much (as the familiar criticism runs) that a pre-occupation with labelling, stigma and interaction may leave the analysis at the microscopic level. The problem is more that such studies are often curiously fragmented, abstracted from the density of urban life in which social control is embedded. It is not so much that these agencies often have no history: they also have little sense of place. They need locating in the physical space of the city, but more important in the overall social space: the master patterns of social control, the network of other institutions such as school and family, and broader trends in welfare and social services, bureaucracies and professions. This paper is a preface to a grander project of this sort.

What I want to do — largely for a sociological audience outside crime and justice professionals — is sort out some of the implications of the apparent changes in the formal social control apparatus over the last decade or so. I will concentrate on crime and juvenile delinquency though there are important tendencies — some parallel and some quite different — in such areas as drug abuse and mental illness which require altogether separate comment. I will be drawing material mainly from the United States and Britain — countries which have developed a centralized crime control apparatus

embedded in a more (Britain) or less (United States) highly developed commitment to welfare and more (United States) or less (Britain) sophisticated ideologies and techniques of treatment and rehabilitation.

This paper, then, is an exercise in classification and projection, rather than explanation.

From Prison to Community

Our current system of deviancy control originated in those great transformations which took place from the end of the 18th to the beginning of the 19th centuries: firstly the development of a centralized state apparatus for the control of crime and the care of dependency; secondly the increasing differentiation of the deviant and dependent into separate types each with its own attendant corpus of "scientific" knowledge and accredited experts; and finally the increased segregation of deviants and dependents into "asylums": mental hospitals, prisons, reformatories and other such closed, purpose-built institutions for treatment and punishment. The theorists of these transformations each place a somewhat different emphasis on just what happened and just why it happened, but all are agreed on its essentials [2].

The most extraordinary of these three features to explain – the other two being, in a sense, self evident in the development of the modern state – is the growth of the asylum and its subsequent survival despite one and a half centuries of failure. Any account of the current and future place of incarceration, must come to terms with that original historical transformation [3].

We are now living through what *appears* to be a reversal of this first Great Transformation. The ideological consensus about the desirability and necessity of the segregative asylum – questioned before but never really undermined [4] – has been broken. The attack on prisons (and more dramatically and with more obvious results on mental hospitals) became widespread from the mid nineteen-sixties, was found throughout the political spectrum and was partially reflected in such indices as declining rates of imprisonment. At the end of the eighteenth century, asylums and prisons were places of the *last* resort; by the mid-19th century they became places of the *first* resort, the preferred solution to problems of deviancy and dependency. By the end of the 1960s they looked like once again becoming places of the *last* resort. The extraordinary notion of abolition, rather than mere reform became common talk. With varying degrees of enthusiasm and actual measurable consequences, officials in Britain, the United States and some Western European countries, became committed to the policy labelled "decarceration": the state-sponsored closing down of asylums, prisons and

reformatories. This apparent reversal of the Great Incarcerations of the nineteenth century was hailed as the beginning of a golden age – a form of utopianism whose ironies cannot escape anyone with an eye on history: "There is a curious historical irony here, for the *adoption* of the asylum, whose *abolition* is now supposed to be attended with such universally beneficent consequences, aroused an almost precisely parallel set of millenial expectations among its advocates" [5].

The irony goes even further. For just at the historical moment when every commonplace critique of "technological" or "post-industrial" or "mass" society mourned the irreplaceable loss of the traditional *Gemeinschaft* community, so a new mode of deviancy control was advocated whose success rested on this very same notion of community. Indeed the decarceration movement derives its rhetoric from a much wider constituency than is implied by limited questions of how far should imprisonment be used. It touches on issues about centralization, professionalization, the rehabilitative ideal, and the limits of state intervention. The current (variously labelled) "pessimism", "scepticism", or "nihilism" about prisons, draws on all these wider themes [6].

In the literature on community treatment itself [7], two sets of assumptions are repeated with the regularity of a religious catechism. The first set is seen either as a matter of common sense, "what everybody knows" or the irrefutable result of empirical research: 1) prisons and juvenile institutions are (in the weak version) simply ineffective: they neither successfully deter nor rehabilitate. In the strong version, they actually make things worse by strengthening criminal commitment; 2) community alternatives are much less costly and 3) they are more humane than any institution can be – prisons are cruel, brutalizing and beyond reform. Their time has come. Therefore: community alternatives "must obviously be better", "should at least be given a chance" or "can't be worse".

The second set of assumptions appeal to a number of sociological and political beliefs not as self evident as the previous set, but taken by the believer to be just as well established: 1) theories of stigma and labelling have demonstrated that the further the deviant is processed into the system, the harder it is to return him to normal life – "therefore" measures designed to minimize penetration into the formal system and keep the deviant in the community as long as possible are desirable; 2) the causal processes leading to most forms of deviance originate in society (family, community, school, economic system) – "therefore" prevention and cure must lie in the community and not in artificially created agencies constructed on a model of individual intervention; 3) liberal measures, such as reformatories, the juvenile court and the whole rehabilitative model are politically suspect, whatever the

benevolent motives which lie behind them. The state should be committed to be doing less harm rather than more good — "therefore" policies such as decriminalization, diversion and decarceration should be supported.

It is the last of these beliefs which must be used to scrutinize them all — for why should community corrections itself, not be subjected to the very same suspicion about benevolent reform? A large dose of such scepticism, together with a much firmer location of the new movement in overall structural and political changes, is needed for a full scale critique of community corrections. Such a critique — not the object of this paper — would have to note at least the following doubts [8] : 1) it is by no means clear, in regard to crime and delinquency at least, that decarceration has been taking place as rapidly as the ideology would have us believe; 2) it has not been established that any community alternative is more effective in reducing crime (through preventing recidivism) than traditional imprisonment; 3) nor are these new methods always dramatically cheaper and 4) the humanitarian rationale for the move from imprisonment may be unfounded for two (opposite) reasons: a) decarceration may indeed lead to something like non-intervention or benign neglect: services are withdrawn and deviants are left neglected or exploited by private operators; b) alternatively, new forms of intervention result, which are often difficult to distinguish from the old institutions and reproduce in the community the very same coercive features of the system they were designed to replace.

However cogent this emergent critique might be, though, it comes from the margins of contemporary "corrections". Perhaps more than in any other area of social policy, crime and delinquency control has always allowed such doubts to be neutralized in the tidal wave of enthusiasm for any new "reform". There is little doubt that the rhetoric and ideology of community control is quite secure. And — whatever may be happening to overall rates of incarceration — most industrialized countries will continue to see a proliferation of various schemes in line with this ideology.

