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## PLEASURE AND HAPPINESS

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I believe two vocabularies are used to denote one set of mental phenomena. One centers around the term 'happiness', the other around 'pleasure'. Both are complex, and they are not isomorphic. My goal is to delineate the structure of the two vocabularies, and map one onto the other. The paper is therefore a partial analysis of the concepts of pleasure and happiness, and a defense of the thesis that pleasure and happiness are the same thing.

I begin by distinguishing between *the occurrent and dispositional senses of happiness*. In the occurrent sense, 'A is happy' means that A feels happy or is *experiencing* happiness; he is in high or good spirits, is in a good mood, and feels good. In the dispositional sense, 'A is happy' means that A is *predominantly* happy in the occurrent sense. The dispositionally happy man may occasionally be unhappy (for example, when a friend dies), and he may at the moment be asleep or unconscious. That someone is smiling, has sparkling eyes, looks healthy and rested, and is bubbling effusively about a favorite hobby is good evidence of occurrent happiness. That someone is moderately wealthy, loves his wife, enjoys his work, and has robust health is good evidence of dispositional happiness. 'Happy' is ambiguous in the same way 'warm' is. 'It is warm in Florida' may describe the current weather there (as in the daily paper) or the normal weather (as in a geography book). In both senses, a man may be happy now, unhappy later. Even dispositional happiness may end, as when an accident paralyzes a man and kills his wife. Elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> I define occurrent happiness in terms of belief, desire, and occurrent thought.

The previous paragraph concerns happiness as a *nonrelational* state. There are in addition various types of *relational* happiness. The adjective 'happy' can either stand alone, or it can take various complements such as 'that' and 'with'. *Happy that* expresses a propositional attitude. *A is happy that p only if A believes and desires that p*. It is presupposed in addition

that the person *knows* that *p*. Someone is unhappy that *p* only if he believes that *p* but desires that not-*p*. How happy *A* is that *p* is determined by how much he desires that *p*. It follows from my analysis of occurrent happiness that, other things equal, the happier a person is that *p*, the happier he is, provided the thought that *p* is occurring to him.<sup>2</sup> *Happy to* can always be transformed into 'happy that'. Thus 'John is happy to be alive' means John is happy that he is alive, and 'John is happy to get his income tax refund' means John is happy that he has just gotten it. 'Happy' in these contexts is synonymous with *glad*, 'unhappy' with *sorry*.

A person can *be* happy that *p* even though it does not *make* him happy that *p*. I am happy that I went to Redford High School, but it no longer makes me happy that I did so. I am happy that my alma mater has a good football team even though, due to lack of sufficient personal interest, it does not make me happy that they do. One goal of the present paper is to explain what it is for something to make a person happy. A person is *happy with X* only if he is happy with *X as it is*, as opposed to how it was or will be. You are happy with your wife only if you are happy with her as she is. This suggests that a person is happy with *X* only if he is happy *that X is the way it is*, and only if he has in mind a specific idea of the way *X* is (which he may or may not be able to articulate). This is insufficient, however. I am happy that my alma mater's football team is good, but I am not happy with my alma mater's team. The reason for this, I believe, is that it does not make me happy that the team is good. So, *A is happy with X if, and only if, it makes A happy that X is the way it is*. Finally, *A is happy about X* iff *X*, or some fact about *X*, makes *A* happy. John is happy about his promotion if his promotion makes him happy. Mary is happy about the fact that she is married provided it makes her happy that she is married. And I am happy about my car because it makes me happy that it runs so well. Note that while I am happy that I went to Redford High, I am no longer happy about the fact that I went there.

We see that the general phenomenon of happiness can be divided into three basic categories: nonrelational happiness (being happy), propositional happiness (being happy that *p*), and 'happification' (making happy). The third remains to be defined. We will see later that there are two basic types of happification, epistemic and nonepistemic. They will be defined separately.

I believe that *pleasure* can be identified with occurrent, nonrelational

happiness. *A person experiences pleasure if, and only if, he experiences happiness.* And the happier he is, the more pleasure he is experiencing. McDougall objected to the identification of pleasure and happiness on the grounds that an unhappy man can experience pleasure:

Consider the case of a man whose lifelong ambition and hopes have recently been dashed to the ground. If he were fond of music, he might, when the first shock of disappointment had passed away, attend a concert and derive pleasure from the music ... and yet be continuously unhappy (1923, p. 160).

