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DEMONSTRATIVES, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND
DEMONSTRATA¹

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There are, of course, limits to what can be accomplished by intentions (even the best of them).

David Kaplan (1978)

I. INTRODUCTION

What is the relation between the demonstration (or ostensive gesture²) that typically accompanies the occurrence of a (visual)³ demonstrative, and the referent of that expression — the demonstratum? Suppose, for instance, that you and I are in the park, observing the antics of several neighborhood dogs, one of whom I recognize as my dog Fido. Suppose further, that I wish to inform you of the fact that Fido is among this canine group, and that I thus say to you, while pointing in the direction of Fido, “That dog is Fido.” The question at issue here is: What bearing, if any, does my demonstration — my pointing — have on the determination of Fido as the demonstratum of “that dog,” as that expression occurs in my utterance?

One possible response to the foregoing is suggested by David Kaplan in his recent paper “Afterthoughts.”⁴ There Kaplan rejects an earlier held view, arguing that the demonstration has no bearing on the determination of the demonstratum, which is determined instead by what he refers to as the “directing intention” of the speaker. This “directing intention” refers to the speaker’s intention to demonstrate a perceived object on which his attention has focused. The intention is said to be a “directing” one, as it is thought to direct (that is, to *guide*) the forthcoming demonstration.⁵ The demonstratum of the demonstrative expression (which the demonstration accompanies) will be the *intended* demonstratum: the perceived object on which the speaker has focused, and which he *intends* to demonstrate. The “directing

intention" is thus said to determine the demonstratum, as the demonstratum will be the perceived object which the speaker has an *intention* to demonstrate, and it is that *intention* which "directs" the forthcoming demonstration. According to this new view of Kaplan's, the demonstration itself is to be regarded as,

a mere externalization of [the] inner [directing] intention. The externalization is an aid to communication, like speaking more slowly and loudly, but is of no semantic significance.⁶

Thus, according to Kaplan's current view, Fido was secured as the demonstratum of "that dog," as that expression occurred in my utterance of "That dog is Fido," because I had an *intention* to demonstrate *Fido* (the perceived dog on whom my attention was focused), and that intention was what "directed" my forthcoming demonstration — my pointing. And even if, per chance, my aim happened to be a bit "off target," resulting in the unwitting demonstration of the nearby Spot, that wouldn't change matters (although it might confuse the audience as to the identity of the intended demonstratum). For the *actual demonstration* has no bearing on the securing of the demonstratum; all that matters is the *intention* of the speaker. And my intention was to demonstrate *Fido* (on whom I was focusing) and it was, moreover, that intention which "directed" my forthcoming demonstration, and so (says Kaplan), it's Fido — and not the demonstrated Spot — that gets secured as the demonstratum of "that dog."

This new view of Kaplan's stands in marked contrast to his earlier held view, according to which the demonstratum of a demonstrative expression is fixed by the accompanying demonstration. On this latter view, argued for in both "Dthat"⁷ and *Demonstratives*,⁸ if it was Spot that I *actually* pointed to, then even if it was the nearby Fido that I *intended* to point to, the former and not the latter would come out as the demonstratum.⁹

In short, Kaplan now wants to claim that it is the "directing intention" — and not, as he once held, the demonstration — that is "criterial" (as he puts it) in the determination of the demonstratum. As noted above, the latter is now thought by Kaplan to be of no semantic significance. In a footnote to "Afterthoughts,"¹⁰ Kaplan likens the demonstration which characteristically accompanies visual demonstratives, to the gesturing at oneself which occasionally accom-

panies an utterance of “I.” In both cases, the gesturing is semantically impotent. For “I” will refer, without exception, to the speaker — even if (as usual) there is no accompanying gesture, or even if the speaker points at someone else, rather than at himself. Similarly, a demonstrative expression will refer, without exception, to the intended demonstratum — even if the object or individual *actually* demonstrated is someone or something else.¹¹ The significance of the demonstration is merely *pragmatic*, as it may (if things go as planned) facilitate communication. If I *intend* to point to Fido and if, moreover, I *actually succeed* in doing so, then the demonstration has presumably fulfilled its function — which is simply to facilitate communication: to make it clear to the audience that it is *Fido* that I’m talking about. (I say “presumably” here, since communication will be facilitated only if the audience *attends to* the demonstration.)