I shall take the term "community control" to cover almost any form of formal social control outside the walls of traditional adult and juvenile institutions. There are two separate, but overlapping strategies: firstly, those various forms of intensive intervention located "in the community": sentencing options which serve as intermediate alternatives to being sent to an institution or later options to release from institutions and secondly, those programs set up at some preventive, policing or pre-trial stage to divert offenders from initial or further processing by the conventional systems of justice. Behind these specific policies lies an overall commitment to almost anything which sounds like increasing community responsibility for the control of crime and delinquency.

Blurring the Boundaries

The segregated and insulated institution made the actual business of deviancy control invisible, but it did make its boundaries obvious enough. Whether prisons were built in the middle of cities, out in the remote countryside or on deserted islands, they had clear spatial boundaries to mark off the normal from the deviant. These spatial boundaries were reinforced by ceremonies of social exclusion. Those outside could wonder what went on behind the walls, those inside could think about the "outside world". Inside/outside, guilty/innocent, freedom/captivity, imprisoned/released — these were all meaningful distinctions.

In today's world of community corrections, these boundaries are no longer as clear. There is, we are told, a "correctional continuum" or a "correctional spectrum": criminals and delinquents might be found anywhere in these spaces. So fine — and at the same time so indistinct — are the gradations along the continuum, that it is by no means easy to answer such questions as where the prison ends and the community begins or just why any deviant is to be found at any particular point. Even the most dedicated spokesmen for the community treatment have some difficulty in specifying just what "the community" is; one N.I.M.H. Report confessed that the term community treatment: ". . . has lost all descriptive usefulness except as a code word with connotations of 'advanced correctional thinking' and implied value judgements against the 'locking up' and isolation of offenders" [9].

Even the most cursory examination of the new programs, reveals that many varieties of the more or less intensive and structured "alternatives" are virtually indistinguishable from the real thing. A great deal of energy and ingenuity is being devoted to this problem of definition: just how isolated and confining does an institution have to be before it is a prison rather than, say a residential community facility? Luckily for us all, criminologists have got this matter well in hand and are spending a great deal of time and money on such questions. They are busy devising quantitative measures of indices such as degree of control, linkages, relationships, support — and we can soon look forward to standardized scales for assigning programs along an institutionalization-normalization continuum [10].

But, alas, there are not just untidy loose ends which scientific research will one day tie up. The ideology of the new movement quite deliberately and explicitly demands that boundaries should not be made too clear. The metaphor of "crumbling walls" implies an undifferentiated open space. The main British prison reform group, the Howard League, once called for steps to ". . . restore the prison to the community and the community to the prison" and less rhetorically, here is an early enthusiast for a model

"Community Correction Centre":

> The line between being 'locked up' and 'free' is purposely indistinct because it must be drawn differently for each individual. Once the client is out of Phase I, where all clients enter and where they are all under essentially custodial control, he may be 'free' for some activities but still 'locked up' for others [11].

There is no irony intended in using inverted commas for such words as "free" and "locked up" or in using such euphemisms as "essentially custodial control". This sort of blurring — deliberate or unintentional — may be found throughout the complicated networks of "diversion" and "alternatives" which are now being set up. The half-way house might serve as a good example. These agencies called variously, "residential treatment centers", "rehabilitation residences", "reintegration centers" or (with the less flowery language preferred in Britain) simply "hostels", invariably become special institutional domains themselves. They might be located in a whole range of odd settings — private houses, converted motels, the grounds of hospitals, the dormitories of university campuses or even within the walls of prisons themselves. Their programs [12] reproduce rules — for example about security, curfew, permitted visitors, drugs — which are close to those of the institution itself. Indeed it becomes difficult to distinguish a very "open" prison — with liberal provisions for work release, home release, outside educational programs — from a very "closed" half-way house. The house may be half-way *in* — for those too serious to be left at home, but not serious enough for the institution and hence a form of "diversion" — or half-way *out* — for those who can be released from the institution but are not yet "ready" for the open community, hence a form of "after care". To confuse the matter even further, the same center is sometimes used for both these purposes, with different rules for the half way in inmates and the half way out inmates.

Even this blurring and confusion is not enough: one advocate [13] draws attention to the advantages of *quarter-way* houses and *three-quarter* way houses. These "concepts" we are told are already being used in the mental health field, but are not labelled as such in corrections. The quarter-way house deals with people who need supervision on a near permanent basis, while the three-quarter way house is designed to care for persons in an "acute temporary crisis needing short term residential care and little supervision". Then — taking the opposite tack from devising finer and finer classification schemes — other innovators argue for a multi-purpose center: some half-way houses already serve as a parolee residence, a drop-in center, a drug treatment program and a non-residential walk in center for after-care.

The fact that many of these multi-purpose centers are directed not just at convicted offenders, but are preventive, diagnostic or screening enterprises

aimed at potential, pre-delinquents, or high risk populations, should alert us to the more important forms of blurring behind this administrative surrealism. The ideology of community treatment allows for a facile evasion of the delinquent/non-delinquent distinction. The British system of "intermediate treatment" for example provides not just an intermediate possibility between sending the child away from home and leaving him in his normal home environment, but also a new way ". . . to make use of facilities available to children who have not been before the courts, and so to secure the treatment of 'children in trouble' in the company of other children through the sharing of activities and experiences within the community" [14]. There is a deliberate attempt to evade the question of whether a rule has been actually broken. While the traditional screening mechanism of the criminal justice system have always been influenced to a greater or lesser degree by non-offense related criteria (race, class, demeanour) the offense was at least considered. Except in the case of wrongful conviction, some law must have been broken. This is no longer clear: a delinquent may find himself in custody ("short term intensive treatment") simply because of program failure: he has violated the norms of some other agency in the continuum — for example, by not turning up to his therapy group, "acting out", or being uncooperative.

We are seeing, then, not just the proliferation of agencies and services, finely calibrated in terms of degree of coerciveness or intrusion or unpleasantness. The uncertainties are more profound than this: voluntary or coercive, formal or informal, locked up or free, guilty or innocent. Those apparently absurd administrative and research questions — when is a prison a prison or a community a community? is the alternative an alternative? who is half-way in and who is three-quarter way out? — beckon to a future when it will be impossible to determine who exactly is emeshed in the social control system — and hence subject to its jurisdiction and surveillance — at any one time.

