TEMPORALITY AND THE MODERN STATE

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To speak of an "act of remembering" is to speak of something that appears at first glance simple and clear-cut. Since all memories apparently repeat similar patterns, it is easy to treat them uniformly. And if every recollection is like every other, then one might logically assume that all could be placed within the same category of mental phenomena. But the matter is more complicated than it might seem. There are, in fact, at least three types of memories corresponding to three ranges of time a memory might span.

There is, first of all, the memory that operates within the framework of a few hours or a few days. This memory simply recalls immediate or short-term events such as when and where to meet someone for an appointment. Second, there is the memory that operates within the parameters of an individual's lifetime. This type of memory recollects events with reference to long-range personal experience, or it locates encounters with people and things within the framework of one's normal biological span of existence (for instance, by marking memorable occasions by means of birthdays or anniversaries). Lastly, there is the memory that transcends the individual's lifetime and "recollects" facts, events, or processes that happened long ago. In exercising this kind of memory one brings to mind events that perhaps go back centuries (say, to "remembering" that Socrates died in 399 B.C. or that the Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776).

Put differently, there are three partially intersecting planes of temporality to which everyone has recourse: the temporality of day-to-day existence, the temporality of one's biological lifetime, and the temporality of what Ferdnand Braudel has called *la longue durée.*[1] Braudel uses this term to refer to the long termporal duration, the "almost timeless history," of the relationship of humans to the natural environment. As used here, the *longue durée* will mean something slightly different. It designates the span of historically interpreted time, usually stretching from some originary point in the past (a

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beginning, a founding moment) down to the period of one's own lifetime. Depending on how the flow of time is conceptualized, this can mean a few generations, a few centuries, or even a millenium or two. For instance, the *longue durée* for a Roman of, say, the first century A.D. would be the period from the founding of Rome to the Age of Augustus, with everything predating this time being essentially irrelevant. For a Christian living in the same century, the *longue durée* would be the temporal expanse stretching from Adam's expulsion from paradise to the birth of Christ. The long duration, then, may vary in length and in the kinds of meaning invested in it. But to the extent that a particular temporality is widely accepted and internalized by a population at large, it cannot help but have an effect on the values and attitudes accepted by every member of society. Also important to note is the fact that the *longue durée* makes available a medium through which institutions and entire social systems are able to chart the course of their development. Hence, it provides an indispensible framework for the preservation of long-term historical memories.[2]

Of the three time senses just mentioned, only the third, that of the *longue durée,* is so broad that it cannot be checked against individual experience. Since the happenings that are "recalled" within the long duration are not personal, they depend upon external accounts for their factual validation, and upon external interpretations for whatever significance is attributed to them. These happenings are then learned or assimilated ("remembered"), after which they can be consciously recollected along with the particular meanings the events are supposed to possess. Many of the events in the *longue durée* are heavily charged with value, certainly more than are ordinary occurrences within day-to-day temporality. But since these events were not experienced directly, the importance they receive is always conferred from without. The power of this third form of temporality lies, then, with the institutions or traditions that shape it by deciding which of its aspects are deemed significant or insignificant.

For this reason, this last temporal sense is the most important, since it provides the decisive framework within which the other two temporalities operate. A great deal of how one's own life is understood, or even how one's everyday experiences are apprehended, both leans on and subsists within what is acquired from the *longue durée.* The long duration not only helps establish the dimensions of the two narrower temporal spheres; it also helps constitute the meanings that are encoded and accentuated within them, and this despite the fact that this mode of temporality is the one least amenable to the personal control of the individual. So much of *how* one thinks, what one remembers, and how one evaluates one's own or others' behavior depends on

who or what stakes out and superintends the trans-individual temporal sense. With this in mind, it is important to look more closely at this third realm of temporality. My main concern in the following pages is, first, to explain briefly which social and political forces in Western history have vied for the power to interpret the *longue durée;* second, to clarify which institutions in the modern world now shape or mold temporality; and third, to discuss what bearing our current sense of duration may have, directly or indirectly, on personal and social values. I wish to argue that of the three major ways of structuring temporality – the traditional, religious, and political – the last has by now become dominant. This means that the state is presently the chief institution of the modern era determining our "representations" of the past. And in achieving this hegemonic position, it has usurped or greatly weakened the traditional and religious modes of interpreting time. Even so, the state's control of temporality is being challenged today by capitalism, and this is happening not because capitalism offers a new view of the *longue durée,* but because it is in its interest to undermine the importance of temporality *as such.* Though there are some signs to the contrary, what Western societies may now be on the verge of facing is not a return to an earlier form of temporality, but simply the experience of atemporality on a mass scale.

Time in the Ancient World

At the beginning of human history, the dimension of time itself was understood as something *mythic.* But the same relation I have just described still applied: the realms of the biological life-span and of day-to-day experience received value from, and were literally sustained by, an all-embracing suprapersonal plane of temporality without which there could have been no meaningful grounding in existence. To be more accurate, for archaic man this most encompassing expanse of temporality was not thought to be a time-span of linear sequence as we now conceive it. Rather, it was regarded as a sphere of static, primordial time as compared to the agitated, mundane time of normal life. The assumption was that before quotidian reality was created there existed a cosmic time that preceded, and laid the foundations for, the time of everyday occurrences. This time before normal time was sacred, qualitative, transcendental, and creative. It was a time without duration or regular succession, a *Gestalt* that antedated, and then produced, the time of the "beginnings."[3] By contrast, ordinary time was considered profane, quantitative, and flatly repetitive. The only way to make mundane existence meaningful was to suffuse it with sacred time through a festive or ritual re-enactment of the events that were presumed to have occurred in primordial time. Then the banal and wholly ordinary world would partake in

the cosmic, and the truly significant would be brought down to earth. In this way another form of time (sacred time) would penetrate the time of day-to-day events, and life would become spiritualized. At the crux of this notion was the importance of a kind of remembering that was neither personal nor historical. It was a remembering of deeds performed by supernatural actors, deeds that were thought to provide the grounding for prosaic time, and that had therefore to be recalled and imitated if life was to be worthwhile. "What matter[ed]," as Mircea Eliade has expressed it, "[was] to remember the mythical event, the only event worth considering because the only creative event."[4]

With the eventual dissolution of this archaic conception of time – an event that, in ancient Greece and the Near East, occurred during the second millenium B.C. – several things happened. Most notably, the static notion of time was demythologized and historicized. Mythic atemporality gradually came to be replaced by a sense of continuous duration that never had to be confronted before. Moreover, this duration was experienced not as cyclical but as linear. Like a river that sweeps everything with it and lets nothing stand still, time began to be viewed as moving in only one direction: from a distant past to an unknown future with the present as a continuously vanishing moment in between. The dawning awareness that human time travels "along a rectilinear line in a universe where everything, if it moves at all, moves in a cyclical order" must have been extremely unsettling.[5] In the present age it is virtually impossible to know how disorienting this perception must have been to ancient peoples, since today all of us operate wholly within a modern, secularized temporality. Only traces remain that indicate how disturbing the transition from mythic to human time undoubtedly was, and recreating the intensity of this disturbance from the few fragments that are extant is as difficult as recreating an original mass from matter dispersed in space. It seems, though, that profane time was at first experienced by the earliest civilizations in the West as something disintegrative: as a kind of collapse of equilibrium or a "fall" into unwanted duration.

Except for the Hebrews, most Near Eastern civilizations initially regarded temporality as a movement away from some primordial, cosmic unity, and therefore as something inherently regressive. This is clear from Mesopotamian documents where time was viewed as a rush away from order, and hence as a descent from the superior time of "the beginnings." The earliest Greeks also treated time as a kind of degenerative process, a falling away from the harmony of the original *arche*. These pessimistic perspectives on temporality emerged because of the tremendous loss of security that must have accompanied the breakup of sacred time. Instead of facing a situation in which

everything had already happened and needed only to be repeated ceremonially, men now faced a situation in which every moment was new, where nothing that happens had ever happened before, and where each instant was therefore qualitatively different from every other. This certainly engendered an enormous reservoir of anxiety, which was at least partially channeled into the depressing notion that time is an unavoidable process of loss or disintegration. Hence, the first glimpse at the fact that there is such a thing as a *longue durée* appears to have brought with it mainly the experience of sorrow.

