A "New Rhetoric" for a "New Dialectic": Prolegomena to a Responsible Public Argument

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ABSTRACT: This essay offers, as a counterpart to pragma-dialectical argument, a "new rhetoric" produced in the situated discourse of a public forum when a community addresses matters of common urgency and undertakes informed action. Such a rhetoric takes the principles of discourse ethics as its informing dialectic by identifying an interlocutor as one who is obligated *both* to argue effectively, *and* also to hold open, even reinforce, norms of communicative reason. Implications concerning the study of fallacies and the *ethos* obligations of communicative reasoning are discussed.

KEY WORDS: Rhetoric, dialectic, discourse ethics, fallacies, *ethos*, argument, argumentation, informal reasoning.

In the Aristotelian tradition, the world of argument is divided up into a process of coming to knowledge within three distinct categories of reason. The first kind of knowledge is the product of reflective thinking that is yielded up by private contemplation of certain or infallible premises; apodeictic reasoning follows a strict set of rules that condition arguments by virtue of adherence to formal validity (*Posterior Analytics* 71b17; 85b23). The second kind of knowledge is the product of putting contemplative reason in the service of discussion, and may or may not yield certain results. Unlike apodeictic argument, dialectic takes as its materials the opinions of others and critically tests claims to truth by virtue of formal tests for cogency, consistency, and completeness (*On Sophistical Refutations* 165a39; *Topics* 100b18; 104a36; 104b). Rhetorical argument is produced by systematic investigation into a situation troubling the public (*Rhetoric* 1355b). Its method requires inquiry into all of the available means of persuasion; with the assistance of dialectic (*Rhetoric* 1355a), a domain of reasons found pertinent to a contingent situation is discovered, and the rhetor selects what proofs are most likely to overcome opposition and influence the judgment of an audience whose faculties speech influences (*Rhetoric* 1357a).

The genius of the Aristotelian system is in its connection of theoretical and practical reasoning through dialectical argument.[1] From theoretical reason, dialectic borrows rigor, confidence, and a willingness to test and develop one's own thinking. From practical reason, dialectic takes up its work to find general principles sufficient to examine critically and refine the passing prejudices, shared ignorance, and unexamined conformities of a community and its

audiences. In this manner a good dialectic empowers rhetorical argument. Persuasion is made effective not by trickery, deceit or strategic thinking, but by virtue of its connection to well-founded, sound arguments secured by a critical dialectic that informs speech directed to the decision to act in a particular case.

I have been thinking about Aristotle's mutually informing relation of dialectic and rhetoric recently in connection with the project of pragma-dialectical argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 1987). In their latest work, *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies* (1992), the pragma-dialecticians *hint* that the study of reason and reasoning can be balanced by connecting dialectic and rhetoric in a mutually informing and productive new way. In fact, they say that "to bring about a convergence of different angles, we would, in a certain sense stimulate an integrating return to the classical roots of the study of argumentation as exemplified in Aristotelian Analytic, Dialectic and Rhetoric" (pp. 8–9).

I use the word "hint" \at a new connection between dialectic and rhetoric because the book takes on only one side of the task, albeit an important mission: that is reformulating dialectical argumentation as rule governed, procedurally regulated communication that pursues the ideal of reasonableness through speech acts exchanged in the resolution of differences in opinion. This reformulation invites an important question: what would a "new rhetoric" look like that would be a worthy partner of van Eemeren and Grootendorst's "new dialectic"?[2]

Before addressing this question, I must answer a potential objection: Why search for a "new rhetoric" when we already have a serviceable one developed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)?

As van Eemeren and Grootendorst point out, the "new rhetoric" of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is not sufficiently informed by a systematic dialectical basis (1992, p. 5). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca did perform a valuable service in reanimating the points of departure and schemes of persuasion of the rhetorical tradition. They showed that rhetorical argument aimed at a particular audience is worthy of more regard than idle chatter precisely because any argumentation is held accountable to a transcendent truth adjudicated by the universal audience. There is a flaw in this formulation, however. The accumulation of rhetorical techniques cannot be tested by a dialectic. In the absence of the universal audience – which never really assembles as far as anyone knows – there is no principled dialectic to regulate or test systematically the claims of rhetoric. Absent an informing dialectical basis, there is no place for development of a theoretically informed rhetorical practice. So the techniques, schemes, and concerns of rhetoric overlap and develop somewhat idiosyncratically.

