Incompleteness and Fictionality in Meinong's Object Theory*

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1. Every period in the history of philosophy has its own way of looking back. For instance, when we turn to recent developments in logic and semantics, which have taken place in a period when Meinong seemed to be already completely forgotten, we witness his rediscovery, even his reincarnation, within several of the new theories: in so-called free logic, in Meinongian semantics, in para-consistent logics, etc. It would be a very interesting topic to compare these different approaches and to evaluate them by criteria applied to the evolution of theories: universality, explanatory power, simplicity, etc. One further point of view of such an evaluation might then be: to compare the new approaches with the ideas and theories of the original theory of objects. To contribute somewhat to the latter point of this vast program is the first purpose of this paper.

To my mind the fate Meinong's object-theory has suffered during this century can serve as a good example of how dramatically the view of certain conceptions can change and does change in the history of philosophy.

2. One feature which immediately comes to mind when dealing with Meinong's philosophy is the question: which Meinong? In his voluminous and rich jungle-book,[1] a summa of some of the most interesting Meinongian problems, Richard Routley, one of the earlier apologists of Meinong and a strong prophet of noncism, distinguishes three Meinongs: first, the unhistorical or mythological Meinong, second, the consistent Meinong, and third, the para-consistent or dialectical Meinong.

The best known Meinong is the one associated or identified with the greatest entity-multiplier in the history of philosophy — note the appraisal in the definite description. This is the mythological Meinong, who according to Routley is not so much a descendant of Russell but of Oxford philosophy. This may well be true. Nevertheless, it was mainly the Russell-Meinong discussion concerning the character of judgements

about non-existent objects at the beginning of this century which created the mythological Meinong. In the 1930s, when Russell's theory of description was recognized as a model of logico-philosophical analysis, Ryle in his incomparably impressive way hallmarked Meinong as the "supreme entity-multiplier in the history of philosophy".[2]

The main reason for this accusation was seen in Meinong's principle that we can truly predicate whatever we intend to predicate of non-existing objects, therefore seemingly presupposing the being of things which do not exist or logically cannot exist. Russell himself thought that we are easily misled if we take the duality of meaning and denotation as fundamental. For if we do so we are led to think that propositions concerning the so-and-so presuppose that the so-and-so exists, while the theory of description was constructed in order to show that this is not the case. Against this background it seemed clear that one could go around Meinong's paradox that there are objects which are not there. On the other hand, Meinong could never accept Russell's claim that judgements about non-existing objects are non-referential, since Meinong held the thesis that all singular terms refer.[3] Looking through the glasses of Frege, Russell says in *Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description*:

> If we are to preserve the duality of meaning and denotation we have to say, with Meinong, that there are such objects as the golden mountain and the round square, although these objects do not have being. We even have to admit that the existent round square is existent, but does not exist.[4]

It is not at all clear if the historical Meinong has really adopted the Frege-principle of the duality of meaning and reference. But surely he never accepted a principle which assigned existence or being to every object of our thoughts and theories. On the contrary, as we shall see in a moment, he introduced the idea and the concept

of a pure object which is immune to the question of existence. Those who accuse Meinong of some basic incoherence in his position reason in this way: if someone states, 'something is such and such', he/she normally attributes existence to something. And if it is denied of something that it exists, it looks as if the reasoning still does presuppose the existence, in the sense of

(Ex) (x exists).

But nothing of this kind is involved in Meinong's idea that if we want to examine an object thoroughly it is best *not* to take notice of its ontological status, but to find out how the object is, whatever ontological status it may have. The object of this inquiry he characterized as an object beyond being and non-being.