Such cases only show, however, that pleasure cannot be identified with *dispositional* happiness. If the man had not been occurrently happy during the concert, he could not be said to have enjoyed it. It is often objected that happiness is more lasting and durable than pleasure, which is transitory. This objection also collapses once occurrent happiness is distinguished from dispositional. True, we may suppose that a cup of coffee provides a derelict with a moment of pleasure without supposing that it makes him a happy man; nevertheless, at that moment he did experience happiness. Occurrent happiness can be as fleeting as pleasure. Another ineffective objection is that many sources of pleasure are not sources of 'true' happiness, that a man can enjoy life without being *really* happy. I am identifying pleasure with happiness, not with true happiness.<sup>3</sup> The identification of pleasure with happiness does not entail that long term happiness can be achieved by indulging in any old momentary pleasure, nor in every whim or passing fancy. Long term happiness (or pleasure) often requires pain (or unhappiness) and sacrifice today, as every student should realize. And some pleasures, such as drinking before driving, endanger future happiness. We could not identify present pleasure with long term happiness any more than we could identify present happiness with long term happiness.

'Pleasure' is ambiguous too. In another sense, to experience pleasure is to have *pleasure-sensations*. A variety of stimuli commonly cause pleasure-sensations, such as stimulating the erogenous zones, massaging a tense muscle, scratching an itch, and stepping into a warm shower on a cold day. Pleasure-sensations have bodily location in the same way aches and pains do, but in contrast almost never last as long. Happiness is a feeling, but it is not composed of bodily sensations. It is not located in any part of the body, nor all over the body. Feeling happy does not even depend on somatic sensations in the way feeling sick or fatigued does. Pleasure-sensations do contribute to happiness, because we are happy that they occur. There are also two types

of pain. 'Physical' pain denotes the having of an all too familiar type of sensation. 'Psychological' pain denotes suffering, misery, grief, heartache, and similar mental states. Psychological pain is unhappiness. Physical pain contributes to unhappiness.<sup>4</sup>

I do not deny that 'pleasure' and 'happiness' have different *connotations*. They certainly do. 'Pleasure' suggests wordly, trivial, animal, and short-range pursuits, while 'happiness' suggests spiritual, profound, noble, and long-range pursuits. These connotations have crystallized in idioms like 'pleasure-seeker', 'the life of pleasure', and 'giving oneself over to pleasure' on the one hand, and 'the happy life', 'overcome by happiness', and 'transports of happiness' on the other. I am not even asserting that 'pleasure' and 'happiness' are *synonymous*. I maintain only that in one sense the terms *refer to the same mental state*. If we want to cheer up a glum friend, to make him happy, then wine, women and song may be just the prescription. And the conditions of happiness, be they health, wealth, and self-fulfillment, are equally conditions of a pleasurable life. Intense pleasure can be derived from scientific discovery, artistic creation, and any of the noblest achievements. It is particularly evident, finally, that extreme happiness — joy — is pleasure, and that extreme unhappiness — suffering, grief, etc. — is pain.

So in one sense pleasure is a nonrelational state. There are several associated relations. Things can *please* us. Pleasing can be identified with happyfying. If *X* pleases *A*, then either *A* is pleased *by X* or *A* is pleased *with X*. I am pleased by (not with) the sound of a piano, and pleased with (not by) the condition of my piano. To be pleased by something is to *get pleasure from* it. Each type of relational pleasure is equivalent to a type of relational happiness. *A is pleased with X iff A is happy with X*. I am pleased with the condition of my piano because it makes me happy that it is in good condition. *A is pleased by X iff A is made happy by X*. I am pleased by the sound of a piano when it makes me happy. It follows that *A is pleased with X iff A is pleased by the fact that X is the way it is*. I am pleased by the fact that the condition of my piano is what it is. To be pleased *about* something is to be happy about it. We would expect that to be pleased *that* something is the case is to be happy that it is. Not so.<sup>5</sup> I am happy that the Second World War is over, but the war ended so long ago I can no longer say I am pleased that it is over. I am glad that the Russian dancer defected, but I do not care enough to be pleased that he did. Instead, we have the following equivalence: *A is pleased that p iff it makes A happy that p*. It no longer makes me happy that the war is over,

and it does not make me happy that the dancer defected. It follows that to be pleased *that p* is to be pleased *by the fact that p*. I am pleased (by the fact) that I have a good job. Finally, *pleased to* can always be transformed into 'pleased that'. I should note that 'I am pleased' is an incomplete or elliptical sentence, unlike 'I am happy' or 'I am experiencing pleasure'. 'Pleased' demands a complement.