It is important to note that Kaplan’s “directing intention” theory does not purport to be about demonstratives *generally*, but rather about what are referred to as “perceptual demonstratives.” Although Kaplan doesn’t specify exactly what he means by such expressions, he presumably has in mind expressions traditionally classed as demonstratives (*this, that, this F, that F, he, she*, etc.), which are used to “pick out” objects or individuals within the perceptual field of the speaker and audience. Kaplan aptly describes such uses as ones which Donnellan might call “referential” uses of demonstrative expressions.¹² Kaplan’s “directing intention” theory thus does *not* purport to account for how the demonstratum of (for instance) “that murderer” in an attributive utterance of “That murderer (whoever he is) will probably never be caught,” gets secured. (Nor *could* it account for such cases, since the “directing intention” is *defined as* an intention to demonstrate a *perceived* individual on whom the speaker has *focused*.)

My intention in what follows will be to look critically at Kaplan’s new view on the demonstration/demonstratum relation. Specifically, I shall argue that there are at least *three* sorts of cases which undermine the view that it is the “directing intention,” and not the demonstration, that is “criterial” in the determination of the demonstratum. The cases I have in mind are:

- (i) cases in which the demonstrated object is clearly *not* the object toward which the speaker has a “directing intention”

- (ii) cases in which the demonstrated object is neither perceived by the speaker, nor the object which the speaker “has in mind”
- (iii) cases in which there appears to be neither a demonstration nor a demonstratum, despite the presence of a “directing intention”

The cases specified in (i) through (iii) above represent natural test cases for Kaplan’s view that it is the intention, and not the demonstration, that secures the demonstratum. For in all such cases, there is a *divergence* between what the speaker *intends* to demonstrate, and what (if anything) she *actually* succeeds in demonstrating. I will argue that, in all such cases, it is the object demonstrated (if there is one) — and not the intended demonstratum — that gets secured as the actual demonstratum.¹³ I will thus conclude that, when tested against the cases in question, Kaplan’s earlier held view on the demonstration/demonstratum relation emerges as far more plausible than his current view on that relation.

II. DEMONSTRATING THE WRONG OBJECT

Let’s begin by looking at cases of the sort specified in (i) above: cases in which the demonstrated object is clearly *not* the object toward which the speaker has a “directing intention.” Such cases are to be distinguished from those involving slightly “off-target” demonstrations, in that there is no doubt that a definite *error* has been made: the individual or object *actually* demonstrated was quite obviously *not* the one that was supposed to have been demonstrated. Suppose, for instance, that I suddenly realize that I have left my keys on the desk in my (shared) office. I return to my office, where I find the desk occupied by my officemate. I then spot my keys, sitting there on the desk, alongside my officemate’s keys. I then make a grab for my keys, saying *just as I mistakenly grab my officemate’s keys*, “These are mine.” Now in such a case, Kaplan would presumably want to say that I had a “directing intention” with regard to *my* keys. For it was *my* set of keys that I focused on, and it was *my* set of keys that “directed” my grabbing. I intended to grab *my* keys, not my officemate’s. Thus,

on Kaplan's view, the demonstratum of "these," as that expression occurred in my utterance, was *my* set of keys. And yet the keys that I've demonstrated by way of grabbing are my officemate's keys. And so surely in such a case my officemate would speak truly were he to say to me, "No, you're wrong. *Those* are not *your* keys; they're mine." The appropriateness (not to mention truth) of such a reply would suggest that my officemate's keys — and not my own — were the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in my utterance. For if *my* keys were that demonstratum, then my officemate's allegation that what I had uttered was untrue, would have been false — which surely it is not. If Kaplan's view were correct, then my officemate's reply would indicate that he simply hadn't *understood* what I had in fact said (which was actually *true*), and his failure to understand what I had said, would be due, on Kaplan's view, to the fact that I demonstrated an object which was not the actual (i.e., intended) demonstratum. (Contrast the appropriateness of my officemate's reply with the inappropriateness of my rejoinder, uttered while handing him back his keys, "Yes, *these* keys are yours, but I never said they were mine." If Kaplan's view were correct, my rejoinder ought to be both appropriate and true.¹⁴)