Before I return to the question of Meinong's ontological commitments, I want at least to mention the other two Meinongs of Routley's jungle-book. The one is a consistent, the other a para-consistent Meinong. Even to Routley, who seems to favour a "para-consistent approach", it is clear that the historical Meinong did not show any inclination towards a dialectical kind of logic or ontology. Meinong did not give a convincing counterargument to Russell's objection that he apparently did not consider the proposition that the round square is existent but does not exist as contradictory.[5] However, he was quite clear that the law of contradiction is only to be applied to what is real or possible, but cannot meaningfully be applied to impossible objects, which by their very nature are determined by properties excluding each other and are thus in need of principles that transcend classical logic. But in no way did Meinong give room to the idea that consistency itself should be given up. So, Routley seems to me completely right in considering a reconstruction of Meinong's theory of objects "within a para-consistent framework" as unhistorical.[6]

But where do we find the historical Meinong? If we look at the newer literature on Meinong, which chiefly is in English, we very often detect that it is not Meinong who is quoted, but Findlay. Particularly Meinong's theory of incomplete objects is mainly taken in the form Findlay has presented it in his thesis of the early 1930s and again in the second edition of his excellent and most valuable description of Meinong's writings.[7] Nevertheless, however highly we esteem the service Findlay has rendered to Meinong and to those interested in Meinong, and however reliable we find his way of

presenting Meinong's case, it remains an interpretation which at least here and there cannot avoid looking through the glasses of Russell. I do not want to exaggerate and to state that interpretations always create new objects instead of clarifying the ones they are supposed to interpret or to analyse. But if we compare Findlay's interpretation of Meinong's theory of objects with most of what goes under Meinong's name, then it is quite clear that Findlay's reconstruction is intended as an historically adequate account of Meinong's theory, while most of the others do not even claim this and could not claim it justifiably.

What I intend to do in this paper is first to try to give a clear and simple picture of Meinong's general theory of objects, secondly, to describe the character and use of incomplete objects, and thirdly to relate these ideas to the ontological and epistemological problem of fictionality. I think that the distinctions used in Meinong's theory are of great value. Moreover, I think that they also provide the best basis for a theory of fictionality which does not impose on us the unacceptable idea that works of art (and perhaps even scientific theories) always only pretend to deal with objects but never do so in reality. No doubt, the origin of these ideas is mainly found in the real or actual Meinong. I, therefore, will be concerned with the actual Meinong and not with one of the countless possible ones which nowadays serve as a signpost to semantical theories about the realm of non-existence. And we must be quite aware of the fact that the actual Meinong developed his theory of objects over a period of about twenty years, trying to refine and to reformulate his conceptions all the time. That we cannot look back otherwise than from our own point of view seems to me a trivial fact, not worthy to be blown out of all proportion into a hermeneutic circle.

3. Object-theory as conceived by Meinong, is the most general theory of any kind of entities and non-entities, comprising all actual, possible and impossible objects.[8] Twardowski, who was the first within the Brentano-school to emphasize the part of the content in the act-object relation was probably also the first to conceive of the idea of a general object theory, which he still called metaphysics.

Meinong, however, pointed out that metaphysics was traditionally conceived as the most general *science of being* and therefore left all the homeless objects beyond being outside its framework. In this Meinong was right. But, I think, he also had an appropriate understanding

of how to develop this new theory, because he did not think of it as a purely descriptive or phenomenological enterprise. He rightly thought that if you try to suggest principles then you are also giving methodological rules. What are the correct principles to cover the objects of an appropriate and general theory of objects? How mathematics should enter the sciences is one of the questions which led to general object theory. Thus, the formal character of a systematic approach was clearly seen in Meinong's apologia of object-theory when he said:

> Object-theory has the task to try in regard to the whole complex of objects, what mathematics does for a part and intends to do for even a much larger part of that totality.[9]

Object-theory is first and foremost free of existential presupposition: it is, in Meinong's own words, '*daseins-freie Wissenschaft*'. Husserl, by the way, called his theory of objects "formal ontology" and it is interesting to find in Meinong's remarks on Husserl's *Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* the observation that "general theory of objects" would have been the "most natural" name for what Husserl had dubbed 'formal Ontology'.[10] To carry out the task to investigate objects as what they are Meinong introduces the principle of the pure object, saying that "neither being nor non-being can belong essentially to the object in itself . . . The Object is by nature indifferent to being ('*ausserseiend*'), although at least one of its two Objectives of being, the Object's being or not-being, subsists".[11]

In other words, existence is not a part of the Object in itself, it is not part of the nature of the object. This principle is linked with the other one saying that being-so ('*so-sein*') is independent of being. If we are asking for the nature of an object then we do not get informed when we hear that it exists, but only when we grasp its being-so we get informed about the nature of an object, because the nature of an object is made up of all the nuclear properties of the object.

