Book Reviews

Herbert W. Simons (ed.), *The Rhetorical Turn*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1990.

The 1986 Temple Conference on the Rhetoric of the Human Sciences has now spawned two admirable volumes. The first was *Rhetoric in the Human Sciences* (Sage, 1989). The second, reviewed here, is a collection of some of the most lucid and thoughtful essays in the genre. Herbert W. Simons – who edited both volumes – can take pride in the result.

John Lyne's essay, "Bio-Rhetorics," should be required reading for rhetorical critics. It is a carefully-argued debunking of E.O. Wilson and the sociobiologists – who claim to be making narrow scientific claims while posing as "cultural theorists." Lyne marshals his evidence carefully, so the final portrait is devastating: *Either* the sociobiologists are oblivious to the rhetorical effects of "the selfish gene" and images such as genes keeping culture "on a leash," (Lyne's essay might be called "The Selfish Trope"), *or* they are charlatans – cynically manipulating nuances and hiding from criticism by jumping back and forth across disciplinary lines.

John Angus Campbell's essay, "Scientific Discovery and Rhetorical Invention," continues his writings on the evolution of Darwin's thought. Here he describes a rhetoric of discovery, so to speak: The Popperian distinction between discovery and justification is blurred as we follow the early Darwin adapting to the perspectives of his peers, making innovation seem unthreatening to conventional wisdom, and trying to keep intuitions he would later call *natural selection* consistent with theories of geological change. The mature theory in *Origin* did not "pop full blown" into Darwin's mind, it evolved through these struggles.

Tullio Maranhao tells a similar story about Freud in "Psychoanalysis: Science or Rhetoric?" A theory vulnerable to charges of romanticism had to be packaged in the metaphors of 20th century reason. Alan G. Gross tells a story – with the same implications for the distinction between discovery and justification in "Evolutionary Taxonomy as an Example of the Rhetoric of Science." As the argument topoi of taxonomy unfold (and its unsystematic sampling practices become apparent), taxonomy presents a cautionary tale for realists – no mirrors of nature here. And Carolyn R. Miller, in "The Rhetoric of Decision Science," is less concerned with showing that decision science is a rhetoric than with arguing that it is a defective one – analytic philosophy pursued by other means.

The distinction between *strong* and *weak* rhetorics of science is now standard. Strong programmers deny epistemic privilege to scientific knowledge. Weak programmers say that rhetoric is integral to science, but not scientific knowledge claims. Robert E. Sanders is a weak programmer in "Discursive Constraints on the Acceptance and Rejection of Knowledge Claims," but his study of how rhetorical differences have kept research in ordinary conversation fragmented across field lines is ambiguous: It *might* mean that different people are describing the same thing differently, *if* you believe with Sanders in epistemic progress and integration. But a strong programmer would read Sander's review as supporting the strong program: Conversation analysts are following different lines of argument.

Next come four essays on politics – all seeing politics as essentially rhetorical and seeing rhetorical analysis as synonymous with reflective critique. All involve, as John Nelson says, taking the comparisons of sciences as communities and "truth-seeking as politicking seriously enough to develop their implications." Eugene Garver, in "Arguing Over Incommensurable Values," discusses Machiavelli's portrait of life within pluralism. Susan Wells, in "Narrative Figures and Subtle Persuasions," discusses the rhetorical effects of the arrangement of an investigative committee's report on the assault by Philadelphia police on a radical organization. The report is postmodern – a jumble of disconnected fragments, while each discrete section is itself a coherent narrative. Wells directs our attention to the silences between the report's sections and to the commission's choices of topics for praise and blame "as socially located markers of ideas." Manfred Stanley, in "The Rhetoric of the Commons," discusses the concept of *the forum*, or public sphere, and identifies two general idealizations – the *liberal* and *democratic* forums, each with its own vision of ideal education, type of consensus, metaphor for experience, and conception of participation. And John Nelson, in "Political Foundations for the Rhetoric of Inquiry," argues that foundationalism is itself a rhetoric. Political foundations are "constitutive conventions and narratives for political communities." So *founding* acts (as in Arendt's discussion of the "founding fathers") become sources of authority – in esoteric domains as well as popular politics.

Next come four philosophical essays. Kenneth Gergen sees "The Checkmate of Rhetoric" as a fixation on debunking empiricism and a failure to achieve a positive account of intellectual progress. It is one thing to usher the rocket scientist into a rhetorical community but another to *then* explain how the discourse succeeds in getting rockets to go up. This is a stake in the heart of deconstruction's claim that "the act of reading obliterates the author's intentions." If reading obliterates the author, then how are we able to read Hemingway as he intended? Why is it hard to read Fitzgerald as mocking the rich? Gergen suggests a focus on practices; and, from a different perspective, so does Joseph Margolis, in "Reconciling Realism and Relativism." Relativism (say, Foucault-style outsider-status) is parasitic to the internal realities of whatever one is outsider to; *inside* argument is a process of fitting pieces together – realism of a rhetorical sort. And similarly, Richard Harvey Brown ("Symbolic Realism and the Dualism of the Human Sciences") uses a view of rhetorical reason to make the sterile, hyperbolic standoff between positivism and romanticism more useful.

In a fitting coda, Dilip Gaonkar discusses the risks of a gypsy discipline. They are the risks real Gypsies run, the risks of strangers. Rhetoric must assimilate (get some substance) or keep moving. The risks of assimilation are considerable, for Gaonkar's essay brings out an ambivalence – or nonchalance – among rhetoricians of science. Once foundationalism is debunked (telling the story of the death of foundationalism is a Burkean ritual kill in this genre) is the survivor – rhetoric – the new queen of the sciences? Simons quotes James Boyd White: Rhetoric might be "the central discipline for which we have been looking for so long" by which "other disciplines can be defined, organized and judged." Simons likes that quotation enough to have used it twice (see the preface to the first volume). A modest hermeneutic license would allow A.J. Ayer to read White's claim as epistemic imperialism: Epistemology is deposed; rhetoric is the new arbiter discipline. One would think that *defined, organized,* and *judged* have new meanings, or they mislabel these essays. Yet these essays do define, organize, and judge in ways Ayer would find familiar; and a common theme is rhetoric's role as a synonym for critique. As Gaonkar says, this is a *philosophical* enterprise – in a discourse, I would add, that seems to deny the value of philosophical enterprises. Perhaps the real *rhetorical turn* will come not when all the foundationalists are convinced that all knowledge claims are in some sense rhetorical but when the new rhetoric turns its method on itself.

