THEORIES OF REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED:

Contrasting Models of Collective Violence

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> *One must start with error and convert it into truth.*
>
> *I.e., one must expose the sources of error, otherwise hearing the truth does not benefit us. It cannot penetrate if something else occupies its place.*
>
> *To convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state the truth, rather one must find the* way *from error to truth.*
>
> Ludwig Wittgenstein[1]

Just over a decade ago, Lawrence Stone capped an elegant essay on "Theories of Revolution" with the anticipation that social theory would increasingly enlighten historical research, and modern historiography help confirm or refute more daring theoretical conjectures.[2] Since then, several fine works of historical and comparative analysis have been published on the origins and outcomes of revolutionary situations.[3] As yet, however, no general theory featured in Stone's review has been employed in any capacity beyond decorative footnoting by noteworthy students of revolutionary history, past or present. At most, one or another general theory has served to provide catchy, convenient headings for topical partitions in historical narrative.[4] Nor, from their side, have authors of general theories ventured to test their ideas against well-researched blocs of historical data. Instead, they have been content to relay odd bits of history an anecdotal "evidence" for the hypotheses at hand. And when political analysts have sought to explain how successful revolutionaries prevailed, they have preferred to winnow the writings of movement strategists rather than consult the social science model-builders.[5]

This mismatch between general theories and specific revolutions is no accident. The theories themselves are at fault, for reasons this paper sets out to clarify.

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Because the argument is long and winding, however, it may help first to summarize the principal points of concern. The paper falls into four parts. Part I makes a polemical resumé of what's wrong with theories of revolution; stresses the need to get away from guesswork about supposed "revolutionary states of mind" in society at large, and to refocus analysis on shifting political power balances between mobilized groups contending for control of the state and public policy; and concludes with a homily on the indispensability of theory to research on revolutions. If some readers find this last too tediously familiar, they will (I hope) indulge the excesses of an apprentice historian trained in a largely anti-theoretical discipline. Part II is an excursus on definition, arguing that the failure of general theories to explain particular revolutions stems in part from the habit of demarcating the *explicandum* "revolution" along nonpolitical lines. Specifically, in defining revolution by either the *intentions* of certain contenders or by the social and institutional *outcome* – the changes of state and society wrought in the course of revolutionary conflict or afterwards by the winning parties – one obscures the political crux of revolutions: namely, an open-ended situation of violent struggle wherein one set of contenders attempts (successfully or unsuccessfully) to displace another from state power. Hence, I argue, intentions and outcomes should be regarded as what they actually are – historical variables – and theory focused on the occurrence of revolutionary *situations* of "dual power" or "multiple sovereignty." This means placing the weight of analysis on, not "states of mind," but basic political processes, social power balances, and contests for control of the state. How general theories that ignore this precept come to grief is the subject of Part III, an extended critique of leading studies by James C. Davies, the Feierabends, Ted Robert Gurr, Neil J. Smelser, and Chalmers Johnson. The basic model on which these theories rest is a familiar metaphor, attractive and misleading, which likens revolutions and political violence to natural disasters – explosions, eruptions, earthquakes. Instead of conceiving revolt and revolution as political phenomena – vicious but principled fights over policy and resources – the volcanic model (as we may call it) depicts them as irrational eruptions of indiscriminate aggression. Thus, for reasons spelled out in some detail below, the volcanic model (together with logical problems in each of the theories it spawns) steers research analysis down a blind alley. An alternative way of seeing revolutions and popular protest is sketched in Part IV, which outlines a political model of mass mobilization and suggests provisional theses to guide research. Taken by itself, of course, the political model provides few if any direct answers; it does, on the other hand, open up a range of questions which, when put to available information on popular violence, make more sense of its origins and operation. So much for the ground plan; back to the argument.

I

Now it is true, as Stone proposes, that theoretical work on revolutions can help correct the "antiquarian fact-grubbing to which historians are so prone" by drawing attention to problems of general import, "away from the sterile triviality of so much historical research."[6] But incompetent theory cannot enhance understanding of history. And, unfortunately, available theories of revolution and collective violence – in particular, those constructed by leading American social scientists to account for the worldwide turmoil of the 1960s – are deeply defective. Their elementary concepts and empirical descriptions are built upon misleading metaphors, riddled with erroneous theoretical assumptions about the causes[7] and characteristics of violent strife between embattled groups. And their general conclusions about the social origins of political upheaval typically rest on arguments that, under scrutiny, turn out to be trivially true (often by definition), unsupported by evidence, or patently false. Close inspection reveals that the seemingly sophisticated concepts imported from social psychology to explain violent politics are little more than neologisms for social resentment or, as one critic puts it, "righteous indignation";[8] and, further, that resentment and grievances alone, no matter how aggravated, cannot account for civil violence on any scale, much less the outbreak of concerted assaults on incumbent state-managers.

Grievances, of course, whatever this specific origin in any given case, are as basic to rebellion as is oxygen to combustion; few would dispute this. But fluctuations in grievances account for the outbreak of collective protest as poorly as fluctuations in the oxygen content of air explain the incidence of fires.[9] More important are the politically significant resources people have at their disposal to act upon grievances. Like any move to unseat incumbent authorities, violent redress and revolt depend on a favorable distribution of social power chances. They require an (at least momentarily) opportune balance of tactical forces in the immediate political arena. Romantic myth aside, oppressed groups cannot rebel in a situation of complete impotence; powerless people "are easy victims."[10]

A commonplace, perhaps, but like many such it is important and (being so obvious) often goes unnoticed by exponents of the more sophisticated conventional wisdom. Consider the conclusion drawn by the editors of the Milton Eisenhower Commission Report on the "Causes and Prevention of Violence," a large volume informed by the hard labor of several theorists of revolution whose ideas and assumptions will be under criticism here:

> . . . one principle seems evident from the comparative statistical evidence: whatever the historical, political, or social character of a nation, its citizens

> are likely to resort repeatedly to public protest and violence so long as they have severe and persisting grievances.[11]

If we take this to mean that whenever revolutions and popular violence take place, grievances will provide the political motive for collective action, then it is quite true; in fact, a truism. If, on the other hand, we read it to mean that where- and whenever compelling grievances exist, angry people will rise to remedy them, then the statement is obviously false.[12] There are many situations on record where "severe and persisting grievances" abound and are clearly perceived as such, but where victimized people lack the political wherewithal to galvanize anger into action, or else face such comprehensive repression that any but the most cautious petition for redress is well-nigh suicidal.[13] This fact betrays political problems requiring a different kind of analysis from that proposed by most writers on revolution.

If defective theories confuse more than clarify, however, why bother with criticism instead of just getting on with research, as the leading historian of the French Revolution, for one, sternly recommends?[14] Simply because problems of explanation remain no matter how much research is accomplished. Facts never speak for themselves, but must be spoken for; they provide the problem, not the solution. Nor are "facts" and "theories" so separate and distinct as dogmatic empiricism implies. Modern philosophy of science has shown that all observation proceeds from theoretical assumptions, and that hence there is no theory-free, uninterpreted "empirical basis" to knowledge.[15] Theories both govern the choice of relevant data and color and observational experiences by which facts are perceived and registered. Observations are themselves "always *interpretations* of the facts observed"; they are *"interpretations in the light of theories."*[16] When not formulated explicitly, theories slip by disguised as observational terms and empirical descriptions, "Trojan horses which must be watched most carefully."[17]

Consequently, fact-finding as such, no matter how conscientiously accomplished, cannot guarantee the spontaneous induction of interesting, nontrivial hypotheses. Nor can it ensure that the "facts" thus collected and reported will not be contaminated with theoretical suppositions which, if made explicit and subjected to further inquiry and testing, would be proven false. This is certainly not to discourage empirical studies – good research on revolutions is in short enough supply – but only to stress that facts do not "speak for themselves" (save by theoretical ventriloquy), and that "theoretical assumptions, all the more if implicit and unexamined, determine the selection and interpretation of facts, and instead of guiding empirical work, tyrannize over it, dictating in advance the outcome of investigations that ostensibly aim to uncover new facts."[18]

The problem for the moment, then, is primarily conceptual, not evidential; but the bearing of these concerns on empirical inquiry and practical action should be clear enough. For an understanding of revolutions, like anything else, can be no better than the theories that inform it. And the first step toward better theory is to subject existing theories to theoretical criticism.[19]

II

Since no word has suffered more from the debasement of political discourse than "revolution," we must spell out what we mean by it. Admittedly, definitional quibbles are as boring as they are pointless. What matters is not words as such, but what they depict and purport to explain when phrased as theories of how the world works. If the proper task of definition, then, is to focus argument on fact, to convert disputation over terms into disagreement about what they stand for,[20] thus opening arguments to further inquiry, testing, and refutation, then the definitions we adopt will determine what we choose to explain with theories. Now the question becomes, What factual configurations in revolutionary history constitute the *explicandum,* that is, the "event" a theory should account for?

Let's begin with one standard definition, recently boiled down to a single sentence by a well-known political critic, of revolution as "an attempt . . . to seize state power on the part of political forces avowedly opposed not merely to the existing regime but to the existing social order as a whole."[21] This formula neatly distinguishes revolutions from other attempts at violent change of government. Military *coups d'état* have customarily aimed at rotating cliques of political entrepreneurs in routine fashion, while leaving the existing hierarchies of power and social privilege fundamentally unchanged. And fascist counterrevolutions, even those attracting wide popular support for anticapitalist programs and rhetoric, have typically acceded to government with the cooperation of established élites who, while pretending to be overwhelmed by force, retained substantial influence and perquisites after the apparent "seizure of power."[22] Rebellions, on the other hand, however violent or socially radical, are not revolutionary if confined to attacks on local agents of oppression. But allied with revolutionary challengers for power at the center, rebellions can (without conscious intent) have profoundly revolutionary consequences.[23]

The standard conception seems vindicated. But even a cursory review of the actual course of real revolutions reveals several problems. Consider the first "Great Revolution" of the twentieth century – that in Mexico, 1910 to 1920.

It began when élite liberals rebelled to prevent the "reelection" of the presidential dictator. Some of the rebels, anxious for the leverage conferred by a mass following, sought allies among provincial *campesinos* mobilized in defense of property rights against the onslaught of commercial plantations (whose owners stood with the dictatorial coalition). Once launched, this tenuous tactical alliance triggered an agrarian social revolution which, though defeated in the end by superior firepower, left its indelible stamp on the new constitution. By every standard reckoning – effective transfer of power to a new class, social upheaval, mass mobilization, a new dominant ideology, or sheer bloodshed (between one and two million people perished) – Mexico experienced a Great Revolution.[24] And, as hindsight, the standard definition affords a fair, if not perfect, synopsis of political currents that won out in the end. If we step back a few years in time, however, and attempt a *prospective* scan of objective possibilities, this venerable definition cuts only thin air. At the time their drama began, neither the liberals nor the country people imagined themselves playing the part of "political forces opposed . . . to the existing social order as a whole." Clearly we need a means of disentangling the identification of an actual revolutionary situation from the announced intentions of certain protagonists, as well as from the (by no means predestined) identity or accomplishments of the winners.

In this effort we are aided considerably by the recent work of Charles Tilly, who develops a political model of revolutionary situations from a pivotal idea in Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution.* At base, revolutions are always contests for state power. They involve the seizure (or attempted seizure) of control over a governmental apparatus – understood as the principal concentrated material means of coercion, taxation, and administration in society – by one class, group, or (more likely) coalition from another.[25] The revolutionary situation itself is delimited by what Trotsky (following Lenin) called "dual power" and Tilly, with a wider range of comparative reference, has rechristened "multiple sovereignty": the fragmentation of governmental authority into two (or more) epicenters, each of which claims exclusive legitimacy, in a territory where only one such violence and taxation monopoly had previously operated. Historically, multiple sovereignty has often come about when the polity – those groups routinely making successful claims on the exercise of government in their interest – splits into warring factions. Such a fissure in the ruling establishment, moreover, may well provide challengers from below with tactical opportunities and leverage to press their demands for redistributive justice – precisely what happened in most of the so-called Great Revolutions.[26] In any event, multiple sovereignty effectively begins when mobilized political contenders – be they dissident élites, popular

movements, or a tactical coalition of the two – are rebuffed in their bid for authority-sharing by incumbent power holders, and then obtain practical recognition for their claims to exclusive legitimacy from important segments of the population at large.[27] When, in other words, strategic groups in a given country are confronted with conflicting demands from both government and rebel authorities for taxes, troops, supplies, and continuing allegiance – and deliver to the rebels, the revolution is on. It ends when, by victory, defeat, or partial accommodation of the alternative coalition, one group or alliance commands a stable monopoly over the concentrated means of coercion and taxation.[28]

Though this simple scheme affords a ready means of comparing revolutionary situations, helping highlight the decisive similarities and differences between major, minor, and misfired revolutions (including the elusive Chinese Cultural Revolution), it does run against some deeply-grooved political intuitions. Almost instinctively we think of "real" revolutions as great popular upheavals that drastically and permanently transform society, generate new power arrangements and institutions, and bring forth egalitarian or otherwise radical ideologies. A minority have turned out this way, to be sure. It is hopeless, however, to try to isolate an exclusive set of "true" revolutions according to standards of mass participation, ideological novelty, the class composition of the new polity, or the nature and extent of resulting social change. Even the Great Revolutions all vary hugely on these counts. Moreover, to reify a definition of revolution in terms of certain features that are contingent on the final victory and authenticity of favored (or disfavored) protagonists is to endorse a "radical" twist on the Whig view of history, in which the winners' claims and accomplishments are recorded for posterity while the losers are consigned to oblivion.[29] To make historical sense, any viable conception of revolution must take into account that those who initiate, lead, provide mass support for, and ultimately benefit from revolutions are often very different groups of people.[30]

There are, then, certain advantages to defining revolutions *prospectively* as open-ended revolutionary *situations* of multiple sovereignty. Most important is the detachment of the defining condition from the programmatic *intentions* of one or another set of warring contenders, as well as from the institutional *outcome* extant at or after the close of active hostilities. Why this detachment of the defining circumstance from variables customarily identified with the very essence of revolution marks an analytic advantage is not altogether obvious, however, and requires clarification.

As noted, one trouble with defining revolutions in retrospect by the ideological

designs of key contenders is that these aims oftentimes did not exist when the sequence of events known holistically as "The Revolution" was first set in motion. What through the foreshortening of hindsight looks like the wished-for outcome turns out, on closer inspection, to be the unplanned, unintended, even unforeseen consequence of a violent free-for-all fought for control of the state and public policy by contenders who did not count on seizing (much less holding) power at the outset or (like Zapata) became revolutionaries in spite of themselves. And when radical challengers did set out schemes for renovation or reform, their programs were improvised and revised under fire, as they and rival power groups struggled to attract and accomodate different social bases of support. Radical designs for sweeping change, in other words, have been as much or more the products than the precursors of revolutionary upheaval. Conversely, reformist programs composed in a spirit of compromise and moderation in peaceful circumstances have, once the going got rough, become the ideological cutting edge of revolutionary violence – as happened, for example, in the French Revolution.[31] In still other instances, including both successful and failed revolutions, as well as those defeated challenges deemed mere "rebellions" by the condescension of posterity, the most radical of programmatic intentions have been suppressed before they could institutionalize desired changes of social and political relationships,[32] shelved for reasons of expediency,[33] kept marginal and ineffective thoughout,[34] and on rare occasions, picked up and pushed through by governments holding power even years after the cessation of open revolutionary conflict.[35] All of which considerations make dubious any effort to classify historical revolutions by the stated intentions of outstanding protagonists.

The same criticisms apply if the definition by intention is qualified by the rider that to be called a revolution, an episode of political upheaval must involve some challenger with radical designs who is strong enough to actually constitute a clear and present danger to the state and social order.[36] For just as radical revolutionaries have seldom if ever been serious threats to the status quo until other forces – having no such intent – shook it apart, so have movements with conservative ideas and instincts found themselves pressing revolutionary claims once the collapse of state power shoved a new set of options before them. Be it therefore maximal – requiring that principal contenders aim at total transformation of society – or minimal, demanding only that they try to change by force a government's "constitution, rulers, or policies,"[37] the definition of revolution by subjective intent is a dead end. Without denying the crucial import of ideologies and public programs in revolutionary situations, the point remains that the genesis and course of revolutions cannot be defined (much less explained) by the conscious intentions of any single contender. Revolutions commonly commence with efforts

at conservative restoration, and they conclude with results that are seldom intended or foreseen by their principal makers.

What, then, of the other alternative – that of defining revolutions by the broad institutional outcomes to which they contribute? Defined thus by outcome, revolutions are equated with the sum total of social and political changes induced by or in direct consequence of violent contests for state power, hence too with the transformative programs enacted by the winning parties. Consider Samuel P. Huntington's felicitous and widely adopted definition of revolution as a "rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies."[38] On the face of it, this line of demarcation offers two clear-cut advantages. One, it mortgages the requisite changes to political violence, thus avoiding confusions that arise when "revolution" is used to denote rapid and extensive social change, regardless of whether it stems from coercive struggles for state power. (And, incidentally, the greatest social transformations of modern history, those that have affected the everyday lives of ordinary people most profoundly, have taken place in periods of political stability, not in revolutionary situations.)[39] Two, Huntington's definition neatly distinguishes revolutions from historical outcomes of lesser gravity: "insurrections, rebellions, revolts," which do not inaugurate fundamental social changes; *coups d'état* which revise only the membership rosters of ruling juntas; and wars of national independence (including the American) which fail to force changes in the basic structure of social relationships. Furthermore, as Huntington points out, this definition delimits a very narrow range of outcomes – "what others have called great revolutions, grand revolutions, or social revolutions."[40] Thus excluded are failed or abortive revolutions where incumbents win out over insurgents and (by extension) counterrevolutions in which radical right-wing forces abetted by conservative élites accede to power and, while attempting to make reaction popular and plebeian, shore up property and privilege by force. With the adjective "domestic," finally, Huntington disqualifies revolutions like those in postwar East Europe where structural changes were prodded through at bayonet point by an occupying army.