If van Eemeren and Grootendorst have developed a theory of argumentation that would hold rhetorical argument accountable to principles of a dialectic embedded in a formal communicative interaction, then what would be the unique features of a complementary rhetorical theory? How could rhetoric simultaneously be accountable to the rules of communication while performing its function to persuade to action? It is important to answer these questions – and

thereby to define a "new rhetoric" in relation to the "new dialectic" – because such an inquiry raises the crucial issue of how to relate a discourse ethics to the wider, public world of social action.

My plan is to review the distinction between rhetoric and dialectic laid out by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, to sketch the principles of a "new rhetoric" that would be informed by a pragma-dialectical view of argumentation, and to show how the "new rhetoric" might add insights and extend discussion of argument fallacies. My objective is to pursue the Aristotelian goal of creating an under-standing of argument where critical-rationality and effective public persuasion productively inform and complement one another. The essay will concentrate on suggestions for developing a "new rhetoric" rather than attempt to sketch all the premises of a complete rhetorical theory.

RHETORIC AND DIALECTIC RECONSIDERED

The "new dialectic" offered by van Eemeren and Grootendorst is (1) "critical-rationalistic" insofar as argumentation is part of a critical discussion where "reasonableness is not solely determined by the norm of intersubjective agreement but also depends on the 'external' norm that this agreement should be reached in a valid manner"; (2) "pragma-dialectical" in that the formal norms of discussion are connected with the resolution of differences of opinion; and (3) "resolution oriented" insofar as "the function of argumentation in bringing differences of opinion to an adequate conclusion" is emphasized. (4) The "new dialectic" measures outcomes of argumentative engagements according to standards of the cogency of standpoints, support, and responses; and (5) is "reflection minded" in that adherence to rules motivates a rational means of achieving consensus which in turn furthers a discussion-minded attitude. In sum, "critically, dialecticians try to bring about in them [interlocutors] a better understanding of the problems involved in producing, analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse" (1992, p. 9).

In contrast, rhetorical argument is (1) "anthropo-relativistic," that is, its versions of reasonableness are located within standards prevailing in a certain community for acceptable arguments. (2) These localized epistemic standards are dependent upon the specific epistemic background of an audience whose adherence is sought. (3) Thus, the production of rhetorical argument is audience oriented to the extent that an interlocutor produces reasons based "on the effectiveness of argumentative patterns with respect to the people who have to be won over." Therefore, the success of a rhetorical argument is measured by its "persuasiveness" or effectiveness, and its method of inculcation is "prescription-minded," that is rhetoric is learned through imitation of "shining examples" or "cut and dried drills."

Pause to reflect on similarities and differences between the two kinds of argumentation. Both rhetorical and dialectical argument employ speech in a reasoned way to engage an other whose doubts are made manifest; but the locus

of reason in dialectic is in an exteriorized, trans-situational, set of procedures that govern the rules of coming to agreement; whereas the locus of reason in rhetoric is in an implicit, audience-specific, and shifting standard which restricts the domain of acceptable argumentation and invites the use of topics that motivate audiences to follow a line of self-interest associated with the interests a speaker. Pragma-dialectics invites critically tested convictions; rhetoric commands persuasion.

The separation of dialectical and rhetorical argument clarifies the different materials, functions and forms of distinct discourse domains. However, it is crucial that dialectic and rhetoric not be left disconnected. A complete disjunction between dialectical and rhetorical argument can only demean both enterprises.[3] Were we to be convinced that dialectic was the only valid form of communicative reasoning, then rhetorical argument would appear at its best as defective discussion and at its worst as the use of psychological and social force in the service of conformity. There would be no substantive differences between a good rhetoric and a bad rhetoric, for all public discourse involving constituent interests and oppositions would be suspect of somehow being tainted by a false purpose – the use of language for effects unconstrained by tests of truth, reliability, or informed consent. Were we to be convinced that rhetoric was the only real form of argumentation, then dialectical argument would seem to be so much hair splitting and carping apologetics. There would be little intrinsic difference from this latter vantage between the force of rules and the rule of force. Both would be an imposed order by the stronger on the weaker. A rhetoric released from an informing dialectic would celebrate unencumbered the power of naming and revel in the sheer pleasure of cultural performances. A dialectic insensitive to the needs of the other breeds eristics (Wenzel, 1990, p. 24).