Thinning the Mesh and Widening the Net

On the surface, a major ideological thrust in the move against institutions derives from a desire to limit state intervention. Whether arising from the supposed failures of the treatment model, or the legal argument about the over-reach of the law and the necessity to limit the criminal sanction, or the implicit non-interventionism of labelling theory, or a general disenchantment with paternalism, or simply the pragmatic case for easing the burdens on the system — the eventual message looked the same: the state should do less rather than more. It is ironical then — though surely the irony is too obvious

even to be called this — that the major results of the new movements towards "community" and "diversion" have been to increase rather than decrease the *amount* of intervention directed at many groups of deviants in the system and, probably, to increase rather than decrease the total *number* who get into the system in the first place. In other words: "alternatives" become not alternatives at all but new progams which supplement the existing system or else expand it by attracting new populations.

I will refer to these two overlapping possibilities as "thinning the mesh" and "widening the net" respectively. No one who has studied the results of such historical innovations as probation and parole should be surprised by either of these effects. As Rothman, for example, comments about the early twentieth century impact of the psychiatric ideology on the criminal justice system: ". . . rationales and practices that initially promised to be less onerous nevertheless served to encourage the extension of state authority. The impact of the ideology was to expand intervention, not to restrict it" [15].

The detailed processes through which the new community agencies are generating such expansion are not my concern here [16]. I will merely use the two strategies of "alternatives" and "diversion" to suggest how illusory is the notion that the new movement will lead to a lesser degree of formal social control.

Let us first examine community alternatives to incarceration. The key index of "success" is not simply the proliferation of such programs, but the question of whether they are replacing or merely providing supplementary appendages to the conventional system of incarceration. The statistical evidence is by no means easy to decipher but it is clear, both from Britain and America, that rates of incarceration — particularly in regard to juveniles — are not at all declining as rapidly as one might expect and in some spheres are even increasing. Critically — as one evaluation suggests [17] the "alternatives" are not, on the whole, being used for juveniles at the "deep end" of the system, i.e. those who really would have been sent to institutions before. When the strategy is used for "shallow end" offenders — minor or first offenders whose chances of incarceration would have been slight — then the incarceration rates will not be affected.

The exact proportions of these types are difficult to estimate: one English study of community service orders shows that only half the offenders sent would otherwise have received custodial sentences [18]. Leaving aside the question of the exact effects on the rest of the system, there is little doubt that a substantial number — perhaps the majority — of those subjected to the new programs, will be subjected to a degree of intervention higher than they would have received under previous non-custodial options like fines, conditional discharge or ordinary probation.

What all this means is that as long as the shallow end principle is used and as long as institutions are not literally closed down (as in the much publicized Massachusetts example) there is no guarantee either than incarceration will decrease dramatically or that the system will be less interventionist overall. The conclusion of the recent National Assessment of Juvenile Corrections holds true generally: although there are exceptions, "in general as the number of community based facilities increases, the total number of youths incarcerated increases" [19].

The paradox throughout all this that the more benign, attractive and successful the program is defined — especially if it uses the shallow end principle, as most do — the more it will be used and the wider it will cast its net:

> Developing and administering community programs can be a source of gratification to sincere correctional administrators and lay volunteers who believe they are 'doing good' by keeping people out of dungeons and helping them obtain social services. Judges, reluctant to send difficult children to a reformatory and equally reluctant to release them without an assurance that something will be done to prevent them from returning may be especially enthusiastic about the development of alternative dispositions [20].

Turning now to the more explicit forms of diversion, it is once again clear that the term, like the term "alternatives" is not quite what it implies. Diversion has been hailed as the most radical application of the non-intervention principle short of complete decriminalization. The grand rationale is to restrict the full force of the criminal justice process to more serious offences and to either eliminate or substantially minimize penetration for all others [21]. The strategy has received the greatest attention in the juvenile field: a remarkable development, because the central agency here, the juvenile court, was *itself* the product of a reform movement aimed at "diversion".

Clearly, all justice systems — particularly juvenile — have always contained a substantial amount of diversion. Police discretion has been widely used to screen juveniles: either right out of the system by dropping charges, informally reprimanding or cautioning, or else informal referral to social services agencies. What has now happened, to a large degree, is that these discretionary and screening powers have been formalized and extended — and in the process, quite transformed. The net widens to include those who, if the program had not been available would either not have been processed at all or would have been placed on options such as traditional probation. Again, the more benevolent the new agencies appear, the more will be diverted there by encouragement or coercion. And — through the blurring provided by the welfare net — this will happen to many not officially adjudicated as delinquent as well. There will be great pressure to work with parts of the population not previously "reached".

All this can be most clearly observed in the area of police diversion of juveniles. Where the police used to have two options — screen right out (the route for by far the *majority* of encounters) or process formally — they now have the third option of diversion into a program. Diversion can then be used as an alternative to screening and not an alternative to processing [22]. The proportion selected will vary. British research on police juvenile liaison schemes and similar measures [23] shows a clear widening of the net and one survey of eleven Californian diversion projects suggests that only 51 percent of clients were actually diverted from the system, with the rest receiving more processing than they would have received otherwise [24]. Another evaluation of 35 police departments running diversion programs concludes:

> ... the meaning of 'diversion' has been shifted from 'diversion from' to 'referral to'. Ironically, one of the ramifications of this is that in contrast to some earlier cited rationales for diversion as reducing costs, caseload and the purview of the criminal justice system, diversion may in fact be extending the costs, caseload and system purview even further than had previously been the case [25].

The key to understanding this state of affairs lies in the distinction between *traditional* or *true* diversion — removing the juvenile from the system altogether by screening out (no further treatment, no service, no follow up) — and the *new* diversion which entails screening plus program: formal penetration is minimized by referral to programs in the system or related to it [26]. Only traditional diversion is true diversion in the sense of diverting *from*. The new diversion diverts — for better or worse — *into* the system. Cressey and McDermott's laconic conclusion from their evaluation of one such set of programs might apply more generally.

> If 'true' diversion occurs, the juvenile is safely out of the official realm of the juvenile justice system and he is immune from incurring the delinquent label or any of its variations — pre-delinquent, delinquent tendencies, bad guy, hard core, unreachable. Further, when he walks out of the door from the person diverting him, he is technically free to tell the diverter to go to hell. We found very little 'true' diversion in the communities studied [27].