Neat, clean, and apparently comprehensive, Huntington's version of the definition by outcome nonetheless harbors some serious drawbacks. To begin with, the "great revolutions" he mentions all differ dramatically in the extent to which they involved "rapid, complete, and violent change in values, social structure, political institutions, governmental practices, and social-political leadership."[41] By these criteria – and don't inquire too closely into the meaning of "rapid" or "complete" – the credentials of several great revolu-

tions appear dubious.[42] Huntington is well aware that the winning parties in revolutionary situations are often compelled to water down or betray their promises, and (by his lights, worse) that they frequently fail to erect a new and viable political order atop the ruins of the old régime. Hence he proposes to measure a revolution by the "authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth."[43] But this commonsense qualification only weakens the integrity of his original formulation, which restricts the name revolution exclusively to violent contests for state power that produce thorough and lasting changes of politics and society. Which raises another point of criticism.

Huntington's definition by outcome marks no real distinction between changes induced by the violence of revolution and changes made by the violence of rule – between social upheavals impelled by the uncontrolled violence of open revolutionary situations, and those produced by the sometimes coercive plans and policies imposed by state-managers after the advent of a new régime. Often enough, structural changes identified in retrospect as the essence of each great revolution were rammed through, not in the cross fires of a revolutionary situation when power was up for grabs, but afterwards as the settled policy of government officials. The changes that made most great revolutions great were accomplished by governments whose authority went uncontested, not by insurgent forces fighting the incumbency. In sum, the "rapid, complete, and violent" change that Huntington equates with revolution typically took place after the transfer of power and consolidation of a new régime, while a single government (or orderly succession of governments) was in place, hence within the bounds of political continuity.

The ideological designs of respective rival contenders for power, to sum up, afford a poor guide to the actual origins, course, and outcome of revolutionary situations.[44] Now it is true that intentions (carried into action) bear upon the outbreak of revolutionary situations and, as the struggle ensues, play a role in shaping the eventual outcome. But neither outbreaks nor outcomes are reducible to intentions, both because (as noted) intentions are notoriously variable in response to changing conditions, and because politics in history is a game with many players, no one of whom calls all the shots all the time. For certain purposes, on the other hand, it may be useful to group revolutions in retrospect by the broad institutional outcomes they help bring about[45] – and, indeed, one critical task for analysis is to explain why each historical outcome, and not another, came to pass. While useful for post-hoc classification – for sorting the results of revolution after the fact – this approach is altogether misleading if used to define revolution as such. For by demarcating the event so as to include *by definition* the social and institutional changes that may or may not be achieved by victorious movements turned govern-

ments, it confounds three distinct *explicanda,* each of which can occur (and has occurred) without one or both of the others happening as well: the disintegration of central state authority into multiple sovereignty; the transfer of power; and the capacity of ruling groups to foster societal transformation. In any given revolution there is surely a connection between the social conflict groups involved in a revolutionary crisis, the transfer of power, the political identity of the winners, and their subsequent plans and policies. That goes without saying. But the connection is a contingent connection: it must be opened to investigation, case by case, not prescribed beforehand by definition.[46]

III

Theories of revolution, to resume, fall into three main lines of thought: (1) the outside-agitator model, which imagines revolutions and lesser public disturbances to be the work of subversives who, with a sinister genius for cajolery and coercion, provoke otherwise disinterested masses to violence; (2) the volcanic model, through which civil strife appears to be the periodic eruption of social-psychological tensions that boil up in human groups like lava under the earth's crust or steam in a geyser; and (3) the political model, in which the sound and fury of public violence signify shifting power balances and struggles for hegemony between contenders for control of the state. What the other two models dismiss as the handiwork of secret agents or mere nihilistic thrashing about is thus revealed to be the by-product of political power struggles between incumbent authorities and groups of challengers, who take to the streets (or hills) when legal measures fail to bring a redress of grievances, just and equitable performance on the part of officialdom, or a restructuring of the polity that accommodates their claims – fail, in short, to bring them an effective say in the decisions that shape the course of their collective destinies. Boiled down to simplest terms the political model comes to this, that collective violence springs from premeditated collective action (or, better, *inter*action) of which it is simply a tactical or strategic extension by other, coercive means. And, like all politics, popular collective action is a deliberate effort undertaken for discernible, practical reasons. This is not to imply that anger, passion, hatred, or irrational nastiness never figure in violent politics. They do, as on a battlefield. But anger and outrage alone do not *produce* political violence any more than patriotism causes war. They want political mobilization via association, formal or informal, to be galvanized into action. Consequently, conflicts of political interest settled by violence and bloodshed differ from other conflicts of political interest by that fact alone; they do not comprise or entail some separate species of abnormal "collective behavior."

This rough-edged breakdown is not meant to exhaust the manifold similarities and differences between available theories of revolution. Nor does it feign justice to any one of them. At best, it renders real theories of revolt and revolution the way a zoologist's taxonomy approximates living animals, by identifying strategic features that sort one family from another. And what groups theories of revolution into natural families of thought is their nexus of assumptions about what gets sizable sets of ordinary people involved in collective violence: clandestine conspirators; unrelieved societal tensions and frustrations that explode in a burst of cathartic rage; or practical political contention that (under certain circumstances) compels mobilized groups to take violent measures to advance and defend their interests.

Having been assailed by a competent critical literature and disgraced to all but the most refractory police and military circles (including para-academic agencies that service them), the outside-agitator model need not detain us. Suffice it to note that while militant minorities may be no less essential to organizing revolution than to the routine exercise of government, the conservative half-truth that agitators foment revolutions becomes a lie because it ignores the social and political conditions that make movement mobilizers effective in some settings but impotent in others.[47] The volcanic model, on the other hand, remains the most popular image of revolutions and collective violence, certainly among authors of general theories. Because the volcanic model is, after the outside-agitator myth, the most persistent (and persistently misleading) way of seeing revolution – a compelling metaphor obstructing political analysis – the core of this essay is devoted to its anatomy and criticism of theories that make it a central (if implicit) organizing assumption. The political model and its implications for explaining revolutions will be examined subsequently.

In full sociological dress, the volcanic model of collective violence is a creature of late nineteenth-century social thought. The volcanic metaphor as such is much older than that, of course, dating from whenever observers first likened the violence of revolt to natural catastrophes on the order of earthquakes and eruptions. But this turn of political sensibility was not fashioned into coherent theory before Durkheim ventured to explain anomic reactions to modern society – from suicide to socialism – as the consequence of a burgeoning division of labor whereby the "mechanical solidarity" of traditional life and customary restraints on anti-social behavior were coming unstuck faster than new institutional software could instill moral regulation appropriate to the "organic solidarity" of industrial civilization. Social change, in a word, had outstripped moral development. This progressive differentiation of function, dramatically accelerated by the Industrial Revolution and rise of large-scale

capitalist enterprise, was thus seen to be the master process behind the observed "increase of unhappiness and the loss of secure contexts of belief and membership in which alone man finds refuge from *anomie.*"[48]

Subsumed in the volcanic model, then, is a standard scenario relating social transformation to the rise of popular protest: rapid structural change (formerly associated with the coming of urban industrial capitalism to Europe and North America, more recently with hothouse "modernization" in the Third World) produces widespread dislocation, alienation, and hardship, as well as a quantum leap in the level of expectations. As social and economic horizons broaden, privation and dependence cease to appear to be the inescapable fate of the lower classes. "Consequently," writes Durkheim, "there is no restraint upon aspirations." Acquiring new wants much faster than means of satisfying them, people harbor a sharpening sense of bitterness and frustration. With the quickening dissolution of communal solidarities and growing "disharmony between life experiences and the normative framework which regulates them," the attendant tensions and hostility erupt in crime, deviance, suicide, insanity, and – when these valves fail to let off enough steam – in "spontaneous outbursts of popular misery."[49] The tacit assumption throughout is that since political reckoning works through the formal channels of government, party, or trade union, popular action stems not from principle but from brute impulse.

Thus the volcanic model pictures the etiology of revolt and revolution like this: the onrush of uncontrolled changes in the structure of society begets multiplex tensions which, if unrelieved, erupt into mass violence where and when social controls relax or weaken. These tensions arise, in turn, from several sources: runaway expectations that outstrip gratifying achievements, producing frustration; disorientation suffered by simple folk recently wrenched from traditional milieux and subjected to the bewildering complexity, impersonality, and sheer novelty of modern life; and, concurrently, the trauma of integration into the alienating role structure of competitive, bureaucratic society. Whereas these discontents mount first in the hearts and minds of uncoordinated individuals, they find outlet sooner or later in collective behavior.

Plausible on the face of it, the volcanic scenario proceeds from several dubious assumptions: that revolutions and collective violence spring from a rebellious attitude toward authority – a "revolutionary state of mind"; that, accordingly, the potential for mass revolt is a function of the general level of individual anger and hostilities, which varies with the sum total of individual deprivations; that individual attitudes and intentions of participants in revolutionary events closely correspond to the changes effected by said collective actions (that, in

other words, if major changes come about, it is because many people were angry enough to want it that way); that revolution is an extreme form of popular discontent – the greater the discontent, therefore, the greater the potential for revolt; and, in line with all of the above, that revolution and the impetus thereto are conditions of society at large, not of a specific power arrangement or balance of political forces in a given régime.[50]

Admittedly, the theories under criticism seldom profess to explain the political workings of revolution, which task is commonly left to narrative historians. The aim of these theories, rather, is to account for mass grievances that impel violent attacks on the status quo. To take another leaf from Trotsky, who in his preface to *The History of the Russian Revolution* observed that without organization the force of popular discontent would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston-cylinder – adding, of course, that what moves things is not the piston or the cylinder, but the steam – volcanic theories attend to the "steam," not to the "cylinder." And they wind up in a quandry. Unlike Trotsky, who for all his orthodox rhetoric contrasting spontaneity to consciousness had a keen sense of the political logic behind untutored collective violence (witness his chapter on the agrarian revolution of 1917 showing that peasant "steam" had a village-level "cylinder" all its own), exponents of the volcanic model are at a loss to explain how grievances are turned into militant activity. They take the answer for granted and so beg the question. Faced with any example of revolution or mass upheaval, theories built around the volcanic model search for evidence of prior malfunctions of the "social system" that serve to increase the general store of discontent, which – by processes unaccounted for – explodes in concerted violence against power-holding authorities. Attention is focused on the probable sources of individual discontent and, by simple extension, the aggravations of society as a whole.[51] Clearly and emphatically, the model diverts attention from practical political contests pitting interested contenders for power against the incumbent polity and one another, and derives violent fights for hegemony in the state from prior impulses of frustration-aggression, relative deprivation, structural strain, or systemic disequilibrium. How these irritants to the body politic are converted into mass mobilization for collective action, however, remains a mystery. Like the orthodox Marxism they implicitly refute, volcanic theories of revolution are, to say the least, profoundly anti-political. A review of outstanding theories will make principles clearer, and absolve me from the accusation of having burned a strawman of my own making.

The simplest volcanic theories try to psychologize revolutionary violence – put it on the couch as it were – and treat coercive political conflicts as

passing aberrations of society's collective conscience. Economic and political circumstances creep into the theoretical picture as stage props now and then, but "objective" conditions are typically held to be much less important than people's "states of mind." A clear case in point is the well-known J-curve hypothesis of James C. Davies, who maintains that a

> revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable.[52]

By "gratifications" Davies means the satisfaction of basic human requirements, ranging from the physical (food and water, rest, sex, etc.) to the culturally specific (standard of living, economic opportunities, dignity, and the like). The J-curve, in turn, is a hypothetical line graph tracing a gradual rise and sudden drop in gratifications, depicted as a reversed, inverted "J." As the fatal gap widens between what people want and what they actually get, the "frustration that develops, when it is intense and widespread in the society, seeks outlets in violent action." And if this "dissonant energy" flares up to the critical point where it "becomes a resonant, very powerful force that heads like a great tidal wave or forest fire toward the established government," a revolution ensues, or, failing that, at least a goodly revolt.[53] Historical examples that allegedly fit this pattern include Dorr's Rebellion (Rhode Island, 1842), the Russian Revolution (1917), the Nasserite *coup d'état* in Egypt (1952), the French Revolution (1789), Southern secession (1861), the Nazi accession (1933), ghetto rebellions and black militancy in the 1960s, and campus collective actions of the same decade.

Though some may care to take up Davies' invitation and help test the J-curve's predictive power by developing a calculus of comparative frustrations, we need not await the results of this unlikely venture before passing judgment on the general theory. For there are logical reaons to suspect that even if one could calculate a ratio of gratification to expectation – difficult or impossible, since Davies compounds a wide variety of gratifications into a one-dimensional (and nonempirical) index – the J-curve would be no more persuasive. Davies asserts that frustration arouses a "revolutionary state of mind," manifest in some people as aggressiveness and blood lust, in others as "bafflement," "apathy," or "active contempt" for the government. In short,

> The best lack all conviction, while the worst
> Are full of passionate intensity.

Davies does not, however, propose any way of telling whether the presumed gap between expectations and gratifications is "intolerable" (thus producing a revolutionary mental state), save that at some (unspecified) point it is no longer tolerated. Having made a quick lap around the track of circular reasoning, Davies next omits to explain how a "revolutionary state of mind" is transformed into concerted action sufficient to topple the incumbent régime. He simply assumes it happens automatically, thus begging the question he claims to have answered. Nor does he manage to identify which groups experience declining gratifications, which feel frustrated, or which rebel – much less verify for any specific case that they are, in fact, the same clusters of people. Instead of evidence and analysis, Davies plugs in the tautological assertion that "Marx to the contrary, revolutions are made not only by economically depressed classes and their leaders" – Marx, by the way, neither said nor implied such foolishness – "but by the joint effort of large numbers of people in all social groups who are experiencing frustration of different basic needs."[54]

Different people, naturally enough, experience satisfaction and frustration in different ways at different times, a fact the J-curve model muddles by reducing everyone's own gratifications to a single linear trace which, like a cosmic thermometer, registers an entire society's emotional temperature over time. Not surprisingly, therefore, a look backward from the accomplished fact of revolution or revolt turns up evidence of discontent among all manner of groups and individuals. But then so does a glance at routine social life in times of political continuity. The final flaw in the J-curve hypothesis is that Davies' method of scanning the prerevolutionary period for signs of frustrated expectations is bound to identify as crucial for revolution circumstances that are in fact commonplace outside of revolutionary situations – "as with the famed methodologist who achieved a hangover with bourbon and water, Scotch and water, not to mention rye and water, and therefore stopped drinking the offending substance: water."[55] How to distinguish frustrations that lead to revolution from those that form the grist of political continuity, Davies never tells us.[56]

Since Davies props up his arguments with a spotty assortment of historical anecdotes, and so leaves his general theory open to attack on evidential grounds, believers in the logic of the J-curve hypothesis may appeal before the higher court of cross-national quantification. For an imposing battery of numbers has been compiled, examined, and explained in quite similar terms by the research team of Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold.[57] Collating statistical data on social change and political violence for eighty-four nations between 1948 and 1965, the Feierabends interpret their

computer correlations as strong confirmation of the idea that not only do "modern and traditional nations tend toward stability, while transition leads to turmoil and violence," but "the faster the rate of socio-economic change, the higher the level of political unrest."[58] Why so? Because, they argue, rapid social changes that typify the "transitional" phase between tradition and modernity tend to induce "systemic frustration" – meaning "frustration that is experienced simultaneously and collectively within societies"[59] – which in turn spills over into strife and violence. In short, the Feierabends pour computerized statistical wine into an old theoretical bottle: rapid social change engenders widespread frustration which leads to violence.

Our concern here is not the Feierabends' willful insensitivity to strategic differences in national social structure and political organization, which they flatten beneath the juggernaut of Quantitative Method. Nor is it their naive reliance on simpleminded modernization theory for a convenient set of evolutionary pigeonholes in which to stuff the world of nations.[60] Nor, finally, is it their sometimes comically inept classification of states as "stable" or "unstable" on the basis of superficial samplings from a short span of history that fail to register the crucial issues and axes of political conflict. (Readers with a grim sense of humor will be amused to learn that Pakistan, Libya, Ethiopia, and Cambodia are thought to be "traditional" and "stable"; Ceylon and Chile "transitional" but "stable"; and Israel and Uruguay both "modern" and "stable.")[61] Rather, what counts for present purposes is the theory by which the Feierabends propose to explain their computer correlations between numerical indicators of rapid change in "transitional" societies and the statistics on political violence.

The issue is problematic because the key explanatory variable and theoretical linchpin of their argument, the psychological notion of "systemic frustration," is not itself subject to direct measurement. On the contrary, its presence and intensity must be ascertained indirectly by way of several intervening assumptions about the connection between social change and systemic frustration on the one hand, and between said frustration and recorded outbreaks of political violence on the other. The Feierabends require, in other words, a set of theoretical propositions enabling them to interpret certain data on social change as evidence of systemic frustration and, having thus established the existence of widespread frustration in embattled societies, explain levels of violence by reference to it. By themselves, raw statistical correlations between indices of rapid "modernization" and collective violence explain nothing. Only by theoretical criteria can they be taken to evince causal interconnections.[62]

And those criteria? The only explanatory link between quantification and conclusion is a set of ideas the Feierabends describe as "intuitively persuasive."[63] Under analysis, these propositions dissolve, roughly in equal parts, into unwarranted assumptions and trivial truisms:

> Change, especially extensive, rapid, and abrupt change, is an unsettling and bewildering human experience. It is likely to create strain in the psyche of the individual and crisis in the social order. Old ways, familiar environments, deep-seated habits, and social roles become obsolescent, while a new way of life and a new routine are not yet clearly established.

Echoing the anxieties and analysis of nineteenth-century social conservatives, the Feierabends continue:

> . . . massive change that moves people physically into new environments, exposes their minds to new ideas, and casts them in new and unfamiliar roles is very likely to create collective bewilderment. This bewilderment may find expression in turmoil and social violence.[64]

Why bewilderment should incite mass political violence rather than, say, induce passivity,[65] the Feierabends do not explain.

But there are deeper difficulties to come. As the Feierabends are quick to acknowledge, social change – or, as Marxists sometimes put it, combined and uneven development – is a many-splendored thing which, because it benefits some interests while damaging others, makes for satisfaction and discontent in different quarters. Therefore, they contend, it is "only when change brings with it social circumstances that breed discontent and strain that it may be assumed to be responsible for social turmoil." This, they explain, is because "our theoretical assumption linking change to violence begins with the notion that political turmoil is the consequence of social discontent" – a platitude dignified but slightly by their observation that it stems from "a motivational rather than a structural orientation," and thus "reaffirms the oft-repeated insight that political protest and revolution begin in the minds of men."[66]

How, then, to tell which changes in and of society promote satisfaction and quiescence and which breed discontent and sedition? Here the Feierabends resurrect Adlai Stevenson's homely adage from the 1950s about the "revolution of rising expectations," arguing that just those changes which frustrate social expectations arouse collective anger and the impulse to violence: "The consequent lack of alignment between expectations and attainments," they

write, "creates the intolerable discrepancy which is postulated as the motivational antecedent to political violence."[67] In plain English, the painful gap between wishes and fact, between "ought" and "is," impels violent strife.