The antagonism that pushes apart rhetoric and dialectic is a cultural legacy that is as least as old as the bitter debates between Plato and the Sophists, and it is reduplicated in contemporary institutions; some of which depend upon rather strict codes of technical reason to govern state-of-the art decision-making, while others deploy modern propaganda techniques to lure the mass audience. Equally compelling as the legacy which leaves dialectic and rhetoric split apart, however, is Aristotle's insight that theoretical argument and practical argument can mutually reinforce one another to invite reflective choice. So we approach the central question of the paper: How can a "new dialectic" inform a "new rhetoric"?[4]

A RESPONSIBLE RHETORIC

Let us begin by examining a little more closely the sources of rationality from which the "new dialectic" is developed. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst find in ordinary conversation what Habermas (1981) would call the rationality potential of speech acts; that is, when a discourse is called into question, an interlocutor is expected to be able to provide reasons for the assertions he or she makes. This

requirement of everyday conversation is the site of reason-making in ordinary speech, and the "new dialectic" makes intersubjective expectations explicit as a set of "rules for critical discussion." These rules define junctures in settling a difference of opinion where reasoning can become distorted, and result in a less than well formed discussion.

Judged from the perspective of conversation, where the correctness of a mutually informed opinion is at stake, attention to the implicit rules of discourse make perfect sense. If we are appealing to reason in a critical sense, then it would be contradictory to prevent standpoints from being advanced, to refuse to defend our position, to advance irrelevant attacks, to conceal or falsely attribute related premises, to assume as true what is really open for discussion and in need of proof, to enter into discussion that which cannot be proven, to not retract what is agreed to as indefensible, or to take refuge in ambiguity. Not only do such tactics cut against discovery of the truth of a matter, they vitiate the communicative relationship by breaking off stages of development. Thus, bad arguments are bad communicative practice because they can incapacitate serious discussion at any point of resolving differences. The "new dialectic" serves as a normative test for any who would claim to use reason in a communicative interaction. Now comes the key question: Is it possible to formulate a theory of rhetorical argument informed by a dialectic rooted in speech acts and communication ethics?

If we conceptualize rhetorical argument as the psychological manipulation of an audience by the cunning use of linguistic techniques, then the answer is no. A rhetoric that privileges the intention of a speaker who engineers a message to produce a favorable reaction violates fundamentally the communicative relationship which depends upon a mutual invitation for reflection and enlightened, critically tested convictions. Such a rhetoric would be no different than mass propaganda, abjuring truth in the interest of effects.

On the other hand, if we conceptualize rhetorical argument as the situated discourse of a public forum produced when a community addresses matters of common urgency and undertakes informed action, then another rhetoric, *a responsible rhetoric*, may yet emerge. Such a rhetoric would take discourse ethics as its informing dialectic, by resituating the rhetor as one who is obligated *both* to speak and listen effectively in the service of a cause *and* also to hold open, even reinforce, communicative reason. In such a rhetorical practice, the speaker is not viewed as merely the source of a single message intended to coerce audience must conformity, but one voice among many in a moment of public controversy.

I will sketch the key terms of this "new rhetoric."

Situated Discourse of a Public Forum

A situated argument is discourse that emerges as a concern to people who take turns as speaker and audience. Temporally, any rhetorical argument is brought into being against a background of historical expectations formed through a

tradition of addressing the needs of a community of interlocutors. Such a tradition develops a custom of discussion, thereby establishing a *modus vivendi* which permits the business of argument to be conducted in a public forum; a public forum is a place where all whose opinions are presumptively of merit are asked to speak and listen; and each public forum differs in its interpretation of the rules of participation. Yet, all public argument shares a common characteristic: the use of reasoned discourse to evaluate and test alternatives for action. Habermas (1974, 1989) sees the contemporary emergence of a public in the discussions among members of European civil society who deployed critical rationality to test opinion. Though public argument developed differently in and among European nations, characteristic of public discussion is adherence to "the force of the better argument" which requires that reasons based on blind obedience to authority, institutional right or class obligation be submitted to open questioning.[5]