Along with the notion that time is continuous dissolution, another conception of time arose to challenge this interpretation. This second conception emerged in response to practical, everyday considerations and not, as with the first, in order to satisfy speculative or metaphysical needs. For people who simply wanted to mark the time they were in, or to have a scaffolding that helped them recall the recent or distant past, or to orient themselves by means of some sort of dating system enabling them to comprehend the continuum of events, a different kind of temporal organization was needed – one that would provide a more down-to-earth meaning to the succession of the *longue durée*. It is in this context that the most primitive chronologies were originally established. Generally the earliest forms of dating were based on the marking of a "before" and "after" with regard to memorable local occurrences such as wars, or certain natural phenomena such as floods or eclipses. Eventually these modes of forging a rudimentary sense of the past were codified into legends or sagas, which provided at least one way of keeping track of the duration that preceded one's own period. This method of ordering temporality was explicitly traditional and social. It was founded on a composite of village or regional memories, sometimes subsumed into legends and sometimes simply passed on as local folklore. In either case, the crude chronologies that resulted helped people gain some notion of duration extending back a few decades or perhaps a century. No doubt beyond that everything was darkness – or else the imagined age of gods and giants.

With the rise and consolidation of the early ancient states, however, an attempt was made both to assimilate and abolish the various traditional modes of time-reckoning by reducing them to one unified time-frame: that defined by the state itself. For example, the first Near Eastern states introduced the so-called King Lists (sparse accounts of the reigns of kings and the length of their dynasties) as a more effective method for organizing and recording temporality. This allowed the time of the long duration to be charted *politically* instead of socially. The time of particular locales or of diverse groups or clans was simply usurped and reordered to fit the needs of a centralized political framework.[6]

The most important consequence of this politicization of time in the ancient world was that the state's account of duration tended to treat all earlier forms of time-reckoning as confusing and unsystematic, and hence parochial or obsolete. However, the effort to replace a traditional with a political temporality eventually gave way to something even more radical. That was the attempt to harness political temporality to a religious framework. Not long after the early states were established, a priestly class began to replace the official court chroniclers (who were merely state functionaries) as annalists of historical time. As the group assigned both to "keep the calendar in order" and to search for and explicate signs of the gods' intentions toward men, the priestly caste managed to intrude itself into the previously secular sphere of the scribe and chronicler. Under their guiding influence, history began to be treated as a moral story. In Sumer and elsewhere, the rise and fall of empires was said to be due to how well-disposed rulers were to carrying out the designs of the gods – designs that only the priests claimed to be able to interpret.[7] At the same time, numerous accretions of a spiritual nature (e.g., religious festivals, sacred *fasti*, and ritual observances) were grafted onto the old dynastic chronologies in a way that completely changed the meaning of what had once been a strictly political form of time-reckoning. Just as the state had earlier expropriated and then transformed a traditional marking of time, so now the priestly caste began adorning political temporality with primarily religious meanings and significations.

The same also happened in ancient Israel. Especially in the prophetic tradition, political history was even more obviously collapsed into, and made a mere facet of, religious history. Time or duration rather than space or extension was thought to be the means by which Yahweh revealed his intentions to his chosen people. Consequently, a correct understanding of the temporal dimension was essential to an understanding of the meaning of existence, since the traces of God's will (which it was crucial to know) could be discovered in no other way.[8] The Jews did not even need to lean on political scaffoldings such as King Lists. Their temporality was religious from the start. Year One of the Jewish calendar, for instance, began with Creation, and time was charted in linear succession from that point.[9] Political events were noteworthy, if at all, only to the extent that they illuminated larger religious meanings.

Of these three forms of marking time after the breakup of the mythic worldview – the traditional, the political, and the religious – the first and third were undoubtedly the most widely utilized by all strata of society.[10] Still, it is important to insist that throughout the entire extent of the ancient world none of these three forms of time-reckoning ever disappeared. Each

survived in its own way and in its own sphere. And each was used by different interests to gain a measure of control over the interpretation of the *longue durée.*

Christian Temporality

With the advent of the Christian era, a powerful new impetus appeared that strengthened the hold of religion over the temporal dimension. Primitive Christianity introduced a radically novel conception of the long duration, which left a lasting imprint in the West for nearly two millenia.

According to the early Christian view, temporality could not be understood as a neutral chronology proceeding from some real or hypothetical origin (the Creation, the founding of a nation, etc.). Rather, temporality had a *center,* a mid-point, from which it extended in opposite directions forward and backward. This center was the Incarnation. Before God became man, all duration was regarded as preparatory time: preparatory to the birth of Christ. Since Christ's death, however, time became something qualitatively different. It became eschatological time: a powerful, redemptive mode of time, which anticipated the inevitable *Dies Irae.*[11] Never before in history had temporality been partitioned so sharply from a point *within* time. But the reigning assumption was that the period of eschatological time (extending from the Resurrection to the coming of the Kingdom) would be extremely short: a matter of a few years or at most a few decades. When the Second Coming did not take place as soon as expected, an auxillary form of temporal understanding emerged within Christianity, a form that might be called ecclesiastical time.

Ecclesiastical time appeared along with the early institutional church after the white heat of expectation, which undoubtedly characterized primitive Christianity, gradually cooled. Of course, the Christocentric view of time did not disappear. It continued to inform all the essential aspects of Christian doctrine. But accompanying it by the fourth century A.D. was another kind of temporal conceptualization developed by the first church historians. The method they improvised was the creation of "epochs," or "ages," moving toward the fulfillment of God's design. Julius Africanus, for example, writing in the late third century, arranged the whole span of time from the Creation to 221 A.D. according to six long epochs (taken from the six days of Creation). Following him, Eusebius layed out the history of the world along similar lines down to the Age of Constantine.[12] Political events such as the succession of Roman emperors were mentioned but not highlighted. What really mattered was the succession of popes, the appointment of bishops, the

calling of councils, and the death of martyrs. With Eusebius's detailed and influential work, a political temporality was loosely bonded onto a religious one, exactly the reverse of what had happened earlier in the Near Eastern empires. Later, Augustine, Isidore of Seville, and numerous others continued the "six epochs" scheme leading toward an approaching seventh epoch, which would be the ultimate *consummatio saeculi.*[13]

In the early and late Middle Ages, this religious mode of structuring time continued to be dominant. To a large extent, it took hold among the common people of Europe so that when they thought at all about a great expanse of time, they most likely thought about it in religious terms.[14] The general acceptance of a Christian dating system after the eighth century A.D. also solidified a religious perspective on the *longue durée.* It became the practice to number years since the birth of Christ as "years of Our Lord" so as to acknowledge the theological centrality of the Incarnation in Christian time-reckoning. The only serious challenger to religious temporality was not a political but a traditional (or local) classification of time. Frequently, the elders of a village kept track of duration by recourse to their own improvised schemes, which often relied on local family genealogies or sketchy information passed down orally. Other villages or regions had professional "remembrancers," who were individuals or even groups (like the Gaelic learned orders in the Middle Ages) whose task it was to preserve folk memories in a medieval culture that was essentially pre-literate.[15] Eventually some towns, and to a lesser extent urban guilds and corporations, also forged their own temporal structures, their own historical and institutional memories, and these, too, often existed independent of ecclesiastical or statist time-frames.