Trivial, even tautologous, this conclusion warrants our attention if only because the mistakes that lead up to it typify so much of the literature on revolutions and collective violence. The Feierabends never trouble to examine the economic and political structure of the régimes they survey. Nor do they analyze any population into its constituent classes, interest groups, or contending parties. On methodological principle, they decline to consider the issues at stake in deadly quarrels and, like the military, attend mainly to body-counts.[68] Worse, they omit to specify just which groups are adversely affected by the social changes they adduce, which ones are frustrated, and which are involved in violent politics. It is evidently assumed, not argued (much less confirmed), that these are in fact the same sets of people. Neither do they indicate when the putative discrepancy between expectations and attainments becomes "intolerable." And when the Feierabends elaborate their central concept of "systemic frustration," they never once explain how this feeling of aggravated disappointment among disparate individuals converts into collective action, or even begin to specify the conditions under which expectations may be frustrated *without* producing rebellion.[69] Like Davies, they simply presume a direct connection between frustration and revolt, and thus beg the question they profess to have answered.[70] In fine, the Feierabends' impressive display of statistical fireworks leaves behind a dense quantitative smokescreen covering the slipshod quality of their theoretical explanations.

Similar difficulties – inherent in the attempt to explain violent political *inter*actions by reference to individual frustrations writ large – plague the prize-winning work of Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel.* Rather than try to explain the actual timing of revolutions with the aid of a prop like the J-curve, Gurr cautiously restricts himself to accounting for violent "potentials." To do this, he offers a massive explication of a simple psychological notion: relative deprivation,

> defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions of life they think they are capable of getting and keeping.[71]

Relative deprivation, then, is the feeling people experience when they fail to get what they think they deserve.[72] As a consequence, they become angry

and if enough of them do not get what they think they ought, their potential for collective violence and (should the government lose "coercive control") "internal war" increases. The gist of Gurr's message, all in all, is that the "potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity."[73]

Strangely enough, Gurr declines to analyze the role of governments in fomenting episodes of political violence, and thereby omits from consideration the very "collectivity" historically responsible for initiating most incidents recorded as "civil strife," as well as for committing the vast bulk of murder and mayhem.[74] Nor, on principle, does Gurr's scheme (which focuses exclusively on violence by rebels against régimes) come to grips with violent clashes that set contenders for power in the state against one another, though his data inadvertently include them in practice.[75] Like Davies and the Feierabends, moreover, Gurr offers no explanation of how the frustrations of uncoordinated individuals are transformed into collective assaults on incumbent power holders. And, in like fashion, his overall argument founders on an obvious fallacy: if we look back in time from a given outbreak of collective action-cum-violence, it is clear that some sort of group dissatisfaction is involved; group dissatisfaction presupposes individual dissatisfaction, which commonly arises from an invidious discrepancy between "is" and "ought." But how often does the history of political continuity display the same distressing array of injustice, suffering, unhappiness? Far more individuals, groups, and classes suffer situations of misery and deprivation (relative or absolute) than ever engage in public protest, much less revolution. Run backwards, that is to say retrospectively, theories that explain revolutions and collective violence by shared frustrations, discontents, deprivations, and so forth are invariably true – true by definition. Run forwards, or prospectively, however, such theories are powerless to distinguish political watersheds from business as usual.[76] Ultimately, the argument from relative deprivation bites its own tail and slips into tautology.

In fairness, it should be noted that Gurr has since abandoned relative deprivation as an explanatory principle and replaced it with "strain," by which he means "relatively invariant 'structural' constraints on the equitable distribution of values (valued social goods and conditions) within and among societies."[77] Clearly, this marks a laudable step away from woolly guesswork about the hypothetical "states of mind" of undifferentiated masses toward concern with tangible political issues of distributive justice. It remains dubious, however, just what is gained by formalizing the commonsense truism that "strain," as Gurr defines it, is strongly associated with MPC (manifest political conflict). Of course it is. But the unsolved problem remains: How, and under what circumstances, are "strain" and the grievances that stem from it trans-

muted into efforts at collective redress? This is the key question facing would-be theorists of revolution, and neither Gurr nor anyone else working within the conceptual confines of volcanic psychology has proposed a cogent answer.

Perhaps the most interesting exponent of the volcanic model is Neil Smelser in his *Theory of Collective Behavior.* In this bold and influential book, Smelser seeks to demonstrate, *pace* the critics, that despite its explicit focus on moral conformity, Parsons's general theory of the "social system" is (if cleverly applied) quite capable of explaining the "'collective behavior' of terrorized masses and excited mobs, crowds and movements – with which our era is so filled"; that is, the "highly transient, fluidly changing" behavior usually identified with fads, fashions, riots, and revolutions.[78] True to the Parsonian ontology, in which the final cause of social action is found in the sphere of values, Smelser singles out five modes of "collective behavior" arranged in a step-level hierarchy that culminates, predictably, in action to "restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of a generalized belief."[79] The five kinds of collective behavior, defined by their social-structural antecedents and goals, are the panic, the craze, the hostile outburst, the norm-oriented movement, and the value-oriented movement. Of these, the last three constitute the sociological genera of which riot, rebellion, and revolution are political species.

For any manifestation of "collective behavior" to take place, six "determinants" must come into play: (1) "structural conduciveness" – a given human configuration must provide social space for a corresponding mode of collective behavior; a money economy, for example, is prerequisite to financial panics; (2) "structural strain"; (3) the "growth and spread of a generalized belief" that defines and explains the "strained" situation to the people who experience it; (4) "precipitating factors" – fortuitous sparks to ignite the volatile mixture of stages one to three; (5) "mobilization of participants for action" – the obvious fact that people must cooperate to act in concert; and (6) the "operation of social control"; that is, the extent and timing of counter-collective action by authoritative power holders.

Smelser's intricate account of what makes people band together and go against the grain is, at base, a definition writ large. Looking back in time from a given instance of "collective behavior," we find the antecedent stages present by definition; they also appear in situations that do not produce such occurrences. The first four determinants, for example, can coexist in unmobilized populations; moreover, to call mobilization itself a "determinant" is an exercise in circularity, since mobilization is precisely what the theory is supposed to explain. And why "social control" figures at stage six, rather

than at stage one (where, logically, "conduciveness" would be reciprocal to control), is puzzling.[80]

These problems aside, Smelser's painstakingly elaborated scheme rests on a Dionysian conception of unlicensed redress that obscures the political logic of revolutions and collective violence. Though he repudiates the crude reductionism of Le Bon's crowd psychology, Smelser persists in portraying revolt and revolution as, not violent extensions of "normal" political strife between power-holding incumbents and aggrieved challengers, but the nihilistic thrashings of crazed mobs, transported by the fantasy of a "generalized belief" to paroxysms of violence. Smelser is, of course, fully aware of the political sources of popular protest. For if, he writes, "we ask a member of a protest movement why he is protesting, he will reply that he is dissatisfied with some kind of injustice or inequity, and that he is working to remove it and thereby improve the political situation." Yet in practice, Smelser's assiduous effort to empirically establish the "causal links between social variables and the ideologies and behavior of participants in a movement"[81] winds up reducing the politics of collective action to mere epiphenomena of social-cum-psychological "strain," and thereby jettisons the structural baby with the incidental bathwater. When, further, we find American spiritualist cults and the Bolshevik Revolution lumped together under the rubric of "value-oriented movements," while Lenin, Hitler, and Father Divine join hands as motivational bedfollows, it is hard to stifle the suspicion that Smelser has consigned all deviants from enlightened liberalism to the same circle of Hell.

Like Smelser, Chalmers Johnson spins his theory of *Revolutionary Change* off the chimerical Parsonian conception of a functionally integrated "social system" drifting through time in homeostatic equilibrium.[82] Revolutions are held to derive from systemic disequilibrium. Such a delicate condition of societal debility comes about when "intransigent" élites are unable or unwilling to meet the challenge of manifold "dysfunctions" caused by the introduction of new ideas, technology, forms of economic organization, etc., which open a widening fissure between a "society's values and the realities with which it must deal."[83] In circumstances of protracted disequilibrium, disoriented individuals tend to gravitate toward purveyors of alternative value systems which, in the helter-skelter of spiritual incoherence, become focal points of social protest. The emphatic association of political upheaval with personal psychic disorders cartoons the leitmotivs of volcanic psychology:

> As the disequilibrium of a social system becomes more acute, personal tensions are generated in all statuses. These tensions may be controlled by some people through internal psychological defense mechanisms, and the

> alienative [*sic*] sentiments of others may be dissipated through deviant behavior (e.g., fantasies, crime, mental disease, and psychosomatic illnesses). However, with the passage of time, these mechanisms tend to lose their efficacy, and persons subject to highly diverse status protests will begin to combine with each other and with deviants generally to form a deviant subcultural group or movement.[84]

Once the sociological stage is set – when "disequilibrium" meets with "elite intransigence" to produce a "power deflation" and loss of legitimacy for ruling groups – chance happenings like defeat in a faraway war, which undermines the loyalty of the army and keeps the régime from killing off dissenters, can become surprise "accelerators" of revolution.[85]

What's wrong with this picture? To begin with, as Johnson himself points out, "disequilibrium" is impossible to verify independently of the political crisis it supposedly explains. Other indicators adduced (suicide and crime rates, circulation of "ideological" newspapers, or extent of military mobilization) do not correlate significantly with violent struggles for state power and are explained more convincingly in quite different terms.[86] More serious weaknesses afflict the logic of argument, however. For one thing, revolutions are pegged to a moral malaise repeatedly identified in great literature as the human condition worldwide: "dissynchronization" between values and realities. For another, Johnson consistently confounds "society" with the state, and so mistakes violent struggles with incumbent state-managers for indiscriminate rampages against the "system." Such confusion inheres in the "social system" model itself which, imagining a "world where men use power benignly on behalf of the common interest and collective goals,"[88] regards the state as simply a public guardian of prior consensual norms, and thus effaces all distinction between political protest and moral deviance. With that, unofficial collective violence becomes "anti-social" action whose aim is not to exert political pressure but to "disorient" others by violating the code of reciprocal expectations that makes social order possible.[89] Small wonder, then, that Johnson should rehabilitate the reactionary folklore of political dissidents as sick people – a "psychological class," as he puts it, of "outcasts, fools, and experts"[90] – or second Smelser's motion to dismiss unauthorized mass mobilization as the eruption of lunatic enthusiasm. For Johnson as for Smelser, popular protest and collective violence are not political bargaining by other means, but ominous signs that civilized life in the "social system" may soon end, like West's *Day of the Locust,* with a nightmarish rising of

> the cultists of all sorts, economic as well as religious . . . – all those poor devils who can only be stirred by the promise of miracles and then only to

> violence. A super "Dr. Know-All Pierce-All" had made the necessary promise and they were marching behind his banner in a great united front of screwballs and screwboxes to purify the land. No longer bored, they sang and danced joyously in the red light of the flames.[91]

Revolutionary Change, like *Theory of Collective Behavior,* could only be written in California.

Just how this motley crew of sociological perverts can organize in common cause, much less overturn a government or (like Lenin and the Bolsheviks) take advantage of its fall, Johnson does not disclose. He indicates only that persisting disequilibrium tends to "disorient" the good sense of "non-deviant actors," who soon start dancing to the ideological melodies of revolutionary Pied Pipers. Once again volcanic psychology leaves us totally in the dark as to what groups become "deviant" and what groups mobilize effective action against the incumbent régime. Like other champions of the volcanic model, Johnson looks back in time from a violent power transfer or insurrection to discover its "cause" in anger-inducing disequilibrium, a condition that (as defined) commonly obtains in situations of political stability. Moreover, his attempt to invoke fortuitous military and political events – "accelerators" – as the "final, or immediate, causes of revolution" begs the question. Johnson says that accidental upsets of this kind are easily absorbed by "functional societies," whereas "when they impinge on a society experiencing power deflation and a loss of authority" (again the equation of state with society), they "immediately catalyze it into insurrection." But since, by his own account, a régime's loss of power and authority occurs because its ruling élites fail to counteract disequilibrium with "policies which will maintain the confidence of non-deviant actors in the system,"[92] and since (as noted) the only evidence of disequilibrium is the revolutionary crisis it allegedly acounts for, the overall argument turns in a circle. The only evidence for the *explicans* is the *explicandum;* and this, to be sure, is the hallmark of circular reasoning.[93]

Perform a simple thought-experiment: replace "systemic disequilibrium" with contradictory "forces and relations of production" and "accelerators" with "overdetermination," and Johnson's theory of revolutionary change resembles Althusser's rhapsody on the Bolshevik Revolution as the upshot of an "overdetermined contradiction." By that murky term Althusser appears to mean that whereas singular events like 1917 derive "in the last instance" from the global contradiction between productive forces and relations, more immediately from that between Capital and Labor, the specific revolutionary "rupture" cannot be deduced from this very general rule. Rather, it can only be understood in connection with a "vast accumulation of contradictions"

(World War I, the collapse of Tsardom, the peasant movement) which, as they "merge" and "fuse" into a "ruptural unity," discharge the primary contradiction full force. The Capital-Labor contradiction is, in other words (as Wilde said of truth), seldom pure and never simple, "but always specified by the historically concrete circumstances in which it is exercised"; it is "inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is found, inseparable from its formal *conditions* of existence, even from the *instances* it governs; it is radically *affected by them,* determining, but also determined in one and the same movement," such that, in sum, "it might be called *overdetermined in its principle.*" What, then, of the old saw that history is the history of class struggles, nowadays fought between Capital and Labor? Well, answers Althusser, the lovely "*'simplicity'* of this *purified* schema has answered to certain subjective necessities of the mobilization of the masses" – it served to reassure simpler minds of their starring role in History – but it won't do as serious "scientific" explanation, what with the Great Simplifier dead and Party intellectuals called to confront literate critics in public debates. After all, he asks, *"are we not always in exceptional situations?"* Its ears and whiskers already visible for several paragraphs, the *bête noire* of historical specificity bounds from Althusser's bag:

> . . . the economic dialectic is never active *in the pure state;* in History, these instances, the superstructures, etc. – are never seen to step respectfully aside when their work is done or, when the Time comes, as his pure phenomena, to scatter before His Majesty and Economy as he strides along the royal road of the Dialectic. From the first moment to the last, the lonely hour of the "last instance" never comes.

Needed, therefore, is an "elaboration of *the theory of the particular essence of the specific elements of the superstructure,"* which will be no easy task, seeing as how the Marxian theory of state and revolution is "like a map of Africa before the great explorations, . . . a realm sketched in outline, with its great mountain chains and rivers, but often unknown in detail beyond a few well-known regions."[94]

The cartographical simile presumes that the "superstructure" has been outlined accurately and that all we need do is "elaborate" basic truths by filling in the details. Nevertheless, Althusser's clear implication that orthodox Marxism has published no political theory of consequence, only a golden treasury of clichés suitable for blessing any change of Party mind, is apt if obvious. Yet his critics remain dissatisfied. They point out that this elaborate prolegomenon to a "theory of the specific effectivity of the superstructures and other 'circumstances' " only facelifts a commonplace: history is com-

plicated, and a given outcome like 1917 is explicable only by the interweaving of many influences without any one of which things would have turned out differently.[95] They neglect to add, however, that the only evidence Althusser offers that his pet revolutions derive – in the apocryphal last instance or any other – from the primary contradiction is that they did, in fact, happen to occur. Since, again, the only evidence of the explanatory principle is the set of facts it supposedly explains, the argument is circular. By no stretch of the dialectical imagination will this pass muster as revolutionary theory.

But back to the main line of argument. The point here is that Johnson nowhere accounts for the political circumstances that determine whether the ideological currents he caricatures ever become significant in contests for national state power. This failure stems in part, as Theda Skocpol rightly observes, from the widespread misapprehension that revolutionary movements have actually "made" revolutions happen. Never, in point of fact, did vanguard groups or mass movements create single-handedly the revolutionary situations that catapulted some of them to power.[96] As for the ideological or "value" changes on which Johnson and Smelser lay so much stress, these have been more the products than the precursors of revolutions, mainly because, in the words of one historian, the "revolutionary ideology becomes the locus *par excellence* of the political struggle between groups . . ."[97] In two key cases, Mexico and China, the ideological currents that emerged triumphant did not palpably exist as political reference points when the old régimes were toppled in 1911.[98]

Like Davies and Smelser, Johnson has at least one foot in another analytic tradition: the natural history approach, which treats revolutions as pathologies of the body politic analogous to human diseases with fixed and recurrent developmental stages. Crane Brinton, the leading natural historian of comparative revolutions, describes them as a kind of "fever" and charts their course with the aid of medical metaphors.[99] Quite like historical novels or movies, natural histories retrospectively assign a beginning, middle, and end to violent power contests and conceive a plot in time-honored dramaturgical fashion. But in so doing, they build their conclusions into their premises by working backwards from the fait accompli of a revolution to the gathering of apparently causal preconditions – conditions that commonly obtain in state societies during periods of political continuity.[100] The trouble with natural histories, in short, is that they assume what they are designed to prove. In this respect, however, they are no more or less egregious than more modern and systematic efforts to construct general theories of revolution.