III. FAILURE TO PERCEIVE THE INTENDED DEMONSTRATUM

Clearly, cases of the sort just described cast doubt on Kaplan's view that the "directing intention" is what is "criterial" in the determination of the demonstratum, while at the same time lending support to the view that it is the *demonstration* which is "criterial" in such determination. Other cases which do the same are those in which the demonstration, though not, properly speaking, "off target," demonstrates an object or individual other than the one the speaker "has in mind." (These are the cases specified in (ii) above). A classic example of such a case is provided by Kaplan himself in his paper "Dthat."¹⁵ There Kaplan imagines a scenario in which he takes himself to be demonstrating a picture of Carnap (the object he "has in mind"), though in fact he is demonstrating a picture of Agnew. (He's not looking where he's pointing, and someone has switched his picture of

Carnap with one of Agnew.) While making the demonstration, he supposes himself to be asserting, "Dthat is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century." ("Dthat" is an expression introduced by Kaplan to represent the demonstrative use of "that." An expression has — or at least *had* — a "demonstrative use" for Kaplan just in case "the speaker intends that the object for which the phrase stands be designated by an associated demonstration."¹⁶) Intuitively, Kaplan's utterance would be false, supposing Agnew not to be one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. And that is precisely what Kaplan's earlier held view predicts, since, according to that view, the picture of Agnew — the object demonstrated — is the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in Kaplan's utterance, and it is presumably false that such a picture pictures one of the greatest philosopher's of the twentieth century. Kaplan goes on (in "Dthat") to defend this view, arguing that,

... it would simply be wrong to argue an "ambiguity" in the demonstration, so great that it can be bent to my intended demonstratum. I have said of a picture of Spiro Agnew that it pictures one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. And my speech and demonstration suggest no other natural interpretation to the linguistically competent public observer.¹⁷

Cases such as the one just described pose two basic problems for Kaplan's current view. First, that view is unequipped to provide any sort of analysis of such cases, since there appears to be a demonstratum (in the case just described, a picture of Agnew), and yet no "directing intention." For such an intention is, according to Kaplan, an intention of the speaker "to point at [or otherwise demonstrate] a *perceived* individual on whom he has *focused*."¹⁸ (emphasis mine) The difficulty is that, in cases of the sort in question, there is no "perceived" object or individual on whom the speaker has "focused." Kaplan neither perceived nor focused on the picture of Agnew (nor on that of Carnap), and thus lacked any "directing intention." In the absence of any such intention, how is Kaplan's view to account for the apparent fact that a demonstratum (the picture of Agnew, presumably) is nevertheless obtained? It appears to be unable to.¹⁹

One might suppose that Kaplan could get around the preceding difficulty simply by broadening the notion of "directing intention" so as to allow objects *not* within the perceptual field of the speaker and/

or audience to be the focus of such an intention. Kaplan might then say that, in this expanded sense of “directing intention,” the picture of Carnap (the intended demonstratum) was the focus of such an intention, and was thus the demonstratum of “dthat,” as that expression occurred in the utterance in question. But it’s not so obvious that Kaplan would be comfortable making such a move. For in a footnote to “Afterthoughts,”²⁰ he describes cases of the sort in question as “complex” and “atypical,” which would seem to suggest that he might hesitate to extend his “directing intention” theory of securing demonstrata to cover such cases. And surely he would have good reasons for such hesitation. For in cases of the sort in question, the intuition is surely that the (unperceived) intended demonstratum does *not* get secured as the actual demonstratum. In the picture-switching scenario described above, the intuition is surely that the picture of Agnew — and not that of Carnap — comes out as the actual demonstratum.