Meinong considers and distinguishes objects of different levels: those which constitute other objects, and those which are constituted by lower-level objects, like an objective which is the bearer of truth and falsity, of its constituents. Those objects of higher order necessarily have constituents of a lower order, but the hierarchy has infima: those objects which do not depend on others.

I shall not describe or develop further the overall picture of Meinong's general theory. It may be rightly seen as a framework wide enough to cover all our common sense intuitions as well as the whole of logical and ontological space.

The mainstream of the counterarguments against such an ontologically tolerant theory comes from defenders of the principle of parsimony, Occam's maxim not to do with more entities what you can do with less. However, Meinong emphatically denies being guilty of violating this maxim. He, too, accepts the principle of parsimony: what does not exist or subsist should not be taken as an entity. But why therefore deny non-entities? And, after all, quantifying over possibilia, i.e. modal semantics, seems a convenient tool to explain states of affairs, which may or will become facts, and to explain those events which we eventually want to avoid. The extension of an approach to what is not possible seems to lead to a wider application of non-standard methods in logic, a topic I shall not be concerned with here.

4. I now turn to the problem of incomplete objects, one of Meinong's important discoveries concerning the logical structure of objects. In sketching the idea of a general theory of objects, I have not said anything about objects as such. If we think of the logical or categorical structure of the world, then the concept of an object is the genus which has to be taken as the *summum genus* of all genera, therefore it is not definable in the classical way by using some other genus. This was already clearly seen by Twardowski.[12] Actually, Meinong is using almost Twardowski's words when he emphasizes that we cannot make clear what the meaning of the term "object" is, because "everything" may be an object. That we can distinguish objects one from another can be seen by the fact that we can count objects, be they existing or non-existing. As we know, it is not generally agreed that the use of such a wide notion will be useful in logical and ontological investigations. Wittgenstein is among those who complain that Frege's terms "concept" and "object" are too general: though one can count, he says, "tables and tunes and waves and thoughts, it is difficult to bring them under one heading".[13] The heading is indeed thin; however, it makes something out of everything. That is obscure.

So, let us look more closely at what is called an object. Because what we know best are the things of our actual world, we may first try to give a characteristic of

those things that make up the actual world, the actual existing objects.

Meinong credits only individuals with actuality. If something exists, he states, it is completely determined: it is a *complete object*. In order to determine a complete object, which *a priori* also exists or subsists, the whole logical space is to be used.

Although Meinong does not mention it, his principle of complete determination has a long history. It has been formulated for instance by Kant, who said: "Everything that exists is completely determined". Meinong not only accepts this wording, but uses also Kant's explication, namely, that not only "one of every pair of given contradictory predicates, but that one of all possible contradictory predicates is always predicable of the thing".[14]

In Meinong's formulation this reads: "Everything existing or subsisting is completely determined (positively or negatively)".[15] Subsistence is on a par with existence in regard to completeness, but is nevertheless to be distinguished from it, since only real things can exist. If we, however, accept completeness as a criterion of existence, then all objects that are completely determined would fall into the class of existent objects. In order to distinguish concrete and abstract objects, Meinong assigns to the former existence and — like Russell — to the latter subsistence.

It is the mark of existences, that is, real things, that "what exists must exist at a certain time",[16] and it is the mark of subsistences that they are timeless ideals, and not subject to causal relations. It would be tempting to discuss these characterisations and the others put forward by Meinong, because they cover quite a wide field of examples. But it is far from clear what the sufficient conditions for something being ideal are. Since, however, we want to deal with incomplete objects, we cannot or should not stick only to those that are complete.

If we now turn to incomplete objects, we may also learn more about the complete ones, which make up our actual world and which attract our robust sense of reality, but which can never be completely apprehended by the human or any other finite mind.