Now that the troops have passed in review, we may summarize the reasons

for their collapse under fire at the front. There are, I suggest, three recurrent fallacies built into the volcanic model that condemn theories fashioned after it to failure. From the top:

The confusion of "state" and "society." Whereas the events these theories purport to explain are preeminently political – that is, they concern fights over "who gets what, when, and how" and, hence, for control over government, community, or workplace – the theories themselves either decline to discuss politics at all, or else crudely reduce political processes to "underlying" socio-psychological imperatives. From the assumption that collective violence erupts from overheated "states of mind," it follows that what a theory should disclose is the cause of mass anger, call it frustration, relative deprivation, strain, or some other neologism for social resentment. Instead of dissecting the structure of power relations, patterns of contention, and the mobilization of interested parties, volcanic theory looks to the genesis of belligerent states of mind in "society" at large. Collective action becomes "collective behavior," the abnormal, antisocial activity of disaffected individuals driven to fits of irrational nastiness by pent-up frustrations with the status quo. A whole "society" therefore explodes in revolution or, conversely, a revolution aims to overthrow society itself. This lack of a political focus on state institutions, power relations, and the mobilization of contending groups leads directly to a second fallacy:

The strange case of the "absconded actor."[101] Because the target of theoretical attention is the anger-inducing tensions of a whole society – and here again "society" is simply the population living inside the borders of some national state – it remains unclear just who bears the brunt of frustration, who takes part in revolutions, and what connection (if any) exists between these two sets of actors. Volcanic theories never identify specific power groups acting politically to advance and defend (by violence if need be) their interests. Instead, the real people who form up action groups, parties, and tactical coalitions to contest power in revolutionary situations are dissolved into anonymous masses whose undifferentiated hostilities discharge in collective violence. By implication, however, the prime suspects would appear to be alienated individuals from all classes or, alternately, these growlers and grumblers plus a mass following recruited from the poorest and most oppressed strata – people who, living in a state of chronic anxiety and frustration, form the most impulsive, unstable, and (presumably) "revolutionary" elements in society. Though never confirmed by competent study or successful practice, this wisdom reaches far beyond the ivied walls of academe. For with few exceptions (Marx among them),[102] radicals tend to gauge "revolutionary potential" by, not the social power and tactical leverage of aggrieved groups,

but their misery and discontent, on the unfounded assumption that the prize belongs, as on "Queen-for-a-Day," to the ones with the least reason to go on living. Which leads to a third mistake:

The two-stage leap of faith – from social change to grievances, and from grievances to revolt, without explaining either the genesis of specific grievances or the conversion of vague and various discontents into drastic but deliberate political action. Recall that volcanic theories posit the presence of aggravating upsets in society at large (frustration, deprivation, strain, disequilibrium), which they infer to be aroused by rapid and large-scale rearrangements of social life (e.g., "modernization") or, in one instance, by sudden adverse economic fluctuations or political turnabouts. Then, goes the volcanic argument, these grievances – or discontented "states of mind" – touch off violent protest or, at minimum, render people susceptible to the appeals of extremist agitators.

Now there are two missing links in this chain of reasoning. (1) The volcanic theories have no way of ascertaining the presence and magnitude of frustration, deprivation, or strain independently of the political conflicts they allegedly produce. These motive forces are present either by definition or drastic inference from data on the pace and pattern of social development. The "measures" taken of relative deprivation, for example, were not measures at all, but speculative projections from data on social conditions and patterns of change which, by farfetched inference, were thought to generate varying degrees of "RD."[103] Nor can volcanic theories, trained as they are on the putative emotional climate of a whole society, distinguish specific grievances, much less connect them with the political initiatives of competing power groups. (2) Volcanic theories have no real argument connecting frustration, deprivation, strain, or disequilibrium to violent politics – beyond the trivial truism that behind every act of collective violence lies discontent. Not only do the supposed indicators of social frustration, strain, and so forth commonly turn up in situations of stable rule, but manifest grievances do not always lead to violent upheaval; except under complex political circumstances – both organizational and tactical – that volcanic theories omit to consider seriously.[104] *Why* aggrieved people revolt or assist revolutions in some cases but not in others remains as much a mystery as ever. And to imply, as some volcanic writers are wont, that when the pressure of discontent is great enough, rebellion erupts,[105] is either tautologous or absurd. For quite apart from the difficulty of weighing grievances on a common scale, it is clear from comparative history that the worst abuses are usually suffered where repression dampens protest to a whisper. Grievances may "motivate" rebellion, but they do not explain it. Just as avarice requires the proper economic conditions,

given or improvised, to produce accumulation, so grievances require favorable political circumstances to provoke protest. There is, in short, no direct passage from anger to action, save through tautology.

What we've rejected, again, is the idea that violent protest up to and including revolution springs directly from mass anger – a "revolutionary state of mind" – and, hence, that its explanation lies in the build-up of socially induced psychological tensions which, grown "intolerable," erupt in concerted violence. The point of dissecting theories based on volcanic assumptions is not simply to poke logical fun at suspect arguments, but to spotlight certain recurrent ideas that obstruct the understanding of revolutions and collective violence. This merits attention, moreover, because the volcanic model not only gives rise to erroneous general theories; it permeates the descriptive vocabulary used by observers and analysts to record and make sense of popular violence. And while there is little harm in using volcanic imagery as rhetorical embellishment of essentially political explanations,[106] "mere description" couched in volcanic terms commonly bears dubious theoretical doctrines on the causes of collective violence.[107]

IV

It remains to sketch the political model of collective violence and to note its implications for the comparative study of revolutionary situations. This will not take long, as the thoughts to follow are a long way from comprising "a principle, a procedure, and an explanation" – the hallmarks, in Whitehead's phrase, of a full-fledged theory. My points are heuristic rather than definitive, and make no claims to originality. They amount, in fact, to little more than a simple summary and partial generalization of hypotheses already on hand in the literature that, thus far, have been left independent of one another. If successful, moreover, this concluding exercise will yield, not another general theory like those reviewed and rejected above, but merely a set of provisional assumptions or working hypotheses to guide research on comparative revolutions. Rather than "rigid schemata," we want "practical criteria of historical and political interpretation."[108] Our interest, in other words, is not in making up another abstract theory from which (by sleight of mind) particular revolutions may be deduced as empirical instances, but in setting down some workable ideas with which to begin sorting out comparable cases. And there, as always in the human sciences, "specific chains of historical causation that do not fit into any recognizable family of sequences may have to bear a substantial share of the explanatory burden."[109]

Our conceptual entry-wedge is innocuously blunt: namely, that for all the violent passion and passionate violence they entail, revolutions, rebellions, and lesser forms of coercive civilian conflict are best understood as (to adapt Clausewitz's venerable definition of war) "a mere continuation of politics by other means."[110] This requires that analysis discard the fanciful notion of an entire society's "state of mind," goaded to aggressive outbursts by felt frustration or "structural strain," and focus instead on the actual power balances and patterns of contention between conflicting classes, parties, and interest groups. Put more positively, the political model seeks the genesis of revolutions and mass violence, as of war, in the competing interests and aspirations of embattled power groups. Like war, revolutions and collective violence arise from ongoing contests for resources, influence, and hegemony previously managed within existing diplomatic channels. And, like, war, they involve a calculated test of strength: the contenders size one another up, and risk collision only when the likely benefits outweigh the certain dangers. To paraphrase Clausewitz once more, revolution and war, like commercial rivalry and politics, betray conflicts of vested interest. They are violent extensions of "normal" societal intercourse, and differ from other, nonviolent conflicts by that fact alone.[111] To explain them, there is no need to invent ad hoc categories of "collective behavior" or to psychologize political motives in terms of aberrant "states of mind." Per se, attempts to upset or overturn the prevailing structure of power and stratification are no more or less rational than efforts to bargain within or defend it.

Which is not to say that ideologies, mentalities, or other "collective representations" will not reward careful research. Indeed, the practical ideologies and situational *mentalités* of political action-groups – from radical state-managers to rank-and-file activists and hangers-on[112] – have been among the most exciting and valuable subjects of inquiry. My point is simply that "states of mind" cannot just be taken for granted or "postulated" as they are in the volcanic theories examined above; they must be empirically established as the attitudes and assumptions of identifiable groups. Apart from the social situation and political experience from which it arises, a "revolutionary state of mind" explains nothing.[113]

To summarize, collective violence is the dark side of collective action – or, more precisely, interaction – which, like all politics, is a deliberate and concerted effort made for conscious and specific reasons. "So we see therefore," writes Clausewitz, putting his finger on the nub, "that war is not merely a political act, but a genuine political instrument, a continuation of political dealings, a completion of the latter by other means . . . the political intent is the aim, war is the means, and the means can never be conceived of apart

from the aim."[114] Which is not to imply that gratuitous cruelty and embittered nastiness play no part in collective violence. Moreover, to assert that collective violence obeys a political logic is not to deny the "diversity of motives, the muddle-mindedness and hesitations . . ., the doubts and changes of attitude of the participants," or to forget that, ultimately, we are "dealing with individuals, with people who often did not know where they were going, but who, all at once, set off on a journey increasingly perilous."[115] Rather, it is simply to recognize that no fundamental difference separates the backroom reckoning of professional state-managers from the intuitive hunch-playing of ordinary people, who are no more reckless than their rulers in committing themselves to life-risking political interventions. Collective violence certainly arouses anger, outrage, and aggressiveness just as war evokes "emotions and aspirations in whose incandescent atmosphere even calculations involving the individual human life obey different laws from those of individual profit" and loss.[116] But anger explains collective violence as poorly as jingoism explains war. Angry people doing ugly things are endemic to revolutions; their rage is not, however, what brings on revolutionary situations. The origins of revolution, like war, lie in the structure and workings of politics. For politics, concludes Clausewitz, is the "womb in which war develops"; in it the lineaments of war (and revolution) lie "still hidden, indicated like the features of the living creature in embryo."[117]

Collective violence – sometimes intended, even carefully planned by rebels or rulers, oftentimes the unexpected result of runaway confrontations[118] – relates to domestic politics as war to diplomacy. Hence "as long as the exercise of government remains a matter of dispute between various groups, the opportunity and the temptation for recourse to popular violence will remain."[119] By itself, this says little. Yet it throws light on a number of facts otherwise inexplicable. If indeed, as appears from the history of science, a model is never defeated by facts, however damaging, but only by another model that looks to account more cogently for the data at risk as well as anticipate and correct further empirical findings,[120] it behooves us to see what the political model predicts[121] in place of the three volcanic fallacies outlined above. As will be apparent, the political model confutes the volcanic conception on all three scores: the nature and origin of grievances, the social composition of revolutionary "masses," the pathways from anger to action.

It is unfortunately impossible, in an essay already choking in its own footnotes, to give more than a hint of the relevant evidence. Serious documentation must await another occasion. Meanwhile, if these tentative arguments cause others to improve or refute them with sounder research, they

will have accomplished their mission. After all, imperfect ideas clearly refuted are preferable to important issues obscured by neglect.

(1) As collective violence is no mere eruption of rage, but a concomitant of scrambles for tactical advantage between counterpoised interests, its motive lies in, not vague social frustrations, but principled complaints over recognized bones of contention between groups. And rather than chaotic outbursts of angry people, careful study of popular violence reveals a social structure, political pattern, and tactical logic – akin to war, diplomacy, or elections.

Consider some evidence. Though moral and political outrage may fuel the civilian side of revolutions and collective violence – state specialists in repression, trained to murder strangers they do not begrudge, need not be angry to discharge their professional responsibilities – there is no reason to assume that anger arises from frustrated expectations. As Peter Lupsha points out, citing the experimental literature, acute frustration need not arouse agression: people may be socialized to accept frustration as inevitable, legitimate, even deserved; they may be trained to regard aggressive behavior as socially improper; or, conversely, by role-model imitation or on command, they may become aggressive without being frustrated at all.[122] Furthermore, faced with actual incidents of collective violence (race riots, for example), Lupsha also points out, frustration-aggression theory bumps into three inconvenient facts: the timing of hostilities (if accumulated frustrations be the impetus to riot, why then?); the identity of those whose aggressive behavior precipitated collective violence (they were often white, indeed officers of the law); and the selectivity of violence, in particular damage inflicted on the property of merchants reputed to have sold shoddy merchandise or engaged in deceitful credit and selling practices. Having thus dismissed psychologism from the explanation of collective violence, Lupsha suggests that "righteous indignation" over concrete grievances, not frustration, best describes the impetus to action.[123]

This fits the findings published by historians of people's politics and popular violence in Europe and the Third World. These authors, after years of painstaking research into the social composition and political motives of crowds involved in riots, revolts, and a few revolutions, report abundant evidence that "behind every such form of popular direct action some legitimizing notion of right is to be found."[124] Not only did rebels and rioters of the old régime appeal to "political and moral traditions" that sanctioned, even prescribed, what violence they committed, but (to preview a point sharpened below), far from being "miserable, uprooted, unstable masses," they were for the most part people with a recognized place and "stake in their community," who were "often skilled craftsmen or better," who, "even when poor and un-

skilled," were "respectable to their everyday neighbors," and whose violence, however cruel or unusual by present-day standards of shame and revulsion, was not "random and limitless but aimed at defined targets and selected from a repertory of traditional punishments and forms of destruction."[125]

To the discerning eye, moreover, even the most "spontaneous" and seemingly anarchic forms of collective violence – food riots, tax revolts, jacqueries, *journées* (crowd actions in the French revolutions) – reveal, each of them, not only implicit theories of right and justice, as well as practical objectives – first crack at local food supply, reduced taxes (most European rebellions between 1300 and 1700 were tax revolts), a rollback of seigneurial impositions, cheap and plentiful bread – but a political anatomy, a standard operating procedure, even (most clearly visible in food riots) a veritable customary script which police and people knew by heart.[126] Like the authorities who repressed them, the food rioters, anti-tax demonstrators, and peasant militants knew what they wanted and had rough-and-ready methods for getting it. And if, as some hostile observers have argued, the common folk in preindustrial settings showed a naive, almost mystical attachment to coercion as a political panacea, it was because "violence, in one form or another – collective or private – was the only means of influencing policies and events available to the *petit peuple.*"[127] This does not mean that the *petit peuple,* in France or elsewhere, never made mistakes, that they were unerringly accurate in their judgment of what went wrong and who was responsible, that they never claimed innocent victims (they plainly did, the September Massacres of 1792 being only the most notorious case), that their protest was inherently "emancipatory," that their indignation never had a repressive or reactionary component, or even that their sense of self-interest over the long run was always reliable (like voters in presidential elections, popular movements have been regularly disappointed by the parties and politicians they helped bring to power). The *sans-culottes,* for example, as their most empathetic historian makes clear, committed major misjudgments and needless brutalities, which blunders cost them dear once the national balance of political power shifted in their disfavor.[128] All told, however, popular movements are no uglier in this regard than statesmen and generals, whose efforts to achieve political objectives through organized violence have rarely been distinguished by their solicitude for defenseless civilians.[129]

What, then, to make of Lenin's over-quoted dictum, that "revolutions are festivals of the oppressed and the exploited,"[130] and, on the sinister side, of the observation that these festive occasions could also be "repellent, dreadful, hideous, and above all depressing," the handiwork of a popular justice that was "frequently cruel and cowardly, base and vengeful, barbaric and not at

all pretty to watch"?[131] Is not all this harping on the political character of popular violence, its naive realism, its *Gesetzmässigkeit,* a lofty evasion of facts which, closely examined, become unbearable? Is it not, in a word, a sociological apology for massacre? Here at least four points need mentioning. First, politics, especially people's politics, has an uproarious aspect. (Wendell Phillips once called presidential elections the "saturnalia of American life.")[132] Second, the popular festivals to which Lenin alludes were established parts of customary life under the old régime, celebrations that reaffirmed community solidarity and norms while at the same time providing ritualized occasions for vigilante criticism of the political order.[133] Third, and important to recall, the brutality of popular vengeance in revolutions owes much to the disciplinary methods of the establishment. (As Babeuf exclaimed on seeing the severed heads of two Paris notables paraded on pikes a few days following the fall of the Bastille, "Cruel punishments of every sort, quartering, the rack, the wheel, the stake, the whip, the gibbet, so many tortures everywhere have taught us such wicked ways!")[134] Fourth, the vast majority of clashes recorded as "rebellions" have commenced when the authorities chose to repress collective actions that, while prohibited, were nonetheless peaceable – until police violence turned noisy but nonviolent demonstrations into insurrections.[135] (No proponent of systemic frustration, relative deprivation, or social strain as the source of civil strife has, to my knowledge, ever accused the authorities of such or similar warps of consciousness.) In short, most striking is the *continuity* in modes of political behavior before and during revolutionary outbreaks. While revolutions certainly accelerate the same dizzying fission and fusion of coalitions and counter-coalitions, fights and truces between opposing interests, and intramural rivalries between factions and cliques that typify ordinary politics, close-up studies indicate that when mass violence attends revolutionary situations, it follows fault lines opened well before the first round of active hostilities.[136]

A final blow to the volcanic model of grievances – which, viewing revolutionary violence as a sudden eruption of rage, reads in the perpetrators' "state of mind" both a bitter rejection of existing society and a mental rehearsal of radical reconstitution – is that the actual aims of popular movements have been largely conservative, even reactionary, in the literal sense of trying to preserve older economic and political arrangements under attack by the state or upper classes. From the *Bauernkrieg* of 1525 to the *sans-culottes* of 1793 and 1794, the *communards* of 1871 to the rural rebels of 1917 who inadvertently gave Lenin's urban minority *coup* its indispensable boost, the actual aims and actions of "revolutionary masses" give precious little sign that they ever sought to overthrow the existing order, much less replace it with a new one.[137] On the contrary, their radicalism has been tactical, their collective

violence the cutting edge of defensive conservatism, and their "revolutionary" interventions an attempt to turn political crises to their own sectional advantage, grabbing the opportunity afforded by breakdowns of state power to reclaim property and prerogatives lately usurped by dominant groups.[138] True, the spread of modern industrialism and victory of the national state over other frameworks of rule have changed the identity of players in the political game as well as its locus and immediate ends. Even so, in the very few revolutions to see sizable proletarian involvement, the workers themselves have moved to remedy specific grievances – over wages, hours, working conditions, job security – affecting their particular occupations. And when they took up arms and marched under radical banners, it was to defend recent reformist gains against reactionary violence.[139]

This is not to gainsay the role of ideology in people's politics, but only to remind that the radical schemes for renovating society by which some revolutions tend to be identified and remembered have been superimposed on popular movements by certain of their coalition partners, often (though not always) revolutionary intellectuals, the masses' own version of utopia being basically their experience of existing society minus its most oppressive features. The game of revolutionary ideas is thus a tricky one with at least three possible outcomes: radical visions may be rejected as irrelevant, dangerous, or both by their intended audience; the "masses" may adopt the ideology and organization offered by their tactical coalition partners, only to bend both (at times beyond recognition) to suit their immediate interests; or, if radical élites do gain power, the utopias of revolution may become new ideologies of rule.[140]

(2) But neither ideologies nor the sense of grievance to which they appeal explain collective action to set things right. As James Scott rightly remarks, if anger born of exploitation and injustice were enough to spark rebellion, the Third World would be in flames.[141] A key question still unanswered is *which* groups with a grievance are in a position to act on it or, at minimum, lend support to parties promising redress. Here again the volcanic and political conceptions point in different directions. If, by the volcanic model, revolutions and collective violence are eruptions of rage, then people suffering the worst grievances should make the readiest rebels. Although (as noted above) volcanic theories seldom inquire into the social composition of action groups in revolutionary situations, their logic of analysis clearly implies that people who are poorest and most oppressed or, from another angle, most atomized and isolated from stabilizing community involvements would be the majority of faces in the revolutionary crowd. The political model, on the other hand, predicts the opposite: that displaced, disfranchised groups would be under-

represented in the census of popular activism. Why? Because people with the meanest grievances to fight about have often the fewest resources to fight with. Hence the political model expects that the core groups in revolutionary politics will be those whose economic basis, social standing, organizational networks, and political connections – including alliances improvised according to the age-old rule that the enemy of my enemy is my friend – endow them with the tactical bargaining power to press their claims in the political arena.

