

Arguers as Editors

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ABSTRACT: People use editorial criteria to decide whether to say or to suppress potential arguments. These criteria constitute people's standards as to what effective and appropriate arguments are like, and reflect general interaction goals. A series of empirical investigations has indicated that the standards fall into three classes: those having to do with argument effectiveness, those concerned with personal issues for arguer and target, and those centered on discourse quality. The essay also sketches the affinities certain types of people have for the different criteria.

KEY WORDS: Message production, editing arguments, interaction goals, individual differences, effectiveness, appropriateness, discourse competence, argument.

In the course of producing an argument, people must do two analytically distinct things. They must generate messages which might possibly be said, and then must decide whether or not to utter them. This division of argument production into two phases,¹ inventing and editing, is at the heart of our research program (Hample & Dallinger, 1987d).

Rather than studying the whole process of argument production, we have concentrated on the editing phase. By "editing," we refer to the simple decision to say or suppress a possible argument. Our methodologies have not permitted us to examine the means by which a person might modify an argument to make it more attractive. Instead, we have tried to discover (a) what standards people use in making their editorial decisions, and (b) what variables influence the preference for one criterion over another. Most of our research on this latter question has dealt with individual differences variables, although we have some general findings on the effects of situation as well.

I

Let us begin by explaining what we believe to be the editorial standards people use in arguing, and how we discovered them. Our earliest research paradigm was to provide respondents with a situation description and a list of possible arguments. We asked people to indicate which arguments

they would be likely to use in the given situation. Then we asked for the reasons that each of the other arguments would be suppressed, and we coded these open-ended answers. Before we report our main results, several features of this methodology may deserve some notice.

First is our decision to provide respondents with ready-made argument repertoires. This is, of course, an artificiality. Our first two studies offered respondents 16 possible arguments (Hample, 1984b; Hample & Dallinger, 1985), one later experiment gave 32 choices (Hample & Dallinger, 1988), and all the others have 48. We certainly do not believe that people in ordinary argumentative situations will consider more than a handful of possible arguments, not even as many as the smallest number we have provided in our protocols. We felt, however, that we could not obtain plausible data simply by asking subjects to report their own suppressed arguments. People are naturally reluctant to paint themselves unattractively, and so we would not have been told about obviously stupid or offensive thoughts (Rosenberg, 1969). And some suppressed arguments may only have flickered through consciousness or perhaps never arrived there at all (Hample, 1986); obviously these would have been unavailable for self reporting (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Hample, 1984a; Benoit & Benoit, 1986).

Both for these reasons and because we were only interested in editorial processes, we decided to simulate the generative phase of arguing by providing prepared lists. To assure reasonable coverage of the possible arguments in a given situation, we used the work of Marwell and Schmitt (1967) as a template. They give 16 strategies which can be used to obtain compliance, and we wrote one, two, or three examples of each strategy for each situation in our various experiments.

A second point which deserves some emphasis is our decision to use open-ended questions to elicit the editorial criteria. Even in the first stages of the research program, we could have provided a list of normative criteria taken from textbooks. However, we sought a simple description of what people do, not an evaluation of how close or far they are from pedagogical or theoretical prescriptions. Consequently, coding respondents' own explanations seemed a more valid research strategy than forcing people to use a standard list.

Finally, we ought to say a word about the role of situations in our work. The first study (Hample, 1984b) made use of one of Marwell and Schmitt's situation-and-strategies lists. This example required respondents to role play (they were to pretend to be parents of a high school student). But feeling that this procedure was too remote from actual arguing, in all the later studies we have generated situations which are more true to undergraduate life. Every study after the first has also used several situations; the Hample and Dallinger (1985) paper, for instance, has four distinct sets of realistic materials. Our chief impulse in using multiple

situations has been to increase the variability in our data, and to insure, insofar as we can, that none of our results are due to a single idiosyncratic or unrealistic context. Later in this article, however, we will have a few substantive things to say about the relationship between situation and editing.

Table I contains the coding manuals which we used to classify the open-ended responses in Hample (1984b) and Hample and Dallinger (1985). The manuals were developed by reading through the data several times and generating a category system based on our respondents' own words and ideas. The coding system from the first study was used as an initial draft of that for the second investigation. The second study, which involved more respondents and more situations, permitted us to make some slight elaborations in the manual but also suggested that two of the codes be dropped because of their rarity. The residual category (code 14 in Table I) was used for about 3% of the responses in Hample (1984b) and 6% in Hample and Dallinger (1985). These percentages are low enough to afford confidence in the comprehensiveness of the coding system as a whole.