This brings us to a second problem posed by cases of the sort in question for Kaplan’s current view. The problem is that Kaplan’s earlier held view provides an intuitively plausible account of such cases by supposing that the demonstratum is obtained (at least in part²¹) by the demonstration — by the pointing. If such a view is correct (as it seems to be), then it is natural to suppose that it can be extended to include *other cases* as well — cases in which there *is* a “directing intention.” And if it *can* be so extended, then Kaplan’s current view — which claims that the demonstration has *nothing whatever* to do with the determination of the demonstratum — must be wrong.

It is not difficult to anticipate the sort of reply that Kaplan would be likely to make to the foregoing. Because he describes cases of the sort in question as “complex” and “atypical,” he would probably argue that they shouldn’t be given much weight. Kaplan’s characterization of such cases as “complex” and “atypical” is certainly accurate, but it is precisely such cases that expose views like Kaplan’s for what they are: views that derive a certain amount of intuitive plausibility from their ability to handle the “easy” cases (the “simple” and “typical” ones, in which the intended demonstratum is in fact the object or individual demonstrated), but which are vitiated by their failure to handle the “difficult” cases (the “complex” and “atypical” ones, in which the

intended demonstratum is *not* identical to the object or individual actually demonstrated). Moreover, the natural test cases for a theory which claims that it is the speaker's intention, rather than his actual demonstration, that fixes the reference of a demonstrative, are those in which the *intended* demonstratum and the object or individual *actually* demonstrated, are clearly different. And, cases of the sort specified in (ii), are examples of just such cases. It would therefore be a mistake to attempt to downplay their significance.

IV. FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE ANYTHING AT ALL

Let's now move on to cases of the sort specified in (iii) above: cases in which there is neither a demonstration nor a demonstratum, despite the presence of a "directing intention." To return to the canines in the park scenario, suppose that I say to you (under the conditions described above), "That dog is Fido," but fail to accompany my utterance with any sort of ostensive gesture (pointing, nodding, glancing, etc.), due to some sort of sudden, momentary, paralysis. Suppose that, though my intention was to point at Fido, I suddenly found myself (in the midst of my utterance) unable to do so. Suppose further that I was unable to demonstrate Fido via any sort of glance or stare in his direction, as my eyes, frozen in their sockets, had shifted from Fido to my addressee, and could not (due to the paralysis) be shifted back to Fido. On Kaplan's view, since I had an intention to demonstrate a particular dog (on whom I had focused), that dog ought to be the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression in question, and my utterance ought thus to come out true just in case that same dog is Fido. The fact that I failed to issue a demonstration of any sort (despite my intention to do so), shouldn't, on Kaplan's view, prevent the dog in question from being secured as the demonstratum, since the demonstration is supposed to have nothing to do with securing the demonstratum. The demonstration, on that view, is "merely an aid to communication, like speaking more slowly and loudly."

This just doesn't seem right to me, and here's why. "That" in the demonstrative description "that dog," as that expression occurs in the utterance in question, is a demonstrative *adjective*: it specifies *which*

dog by *describing* that dog as the one being *demonstrated*, just as the adjective “spotted” in the description “the spotted dog” specifies which dog by describing that dog as the spotted one.²² If there is no spotted dog (in the domain of discourse), then the description “the spotted dog” is empty — it has no referent. Similarly, if there is no demonstrated dog — no dog that is being pointed to or otherwise indicated by the speaker²³ — then the demonstrative description “that dog” is likewise empty — it has no demonstratum. Such a view coheres with the intuition that, had I somehow managed to to anticipate my sudden paralysis, I wouldn’t have uttered “That dog is Fido” — and wouldn’t have done so for precisely the same reason that I wouldn’t have uttered “The dog I’m pointing to is Fido.” For had I been able to anticipate my sudden inability to issue any sort of demonstration, I would thereby have been able to anticipate that “that dog” and “the dog I’m pointing to” would both be empty, and so wouldn’t have employed either. The fact that I *intended* to demonstrate a particular dog, does not entail — as Kaplan would have it — that that same dog is the demonstratum of “that dog,” as that expression occurs in my utterance. My “directing intention” would no more entail that, than it would entail that the dog toward whom that unfulfilled intention was directed was the referent of “the dog I’m pointing to” — had I chosen to utter that description instead.