Charles Arthur Willard
University of Louisville, U.S.A.

John Woods and Douglas Walton, *Fallacies. Selected Papers 1972–1982*, Foris Publications, Dordrecht, Holland and Providence R.I., U.S.A., 1989 (Studies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis 9), xxii + 322, ISBN 90–6765–305–5 (paper), ISBN 90–6765–306–3 (bound)(*)

Hamblin's book on fallacies (1970) may be looked upon as this century's watershed as far as the study of fallacies is concerned. This holds both for purely theoretical work and for pedagogial concerns. Before Hamblin (B.H.) one had the so-called "standard treatment", the shallow treatment given to fallacies in contemporary logic texts. After Hamblin (A.H.) there were the papers written by Woods and Walton that soon made it all but impossible to go on writing about fallacies in a one-or-two-examples-suffice-to-be-on-guard sort of way. It is 22 A.H. now, and the world has changed. There are interesting theoretical developments, new journals, conferences, and attractive textbooks are available as well. In the meantime, the intricacies of the field and the many interconnections with other fields have become more obvious. We don't have to fear that we shall be out of work. On the contrary, here one finds the materials for many a dissertation that remains to be written.

Those students that are enticed by "the blaze of her splendors" (Johnson, 1987) and eagerly enter the field will soon hit upon the classical corpus written by John Woods and Douglas Walton during the period up till 15 A.H. The authors, two Canadian professors of philosophical logic, picked up Hamblin's challenge to proceed with serious theorizing in the field of the traditional fallacies. The result was a great number of papers in which various systems of philosophical logic are applied to problems connected with a number of fallacies. Anyone interested in some particular fallacy is sure to profit from some of these papers, whereas those that plan to study the field as a whole will, at one time or another, want to avail themselves of a complete survey of the "Woods and Walton approach". The original papers, however, were published in about twenty different journals, and are therefore not readily accessible. Hence, it is very fortunate that Foris has undertaken to publish a collection of the most important papers that appeared during the first ten years of the Woods and Walton era.

The volume contains nineteen papers, sixteen coauthored by Woods and Walton, one by Woods, and two by Walton. There are six papers on begging the question (*petitio principii*), two on *ad verecundiam*, and two on *ad hominem*, whereas two papers are not concerned with any one particular type of fallacy. The other papers each treat one of the following seven fallacies: *ad baculum, ad ignorantiam, ad populum, post hoc*, Composition and Division, Equivocation, and Many Questions.

The book has been dedicated to the memory of C.L. Hamblin.

THE WOODS AND WALTON APPROACH

Characteristic for the Woods and Walton approach is their tackling of various informal fallacies by means of formal methods. According to Woods (Chapter 17, 223, 224):

> Of the dozen or so fallacies that we have been studying recently there is not one case in which the investigation did not benefit from the application of formal methods. Graph theory and intuititionistic logic are, we think, helpful in modelling circularity; causal logic fixed perspectives for the *post hoc*; Hintikka's system of dialogic gives an interesting representation of dialectical exchange; Routley's consistent and complete system of dialectic illuminates certain features of the *ad hominem*; various constructions of erotetic logic work well for Many Questions; and so on.

The role of formal methods (logical and other) is discussed in Woods's paper *What is Informal Logic?* (Chapter 17 in the book). The fallacy of Composition and Division is used as an illustration. Woods stresses the importance of a distinction between the use of formal methods as such and the practice of *formalization* in the sense of constructing a formal axiom system (223). For instance, if someone were using Hamblin's formal dialectic to articulate certain views on the fallacy of Many Questions, he would be using a formal method, but he wouldn't be involved in formalization. The advantages of using formal methods are pointed out by Woods in the following words (224):

> In our own work, we have been impressed to discover two particular advantages in the deployment of formal resources. One is the provision of clarity and power of

> representation and definition. (...) The other is provision of verification *milieux* for contested claims about various fallacies.

But from the examples that Woods adduces to illustrate this point it becomes clear that claims about the formal systems used are at stake as well.

It would be a misrepresentation of the Woods and Walton approach to say that in this approach one assigns one logic (one logical system) to each traditional fallacy. Nothing in the approach prevents one from trying out several formal methods on one and the same fallacy. For instance, in their analysis of *ad ignorantiam* the authors apply (1) Hintikka's epistemic logic; (2) Hamblin's formal dialectic, and (3) Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic. Conversely, all three methods mentioned, and others besides, are put to work in those papers that discuss begging the question (*petitio principii*).

The authors do not present a unified theory of fallacies, nor do they seem to aspire to achieve such a theory. All the same, these papers display a remarkable coherence as they are all products of the typical Woods and Walton approach in which the same formal systems are used again and again in the context of different fallacies.

READABILITY

One wouldn't read this collection of essays from cover to cover. But if someone should, nevertheless, decide to do so, he shouldn't be discouraged by the very first chapter, which contains a rather disappointing review of *The Concept of Argument*, Chapter 7 of Hamblin (1970). This paper from 1972 would get the lowest rating of them all, and is not representative of what the book has to offer. The second chapter contains a very readable and interesting paper on *ad verecundiam*, published in 1974. But this chapter isn't typical either, given that, apart from a few epsilon symbols, no applications of formal methods are to be found in it. The third chapter, a paper on *petitio principii*, published in 1975, displays the typical Woods and Walton approach, but constitutes fairly tough reading. In Chapter 4 (*Ad Baculum*, 1976) and Chapter 5 (*Ad Hominem*, 1977) the use of formal methods remains confined to some symbolism from propositional logic. Both papers are worth studying, especially the second one, but once more they do not show what a typical Woods and Walton paper is like. Chapter 6 on *petitio principii*, published in 1977, is the first of the chapters that is both very readable and typical of the Woods and Walton approach. If you are mainly interested in getting to know this approach, it would, therefore, be advisable to read just the introduction and then start with Chapter 6 instead of Chapter 1. Or, even better, one could start with Chapter 8 (*Composition and Division*, 1977), or Chapter 11, a very readable and interesting paper on *ad ignorantiam*, published in 1978, which (as noted) displays the use of several formal methods. But if you are interested in a particular fallacy, you can also select the papers that pertain to that fallacy, and read through them in chronological order.

For the most part, the different chapters are self-contained. Wherever they use some system of philosophical logic the authors usually explain the main features of that system, so that recourse to other logical literature is unnecessary. Kripke models for intuitionistic logic are even explained in three different papers. All the same, these papers do not provide easy reading. Unfortunately, a brief explanation of a logical system is likely to be too terse for the ininitiated to follow, whereas those who are familiar with the system do not need to have it explained. Yet the authors manage in most cases to give at least a rough idea of how things work. For those who want to learn more about philosophical logic, there are plenty of references to the literature.