5. If complete objects are the only ones which are individuals, then to be in the sense of existence or subsistence means to be an individual: the individual object so and so. However, it is a curious fact that to apprehend, to grasp such a complete object we are relying on incomplete ones.[17] The first reason for this fact lies in this: in order to know an object entirely, that

is in regard to all its determinations, we need to know an infinite set of propositions. Since no finite mind can have infinite knowledge, we cannot have complete knowledge of a complete object. But if an object is *incomplete* there is at least the possibility that we may apprehend it completely.

Incomplete objects are known to us first of all as objects of apprehension. We do know them for instance, Meinong states, as meanings of words and definitions. What do we know of an object of this kind? The answer is simple: we can know the object in so far as it is determined. And the object is determined, for instance, by its description or its definiens: "a triangle which is isosceles". If we now leave aside the epistemic point of view and concentrate on the object, then we see that the principle of the excluded middle does not apply to incomplete objects throughout. Certainly, a triangle is or is not a triangle, but, whether it is isosceles or not, is open to further determination. Is it right-angled or acute-angled? We cannot know this and no one can know this just because the object itself is not determined in any respect. It is an incomplete object, incomplete in regard to (its) determinations.

If only complete objects can exist and do exist (or subsist) then it follows that incomplete objects cannot and do not exist (or subsist). What then is their ontological status? One answer Meinong suggests is that they are pseudo-existent. With existent things they for instance share that they may be referents and may have properties. Yet, they do not exist: they are not completely determined. Clearly, if we accept the assumption of classical semantic theory, that "Fa" is true only if "a" exists, then it follows that no incomplete object could be truly assigned properties or that incomplete objects would have to exist. The latter alternative is unacceptable, because we cannot give up the distinction of existence and non-existence without losing the basic distinction of our ontology and our common way of speaking about the world. The former alternative is to be rejected since we doubtlessly communicate all the time about properties of non-existing objects. And, more importantly, from an epistemic point of view we could say that knowledge by description is built upon incomplete objects, whereas only knowledge by acquaintance brings us in direct contact with actual and complete objects.

What then is the role of incomplete objects in regard to our knowledge of complete objects? If we understand this, we might also understand better the character and even the ontological status of incomplete objects.

Meinong's reasoning is as follows: the human mind is

not capable of grasping and knowing a complete object entirely. But in order to pick it out of the universe of existing things as the object referred to, the mind uses another object by which the referring act can achieve its goal. Our presentation which will be intentionally directed to the object cannot use this object because of its completeness; instead, it uses one that is incomplete in its so-being: an incomplete object. The incomplete object is presented as an auxiliary object for something that is at least less incomplete or entirely complete. Our knowledge in regard to an object will not only depend on the determinations of its so-being, but will be the more reliable and perfect the more determinations are grasped.

An incomplete object is first of all to be considered as something that is determined by something else, though not completely. In the simple case we may take the meanings of relatively primitive terms as examples of auxiliary objects used to refer to a complete one, since Meinong himself has pointed out that meanings of words are very often auxiliary objects.[18] This remark has led Findlay to state "that Meinong's distinction between the auxiliary and the ultimate object does much the same work as Frege's distinction between the sense and reference".[19] I do not think we find in Meinong's writings any hint that he accepted Frege's semantic principle even if it is true that in some sense auxiliary objects are just Fregean senses.

However, Meinong is interested not only in this aspect of incomplete objects. He also asks for an answer to the question: how are they related to complete ones if the latter are aimed at or referred to as the ultimate objects? To answer this question we have to emphasize the distinction already used between two kinds of being: so-being, which presents the content of a thought of an object, namely, its character or nature, and being proper.

The *principium exclusi tertii* is valid only for complete objects, Meinong argues. We cannot state of "something blue", for instance, that it is heavy when the object is incomplete. "Something blue" is not determined in regard to being heavy. Nor can we state, however, that "something blue" is not heavy, which would be the logical consequence of the application of the principle of the excluded middle. So, the object "Something Blue" is incomplete insofar as the question whether any other attribute than the colour blue is one of the characteristics is left open and is undecidable. The nature of the object is exhausted by its given character.