Because we believe that our later methodologies are better suited to generalizing about our criteria, we will defer those discussions until the next section of this article. However, we could hardly fail to notice that several of our rationales belonged to similar families of editorial rules. Codes 2 and 3 have to do with effectiveness judgments, either immediate or long-term. Codes 4, 5, and 6 are fairly strategy-specific. They seem to represent principled objections to certain types of appeals. While these objections were not universal within our samples (every argument was endorsed by some fraction of our respondents), these codes were used consistently by some of our subjects. Most striking was the group of codes 7 through 10. These all have to do with the personal context of argumentation, as opposed to its instrumental focus on persuasion. Our respondents clearly see argumentation as an extremely face-involving sort of interaction with evident relational implications. Codes 11, 12, and 13, as a group, refer to the quality (not merely the effectiveness) of arguments. Our subjects' attention to truth, relevance, and novelty suggests a genuine appreciation of what competent discourse requires. Encouragingly, all but the discourse codes seem to have parallels in the results of Dillard, Segrin and Harden (1989), whose Study 1 had a design quite similar to our first investigations.²

II

After the second study, we altered our aims and methodologies. Satisfied that we had found a reasonably valid set of editorial criteria, we now

Table I. Editorial Criteria Coded from Open-Ended Responses in Early Studies (Coding Handbook Summary).

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1. Subject chose to use the strategy.
 2. Only use arguments which will WORK. The subject gives no further codable rationale as to why the argument will fail. If the subject does give a codable rationale (e.g., "threats never work") code the answer under the rationale ("don't threaten").
 3. Don't say things which could BOOMERANG TACTICALLY or make the other DEFENSIVE. If the subject seems to have in mind some sort of relational worsening, use code 10. If the subject seems to have in mind some sort of personal boomerang for the other, use 8. If the subject seems to have in mind some sort of personal boomerang for the arguer, use 7.
 - *4. Don't PREPAY. Get the compliance first, then give the reward.
 - *5. Don't make MORALITY as issue. If the problem with morality is that it is a false assumption, use code 11. If the problem with morality is that it is irrelevant, use 12.
 6. Don't THREATEN, BRIBE or PUNISH, or use any other negative or high-pressure tactics. If there is a rationale given, however, code it there (e.g., "you wouldn't want to live with him/her after you threaten him" would be code 10).
 7. Treat YOURSELF POSITIVELY. Don't do anything you'd regret or which would harm your image of yourself. Don't make yourself vulnerable to the other; don't put yourself in his/her debt. Don't BROWNOSE or whine. Don't be PUSHY. Don't STOOP to his level. Don't BEG. Not my STYLE.
 8. Don't HARM the other. Don't hurt the other's feelings, or make the other feel GUILTY or MAD. Don't do anything that will harm the other's present or future happiness or personality. But for questions of the other's right to choose, use code 9.
 9. Treat the other POSITIVELY, as an independent, mature person. Let the other make his/her own choices. Don't PROJECT your own desires or feelings. Don't be SELFISH. He/she may have a GOOD REASON. Don't TRICK the other.
 10. Preserve your RELATIONSHIP with the other. Don't say things that could cause future problems in the relationship. The subject should mention (or clearly have in mind) the relationship. For comments which point only to injury to the other's self-image, use codes 8 or 9; for comments which point only to injury to the arguer's self-image, use 7.
 11. Use only TRUE arguments or assumptions. Don't rely on false premises about debts or moral issues. Be HONEST. Don't B.S. Be REALISTIC. Don't say things the other thinks are FALSE. Don't make IMPOSSIBLE ASSUMPTIONS.
 12. Only use RELEVANT arguments. Don't use any which you or the other or anyone else would perceive as irrelevant to the issue. Be DIRECT. Don't say UNNECESSARY things.
 13. Be NOVEL and informative. Don't say obvious things, or things the other already knows.
 14. OTHER. This category especially includes suggestions as to what the subject would prefer to be arguing (e.g., "I wouldn't use this one because the last one is better"). Also, this is STUPID or IGNORANT. Use this if the subject offers a rebuttal to the argument, rather than an explanation of why s/he wouldn't choose to use it.
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* The items whose number is preceded by an asterisk are those which were present in Hample (1984b) but not in Hample and Dallinger (1985).

wanted to know how they were used and by whom. In coding the open-ended responses, we noticed, for instance, that some respondents would make extensive use of person-centered rationales for suppression, while others rejected arguments almost solely on the basis of effectiveness. We undertook a series of studies to associate individual difference variables with preferences for editorial standards.