To conclude this section: whatever the eventual pattern of the emergent social control system, it should be clear that such policies as "alternatives" in no way represent a victory for the anti-treatment lobby or an "application" of labelling theory. Traditional deviant populations are being processed in a different way or else new populations are being caught up in the machine. For some observers [28] all this is an index of how good theory produces bad practise: each level diverts to the next and at each level vested interests (like job security) ensures that few are diverted right out. And so the justice machine enlarges itself. This looks "successful" in terms of the machine's

own operational definition of success, but is a failure when compared to the theory from which the policy (supposedly) was derived.

Be this as it may, the new movement — in the case of crime and delinquency at least — has led to a more voracious processing of deviant populations, albeit in new settings and by professionals with different names. The machine might in some respects be getting softer, but it is not getting smaller (and probably not more efficient — but that's another story).

Masking and Disguising

The softness of the machine might also be more apparent than real. It became common place in historical analyses to suggest that the more benign parts of the system such as the juvenile court [29] masked their most coercive intentions and consequences. This conclusion might apply with equal force to the current strategies of diversion and alternatives. Even more than their historical antecedents, they employ a social work rather than legalistic rationale; they are committed to the principle of blurring the boundaries of social control and they use the all-purpose slogan of 'community' which cannot but sound benign.

There can be little doubt that the intentions behind the new movement and — more to the point — its end results, are often humane, compassionate and helpful. Most clients, deviants or offenders would probably prefer this new variety to the stark option of the prison. But this argument is only valid if the alternatives are real ones. The net-thinning and mesh-widening effects, though indicate that the notion of alternatives can be misleading and mystifying. Note, for example, the curious claim that agencies like half-way houses are justified because they are just as successful in preventing crime as direct release into the community. As Greenberg notes, however, when such alternatives are presented as a condition of release from prison, "... the contrast between the brutality of the prison and the alleged humanitarianism of community corrections is besides the point, because the community institution is not used to replace the prison; instead the offender is exposed to both the prison and the community 'alternatives' " [30].

Even when the alternatives *are* real ones, it is not self evident that they are always more humane and less stigmatizing just because, in some sense they are "in the community". Community agencies, for example, might use a considerable amount of more or less traditional custody and often without legal justification. As the assessment of one experiment revealed:

When subjects failed to comply with the norms of the intensive treatment regime, or even when a program agent believes subjects might fail to comply, then, as they say in the intensive treatment circles, detention may be indicated. Both these features, and the extensive use of

home placements as well, suggest that the term 'community' like the term 'intensive treatment' may come to have a very special meaning in programs designed to deliver 'intensive treatment in the community' [31].

Such disguised detention, though, is probably not a major overall source of masking. More important is the bureaucratic generation of new treatment criteria which might allow for more unchecked coercion than at first appears. In a system with low visibility and low accountability, there is less room for such niceties as due process and legal rights. Very often, for example, "new diversion" (minimization of penetration) occurs by deliberately avoiding due process: the client proceeds through the system on the assumption or admission of guilt. Indeed the deliberate conceptual blurring between "diversion" and "prevention" explicitly calls for an increase in this sort of non-legal discretion.

All this, of course, still leaves open the question of whether the end result — however mystifying some of the routes that led to it — is actually experienced as more humane and helpful by the offender. There is little evidence either way on this, beyond the rather bland common sense assumption that most offenders would prefer not to be "locked up". What is likely, is that deep end projects — those that are genuine alternatives to incarceration — have to make a trade-off between treatment goals (which favour the integrated community setting) and security goals which favour isolation. The trade-off under these conditions will tend to favour security — resulting in programs which simulate or mimic the very features of the institution they set out to replace. Let us consider two somewhat different examples.

The first is Fort Des Moines, a "Community Correctional Facility" which is part of a wider Community Corrections Program [32]. This is a 50 bed non-secure unit, housed in an ex-army base. The clients work in ordinary jobs outside and there is minimal physical security in the shape of bars or fences.

Here, though, are some of the security trade offs: 1) the low "client-counsellor" ratio — one staff person for every two clients — allows for intensive "informal observation" of the clients for security purposes. There is, for example, a "staff desk person" who signs clients in and out, recording their attitudes and activities. There is also a "floating staff person" who circulates throughout the institution, observing client behaviour, taking a count of all clients each hour (called the 'eye check') and recording the count in the log; 2) the client has to "contract" to behave well and participate actively in his rehabilitation: the sanction of being returned to prison is always present. From the beginning of his stay (when he has to sign a waiver of privacy granting the program access to information in confidential agency files) he is closely scrutinized. Besides the obvious offences like using drugs, fighting or trying to escape the failure to maintain "a

significant level of performance" is one of the most serious offenses a client can commit and results in immediate return to jail [33]; 3) the court retains jurisdiction over the client, receiving detailed rosters and program reports and having to authorize internal requests for work, schooling or furloughs. In addition, the local police and sheriffs departments receive weekly listings of the residents, indicating where each has to be at specified hours of each day. This information is available to patrol officers who may see inmates in the community.

These features — especially the complicated compulsory treatment process itself — suggests an intensity of intervention at least as great as that in most maximum security prisons. The commitment to a behaviourist conditioning program — a feature of many American versions of community treatment — is particularly insidious and is illustrated well in my second example, the Urbana-Champaign Adolescent Diversion Project [34]. This — unlike the first example — is genuinely enough in the community: juveniles considered as "beyond lecture and release and clearly headed for court" are referred by the police to a program of behavioural contracting organized by a university psychology department. The volunteer staff monitor and mediate contractual agreements between the youth and his parents and teachers: privileges in return for complying with curfew, house chores and personal appearance. Here are extracts from a typical day in the life of Joe, a sixteen year old who had come to the attention of the juvenile division for possession of marijuana and violation of the municipal curfew laws:

Joe agrees to:

1. Call home by 4:00 p.m. each afternoon and tell his parents his whereabouts and return home by 5:00 p.m.

2. Return home by 12:00 midnight on weekend nights.

3. Make his bed daily and clean his room daily (spread neat; clothes hung up).

4. Set table for dinner daily.

Joe's parents agree to:

1. Allow Joe to go out from 7:30 to 9:30 Monday through Thursday evening and ask about his companions without negative comment.

2. Allow Joe to go out the subsequent weekend night.

3. Check his room each day and pay him 75 cents when cleaned.

4. Deposit 75 cents per day in a savings account for Joe.

Bonus
If Joe performs at 80 percent or above of 1 through 4 above, his parents will deposit an additional 3 dollars in his account for each consecutive seven day period.