Now we might ask whether this way out is not a path

into a logical problem. How do I know that "Something Blue" (*etwas Blaues*) does not have any further determination than the one presented? Could not having no future determination in itself be a determination? And, if so, would this not necessarily lead us into a muddle or even into a kind of paradox of the determination of indeterminacy of determination? That when the object is to be taken as determined by its not being determined it is determined?[20] Meinong's answer to this problem introduces another distinction, namely, the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties. By including into one class all the determinations of an object, that is, all properties that make up its character, its being-so, we form the class of nuclear properties of an object. Let's take the case that an object's nature is determined by one predicate only, "is blue", for instance. Thus we may group it with all other predicates that may determine the nature of that object into the class of nuclear (or constitutive) predicates. It is through them that we apprehend the so-being of objects, regardless of whether or not they exist. But there are other predicates we use, not in order to speak about the properties of individuals, but about objects of higher order, and conceptual frameworks within which we predicate, for instance if we judge that something is thought, assumed or doubted by someone, or if we make judgements about the ontological status of an object, saying that it is real or fictitious, existent or non-existent, possible or impossible, etc. Then we are not concerned with the nuclear properties of the object, but with higher-level objects.

We may now return to the question raised a moment ago, whether for an object to lack further determinations leads to an infinite regress, by adding to all given properties the property of not having a determination. Meinong's solution is that the determination to have or not to have a determination, like the determinations to be complete or incomplete, to have a relation to a subject or not, etc., do never belong to the set of nuclear properties. Therefore, the predicates are not to be mixed up.[21] Take the principle that of any pair of contradictory sentences either "p" or "non-p" is true; if we can apply this principle to incomplete objects, they would not be incomplete any more.

How, if at all, are these incomplete objects then related to the existing or subsisting ones? Meinong offers two answers to this difficult question. The first answer is that the indeterminateness encountered in the so-being of objects is to be encountered also in the being of incomplete objects itself.

.If we again take as an example the famous problem of

the general idea of a triangle which is neither isosceles nor scalene, we see Meinong defending the Lockean party against Berkeley. We do apprehend the abstract triangle which is not determined in respect of its sides and angles. The object which we grasp is incomplete. Nevertheless, it may be clearly defined in Euclidian Geometry such that the sum of its angles equals two right angles. Moreover, the incomplete object — the general abstract idea of a triangle in Locke's sense — is embedded in every complete object which is a triangle. How should we interpret this relation? Certainly not in the way of a part-whole relation, as one may think at first. For all parts of a complete object must be complete parts; otherwise the object could not be complete. Meinong uses different terms to name this relation (*implektiert, implexives Sein*, etc.), but what he intends to say may be expressed by the notion of embedment. An incomplete object, therefore, is embedded in all complete objects that satisfy the determination of the incomplete object.[22] This notion of satisfaction, however, should not be understood as a shadow synonym of existence or subsistence, since, as Meinong himself has pointed out, we also have to take into account properties which involve their non-being, and which therefore can only be satisfied by something that neither exists nor subsists.

Perhaps we can get a better understanding, if we think in the following way. If, for instance, we take truth, we may say of an object that if it has the property which it is said to have, then it is true that the object does have the property. So, if *f* is a determining feature of *a* then *af* is true. And that might even follow just from what is said. Because, if *f* is part of the meaning of *a*, then *f* is true of *a ex vi terminorum*. The sentences,

(1)   The round square is round.

and

(2)   The golden mountain is golden.

do have "the round square" in (1) and "the golden mountain" in (2) as proper parts of their meaning; so it can be said that "the mountain of which it is true that it is golden" is a description which is true of the non-existent object "the golden mountain", and "the square of which it is true that it is round and square" is a description which is true of the non-existent object "the round square".

Concerning the question of identity, I should like to repeat the argument of Routley and others that the criteria for the identity of non-entities "are the same as those for entities, namely coincidence of appropriate classes of properties" of the objects.[23]

Clearly this does not solve all the problems of identity of non-existent objects, but it expresses very accurately Meinong's idea that "the round square" and "the perpetuum mobile" cannot be the same, because "the round square is the round square" and "the perpetuum mobile is the perpetuum mobile". It seems an open question if we have to rely on self-identity in the case of non-existing and even impossible objects, too. Here I think it is fruitful to remind you that Meinong himself preferred the idea of a pure object, which is beyond being and not being, as the proper object of investigation, an object free of all existential presuppositions. Even Quine does find this idea "a good one".[24] Only when we want to understand it fully, we will have to use another perspective in our research.