'Please' has different contraries in different contexts. We are *pained by* the death of a loved one, *displeased with* a lousy car. Something pains us if it makes us unhappy, and displeases us if we are unhappy with it. 'Pleased by' is synonymous with *gratified by*. 'Gratified with' is improper, though. 'Pleased with' has two near synonyms: *satisfied with* and *content with*. Pleasure is stronger than satisfaction, though. The representatives of a defeated nation may well be satisfied with the terms of the surrender, though we could hardly expect them to be pleased with the terms.<sup>6</sup> We may be satisfied, but not pleased, with a mediocre performance.<sup>7</sup> Pleasure, we might say, is positive, while satisfaction is merely non-negative. This suggests the following equation: *S is satisfied or content with X iff S is not unhappy with X*, provided *S* has some belief about the way *X* is. The fact that our performance was mediocre may not make us unhappy, but it will hardly make us happy. It follows, of course, that being pleased with something entails being satisfied with it.<sup>8</sup> *Dissatisfaction* and satisfaction are not merely contrary, but contradictory. We must be either satisfied or dissatisfied with our performance (provided we have any beliefs about it). We can, in contrast, be neither pleased nor displeased with it. Consequently, *S is dissatisfied or discontent with X iff S is unhappy with X*. So dissatisfaction and displeasure are the same thing even though satisfaction and pleasure are not.

In one sense, you *like* something iff it pleases you. There are therefore as many ways of liking something as there are ways of being pleased. I like the sound of a piano, and the condition of my piano; John may like seducing young girls, and he may like the fact that he seduces them. Bedford (1959, p. 73) and Taylor (1963, p. 13) pointed out, though, that it would be impolite for a guest, while in order for the hostess, to say that she is pleased with the dessert. The guest would be guilty of no impropriety if she said only that she liked the dessert: that would be a compliment. This suggests that '*X* pleases *A*' and '*A* likes *X*' do not after all have the same truth conditions. The suggestion is misleading. It would not be at all inappropriate, let alone false, for the guest to answer 'Yes' if the hostess asked, 'Are you pleased with your dessert?'

The conditions under which it is proper to make a statement are not always its truth conditions.

To be pleased or made happy by something is to get pleasure from it. There are, however, two different ways of getting pleasure from something.<sup>9</sup> John may get pleasure from seducing sixteen year old girls, or he may get pleasure from the fact that he seduces sixteen year old girls. The ways are independent. John may get pleasure from seducing young girls even though he does not get pleasure from the fact that he does; indeed, it may distress him severely that he seduces young girls, which may send him to a psychiatrist. On the other hand, John may get pleasure from the fact that he seduces young girls (he takes it as sign of youthfulness and sex appeal), even though he does not get pleasure from the act of seducing young girls (due to some physical disorder); indeed, it may hurt him to seduce young girls, and that may send him to a doctor. We can begin to see how the two ways in which something can make us happy differ by noting the following. John could not get pleasure from the fact that he seduces sixteen year old girls without knowing that he does so; but he could still get pleasure from seducing them (he might not know the age of the girls he seduces, or he might think they seduce him). A father could get pleasure from the fact that his daughter plays the piano beautifully without ever having heard her play, but he could not then get pleasure from her beautiful piano playing.

In both cases, getting pleasure from something entails being *aware* of it. But the types of awareness involved are different. We must distinguish *non-epistemic* from *epistemic* awareness.<sup>10</sup> This is the distinction between being aware of Heifetz playing the violin, and being aware (of the fact) *that* Heifetz is playing the violin. The latter entails knowing and believing that Heifetz is playing the violin; the former entails direct perceptual contact with Heifetz's violin playing. A person can be aware of Heifetz playing the violin even if he does not know who Heifetz is, or how to tell the difference between a violin and a viola. A person can be aware that Heifetz is playing the violin while in a sound-proof windowless monitoring booth surrounded by dials and meters. Facts or true propositions are the objects of epistemic awareness. Concrete objects, events, or states of affairs are the objects of non-epistemic awareness. John can get pleasure from seducing young girls only if he is aware of seducing them, so I call this *nonepistemic happiness or gratifying*. John can get pleasure from the fact that he seduces young girls only if he is aware that he seduces them, so this is *epistemic happiness or gratifying*.<sup>11</sup>