The Nation-State and the Longue Durée

During this long period in the West from the late Roman Empire to the late Middle Ages not much use was made of political temporality. Except for royal chroniclers, few charted or interpreted duration along political lines. But this changed dramatically during the centuries between A.D. 1500 and 1800. It was at this time that the new nation-states of Europe began asserting their claims to authority and legitimacy, and in every case they asserted these claims *against* standing religious and traditional institutions. As defenders of the state saw it, the power of ecclesiastical and traditional bodies operated as a break on governmental rights to sovereignty and jurisdiction within national boundaries. If the new states were to establish their supremacy, it seemed necessary to subdue religious organizations and weaken traditional corporations as an essential part of a successful bid for hegemony. To be sure, the administrators of the ascendent nation-states were not interested in

temporality *as such.* They did not set out to replace earlier forms of time-reckoning with a specifically political one that would better serve their interests. All they were concerned with was securely establishing the authority of the state over other kinds of institutions that stood in their way. Nonetheless, as the nation-states - particularly the absolutist monarchies - did eventually succeed in defeating or weakening the threats to sovereignty represented by religion and tradition, they were also able, simultaneously, to defeat or weaken the modes of temporal interpretation that inhered in ecclesiastical organizations and traditional bodies. This turned out to be a boon not directly intended. It was only later, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that the managers of modern states realized the great tactical advantage of reducing a plethora of temporalities to one: that is, to a temporality directly serving state interests and no others. Only when this awareness dawned did the struggle for control of how the *longue durée* would be interpreted become, strictly speaking, an ideological one.

But between A.D. 1500 and 1800 the leaders of, and theorists for, the various nation-states of Europe had not yet become so sophisticated. The tasks of streamlining governmental procedures, overcoming feudal remnants, and subordinating especially the denominational churches to state control were seen as the central matters to be addressed. For this reason, the main thrust of administrative activity was taken up with insuring that the state be regarded as the only legitimate coercive authority; that people acknowledge none higher than it; that all intervening bodies between the state and the individual be viewed as potential dangers to sovereignty; that the state's primary function be seen as organizing and administering the collective life of society; and that, as a legal apparatus, the state's orders be taken as law, or as Jean Bodin aptly put it, that the state issue orders but receive them from no one. With this kind of defense of the state, it did not matter whether one spoke of a *Machtstaat* or *Rechtstaat.* In either case, sovereign authority was to be concentrated at the top; and power itself was to be dispersed from a central point outward and downward.

One example of this development was the emergence of the "well-ordered police state" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[16] Especially in Central Europe and Russia, a new type of "interventionist and regulatory *Polizeistaat*" made its appearance. Its goal was to codify, rationalize, and administer literally everything in society that lent itself to political control. Ironically, the Protestant Reformation helped prepare the way for the very kind of state that eventually turned on the churches and questioned their right to autonomous jurisdiction. Within a century after the Reformation began most of the Protestant churches had come to terms with the state. By

and large they conceded that the state was the sole source of authority in earthly matters, though they of course pressed the state to pursue religious ends and protect "sacred values." But in effect this accommodation meant that the churches eliminated themselves as counter-institutions to political power. (Later they would also discover that they had simultaneously eliminated most of the residual control they still had over the interpretation of temporal duration.) In some instances, the churches, Protestant and Catholic alike, simply allowed themselves to become either state institutions or de facto civil religions. In others, they forfeited what might have been an oppositional stance by accepting uncritically the state's contention that if it could have free reign to regulate, centralize, and rationalize public activity, the result would be a maximization of social potential, which would be pleasing to God. It was even argued by theorists of the state, and accepted by church leaders, that the whole state might in fact be regulated and run simply for the greater glory of God. This opened the way for the concept of a statist *dirigisme* under religious auspices. But it was only a step to remove, eventually, the religious justification and substitute for it either the notion that the state is its own end and needs no other; or the notion that the state exercises its codifying and regulating power not for God's pleasure but for the good of the people themselves. In the latter instance, eudaemonism merely replaced religion as the primary reason for state intervention in everyday life. But the intervention itself continued as before.[17]

Another example of the early nation-state's suppression of rival institutions came in its treatment of traditional organization, many of which, not surprisingly, had their own manner of constituting and interpreting the *longue durée*. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the state went on the offensive against virtually every kind of intervening body existing between the individual and the state itself. Such bodies were viewed as dangerous because they represented a diversity of perspectives while the state had a vested interest in uniformity. Moreover, from the point of view of the state these traditional institutions promoted divided loyalities on the part of the people, which in turn threatened sovereign power. Primordial sentiments and primordial attachments, which historically had been extended to familial or well-established traditional institutions, had therefore either to be dissolved altogether, or preserved but securely harnessed to the interest of the state.[18] *Only* the public and private corporations, the communal guilds, the local social groupings, and the numerous customary institutions compatible with what the state saw as its higher *raison d'état* were sanctioned. Even though many of the intermediate bodies were historically antecedent to the state, they had to be legitimized by various governmental agencies in order to have the right to continue operating. In other words, they

had to be chartered, or given *legal status*, which essentially meant receiving the state's *imprimatur*. For both state administrators and the early theorists of the state (with the exception of a few like Althusius and Grotius, who defended traditional corporations against interventionist state power) virtually all associations of any consequence were treated as if they were gratuitous concessions of sovereign authority, if not administrative extensions of the state itself.[19]

By the mid-eighteenth century, the European states had for the most part won what Otto von Gierke called their "war of annihilation" against the major intermediate institutions that had survived since the Middle Ages.[20] And if any legitimation were needed to support the state's action, there were numerous political theorists to provide it. Besides the earliest defense of the state's campaign against traditional associations provided by Bodin and Hobbes, Rousseau now argued that in the ideal state no intermediate bodies should be allowed to exist at all; Turgot claimed that traditional corporations possess no rights whatsoever over against the state; Kant averred that customary bodies are fundamentally irrational and should be justly eliminated by the state; and Fichte contended that all ancient corporations should simply be transformed into state institutions.[21]

Consequences of a Political Interpretation of Time

Taken altogether there were three important consequences of the state's assault upon intermediate bodies (bodies that, it must be kept in mind, contained their own historical memories and in some cases their own temporal schema upon which people depended for their interpretation of the *longue durée*). One was that traditional modes of action and perception, which these bodies encouraged, were replaced by new ones more in line with the needs of the nation-state. This meant that both "irrational" religious behavior and various forms of conduct based on folk custom were supplanted by another kind of ideal comportment stressing rational, disciplined behavior, which of course the state could better predict and manage for its own purposes.

The second consequence of the state's protracted "war" upon long-standing intermediate bodies was that the state gradually removed from the field all of its principal competitor institutions: those, in an earlier time, roughly equivalent to it in stature and importance. By 1800 there were no serious rivals to the state in the realm of social or political power, no institutions in which power and authority were so effectively centralized. Not only that, but the state, ruling with a monopoly of legal-administrative techniques, managed to

subordinate under its jurisdiction precisely those bodies that were its former adversaries. In other words, the state had acquired for itself the sole right to regulate, supervise, legitimate, and establish or disestablish those institutions existing outside the sphere of the state itself, that is, in civil society.

The third consequence was that the single individual was more and more isolated, more and more disaffiliated from traditional (and now attenuated) forms of association. An almost unavoidable result of this isolation was the individual's increasing dependence on the state *faute de mieux* for his long-range bearing or orientation. As numerous traditional bodies lost their independent status and became even in legal terms *personae fictae,* there was not much left for the individual to lean on except himself or the ascendent nation-state. Not accidentally, there arose out of this sense of personal atomization one of the more significant intellectual concepts of the eighteenth century: the theory of individualism.