Chapter 7 contains a short and readable, but not very central, paper on *ad hominem* (published in 1977). Chapter 9 on *post hoc* (1977) is very readable as well, and more interesting. Moreover, this chapter contains a fine survey of theories of causality. Chapter 10 on *petitio principii*, (1978) makes for somewhat tougher reading. It is not really made clear in what way exactly one is to apply Kripke's semantics. There is more to be said for the dialogical approach: the paper discusses a number of dialectical circles, including the well-known Woods and Walton segment of dialogue (150, unfortunately not rendered without a misprint). Chapters 12 and 13 on *petitio principii*, among other things, do not make for easy reading either (both papers were published in 1979). Chapter 15 (*Equivocation And Practical Logic*, 1979) presents a good introduction to problems connected with Equivocation. Among the papers I like best is Chapter 16 on *ad populum*, (written by Walton, 1980). Other favorite papers are Chapter 2, 5, 11. Chapter 17 (written by Woods, 1980) is somewhat out of line because of its metatheoretical character. Not easy, but pretty important. The quotes above were taken from this chapter. Chapter 18 is a very readable and nicely introduced paper on Many Questions (written by Walton, 1981). Finally, Chapter 19 is the collection's best piece on begging the question (*petitio principii*). More than any of the other chapters, these last two chapters exhibit a dialectical perspective on argument.

FURTHER REMARKS

In their preface the authors point out that these papers are here published "with their original imperfections". There is surely something to be said for doing it that way. But it seems a shame that the authors didn't avoid a number of annoying, and sometimes confusing, misprints or errors in writing. I counted about sixty of them, some of which occurred in formulas or diagrams. This doesn't help one to understand formal methods! I already mentioned that the Woods and Walton segment appears slightly misprinted on page 150. (There is a superscript "2" missing with the "C" on the top to the right.) The attempt to render the segment on page 288, again, is not flawless. If someone wonders about formula (ii) on page 107, I suggest to have a look at page 231 to be enlightened.

The system of internal reference used in this book is not user-friendly. How does one keep in mind that number "[234]" refers to Chapter 3, etc.? At the very least one would have expected that, having been referred to the bibliography, the bibliography would again refer the reader to the chapter that contains the paper he is looking for.

Notwithstanding these weak points in the editing, this collection of papers by Woods and Walton is to be recommended to all serious students of fallacies. It is, of course, not an elementary textbook. Those who want more in the way of an introduction to fallacies as they are studied in the Woods and Walton approach may be referred to *Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies* (1982), by the same authors. But participants of research groups, students writing a paper or a dissertation, etc., may often need to consult the original papers. For them *Fallacies* is very handy.

NOTE

(*) A Dutch version of this review was published in the *Tijdschrift voor taalbeheersing* **13**, 1991, 155–157.

REFERENCES

Hamblin, C.L.: 1970, *Fallacies*, Methuen, London. Reprinted with a preface by J. Plecnik and J. Hoaglund, Vale Press, Newport News, Virg., 1986.

Johnson, R.H.: 1987, 'The Blaze of Her Splendors: Suggestions About Revitalizing Fallacy Theory', *Argumentation* **1**, 239–253.

Woods, J. and D.N. Walton: 1982, *Argument. The Logic of the Fallacies*, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, etc.

Erik C.W. Krabbe
Department of Philosophy, Groningen University
A-weg 30
9718 CW Groningen
The Netherlands

Norms in Argumentation, Proceedings of the Conference on Norms 1988, Edited by Robert Maier (Dordrecht, Holland: Foris Publications 1989).

This book is a collection of papers presented at an inter-disciplinary workshop held at the University of Utrecht in March 1988. The purpose of the workshop was to confront different approaches to norms for argument, where argument is generally understood as a verbal exchange between parties intended to resolve a conflict of opinion. The book contains essays by Kuno Lorenz, Erik Krabbe, Marie-Jeanne Borel, Robert Maier, J. Anthony Blair, Joseph Wenzel, Frans van Eemeren and Robert Grootendorst, Sally Jackson, John Shotter, Charles Willard, Chris Sinha, and Rik Pinxten and S.N. Balanjangadhara. It contains no record of questions or discussions, an omission which is unfortunate given the diverse participation and the possibility of thereby achieving a better synthesis of the material.

Among the essays, there is considerable variety in quality, viewpoint, and readability. It is impossible in a short review to do justice to all the articles. I have, accordingly, selected four for attention here. These are Krabbe, "Why Argue? A Note on K. Lorenz"; R. Maier, "Argumentation: A Multiplicity of Regulated Rational Interactions"; John Shotter, "The Unique Nature of Normal Circumstances: Contests and Illusions", and R. Pinxten and S.N. Balagangadhara, "Comparative Anthropology and Rhetorics in Cultures."

Krabbe makes the useful distinction between justifying arguing in general (that is, why do we *argue*, as opposed to doing something else, when faced with a difference in opinion); justifying arguing in a particular case (why should we argue about *this topic now*); and justifying particular norms within the practice of argumentation (for instance, the Rule of Burden of Proof which says that whoever puts forward a claim should be prepared to defend it by offering reasons). Regarding the first issue, Krabbe notes that there are alternatives to argument. These are negotiating, with or without a mediator, drawing lots, quarrelling or fighting, or just ignoring the conflict. Krabbe does not make the mistake of assuming that arguing is the only nonviolent way of responding to a conflict of opinion. Negotiating, working with a mediator, drawing lots, and ignoring the problem would also be nonviolent.

Krabbe might have said more: interesting questions are posed here. For instance, what role does argument play in negotiation and mediation? My own experience with these processes suggests that argument plays some role within them; participating parties give reasons for beliefs and opinions and, when resolution options are selected, parties try to find appropriate objective criteria to use to make this selection. Current models of conflict resolution understand negotiation and mediation as win-win, not win-lose, procedures. Parties in conflict should see each other not as opponents, but as partners working together to find a solution to a common problem. Still, support of claims by reason and evidence remains a part of the process. Characteristically, contemporary forms of conflict resolution are understood as non-adversarial. Does this imply that argument has no role to play? I believe that rational argument, critique, and counter-argument are not eliminable. The challenge is to construe and conduct these activities non-adversarially – something feminists, among others, have been proposing for some time.