In order to do this, we felt obliged to abandon open-ended explanations for argument suppression. Although we certainly prefer the richness of respondents' unconstrained answers, we adopted the checklist in Table II for several reasons, most of which have to do with the amount of time subjects required to write out their rationales. Because we want to be able to generalize our results beyond the particular situations and messages we use in our studies, we have to provide a representative sample of both situations and messages (Jackson & Backus, 1982; Jackson & Jacobs, 1983; for a recent exchange on these points, see Jackson, O'Keefe, Jacobs & Brashers, in press, and Hunter, Hamilton and Allen, in press). We made the decision, therefore, to use multiple examples of each message type, and to include several situations, in each study.

Our results have consistently shown the importance of these decisions. Our multiple instantiations of message types are only moderately associated (with Cramer's V 's of about 0.35), and we have often shown substantial situational effects. Without multiple operationalizations of both message type and situation, our ability to generalize would be severely

Table II. Checklist of Response Codes for Each Possible Compliance Gaining Tactic.

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1. *I would use this one.* This means that you would be willing to say or do whatever is indicated. You may accept as many of the 48 as you wish.
 2. *No: This wouldn't work.* You reject this approach because it would fail, or even perhaps backfire.
 3. *No: This is too negative to use.* You prefer not to use this one because it is too high pressure — a distasteful threat or bribe, perhaps.
 4. *No: I must treat myself positively.* You might later regret using this approach, or it doesn't match your self-image.
 5. *No: I must treat the other positively.* You feel that this approach might hurt the other's feelings — perhaps make him/her feel guilty or mad.
 6. *No: I must treat our relationship positively.* You reject this approach because it might injure the relationship between you and the other person.
 7. *No: This is false.* You consider that this approach is false or impossible or easily refuted.
 8. *No: This is irrelevant.* The approach seems irrelevant, either to you or to the other person.
 9. *No: Other.* You wouldn't use this approach, but for reasons other than numbers 2 through 8.
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limited. It would have been too onerous for our respondents to write out rationales for all the message examples we wanted to test, and the likelihood of fatigue effects would have been further increased by our desire to collect data on personality variables. Consequently, we adopted the checklist in Table II, from which respondents make a single choice for each possible argument.

Table II differs from Table I in several respects. It has been worded for the respondents, and some explanatory detail has been dropped. More critically, several codes have been joined together or discarded. Table I's codes 2 and 3 have been absorbed into Table II's code 2; codes 4, 5, and 6 have been combined into the new code 3; Table I's codes 8 and 9 became code 5; and the original code 13 was dropped for lack of use. These changes were intended to simplify the scheme, in order to make it easier for respondents to use. The test-retest reliability of the response checklist over a six week period is about 0.65 (Hample & Dallinger, 1987a), and less than 10% of the answers fall into the residual category (the new code 9). These results suggest that the checklist is at least minimally reliable and valid.

Although we normally have respondents make one choice from the checklist for each possible argument, in one study we asked subjects to make Likert judgments of all the responses for each argument so that we could factor analyze the criteria (Hample & Dallinger, 1988). We found three general dimensions. *Effectiveness* comprises the first three codes: the decision to endorse, rejection on grounds of effectiveness, and suppression because of negativity. The second grouping is the *person-centered* factor: these rejections are based on the face and relational issues represented by codes 4, 5 and 6. *Discourse competence* is the last dimension. Truth and falsity are the rejection criteria here.

In the remainder of this section, we wish to discuss each code individually. We will try to show the theoretical importance of each editorial criterion, and to map its usage patterns in terms of the sorts of people who do or do not prefer it. Table III is a convenient summary of our individual differences results to date.

Strictly speaking, *endorsement* is not an editorial criterion at all, of course. The vast bulk of compliance-gaining research has dealt with this single response (for reviews, see Boster, 1985; Seibold, Cantrill & Meyers, 1985; Wheelless, Barraclough & Stewart, 1983). We have found that more potential arguments are endorsed by people with these characteristics: a tendency to approach arguments (Infante & Rancer, 1982), high verbal aggression (Infante & Wigley, 1986), high self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), and high self-reported effectiveness and appropriateness in arguing (Trapp, 1986). Fewer arguments tend to be endorsed by people with high grade point averages, high construct differentiation for disliked others (Crockett, Press, Delia & Kenney, 1974), and by females.