Sanction
If Joe falls below 60 percent in 1 and 2 above in any consecutive seven day period, he will cut two inches off his hair.

Comments about the alleged "humanitarianism" of this program are redundant.

Merging Public and Private

The notion that the state should be solely responsible for crime control only developed in England and America in the later part of the nineteenth century. The key changes then – the removal of prisons from private to public control and the creation of a uniformed public police force – are taken as the beginning of the continued and voracious absorption of deviancy control into the centralized apparatus of the state. Certainly the political and economic demands of industrial society have led to increasing state control in the form of laws, regulations, administrative and enforcement agencies.

At a somewhat different level, though, there are other developments – in line with the move from concentration to dispersal traced in this paper – which are going in a somewhat different direction. Indeed some observers – particularly in the case of the police, have gone as far as noting a tendency to the "privatization of social control" [35]. While this might be an exaggeration, it is apparent that along with the other types of blurring, there has been some merging of the obviously public and formal apparatus of control with the private and less formal. The ideology of community implies this: on the one hand, the repressive, interventionist reach of the state should be blunted, on the other, the "community" should become more involved in the day to day business of prevention and control.

It would be tempting – but too simple – to see this interpenetration of the public and private as going back full circle to its earlier historical forms. The connections between crime control and contractual or other forms of profit making which emerged at the end of the seventeenth century, are not quite the same as today's versions of private control – nor can they ever be in the rationalized centralized state.

The increasing involvement, though – particularly in the United States – of private enterprise in the public service sector, is noteworthy enough. Indeed in Scull's analysis decarceration itself is attributed to a fiscal crisis: the state divests itself of expensive crime control functions allowing private enterprise to process deviant populations for profit. This is readily observable in the case of private clinics, hospitals or welfare hotels for the old and mentally ill, where private agencies either serve their "own" clientele or function under licence or contract from the state.

In the areas of crime and delinquency it is not quite as clear how ". . . the spheres of public and private actually have become progressively less dis-

tinct" [36]. The term privatization does not fully cover the complicated ways in which the new community alternatives relate to the system from which they are supposedly diverting. In some cases, there *is* clear privatization in the form of half-way houses, hostels, group homes or fostering schemes being run for private profit. But the fate of most private agencies in this area – especially if they prove successful – is to become co-opted and absorbed into the formal state apparatus. This has happened even to radical self-help organizations which originated in an antagonistic relationship to the system. In the case of diversion, the ideal non-legal agency (free from system control, client oriented, with voluntary participation, independent of sponsor's pressure) often becomes like the various "para-legal" agencies closely connected to the system and dependent on it for space, referrals, accountability and sponsorship [37]. Various compromises on procedure are made as temporary tactics to deflect suspicion and criticism, but are then institutionalized. The private agency expands, for example, by asking for public funding and in turn might change its screening criteria to fit the official system's demands. It becomes increasingly difficult to assign the status of private or public to these agencies.

At the same time as private agencies find it difficult not to be co-opted, the public sector responds to pressures (some fiscal and some sincerely deriving from the community ideology) by using more private resources, especially in the form of volunteers. Ex-offenders treat offenders, indigenous community residents are recruited to probation or voluntary "big brother" type schemes, family members and teachers are used in behavioural contracting programs or university students take on counselling functions as part of their course work.

All this is a fairly long way removed from the pre-nineteenth century forms of privatization. The closest parallels to this might be in the area of policing. In both Britain and the United States private policing has become a massive industry. In the United States, private police outnumber their counterparts in the public sector – a growth attributed to the increasing involvement of the ordinary police in human services "dirty work", leaving large corporations dependent on private protective and investigative services in areas such as pilferage, security checks, industrial espionage and credit card scrutiny.

Alongside all this, there have been changes in police methods which have some other curious historical parallels – to the time when the dividing lines between the civilian population and a uniformed, centralized police force were not at all clear. There has been considerable expansion in the use of informers, secret agents, undercover work, agents provocateurs – all those disguised operations in which the police are made to look more like citizens and citizens more like the police. There is a great deal of evidence about the

infiltration of social movements by informers and agents provocateurs [38] while undercover work and entrapment in the field of victimless crime or vice (drugs, gambling, prostitution) has become – if this is not a contradiction – open knowledge. Here, police work is less re-active than pro-active: aimed at anticipating and preventing crimes not yet committed through such methods as police posing as criminals (prostitutes, fences, pornographic book dealers) or as victims (for example, as elderly citizens to attract mugging).

Leaving aside the surrealistic possibilities this opens up (agents who are themselves under surveillance selling drugs to and arresting other agents), and the implications for civil liberties and conceptions of trust and privacy [39] it directs attention to further twists and ambiguities in the already complex relationship between deviance and social control. While some parts of police work are becoming more underground and secretive, others are trying to reach out more openly into the wider community. Schemes for "community based preventive policing" are now well established in Britain and America. Community relations officers, juvenile liaison bureaus, school-linked officers are all involved in establishing closer links with the community, humanizing the face of police work and encouraging early reporting and surveillance. Official law enforcement agencies also actively support various projects aimed at encouraging early reporting of crime through such methods as building up neighbourhood "whistle alert networks" or citizen band radio reporting. A more obvious form of privatization is the development of unofficial residents patrols to maintain surveillance over neighbourhoods as well as mediating between the police and residents [40].

It might be premature to cite these developments as heralding a quite new mode of law enforcement. The appeal of the ideology of citizen involvement in crime prevention, though, is strong and shares the very same roots as the broader movement to the community. Here is an official version:

> ... Crime prevention as each citizen's duty is not a new idea. In the early days of law enforcement well over a thousand years ago (sic) the peacekeeping system encouraged the conceopt of mutual responsibility. Each individual was responsible not only for his actions but for those of his neighbours. A citizen observing a crime had the duty to rouse his neighbours and pursue the criminal. Peace was kept for the most part, not by officials but by the whole community [41].

Needless to say, today's forms of peacekeeping by the community are not quite the same as those golden days of "mutual responsibility". Closed circuit television, two way radios, vigilante patrols and police decoys hardly simulate life in a pre-industrial village. This is not for want of trying. In some large stores, private security police are posing as employees. They conspicuously steal and are then conspicuously "discovered" by the management and ceremonially disciplined, thus deterring the real employees. They

then presumably move on to stage somewhere else another such Durkheimian ceremony of social control.