To give an inkling of such a kind of investigation we may finally examine how Meinong himself used his framework in order to account for fictional objects. We shall therefore not be concerned with a Meinongian semantics for fictional objects, but with Meinong's own ideas about fictional objects. A comparison of these ideas with present-day semantics and theories of fictionality would require another chapter, and will therefore not be given here.[25]

We have seen that Meinong has a clear-cut distinction between what does exist (respectively: subsist) and what does not. It is completeness of determination which is the mark of the realm of existing things and, therefore, of the actual world. Incomplete objects are objects which are not determined in every respect.

Fictional objects very often are understood as those objects that are introduced into our actual world by storytelling, where in the frame of a story some character is created, described, or named, who therefore can be identified within the frame of the story. Also, the quantifiers in stories are within the scope of the operator which marks the story-character of a story. As a consequence of this basic fact theories of fictionality rely on the distinction between existing and non-existing objects, complete and incomplete objects.

Meinong's theory of objects provides us with a category subsuming not only objects of fiction as well as all other kinds of fictional objects, but also all kinds of objects of apprehensions, because even complete objects are apprehended, according to Meinong, by incomplete ones. Since an incomplete object never can

be identical with a complete one, the question of a possible identity between a fictional object and a real one is always to be answered negatively. The reason is quite obvious: because of the lack of complete determinations there might exist indefinitely many objects satisfying the character of an object and, nevertheless, none of them need be identical with any other.

I do not think that this account solves all difficulties. One of these difficulties concerns the question whether what is incomplete is really a property. It has been suggested that Meinong confuses two notions — or worse: two entities — in his use of the concept of incompleteness, namely properties and individuals. If, for instance, we think of the abstract tone C, we are thinking — according to Meinong — of a property which, if we take it purely, is such that loudness neither belongs to it nor is missing from it. So the question is, is the tone a being-so proper, or an individual so-being, namely C?[26]

I think that Meinong is not bound to decide the question once and for all. Some would like to interpret Meinong's theory of objects as a theory of abstract objects designed to provide room for all non-existing objects. But it seems to me that his interest in constructing the theory of objects was not a theory of abstract objects only, but a theory of all objects, existing and non-existing, real, possible and impossible objects. Only the important class of incomplete objects, which as a subclass contains the objects of fiction has been associated by him with a theory of universals as abstract objects.

It seems to me that one of Meinong's most fruitful conceptions is his theory of incomplete objects which may be completed. This conception allows for the fact that we can elaborate on our concepts and ideas and that we do widen our knowledge of objects even if they are incomplete. The propositional attitude with which most of this work is done is not knowing or believing, which are directed towards the universe of actual objects, but assuming. That is why Meinong thinks that in all our intellectual efforts we have to go through assumptions. With the capacity of assuming any kind of object, according to the principle of the freedom of assumptions, we cannot only create objects but complete them, even if we cannot turn them into complete ones. How the completing is done depends on the field of work within our intellectual fabric, be it everyday work of imagination, phantasy, or plain thinking in the scientific enterprise, or work in the arts. In none of these

and many other fields can we dispense with fictional objects, that is to say, with incomplete objects that serve as those objects which we try to use as starting points for further work.

Clearly, the ontology of Meinong does provide us with what we may need when we do not want to reduce different kinds of objects to one another or when we are unable to reduce them: it is a rich ontology. But is it too rich? I do not think so, if we read it *bona fide*. It proceeds from experience or — if you like — preanalytic data to the explanation by theory, but it does not propound a theory which answers all the questions that can be raised. Surely, there remain many questions and quite a lot of them are difficult to answer.