Table III. Summary of Associations Among Editorial Criteria Usage and Individual Differences Variables, Grouped by Study.

Code:	Effectiveness			Person-Centered			Discourse		None
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
arg-ap ¹	+								
arg-av					+				-
verb agg	+	+			-				-
int orient		-	+		+				
female		-	+		+				+
self-mon ²	+			-					
other-dir		-	+	-	+	+		-	
extravrsn			-			-			
female			-			-			
argt eff ³	++	+	-		-				
argt app	+								
female		-			+				
gpa	-				+				
soc des ⁴					+	-			
Mach									+
female					+				
gpa							-		
rcqliked ⁵		-			+	+	+	-	
rcqdislk	-		+	+		--	-		
female	-				+				
androgeny ⁶									
masculine		++		-	-	--	+		
feminine									
spouse's ⁷				+	+		+		++

Note: Abbreviations for the variable names are explained in the text. The editorial codes are labeled and described in Table II. A “+” refers to a positive association, a “-” to a negative one, and doubled signs refer to especially strong relationships. “Female” refers to gender, which we always coded as male = 1 and female = 2; thus, positive associations indicate that females make more use of that code.

¹ Hample and Dallinger (1987a).
² Hample and Dallinger (1987b).
³ Hample and Dallinger (1987c).
⁴ Hample and Dallinger (1987e).

⁵ Dallinger and Hample (1989a).
⁶ Dallinger and Hample (1989b).
⁷ Hample, Dallinger and Myers (1989).

Those who are especially likely to endorse arguments therefore appear to be aggressive, marginally sophisticated at best, and male. They seek out chances to argue, but are verbally hostile and tend to have low grades. On the self-monitoring scale, they claim to be sensitive to the other, but they show low interpersonal differentiation for disliked others. They judge

themselves to be appropriate and very effective arguers, but we are somewhat inclined to doubt this self-perception, not only because of the associated individual differences variables, but also because of their evident lack of selectivity about what to say.

The next code is *effectiveness*, which is the first true editorial criterion. Here the respondents suppress arguments because they do not appear to be potentially effective. Effectiveness is generally thought to be the instrumental goal in regulative interaction, and is the arguer's first objective (Clark & Delia, 1979; O'Keefe & Delia, 1982; O'Keefe & Shepherd, 1987; Hample & Dallinger, 1988). Arguers ought to have more than one goal, however. Any argumentative interaction involves an inherent conflict between the desire to have one's own way and the need to protect the other's face (Brown & Levinson, 1987; O'Keefe & Shepherd, 1987). Presumably, everyone who argues recognizes the effectiveness goal and the consequent applicability of this editorial rule. But since our respondents could only choose one response from the list, those who used effectiveness to a great extent necessarily used the other criteria less often; therefore, people who prefer this criterion tend to be less sensitive to the face issues in argumentation. Readers may notice in Table III how often the results for effectiveness (code 2) are exactly opposite those for code 5 (concern for other's welfare).

What kind of people make extensive use of effectiveness to edit their utterances? We find positive associations between effectiveness editing and verbal aggressiveness, self-reported argument effectiveness, and the masculine sex role (Wheless & Wheless, 1981). People who are least likely to justify rejections on effectiveness grounds are high in interpersonal orientation (Swap & Rubin, 1983), female, high on the other-directed subscale of the self-monitoring instrument (Gudykunst, Yang & Nishida, 1987), and high on construct differentiation for liked peers.

Exclusively task-oriented argument editors are similar to those who endorse frequently: they are aggressive, male, relatively insensitive to others, but feel that they argue well. Our overall impression is that of a pushy, overconfident male who claims argumentative mastery but in fact lacks it.

The third code, which we refer to as *principled objection*, justifies the suppression of an utterance because of the type of argument it is: a threat, a bribe, an offensively sanctimonious moralization, or something else too negative to use. Only this code displays any real sensitivity to argument form. Other codes (7 and 8) have reference to an argument's integrity, and all the remaining rejection standards have to do with pragmatic effects of some sort. Along with the endorsement decision and the effectiveness criterion, principled objection completes the first overall factor, which we also call effectiveness.