I should point out that I am not claiming that pairs of expressions like “that dog” and “the demonstrated dog” are *synonymous*; I am rather claiming that they are *co-referential*. Specifically, I am claiming that an expression of the form “that *F*” will refer to the demonstrated *F* (the referent of “the demonstrated *F*”) — provided there is such an *F*. If there is no demonstrated *F*, then the expression “that *F*” is empty — it has no demonstratum.²⁴

If such a view is correct, then it can easily be extended to account for the cases specified in (i) and (ii) above, as well as for those specified in (iii). Both “these” in my utterance of “These are mine,” and “dthat” in Kaplan’s utterance of “Dthat is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century,” are pronouns which *describe* something as *demonstrated*. And so such expressions will naturally have as their referents things which are in fact *demonstrated*, just as the description “the spotted dog” will naturally have as its

referent a dog which is in fact *spotted*. The oddness which is associated with cases of sorts (i) and (ii) above, is easily accounted for by an appeal the well-known distinction between what a speaker *intends* to say, and what she *actually succeeds* in saying. The speaker intends to make an assertion about a particular object (the intended demonstratum), but actually succeeds in saying something about some other object (the object demonstrated). The oddness associated with cases of the sort just described (in which an intended demonstration isn't forthcoming) can be similarly accounted for. The speaker intends to say something about a particular object or individual (e.g., Fido), but fails to actually say anything about *any* object at all. For she fails to demonstrate anything, and thus fails to secure a demonstratum for the demonstrative expression she utters. The intuition that she somehow *does* succeed in saying something could then be accounted for in one of two ways. First, one could argue that the intuition in question is accounted for on the hypothesis that the *actual* utterance is charitably (but falsely) assumed to be one and the same as the *intended* utterance — the latter of which *would* include an accompanying demonstration.²⁵ Alternatively, one could account for the intuition that something was said by appealing to the familiar sentence/statement distinction. Though the speaker utters a meaningful sentence in an attempt to make a particular statement, she fails in that attempt, and she fails because the conditions for the securing of a demonstratum have not been met: No object has been demonstrated. But because the speaker — despite her failure to make any determinate statement — has uttered a meaningful sentence, there is a *sense* in which she has “said something.” In response to a query of “What was that she said?”, one might respond, “She said, ‘That dog is Fido’”, merely repeating the sentence uttered, and not thereby purporting to make any statement. But again, in the sense of “saying something” according to which to “say something” is to make some determinate *statement*, the speaker in question fails to say anything at all.

There are two conclusions to be drawn from cases of the sort just discussed — cases in which there is neither a demonstration nor a demonstratum, despite the presence of a “directing intention.” First, Kaplan’s view that the “directing intention” is “criterial” in the determination of the demonstratum, is an implausible one. For in the case

just considered, the directing intention was there, and yet the demonstrative description was empty — there was no demonstratum. Second, Kaplan's view that the demonstration has nothing whatever to do with the demonstratum, is likewise an implausible one. For the only difference between the case just considered — where there was no demonstratum, and the original canines in the park scenario — in which there *was* a demonstratum, is that while in the former case there was no demonstration, there *was* a demonstration (a pointing gesture) in the latter case. The logical conclusion to draw is that demonstration does — at least in some cases — have something to do with the determination of the demonstratum; intentions by themselves are simply not enough.