It is not often noticed that individualism and the sovereign state made their debut in conjunction with one another, and both prospered at the expense of older modes of collective identity (e.g., ecclesiastical and traditional institutions). This development produced an important new alignment with consequences lasting to the present time. With the private individual seemingly located on one side and the power-state on on the other - and with a diminishing number of "meaning-giving" institutions in between - each acquired its own sphere, which at first the other refrained from intruding upon. Individualism, for instance, was permitted and even encouraged by the state. One of the principle assumptions of the period around 1800 was that of the state as a liberator of the individual. It was the state, after all, that was given credit for freeing the individual from the dead-weight of tradition, the individualist's chief *bete noire.* But there was another side to the issue. For the most part, the philosophy of individualism was officially approved of only on the understanding that it not intrude into the public sphere: that it, in other words, not be defined politically but only privately. The Romantic movement and, even more, the various aesthetic movements that succeeded it in the nineteenth century offered an articulate defense of just this kind of non-political individualism. The ideal of *Bildung* or "self-cultivation" was to be nurtured entirely outside the realm of politics (a realm conceded to be the proper but "unaesthetic" domain of the state). The state, on the other hand, agreed - at least initially, though this changed later - not to invade the personal world of the individual. Rather, it would leave the individual free to entertain whatever thoughts or fantasies he or she pleased, with the only condition being that at least one's outward behavior conform to the demands of the state. That is to say, the individual was duty-bound to follow the rules

of propriety, to be law-abiding, to respond to the requirements of the state, but in the vacant spaces left over the individual could think and believe what he or she wanted. Even in the era of so-called laissez faire capitalism, the state never actually relinquished its numerous policing functions. It only confined them to the manifest comportment of individuals, to those things that could be seen and thereby regulated or disciplined, but it left the inner world alone so long as it did not usher out in acts defined as reprehensible by the state.

In a similar way, the realm of temporality was also parceled out between the individual on the one hand and the state on the other. The short-term sense of time, centered around one's biological life or one's daily memories, was relegated to the sphere of the individual. Every person was free to choose what form to give to the temporality of his or her own lifetime. The state at the beginning of the nineteenth century showed very little interest in this private domain. But matters were different when it came to the *longue durée.* Here the state claimed, and still claims, primary responsibility for remembering and interpreting the long span of time stretching from the distant past to the present. This claim was easy enough to make, since, as I have indicated, there were at this time no institutions or social groupings capable of challenging its authority. Even those intermediate bodies still existing had forfeited to the state, partly as a condition of their continued existence, whatever latitude they once had to shape, or give value to, the broader configurations of temporality.

Temporality and State Power

Later in the nineteenth century a more advanced and important stage was reached with regard to the state's approach to temporality. The rulers of modern nation-states began to realize that controlling a population's sense of time was not only a source of power but one of the most important ways of *exercising* power. This insight was arrived at by way of a larger re-thinking of the relations between the state and civil society. In briefest terms, this re-thinking centered on the following points. (1) The functions of the state, it was now argued, should not be viewed as narrowly political but as social in the broadest sense. The state's fundamental task therefore is to insure system integration or "pattern maintenance," to encourage social harmony, and to help resolve or meliorate conflict within the social whole. (2) The state can best accomplish these goals not by brute force but by persuasion, and persuasion entails the use of new and subtle kinds of pressure, including the manipulation of symbols, values, and frames of meaning the state had not placed much stress on before. (3) But if this is the direction in which the state is to go, then it must necessarily concern itself with the perceptions and

psychological dispositions of its citizens. It must win people's allegiance rather than merely command their obedience. Yet to follow this route would mean leaving the relatively flat level of outward behavior and entering into the more complex realm of psychological motivation. If, as began to be alleged now, behavior was nothing more than the expression, or the translation into specific acts or practices, of the interpretive frames and modes of perception entertained by the mind, and if these mental frames and modes of perception could be decisively affected by certain symbolic structures or *Weltbilder* promulgated by the state itself, then it would be possible for states to secure their populations not simply on the basis of fear, but on the basis of much firmer emotional commitments stemming from the manipulation of deeper layers of the personality. (4) One small but by no means insignificant way of tapping these deeper layers of the personality would be by controlling people's perceptions of the historical past; and one of the most effective ways of doing this would be by shaping the forms of temporality through which people think about or interpret the *longue durée.*

True, the nineteenth-century state did not in every instance attempt to elicit the adherence of *all* its members at the deepest psychological level, though it did of course require – at least formally and legally – a uniformity of external conduct. Instead, the state was most concerned with reaching and winning the loyalty of the average individual, not the exception to the rule. Hence, governments were generally content to let the apolitical aesthete alone, probably because in his "power-protected inwardness" the aesthetic individual was not regarded as much of a threat to the state apparatus. Much preferable, though, from the point-of-view of the state was a different kind of individualism, which has in fact been vigorously promoted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This was an individualism based on a convergence of the private ego and the will of the state, an individualism that expressed itself in terms of nationalistic or patriotic sentiments. The type of individualism that took this route lost its merely personal character and found in the nation the most solid foundation for a stable identity.[22] Paradoxically, this form of individualism fulfilled its original, particularistic goals only by transcending and, in a sense, universalizing them: the nation-state simply became the self writ large.

With notions such as those summarized above, the managers of modern states began to take a more active, ideological interest in the temporal orientations of the populations as a whole. Now it became more important than it had been in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries to formulate the categories of "pastness" most advantageous to the state, to push for state forms of periodization, or advance political conceptions of duration. When

states officially encouraged new temporal orientations they always did so not on the grounds of their own self-interest but in the name of the whole, the "concrete historical collectivity," they invariably claimed to speak for or impartially represent.[23] The importance of remembering was stressed, as it was earlier by ecclesiastical and traditional institutions, but now it was imperative to *remember different things*. Whereas Christianity emphasized the remembrance of religious events (the Incarnation, the Last Supper, the acts of the apostles) and traditional institutions stressed the recollection of ancestral customs and folkways, the state encouraged the remembrance of civil-historical occurrences, particularly those political events that formed part of the triumphal procession toward national greatness. Most modern political chronologies through which people today interpret the past and by which they chart the passing of historical time were established only in the nineteenth century. Not until then did a thoroughgoing politics of time really come into being. And not until then did it become clear how much the manipulation of temporal schemata could be useful for political domination.[24]

A political or statist temporality simply means that the state has the last word in determining how the long duration is to be ordered and evaluated. It means that the state decides on the basis of the time-frame it promotes, which collective memories are relevant and worth encouraging, what dates are to be placed on the historical calendar, and which threads of continuity still linking the past to the present are to be maintained and which cut out. Recent events in Iran under the Shah testify to the importance that each of these procedures has for states bent on shaping temporal configurations. One of Pahlavi's modernizing ambitions was to force Iranians to think in terms of political rather than religious time. Consequently, he instituted a number of "national days" including a lavish celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus, which were explicitly designed to commemorate state events over religious ones. At the same time, he turned history into the story of the development of the state instead of what it had been - an account of the evolution of religious doctrine. It was the Shah's guiding assumption that if his people experienced historical time differently (i.e., politically), they would also come to think of themselves differently (i.e., as Persians rather than Muslims).[25]

If, then, a political interpretation of time is accepted by a population, the results can obviously be significant for the kind of political socialization

desired by the state. By organizing the time of the *longue durée,* the state gains a strong hand in determining how the temporal dimension itself is experienced. And to the extent that an individual's conception of temporality necessarily affects his overall orientation in the world, it also affects his attitudes and intellectual disposition, and therefore perhaps his social and political behavior. Similarly, according to the degree to which the state is able to attenuate or otherwise weaken rival cultural memories, it may succeed in severing the individual from his or her past - only to re-systematize or re-orient the individual along lines more useful to the state. The net effect of this, at least from the state's perspective, would undoubtedly be a more manageable polity, with more social order, more cohesion, more homogeneity. The state would then become by some ideal vision, not simply a machine for governance, but literally a "state of mind, an instilled mentality."[26] It would also be in a much better position to secure the psychological as well as the formal integration of the individual.