I mention only a few of them. The first question is how incomplete objects are related to the complete ones, like the object "Something Blue" (*etwas Blaues*) to the blue object which we see on our desk. The second is more general. How are we to view the relation between an incomplete object and its complete counterpart, if we use the incomplete and even fictional object to grasp the complete one? In other words, how is the incomplete object embedded or engraved in the real one, if the latter is the target of our acts of assuming, believing, or judging?

Notes

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[1] R. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items*, Canberra, 1980.
[2] G. Ryle, *Oxford Magazine*, 26 Oct. 1933, quoted in J. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, Oxford, 1963.
[3] Cf. K. Lambert, *Meinong and the Principle of Independence*, Cambridge, 1983, p. 67.
[4] B. Russell, 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', in *Mysticism and Logic*, London, 1963, p. 162.
[5] Cf. A. Meinong, 'Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften' (1907), in A. Meinong, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. V, pp. 222ff.; *Philosophenbriefe. Aus der wissenschaftlichen Korrespondenz von Alexius Meinong*. Hsg. R. Kindinger, pp. 151f.
[6] R. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, p. 503.
[7] J. N. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values*, 2nd ed. Oxford, 1986, Ch. 6. Used as a primary source by, for instance, Lambert, Parsons, Rapaport, Routley, D. Smith.
[8] A. Meinong, *The Theory of Objects* (*Über Gegenstandstheorie*, 1904), in (ed.) R. M. Chisholm, *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, §2.

[9] A. Meinong, *Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften* (1907), in A. Meinong, *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. V, bearbeitet von R. M. Chisholm, p. 307.

[10] A. Meinong, 'Bemerkungen zu E. Husserl's "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie"', in A. Meinong, *Kolleghefte und Fragmente*, p. 293; Engl., 'Critical Notes on Husserl . . .', in A. Meinong, *On Objects of Higher Order and Husserl's Phenomenology*, ed. by M.-L. Schubert-Kalsi, The Hague, 1978, p. 216.

[11] A. Meinong, *On the Theory of Objects*, p. 86.

[12] K. Twardowski, *On the Content and Object of Presentations*, translated by R. Grossmann, The Hague, 1977.

[13] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, IX, 93, p. 119.

[14] I. Kant, *Critique of pure reason*, Transc. Dialectic, book II, Ch. 3, B 601.

[15] A. Meinong, 'Viertes Kolleg über Erkenntnistheorie' (1917/18), in A. Meinong, *Kolleghefte und Fragmente (Gesamtausgabe — Ergänzungsband)*, p. 367.

[16] A. Meinong, *On Assumptions*, ed. 6 translated by J. Heanue, Berkeley, 1976, p. 59.

[17] A. Meinong, *Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit*, p. 207, and in *Kolleghefte und Fragmente*, p. 257, we find the question: "How do I know that all individual objects must be complete?".

[18] Cf. A. Meinong, *Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit*, p. 198.

[19] J. Findlay, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

[20] I thank M. David for having directed my attention to this paradox, which I thought of as a kind of regress-argument.

[21] A. Meinong, 'Zweites Kolleg über gegenstandstheoretische Logik', in A. Meinong, *Kolleghefte und Fragmente*, Hsg. R. Fabian und R. Haller, Graz, 1978, p. 255. Cf. T. Parsons, 'A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects', in *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 1 (1975), pp. 73f.; T. Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects*, New Haven, 1980, pp. 22f.; R. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, pp. 264f.

[22] Cf. A. Meinong, *Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit*, p. 213.

[23] R. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, pp. 238f.

[24] W. V. O. Quine, 'Existence and Quantification', in W. V. O. Quine, *Ontological Relativism and other Essays*, New York, 1969, pp. 100f.

[25] Cf. T. Parsons, *Nonexistent Objects*, pp. 63—174; R. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*; H. N. Castañeda, 'Fiction and Reality', in *Poetics* 8 (1979); R. Haller, 'Theories, Fables, and Parables', in *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 12/13 (1981), pp. 105—117; R. Haller, *Facta and Ficta*, Stuttgart, 1986; (ed.) R. Haller, *Non-Existence and Predication*, Amsterdam, 1986.

[26] R. Grossmann, *Meinong*, London, 1974, pp. 178ff.

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