A quick scan of the literature bears this out. Popular movements have been led, staffed, and supported by, not the altogether downtrodden and oppressed segments of society, but groups that, while having plenty to fight for and against, had something to fight with. Reviewing, for example, who trooped out in medieval "peasant risings" (not really risings, most of them, but community self-defense actions that were substantially non-peasant in social composition), fought the *Bauernkrieg,* stormed the Bastille, mobilized the *mouvement sectionnaire* in 1792, threw up the barricades at Lyon in 1834 and Paris in 1848, defended the Commune, and, years later, sustained revolutions from Mexico and Russia to China and Vietnam, suggests that the "revolutionary masses" were hardly the most miserable, desperate, or disadvantaged members of society. Far from being the unstable, disorganized, and "dangerous classes" so dear to political folklore, reactionary and "radical" alike, the "masses" were people of local standing and substance, however modest – small proprietors, mostly, peasant landowners, shopkeepers, artisans, journeymen, and snugly entwined in community networks. Where, with the advance of industrialism, proletarians became a political force, strike movements were spearheaded first by skilled craftsmen and, in the era of monopoly capital, by large-scale organized labor. As for "lumpen" elements, if they took to the streets at all, it was to hop a bandwagon set rolling by the hardworking little people.[142]

Eric Wolf's analysis of rural mobilization in twentieth-century revolutions helps explain why this pattern should prevail. Observing how, "ultimately, the decisive factor in making a peasant rebellion possible lies in the relation of the peasantry to the field of power which surrounds it," Wolf notes that the political prerequisite of collective action is *tactical power.* Before peasants – or anyone else – can attempt rebellion without overwhelming risk, they must occupy a social position that grants them tactical bargaining power – or else acquire such leverage through coalition with outside forces powerful enough to offset their immediate enemies. "Peasants," he writes, "cannot rebel successfully in a situation of complete impotence; the powerless are

easy victims."[143] Proceeding from these insights, Wolf identifies three sets of social conditions that endow a peasant population with tactical leverage. First, control over their own means of production gives "middle" peasants – small landowners and secure tenants farming chiefly with family labor – a margin of economic independence that, in a fight, becomes an important political asset. Second, location in outlying areas often puts "poor but free" cultivators beyond the effective reach of landlord and official coercion. And, finally, in the case of dependent tenants and landless laborers, who to subsist must first come to terms with the lords of property, the necessary counterforce may come from the intervention of outside powers (radical parties or revolutionary armies) that crack apart established domains by superior violence. Likewise, tactical leverage may come from coalitions between peasant communities and interests near the centers of power able to protect local protest with the arm of the state. With this analysis of class power balances in the countryside, Wolf confirms Hamza Alavi's observation – the first of its kind in the recent radical literature – that the very poor peasants who star in so much leftist "theory" as The Revolutionary Class were no such thing and, moreover, that the practical programs (if not the rhetoric) of successful movements show that the leaders knew (or soon learned) this to be the case, regardless of what they later published for public consumption.[144] Rather, it was the phalanx of village proprietors who supplied the first rural allies of radical power challenges in the great revolutions of our century. That these groups were themselves oppressed and threatened by ongoing economic and political trends is obvious – the Russian villagers of 1917 being a good example. However, and this is the point, when oppressed people do manage to launch a revolt, look for special features of social organization and political opportunity that tilt the delicate balance of risk and reward to their immediate advantage. In Russia, the combination of a tight-knit rural community (whose repartition of holdings to equalize tax burdens aligned rich and poor peasants in a general land hunger) and sudden collapse of government power goes a long way toward explaining why a class notoriously oppressed could strike hard on its own behalf.[145]

(3) Which brings us to consider the pathways from arousal to action. The volcanic model, recall, makes two inferential leaps – from social change to mass anger, and from mass anger to collective violence – thereby vaulting the problem of how change stirs up grievances among specific groups, and how said discontent converts into concerted protest. The political model, on the other hand, implies two analytic links to span these gaps: one, an indelible but indirect relation between the economic and political structure of a social setting, the changes it undergoes over time, and the genesis of conflict; two, an organizational and tactical nexus between the advent of grievances and

collective action to repair them. It suggests, in short, a political power analysis of both grievances and opportunities to act upon them. Very briefly:

Changes in the social structure and composition of a human setting, obviously enough, alter the makeup of contending parties (their identity, interests, characteristic grievances) as well as their organizational bases of collective action – hence, too, their tactical bargaining power vis-à-vis other groups. Note how this differs from the neo-Durkheimian wisdom which, reformulated by Samuel P. Huntington, sees revolutions and popular violence as unfortunate concomitants of "modernization" processes that set expectations soaring faster than incumbent governments can coopt, crush, or liquidate the groups that harbor them.[146] For the influence of structural change on political conflict, while huge, is indirect. Large-scale, long-term transformations – broadly, since 1450, the development of capitalism and formation of national states – affect the number, identity, and class composition of groups contending for local and central power, their social bases of solidarity, the tenor and substance of their collective demands. Similarly, changes of society restructure arenas of defiance, transforming both the immediate aims of political struggle and the repertoire of feasible stratagems – an idea Marc Bloch captured perfectly, in a single sentence, when he wrote that the "agrarian revolt is as inseparable from the seigneurial régime as the strike from the great capitalist enterprise."[147] Jeffrey Paige, comparing settings and shapes of *Agrarian Revolution,* sharpens the point further by showing how modes of rural protest conform closely to the modes of production in which they occur. By setting a typology of agrarian structures alongside data on the recurrent kinds of protest actions to which they give rise, Paige reveals a close correspondence between the institutional devices landed upper classes use to pump a surplus out of cultivators and the characteristic forms assumed by lower-class resistance. Each agrarian régime, in short, gets the rebellion it deserves. Moreover, and this is his most interesting and controversial contention, given how the structure of exploitative enterprise endows its contending classes with a distinct set of interests, aims, and power resources, the range of political options is tightly restricted: Try as they might, for instance, radical socialists are unlikely to win a hearing among manorial or hacienda peasants wishing to expel local squires and annex nearby estates. Where, on the other hand, sharecroppers farm small holdings rented from absentee landlords whose property claims stand or fall with a distant government, there is both incentive and opportunity to support movements out to unseat the régime.[148]

Which brings up the organizational link between grievances and the ability to act on them. For individuals are not magically mobilized for action, no matter how aggrieved, hostile, or angry they may feel. Their anger must first be set to

collective ends by the coordinating, directing offices of organization, formal or informal. The habitual association of interested friends may count as organization, as may peasant communities or more modern, "artificial" setups like labor unions or radical parties. The point, in any event, is that there must be some kind of organization on hand to orchestrate discontent and galvanize it into retributive action. Otherwise the "unhappy merely brood passively on the sidelines."[149]

Now the question becomes, How do structural changes of society – by reshaping the organizational means for acting on interests and grievances – affect the tactical power of aggrieved groups? The issue, then, is not only how structural changes after the identity, interests, aims, and options of contending forces, but how they modify their respective bases of solidarity and collective effort, how, in a word, they redistribute social power chances. One senior sociologist, concluding a study of power relations at the apex of the ancien régime, sets the problem up nicely:

> We sometimes try to explain explosive shifts in the social distribution of power . . . in the short term alone, by the events occurring immediately before or during the revolutionary period itself. Often enough, however, such violent outbreaks can be understood only if attention is paid to long-term shifts of power balances in the society concerned which, to be sure, take place in small steps over a long time, so that in retrospect the participants as well as later generations usually perceive only isolated symptoms, but not the long-term change in power distribution as such. The question is why, at a certain moment, this phase of latent, semi-subterranean, and quite gradual transformation in the distribution of social power chances passes over into another in which the transformation of power relations accelerates and power struggles intensify until non-élite strata – hitherto excluded from disposal over the state monopoly – use physical force to attack the incumbent rulers' violence monopoly, which is broadened through the participation of those previously excluded or abolished altogether. In the latter case, this use of physical force to attack the incumbent proprietors of the violence monopoly does not, of course, destroy the central state monopoly of physical violence and taxation as such, even though this destruction may for a time be the goal of the combatants. What happens, usually, is that groups hitherto excluded from control over the central state monopoly either win a share in this control or replace the incumbent monopoly élites with their own representatives. A central problem is . . . [therefore]: Under what circumstances does a long-term power-shift in the framework of a state-society lead to violent attack on the current controllers of the physical violence monopoly?[150]

Several questions leap to mind. One concerns the relative fragility of state power structures – their vulnerability to fragmentation from above and challenge from below. Here Theda Skocpol, following up Barrington Moore's pioneering labors, has discerned certain similarities in the political architecture of the old régimes in France, Russia, and China – like Moore, she styles them "agrarian bureaucracies" – and their propensity to collapse into revolutionary situations. More than that, Skocpol argues a connection between the power structure of the old régime in each case, its pattern of collapse, and the options to befall contending parties once the roof fell in.[151] This is a valuable insight, to be sure, but it requires two sorts of supplement: a careful trace of the various pathways to multiple sovereignty – in particular, the intricate rivalries, maneuvers, and realignments of governing groups whose failed consensus opened the door the revolutionaries ran through;[152] and systematic analysis of the power struggles that intercede between the crackup of the old and establishment of a new régime. Doubtless enlightened by sociological scrutiny, these political processes do not submit to sociological reduction. There remain, as Richard Cobb writes in another well-aimed one-liner, "several principal problems to the mystery of the breakdown of government – for it is a mystery – and of that very, very fine line that separates a sedition from a revolutionary crisis."[153] Here is where political sociology rejoins political history: to sort out the social bases of contending forces and anatomize the structure of power requires sharp-eyed sociology; to see what political capital the contenders actually make of the resources and opportunities they have, however, requires good analytic history. All the rules of chess and points of strategy cannot predict the course of a game. Why should it be different with the more complex competition of revolutions?

It is difficult, and perhaps not altogether fitting, to try and append an uplifting conclusion to an essay, the dramatic drift of which has been generally downhill. If these considerations point to any conclusion at all, it is that there is no pat formula for explaining revolutions. Still, a few pointers for making sense of specific cases have been mentioned and may be quickly summed up: Revolutions, like collective violence generally, being the offspring of political contests, must be analyzed accordingly. A logical first step, therefore, is a political demarcation of the *explicandum,* revolution, as an open-ended revolutionary situation – thus avoiding the pitfalls of conventional definitions that short-circuit history, yoking outcomes to intentions in an ersatz totality, The Revolution, which unfolds toward an end state inherent in its "project." (In practice, the latter tack means reducing revolutionary history to what winners – or martyred saints to later winners – say about what they did.) The next step is abandoning the volcanic model and its false image of revolution as the eruption of intolerable injury into raging violence. This hand-to-hand struggle,

fought out in Part III, need not be rehearsed. Once the volcanic model is out of the way, several points about grievances and opportunities to redress them come into view: (1) instead of generalized frustration as a cause of political irritation, look to the nexus of established rights and obligations in which groups of ordinary people are embedded and which, once violated, make for grievances; (2) note too, with regard to opportunities, the tactical power resources available to aggrieved groups – their economic basis, community organization, political connections with outside allies, and (most important) fissures in the power structure that open from above. The combined result is (3) a focus on the social distribution of power chances, on tactical coalitions between sets of aggrieved challengers, and on the "fortuitous" occurrence of top-level power struggles that, without warning, open the political arena to popular intervention. Thus confirmed is Plato's lasting insight that no revolution happens without there first appearing cleavages among the incumbent power élite. Here, again, is a real role for sociologically informed political history, to appreciate the intricate turnabouts that make all the difference between the coming of a revolutionary situation and the persistence of the status quo.

NOTES

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Bemerkungen über Frazers 'The Golden Bough,'" *Synthese* 17 (1967), p. 234. I am indebted to Anton Blok for calling this piece to my attention and underscoring its methodological interest.
2. Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics* 18 (1966), pp. 159–76, revised and expanded to form the first chapter of *The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529–1642* (New York, 1972).
3. To mention only the most important recent studies in English comparing revolutions: Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966); Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1969); Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975); Jeffery M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution* (New York, 1975); Theda Skocpol, "France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 18 (1976), pp. 175–210. Single case studies, largely innocent of formal theory or explicit comparison, yet written with wit and imagination that illuminate other examples well removed in time and space, include John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (Harmondsworth, 1972); Richard Cobb, *The Police and the People* (Oxford, 1970); Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); and Roy M. Hofheinz, Jr., *The Broken Wave* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
4. The most sustained example is Lawrence Stone, "The English Revolution," in *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe,* ed. Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene (Baltimore, 1970), later expanded to form the core of *Causes of the English Revolution.* Stone's "theoretical framework" is borrowed from Chalmers Johnson (see below) but, happily, the defects of that theory do not injure his excellent history. Another example, making use of a general theory

not inventoried in Stone's review, is Robert A. White, S. J., "Mexico: The Zapata Movement and the Revolution," in *Latin American Peasant Movements,* ed. Henry A. Landsberger (Ithaca, 1969). Father White's narrative is subdivided by topical headings taken from the work of Neil Smelser (see below).

5. E.g., Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency," in *National Liberation,* ed. Norman Miller and Roderick Aya (New York, 1971); Mark Selden, "People's War and the Transformation of Peasant Society: China and Vietnam," in *America's Asia,* ed. Edward Friedman and Mark Selden (New York, 1971); Andrew Mack, "Sharpening the Contradictions: Guerrilla Strategy in Imperialist Wars," *Race and Class* 17 (1975), pp. 161–78, which enlarges upon *idem,* "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27 (1975), pp. 175–200; and Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An* (Berkeley, 1972).
6. Stone, *Causes of the English Revolution,* p. 22.
7. Here I use "cause" in the ordinary language sense of a "determinate and discoverable connection between two or more facts." Barrington Moore, Jr., *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them* (Boston, 1972), p. 6 n.
8. Peter A. Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories Versus Indignation," *Politics and Society* 2 (1971), pp. 89–104. Lupsha shows that the commonplace notion of "indignation" makes more sense of what motivates collective violence than do the psychological concepts recently in vogue. He does not, however, indicate the social and political conditions of any setting that facilitate or stifle efforts to act upon grievances that arouse indignation.
9. This homey but helpful analogy is taken from Charles Tilly, "Town and Country in Revolution," in *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia,* ed. John Wilson Lewis (Stanford 1974), p. 302.
10. Eric R. Wolf, "Peasant Rebellion and Revolution," in Miller and Aya, *National Liberation,* p. 54.
11. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Violence in America* (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 572.
12. "It goes without saying," writes Walter Laqueur, "that at the bottom of every protest movement there is a feeling of grievance. But this is no more than stating the obvious; there is no accounting for the fact that at one time a major grievance may be fatalistically accepted whereas elsewhere (or at another time) a minor grievance may provoke the most violent reaction." "Coming to Terms with Terror," *Times Literary Supplement,* 2 April 1976, p. 363. By "minor grievance" Laqueur means the Palestinian displacement; but his point is valid, although he spoils it with a non sequitur: "It is not the grievance per se that matters but the perception of the grievance." – Which only turns the tautology back a notch by evading the question, How does militant perception of a grievance induce collective action to repair it?
13. To cite only the most notorious example: "Overt opposition was inhibited by German terror, and the meager record testifies not to passivity, but to a healthy recognition by the Jewish parties of the real deployment of power in the ghettos . . . . Civil disobedience as a strategy of political opposition can succeed only with a government ruled by conscience. In 1938, after Kristallnacht, when Gandhi advised the Jews in Germany to employ *Satyagraha,* . . . he disclosed his inability to distinguish between English and German political morality. The Jews in Poland . . . made no such miscalculation . . . . Most Jews feared that worse would come from such audacious Jewish acts of resistance in those circumstances . . . . Although the parties could claim to speak for the people by articulating their feelings, they could not always claim to act for them, simply because terror

repressed the will to resist." Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The War against the Jews, 1933–45* (Harmondsworth, 1977), pp. 334–35. For details on the political and organizational shifts inside the Warsaw ghetto before the rising of April-May 1943, which made it the exception that proves the rule, see *ibid.*, pp. 399–408.

19. Richard Cobb, *A Second Identity* (London, 1969), pp. 17–18, *et passim.* Despite his outspoken antipathy to theory and systematic comparison – and, it must be admitted, at times also because of it – Cobb's writings are packed with luminous insights of passionate interest to the student of comparative revolutions.

15. One key passage reads: "The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing 'absolute' about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 'given' base, and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being." Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery,* rev. ed. (London, 1972), p. 111.

16. *Ibid.,* p. 107 n. (Popper's emphasis). "Our observational experiences," he adds, "are never beyond being tested; they are impregnated with theories" (p. 111). Moreover, it "is through our theories that we learn to observe, that is to say, *to ask questions* which lead to observations and to their interpretations." *Idem, Conjectures and Refutations,* 5th ed. (London, 1974), pp. 247–48 (his emphasis). "How odd it is," wrote Darwin, "that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service." Quoted by P. B. Medawar, *Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought* (London, 1969), p. 11 n.

17. Paul K. Feyerabend, *Against Method* (London, 1975), p. 75. Exhilarating reading.

18. Christopher Lasch, "The Family and History," *New York Review of Books,* 13 November 1975, p. 36. "But I should go even further," writes Popper, "and accuse at least some professional historians of 'scientism': of trying to copy the method of natural science, *not as it actually is,* but as it is wrongly alleged to be. This alleged but non-existent method is that of collecting observations and then 'drawing conclusions' from them. It is slavishly aped by some historians who believe that they can collect documentary evidence which, corresponding to the observations of natural science, forms the 'empirical basis' for their conclusions." *Objective Knowledge* (Oxford, 1972), p. 186 (his emphasis).