Education and History

One method by which the state has attempted to be just this kind of "structure of consciousness"[27] has been through the control of mass education. To assume the principal educative role in society - again, something that occurred only in the nineteenth century - was a crucial strategic move on the part of the state. It provided an exceptionally effective means for communicating its point-of-view on a number of things, not least of which was what information the population should remember about the past and how it should regard the long duration. Until the state began systematically to shape and administer general education, it possessed no uniformly effective method by which it could inculcate its perspective on temporality. There is no denying, for example, that in the West up until the beginning of the nineteenth century education was largely in the hands of the family, the community, or the church.[28] Governments rarely had a major say in the content of the curricula, and hence education was generally a conduit for either a religious or traditionalist view of temporality. In Europe, the Christian conception of time as a succession of epochs was taught well into the eighteenth century. In colonial America, history was most often understood to be not an account of the trials and tribulations of states but a map for reading divine intentions. In fact, nationalistic and patriotic history texts did not gain wide currency in American grade schools until as late as the 1890s.[29]

However, beginning around 1800 the control of education by ecclesiastical or traditional institutions noticeably declined. It was now the nation-state that began to nationalize, centralize, and politicize both the administration of education and the curriculum taught in the primary and secondary schools. By means of compulsory education the state found the ideal way to disseminate its ideological viewpoint (including, of course, its outlook on time and history) to all those who fell under its jurisdiction. In France, Napoleon made it a point of rule to subordinate education to governmental authority, hoping thereby to make the school a place to propagandize the young as well as to teach them morals. Later the Ferry Laws of 1882–86 confirmed and extended the secularization of French education, made primary school attendance obligatory, standardized the curriculum, and excluded the lingering traces of religious influence from the public school system. In Prussia, the Civil Code of 1794 placed the responsibility for all education, from the primary schools to the university, solely in the hands of the state; and the educational reforms of von Stein a decade or so later further strengthened governmental authority in matters of instruction. Throughout the nineteenth century – not just in Prussia but in the other *Länder* as well – the elementary *Volksschule* instilled a sense of national identity by placing a strong emphasis on history as seen from the state's point-of-view. In Russia under Catherine the Great (1792), primary and secondary schools in every province were placed under the direction of state administrators. In England, where the statist influence was weakest, elementary education was not made compulsory until the 1870s, and it was only with the Education Act of 1902 that a national system of education was established and explicitly put under the "guardianship" of the state. In the United States in the nineteenth century, the individual states and localities rather than the federal government were given major control over public educational institutions. But this did not mean that instruction was any less statist in orientation, or any less intent upon communicating a politicized notion of temporality.[30]

The result of this entire process by the early twentieth century in Europe and America amounted to a massive secularization of education unlike anything that would have been thought possible before 1800. Compulsory elementary (and later secondary) instruction was introduced along with a standardized and state-approved curriculum. Likewise, the conception of schooling as a principal means of increasing allegiance to the nation-state triumphed everywhere, since, as Durkheim pointed out, education helped guarantee social solidarity. Finally, a particular attitude toward history and the *longue durée*

also became ascendent, in part because of the state's direct involvement in the schools. Under the guise of being neutral and objective, an unmistakably political attitude toward time was communicated – one that tended to dismiss as irrelevant all other outlooks on temporality, and all other modes of periodization not supportive of the state, or not appearing to be politically legitimizing. Even when the schools appeared to stress only "facts" about the past, entire historical taxonomies and systems of classification (which were far more important than the facts) were conveyed as well, since these taxonomies were indispensible for organizing and interpreting the details. Bourdieu's remark that "[t]he whole trick of pedogogic reason lies precisely in the way it exhorts the essential [in this case, a political temporality] while seeming to demand the insignificant" appears to speak exactly to this point.[31]

The Theory of Progress

Another tactic, though by no means as systematically exploited as education, that the state used to frame time to its own advantage was the political appropriation of the theory of progress. To be sure, the theory of progress had already gained currency before the nineteenth century, but it was only at that time that the managers of the state, or more frequently their ideological allies, learned how to turn this concept to good political use. The notion that time contains an inherently progressive teleology is simply one among many ways to think about the shape of temporal duration. It assumes that time is linear rather than cyclical, that the direction in which it moves is always forward rather than backwards, and that most if not all aspects of life have manifestly improved as one travels the distance from the past to the present.

At first the theory of progress, which in its modern form originated in the seventeenth century, made no reference to the state at all. Progress was said to be inherent in the nature of things. It was an organic principle of life, a natural law of civilization. By the nineteenth century, however, the ideologues of the state altered this theory in such a way as to make the modern state central to the whole idea of progress. When this happened, the history of progress became virtually synonymous with the growth of the centralized state, or at the very least the two were viewed as running parallel to and reinforcing one another. Here was yet another instance of the penetration of civil society by the state. The result was a new mode of the politicization of time which inclined those who accepted it – probably the vast majority – to regard the *longue durée* in ways that ultimately benefited the state itself.

There were two ways in which the idea of duration-as-progress was harnessed to the state. The first simply made the state, and not natural tendencies, the motive force of social advancement. The state, it was said, drives and pushes the world forward to actualize its potential; if it were not for the state as a catalyzing agent, history would remain static, tradition-bound, and incomplete. One can find something of the notion that the state is literally the *cause* of progress in Hegel. For him, it is true, the history of states was an outward manifestation of the march of the Idea through time. But though the Idea was treated as the impetus of history, states were nevertheless seen as the chief instruments through which the progressive realization of the *Weltgeist* was attained. Similar notions were adopted by prominent nineteenth-century historians, particularly in the German tradition: Droysen, Sybel, Treitschke, and others. It became a commonplace of historical thinking to identify progress with the expansion of the power state. For some, in fact, material progress was little more than the byproduct of enlightened state activity.[32] Traces of views such as these still persist in the Soviet Union where the people's state is extolled as the foremost "carrier of progress." In Soviet histories, the long duration proceeds in an almost Comtean sequence of stages leading to a glorious present. Those who question whether the existing Soviet state represents the furthest advance of reason and freedom are considered almost by definition to be obdurate reactionaries or "enemies of progress."[33]

The other way time-as-progress was tied to state interest was by defining progress in such a manner that it could be said to be facilitated by the state, even if it was not itself the direct result of governmental policies. For instance, if progress were defined, as it often was, as the gradual transition from the simple to the complex, or from chaos to order, then progress could very easily be seen as the movement from underdeveloped to developed societies: or from "stateless," primitive communities to modern collectivities supervised by power-states. Indeed, just this framework became fundamental to the nineteenth century's understanding of how time unfolds in a forward direction. It was simply assumed, and uncritically taught in the schools, that the passage of time *means* the transition from anarchic statelessness to ordered statehood. Not accidentally, new disciplines such as anthropology also emerged to fortify this "progressive" account of the *longue durée*.[34]

Similarly, if progress were defined as the growth of "machine civilization,"

the state could claim to have laid the groundwork that made a general advancement possible (transportation, communication networks, sanitation, etc.), and in this way be linked to a progressive concept of time. Or, if progress were defined as spiritual betterment, the state as an "ethical institution" (Hegel, Fichte) could take credit here too, since, according to many of the state's defenders, it is a bringer of moral consciousness and ethical fulfillment in an otherwise indifferent world. Or again, if progress were defined as the improvement over time of social manners or the capacity for individual self-discipline, then the growing influence of the state as a "political super-ego" - subtly pressing for self-control and the virtues of propriety and good conduct - could be said to have promoted the overall progressive direction some have alleged is evident in Western social behavior since the ascendency of the centralized state.[35] Or, finally, if progress were defined as the advance of political rights and liberties - or, as it was typically stated, as the growth of "the principle of union, order, cooperation, [and] harmony among human beings" - then once again the modern state could be identified with the progressive unfolding of these principles.[36] In the opinion of many nineteenth-century political theorists, the modern state encouraged these developments far more than did previous political forms.