Krabbe might have tried (question-beggingly?) to *argue* that *arguing* is the preferable nonviolent mode of responding to disputes about opinion, for an important range of cases. If negotiating and mediating incorporate some arguing (properly understood), perhaps this case could be made. Drawing lots makes sense only if we assume that the issue is truly not amenable to resolution by reasoned discourse, and avoiding the issue is feasible only for a limited range of cases.

Maier, unlike Krabbe, incautiously speaks as though argumentation is the only alternative to fighting and violence. He says – also somewhat incautiously, I think – that "at the present moment we have no unified theory of the subject (argumentation)" (p. 124). Maier conceives argumentation as an inter-individual system. People who argue with each other are, on his interpretation, paradigmatically arguing about what is to be done. An argumentative discussion is an interaction bringing together the preparatory actions of different agents, prior to their undertaking further collective or individual actions. Such discussions are conceptualized in terms of the proponent, who defends a position, and the opponent attacks it. (Note the adversarial, indeed military, overtones of these concepts.)

The question arises as to whether it is possible that there is a *unique general system of norms* which would govern all types of argumentation. Maier's answer is that there is no such system; there are, instead, "multiplicities." Three approaches to argumentative norms have been common: the formal approach; the nonformal 'normative criteria' approach; and the socio-historical approach of finding norms in the practices of historically situated individuals who see them as "self-evident obligations."

Maier offers a general argument purporting to show that none of these approaches can provide universal norms. The argument hinges on his conceptualization of arguments as actions. Actions aiming at goals may reach them (a) more or less specifically, (b) more or less economically, and (c) with a greater or lesser guarantee of a stable result. The desiderata of specificity, economy, and stability are, however, incompatible: no two can be optimized together. Thus there is no unique optimality. "That means that the three above-mentioned criteria of evaluation, which apply to all discussions, are multi-dimensional. Therefore there isn't a unique optimal form of discussion, and no universally valid system of constituted norms which would guarantee this optimum" (p. 129).

This argument seems right, granting the action framework within which Maier has conceptualized argumentative discussions. (The framework is stated, not defended.) Later Maier reaches the startling conclusion that classical logic is, in general, not valid in argumentative discussions. To derive this result, he again relies upon his conceptualization of argumentative discussions as preparatory actions. He argues (persuasively) that classical logic does not handle conjunction, disjunction, and negation for *actions*, and draws the conclusion that classical logic does not apply within argumentative discussions. But this argument is flawed. Even if we presume the action framework stipulated by Maier, we can at most conclude that classical logic would not apply in reasoning *about* argumentative discussions. We cannot reasonably conclude that it does not apply *within* such disucssions.

What we are trying to achieve in an argument and how well we need to achieve it will vary from one context to another. Maier recommends trying to derive norms from the relevant activities while at the same time remembering that argument is a self-reflexive activity containing within itself resources for self-critique, so that norms derived from practice are necessarily incomplete. It would be interesting to relate these proposals to the theories of Stephen Toulmin and John McPeck – and to their critics. Maier's essay is abstract, at places hard to follow, and contains at least one seriously flawed argument. Nevertheless it present important considerations.

Shotter, who takes a broadly Wittgensteinian position, makes several fascinating observations. Our (presumably western) current ways of talking, he says, sustain a possessive individualistic social order and constitute us as people able to sustain that order. Within this order, we are the beneficiaries of powerful communicative processes, but "we are also their victims" (p. 144). We see our social order, including its conversational and argumentative practices, as normal: what we do has a "this is the way it must be" feeling to it. Nevertheless, *pace* Fish, "a normal context is just the special context you happen to be in." Only it doesn't seem special to you – because you're in it.

If we view reality from the point of an orderly theoretical system, the claim that something essentially formal underlies all our actions will seem undeniable. But this is a self-deceptive hermeneutical fallacy, Shotter contends. (A brand new fallacy!) He calls it the *ex post facto* fallacy. Here (with apologies) is a quasi-formal version.

1. We interpret X as S.
2. Given S, we are now able to 'see' that X is also Y, Z, ...
3. Y and Z now make it clear that S is a definitive characterization of X.

"The original situation has now been 'given' or 'lent' a determinate character in the terms of the system which it did not, in its original openness, actually possess." This fallacy operates on a grand scale in social sciences, Shotter says. Once we are inside the system (S) we find it hard to escape; we are entrapped. As Wittgenstein said in the *Philosophical Investigations*, "We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it."

Shotter moves on to discuss contestable concepts, arguing that vagueness and uncertainty are uneliminable features of our social activities. Somehow we have to understand ourselves as within a "whole agglomeration of everyday social activity which is the background against which, ultimately, we must make our judgments." Fixed pictures, even formal systems which order that reality have value and facilitate some attainments, but such systematization has its dangers. We tend to fall victim to the illusion that *our* characterizations must be right because *others* are inconceivable. Which sort of closure we choose is fundamentaly a practical, moral, and political choice, a choice which will determine "both our situation and the sort of people we must become to deal with it" (p. 156). As Shotter understands the matter, a norm is a consequence of intelligent and intelligible action, not a precondition for it.

Shotter's essay, while suggestive and interesting, is abstract, occasionally repetitious, and somewhat diffuse. It was not until the end of the paper that I was able to extract a conclusion about argumentative norms. (Even then it took some imagination!) Shotter seems to be warning that formal or nonformal rules for evaluating argument, which presumably constitute some sort of System, can tempt us into the *ex post facto* fallacy and distort our understanding of argumentation and arguments as they occur in the living social world. Thus, while we can – and presumably should – have norms which we use to draw distinctions between arguments (valid, invalid, cogent, noncogent, enthymematic, complete, sound, unsound, fallacious, plausible, strong, weak, inductive, deductive, and so on), we should understand and be careful to remember that all such norms have their limits. They may not always be applicable and, even when applicable, may not lead us to answers to the most important questions we could ask about the social discourse to which they are applied.

Intelligence does not presume norms; norms presume intelligence. Norms are not provided by Plato, God, Russell, or Quine. Not even by Grice. They 'emerge' (in a way not clarified) from social practice generally and argumentative practice in particular. We make that practice and it makes us. Does our argumentative practice make us individualistic and competitive? Do we make that practice as it is because we are individualistic and competitive? His comments about possessive individualism suggest that Shotter would answer both questions affirmatively. But these themes are more suggested than developed.