In response to the foregoing, it might be objected that cases in which an anticipated demonstration isn't forthcoming are highly unusual, and so shouldn't be focused on to the exclusion of the more ordinary cases, where the demonstration *is* forthcoming. In reply to such an objection, I would simply repeat what I said earlier, and point out that it is often just such "atypical" cases which enable us to adjudicate between competing views which account equally well for all of the "typical" cases. Kaplan's view may fare as well with such "typical" cases as some competing view which regards the demonstration as being crucial to the determination of the demonstratum. And yet Kaplan's view may (as we've just seen) give a much poorer showing than the competing view when it comes to dealing with certain "atypical" cases. Other things being equal, the logical conclusion to draw is that the competing theory is the better of the two.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Kaplan is clearly mistaken in thinking that the demonstratum of a perceptual demonstrative is, in all cases, fixed by the "directing intention," as opposed to the demonstration. We have just seen a host of counter-examples to this view — examples which suggest that it is the demonstration, and not the intention, that fixes the demonstratum. It would, however, be rash to conclude that the demonstration *always* determines the demonstratum, and that intentions *never* come into

play. There is an obvious problem with any such view — a problem to which Kaplan draws attention in “Dthat.” There, Kaplan argues that,

There are situations where the demonstration is sufficiently ill-structured in itself so that we would regularly take account of the intended demonstratum as, *within limits*, a legitimate disambiguating or vagueness-removing device.²⁶

Kaplan then goes on to consider two sorts of cases in which an “ill-structured” demonstration appears to be disambiguated by an appeal to the *intended* demonstratum. He first considers cases of “vague demonstrations” effected by a casual gesture — a wave, nod, or glance. With respect to such cases, Kaplan says,

I suppose that ordinarily we would allow that a demonstration had been successful if the intended object was roughly where the speaker pointed. That is, we would not bring in our surveying equipment to help determine the content of the speaker's assertion; much more important is what he intended to point at.²⁷

Such an analysis would appear to have intuitive plausibility in its favor. Suppose, while uttering “That is Fido,” I succeed in pointing in the *general* direction of Fido (the intended demonstratum), without pointing *right at* him. Nevertheless, Fido would still appear to get secured as the demonstratum, despite the fact that there were probably many *other* objects/individuals in whose *general* direction I pointed. That none of these *other* entities get secured as the demonstratum coheres with the view that the *intended* demonstratum serves to disambiguate the “ill-structured” demonstration.

Kaplan then goes on to draw attention to the fact that, “from the surveyor's point of view,” in pointing to one thing, we often succeed in simultaneously pointing to other things as well.²⁸ For instance, when I point to Fido, I point as well to his coat, and perhaps to a particular section of his torso — such as his rib cage. Yet, according to Kaplan, if it was Fido (and not, e.g., his coat) that I intended to point to (while uttering, e.g., “That is Fido”), then it is Fido — and Fido alone — that gets secured as the demonstratum. Such an analysis seems plausible enough. After all, my utterance of “That is Fido” is surely not going to be rendered false because, e.g., Fido's *coat* is not identical with Fido. Nor is it going to be rendered ambiguous merely because, in pointing to Fido, I point to his coat as well.

Perhaps, then, Kaplan was correct in thinking that intentions come

into play in the disambiguation of certain “ill-structured” demonstrations.²⁹ In that case, one might suppose that the proposed view, according to which (perceptual) demonstratives *invariably* refer to whatever is *demonstrated* by the speaker, must be wrong. How can such a view be made to cohere with the fact that Fido (the intended demonstratum) — and Fido alone — gets secured as the demonstratum of “that,” as that expression occurs in the utterances described above? For whether I point in Fido’s general direction, or right at him, I will simultaneously point at other things as well.