Absorption, Penetration, Re-integration

The asylum represented not just isolation and confinement – like quarantining the infected – but a ritual of physical exclusion. Without the possibility of actual banishment to another society, the asylum had to serve the classic social function of scapegoating. The scapegoat of ancient legend was an animal driven to the wilderness, bearing away the sins of the community.

In the new ideology of corrections, there is no real or symbolic wilderness – just the omnipresent community into which the deviant has to be unobtrusively "integrated" or "reintegrated". The blurring of social control implies both the deeper penetration of social control into the social body and the easing of any measures of exclusion, or status degradation. For the apologists of the new corrections, the word "re-integration" has a magic ring. Thus Empey [42] argues that we are in the middle of a third revolution in corrections: the first from Revenge to Restraint (in the first part of the nineteenth century), the second from Restraint to Reformation (from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century) – and now from Reformation to Re-integration. Leaving aside the historical inaccuracy of this sequence, it does not actually tell us what this new utopia will look like.

In the most immediate sense, what is being proposed is a greater direct involvement of the family, the school and various community agencies in the day to day business of prevention, treatment, and resocialization. This implies something more profound than simply using more volunteers or increasing reporting rates. It implies some sort of reversal of the presumption in positivist criminology that the delinquent is a different and alien being. Deviance rather is with us, woven into the fabric of social life and it must be "brought back home". Parents, peers, schools, the neighbourhood, even the police should dedicate themselves to keeping the deviant out of the formal system. He must be absorbed back into the community and not processed by official agencies [43].

The central role allocated to the family – part of the broader movement of the rediscovery of the family in sociology and social policy – is a good example of the integration ideology. Well established methods such as foster care, substitute homes and family placements are being extended and one enthusiast looks forward to "... the day when middle class American families actually wanted in large numbers to bring juvenile and pre-delinquent youths into their homes as a service commitment" [44]. The family having a delinquent living with them is seen as a "remarkable

correctional resource" for the future. In Britain and Scandinavia a number of alternative systems of family placement besides salaried foster parents have been tried — for example "together at home", the system of intensive help in Sweden in which social workers spend hours sharing the family's life and tasks. Alongside these diversionary alternatives, parents and schools are also encouraged to react sooner to early signs of trouble.

Going beyond the family setting, the stress on community absorption has found one of its most attractive possibilities in the system of community service orders developed in England. Under this system, offenders are sentenced to useful supervised work in the community: helping in geriatric wards, driving disabled people around, painting and decorating the houses of various handicapped groups, building children's playground etc. This is a particularly attractive scheme because it appeals not just to the soft ideology of community absorption, but the more punitive objectives of restitution and compensation.

Needless to say, there are profound limits to the whole ideology of integration — as indeed there are to all such similar patterns I have described. The "community" — as indicated by the standard local reaction to say, half-way houses or day centers being located in their own neighbour-hood — is not entirely enthusiastic about such "integration". In the immedi-ate future the segregation of the deviant will remain as the central part of the control apparatus. The established professionals, agencies and service bureau-cracies are not going to give up so easily their hard won empires of "expertise" and identity in the name of some vague notion of integration. Nevertheless at the rhetorical and ideological levels, the move to a new model of deviancy control has been signalled. On this level at least, it may not be too dramatic to envisage the distinction between cannibalism and anthropemy becoming less relevant:

> If we studied societies from the outside, it would be tempting to distinguish two contrasting types: those which practise cannibalism — that is which regard the absorption of certain individuals possessing dangerous powers as the only means of neutralising those powers and even of turning them to advantage — and those which, like our own society, adopt what might be called the practice of anthropemy (from the Greek èmai', to vomit); faced with the same problem the latter type of society has chosen the opposite solution, which consists of ejecting dangerous individuals from the social body and keeping them temporarily or permanently in isolation, away from all contact with their fellows, in establishments especially intended for this purpose [45].

Conclusion — Towards the Punitive City

These emerging patterns of social control — dispersal, penetration, blur-ring, absorption, widening — must be seen as no more than patterns: repre-

sentations or models of what is yet to be fully constructed. Historians of social policy can use the emergent final system to validate their reading of such early, tentative patterns; the student of contemporary policy has no such luxury. The largest question mark must hang over the future role of the prison itself in the total system. The rhetoric of community control is now unassailable, but it is not yet clear how *far* the prison will be supplemented and complemented by these new forms of control.

It is, eventually, the sheer proliferation and elaboration of these other systems of control — rather than the attack on prison itself — which impresses. What is happening is a literal reproduction on a wider societal level of those astonishingly complicated systems of classification — the "atlases of vice" — inside the nineteenth century prison. New categories and subcategories of deviance and control are being created under our eyes. All these agencies — legal and quasi-legal, administrative and professional — are marking out their own territories of jurisdiction, competence and referral. Each set of experts produces its own "scientific" knowledge: screening devices, diagnostic tests, treatment modalities, evaluation scales. All this creates new categories and the typifications which fill them: where there was once talk about the "typical" prisoner, first offender or hardened recidivist, now there will be typical "clients" of half-way houses, or community correctional centers, typical divertees or predelinquents. These creatures are then fleshed out — in papers, research proposals, official reports — with sub-systems of knowledge and new vocabularies: locking up becomes "intensive placement", dossiers become "anecdotal records", rewards and punishments become "behavioural contracts".

The enterprise justifies itself: there is hardly any point in asking about "success — this is not the object of the exercise. Research is done on the classification system *itself* — working out a "continuum of community basedness", prediction tables, screening devices — and one does not ask for a classification system to "work". In one massive American enterprise [46] some 10 Federal agencies, 31 task forces and 93 experts got together simply to study the ways of classifying various problem groups of children.