Pinxten and Balangangadhura offer an unpretentious and lively critique of argumentation theory. They see it as culturally biased. The very theme of the workshop, they contend, "reflects a set of highly culture-specific assumptions" and "carries a mantle of universality which is rather illusory." Argument (within influential circles, such as the pragma-dialectical theory of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst) is seen as a subspecies of conversation. If general conversation theory is culturally biased, then any theory of argument based on it will be flawed in a similar way. And, these authors contend, maxims of Gricean theory so widely appealed to do not fit many conversations in Asian or North American Indian cultures. The Gricean maxims: 'be brief', 'be relevant', 'be informative', 'be cooperative' do not fit examples put forward by these authors in which people appear to talk to establish a relationship, to impress each other, to save face, or to lead the other to contemplate a metaphysical paradox. The Gricean theory of conversation is shown to be culturally biased: if we apply it to many conversations in many parts of the non-western world, we would be forced to conclude that these 'other people' simply do not know how to converse. The result is clearly absurd.

It is not plausible, these authors submit, to say that arguing is a necessary practice because it is the only nonviolent way of solving conflicts of opinion. The problem of "solving conflicts of opinions" is a problem *within* argumentation theory, in the way the question 'how does potentiality relate to actuality?' was a question *within* Aristotelian physics. Reason (in the sense of western-style argumentation) and violence are not the only alternatives in situations where people differ. How could scholars have gone wrong? The answer is "as obvius as it is deplorable"; people who have hastily proposed this

dichotomy have not "studied how other cultures have solved the same problem". You have to be arrogant to think your pet theory about your culture's customary way of solving a problem is the only way of solving it.

To have this essay first, and the others as answers to it, would have made an exciting volume indeed! As it stands, *Norms in Argumentation* offers nourishing food for thought. Let's hope it will be widely consumed.

Trudy Govier
Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Alain Lempereur (éd.), *Colloque de Cerisy, l'argumentation* (1991) Philosophie et Langage, Mardaga: Liège. pp. 216.

Ce livre interdisciplinaire, recueil des 12 conférences plénières du colloque "Argumentation et Signification" tenu au Centre Culturel International de Cerisy-la-Salle en août 1987 sous la direction de Michel Meyer, présente le grand avantage de mettre à la disposition du lecteur tout un éventail d'approches de l'argumentation, venant de traditions, d'horizons et de pays différents. Dans un espace restreint, il rassemble des perspectives sur l'argumentation dont la diversité dépasse largement celle annoncée par la tripartition du livre en *Histoire et Philosophie de l'argumentation, Statut epistémologique de l'argumentation* et *Pragmatique de l'argumentation.*

Après une présentation par A. Lempereur (F.N.R.S.), la première partie s'ouvre par un article lucide de Charles H. Kahn (Université de Pennsylvanie) "*L'argumentation dans les dialogues socratiques*". Kahn y rejette les hypothèses traditionnellement historiciste et évolutionniste pour développer ses propres interprétations dites *protreptique* et *proleptique.* Selon la première, Platon utiliserait la puissance hypnotique de l'oeuvre d'art pour attirer le lecteur dans l'univers de la pensée philosophique, et selon la seconde, le contenu de cet univers philosophique n'est révélé que graduellement et progressivement dans ses dialogues. Une analyse perspicace de *Lachès*, de *Protagoras* et de *La République* appuie ces hypothèses.

Dans un article concis et élégant, "*La régression à l'infini et l'argumentum ad hominem*", Henry W. Johnstone (Université de Pennsylvanie) défend une thèse qu'il qualifie lui-même d'ambitieuse, à savoir que "le caractère résolument philosophique des arguments de la régression à l'infini dérive de leur caractère *ad hominem*" (p. 34). Johnston montre de manière convaincante qu'étant donné que les prémisses d'un argument philosophique, comme par exemple celui sur l'existence d'un créateur de l'univers, s'esquivent à l'infini, elles ne peuvent s'ancrer que dans les engagements de ceux qui argumentent, et deviennent par là des arguments *ad hominem.* Socrate dans la *Parménide* de Platon illustre la place de la régression à l'infini dans l'argumentation philosophique, poussé comme il l'est à progresser – ou régresser – de plus en plus dans "la stratification des prédicats", formule heureuse par laquelle Johnston met au clair le paradoxe du "Troisième homme".

Alain Michel (Université de Paris-Sorbonne) présente un article "*Rhetorique et philosophie dans le monde romain: les problèmes de l'argumentation*", qui est véritablement historique dans ce sens qu'il trace l'évolution des philosophes qui, dès le Ve siècle jusqu'au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance, ont traité l'argumentation. Dans un style savant et serré, Michel appuye son hypothèse selon laquelle c'est Cicéron qui a le mieux su concilier et transmettre les pensées platonicienne et aristotélicienne, dans une théorie ayant beaucoup de traits en commun avec une linguistique de la communication. Un exemple en est fourni par *De Inuentione* où Cicéron expose sa théorie des "états de cause", dont le premier est relatif au fait (la référence), le second à la dénomination (la sémantique), et la troisième aux motifs (l'interprétation). Que Cicéron soit proche même de l'actualité, est démontré d'une part par ses réflexions sur les lieux communs (thème on le sait à l'agenda), d'autre part par sa définition de l'argumentation qui est parmi les plus précises de tout le recueil: "on peut définir l'argument comme un moyen rationnel qui nous fair donner foi à une chose douteuse" (p. 40).

Dans "*Rhétorique et production du savoir: Les grands courants de la théorie rhétorique américaine*", James Golden (Université d'Ohio) nous donne un panorama extrêmement utile du développement de la rhétorique américaine des années 1920 jusqu'à nos jours, un développement où on a vu les traditions néo-aristotéliciennes remplacer par une rhétorique épistémique, tournée vers la création de connaissances et de vérités nouvelles et ancrée dans les réalités sociales. C'est une rhétorique que dans une perspective européenne, on rapprocherait des analyses du discours et des analyses psycho-sociales de la communication publique. Golden donne d'ailleurs des exemples fort intéressants de discours politiques tenus par Lincoln, Roosevelt, Reagan et autres. Golden distingue deux grands courants épistémiques, un courant "dramatiste" fondé sur les concepts de "rationalité narrative", "vision rhétorique" et "fable", et un autre courant "idéologique", parfois matérialiste, qui inclut le peuple et ses lieux communs à la place d'un auditoire idéal. L'article qui constitue déjà un élargissement considérable du domaine de la rhétorique, se termine par une toute nouvelle perspective – la philosophie organiciste d'une conception holographique de l'argumentation.