Matters of Common Urgency

Rhetorical argument moves to action by virtue of its characteristic concerns with disturbances in the ongoing work and lifeworld of a community. The "common urgency" of an audience is defined through arguments that identify (1) the material constraints and resources necessitating and limiting actions, and (2) the possibilities and alternatives for common decisions. Rhetorical argument often concerns the evaluation of means and ends that measure the future success and assess the consequences of actions. The urgency of a situation inviting action often gives to rhetorical argument its elided quality; since we know who we are, the central question becomes how to further interests given a pressing situation. To the extent a common urgency puts at risk group identity, rhetorical argument can lead to a discussion of what means or ends are acceptable or important, and thus invite reflection on communal values in the face of impending choice. Rhetorical argument takes on the unique burden of consensus formation through the discovery of common grounds for choice and decision.

Informed Action

Rhetorical argument is informed action. To address an other is to act toward him or her. Thus, to enact argumentation is to engage the reasons of the other, *and* to put into play and at risk what one thinks of reasoning common to us both. Rhetorical argument, *informed action*, is constituted in mindful choices that balance competing demands for reason: on the one hand, the need for open-ended discussion with others to ground decision in mutually understood perfected reasons; on the other, the timeliness, sensibilities, and needs of a situated audience. Public argumentation thus is doubly focused: on the outcomes of policies *and* on questions of fidelity to its own enactment of deliberative norms and processes.

Informed action is always risky. To acknowledge situated constraints is to reach decisions regarding whose standpoints must be considered, what position

has the burden of proof, what knowledge can be considered as sufficiently settled, when to abandon unproductive avenues of discussion and to take up alternatives, how to regard opposition, and who should be heard on an issue. If a decision is made to include too little argumentation and limit discussion, then relevant issues and standpoints may be suppressed unwarrantedly. If a decision is made to include too much argumentation and to extend discussion in the interests of certainty or procedural regularity, then an otherwise propitious action may be delayed or precluded altogether by eristics.

A responsible rhetoric is one whose argumentative practices take into consideration in the particular case both the need to engender effective deliberative outcomes *and* to preserve the communicative relationships that make such action meaningful to all concerned. A responsible rhetorical practice is responsible to maintaining the possibilities of communication through assuring the quality of a common deliberative discourse.

Let us test this definition of a "new rhetoric" in two ways. First, does rhetoric still remain basically within its office outlined by van Eemeren and Grootendorst? Second, does the "new rhetoric" reorient our understanding of effective argumentation so that rhetorical argument stands as a complement to a dialectic rooted in discourse ethics, while fulfilling its traditional persuasive role?

Recall, that the *sine qua non* of rhetorical argument according to van Eemeren and Grootendorst is its concern with persuasiveness and effectiveness; to that end, schemes or patterns of influence are deployed to influence an audience. This limits the focus of rhetoric to situated discourse where indefinite reflection is not an option. Some premises are regarded as decided or their examination is deemed beyond the scope of *our* discussion. Rhetorical inquiry differs from pragma-dialectical study because it examines situations where the rules of conversation must be balanced, as it were, by the interests of consensus-making. The "new rhetoric" is grounded in the traditional office of persuasion, but rhetoric is reoriented by its reconnection with dialectic: to maintain the possibility of effective persuasion, rhetorical argument has to be responsible to a governing dialectic grounded in discourse ethics.

The key move in this new orientation is resituating the rhetorical agent. In the past, the rhetor has been viewed as a single, integrated consciousness which uses reason to achieve an effect. Now, a rhetor is a person situated in the midst of a controversy who has to reflectively craft a message that is simultaneously effective for the purposes of engaging a community in action *and* yet reinforces or at least does minimal damage to communicative rules and practices. A responsible rhetoric is governed by the principle that pressures to restrict communication should be resisted in the interests of deliberation and effective action. In a contested situation, a responsible rhetoric, then, would engage inquiry into how to create modes of access so that all points of view relevant to a situation can be heard; how to stipulate burdens of proof so that the test of a point of view should be accorded a burden of proof commensurate with its seriousness; how to craft thresholds between what is established as community consensus and what should be held open for re-examination; and how to balance

the opinions of expert authority against the views of those who are not experts but nonetheless can speak with the knowledge of common experience and the duty of shared participation. The dialectic that founds a responsible argumentative practice is grounded in the principles of conversation. Any departures from, or interpretation of, conversation rules would thus have to be mindfully undertaken and justified. A responsible rhetoric linked to a discourse ethics thus would be open to critical-rational discussion even as it pursued the ends of effective action.