19. The reader should be forewarned of two large omissions: First, this paper does not review the body of argument against which these general theories (like so much of modern social science) were tacitly written: Marxism. Marx's underdeveloped ideas on state and revolution and their role in later "Marxist" theory and practice require separate treatment, which perforce must consider the superlative exposition by Hal Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution* (New York, 1977). Second, I make no effort to examine the literature as a whole. For a recent conspectus – including the obligatory burlesque of Marx – see A. S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution* (London, 1975). Excessively benign, this book does illumine major flaws in the literature with an occasional glimmer of critical insight. There are, in addition, several studies of recent vintage that scrutinize aspects of the prevailing wisdom: Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence"; Isaac Kramnick, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," *History and Theory* 11 (1972), pp. 26–63; Michael Freeman, "Review Article: Theories of Revolution," *British Journal of Political Science* 2 (1972), pp. 339–59; Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography," *Political Science Quarterly* 88 (1973), pp. 23–52; Ted Robert Gurr, "The Revolution-Social-Change Nexus: Some Old Theories and New Hypotheses," *Comparative Politics* 5 (1973), pp. 359–92; Diana E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force* (New York, 1974), esp.

pp. 1–15, 42–55; Barbara Salert, *Revolutions and Revolutionaries* (New York, 1976); and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of a Social-Structural Approach," in *The Uses of Controversy in Sociology*, ed. Lewis A. Coser and Otto N. Larsen (New York, 1976). Of these, Freeman, Russell, and Skocpol are closest to the present effort: Freeman for his observation that the major works of general theory (he reviews Smelser, Johnson, and Gurr) are "at too many crucial points vague, muddled, and trivial or even tautological" (p. 356); Russell for her stress on organized coercion and armed force as key political variables affecting the possibility, course, and outcome of revolutionary situations; and Skocpol for several points of criticism, two of which stand out: one, her correct judgment that theories purporting to account for revolutions in terms of "dysfunctions" in the "social system" wind up proposing social-psychological explanations of "deviant" political behavior which explain neither revolutions nor anything else (pp. 161–65); and, two, her emphasis on the specific political sequences leading up to revolutionary situations – which, more often than not, have come about as the unintended, unforeseen consequences of struggles for state power between established contenders (pp. 170–71). Theories of revolution are led astray, she argues, by the assumption that what matters most is the emergence of ideological groups intending to overthrow the "existing political or social order." By neglecting to place the state and contention for control over it at the center of analysis, even theories ostensibly designed to explain revolutions by changes of social structure fall back on "feelings and consciousness – of dissatisfactions and of fundamentally oppositional goals and values – as the central problematic issue in the explanation of revolutions" (pp. 168–69). The burden of her essay (like this one) is to show why this line of argument begs the question. Skocpol is, however, more generous in her estimate of discarded theories as well as more critical (wrongly, I think) of the political-process scheme sketched by Charles Tilly (pp. 165–68).

20. Cf. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (Harmondsworth, 1970), p. 43.
21. Christopher Lasch, "Epilogue," in *The New American Revolution,* ed. Roderick Aya and Norman Miller (New York, 1971), p. 319.
22. "In no case was an actual revolution against constituted authority launched; fascist tactics were invariably those of a sham rebellion arranged with the tacit approval of the authorities who pretended to have been overwhelmed by force." Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1957), p. 238. "Nazi propaganda later built up a legend which represented Hitler's coming to power as the upsurge of a great national revival. The truth is more prosaic. Despite the mass support he had won, Hitler came to office in 1933 as the result, not of any irresistible revolutionary or national movement sweeping him into power, nor even of a popular victory at the polls, but as part of a shoddy political deal with the 'Old Gang' whom he had been attacking for months past. Hitler did not seize power; he was jobbed into office by a backstairs intrigue." Alan Bullock, *Hitler,* rev. ed. (New York, 1962), p. 253. These observations, general and specific, make clear that no fascist party or movement gained power from victory in an open revolutionary situation. The single seeming exception, Franco, bent the genuine fascists to his own purposes, not the other way around. Cf. Stanley G. Payne, *Falange* (Stanford, 1961), *passim.*
23. This is a central theme developed by Eric R. Wolf in "Peasant Rebellion and Revolution" and *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century.* The converse, politically speaking, is also true: should they strike an alliance with coalition partners of another hue, anticapitalist rural rebellions can have counterrevolutionary consequences, in the sense of boosting reactionary projects. The most searching case study of this phenomenon is Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).
24. Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution;* Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century,* ch. 1.

25. "The key question of every revolution is undoubtedly the question of state power. Which class holds power decides everything." V. I. Lenin, *One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution, Collected Works* (Moscow, 1962), vol. 25, p. 366. The present discussion proceeds from two other assumptions: one, that classes rarely form solidary units of political action in or against the state (even the most monolithic of oligarchies witness factional conflicts); two, that as a consequence, political action groups – especially those that achieve or aspire to state power – are usually cross-class coalitions, like the Bolshevik Party.
26. Being an élite affair, the English Revolution would appear exceptional in this regard, though there is strong evidence of political stirrings among subaltern classes during the Civil War. Cf. C. S. L. Davies, "Les révoltes populaires en Angleterre (1500–1700)," *Annales; E. S. C.* 24 (1969), pp. 24–60; and Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (New York, 1972). For general observations on the interplay of high politics and popular action in some Great Revolutions, see Skocpol, "France, Russia, China," *passim.* Curiously, Skocpol ("Explaining Revolutions," pp. 166–68) accuses Tilly of failing to see that revolutions usually commence with infights in the governing class which, as they ramify downwards, open fissures in the power structure enabling popular movements to take action – when, in fact, it is one of the best insights his scheme affords (cf. note 28 *infra*). Womack's *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution,* perhaps the clearest (and certainly the most dramatic) study of this political pattern, can be read as an extended empirical test and confirmation of Tilly's central tenets: reading one enhances understanding of the other. In any event, the general point is ancient wisdom, dating back to Plato's *Republic* 465B, 545D, and restated many times since, notably by Rousseau and Pareto. On the social setting of Plato's politics, see Alvin W. Gouldner, *Enter Plato* (New York, 1965), and Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies,* 5th ed. (London, 1966), vol. 1, where it is noted that Plato drew from this insight the conclusion that his "best state was therefore to be reconstructed in such a way as to eliminate all the germs and elements of disunion and decay as radically as this could be done . . . with an eye to the conditions necessary for the unbroken unity of the master class, guaranteed by its economic abstinence, its breeding, and its training" (p. 55). That is, the "whole problem of preserving the state is reduced to that of preserving the internal unity of the master class . . . by training and other psychological influences, but otherwise mainly by the elimination of economic interests which may lead to disunion" (p. 48). It is the great good fortune of the human race that no ruling class has ever managed to muster the austerity needed to achieve Plato's stable-state totalitarianism.
27. The best general analysis of this process in anti-imperialist wars is still Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency."
28. Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (London, 1977), pp. 223–32; Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in *Handbook of Political Science,* ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass., 1975), vol. 3, pp. 483–555. Professor Tilly, from whom I take the above distinction between "retrospective" and "prospective" analysis and whose brilliant essay occasioned the present study, reminds me that Peter Amann deserves credit for rehabilitating Trotsky's model in "Revolution: A Redefinition," *Political Science Quarterly* 77 (1962), pp. 36–53.
29. To wit: "Any definition that would call both the victory of George Washington and the victory of Francisco Franco by the same name is bound to confuse more than define." Herbert Aptheker, as quoted (approvingly, alas) by W. F. Wertheim, *Evolution and Revolution* (Harmondsworth, 1974), p. 124. While the political outcomes of the American Revolution and Spanish Civil War were indeed hugely different, Aptheker's denial that a revolution occurred in Spain between 1936

and 1939 – because conservative Nationalists (with extensive outside help) defeated the incumbent Republican government – seems tendentious and silly. Nevertheless, it is interesting that orthodox communists and liberals alike should concur in pretending that the Spanish Civil War saw no real revolutionary situation. Cf. Burnett Bolloten, *The Grand Camouflage,* 2nd ed. (New York, 1968), and Noam Chomsky, "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship," in *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York, 1969). From the *prospective* standpoint of multiple sovereignty, on the other hand, the revolutionary implications of Franco's misfired *coup* of July 1936 are clear enough. For in "the next few days half Spain was reconquered from the insurgents. Neither the anarchists nor the socialists took Government office. But they alone retained real power in their respective strongholds, and exerted it through the defense committees created in the days of street-fighting." Thus the "rising of the generals had achieved what the socialists and anarchists themselves would never have achieved: in half Spain and in six of its seven largest towns it played power into the hands of the revolutionary proletariat." Franz Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit* (Ann Arbor, 1963), p. 63.

30. Cf. Moore, *Social Origins,* p. 427.
31. Two examples, from the Russian and French revolutions, may illustrate. Despite their doctrinaire comportment, the Bolsheviks were caught with their programmatic pants down on grabbing power in 1917. As Marxist socialists, they wanted to transform society, to "build socialism." But their key tenets – workers' control, nationalization of land, banks, and industry, planning, and so on – were vague and variously interpreted, even inside the Party itself. Lenin's initial policy was "state capitalism," a conciliatory halfway house that collapsed when the combined crises of Civil War and food supply forced an emergency shift to War Communism. As the infant Party-state fought for survival, War Communism quickly acquired high programmatic significance in the Bolshevik mind's eye, though the measures taken had not been anticipated by Bolshevik theory as of October 1917. Far from being a doctrinal fulfillment, in other words, War Communism made an ideological virtue of military and political necessity. See Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New York, 1973), pp. 53–57, 78–79, and his follow-up essay, "Bolshevism and Stalinism," in *Stalinism,* ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York, 1977), esp. pp. 20–21. The French Revolution presents another variation on the same theme. Recounting political developments leading from the Estates General to the Terror, Norman Hampson observes that with few individual exceptions the deputies to the Convention of 1793–94 "aspired to much the same sort of society as those of the Third Estate in 1789," and that no "new social conscience" arose after 1792 under the stimulus of the "*sans-culotte* presence." Rather, what happened was that the intervening years of political conflict had "affected their tactics rather than their principles." *A Social History of the French Revolution* (London, 1963), pp. 63–64.
32. These instances are commonly swept under the definitional rug as mere "rebellions." Though there is little harm in calling ephemeral ruptures of government sovereignty "rebellions" if they do not reach beyond local and regional arenas, it is worth noting that the bloodiest conflict of the last century – perhaps of world history before 1914 – is usually referred to as the Taiping "Rebellion," doubtless because the insurgents were defeated. The "rebellion" is guesstimated to have cost as many as twenty million lives, though trustworthy figures do not exist. Cf. Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 236–48. In the definitional terms proposed herein, of course, the "rebellion" was a revolutionary situation: see the standard military and political histories by Franz Michael *et al., The Taiping Rebellion,* 3 vols. (Seattle, 1966–71), and Jen Yu-wen, *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement* (New Haven, 1973). A more

concise, well-focused, analytic account giving due attention to facts of social structure is Albert Feuerwerker, *Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century China,* Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, no. 21 (Ann Arbor, 1975).

33. On this, see the acute observations of Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," *American Political Science Review* 59 (1965), pp. 964–74.
34. The emergence and suppression of popular radicalism in the English Revolution is described by Hill, *World Turned Upside Down,* and Brian Manning, *The English People and the English Revolution* (London, 1976). Mass popular movements were much stronger in France and saw action repeatedly in the peak years of the Revolution between 1789 and 1794; but their fortunes were mortgaged to the good favor of governing groups, who on several occasions had reasons of their own to encourage mass militancy. Once deprived of official sanction, the popular movement fell easy prey to its natural enemies. Richard Cobb explains: "If, for a very short period, the *sans-culottes,* taken together, represented a national force, it was because the Jacobins needed such a force for their own purposes. The true isolation of the *sans-culottes* is demonstrated in the conditions of the year III, when, far from enjoying the support of the governing class, they were actively persecuted by the Thermidorians. The *sans-culottes* were then revealed as completely powerless and also very unpopular." *Police and the People,* p. 335 n.
35. The two greatest Latin American revolutions provide clear examples. See Judith Adler Hellman, *Mexico in Crisis* (New York, 1978), and James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution,* rev. ed. (Berkeley, 1970), who notes that "theory of revolutions is often based on the violent stages of governmental change, the assumption being that if social change is to occur it will take place concomitantly with political upheaval," whereas the "real revolution in Mexican society came about mainly in times of political stability since 1940" (p. 283). In Cuba, the socialist program of the winners was defined after their accession to power, and by a ruling group that had no such ambitions beforehand. Cf. James O'Connor, *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba* (Ithaca, 1970).
36. For one such attempt see Wertheim, *Evolution and Revolution,* p. 127.
37. Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," *History and Theory* 4 (1965), pp. 133–63. Eckstein's conception of "internal war" marks no distinction between revolutionary situations and anti-governmental violence as such.
38. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968), p. 264.
39. Consider, as two obvious examples, the Industrial Revolution in England, Europe, and North America and Stalin's industralization of Soviet Russia via "revolution from above." Cf. note 35 *supra.*
40. *Loc. cit.*
41. *Ibid.,* p. 344. This is not to disparage the revolutions at hand, only to question the criteria for grouping them together.
42. Huntington's list of "great revolutions" includes France, China, Russia, Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Cuba, Vietnam, and Algeria (*ibid.,* p. 275). For discussion of the two most dubious cases, see Andrew Pearse, "Peasants and Revolution: The Case of Bolivia," *Economy and Society* 1 (1972), pp. 255–80, 399–424, and Robert Wasserstrom, "Revolution in Guatemala: Peasants and Politics Under the Arbenz Government," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17 (1975), pp. 443–78.
43. Huntington, *Political Order,* p. 266.
44. This simple point would not merit mention but for the ideological subterfuge surrounding modern revolutions since 1789 and, especially, 1917. Apologists and antagonists alike impute everything to the genius or malevolence of leadership. Hence it is worth remembering that "most, if not all, revolutions have produced

societies very different from those desired by the revolutionaries." Karl R. Popper, "Reason or Revolution?" in Theodor W. Adorno *et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (New York, 1976), p. 298. For more on the historical clash between the designs of radical activists who accede to power and the social structures with which they must deal, see Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions," cited in note 33 *supra.* Cohen, "Bolshevism and Stalinism," brings the contradiction out clearly for the Soviet case.

45. Moore does this to good effect in *Social Origins,* pp. 427–29. Skocpol, "France, Russia, China," explicitly organized around Huntington's definition of great or "social" revolutions, suffers only slightly from its ambiguities and scores an important point about state power structures as the key variable in the revolutionary equation.

46. Two lines of connection seem clear in this regard. One, revolutions affect the nature and direction of structural change to the extent that they bring an effective transfer of power; the larger the transfer of power, the better the prospects for enforced transformation, at least over the long run. One reason why military coups seldom see serious changes is that they entail only minor reshuffles of limited sets of contenders. The apparent exceptions – "white" revolutions from above like those in Germany, Japan, and Turkey – ordinarily involve a reformist segment of the ruling elite that excludes its class brethren from access to power and forms coalitions with groups previously debarred from the polity. Two, the capacity of new rulers to bring radical renovation depends heavily on the degree to which state power is already strong and concentrated – or can be made that way in the course of fighting. That is, the accrued power of the state seems more important in affecting the likelihood of subsequent change than is the level of mobilization in the revolutionary situation itself. Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," pp. 539–40.

47. Cf. Moore, *Social Origins,* p. 221, and Ronald Waterbury, "Non-revolutionary Peasants: Oaxaca Compared to Morelos in the Mexican Revolution," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17 (1975), pp. 410–42. The converse, of course, may also be true: similar social structures may or may not "produce" revolution against their chief beneficiaries, depending on the nature and timing of intervention by extralocal political forces. But this, the question of weaker groups gaining the needed tactical leverage to revolt via coalitation with outside forces better armed and organized then themselves, takes us to one aspect of the political model, discussed at greater length below. Hofheinz, *Broken Wave,* makes the connection clearly for the early years of Chinese Communism in the countryside.

48. In the succinct paraphrase of Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History* (New York, 1969), p. 134.

49. This caricature is spliced together from four handy sources: Emile Durkheim, *Suicide* (New York, 1951), esp. p. 253; Neil J. Smelser, "Toward a Theory of Modernization," in *Essays in Sociological Explanation* (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), p. 141; Talcott Parsons, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany," in *Essays in Sociological Theory,* rev. ed. (New York, 1954), p. 117; and Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium,* 3rd ed.(London, 1970), pp. 53–60. These notes on Durkheimian parentage of the volcanic model borrow heavily from Charles Tilly, "The Uselessness of Durkheim in the Historical Study of Social Change," CRSO Working Paper no. 155, Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

50. The preceding two paragraphs are taken freely (with changes) from Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," pp. 487–88. Elsewhere Tilly has termed this complex of ideas the "hydraulic model": "Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe,* ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, 1975), pp. 390–92. But because writers in this vein resort most often to pyrotechnic imagery, the volcanic appellation seems most apt.