All of these definitions of progress, however varied, naturally assumed that the passage of time amounted to the story of continuous human betterment. And all also assumed that the state was mainly or partially responsible for this linear advancement. This perception undoubtedly had a great influence upon the way people in general thought about the time of the long duration, particularly in the nineteenth century. In the minds of most, the growth of the state and the overall improvement of mankind were certainly linked, and this linkage still seems to be taken for granted today. Here, then, was another way besides education that the ideological enthusiasts of the nation-state attempted to use temporality for political ends. By defining history as the unfolding of a progressive teleology, and then placing the state in the center of the story, they were able to induce people to think of the state as the chief factor in producing whatever good had accrued through the long span of historical duration. One of the first to point to the importance of this development, and at least obliquely comment upon it, was Georges Sorel. In his *Illusions of Progress* (1908), Sorel forcefully argued that the theory of progress was at bottom a conservative ideology. In his view, it legitimized the role the state played in history, and easily lent itself to various forms of political self-congratulation.[37]

Temporality and Social Control

Today the consequences of the state's capacity to frame temporality according to its own designs are plain to see. For one thing, when the time of the long duration becomes politically defined, it also tends to become more abstract. Very often historical temporality comes to be apprehended as something external, as a chronological grid imposed from without. Consequently it is not experienced as genuinely "lived" time, as to a great extent mythic, traditional, and religious time were. The notion of time-as-progress, for example, may be acknowledged cognitively by the general population but not necessarily *felt* personally. It is true, the state helps (as in education) to put "the totality of past events together [into] a single record," and this is useful to a degree even if the record is politically structured. But the state does this chiefly by separating historical events from "the memory of the groups who preserved them and by severing the bonds that held them close to the psychological life of the social milieus where they occurred."[38] These events are then re-interpreted and given back to the same milieus from which they were disembedded, but now in a more abstract framework alien to the *Lebenswelten* of these groups. Hence the distance grows appreciably between one's personal, intimate sense of time and the long-range temporality whose dimensions are marked by the state.

This split is dangerous because whenever individuals want to orient themselves to something long-term, they find very little in themselves or their communities to fall back upon. Since the personal and the everyday are being stripped of real social or political significance, individuals often feel compelled to turn to the state to gain access to supra-individual meanings and memories. In principle, this is not much different from the concentration camp experience as described by Bettelheim.[39] In the camps prisoners were faced with a radical narrowing of temporal relations, since familiar durational perspectives were no longer available. This disordering caused a confusion of values, for without a larger framework of understanding it was difficult to separate what was inherently trivial from what was wholly serious.[40] Under the circumstances, some prisoners were inclined to look beyond the self for a larger orientation toward life. Not surprisingly, the SS guards often provided this orientation, and some inmates of the camps came to adopt the world-views of their captors. It may not be so different today with respect to the individual's relation to the state. When the only temporality one knows directly and experientially is the immediacy of the everyday or

at most the duration of one's lifetime, it becomes easy to lean on an institution like the state for guidance in issues of long-range or far-reaching importance.

Another consequence of the modern state's control over the temporality of the *longue durée* has been its growing monopoly over the storage of information. Because of its extensive inventories of data and its enormous storage capacity (files, dossiers, census information, police records, computer banks, and the like), the state is becoming *the* official source of memory for society. Earlier states did not have such retention capacity, or had it only to a limited degree and in restricted areas. But now, thanks to sophisticated means of codification, storage, and retrieval, state agencies are able to garner and utilize long-term data for purposes of social control. In fact, state data banks help not simply to maintain but to *generate* power over those whom they are used to regulate.[41] The result, of course, is that widespread surveillance becomes easier and so does the state's ability to trace patterns of social relations or models of normative behavior over time. This may be of great use in solidifying the hold that the state's conception of temporality has over the population it administers.

In the time sense promulgated by the state, the present always dominates the past, whereas in religious and traditional societies it has always been the other way around. Even when a state undergoes a revolutionary transformation, one of the first things that occurs is a thorough re-ordering of the temporal index in light of the new situation. Histories get re-written and new historical calendars are invented. Old or "empty" durations are transfigured (or repressed), for the victors are always the ones who decide what temporality should look like and how the *longue durée* should be construed. Ironically, while traditional and religious sources of continuity have been withering or decaying, the state alone seems not only to have preserved some kind of continuity but to have developed a vested interest in it. Yet it seems to be an exclusive and narrow political continuity that the state defends: a continuity that leads straight to the justification of its right to exist or exercise the authority it does. The state, in other words, maintains an interest in temporality only to the extent that the particular time sense it endorses also has the effect of strengthening its own legitimacy; it is not especially interested in temporality or continuity as things in themselves.

The Challenge of Capitalism

In this respect, the modern state needs to be compared to modern capitalism. The latter, too, has some stake in justifying itself, but in this century it has not often had recourse to history or temporality for this purpose.[42] Rather, capitalism today is decidedly atemporal if not anti-temporal. It has little concern with the *longue durée* unless there is something in it that can be packaged and turned into a salable object. Here a crucial difference between the political and economic spheres should be noted. Whereas the state is chiefly interested in a citizen's repetitive and predictable behavior (something encouraged to a degree by a fixed and generally accepted temporality), the economy has no such stake in mere recursive conduct. Nor does it have a vested interest in the flat routinization of life. The function of routinization, political or otherwise, is to ease anxiety and secure stability. But the economy runs on anxiety. It needs the breakdown of habit; it thrives best when people feel comfortable with what is "contingent and changeable,"[43] or when they hold the most open-minded attitudes toward the new and the experimental. In a word, capitalism requires the constant unsettlement of routine and a rapid turnover of needs, wants, and desires that can be commodified, revamped, and then commodified again. As Marx observed, capitalism is by nature profoundly disruptive; it operates by dissolving "fast-frozen relations," profaning what is sacred, and making what is solid melt into air. All of these qualities, however, make it antagonistic to any single, fixed notion of temporality whether this is promoted by the state or some other institution.

Furthermore, the economy of capitalism is primarily concerned with the present or the future, not with the long duration of the past. Focusing on historical temporality serves no useful purpose. What is stressed is anticipatory behavior and a curiosity about coming trends (or "mega-trends").[44] In the corporate board rooms, planning and prognosis take place toward the future, and business strategies are by definition directed toward the years ahead (e.g., "futures markets"). Likewise, capitalism encourages people to think of personal or social goals not as the culmination of past processes in their lives, but as the result of present choices toward an open-ended future.[45] There is no reason to look backward. Memories are treated as inherently counter-productive, and hence there is a built-in hostility to all historical forms of self-reflection. On the other hand, capitalism does stimulate people to become attentive to immediate satisfactions or immediate expectations. But in this there is no place for temporal considerations of the past, which are

regarded as unimportant for successful living. Today the ideal consumer is the individual who easily forgets because he or she has a drastically foreshortened temporal horizon. In this regard capitalism even seems willing to efface in consumers the very rational and calculative conduct on which it was originally founded, while at the same time preserving – among the managers and directors of the economy – precisely this same rationality and calculation. As Michael P. Smith has aptly pointed out, "the numbered, computerized automated credit-card economy has brought quantitative calculability for the corporate managerial strata to a high point, while creating the illusion of personalism (in the form of the name-embossed credit card) and of unlimited purchasing power (requiring no calculability) for consumers. The upshot of this sort of economic structure is to drive up gross annual purchases and consumption, while removing rationality and calculation from the consumer side of the exchange."[46]

This is not to say that capitalism never deals with the time dimension, but only that when it does, it treats it in a manner that negates or nullifies the importance of the *longue durée*. For instance, when "time" is mentioned within the context of capitalist production it never means historical temporality as the term has been used here, but always the "economy of time"; or the amount of productive labor that can be extracted from a working day; or the "time-table" of a work schedule aligned to efficiently meeting pre-set goals; or the detailed segmenting of time to its minutest units to ensure a total utility of time.[47] Time as conceptualized in the discourse of capitalism is simply a measured duration, which no longer contains traces of memory. It is a duration that, as rationalized "clock time," seems bereft of any real relation to the temporality of the past.