Nonetheless, we find a personality pattern quite different for principled

objection as compared to effectiveness. Those most likely to object to certain arguments based on their type are interpersonally oriented, other-directed, and highly differentiated for disliked peers. This criterion tends not to be used by people high in the extraversion subscale of self-monitoring (Gudykunst, Yang & Nishida, 1987), or by people who report that they are very effective arguers. We obtained contradictory results for gender on this editing criterion.

That principled objection should be part of the effectiveness factor, but show a preference pattern more consistent with interpersonal concerns, is perhaps explained in the following way. On the one hand, the objection to these arguments is that they are "too negative," which would seem to imply something about interpersonal relationships. On the other hand, however, the criterion is not really phrased in terms of any people, as are codes 4, 5, and 6: Distasteful to whom? Too high pressure by whose standards? This code evolved from open-ended answers (summarized in codes 4, 5, and 6 of Table I) which clearly showed a sensitivity to argument form; or put another way, this editorial standard reflects prejudices about particular types of argument, prejudices which are not focused on any specific interactional partners. We believe this type prejudice explains why people use this code on the same sorts of arguments as they use codes 1 and 2, and why codes 4, 5, and 6 are truly person-centered, and this criterion is not.

The next three codes form the person-centered factor. They refer to concern about own face, other's face, and the welfare of the relationship. Although our factor analysis grouped them together, they are theoretically distinct and show some differences in their empirical associations as well.

Concern for self is the fourth code, and as its description in Table II indicates, it is straightforwardly about the arguer's face. Any attempt to persuade another automatically threatens the target's negative face (his/her desire not to be controlled by anyone). However, to threaten another's face is intrinsically a threat to one's own positive face (the desire to make a favorable impression). When A pushes B toward some end, B's negative face is offended because s/he has been pushed, and A's positive face is injured because s/he is seen to be pushing (Brown & Levinson, 1987, esp. pp. 65—68). The degree of injury is related to the obviousness of the face-threatening act and the relationship between the actors. So in principle, own face is a permanent background concern for any competent arguer. Thus Benoit and Benoit (1989) report that people make strongly positive or negative self-evaluations, depending on what they did in an argument and how it came out. And in a different context, Rosenfeld (1979) found that fear of projecting an undesirable self-image was the most important reason for not disclosing private information about oneself.

Our own results indicate that certain respondents were most sensitive to own face concerns: people low in self-monitoring, low in other-

directedness, high in differentiation for disliked peers, and low in masculinity (but not high in femininity, or female in any of our analyses). We also found that of two spouses, both will be high on this criterion or else both will be consistently low. With the exception of this last finding, which we will discuss momentarily, the data describe people who are selfish, concerned about their own welfare but not about others'. They are not very focused on their interactional partners but are nonetheless able to list off an impressive number of flaws in people they dislike. Although this editorial standard is certainly person-centered, it is surely not relationally oriented in a very constructive way.

The direct relationship with spouse's use of this criterion (a result that also occurs for code 5, harm to other) has quite a different interpretation, however. In our study of married couples (Hample, Dallinger & Myers, 1989), we discovered that spouses use these codes in a particular pattern. If A is concerned about own face, B is, too; and if A is concerned about other's face, so is B. In a marriage, concern for own face in one partner seems to call out a reciprocal, self-defensive impulse to protect own face in the other. And one spouse's concern for other's face usually encourages an answering concern from the other. In the marriages we studied, which were for the most part happy, long-term partnerships, each spouse seemed to balance his/her face concerns with those of the other. And, although it is not apparent from Table III, we also found that spouse's codes 4 and 5 had an inverse relation: if A had high concern for own face, B showed little concern for other's (i.e., A's) face, and vice versa. So in marriages, the selfishness we sense in frequent use of code 4 is balanced and absorbed into the couples' system of mutual goals and actions.

Code 5 indexes *concern for other*. Here the arguer is concerned about the other's face, the other's welfare and feelings. Benoit and Benoit (1989) show that even people who objectively get their way in an argument may still classify the encounter as "a loss," if winning comes at the cost of hurting the other. As we discussed above, arguing intrinsically threatens the other's negative face. Interpersonally sensitive arguers will have this concern throughout the encounter, although normally as a secondary goal (Dillard, Segrin & Harden, 1989). O'Keefe and Shepherd (1987) show that only people high in construct differentiation are able to combine instrumental and relational goals without subordination. For most people, then, concern for other is part of a panoply of concerns which are normally less salient than effectiveness.