Any "new rhetoric" informed by a discourse ethics and constrained by communicative rationality is risky, for it is always open to two charges. First, by adhering to standards of communicative rationality, the rhetor may be accused of not doing everything he or she can to influence the audience in the service of a worthwhile end. There is pressure to simply "use what works" in the service of what are deemed to be good ends. I believe that in the long run, such a rhetoric would become ineffective because its tricks would become routine, transparent, and empty – like mass advertising. The second charge: it might be said that any kind of departure from critical rationality is inherently distortive of a sound or secured judgment. Here, there is pressure to abandon public persuasion because advocacy argument cannot fully meet tests of critical rationality. While I will concede that public persuasion is often messy, inelegant, and contradictory, I think that public controversies may nonetheless serve as productive sites where dilemmas in communicative reasoning and actions are addressed and worked out.[6] Thus, we may learn something about the interaction of social problematics with communicative reasoning from critical evaluation of public arguments (Goodnight, 1992, 1993).

There are good reasons to follow Aristotle's prescription and resist pressures to split apart dialectic and rhetoric. If situations are to be addressed commonly in such a way as to share knowledgeable grounds for action, and if our rules for reason are to reflect actual practices, then the risks of a constrained rhetoric and a limited dialectic are generally acceptable.

DISCUSSION OF FALLACIES

The value of reconnecting rhetoric and dialectic should be evident in extending the examination of fallacies.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst draw attention to the fact that fallacies are problems lodged in an argumentative discussion. The power of this orientation is demonstrated, I believe, by showing that argument fallacies are connected with violations of coming to agreement in communicative arguments. Fallacies thus can be specified not as a collection of simple thought errors, but as systematic, unjustified departures from a reasonable attempt to come to a mutually satisfactory and informed conclusion.

If my position is correct, pragma-dialectical work on fallacies can be productively extended to a discussion of communication problematics in rhetorical

situations. While each kind of fallacy cannot be examined in this short space, analysis of some representative examples are sufficient to show how rhetorical inquiry might complement a dialectical view. The fallacies to be taken up are hasty generalization, slippery slope, and common violations of the requirement to not exclude argumentation.

1. Secundum Quid (Hasty Generalization)

A common fallacy is the unwarranted acceptance of a proposition based upon an insufficient number of relevant examples. Such reasoning is fallacious because there is no assurance that, with only a few considered instances, the preponderance of other examples will not point in an opposite direction to an asserted claim. Assuming that there is insufficient time and resources to gather up more examples at present, is there a way to make an informed judgment in a situation where the sufficiency of examples has been questioned and remains unsettled?

From a dialectical perspective, the argument is moot, if neither side can convince the other of a mutually acceptable criterion of sufficiency to establish the truth of the claim. Since the truth of the proposition cannot be determined, further argument must be suspended. From a rhetorical standpoint, a decision can be reached by considering the risks associated with accepting the proposition as conditionally affirmed. If there is a great risk to acting on the conclusion, then interlocutors may embrace a more conservative choice. For instance, if our argument concerned a medical procedure, we would wish to be highly confident in the conclusiveness of our reasoning from example. If, on the other hand, we regarded the proposition as only exploratory, and the consequences of action were agreed to be insignificant or reversible, then it might make good sense to try out the claim.

Note that the rhetorically informed decision still leaves open the question of whether or not the original claim can be demonstrated, and both parties agree to be open to further proof; but, mindful consideration of the context at hand releases action on a claim whose truth cannot be confidently demonstrated at the moment. By coming to an agreement over the *situated status* of the claim at issue, interlocutors may affirm the principle of communicative rationality – by acknowledging the need for more definitive examples and adhering to the obligation to remain open to more proof – but they also create mutual conditions that enable action by testing the uncertainty of the claim against the advisability of conduct.