It should be noted that this economic atemporality may be affecting the ideology of the state. Particularly since World War II, modern state systems have exhibited tendencies similar to those within capitalism, which is to say, they have experimented (however hesitantly) with the notion of dispensing with historical time for purposes of legitimation. Perhaps this has occurred because the values of the economic sphere have by now penetrated the political sphere more thoroughly than before, thereby diminishing the importance of the temporal dimension as far as the state is concerned. Or perhaps it has happened because purely ideological modes of legitimation tend to lose their efficacy as political systems become more complex. Niklas Luhmann has argued that since modern societies have become highly differentiated structures, they no longer have an identifiable political core whose evolution can be precisely traced. And since states now hold their polities together mainly by means of procedural rules, they can dispense with historicizing claims to legitimize their authority.[48]

Whatever the cause, some states today do appear less inclined than formerly to base arguments for their *raison d'être* upon temporal considerations. Rather, they seem more disposed to base them on strictly legal criteria, or on their ability to administer effectively, or to reproduce a more or less dependable framework for everyday life. Wherever these new forms of legitimation have taken hold, one usually finds a greater emphasis by the state on planning and prediction, which necessarily makes the outline of the future and not the contours of the past the most important thing. One also finds under these same conditions that modern states become more technocratic in both their organization and their rationale.[49] Today especially it seems as if the new ideologues of the state are beginning to be not historians, as was formerly the case, but systems analysts and "crisis managers." To the degree that the influence of these latter types is increasing, the state may be more and more tempted to justify itself by recourse to instrumental rationality, or by stressing its managerial or "steering" capacities, but it may be much less disposed to justify itself by the continual recall of historical memories as it generally did in the past. (The language of the state has already become noticeably more scientific and technical, except on patriotic occasions when useful sedimentations from the past are ceremonially trotted out.)

Conclusion

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that as things now stand no state has reached, nor is it soon likely to reach, the point where it can comfortably abandon temporality altogether as a source of legitimacy. Even the most technocratic states today still rely on continuity and the "meaning systems" of the past in order to extract a measure of allegiance from their constituencies. Though a concern with history and time may not seem as important to state administrators as it once did, the value of temporal rationales nevertheless remains indispensable. This is particularly true in periods of crisis when state managers and ideologues feel compelled to resuscitate powerful memories of the genealogy of the state, or of the state's place in time, in order to strengthen their authority. In cases such as these, a politics of time is invaluable for at least formally authorizing the existence or role of the state in modern society.

The political interpretation of the *longue durée,* then, still remains strongly entrenched. The challenge to it by contemporary capitalism has proven to be a strange one, for capitalism has not really succeeded in meeting the state on its own grounds. It has evaded confrontation by questioning *not* the shape or structure of a politics of time, but only its importance for the present. Capitalism has done little more than treat the *longue durée* as irrelevant,

which is something different than vigorously contesting it or arguing that its meaning needs to be seriously reconsidered.

Yet there have emerged two other, generally unnoticed, challenges to a statist temporality that have been less dismissive. Both are worth mentioning here, since they have political connotations. But both also need more empirical verification before they can be considered potential threats to existing political time-frames.

The first of these has been established more theoretically than factually. To some recent observers it has seemed that the widespread diffusion of the state's perspective on duration has by no means guaranteed that this perspective will always be subjectively internalized in ways that best serve the state. Crucial discrepancies can exist between the way formal structures *appear* to be adopted by a population and the ways in which these structures are actually assimilated, psychologically and practically, by individuals in their daily lives. For instance, a political temporality may be superficially accepted by people, but given a quite different significance, or placed in an entirely different "register," than the one intended by the state.

Bourdieu, for one, has tried to explain how this happens. He has noticed that it is invariably the policy of modern states to impose a variety of cognitive structures on their citizenry. The purpose is two-fold: to encourage people to think in patterns approved of by the state, and to encourage them to act (on the basis of these patterns) in a manner that best meets the state's needs. A politicized temporal orientation would be an example of such a cognitive structure. If it were accepted as "objective" rather than, as it in fact is, merely arbitrary, and if it were then reproduced in the minds of individuals, a "fit" would be established that would help solidify the existing "cosmological and political order."[50] People's values and judgments would be regulated, perhaps without them being fully aware of it. Furthermore, as a result of these cognitive structures certain desired practices might follow. By controlling how time is thought about, the state could plausibly affect, in almost imperceptible ways, not only the attitudes people hold, but their incentives and motivations as well.

According to Bourdieu, this mainly works. What people internalize is most frequently what they reproduce in their behavior. But sometimes something different occurs. When people pay attention to their *actual social practices* instead of the objective structures conferred from without, they often re-conceptualize and re-work what has been imposed upon them. This is the always present margin of creative freedom that lies within the grasp of all

human beings. Individuals and social groups have a perpetual capacity to innovate; they are able, if they choose, to transform what they receive rather than simply repeat it. Even when the temporal classifications of the state are thoroughly known, people still have the leeway to decide when or how to apply them, or whether, in certain cases, to apply them at all. Hence, in Bourdieu's view, there is always room for a self-conscious social *praxis* to engender "heretical readings" of statist structures.[51] Heretical readings are ways of appropriating imposed forms instead of merely inculcating them – of subjectively modifying what is given instead of reproducing it. Whenever or wherever such readings are set in motion, the formal taxonomies of time are never as secure as they may seem. In light of this, Bourdieu and others have made it clear that today the taken-for-granted can no longer be automatically equated with the taken-as-legitimate.[52]

Michel de Certeau has made a similar point in his discussion of the "oppositional practices" of everyday life. According to him, the powerless (the vast majority) inhabit frames and structures they did not create and cannot hope to abolish in a single lifetime. But they are able subtly to undermine these frames by means of a whole range of tactics that they in fact put into operation constantly. Hidden away in the interstices of contemporary life are all sorts of resistances, manipulative movements, reconversions, conscious maladaptations, and quasi-invisible ruses and avoidances that serve – on a practical if not a theoretical level – to de-legitimize the dominant structures and interpretations. Certeau has convincingly shown that underneath even the (apparently) most undisputed political and ideological forms, including those claiming to explain time or duration, there are numerous acts of opposition and contestation working continuously to weaken the grip of the state over society.[53]

There is a second way in which a statist time-frame is currently being challenged. Within civil society there are, it now appears evident, supressed or discarded modes of long-term temporality that have survived more or less intact despite the state's "war of annihilation" against them, and despite the triumph of the state's view of the *longue durée* during the last two centuries. These traces of traditional and religious time have persisted in fragments of communal life, ethnic groupings, church organizations, and other "antiquated" rituals or solidarities. No matter how attenuated or submerged these islands of duration may be, they are nevertheless capable of actively shaping people's perceptions of themselves and their world in ways not necessarily compatible with the goals of the state.[54] Moreover, these half-hidden temporal orientations contain – often inadvertantly – a certain subversive weight. By their very nature, they call into question the state's one-dimen-

sional account of historical time. What any state would prefer to have accepted as fixed and natural about the *longue durée*, these older temporalities undermine or discredit. Sometimes the results are bizzare and unsupportable, as is the case with the various temporal outlooks of today's millenial subcultures (where duration is still calculated in terms of God-ordained epochs and ages succeeding one another on the way toward the apocalypse).[55] Yet at other times these earlier temporalities are worth remembering and perhaps even resuscitating. Some of them may represent a healthy return of the repressed. It is not impossible to think that an alternate view of the past could help activate communities of resistance informed by time perspectives entirely different from those promoted by the modern state. If so, it would not be the first instance in history where opposition to power and a thoroughgoing re-conceptualization of time went hand in hand.