La deuxième partie *Statut epistémologique de l'argumentation* contient trois articles qui ne traitent pas de l'épistém(olog)ique au même titre. L'article *L'argumentation et les fondements sociaux de la connaissance* de Charles A. Willard (Université de Louisville) touche juste par ses réflexions sur le statut d'une "discipline" et sur la naissance de nouvelles disciplines. Une discipline étant caractérisée par une force centrifuge – qui risque de figer la discipline en bureaucratisation et institutionnalisation – une nouvelle discipline naîtrait par des forces centripètes qui surgissent à la périphérie, au contact de disciplines voisines. C'est le cas, comme on le sait, de la discipline de l'argumentation qui suit depuis quelque temp des chemins multiples, allant d'un système formel vers des systèmes informels, rhétorique, philosophique, linguistique et autres. Avec le risque toutefois de partir sur des "faux accords" (p. 94) ce dont la notion d'"argument informel" constitue un bon exemple. L'article est extrêmement intéressant par ce côté d'"auto-réflexion" ou de méta-réflexion sur le statut épistémique de l'argumentation, de même qu'il est très riche en exemples et références.

L'article d'Olivier Reboul (Université de Strasbourg) *Peut-il y avoir une argumentation non rhétorique*, qui d'ailleurs mène à une réponse négative, aborde l'épistém(olog)ique par une discussion du rôle que joue une argumentation rhétorique, mais pas pour autant manipulatoire, dans les quatre situations privilégiées de la pédagogie, la politique, le droit et la philosophie. L'article fait preuve d'un grand souci de clarté dans son argumentation pour inclure "le rhétorique" dans l'argumentation et dans son exposition des quatre approches "classiques" du rhétorique, approches que l'auteur réfute comme trop réductrices. Or, la définition qu'il donne lui-même du rhétorique comme étant caractérisé par la "non-paraphrase" et la "fermeture" (p. 109) ne nous semble pas échapper à ce même reproche, du moins dans la forme un peu sommaire sous laquelle elle est présentée ici.

Anthony Blair (Université de Windsor) fournit dans *Qu'est-ce que la logique non formelle*? une présentation très utile de ce mouvement de réforme de la logique qui se développe depuis une vingtaine d'années en Amérique du Nord. Née comme une objection contre l'ensemble trop rigoureusement véríconditionnel de la logique formelle, la logique informelle se voit comme une tentative pédagogique de mieux apprendre aux étudiants d'évaluer des arguments ("la pensée critique") et d'améliorer leurs aptitudes au raisonnement ("logique appliquée"). Dans le but d'élaborer une théorie sur les conditions générales de la force d'un argument, Blair propose trois critères: la soutenance, la pertinence et la suffisance, destinés à remplacer les critères formels de vérité, de solidité et de validité.

La Troisième Partie: *Pragmatique de l'argumentation*, contient cinq articles qui couvrent tout l'éventail pragmatique, allant d'une pragmatique linguistique (l'article de J.-C. Anscombre) à une pragmatique sémiotico-philosophique (articles de F. Jacques et de H. Parret), en passant par une pragmatique plus classique, celle des actes de langage (l'article de H. van Eemeren et R. Grootendorst).

L'article "*Dynamique du sens et scalarité*" de J.-C. Anscombre (C.N.R.S.) est le seul traitement linguistique de l'argumentation du recueil. Dans des réflexions méta-théoriques d'ordre linguistique sur l'argumentation dans la langue, Anscombre explore la relation entre informativité et argumentativité pour montrer la fonction autonome et non-dérivée de certains indices linguistiques argumentatifs (tels *peut-être, à peine, presque*). De tels "opérateurs argumentatifs" autorisent des raisonnements de vraisemblance, sinon de vérité, s'appuyant sur des "topos", terme emprunté à Aristote, mais ayant dans ce cadre théorique un sens plus spécifique de schéma de raisonnement gradué. Aussi, la notion de scalarité vient-elle occuper une place centrale dans cette nouvelle version de la théorie de l'argumentation dans la langue, version plus radicale aussi en ce qu'elle amène Anscombre à des conclusions assez drastiques d'un point de vue linguistique, à savoir que "signifier c'est imposer vis-à-vis des faits l'adoption de points de vue argumentatifs", "la langue est fondamentalement scalaire" et que même le lexique est scalaire. Etoffé par des exemples différenciés et appuyé par une rigoureuse argumentation linguistique, l'article d'Anscombre constitue une excellente introduction à cette intégration de l'argumentation dans la linguistique.

Dans un article très court et plutôt programmatique, "*Arguments et narrations*", Seymour Chatman (Université de Californie-Berkeley) présente, à partir de la distinction traditionnelle entre quatre types de textes: narrations, arguments, descriptions et exposés, la thèse d'une "textualité subordonnée", mais sans toutefois fournir des critères suffisants pour déterminer ce qui serait superordonné, et subordonné dans un texte.

Dans "*Argumentation et stratégies discursives*" Francis Jacques (Université de Paris-Sorbonne) nous offre une typologisation d'après des critères pragmatiques (énonciation, objectif, fonction) des stratégies discursives (S.D.) bivocales, concept générique dont les différentes espèces apparaissent en noeuds terminaux de l'arbre, tels que différend, dispute, débat, etc. Retiennent son intérêt tout particulièrement les types *conversation, dialogue* et *négociation*, dont ce n'est que les deux derniers qui comporteraient une dimension argumentative. Le dialogue, fortement finalisé, diffère de la conversation qui affiche "un aspect ludique" et dont la fonction est, d'après Kant de "corrober la relation d'appartenance à la communauté...". Le dialogue et la négociation auraient en commun l'argumentation, mais théorique (vise la vérité) pour le premier, et pratique (vise la légitimité) pour l'autre. L'auteur met au clair d'autres distinctions importantes entre les trois types de S.D., dont la plus importante nous semble être le rôle que jouent les présupposés.

L'article de Jacques est beaucoup plus riche, par exemple dans ses références philosophiques et sémiotiques, que ne le laisse supposer cette brève présentation. Mais il n'évite pas complètement une terminologie hermétique, propre à une certaine tradition sémiotico-pragmatique française qui est parfois plus séductrice qu'argumentée.