I would like to suggest, briefly and tentatively, one possible way of resolving the difficulty at hand. One might begin by drawing an intuitive distinction between *gesturing at* something and *demonstrating* that thing. One might then think of the object or individual actually *demonstrated* as the one the speaker has somehow managed to “indicate,” “present” or “reveal.” It would then be possible, at least in theory, to point (or otherwise gesture) at one thing, while demonstrating another; or to point simultaneously at several things, while demonstrating only one. For factors other than, or in addition to, ostensive gestures might come into play in determining what the speaker *demonstrates* — what he succeeds in “indicating.”³⁰ Specifically, one might suppose that what the speaker *intends* to point at might be a factor which, taken in conjunction with the actual pointing, serves to determine the object demonstrated. Let’s return to the “ill-structured” demonstrations discussed in “Dthat.” Consider again the case where the speaker utters “That is Fido,” while pointing at both the dog and his coat, though intending to point only at the former. Because the speaker points to both things, though intends to point only to one, that thing (Fido) is the object actually *demonstrated*. Similar considerations would apply to the case where the speaker utters “That is Fido,” while pointing in Fido’s *general* direction, as well as in the general direction of a host of other things. Because the speaker intended to point to *Fido* — and succeeded in pointing in the dog’s *general* direction — it is Fido, and Fido alone, that gets demonstrated. One could then say that, in cases of the sort in question, while intentions *do* come into play in determining the demonstratum, it is nevertheless *invariably* the object actually *demonstrated* that gets secured as the demonstratum.

One obvious advantage of such a view is that it coheres with the intuition that an object or individual can be demonstrated without being gestured at. Consider, for instance, an utterance of “That *noise* is driving me crazy,” or of “That *dog* is Fido,” the latter being uttered in a context containing just one dog, situated amongst several cats. Surely demonstrata could be secured in such cases without the assistance of ostensive gestures. Intuitively, this is so because — despite the absence of any ostensive gestures — particular individuals might nevertheless be demonstrated — that is, somehow “indicated” by the speaker.

Whether or not such a proposal turns out to be plausible, will depend, of course, on whether the relevant notion of “demonstration” can be given a convincing analysis. But that is a topic for another paper.

NOTES

¹ I would like to thank Kate Kearns and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions.

² In “How to Secure a Demonstratum” (in preparation), I broaden the notion of demonstration, enabling speakers to demonstrate perceived objects and individuals without the assistance of ostensive gestures. Such gestureless demonstrations typically occur in cases of *non-visual* perceptual demonstratives — as in, for instance, “That noise is driving me crazy.” They also occur in cases where there is only one likely candidate for the demonstratum — as in, for instance, “That dog is Fido,” uttered in a context in which there is a single canine amongst several felines. See the aforementioned paper for details.

³ As indicated above, I believe that, in the case of non-visual perceptual demonstratives, demonstrations are effected otherwise than by ostensive gestures.

⁴ *Themes from Kaplan*, Joseph Almog and John Perry, editors. Oxford University Press: 1989, pp. 567–614.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 582. Kaplan also speaks of the “directing intention” as being “directed” at a perceived object — the intended demonstratum. The intention is thus a “directing” one in a secondary sense as well.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 582.

⁷ Reprinted in *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, French, Uehling, and Wettstein, editors. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 1979, pp. 383–400.

⁸ *Themes From Kaplan*, pp. 481–563.

⁹ Kaplan, was, however, prepared to argue that in certain cases speakers’ intentions did come into play in disambiguating demonstrations. See “Dthat,” p. 396 for a discussion of such cases. These cases are discussed briefly in section V above. For a more thorough discussion of such cases, see my “How to Secure a Demonstratum.”

¹⁰ *Themes from Kaplan*, p. 582.

¹¹ I assume that Kaplan would want to argue that the intended demonstratum would

be secured as the actual demonstratum, even if there were no demonstration at all. See section IV above for a discussion of such cases.

¹² *Themes from Kaplan*, p. 583.

¹³ Since there is no object demonstrated in cases of the sort specified in (iii) above, there is likewise, I shall argue, no demonstratum.

¹⁴ When a wide of the mark demonstration is accompanied by “this,” “these,” “this *F*,” or “these *F*s,” the difficulty with Kaplan’s “directing intention” view is accentuated. This is because, when such expressions are used, the object demonstrated is typically in very close proximity to the speaker. The latter may even be in physical contact with the former. When the *wrong* object has been demonstrated, it is therefore apparent to all who know the identity of the intended demonstratum, that a definite error has been made. If my officemate had been aware of the fact that I had intended to demonstrate the set of keys next to his, he would have no trouble seeing that, in grabbing his keys, I demonstrated the wrong object. But had I instead pointed to his keys (from some distance), though my intention was to point to mine, and had I uttered, “*Those* are mine,” then the off-target character of my demonstration might not even have been detectable.