NOTES

1. Fernand Braudel, "Histoire et sciences sociales: La longue durée," *Annales: Economies, sociétes, civilisations,* IV (October-December, 1958), 725–53.
2. Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 19–20.
3. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume II: Mythical Thought,* trans. Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 108.
4. Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane,* trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), 102.
5. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 19.
6. See Pitirim A. Sorokin and Robert K. Merton, "Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology,* XLII, no. 5 (March, 1937), 615–31.
7. Burr C. Bundage, "The Birth of Clio: A Résumé and Interpretation of Ancient Near Eastern Historiography," *Teachers of History,* ed. H. Stuart Hughes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), 200–10.
8. See John G. Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1968), 54–71.
9. By contrast, Year One for the Babylonians was founded on a political event: the conquest of the country by Seleucus Nicator. Typically, the Romans also began their time-reckoning with a political occurrence, i.e., the founding of the city of Rome (and then subsequently, by a later method of dating, the year of Diocletian's accession to the throne). See Oscar Cullmann, *Christ and Time,* trans. Floyd V. Filson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950), 18.
10. Though most of the documents (e.g., court records, official histories) that have survived from the distant past are freighted with political conceptions, this does not mean that the political sense of time was dominant. Probably these political temporalities did not have wide currency outside the world of the king and his administrators.
11. For a more thorough discussion of the Christian view of time, see, besides Cullmann cited above, R. L. P. Milburn, *Early Christian Interpretations of History* (London: Greenwood Press, 1954); Henri-Charles Puech, "Temps, histoire et mythe dans le christianisme des premiers siècles," *Proceedings of the Seventh Congress for the History of Religion* (Amsterdam, 1951), 33–52; and M.-D. Chenu, "Conscience de l'histoire et théologie," *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* (1954), 107–33.
12. Eusebius, *The Ecclesiastical History,* 2 vols., trans Kirsopp Lake (London: W. Heinemann, 1926-32); and Robert McQueen Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
13. Milburn, *Early Christian,* 81; Paul M. Bassett, "The Use of History in the *Chronicon* of Isidore of Seville," *History and Theory,* XV, no. 3 (1976), 281-87; James William Johnson, "Chronological Writing: Its Concept and Development," *History and Theory,* II, no. 2 (1962), 124–45.
14. See Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society,* I, trans. L. A. Manyon (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 88-89; and Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, *Montaillou,* trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Braziller, 1978), 280–82.

15. See M. T. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 150, 232-36; and his "Remembering the Past and the Good Old Law," *History*, LV, no. 184 (June, 1970), 165-76.
16. On this topic see the excellent article by Marc Raeff entitled "The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Europe," *American Historical Review*, LXXX (December, 1975), 1221-43. In the seventeenth century, the term "police state" (*Polizeistaat*) did not mean what it does today. The word "police" appears to have been derived from *polis*, and a police state meant a "regulatory" state.
17. For further development of these points see the expanded discussion in Marc Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and Russia 1600-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
18. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), 108-09. See also Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 3-83.
19. Otto von Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800*, trans. Ernest Barker (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 62-92, 162-80. This was true mainly of those associations that seemed to challenge state power. The numerous smaller associations that, taken together, constituted civil society were generally tolerated, but most of these had no temporalities embedded in them.
20. Ibid., 166. It is worth noting that the rise of the state was not, as it has often been portrayed, a gently evolving process in which antiquated institutions fell quietly and obligingly by the wayside in order to make way for something better. Rather, state ascendency was achieved through the widespread destruction of everything considered obscurantist or dysfunctional. The systematic demolition of old institutions left in its wake an incalculable amount of historical debris, of which historians are only now beginning to take account.
21. Ibid., 165-69.
22. See Jürgen Habermas, "On Social Identity," *Telos*, 19 (Spring, 1974), 98.
23. Alain Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements*, trans. Alan Duff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 108.
24. This would become even clearer in the twentieth century with respect to repressive regimes such as Nazi Germany or the USSR. These states went beyond the manipulation of temporality to attempt, literally, to *construct time* to suit their own purposes. A still more egregious example is Cambodia. See Pin Yathay, *L'utopie meurtriere* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1980).
25. See Bernard Lewis, *History - Remembered, Recovered, Invented* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 3-5, 41, 101-102.
26. Murray Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom* (Palo Alto, Cheshire Books, 1982), 94.
27. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 191.
28. See Bernard Bailyn, *Education in the Forming of American Society* (New York: Norton, 1972), 18-19.
29. Frances Fitzgerald, *America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 48. For a different development in France see P. Gerbob, "La place de l'histoire dans l'enseignment secondaire de 1802 à 1880," *L'Information historique*, XXVII (1965), 123-30.
30. On the nationalization of education in the West see Fritz Ringer, *Education and Society in Modern Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979); and Edward H. Reisner, *Nationalism and Education Since 1789* (New York: Macmillan, 1927). For France in particular see Francisque Vial, *Trois siècles d'histoire l'enseignment secondaire* (Paris: Delagrave, 1936); for Germany, Andreas Flitner, *Die politische Erziehung in Deutschland: Geschichte und Probleme, 1750-1880* (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1957).
31. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 94-95. See also Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture*, trans. Richard Nice (London: Sage Publications, 1977), 3-68.
32. See Manfred Riedel, "Der Staatsbegriff der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts in seinem Verhältnis zur klassisch-politischen Philosophie," *Der Staat*, II, no. 1 (1963), 41-63; Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1968), 90-123; and Otto Hintze, "J. G. Droysen und der deutsche Staatsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, LXXXVIII (1930), 1-20.
33. Boris Meissner, "Fortschrittsgedanke und gesellschaftliche Transformation in der marxistisch-leninistische Ideologie," *Die Idee des Fortschritts*, ed. Erich Burck (Munich: Beck Verlag, 1963), 118-21.

34. Two recent and important challenges to the assumptions built into nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anthropology are Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Urizen Books, 1977); and Stanley Diamond, "Introduction: Civilization and Progress," *In Search of the Primitive* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1974), 1-48.
35. Norbert Elias provides the best recent example of the argument that "mannered comportment" and bodily repression are indirectly bound up with the rise of the modern state and its "civilizing" influence on society. See Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, 2 vols., trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Urizen Books, 1978, 1982).
36. Leonard T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1911), 127.
37. Georges Sorel, *The Illusions of Progress*, trans. John and Charlotte Stanley (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 117-57.
38. Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, trans. Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 84.
39. See Bruno Bettelheim, *The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).
40. Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 125-28.
41. On this see Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique*, 5-6, 94-95, 100, 169; and Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1979), 26-31.
42. I have argued that it once did. See my "Space, Time, and Modern Culture," *Telos*, 50 (Winter, 1981-82), 73-76.
43. Niklas Luhmann, *The Differentiation of Society*, trans. Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 274.
44. F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, *Towards a Social Ecology: Contextual Appreciation of the Future in the Present* (New York and London: Plenum, 1973), 88.
45. Niklas Luhmann, *Differentiation*, 322.
46. Michael P. Smith, *The City and Social Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 224.
47. Foucault speaks of the drive to extract from time "ever more available moments, and from each moment, ever more useful forces." Michel Foucault, *Discipline*, 154 (also 149, 151). For comments on the origins of the capitalist outlook on time see Jacques Le Goff, "Merchant's Time and Church's Time in the Middle Ages," *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 29-42. The net effect of the capitalist approach to time in the modern period is dealt with in E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," *Past and Present*, 38 (December, 1967), 79-97; and Herbert Gutman, "Work, Culture, and Society," *American Historical Review*, LXXVIII, no. 3 (June, 1973), 531-87.
48. Niklas Luhmann, *Differentiation*, 138-65.
49. Helmut Schelsky, *Auf der Suche nach Wirklichkeit* (Düsseldorf: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1965); and *Der Mensch in der wissenschaftliche Zivilisation* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961).
50. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline*, 166.
51. Ibid., 41, 43.
52. Ibid., 78-87; Anthony Giddens, *Contemporary Critique*, 65; and Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968), 89-90.
53. See Michel de Certeau, "On the Oppositional Practices of Everyday Life," *Social Text*, 3 (Fall, 1980), 3-43; and *La culture au pluriel* (Paris: Christian Bourgeois Éditeur, 1980), 187-251.
54. One French study of the 1950s made this point especially well; see Lucien Bernot and René Blancard, *Nouville, un village français* (Paris: Institut d'ethnologie, 1953).
55. It is estimated that in American this "millenial subculture" may embrace as many as eight million believers. See Charles Krauthammer, "The End of the World," *The New Republic*, March 28, 1983, 12-15.

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