The overwhelming impression is one of bustling, almost *frenzied* activity: all these wonderful new things are being done to this same old group of troublemakers (with a few new ones allowed in). It might not be too far fetched to imagine an urban ethnographer of the future, that proverbial Martian anthropologist studying a day in the life of this strange new tribe, filing in a report something like this [47]:

> Mr. and Mrs. Citizen, their son Joe and daughter Linda, leave their suburban home after breakfast, saying goodbye to Ron, a fifteen year pre-delinquent who is living with them under the LAK (Look After a Kid) scheme. Ron will later take a bus downtown to the Community Correctional Center, where he is to be given two hours of Vocational Guidance and later tested

on the Interpersonal Maturity Level Scale. Mr. C. drops Joe off at the School Problems Evaluation Center from where Joe will walk to school. In his class are five children who are bussed from a local Community Home, four from a Pre-Release Facility and three, who, like Ron live with families in the neighbourhood. Linda gets off next — at the GUIDE Center (Girls Unit for Intensive Daytime Education) where she works as a Behavioural Contract Mediator. They drive past a Threequarter-way House, a Rape Crisis Center and then a Drug Addict Cottage, where Mrs. C. waves to a group of boys working in the garden. She knows them from some volunteer work she does in RODEO (Reduction of Delinquency Through Expansion of Opportunities). She gets off at a building which houses the Special Intensive Parole Unit, where she is in charge of a five year evaluation research project on the use of the HIM (Hill Interaction Matrix) in matching group treatment to client. Mr. C. finally arrives at work, but will spend his lunch hour driving around the car again as this is his duty week on patrol with TIPS (Turn in a Pusher).

Meantime, back in the ghetto . . . .

The logic of this master pattern — dispersal, penetration, spreading out — as opposed to its particular current forms, is not at all new. Its antecedents can be traced though, not to the model which its apologists cite — the idyllic pre-industrial rural community — but to a somewhat later version of social control, a version which *in theory* was an alternative to the prison. When, from the end of the eighteenth century, punishment started entering deeper into the social body, the alternative vision to the previous great concentrated spectacles of public torture, was of the dispersal of control through "hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment" [48]. The eighteenth century reformers dreamed of dispersal and diversity but this vision of the punitive city was never to be fully realized. Instead punishment became concentrated in the coercive institution, a single uniform penalty to be varied only in length. The earlier "projects of docility" which Foucault describes — the techniques of order, discipline and regulation developed in schools, monasteries, workshops, the army — could only serve as models. Panopticism (surveillance, discipline) began to spread: as disciplinary establishments increased, ". . . their mechanisms have a certain tendency to become 'de-institutionalized', to emerge from the closed fortresses in which they once functioned and to circulate in a 'free' state; the massive compact disciplines are broken down into flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted" [49].

This principle of "indefinite discipline" — judgements, examinations and observations which would never end — represented the new mode of control as much as the public execution had represented the old. Only in the prison, though, could this utopia be realized in a pure, physical form. The "new" move into the community is merely a continuation of the overall pattern established in the nineteenth century. The proliferation of new experts and professionals, the generation of specialized domains of scientific knowledge, the creation of complicated classification systems, the establishment of a

network of agencies surrounding the court and the prison — all these developments marked the beginning a century ago of the widening of the "carceral circle" or "carceral archipelago".

The continuous gradation of institutions then — the "correctional" continuum" — is not new. What is new is the scale of the operation and the technologies (drugs, surveillance and information gathering techniques) which facilitate the blurring and penetration which I described. Systems of medicine, social work, education, welfare take on supervisory and judicial functions, while the penal apparatus itself becomes more influenced by medicine, education, psychology [50]. This new system of subtle gradations in care, control, punishment and treatment is indeed far from the days of public execution and torture — but it is perhaps not quite as far as Foucault suggests from that early reform vision of the punitive city. The ideology of community is trying once more to increase the visibility — if not the theatricality — of social control. True, we must not know quite what is happening — treatment or punishment, public or private, locked up or free, inside or outside, voluntary or coercive — but we must know that something is happening, here, in our very own community.

An obvious question: is all this good or bad? Most of us — consciously or not — probably hold a rather bleak view of social change. Things must be getting worse. My argument has obviously tilted towards this view of the world by dwelling on the undesirable consequences — some unintended and others not too unintended — of the emerging social control system. The consequent series of all-purpose radical assumptions, though — that things must always be getting worse; that all reforms, however well intentioned ultimately lead to more repression and coercion; that industrial capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction — need some correction. Undoubtedly some programs of community treatment or diversion are genuine alternatives to incarceration and in addition are more humane and less intrusive. Sometimes the programs might succeed in avoiding the harsh effects of early stigmatization and brutalization. In addition, all these terrible sounding "agents of social control" instead of being disguised paratroopers of the state, might be able to deploy vastly improved opportunities and resources to offer help and service to groups which desperately need them. These possibilities must not be ignored for a minute, nor should the possibility that from the delinquent or criminal's own subjective personal experience, these new programs might indeed be preferable — whatever the overall consequences as depicted by any outside sociologist.

Many of these possibilities are yet to be resolved by more or less empirical evidence. But in the long run — as they say — social control is in the interests of the collective, not the individual. It could hardly be otherwise.

Notes

1 In the United States, some recent and explicit versions of this disenchantment – framed in the language of embittered liberalism – may be found in the various essays in Gaylin, W. et al (1978). *Doing Good: The Limits of Benevolence*, New York: Pantheon Books. In Britain, despite the fact that substantial cuts in welfare services have occurred, the commitment to the welfare state is more entrenched and consequently a liberal disenchantment with "doing good" has not yet surfaced.

2 Rusche, G. and Kircheimer, O. (1938). *Punishment and Social Structure*, New York: Russell and Russell; Foucault, M. (1967). *Madness and Civilisation*, London: Tavistock and (1977). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, London: Allen Lane; Rothman, D. J. (1971). *The Discovery of the Asylum*, Boston: Little Brown.

3 For various relevant attempts, see Cohen, S. (1977). "Prisons and the Future of Control Systems" in M. Fitzgerald et al (eds.) *Welfare in Action*, London: Routledge, pp. 217–228; Scull, A. (1977). *Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant*, London: Prentice Hall; and Rothman, D. "Behavioural Modification in Total Institutions: A Historical Overview", *Hastings Centre Report*, 5: 17–24.

4 Scull, op. cit., documents both the presence at the end of the nineteenth century of the equivalent of today's liberal/social scientific critique of institutions and the reasons for the failure of this earlier attack. For him, the origins of current policy lie in certain changing features of welfare capitalism. Crudely expressed: it no longer "suits" the state to maintain segregative modes of control based on the asylum. In relative terms (and hence the appeal to fiscal conservatives) such modes become costly, while the alternative of welfare payments allowing subsistence in the community, is easier to justify and can be sold on humanitarian and scientific grounds. Scull's argument is a useful corrective to accounts purely at the level of ideas, but it places too much importance on the supposed fiscal crisis, it is less relevant to Britain and America and far less relevant for crime and delinquency than mental illness. In regard to crime and delinquency the picture is not the non-interventionist one Scull implies but – as this paper suggests – the development of parallel systems of control.