Dans "*Les sophismes dans une perspective pragmatico-dialectique*" Frans van Eemeren et Rob Grootendorst (Université d'Amsterdam) exploitent leur approche normative et idéale de l'argumentation pour établir un inventaire des sophismes. Chaque sophisme de l'inventaire, il y en a dix, correspond à l'infraction d'une règle argumentative spécifique. Tout systématique et pédagogique qu'est l'article, les auteurs n'y fournissent pas à notre avis, d'arguments théoriques convaincants pour le bien-fondé de chaque sophisme, ni pour l'inventaire proposé. Si l'article pêche ainsi par un certain manque théorique, il présente par contre un grand intérêt pratique par les exemples qu'il donne d'actes de langage indirects ou implicites typiques des différents sophismes, exemples qui aideront à diagnostiquer les sophismes dans les discours quotidiens. Aussi, cette approche pragmatico-dialectique de l'argumentation, dite "L'École d'Amsterdam" présente-t-elle l'intérêt de ne pas limiter les sophismes à la non-validité des arguments comme c'était le propre du Traitement-Standard de Hamblin, mais de les approcher de la réalité pratique de l'argumentation.

Le recueil se termine par un chant des Sirènes, l'article "Les arguments du séducteur" de Herman Parret (F.N.R.S., Universités de Louvain et d'Anvers), où la pragmatique entre par le biais des actes de discours (indirects). L'auteur montre – en comparant l'acte de séduction aux actes de mensonge et de manipulation – que ni une telle pragmatique ni une sémiotique interactionnelle ne sauraient expliquer la séduction parce que celle-ci n'est ni fausse ni insincère. Ayant sa propre logique, légèrement illogique il est vrai, à savoir une logique d'objectivisation – "c'est l'objet qui séduit", donc le sujet devient objet – l'acte séducteur échappe à cette double option d'Austin de conditions de vérité et de sincérité, et ne peut donc être qualifié de "malheur". Parret réussit de manière élégante, rigoureuse et séductrice à la fois, à nous convaincre que "le séducteur n'a pas d'arguments et qu'un argument n'est pas séducteur".

Enfin, on le voit, le livre est riche en perspectives diversifiées, et justement on pourrait regretter que cette diversité n'ait pas été palliée par des discussions où les conférenciers auraient pu tenter sinon de concilier leurs approches divergentes, au moins de les rapprocher et de les affiner par des argumentations. On se rappellera les discussions d'autres philosophes et savants qu'on trouve dans le célèbre recueil "La philosophie Analytique des Cahiers de Royaumont 1962" (Editions de Minuit)...

Lita Lundquist
École des Hautes Études Commerciales de Copenhague
Dalgas Have 15
DK-2000 Frederiksberg

Desmond Paul Henry, *Medieval Mereology*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner, 1991, xxv + 609 pages.

Anyone with an interest in informal logic and argumentation knows about the famous fallacies of composition and division. According to Copi and Cohen (1990, p. 117), the fallacy of composition is the illicit argument from the attributes of the parts to the attributes of a whole.

Case 1: All the parts of a machine ar light in weight, therefore the machine as a whole is light in weight.

Division is the converse fallacy of illicitly arguing from the whole to the parts, as this example from Copi and Cohen (p. 118) illustrates.

Case 2: A certain corporation is very important. Mr. Doe is an official of that

corporation. Therefore, Mr. Doe is very important.

It is pretty clear that arguments of this kind are fallacious, and moreover, that in some instances they could be serious and significant errors of argumentation. In economic questions, for example arguing from the properties of the parts of an economic structure to the properties of the whole, at the macro level, can be subject to serious errors.

But the problem with analyzing these fallacies is that cases of arguments that have the same form or structure of inferences as cases 1 and 2 can be reasonable, i.e., nonfallacious arguments. Consider the following pair of examples.

Case 3: All the parts of this machine are aluminium.
Therefore, this machine is made of aluminium.

Case 4: This field of tulips is uniformly red in colour.
Therefore, the individual tulips are red in colour.

These cases are arguments that are instances of composition and division, respectively, having the same general forms as cases 1 and 2. But cases 3 and 4 as arguments seem quite reasonable. They appear to be nonfallacious. And, indeed, they even appear to be fairly strong arguments, even if they are not deductively valid (without being supplemented with additional assumptions).

What is the difference then between the fallacious and the nonfallacious cases of composition and division arguments? This is the question of evaluation that, if we could answer it in a generalizable way, would make a significant contribution to our treatment of fallacies.

The clue to an answer is that the structure of inference involved in cases 1 to 4 appears to be deductive in nature once some "meaning postulates" in the form of additional premises are added – see Bar-Hillel (1964) – but it is clearly not that of the standard first-order logic of propositions and quantifiers. What we appear to need here instead, is a part-whole logic of some sort.

Modern logicians have developed formal part-whole logics, and several of these have been evaluated in Woods and Walton (1977) as showing promise to help in the analysis of the fallacies of composition and division. Even so, these fallacies may turn out to be partly informal or practical in nature, since arguments like those in cases 3 and 4 appear to depend on nonexplicit premises that somehow go wrong or are lacking in fallacious cases like 1 and 2.

What may perhaps be less well known to those with an interest in informal fallacies and argumentation is that part-whole reasoning was extensively studied in the middle ages. This may not seem too interesting to argumentation theorists in itself, but what makes it interesting is the surprising depth and subtlety of these medieval treatments, and the continuity between them and the modern, formalistic theories of a part-whole inferences. D. P. Henry's new book, *Medieval Mereology* not only surveys these medieval treatments, but also gives an outline of the contemporary formalistic theories, weaving the two accounts together throughout the book.

Although this is a long (609 + xxv pp.) and scholarly book containing some

Latin, no knowledge of either Latin or formal logic is required of the reader (the Latin merely being made available in some cases for those who wish to consult it). The presentation of texts, translations and commentaries includes Abelard's extensive mereological theories, material from twelfth-century sources like Gilbert of Poitiers, the treatments of Aquinas, Buridan and Ockham, and material from Paul of Venice's *Logica Magna*.

The logical basis of the book is the mereological theory of Lesniewski, as derived from the development of this theory by Lejewski. The technical expression of the theory, with its axioms, is given in the last chapter of the book, in an exposition especially designed for non-specialists. Thus, Henry's book is not exclusively one of historical interest. The historical developments in the medieval period are combined with the modern logical theory in an interesting and useful way. Readers can use this book to gain a practical grasp of the basic principles of mereology as a part-whole logic that both throws light on, and is itself motivated by the conceptual and linguistic puzzle studied by the medievals. Henry's book is actually a relatively painless way for a beginner to learn the basic elements of mereology as a formal system.