2. Slippery Slope

The slippery slope fallacy "entails erroneously suggesting that by taking the proposed course of action one will be going from bad to worse" (1992, p. 164). Such an argument usually obstructs communicative interaction by blocking agreement based upon a false appraisal of cause and effect. The slippery slope in effect argues that once a threshold is crossed (i.e., accepting the claim in question), then a sequence of irreversible events will lead to catastrophe. The

fallacy involved in this reasoning is twofold: first, it violates a notion that causes and effects are proportional, and second, it assumes that a sequence of complex actions are inevitable.

Again, if we were engaged in dialectical argument, further discussion would be suspended with the detection of this fallacy. What one person sees as a natural progression of events would be countered by the other as a wildly imaginative scenario. Yet, there are sometimes reasons to take prudent actions against unlikely outcomes; as Cassandra vainly tried to argue. Regarded as a situated discourse, the truth of the "slippery slope" could be set aside for the time being, and an agreement could be reached to act, taking precautions to look for patterns of consequences developed in the future and to determine other threshold points at which reconsideration of the claim must be addressed.

Like in the instance of hasty generalization, rhetorical argument finds a situated reason for action by mindfully assessing the risks of accepting a claim even as it holds open the possibilities for further proof. Agreement can be reached and the interests of truth served – although not the letter of procedure – by assessing the situated quality of the claim.

3. Open Discussion

In my third example, I would like to try a more complicated analysis. A basic principle of the "new dialectic" is that: "It must be acknowledged that everyone has, in principle, the right to advance a standpoint on any subject and to call any standpoint into question, whatever it may refer to" (1992, p. 107). The violation of this principle is father to a whole family of fallacies. One branch of the family uses authority, prestige, or expectations of blind deference to dismiss objections as unworthy of discussion. The other attacks character, appeals to ignorance, and unpopularity to prevent consideration of standpoints on their own merits. In the first case, the right to call a standpoint into question is unjustifiably denied. In the second case, the right to advance a standpoint is unjustifiably obstructed.

From a rhetorical standpoint, this collection of fallacies is intrinsically important to maintaining the effectiveness of argumentation. A philosopher might say: "of course they are, rhetorical argument makes its living through strategic diversions by confusing the issue and the person." But that is before she has heard of the "new rhetoric." While it can be admitted that rhetorical arguments are directed toward situating opinion, the "new rhetoric" is regulated by concerns for making an informed consensus. From this vantage, the temporary advantage of stifling exchange has a substantial cost to the capacity of rhetorical argument to bring about its ends.

As the two previous examples of fallacies have shown (hasty generalization and slippery slope), an informed consensus can be achieved only if there is enough confidence for at least two parties to take the risk of being wrong when acting together. Acts of argument can erode confidence, when opinions are regarded (by at least one party) as being unjustly asserted as truth or unreasonably excluded as error. Thus, the communicative relationship necessary to

accept mutually informed risks is always put at risk when any particular argument is essayed, precisely because the response of an interlocutor can be anticipated, but not known, before an argument is offered.

Reasoning that strengthens communicative bonds affirms or creates *shared ethos*, a mutual respect that emerges from the communicative relationship between interlocutors. Fallacious reasoning, to the contrary, reduces respect and so impedes the situated requirements of making a consensus. If a public forum is filled with fraudulent attacks on the person, then the good will necessary to continue to adjudicate separate questions erodes. Argument will become a method of effecting a power relationship. If open discussion, including discussion about whose opinion should count, is stifled with a false consensus buttressed by improper appeals to authority, then the trust requisite to open discussion disappears.[7] If common reasoning veers from establishing shared criteria of proof in a particular context, then the competence of the deliberative body is impaired. Argument becomes a private matter, and rhetoric is limited to the public manipulation of appearances. Thus, effective rhetorical address is regulated by the *ethos* obligations of a community of interlocutors.

Responsible rhetorical argument strives for legitimation by informed consensus. So when issues are contested, an interlocutor must be prepared to offer valid reasons for how the rules, procedures, and practices of a particular forum are shaped so as to regulate and encourage valid argument across recurrent situations. Legitimate determination of who gets to argue, what counts as appropriate argumentation, when issues can be acted upon by a viable consensus, and how opposition is invited are crucial to preserving the basic trust, good will, and competence requisite to sustaining a group in situated discussion. Convention usually dictates at what juncture some standpoints must be regarded as secured and some conclusions taken as sufficiently proven for a group; but a responsible rhetoric always accepts the burden of providing valid reasons for constituting the customs and rules of deliberation for a community, and so holds its practices, in principle, open to criticism and improvement.