But what kind of people consistently elevate the importance of the interactional partner? They are people who wish to avoid arguments, are very sensitive to social desirability demands (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), and eschew verbal hostility; who are interpersonally oriented, other-directed, and highly differentiated for liked peers; who think they argue ineffectively but nonetheless have good grades; and who are female.

This is a very consistent set of results. Those who show unusual concern for the other's face needs are exemplary in their concern for others and in their sensitivity to relational demands. However, they follow these impulses to such an extent that they find themselves avoiding arguments to an unusual degree, and they consider themselves to be poor arguers (a possibility that seems inconsistent with their grades and interpersonal perceptiveness). It may well be that a high level of concern for other comes at some cost of concern for self. As we noticed before, this danger is handled in many marriages by a kind of partnered responsibility for face. But in less permanent relationships, the people who have a pronounced preference for this editorial code may be disadvantaging themselves for the sake of their partners.

The last person-centered standard is *concern for relationship*. This criterion emerges as important in our own studies, the Dillard, Segrin, and Hardin (1989) report, the Benoit and Benoit (1989) study, Benoit and Benoit's (1990) essay here, as well as a multitude of other reflections and empirical studies. The instrumental/relationship goals contrast is becoming commonplace in current communication theory. Our own conceptualization is a little different because we are careful to separate relational concerns from what others tend to call identity issues, those of face for self and other.

We find that people who use this editorial standard to an unusual degree are other-directed, but not extroverted or responsive to social desirability demands. They are differentiated for liked peers, but distinctly undifferentiated for disliked peers; this pair of results caused us to reconsider what these two variables actually measure (Dallinger & Hample, 1989a). We have had uncertain results regarding gender: one study indicates that males are more likely to use this criterion, another says that people having the masculine sex role are very much disinclined to use it, and the other studies are silent.

This pattern of results is not as well defined as that for the previous code. Still, we find a group of people who are concerned about the other and perceptive about the people with whom they interact. However, they are not especially outgoing and are unsophisticated about people they dislike. Finally, they are remarkably untouched by social desirability calls. In sum, these are people committed to their relationships and good at maintaining them, but who are unconcerned about other things and other people. We do not get any sense of self-denigration or find any implication of submissiveness here; both of these were present in our description of people who prefer code 5. The code 6 people are simply focused on their relationships.

The seventh and eighth standards are the discourse competence codes. They represent judgments of truth and relevance, both of which are expected of competent conversationalists (Grice, 1975), fundamental to

rational discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1983), and needed for the emancipation and development of society (Habermas, 1979). Table III displays our results to date. Respondents who showed an unusual predilection for truth judgments have poor grades, report a masculine sex role, and are differentiated for liked peers and undifferentiated for disliked others. Married couples seem to have shared preferences for this standard, since one spouse's use of it is directly associated with the other spouse's. People especially concerned about relevance are not other-directed and show low differentiation for liked peers.

We have difficulty in discerning a consistent pattern in our results for either discourse code. Perhaps this is simply because we have not yet found the right predictors. However, we are coming to believe that our poor predictive history for these two editorial standards has occurred because truth and relevance are common possessions of all competent communicators, as Grice says, and therefore personality variables should not associate with them. Possibly measures of cognitive ability or content would predict these codes, but even here we note the failure of respondents' grades to relate in any important way.

We have found that these two discourse competence codes are often associated with the effectiveness standards (Hample & Dallinger, 1988), and Dillard, Segrin, and Harden (1989) report that arguers' efforts to use "plausible and compelling reasons" (coded as "logic") correlate positively with the arguers' emphasis on the effectiveness goal ("influence"). These two findings both indicate that our discourse codes are strongly linked with effectiveness concerns. It may even be that, for our respondents, truth and relevance are primarily explanatory resources for effectiveness judgments, rather than abstract, philosophical values.

The last editorial code is the residual category. Some predictions are expectable because of our forced-choice format. Verbal aggressiveness, for instance, has substantial associations with endorsement and effectiveness, leaving little opportunity for residual choices. Partly because of this effect, and partly because of the necessarily miscellaneous content of the code, we are disinclined to offer any interpretations of our findings here. We make one important exception, however: the strongly positive association between spouses' use of this category. In this instance, we suspect that code 9 may well contain rules idiosyncratic to the marriage (see D. Jackson, 1977; Rausch, Barry, Hertel & Swain, 1974, pp. 201-204).