Incidentally, some other fallacies are also covered in this book as well. The fallacy of *secundum quid*, a.k.a. "neglecting qualifications" or "hasty generalization", is included in the topics covered in the mereological aspects of Aquinas' writings (section 3, pp. 313–317). The type of fallacious inference studied by Aquinas is indicated by the following example: Socrates has curly hair, therefore, Socrates is curly. This interesting type of fallacious argumentation is actually on the borderline between composition and *secundum quid*.

Whether argumentation theorists will have the patience or motivation to plough through six hundred pages of careful historical, conceptual, and formal logical analysis is open to doubt. But I think where Henry's book does have a use for this readership is as a source book of case materials, examples for discussion, and matters of applications of formal logic to interesting examples of composition and division arguments. For anyone working on the fallacies of composition and division, indeed, this book is an invaluable, even indispensable resource. I would recommend it for acquisition for your department or university library, and as a personal purchase for those who have a special interest in fallacies, especially, of course, the fallacies of composition and division.

I think that those of us in argumentation, informal logic, and discourse analysis generally, will find a surprising amount of useful and relevant material here, especially on some of the finer shades of meaning on how to deal with composition and division arguments. Anyone who looks carefully at these analyses and fine distinctions will easily come to the conclusion that we can no longer take for granted (without considerable analysis and careful interpretation) that composition and division arguments are fallacious in a given case.

REFERENCES

Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, *Introduction to Logic*, New York, Macmillan, 1990.
Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, "More on the Fallacy of Composition," *Mind* **73**, 1964, 125–126.
John Woods and Douglas Walton, "Composition and Division," *Studia Logica* **36**, 1977, 381–406. Reprinted in *Fallacies: Selected Papers*, 1972–1982, Dordrecht, Foris Publications, 1989, pp. 93–119.

Douglas Walton
Department of Philosophy
University of Winnipeg
Winnipeg, R3B 2E9
Canada

Celeste Michelle Condit, *Decoding abortion rhetoric. Communicating social change* (1990), Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois Press. pp. xv + 236. $24.95.

This book shows quite convincingly that a rhetorical analysis can provide a clear image of a complicated and lasting public discussion. It is less clear, however, on exactly *how* such an analysis is made: the methodological aspects of the work are, perhaps intentionally, under-exposed. This makes for more pleasant reading if one is only interested in the abortion debate itself; however, it is a pity for the reader who is interested in the analysis of public debates in general.

Condit assumes that three 'units of discourse' are central to the persuasiveness and impact of public discourse: narratives, ideographs and characterizations.

In Condit's analysis *narratives* or stories play a particular role at the beginning of the abortion debate in the sixties, when the discussion in the US first started with horrifying tales of women undergoing illegal abortions in unhygienic circumstances. As opposed to this 'tale of illegal abortion', the anti-abortionists propagated the 'pro-Life heritage tale', in which Western history was cited to demonstrate that a no to abortion was a cultural attainment supported by great thinkers in the past. The catholic opponents started their story long ago at the time of the Greeks and Romans. The protestant opponents (among whom in later years president Reagan) made use of more recent history, with analogies between slavery, the holocaust and abortion.

Condit uses the term *ideographs* to describe 'special words or phrases that express the public values that provide the "constitutional" commitments of a community'. In the US they include Life, Liberty and Property. The anti-abortionists repeatedly, and often with obvious success, sought to demonstrate that the struggle against abortion is a fight pro Life. The obviousness of this argument was supported by the dissemination of selective pictures of a foetus in the third or late second trimester. The supporters of abortion had a much more difficult task. Condit shows how they called upon Equality and Freedom to form a right to Choice of the woman. This required a revision of American ideographic structure. In 1973 this revision was finally endorsed in the legal arena by the sentence of the Supreme Court in the case *Roe* vs *Wade.*

Characterizations are universalized depictions of important agents, acts, scenes, purposes or methods. The term *characterization* encompasses positive and negative forms of 'stereotypes'. Hence, the scene of illegal abortion was characterized as the 'back alley'. That is a simplification, but a useful rhetorical simplification for summing up the problems presented by criminal abortion. Also, the description of the foetus as an 'unborn baby' is to be taken as a characterization. Condit shows how, in pictures, a number of rhetorical figures of speech (metonymy, metaphor and synedoche) serve to make the claim that the foetus can be characterized as an unborn baby and a human being.

In her analyses, Condit sketches an enthralling picture of the history of the American abortion debate. I was particularly fascinated by the way in which a socially acceptable compromise was gradually reached in the public opinion and in the legal arena, while at the same time the polarization in the pro-Life and the pro-Choice movements was becoming more and more acute, resulting in a number of bomb attacks on abortion clinics in 1984. This 'schizophrenia' also explains why the social compromise turned out to be so delicate after 1985 (the year in which Condit's analysis came to an end): at election time the discussion keeps cropping up; as a result of shifts in the Supreme Court the cards are gradually moved around.

The analyses do raise a number of questions.

Do narratives really play a relevant role particularly at the begininng of the abortion debate? Or is it the coincidental result of a particular way of looking at the situation? Condit analyses the articles in mass-circulation magazines about illegal abortions from the early period as narratives. The concept is further extended by her also indicating as 'narratives' or 'tales' particular versions of history, while the narrative structures of the latter are surely not so obvious. On the other hand, later in the book Condit analyses prime time entertainment programmes (Hill Street Blues, Dallas, etc.) for motives expressed either for or against having an abortion. Here too, 'tales' are created, for example about women who, after much ado, finally decide against abortion and then systematically suffer a miscarriage, or appear not to have been pregnant after all! But in this particular chapter the terms 'narrative' or 'tale' are not used at all, and it is not clear to me why not.

The analysis of visual images in terms of figures of speech is quite convincing. In the very moving picture of the two tiny feet of a foetus held between two fingers (propagated around the whole world), the working of a *synedoche* is inescapable. The tiny feet force us to consider the foetus as a human being in all respects. A photograph of a complete foetus is a lot less convincing. But why are figures of speech only employed in the analysis of photographs? Do they only play a role in visual communication?

The analysis in terms of ideographs is clarifying. However, in this way the debate is reduced to a battle (Condit prefers to speak of *negotiations*) of terms. In the end it is a question of how the supporters and opponents of abortion can relate their positions to current or new ideographs in public discourse. The argumentative means by which these relations are made are, for the most part, not included in Condit's analysis. In any case, according to her assumptions, arguments are not part of the basic 'units of discourse'. This makes it rather unclear by what means the revision of the 'ideographical structure', which is the result of the abortion discussion, has been 'negotiated'.

Peter Jan Schellens
University of Twente
The Netherlands