51. These characteristic features emerge clearly from Ted Gurr's own account of the assumptions behind both the "social-psychological" and "social-structural" variants of the volcanic model. The social-psychological theorists (Davies, the Feierabends, Gurr himself) all "begin with the seemingly self-evident premise that discontent is the root cause of violent conflict," Gurr's version being that the "potential for collective violence in a nation or smaller community varies with the intensity and scope of socially induced discontent among its members." This idea, he explains, is "essentially a generalization of the frustration-aggression principle from the individual to the social level." Moreover, "all these empirical theories elaborate on essentially the same basic premise by specifying what kinds of social conditions and processes of change increase social discontent to the threshold of violent conflict." The social-structural theories (of Smelser and Johnson), on the other hand, "differ in emphasis rather than in kind from the social-psychological theories," sharing with them the supposition that "some fundamental social dislocation, variously called 'strain' or 'dysfunction,' is the necessary precondition for revolutionary conflict." But whereas the social-psychological theories begin with "aggregate psychological states," working "backward" to their "social determinants" and "forward" to their "consequences," social-structural theories jump from "specified kinds of social change directly to their violent outcomes without substantial reference to any intervening psychological variables." (*Pace* Gurr, this difference seems more verbal than real, as both versions of volcanic theory explain violent politics as the cathartic eruption of truculent emotions or "states of mind" aroused by discomfiting social changes.) A final similarity, Gurr avers, is their "analogous conceptualization of conditions that intervene between the psychological or social preconditions and the actual occurrence of violent conflict"; that is, they each "specify some aspects of government or institutional arrangements generally that facilitate or deflect the underlying impetus to violence." Gurr, "Revolution-Social-Change Nexus," pp. 364–65, 368. As indicated below, this "conceptualization" of intervening political conditions is no analysis at all, but merely an escape clause on the logical order of: People revolt when they are discontented by social circumstances described in the several theories – except, of course, when they don't.
52. James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America,* p. 690; also *idem,* "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in *When Men Revolt and Why,* ed. James Chowning Davies (New York, 1971).
53. "J-Curve," pp. 690, 691.
54. *Ibid.,* p. 694. Since Davies is reputed to have accomplished a clever synthesis, reconciliation, and improvement of Marx and Tocqueville – who, he maintains, believed revolutions to stem from, respectively, increasing misery and growing prosperity – it is worth noting that this is a travesty of either author's ideas. Readers who give *Capital* or *The Old Régime and the French Revolution* the care they demand and deserve will nowhere find textual evidence that Marx or Tocqueville ever endorsed such simple-minded notions of revolutionary causation. Nevertheless, people who ought to know better (e.g., Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution," p. 42, and Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence," p. 93) continue to credit Davies with the *Aufhebung* of these classics, however critical they remain on other scores.
55. James Rule and Charles Tilly, "Political Process in Revolutionary France, 1830–1832," in *1830 in France,* ed. John M. Merriman (New York, 1975), p. 49. My discussion of Davies and the J-curve borrows heavily from this excellent essay.
56. Curiously, these defects escape the notice even of the sagacious Lawrence Stone, who says the "Davies model fits the history of Western Europe quite well" (!), and even recommends it as an "analytic tool that historians can usefully bear in

mind as they probe the violent social upheavals of the past." *Causes of the English Revolution,* p. 16. Stone's good ecumenical intentions notwithstanding, these remarks betray one of the most depleting consequences of historians' studied aversion to theory: namely, their susceptibility to the charades of crackpot sociology when the need is felt to discern an explanatory forest in the trees of research.

57. Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty K. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America.* Because of the widespread acclaim accorded the Feierabends and their work, we may forego consideration of other attempts to confirm similar propositions about the genesis of revolutions and collective violence with cross-national quantitative data. The reader wishing a comprehensive (if uncritical) survey of that imposing literature may consult Ted Robert Gurr, "The Calculus of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Social Issues* 28 (1972), pp. 27–47. Lest there be the slightest doubt about their reputation as top-notch number-crunchers, the Feierabends were awarded the American Association for the Advancement of Science's 1966 Socio-Psychological prize for research in the behavioral sciences. James C. Davies himself sings paeans of praise for their efforts in *When Men Revolt and Why,* pp. 228–29.
58. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," pp. 653, 671.
59. *Ibid.,* p. 635.
60. Mainland China, for example, is classified as "traditional"; Japan as "transitional" (but stable); and the United States, of course, as both modern and stable (*ibid.,* pp. 655–56). These classifications derive from a statistical definition of modernity in terms of "GNP per capita, caloric intake, telephones, physicians, newspapers, radios, literacy, and urbanization" (p. 654). That these criteria tell nothing at all about class structure or power relations in the state is painfully obvious: "Add together all the indices of modernization commonly used by American scholars – not only high per capita income and high growth rate but also high literacy, high media consumption, highly developed transportation and communication networks, high use of nonhuman energy harnessed to technology, high degree of national consensus, high degree of law and order, highly efficient bureaucracy, at least one political party connecting ruler and ruled in common public purpose – and no country in Western Europe in the late thirties would have ranked higher . . . than Nazi Germany." Manfred Halpern, "A Redefinition of Revolutionary Situation," in Miller and Aya, *National Liberation,* p. 17.
61. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Viiolence," pp. 655–56. Comment would be superfluous. For examples of similar theoretical prescience, featuring the assertion that Pakistan is one of those "traditional societies" having "strikingly low rates of violence compared to the rest," while Ethiopia and Somalia typify those "very underdeveloped countries whose elites have remained tied closely to the traditional ways and structures of life" and where, consequently, "internal wars have been relatively rare," see Eckstein, "Etiology of Internal Wars," p. 147.
62. "For it is a truth of statistics that, while a significant correlation between two sets of items entitles us to infer some causal connection between members of the one set and members of the other, there is an infinite set of possible causal linkages between the two; and no evidence is provided by the correlation alone as to which one out of this infinite set is in fact *the* causal link." Alasdair MacIntyre, "Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution," *Comparative Politics* 5 (1973), p. 335. For a sharp critique of this tendency in quantitative international relations research to substitute statistical correlations for explanations, see Andrew Mack, "Numbers Are Not Enough: A Critique of Internal/External Con-

flict Behavior Research," *ibid.* 7 (1975), pp. 597–618, esp. p. 612. In a candid piece of scholarly self-criticism, Ted Robert Gurr and Raymond Duvall point out that a similar unexplained leap – from "social conditions and patterns of change which, *by inference,* generated varying degrees of RD" (relative deprivation) – was the methodological Achilles' heel of Gurr's well-known theory of civil violence as the result of relative deprivation (see below). "The methodological leap of faith," they admit, "was very hard to justify." Ted Robert Gurr and Raymond Duvall, "Civil Conflict in the 1960s: A Reciprocal Theoretical System with Parameter Estimates," *Comparative Political Studies* 6 (1973), p. 138 (emphasis added). *Conceptual,* as opposed to methodological, problems with this line of thought, including the additional and similarly unwarranted leap of faith from supposed states of frustration or relative deprivation to outbreaks of political violence, are discussed below.

63. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," p. 633.
64. *Ibid.,* pp. 633–34.
65. As it did, for example, among Soviet citizens and Party officials arrested en masse and transported to concentration camps during the Stalinist terror. See Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge* (New York, 1972), esp. pp. 402–3.
66. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," p. 634.
67. *Ibid.,* 640. Not surprisingly, their main empirical find is that the "most detrimental combination of factors" is a rapid expansion of primary education within the confines of a stagnant economy, such that (by their general theory) people's consciousness and expectations rise while opportunities for attainment hold steady or contract (pp. 666–68, 680 n. 33). Ted Gurr, on the other hand, using similar procedures, comes to the opposite conclusion, though his own explanation is couched in the same grammar of motives: education gives ambitious people the sense that they have the personal wherewithal to satisfy their expectations. See "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in Graham and Gurr, *Violence in America,* p. 599. Neither Gurr nor the Feierabends provide a coherent account of how satisfaction or frustration allegedly produced by educational experience leads to political quiescence or militancy.
68. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," pp. 681–83. This is a serious omission, and it does not require the elaborate apparatus of computerized number-crunching to recognize with Gurr and Duvall that "past conflict is generally the strongest determinant of stresses leading to current conflict." "Civil Conflict in the 1960s," p. 155. Perversely enough, however, Gurr and Duvall "opt . . .. for treating past conflict as exogenous" – a decision, they concede, that "might have introduced some inconsistency into our system" (p. 168 n. 9). A curious procedure indeed, but typical of a research strategy whose sense of reality is defined by the exigencies of convenient quantification.
69. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," pp. 634–37. In a later article elaborating the same general theory, the Feierabends do in fact say that political stability can persist despite "systemic frustration" if any of six "qualifying conditions" obtain: no politically effective groups exist that are able to organize revolution; the government is well-endowed and wise enough to improvise reforms that take the wind out of revolutionary sails; the government defends itself with ruthless coercion; the régime is legitimate; aggression is displaced to minority groups or foreign nations; individual acts of aggression are "sufficiently abundant to provide an outlet." Otherwise, in the "relative absence of similar qualifying conditions, . . . aggressive behavior in the form of political instability and violence is likely to occur as a consequence of

systemic frustration." Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "The Comparative Study of Revolution and Violence," *Comparative Politics* 5 (1973), p. 408. A moment's reflection makes clear that most of these "qualifying conditions" are squarely political variables of the kind the general theory declines to consider systematically; and that, for the rest, they comprise highly elastic ad hoc escape clauses which, to the extent they can be stretched to cover any observed anomaly, nullify the independent explanatory power of "systemic frustration." Cf. note 51 *supra.*

70. Their residual categories of "political development" and régime "coerciveness" bear directly on the problem of mobilization for collective action, if only to indicate the probable penalties facing those who would combine to press claims against ruling groups. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence," pp. 659–63. The specific political means by which grievances – and here again "systemic frustration" is just a psychologistic way of saying that certain people are aggrieved – are converted into concerted action remain undisclosed.
71. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, 1970), p. 24.
72. If this seems like a tendentious caricature, the reader should compare the wording of *idem,* "Comparative Study of Civil Strife," p. 596.
73. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* pp. 11, 24, 360.
74. Gurr defines "civil strife" as "all nongovernmental attacks on persons or property that occur within a political system," not including "individual crimes." "Comparative Study of Civil Strife," p. 573. He adds by way of explanation that the "violence used by regimes to maintain social control is not included as an aspect of civil strife because we are concerned with the extent to which ordinary citizens, not officials, resort to force. Regime coercion and violence can be both a cause and a response to civil strife, and for the purposes of this study is analyzed in those terms, not as an integral part of strife" (*ibid.,* p. 574). "Actually," notes Charles Tilly, "a good deal of action of this variety slips into Gurr's analysis disguised as the work of 'dissidents.' For – contrary to the image of Dissidents lashing out at Regimes – the great bulk of killing and wounding in the course of modern collective violence is done by troops, police, and other specialized repressive forces." "Revolutions and Collective Violence," p. 495.
75. *Ibid.*
76. On this point, see *ibid.,* pp. 493–94.
77. Gurr and Duvall, "Civil Conflict in the 1960s," pp. 138, 139–40.
78. Mills, *Sociological Imagination,* p. 52; Alvin W. Gouldner, "Some Observations on Systematic Theory, 1945–1955," in *For Sociology* (New York, 1973), p. 182.
79. Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York, 1962), p. 313.
80. Cf. Rule and Tilly, "Political Process in Revolutionary France," pp. 51–53.
81. Neil J. Smelser, "Two Critics in Search of Bias: A Reponse to Currie and Skolnick," *The Annals* 391 (1970), pp. 51, 54.
82. The archetype of Johnson's theory is Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York, 1951), pp. 520–35. Concerning the conceptual status of the "social system," Johnson has moved from nominalism to reification. In an earlier essay, *Revolution and the Social System* (Stanford, 1964), Johnson takes the social system in homeostatic equilibrium to be a theoretical fiction which, like the famous frictionless pulley of elementary physics, serves as an ideal type against which the facts of experience may be compared and measured (p. 4). More recently, however, in his popular textbook on *Revolutionary Change* (Boston, 1966), Johnson insists that the Parsonian "model of the social system presented in this book" – and to his enduring credit, Johnson provides the lightest, least painful introduction to structural-functionalism available – ". . . is offered on its merits, not simply as a 'heuristic device'"; and, further, that as a "scholar trained in the political

history of Far Eastern societies, I do not find this model to be at variance with my empirical data." Indeed, because "I have found this model to be efficient in understanding the most long-lived social systems on earth, I believe that its generalized use can be recommended on more substantial grounds than merely as a benchmark from which to begin our search for a more genuine social 'reality'" (pp. vi–vii). Quite apart from this dubious generalization about the changelessness of Asian societies – and in fact the persisting "system" he alludes to is not Chinese rural society but the Confucian model of bureaucratic state – a clearer instance of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" would be difficult to find.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 81. This and similar passages cast doubt on Gurr's claim that specification of psychological variables that "intervene" between societal upsets and political violence is what marks off "social-psychological" from "social-structural" theories of revolution. Cf. note 51 *supra.*
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 91 ff.
86. *Ibid.*, pp. 119–34.
87. Writes Johnson: "Society is a form of human interaction that transcends violence, of which one form is revolution. Revolutions are in this sense antisocial, testifying to the existence of extraordinary dissatisfactions among people with a particular form of society" (*ibid.*, p. 59). Later on, Johnson identifies the national state as the "largest self-sufficient form of social system" and, a few lines further, as the "largest form of self-contained social system" (p. 169). For more on the category-mistake of confounding state with society, see Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," pp. 492–93.
88. Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York, 1970), pp. 352–53, by far the most thorough critique (and appreciation) of Parsonian sociology as a whole.
89. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change,* p. 8.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 81. The uncanny resemblance between liberal sociology's theory of political dissenters as mentally unhinged and Soviet authority's practice toward deviationists awaits due analytic attention. There is depressing irony, and perhaps poetic justice, in the realization that the first "Marxist" state acts on Durkheimian principles in attempting to enforce its own version of the *conscience collective.* For a different view, with tart remarks on the liberalizing aspects of functionalist thought in the Soviet setting – asylums are, after all, less punishing physically than labor camps and firing squads, see Gouldner, *Coming Crisis,* pp. 452–72.
91. Nathanael West, *The Day of the Locust, Collected Works* (Harmondsworth, 1975), p. 153.
92. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change,* p. 91.
93. Cf. Popper, *Objective Knowledge,* p. 192. If the social system model is accepted as gospel, of course, then revolutions can (by definition) proceed only from systemic disequilibrium. Hence, argues Johnson, the problem will solve itself "if and when social scientists agree on some model of the social system," as then they will establish independently verifiable indicators of disequilibrium as a matter of "routine social science." Johnson, *Revolutionary Change,* p. 134. The problems with this reasoning require no comment: they show themselves plainly enough.
94. Louis Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in *For Marx* (New York, 1969), pp. 95–101, 104, 106, 113, 114 (his emphasis). Althusser is vague enough to permit several readings, one of which is given here. Another interpretation, perhaps more challenging, is that "base" enjoys no explanatory priority over "superstructure" in Marxist theory – in which case the problem dissolves, together with Althusser's analysis of 1917.
95. "This theory, expressed in Althusser's works in extremely pretentious language, is nothing else but the repetition of Engels' principle of the 'relative autonomy' of

the superstructure in respect to economic conditions and is just as unclear as that principle . . . That important historical events, such as revolutions, result from the coincidence of many circumstances is a commonplace and one could hardly find anybody foolish enough to maintain that any detail of the historical process may be deduced from the general principle of 'contradiction' between productive forces and relations of production. Neither is this commonplace specifically Marxist in any sense. What is specifically Marxist is Engels' famous phrase about the determinant forces of economic conditions 'in the last instance.' This is vague and is not made less vague by Althusser's repetition of it without any further explanation. It is certainly true that Marx never tried to replace historical inquiry with general statements about 'contradictions' nor did he hope that the course of history might be described by deductions from this statement. But that is precisely what makes the whole meaning of historical materialism unclear unless it is reduced again to the commonplace idea that many factors are at work in any historical event and that economic conditions are one of them. This is why some Marxists of the Second International were reluctant to admit Engels' well-known explanations in his letters to Schmidt, Bloch or Mehring. They believed, perhaps not without reason, that the idea of 'many factors' enjoying 'relative autonomy' deprives Marxism of its specificity, and makes of historical materialism a banal commonplace, since the additional vague statement about the 'determination in the last resort' has no meaning whatsoever in historical explanation as long as we are not able to define what are the limits of this 'ultimate determination' and, similarly, the limits of the 'relative autonomy' granted to other domains of social life, especially to various spheres of the so-called superstructure. Again, the whole theory of 'over-determination' is nothing but a repetition of traditional banalities which remain exactly on the same level of vagueness as before." Leszek Kolakowski, "Althusser's Marx," in *The Socialist Register 1971,* ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (London, 1971), pp. 120–21. Cf. Martin Nicolaus, "Foreword," in Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 40 n.

96. Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions," p. 164. The Algerian Revolution is an apparent exception that proves the rule: there the revolutionary situation was instigated by the military action of vanguard cadres who had organized an extensive underground network of support before making their bid for power. However, and this is the point, the character of French response – brutal, indiscriminate, hence ineffective – had everything to do with enabling the "single spark to ignite a prairie fire." Seven years and a million casualties later, the FLN had lost militarily yet won politically by out-administering, not outfighting, the French: Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency," pp. 148–50. Still, De Gaulle sued for peace only after the war activated groups inside the military who threatened a *coup d'état* in collaboration with *colon* interests; and in that sense the FLN benefitted from a political crisis on which their impact was very indirect: see Yves Courrière, *La guerre d'Algérie,* 4 vols. (Paris, 1968–71), and, in English, Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (London, 1977). The same general principle applies to other imperialist wars: contradictions inside the mother country have given the revolutionaries indispensable tactical leverage without which they could have been forestalled indefinitely. See Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars."

97. Francois Furet, "Le catéchisme révolutionnaire," *Annales; E. S. C.* 26 (1971), p. 288.

98. Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions," p. 164.

99. Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution,* 3rd ed. (New York, 1965), esp. pp. 16 ff.

100. For full and fatal criticism, see Rule and Tilly, "Political Process in Revolutionary France," pp. 44–55.

101. Both joke and analysis derive from *ibid.,* pp. 50, 54. An interesting exercise (quite beyond the scope of this paper) would be to examine the common conception wherein a whole "society" is an active unit or agency that "produces" revolution as an example of a "category mistake" – of representing the facts of a matter as if they belonged to one logical type or category, when they actually belong to another. To speak of "society" as a unit that generates or undergoes revolution is to make the same error as the tourist who, after visiting a number of campus institutes, departments, and administrative offices, asks, "But where is the University?" Cf. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Harmondsworth, 1963), pp. 17–25.
102. Marx is widely (and wrongly) believed to have thought that the advance of capitalism would progressively immiserate the majority of workers, and that mass misery would presage a proletarian revolution. The relevant passage of *Capital,* however, forecasts "misery, ignorance, brutalization, and moral degradation" for the "Lazarus-layer of the working class" – for the industrial reserve army (nowadays consisting of migrants laborers and the permanent welfare class) – not for the employed proletariat as a whole. And it is to the latter that Marx ascribed the interest and will to "expropriate the expropriators." See Roman Rosdolsky, *Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Marxschen "Kapital"* (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), vol. 2, p. 355.
103. Gurr and Duvall, "Civil Conflict in the 1960s," p. 138. Cf. note 62 *supra.*
104. Thus, after grappling briefly with political variables, the Feierabends conclude that "coerciveness at first stimulates violence until a certain point is reached. Then coerciveness, in the form of tyranny, seems probably just as apt to bring internal peace as more violence." "Comparative Study of Revolution and Violence," p. 415. Omitting to disclose the location of that "certain point" for any specific instance or set of examples, the Feierabends erect yet another tautology.
105. "Some form of strain must be present if an episode of collective behavior is to occur. The more severe the strain, moreover, the more likely is such an episode to appear." Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior,* p. 48.
106. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward provide a brilliant (if sometimes dubious) account of popular protest using "eruption" as a dramatic synonym for "collective action" in *Poor People's Movements* (New York, 1977). Barrington Moore, on the other hand, prefers explosive and combustive metaphors to evoke the desired atmosphere: "The attempt to enforce conscription in 1793 did no more than toss the sparks into a situation already explosive." "Chinese society was such as to make possible the creation of huge masses of human debris, tinder easily ignited by an insurrectionary spark." "To say that a revolutionary situation existed does not mean that the conflagration was about to ignite of its own accord." "Nevertheless, it is clear that the British intrusion as a whole had generated enough inflammable material to produce a conflagration once the match had been set to it." ". . . in one area, Hyderabad, smoldering discontent did flare into an open revolutionary upheaval for a brief time during the turmoils surrounding the British withdrawal." *Social Origins,* pp. 100, 213, 221, 352, 380. Being too good a sociologist to get hypnotized by his own rhetoric, Moore proceeds at once to make penetrating political class analyses of the events in question.
107. The clearest example close to hand is Juan Díaz del Moral, *Historia de las agitaciones campesinas andaluzas* (Madrid, 1973); completed in 1923 and first published in 1929, this classic account of rural anarchism inspired and informed the standard English studies by Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1950), and E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels,* 3rd ed. (Manchester, 1971). As I try to show elsewhere, however, a close reading reveals inconsistencies between Díaz del Moral's superb factual reports of political mobilization in the country

towns of Andalusia and his dogged insistence that rural collective action was a species of primitive religious or "millenarian" enthusiasm only vaguely related to tangible grievances and goals: *The Missed Revolution,* Papers on Mediterranean and European Societies, no. 3 (Amsterdam, 1975), pp.. 83–107, *passim.* For cogent criticism of Díaz del Moral, Brenan, and Hobsbawm's model, and fresh evidence of method where they see mostly madness, consult Temma Kaplan, *Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868–1903* (Princeton, 1977), esp. pp. 206–12.

108. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks,* ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London, 1971), p. 217.
109. Moore, *Social Origins,* p. 161.
110. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege,* ed. Werner Hahlweg (Bonn, 1973), p. 210. Those who distrust Clausewitz because of his Prussian military connection and doubt the intentions of anyone who cites his authority should compare Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks,* pp. 136–43, 229–38.
111. *Vom Kriege,* p. 303.
112. An excellent study of élite ideology (in this case, official "realism") in actual practice is David Joravsky, *The Lysenko Affair* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), a book whose implacable intelligence illuminates issues far beyond its immediate scope. For the "masses" in one revolutionary situation, see Richard Cobb's delicious essay, "The Revolutionary Mentality in France," in *Second Identity,* and, equally superb, his literary portrait of the Revolution's greatest historian, Georges Lefebvre, *ibid.*
113. "To explain behavior in terms of cultural values" – or, one might add, "states of mind" or "ideology" – "is to engage in circular reasoning . . . the problem is to determine out of what past and present experiences such an outlook arises and maintains itself." Moore, *Social Origins,* p. 486.
114. *Vom Kriege,* p. 210. Cf. Gramsci, who writes that "war in progress too is 'passion,' the most intense and febrile of all passions," adding, however, that "it is a moment of political life . . . the continuation in other forms of a given policy." *Prison Notebooks,* p. 139. Cf. note 110 *supra.*
115. Richard Cobb, "A Personal State of War," *Times Literary Supplement,* 10 March 1978, p. 271.
116. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks,* p. 140.
117. *Vom Kriege,* p. 303. Richard Cobb gives flesh and blood to this bare bones point in his description of how contending parties formed up to fight in the Vendée: "It is important thus to be reminded that great, sweeping revolts do not spring up over night, that they are patiently prepared by smouldering grievances, by the emergence of identifiable hate figures who have names and faces, as well as functions or professions – the rebels from Les Mauges chose with care those they sought out for killing, they knew them by sight, knew where they lived, and they often killed their families as well – and, lastly, even by a series of increasingly realistic dress-rehearsals.

"In this area, both sides had tasted blood two or three years before the Vendée, had indeed become sides, and could recognize each other as such . . . Both sides had lined up their potential armies long before general fighting broke out; the townsmen, the inhabitants of the *bourgs* and the village artisans – and the other allies of the towns, carters, innkeepers, schoolmasters – had the *garde nationale.* The inhabitants of Les Mauges started with religious processions, pilgrimages to sacred trees and to well-tried, reliable shrines that had shown their mettle in previous times of trouble, that might muster thousands, and soon the pilgrimages became armed assemblies and expressions of open defiance; the sacred banners, battle flags. Already, long before the revolt, the rebels marched under the emblem of the bleeding heart pierced by a cross. If twenty scattered farmsteads could be got together to hear a non-juror priest preach damnation to the jurors and to

their allies among the authorities, sooner or later they would respond to a call to arms coming from the same pulpit. Long before March 1793, some sort of outbreak was accepted as inevitable by both sides; the republican authorities had been calling for troops in 1792." Cobb, "The Counter-Revolt," in *Second Identity,* pp. 117–18.

118. The one often leads to the other, well-prepared *coups* encountering powerful opposition and turning into civil wars and revolutions. Spain in 1936 is one example; Chile in 1973 is another, in which the ferocious violence of military takeover came less from malice and aforethought (though there was plenty of both) than from the unexpected strength of popular resistance: "At that moment . . . the political chess game had got out of the control of its players. Dragged along by an irreversible dialectic, they themselves ended up as pawns in a much larger game of chess, one much more complex and politically more important than any mere scheme hatched in conjunction by imperialism and the reaction against the government of the people. It was a terrifying class confrontation that was slipping out of the hands of the very people who had provoked it, a cruel and fierce scramble by counterpoised interests, and the final outcome had to be a social cataclysm without precedent in the history of the Americas." Gabriel García Márquez, "The Death of Salvador Allende," *Harper's Magazine,* March 1974, p. 52. García Márquez's short essay may be the best piece of political journalism since *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.*
119. Cobb, *Police and the People,* p. 85. For a historian who professes contempt for generalizations, Cobb has a surprising number of good ones to his credit.
120. Cf. Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,* ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, 1970). This way of phrasing the point was suggested by Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 68.
121. "Prediction" here does not mean forecasting tomorrow's history, but simply spelling out what basic empirical results should turn up if the model is correct. "Postdiction" may be a better term for theoretical guesses about the findings of historical inquiry.
122. Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence," pp. 96–97.
123. *Ibid.,* pp. 100–1.
124. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 73. The same point is made with a wealth of supporting evidence in *idem,* "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past and Present* 50 (1971), pp. 76–136.
125. This quick summary is taken from Natalie Zemon Davis, "The Rites of Violence," in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, 1975), p. 154.
126. On the anatomy of food riots, see Louise A. Tilly, "The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2 (1971), pp. 23–57, and Tilly, "Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe," esp. pp. 385–90; on tax revolts, Gabriel Ardant, "Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States and Nations," in Tilly, *Formation of National States,* p. 194; on jacqueries, Rodney Hilton, *Bond Men Made Free* (London, 1973), Paul Avrich, *Russian Rebels, 1600–1800* (New York, 1972), and (though sometimes dubious) Roland Mousnier, *Peasant Uprisings* (New York, 1970); and on *journées,* George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1959).
127. Richard Cobb, "'Nous des *Annales,*'" in *Second Identity,* p. 78, and *Police and the People,* where it is asked how else the "people could exercise their will and get their grievances seen to" (p. 89).
128. *Ibid.,* pp. 118–71, 202–3.

129. Popular violence, writes Cobb, "is not so odious and inadmissible as that of war or of diplomacy; it was never gratuitous, nor was it ever exclusive to any one class – or any one party: all classes, all parties were enthusiastic advocates of violence when there was a good chance of using it against their immediate enemies, though they tended to discover the advantages of mercy when they looked like being on the losing side . . . Its victims," moreover, "were, at least by modern standards, limited in number, and, as far as the violence of the common people was concerned, were more often wood and stone, glass and china, than flesh and blood." *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.
130. V. I. Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, Collected Works,* vol. 9, p. 113.
131. Cobb, *Police and the People,* p. 89.
132. Quoted by Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York, 1948), p. 150.
133. Natalie Zemon Davis, "The Reasons of Misrule," in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France,* and, on the cooptation of popular festivals by the Revolutionary government seeking to turn them to its own purposes of forging loyalties to the state, Mona Ozouf, *Le fête révolutionnaire, 1789–1799* (Paris, 1976).
134. Quoted by Jacques Godechot, *The Taking of the Bastille* (New York, 1970), p. 245. For a further cataloging of coercions under the old régime, see Cobb, *Police and the People,* pp. 88–89.
135. The storming of the Bastille may serve as a paradigmatic example. Not only did the "defending" garrison fire first, and repeatedly, on the crowd (which wanted entry to seize arms in preparation for an expected royalist attack on the city), but the casualty statistics make clear that the "defenders" were more likely to survive than the "attackers": of an estimated 800 to 900 besiegers, 98 were killed and 73 wounded; of the 110 defenders, 1 was killed and 3 wounded in the assault. Afterwards, the crowd killed 6 of the defending garrison, as well as the commander and the acting head of the city government who had tried to avoid arming the citizenry: *ibid.*, pp. 229, 243, and Rudé, *Crowd in the French Revolution,* pp. 54–56. The principle is a general one in any event: "In Italy, France, and Germany, agents of government almost certainly did the majority of killing and wounding which occurred in the course of collective violence from 1830 onward." Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, *Rebellious Century,* p. 243. "The substantial record of violence associated with protest movements in the United States is a record composed overwhelmingly of the casualties suffered by protestors at the hands of public or private armies." Piven and Cloward, *Poor People's Movements,* p. 19.
136. Two studies, Tilly, *Vendée,* esp. pp. 195, 340–41, and Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution,* sustain the point with formidable evidence.
137. Village leaders of the *Bauernkrieg* sought to restore land rights guaranteed by the "old law" *(das alte Recht)* and lately abused by revenue-hungry knights: Moore, *Social Origins,* pp. 465–66. The *sans-culottes'* overriding aim was cheap and plentiful bread, and the appointment of authorities committed to assuring it: Rudé, *Crowd in the French Revolution,* p. 200. The *communards,* harkening back to 1793 rather than forward to 1917, wanted city self-government and, though they announced a number of cautious reforms (which had little anti-capitalist flavor), were too preoccupied defending Paris to really enforce those they decreed: Theodore Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945* (Oxford, 1973–77), vol. 1, pp. 735–45. And the peasant rebels of the Russian Revolution simply wanted to eject parasitic squires and incorporate long-coveted estate lands into village holdings: Teodor Shanin, *The Awkward Class* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 153, 159–60; John L. H. Keep, *The Russian Revolution* (London, 1976), chs. 12–19. Keep reports that very few people died by peasant violence, most of which was simply burning manor houses with the eminently practical aim of discouraging landlords from ever returning (pp. 208–9, 213).

138. "At every important stage of the Revolution the *sans-culottes* intervened, not to renovate society or to remodel it after a new pattern, but to reclaim traditional rights and to uphold standards which they believed to be imperilled by the innovations of ministers, capitalists, speculators, agricultural 'improvers,' or city authorities." Rudé, *Crowd in the French Revolution,* p. 225. "From the beginning the movement had been a deliberate enterprise by country chiefs to restore the integrity of the state's villages, to gain local rights of participation in national progress. When Madero initiated the revolution in November 1910, Morelos rural leaders did not flock to his cause without weeks of hard reckoning and calculation, And when they did join him, it was for conscious, practical reasons – to recover village lands and establish village security." Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution,* pp. 317–18.
139. This looks to be one principal finding of Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice* (White Plains, 1978), which appeared too recently to be properly utilized in the present essay. On the essentially reformist demands of German and Russian workers in the revolutionary situations of 1918–1920 and 1917, see pp. 340, 351–52, 362–71, 474–78; and on defensive paramilitary mobilization, pp. 374 and 478.
140. On the comparative sociology of revolutionary élites, see Alvin W. Gouldner, "Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals," *Telos* 26 (1975–76), pp. 3–36, and, on the masses, Moore, *Social Origins,* pp. 480, 496–504, and *Injustice, passim.* Studies of the three outcomes include Isaiah Berlin, "Russian Populism," in *Russian Thinkers* (London, 1978), James C. Scott, "Protest and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition," *Theory and Society* 4 (1977), pp. 1–38, 211–46, and Alvin W. Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism," *Telos* 34 (1977–78), pp. 5–48. The clearest case study showing how precious little popular movements owe to the ideas of radical intellectuals is Cobb, *Police and the People:* though *sans-culotte* demands and rhetoric betray a basic political program and moral attitude, "it is hard to see what they owe to a system of thought. Rousseau, it is true, is frequently and reverently evoked, along with Robespierre, Marat, Brutus, William Tell, and Algernon Sydney, in the proceedings of popular assemblies; but this is merely a formal statement of orthodoxy, a *sans-culotte.* 'For what we are about to receive,' to be got through before proceeding to serious business (food problems, the defence of local interests, denunciations, *scrutins épuratoires*). The *sans-culottes* were rough-and-ready people, engaged in a struggle to gain control of local administration, they possessed neither a national nor a world vision, and they were not political theorists. They voted with a show of hands *par acclamation* not in homage to some abstract concept of unanimity, but in order to cow possible opponents. Rousseau is as irrelevant to an understanding of the *sans-culottes* as Babeuf" (p. 206). Cf. Rudé, *Crowd in the French Revolution,* p. 225.
141. James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven, 1976), p. 4.
142. Though he filters his facts through a stiff class-struggle thesis, Hilton gives tantalizing clues to the role of artisans, prosperous agriculturalists (one "peasant" rebel of 1381, for instance, had property confiscated that included 200 acres of land, 300 sheep, and 100 additional livestock), and insurgent nobles and clergy: *Bond Men Made Free,* pp. 114–34, 165–213. Moore, following German sources, notes the rich peasant roots of the *Bauernkrieg: Social Origins,* pp. 460–67. Godechot, following Rudé's census of the *vainqueurs de la Bastille,* notes that most were artisans and journeymen with bourgeois leaders, while Rudé points out that most *vainqueurs* were enrolled in the Paris national guard, which rigorously excluded "vagrants or social riff-raff": *Taking of the Bastille,* pp. 221–26; *Crowd in the French Revolution,* p. 59. Cobb and Rudé also report that the *sans-culotte* movement itself was staffed chiefly by master craftsmen (including substantial entrepreneurs), small employers of labor, shopkeepers, publicans, and

wine merchants, together with a "thin sprinkling of professional men" – school masters, public letter-writers, and, in the country towns, ex-priests and monks; wage-earners, in fact, were rarely admitted as full members of the *sociétés populaires:* Cobb, "Revolutionary Mentality in France," pp. 126–27, and *Police and the People,* p. 120; Rudé, *Crowd in the French Revolution,* pp. 178, 190. Female rioters, for their part, "were not paupers but women who in normal times could manage, proud women who were not counted among the destitute and who were fighting to remain so and to hold their families together." Olwen Hufton, "Women in Revolution, 1789–1796," in *French Society and the Revolution,* ed. Douglas Johnson (Cambridge, 1976), p. 152. The continuing political presence of artisans and other "petit-bourgeois" elements, sometimes helped, sometimes hindered by organized wage-earners, is clear from Robert J. Bezucha, *The Lyon Uprising of 1834* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), Charles Tilly and Lynn Lees, "Le peuple de Juin 1848," *Annales; E. S. C.* 29 (1974), pp. 1061–91, and Zeldin, *France,* vol. 1, p. 738 (who notes that the Commune was proletarian neither in social composition nor ideological outlook). On the politics of landholding peasants in modern revolutions, see Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century,* and consider what Emiliano Zapata told a reporter in June 1911: "It can't be said of me that I went off to the battlefields under the pressure of poverty. I've got some land and a stable . . . which I earned through long years of honest work and not through political campaigns, and which produce enough for me and my family to live on comfortably." Quoted by Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution,* p. 177. The vanguard role of artisanal craftworkers in the French labor movement, and strong evidence that the "more organization you get, the more strikes," is explained by Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, *Strikes in France, 1830–1968* (Cambridge, 1974). Similarly, the radical movement in German industry during World War I was centered among the labor aristocracy of highly skilled workers: Moore, *Injustice,* p. 287. On the sometime involvement of "lumpen" elements in mass action, on both sides of the barricades, see Rudé, *Crowd in the French Revolution,* pp. 186–90, Richard Cobb, "The Beginning of the Revolutionary Crisis in Paris" and "Revolutionary Situations in France 1789–1968," in *Second Identity,* pp. 156, 276–77, and Moore, *Injustice,* pp. 319–20. Wertheim, *Evolution and Revolution,* wrongly calls the *sans-culottes* the "Parisian *Lumpenproletariat"* (p. 151); they were, of course, no such thing.

143. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century,* p. 290; "Peasant Rebellion and Revolution," p. 54.

144. *Ibid.,* pp. 54–55, and Hamza Alavi, "Peasants and Revolution," in *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia,* ed. Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (New York, 1973). Alavi's article was first published in 1965.

145. Moore, *Social Origins,* pp. 475–76; Shanin, *Awkward Class,* pp. 164–69.

146. Huntington, *Political Order,* pp. 4–5, 36, 37, 39, 47, 56, *et passim.* Why Huntington's theory rests on tautologous reasoning and bad history is explained by Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" *Comparative Politics* 5 (1973), pp. 425–47. The Durkheimian parallels are discussed by Tilly in *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass., 1978), which appeared too late to be utilized here.

147. Marc Bloch, *French Rural History* (Berkeley, 1966), p. 170 (translation emended). A kind of verbal "movie" tracing this great transition and explaining it with ideas woven into the fabric of description is Charles Tilly, "Getting It Together in Burgundy, 1675–1975," *Theory and Society* 4 (1977), pp. 479–504.

148. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution,* pp. 70–71 *et passim.* For a critique of certain simplifying assumptions in Paige's argument, see Eric R. Wolf, "Review Essay: Why Cultivators Rebel," *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (1977), pp. 742–50.

149. Paraphrased from Shorter and Tilly, *Strikes in France,* p. 338.

150. Norbert Elias, *Die höfische Gesellschaft* (Darmstadt, 1969), pp. 394–95.
151. Skocpol, "France, Russia, China,"
152. To wit: "The Mexican Revolution happened because the high politicians of the country openly failed to agree on who should rule when President Porfirio Díaz died." Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution,* p. 30.
153. Cobb, "Revolutionary Situations in France," p. 277.

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