These, then, are our sketches of what each editorial standard means, and what sorts of people use them. It remains for us to acknowledge the effects of situation on editorial behavior. We have found that situation often has direct effects on the frequency with which many of the criteria are used and that it often interacts with the individual differences variables we have been discussing. These effects are collectively quite substantial. Dallinger and Hample (1989b), for instance, report that situation accounts

for half the explained variance in that experiment. We have not scaled our situations on any meaningful variables (for the most likely choices see Cody & McLaughlin, 1985), and so cannot offer substantive interpretations of our results. Nonetheless, our data clearly indicate that situation has a large impact on editing.

III

We believe that this research program is important to the study of argumentation for several reasons. First, it represents an effort to describe an important phase of the argument production process. Historically, most work in argumentation has concerned itself with argumentative products: their forms, their contents, and so forth. One prominent theory explicitly insists on the "externalization" of argument as a precondition of study; that is, scholars should focus only on public texts and take pains to avoid dealing with arguers' thoughts and private opinions (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, pp. 4–7). Certainly, we have no objections to the study of public argumentation and are anxious to declare that we have learned much about argument in this way (see Hample, 1988). Production processes, however, are distinctly not public. Even allowing for the emergent nature of interpersonal argument, much remains buried in the minds of the arguers. Why offer a justification and not an apology? Why address one felicity condition and not another? Why put a point bluntly and not with charity? Why blurt an insult, rather than being as diplomatic as one is able? These are all questions about argument production, and none can be answered securely by looking only at text.³ We believe that our methodologies have permitted us to study some of the private mental processes that produce arguments. Findings of this sort are necessary since theoretical accounts of argument production will surely need to describe the standards against which people measure their arguments.

Secondly, we think that these editorial standards have theoretical, as distinct from descriptive, importance. Whatever else it is, argument is motivated. People do not merely argue *with* reasons, they argue *for* reasons. Our standards may be a step toward supplying our theories with those reasons. These criteria are not simply an editorial checklist; they represent the goals of arguers, and the rules that people think ought to regulate arguments, the parameters of arguers' nascent plans. Arguing is a human behavior, and surely a full theory of argumentation will eventually have to account for people's motivations in arguing.

Finally, our work affords an interesting glimpse of the degree to which naive social actors use argument standards similar to those our scholars have generated. For the most part, our results are comforting in this regard. We find evidence that people actively evaluate the truth and

relevance of what they say, that they are sensitive to face and relational issues, and, of course, that they try to calculate the effectiveness of their arguments prior to utterance. All this is consistent with various of our prescriptions. On the other hand, we found very little attention to argument form, in contrast to our historical preoccupation with that subject.

In sum, we believe that it is theoretically useful to consider arguers as editors. This perspective, with its associated methodologies, affords us a view of some of the value-guided human activities that actually give birth to the public arguments which have absorbed nearly all our scholarly attention to date.

NOTES

¹ The word "phase" suggests a chronology, which is ambiguous in this context. We take no position on whether people generate (or recall) whole repertoires and then select, or whether arguers suppress-or-utter one possibility at a time. Either process is plausible, and we presently have no evidence which permits us to prefer one possibility to another.

² We think that Dillard et al. do not report any discourse criteria only because of differences in how we and they categorize respondents' answers. They used the Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman and Georgacarakos (1982) compliance-gaining tactic typology to generate their stimuli, and one of these tactics is deceit. Therefore we suppose that Dillard et al. did in fact obtain comments about truth and other discourse concerns, but chose to code them into other general categories. One of their goals is labeled "identity," for instance, and is exemplified by "it's immoral," which we suppose would be a convenient place to code "it's a lie." They also give "it's irrelevant" as an example of something which would be coded as "influence," which corresponds generally to our effectiveness code. So we attribute the differences in reported results between our studies to different theoretical concerns, which led to somewhat different summaries of the data. Nonetheless, we find a happy coincidence of findings in our research, and consider both our project and theirs to support one another.

³ We are aware that conversation analysts sometimes address themselves to these sorts of questions (see McLaughlin, 1984), and concede that those analyses are often persuasive. However, we note that they always involve assumptions about what the conversants intended or believed or meant, what feature of the discourse they were responding to, and so forth (see Hample, 1985). Our point is simply that psychological investigation of these mental contents and processes is a more direct route to understanding them.

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