Nonepistemic gratifying is *enjoyment*. To enjoy seducing young girls is to get pleasure from seducing them, not to get pleasure from the fact that one seduces them. What is it to derive pleasure from, or be made happy by something in this way? I believe the basic idea is that the object of enjoyment *causes* one to experience happiness or pleasure. More precisely, *A is enjoying X iff A is experiencing happiness or pleasure at least in part because he is nonepistemically aware of X*. If I am enjoying the music, I must be occurrently happy, i.e., experiencing pleasure; furthermore, I must be aware of the music; and finally, I must be happy at least partly because of the music. I say at least partly, because my happiness may be a result of other things as well, such as the drink I am having and the woman I am with. To enjoy something, it is not necessary to experience any pleasure-sensations, nor is it necessary to be dispositionally happy. How much we are enjoying something can be identified with how happy we are when we are enjoying it. The happier I am when I enjoy the music, the more I enjoy the music.<sup>12</sup>

The above equivalence holds only if *X* is something other than *A* himself. *A* is enjoying *himself* iff he is enjoying *what he is doing*. Suppose John is practicing the piano. Then he is enjoying himself provided he is enjoying practicing. It follows that if someone is enjoying himself, then he is experiencing happiness and pleasure. But a person may experience happiness or pleasure without enjoying himself. John might be happy despite the fact that he is performing some unpleasant chore, such as cleaning up after his dog.

'Pleasure', used above as an abstract singular term, also occurs as a general term, as in 'His pleasures are few', 'It is a pleasure to meet you', and 'the pleasures of dancing'. A pleasure (general term) is a *source* of pleasure (singular term). A pleasure is something that makes us happy, not the state of happiness itself. More specifically, a pleasure is an object of enjoyment, something we get pleasure from non-epistemically. Playing the piano is one of my pleasures, not the fact that I play the piano. Ryle's claim (1949, p. 108) that "His digging was his pleasure, and not a vehicle of his pleasure" is therefore a false dichotomy. The common objection to ethical hedonism (pleasure is the only intrinsic good) that some pleasures are bad (such as excessive drinking, adultery, etc.), is similarly misguided. 'The pleasures of dancing' refers to those aspects of dancing people enjoy. In contrast, 'The pleasure of dancing' refers to the enjoyment of dancing, as in 'I dance for the pleasure of dancing'. Hence Kenny's complaint that on a theory of pleasure like mine, "It would be quite a contingent matter that the pleasure of drinking did not

occur while eating ..." (1963, p. 133), is mistaken. The enjoyment of drinking cannot occur, i.e., we cannot enjoy drinking, except while drinking; this follows from the definition of enjoyment given. Similarly, from the fact that the pleasure of drinking is different from the pleasure of eating, it does not follow that there is no psychological state present both when we are enjoying drinking and enjoying eating. In both cases, we experience pleasure. The pleasure of eating is different from the pleasure of drinking simply because eating is different from drinking.<sup>13</sup> We can agree that 'a pleasure' never means 'a pleasure-sensation'. In contrast, 'a pain' almost always means 'a pain sensation', seldom 'a source of pain'. 'Happiness' is never a general term. There is instead the idiom 'Happiness is *X* (a cold glass of beer, being in love, freedom from want, etc.)', which means that *X* is a source or condition of happiness. 'Happiness consists in *X*' means the same.

An evaluative distinction is often made between higher and lower pleasures (not to be confused with the distinction between psychological and physical pleasure, drawn above<sup>14</sup>). Unfortunately, the distinction is vague. It is clear that eating, drinking, and sex are to be counted lower, while the activities of the poet, artist, and mathematician are higher. There seem to be three criteria. Lower pleasures are: (a) shared with the lower animals; (b) sources of pleasure in part because they produce pleasant bodily sensations; and (c) valued less than higher pleasures by mature, cultured, and sophisticated people. These criteria conflict. Wine-tasting is higher by (a) and (c), lower by (b). Listening to country music is higher by (a) and (b), lower by (c). Pornography is lower by (b) and (c), higher by (a). I wish to emphasize that this distinction is a distinction among pleasures, sources of pleasure. The singular term 'pleasure' has no parallel ambiguity. Furthermore, the term 'pleasure' is strongly associated with lower pleasures, which is unfortunate, since the association is a psychological obstacle to the identification of pleasure with happiness. There is absolutely no factual basis for this association, however: there are countless sources of pleasure in addition to eating, drinking, and sex.