CONCLUSION

It has been my intent to sketch the relationship between a "new dialectic" and a "new rhetoric." The sketch has moved in fairly broad outlines, leaving out details. Is it possible for every argument fallacy that stems from the violation of a communicative relationship to have a rhetorical counterpart? If so, does a pragma-dialectical view of argumentation generate a systematic critique of rhetorical practice? Do rhetorical controversies themselves put at issue communicative norms in such a way as to expand or challenge understanding of what counts as reasonable speech acts and procedural constraints? All of these questions spin out of this brief inquiry. The work of connecting "a new dialectic" and "a new rhetoric" is unfinished, but its prospects appear to be quite promising.

NOTES

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[1] Different translations of the *Rhetoric* have differed as to whether Aristotle regarded rhetoric as *subordinate to* or *coordinate with* dialectic. Cope (1887) draws from 1354a to conclude: "They are sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences; two species under one genus, proof; both modes of proof, both dealing with probable materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of proof employed: the one *concluding* by the formal syllogism, and by the regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its *inferences* by the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymeme, never complete in *form*, and by the single example in the place of general induction" (p. 2). Because of its material and procedure, dialectic is a nearly universal method, according to Cope, while rhetoric is "almost absolutely limited to politics" (p. 3). Grimaldi (1980), by contrast, argues that the relationship of *antistrophe* implies a "cyclic structure" or "analogue" between the two disciplines. "Rhetoric is a methodology of discourse, the method by which to speak on any subject. Dialectic is the method by which to investigate the nature of any subject, the art of logical inquiry," he concludes (p. 1). This essay views Grimaldi's interpretation more productive for analyzing everyday speech, which contains both implicit dialectical rules of exchange governing conversation and rhetorical norms of conduct for address. The question is the relationship between general rules and the exigencies of specific context.

[2] This analysis follows Hegel's (1975 trans., pp. 321–330) injunction to return to the classics for development of the arts and sciences. Whereas classical rhetoric seemed to be limited to practices of the public forum, a contemporary understanding of rhetorical practices investigates the "exigencies" of everyday communication and civic life in addition to public oratory (Bitzer, 1968; Farrell, 1976, 1993).

[3] Solmsen (1954, pp. xx–xxi) believes that the *Rhetoric*'s own connection between dialectic and rhetoric is insufficiently strong to sustain a proper focus on both requirements for proof.

[4] I am not making the case that the "new rhetoric" described in this essay is entirely my own invention. Rather, a number of authors including Farrell (1976, 1993), McKeon (1987), Wenzel (1990), and Bitzer in his seminal 1968 essay have been working toward a reunification of rhetoric and dialectic along Aristotelian lines. The particular definition of a "new rhetoric" in this paper, however, is my own distillation. Note that a "responsible rhetoric" is only one possible rhetorical paradigm, albeit there are persuasive reasons for adopting its norms.

[5] Habermas believes that the "public" is in a state of decline (1964) because civic debate no longer depends upon the force of the better argument, but upon "displays" of mass loyalty and propaganda. Goodnight (1992) critiques this view by arguing that among contemporary rhetorical practices constructive exemplars of public argument can be recovered.

[6] Alexy argues that the practice of communication ethics is not a static application of rules, but – in the case of moral reasoning especially – proceeds as a kind of "genesis" where interlocutors discover how far they can adhere to procedural norms of rationality. "Correspondingly, the rules can be criticized that emerged in this developmental process and that now determine our practical argumentation" (1990, p. 174). By extension, critical inquiry might be directed into rhetorical "models" to examine how different speeches serve as paradigms for addressing questions where the rationality and consensus demands of argument are opposed, and yet develop some common ground. If Alexy's observation is true, then the study of argumentation can be expanded productively by critical inquiry into rhetorical practice.

⁷ Doxtader (1992) argues that rhetorical argument which redefines or resituates context may be necessary to prompt interlocutors into seeing the need for engaging one another in a communicative attitude. If the attributed relationship between interlocutors has a strong *ethos*, then contextual redefinition is more likely to succeed because of mutual respect, whatever the differences over an argument in question. If the *ethos* is weak, then the available common grounds upon which a new context can be built are narrowed.

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