5 Scull, op. cit., p. 42.

6 See Gaylin et al, op. cit. and Von Hirsh, A. (1976). *Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments*, New York: Hill and Wang.

7 The most informative sources in the United States would be journals such as *Crime and Delinquency* and *Federal Probation* from the mid-sixties onwards and the various publications from bodies such as the National Institute of Mental Health and, later, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. A representative collection of such material is Perlstein, G. R. and Phelps, T. R. (eds.) (1975). *Alternatives to Prison: Community Based Corrections*, Pacific Palisades, Calif: Goodyear Publishing Co., In Britain the ideology of community control has been slower and less obvious in its development, though it can be traced in various Home Office publications from the end of the nineteen sixties. See also Blom-Cooper, L. (ed.) (1974). *Progress in Penal Reform*, Oxford: Oxford University Press and Tutt, N. (ed.) (1978). *Alternative Strategies for Coping with Crime*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

8 Some of these may be found in Scull, op. cit. and Greenberg, D. F. (1975). "Problems in Community Corrections", *Issues in Criminology*, 10: 1–33.

9 National Institute of Mental Health (1971). *Community Based Correctional Programs: Models and Practices*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p.1.

10 Coates, R. B., et al (1976). "Social Climate, Extent of Community Linkages and Quality of Community Linkages: The Institutionalisation Normalisation Continuum" unpublished Ms., Centre for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School.

11 Bradley, H. B. (1969). "Community Based Treatment for Young Adult Offenders", *Crime and Delinquency*, 15 (3): 369.

12 For a survey, see Seiter, R. P. et al (1977). *Halfway House*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, L.E.A.A.

13 Fox, V. (1977). *Community Based Corrections*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, pp. 62–63.

14 Hinton, N. (1974). "Intermediate Treatment" in Blom Cooper (ed.) op. cit., p. 239.

15 Rothman (1975), op. cit., p. 19.

16 The most exhaustive research here deals with the two Californian projects – Community Treatment and Probation Subsidy – widely hailed as exemplars of the new strategy. See, especially Lerman, P. (1975). *Community Treatment and Social Control: A Critical Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Policy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press and Messinger, S. (1976). "Confinement in the Community: A Selective Assessment of Paul Lerman's 'Community Treatment and Social Control' ", *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 13 (1): 82–92. Another standard Californian study of the diversion strategy is Cressey, D. and McDermott (1974). *Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. L.E.A.A. For two useful general evaluations of the field, see Rutherford, A. and Bengur, O. (1976). *Community Based Alternatives to Juvenile Incarceration*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, L.E.A.A.; Rutherford, A. and McDermott, R. (1976). *Juvenile Diversion*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, L.E.A.A.

17 Rutherford and Bengur, op. cit.,

18 Pease, K. (1977). *Community Service Assessed in 1976*, Home Office Research Unit Study No. 39, London: H.M.S.O.

19 Quoted in Rutherford and Bengur, op. cit., p. 30.

20 Greenberg, op. cit., p. 23.

21 A clear statement of this rationale and the legal problems in implementing it, is to be found in Law Reform Commission of Canada (1975). *Working Paper No. 7: Diversion*, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada.

22 Dunford, F. W. (1977). "Police Diversion – An Illusion?", *Criminology*, 15 (3): 335–352.

23 Morris, A. (1978). "Diversion of Juvenile Offenders from the Criminal Justice System" in Tutt (ed.), op. cit., pp. 50–54.

24 Bohnstedt, M. (1978). "Answers to Three Questions about Juvenile Diversion", *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 15 (1): 10.

25 Klein, M. W. et al (1976). "The Explosion in Police Diversion Programmes: Evaluating the Structural Dimensions of a Social Fad", in M. W. Klein (ed.) *The Juvenile Justice System*, Beverly Hills: Sage, p. 10.

26 Rutherford and McDermott, op. cit.

27 Cressey and McDermott, op. cit., pp. 3–4.

28 Rutherford and McDermott, op. cit., pp. 25–26.

29 See, especially, Platt, A. M. (1969). *The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

30 Greenberg, op. cit., p. 8.

31 Messinger, op. cit., pp. 84–85.

32 Boorkman, D. et al (1976). *An Exemplary Project: Community Based Corrections in Des Moines*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, L.E.A.A.

33 Ibid., pp. 35–36.

34 Ku, R. and Blew, C. (1977). *A University's Approach to Delinquency Prevention: The Adolescent Diversion Project*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, L.E.A.A.

35 Spitzer, S. and A. T. Scull (1977a). "Social Control in Historical Perspective: From Private to Public Responses to Crime" in D.F. Greenberg (ed.) *Corrections and Punishment*, Beverley Hills: Sage, pp. 265–286 and Spitzer, S. and A. T. Scull (1977b), "Privatisation and Capitalist Development: The Case of the Private Police", *Social Problems*, 25 (1): 18–29.

36 Spitzer and Scull (1977a) op. cit., p. 265.

37 For a description of this process, see Rutherford and McDermott, op. cit.

38 Marx, G. T. (1974), "Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The agent provocateur and informant", *American Journal of Sociology*, 80 (2): 402–442.

39 Marx, G. T. (1977). "Undercover Cops: Creative Policing or Constitutional Threat?", *Civil Liberties Review*, pp. 34–44.

40 For approved examples of these new forms of policing, see Bickman, L. et al (1977). *Citizen Crime Reporting Projects*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice and Yin, R. K. et al (1977). *Citizen Patrol Projects*, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, L.E.A.A.

41 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973). *Community Crime Prevention*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 7.

42 Empey, L. T. (1967). *Alternatives to Incarceration*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

43 For typical statements about absorption, see Carter, R. M. (1972). "The Diversion of Offenders", *Federal Probation* 36 (4): 31–36.

44 Skoler, D. (1975). "Future Trends in Juvenile and Adult Community Based Corrections" in Perlstein and Phelps (eds.), op. cit., p. 11.

45 Levi Strauss, C. (1977). *Tristes Tropiques*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 508.

46 Hobbs, N. (1975). *Issues in the Classification of Children*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers.

47 Strangers to the world of community corrections should be informed that all the projects named in this imaginary report are *real* and current.

48 Foucault (1977), op. cit., p. 113.

49 Ibid., p. 211.

50 Ibid., p. 306.