Two cognates of the noun 'pleasure' are the adjectives *pleasant* and *pleasing*. These adjectives are equivalent, though "*pleasant* usually imputes a quality to the object to which it is applied, while *pleasing* suggests merely the effect of the object upon one" (*Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms*). While 'pleasant' has the contrary 'unpleasant', 'pleasing' as an adjective has no contrary. *Something is pleasant or pleasing iff it is disposed to give pleasure*



*nonepistemically*. In other words, people are disposed to enjoy what is pleasant. We cannot say that something is pleasant only if it *actually* or *normally* gives pleasure. The view from a certain spot may be pleasant even though no one has ever enjoyed it. This may be because no one has ever been there to view it, or because the heat, humidity, and mosquitos are unendurable.<sup>15</sup> The view is still *disposed* to give pleasure, though in the latter case the manifestation of this disposition is inhibited by external factors. To say that something *normally* does something is much stronger than saying it is disposed to do it. Here, I believe, lies the difference between 'pleasant' and *pleasurable*: the latter denotes what normally gives pleasure nonepistemically. People do enjoy what is pleasurable. I should emphasize that what is pleasurable or pleasant must be something we are pleased *by*. We may be pleased with the price of something, but that does not make the price pleasant. Furthermore, what is pleasurable or pleasant must give pleasure *nonepistemically*. Playing tennis is pleasurable, and the thought that I will play tennis today is pleasant; but the fact that I will play tennis today is neither, even though I am pleased by the fact that I will.

Pleasantness can be relativized. Something is pleasant *to A* provided it is disposed to please *A*. Something is pleasant *absolutely* provided it is disposed to please a *normal* person. Thus pain-sensations are unpleasant, even if they are pleasant to a masochist. Masochists are abnormal. The unpleasantness of pain-sensations can apparently be reduced or eliminated by a prefrontal lobotomy, a rare operation. We often describe our sensations and bodily feelings as pleasant. Pleasure-sensations are an obvious case. It must be emphasized, however, that sensations and mental entities in general are not the only pleasant things. *Any* object of nonepistemic awareness (the weather, a waitress, music) can be pleasant or unpleasant.<sup>16</sup> It should also be noted that pleasure-sensations are not the only pleasant sensations: the senses of taste, sight, and sound furnish countless examples. Similarly, not all unpleasant sensations are pains, e.g., an itch. Finally, note that while pleasantness is definable in terms of pleasure, they are quite different things. Pleasure is a mental state, pleasantness is not. Pleasantness is a disposition some mental and physical objects have to promote that mental state.<sup>17</sup>

Pleasantness and unpleasantness are contraries: nothing can be both pleasant and unpleasant to the same person at the same time. It is possible, however, to have two experiences, one pleasant, the other unpleasant. This

would occur if I took a sip of Coke while suffering from a sore foot. A person cannot, of course, experience pleasure (happiness) and pain (unhappiness) simultaneously. One stimulus can be *more* pleasant or unpleasant than another. A deep cut is more unpleasant than a pinprick. *A* is more pleasant than *B* provided people are disposed to enjoy *A* more than *B*. A precise degree of pleasantness cannot be assigned to an object, however. For people in different circumstances enjoy the same thing to different extents. It follows that the pleasantness of two stimuli presented together cannot be expressed as the sum of the degrees of pleasantness of the separate stimuli.<sup>18</sup>

So much for nonepistemic happyfying. What about epistemic? It is time we specified the conditions under which it makes *A* happy that *p*. One necessary condition is that *A* is happy that *p*, from which it follows that *A* knows that *p*. It makes me happy that I won the tournament only if I am happy that I won. However, as noted above, this condition is not sufficient. Many people are glad that Kennedy defeated Nixon in the 1960 election. But if anyone were to say now (over twenty years later) that it makes him happy that Kennedy won the election, we would — as Perry<sup>19</sup> put it — wonder where he'd been. Most of us would be glad that the crop in Ethiopia was good last year, but unless we had some personal interest in the matter it would not make us happy that the crop was good. My suggestion is that due to lapse of time or lack of interest, we are not happy *enough* that these things are the case. How happy do we have to be? Happy enough to influence our happiness. This obviously needs clarification.