¹⁵ *Contemporary Perspectives*, p. 396.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 389.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 396.

¹⁸ *Themes from Kaplan*, p. 582.

¹⁹ It would be of no use to argue that Kaplan’s view has no obligation to account for cases of the sort in question, as the speaker’s failure to perceive the demonstrated object makes the demonstrative a *non-perceptual* one. The difficulty with such a ploy is that Kaplan wants to make a distinction between perceptual (or “referentially” used) demonstratives, on the one hand, and “attributively” used demonstratives, on the other hand. And it is obvious that cases of the sort specified in (ii) are far more akin to referentially used demonstratives, than they are to attributively used demonstratives.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 582.

²¹ I say “at least in part” to accommodate those cases in which speaker intentions allegedly come into play in disambiguating what Kaplan refers to in “Dthat” as “ill-structured” demonstrations. See section V above for a discussion of such cases.

²² The proposed adjectival analysis of “that” is corroborated by the fact that, in certain languages, Haitian Creole, for example, the demonstrative adjective “that” occurs within a definite NP, as in “The that dog is Fido,” which would be the Haitian Creole equivalent of the English “That dog is Fido.” The direct translation of the latter into Haitian would be ungrammatical for the same reason that a sentence like “Spotted dog is Fido” would be ungrammatical — the adjective “that,” like the adjective “spotted,” must be preceded by an article, determiner, or quantifier.

²³ See note 2. above.

²⁴ That the expressions in question are non-synonymous, is easily proved by pairs of sentences like the following, neither of which expresses a necessary proposition.

- (i) That dog [speaker points to Fido] is the demonstrated dog.
- (ii) If there were no demonstrated dog, then that dog [speaker points to Fido] would not exist.

The proposition expressed by an utterance of (i) would not be necessary, since the speaker could have pointed at some other dog while uttering that sentence. And the obvious falsity of an utterance of (ii) (Fido would have existed even if no dog had been demonstrated) shows it to express a contingent falsehood rather than a necessary truth. But if expressions of the form “that *F*” were synonymous with those of the

form “the demonstrated *F*,” utterances of (i) and (ii) would express necessary propositions. A similar argument against the synonymy of “I” and “the utterer of this token” is made by Kaplan in *Demonstratives*. See pp. 518–520 of that work for details.

²⁵ This might also account for any intuition to the effect that the speaker had said something *true*.

²⁶ *Contemporary Perspectives*, p. 396.

²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 396.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 396.

²⁹ Whether or not intentions always come into play in the disambiguation of “ill-structured” demonstrations, is open to question. Suppose that the speaker has bizarre intentions: Suppose that he intends to demonstrate Fido’s *coat*, and to say of the coat that it is Fido. If he points to the dog and (simultaneously) to the dog’s coat, while uttering “That is Fido,” does the coat get secured as the demonstratum? My intuitions are that it does not; for my intuitions — which I take to be widely shared — are that the speaker has said something *true*, as the dog pointed to is Fido. But if intentions are supposed to disambiguate the demonstration, then the *coat* should be secured as the demonstratum, and the utterance ought to come out *false* on the grounds that the dog’s coat is not Fido. For a detailed account of such cases, see my “How to Secure a Demonstratum.”

³⁰ Such factors would doubtless include the semantic content of the uttered demonstrative. Suppose, for instance, that I utter, “That *dog* is Fido,” while pointing in the general direction of Fido, as well as a number of felines. The general direction of the gesture would no doubt “conspire” with the common noun “dog” (and perhaps even with the name “Fido”) to indicate (and thus demonstrate) a particular *dog*. Also, the inclusion of the common noun “dog” would make it clear that it was the animal itself and not its coat (for instance) that was being talked about.

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