First observe, though, that it can make John happy that he seduces young girls even though at the moment he is not seducing anyone. He need not even be thinking about seducing young girls. However, when he does think about seducing young girls, he must have some tendency to be happy. The thought that he seduces young girls must tend to cause him to be happy. Now recall my remark that, other things equal, the happier a person is that *p*, the happier he is, provided the thought that *p* is occurring to him. I therefore suggest the following definition of epistemic happyfication: *It makes A happy that p iff A is happy enough that p so that he tends to be happy when thinking that p.* *A* need not be happy every time the thought that *p* occurs to him. For other unhappy thoughts might outweigh it. It may make John happy that he won the tournament. But if his family was killed in an auto accident the next day, we would not expect him to be happy even if he is reminiscing about the tournament. Indeed, it may make John happy that he won even

though, for one reason or another, he is generally unhappy. He must, however, have some *tendency* to be happy when he is thinking about the fact that he won. Furthermore, he must have this tendency at least in part *because* he is so happy that he won. It would not suffice for John always to be happy and also happy that he won (in which case he would tend to be happy when thinking about the win). I agree that 'A is happy enough that *p* so that he tends to be happy when thinking that *p*' is vague. But so is 'It makes A happy that *p*', in about the same way.

We can similarly say that it makes A *unhappy* that *p* iff A is unhappy enough that *p* so that he tends to be unhappy when he is thinking that *p*. It follows that we are satisfied with our mediocre performance provided we are not unhappy enough that it was mediocre so that we are unhappy when we think about it. This might of course be due to the fact that we are happy that it was that way. Finally, it makes A *very* happy that *p* iff A is happy enough that *p* so that he tends to be very happy when thinking about it.

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#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See 'A theory of happiness', *The American Philosophical Quarterly*, forthcoming.
- <sup>2</sup> See 'A theory of happiness'.
- <sup>3</sup> See 'A theory of happiness'; also Goldstein (1973) and Thomas (1968, p. 105).
- <sup>4</sup> Much of the philosophical literature on pleasure has been concerned with the question of whether or not pleasure is a sensation or feeling. See Ryle (1949, ch. 4; 1954a, ch. 4; 1954b), Gallie (1954), Penelhum (1957), Manser (1960–1), Zink (1962, ch. III), Von Wright (1963, ch. 4), Taylor (1963), Kenny (1963, ch. VI), Pitcher (1965), Alston (1967), Perry (1967, ch. IV), Cowan (1968, ch. 2), Gosling (1969, ch. 2), Puccetti (1969), McCloskey (1971), Momeyer (1975), and Edwards (1975).
- <sup>5</sup> See Bedford (1959, p. 85) and Perry (1967, p. 145ff).
- <sup>6</sup> This example is due to Perry (1967, p. 56).
- <sup>7</sup> Something we are pleased with is *satisfying*; something we are merely satisfied with is *satisfactory*; see Benditt (1974, p. 8).
- <sup>8</sup> If I am *quite* satisfied, or *very* content with something, then I am pleased with it. This was noticed by Anscombe (1967, p. 609); a similar distinction was noticed by Gordon (1969, p. 410ff). Cf. also Penelhum (1964, p. 82) and Perry (1967, p. 129).
- <sup>10</sup> This distinction is carefully drawn for visual awareness by Dretske (1969, ch. III).
- <sup>11</sup> There are some linguistic differences. When 'X gives A pleasure' expresses epistemic pleasure-getting, it can be transformed into a sentence of the form 'It gives A pleasure *that p*.' And 'X is giving A pleasure' can only express nonepistemic pleasure-getting.
- <sup>12</sup> The analysis of enjoyment sketched in this paragraph is developed more fully in 'A Causal Theory of Enjoyment'.
- <sup>13</sup> Contrast Quinn (1968, p. 582ff).
- <sup>14</sup> See Perry (1967, p. 66); contrast Edwards (1975).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Cowan, "The view may be a very pleasant one indeed but rendered completely unenjoyable by the swarms of mosquitos" (1968, p. 20). Contrast Hall, "The noun *pleasure* is used of that feature of human experience common to all occasions on which pleasant objects are experienced" (1966-7, p. 36). Also contrast Brandt (1979, pp. 35-42), who identifies what is pleasant with what is being enjoyed by someone.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Beebe-Center (1932, ch. XI).

<sup>17</sup> An incredible amount of confusion has resulted from failure to distinguish pleasure from pleasantness, and from trying to construe pleasantness as a mental state or process. See, for example, Titchener (1909, pp. 225-264).

<sup>18</sup> Tatarikiewicz (1976, p. 38).

<sup>19</sup> I am indebted to Bedford (1959, p. 85) and Perry (1967, p. 45ff).

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