

Springer Proceedings in Complexity

Cyril Onwubiko · Pierangelo Rosati ·
Aunshul Rege · Arnau Erola ·
Xavier Bellekens · Hanan Hindy ·
Martin Gilje Jaatun *Editors*

Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media

Cyber Science 2023; 03–04 July;
University of Aalborg, Copenhagen,
Denmark

 Springer

Springer Proceedings in Complexity

Springer Proceedings in Complexity publishes proceedings from scholarly meetings on all topics relating to the interdisciplinary studies of complex systems science. Springer welcomes book ideas from authors.

The series is indexed in Scopus.

Proposals must include the following:

- name, place and date of the scientific meeting
- a link to the committees (local organization, international advisors etc.)
- scientific description of the meeting
- list of invited/plenary speakers
- an estimate of the planned proceedings book parameters (number of pages/articles, requested number of bulk copies, submission deadline)

Submit your proposals to: Hisako.Niko@springer.com

Cyril Onwubiko · Pierangelo Rosati ·
Aunshul Rege · Arnau Erola · Xavier Bellekens ·
Hanan Hindy · Martin Gilje Jaatun
Editors

Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media

Cyber Science 2023; 03–04 July; University
of Aalborg, Copenhagen, Denmark

 Springer

Editors

Cyril Onwubiko
Research Series Limited
London, UK

Pierangelo Rosati
University of Galway
Galway, Ireland

Aunshul Rege
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA, USA

Arnau Erola
University of Oxford
Oxford, UK

Xavier Bellekens
Lupovis
Glasgow, UK

Hanan Hindy
Ain Shams University
Cairo, Egypt

Martin Gilje Jaatun
University of Stavanger
Stavanger, Norway

ISSN 2213-8684

ISSN 2213-8692 (electronic)

Springer Proceedings in Complexity

ISBN 978-981-99-6973-9

ISBN 978-981-99-6974-6 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6>

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Paper in this product is recyclable.

Cyber Science 2023 Committee

Committee Chairs

Arnau Erola, Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Aunshul Rege, Temple University, Pennsylvania, USA

Cyril Onwubiko, Centre for Multidisciplinary Research, Innovation and Collaboration, UK

Hanan Yousry Hindy, Computer Science Department, Faculty of Computer and Information Sciences, Ain Shams University

Martin Gilje Jaatun, University of Stavanger, Norway

Pierangelo Rosati, University of Galway, Ireland

Xavier Bellekens, Lupovis, Scotland

Publicity Chairs

Eckhard Pfluegel, Engineering and Computing, Kingston University, UK

Phil Legg, University of the West of England, UK

Uri Blumenthal, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, MIT, USA

Organising Committee

Jens Myrup Pedersen, University of Aalborg, Copenhagen, Denmark

Marios Anagnostopoulos, University of Aalborg, Copenhagen, Denmark

Edlira Dushku, University of Aalborg, Copenhagen, Denmark

Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi, University of Aalborg, Copenhagen, Denmark

Shreyas Srinivasa, University of Aalborg, Copenhagen, Denmark

Mateus Halbe Torres, University of Aalborg, Copenhagen, Denmark

Programme Committee

Amin Hosseinian-Far, Business Systems and Operations, University of Northampton, UK
Antonis Mouhtaropoulos, Department of Computer Science, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Arghir-Nicolae Moldovan, National College of Ireland (NCIRL), Ireland
Arnau Erola, Cyber Security Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Aunshul Rege, Temple University, Pennsylvania, USA
Avishek Nag, University College Dublin, Ireland
Bertrand Venard, Audencia, OII, University of Oxford, UK
Carlos A. Perez Delgado, School of Computing, University of Kent, UK
Charles Clarke, Kingston University, London, UK
Ciza Thomas, College of Engineering, India
David Brosset, Naval Academy Research Institute, France
Dimitris Kavallieros, Center for Security Studies (KEMEA), Greece
Domhnall Carlin, Queen's University (QUB), Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK
Edwin K. Kairu, Carnegie Mellon University, CMU Africa
Eliana Stavrou, Computing Department, UCLan Cyprus, Larnaca, Cyprus
Elisavet Konstantinou, University of the Aegean, Greece
Fatih Kurugollu, Cyber Security, University of Derby, Derby, UK
Felix Heine, Hannover University of Applied Sciences, Germany
Filippo Sanfilippo, University of Agder, UIA, Norway
Florian Skopik, Cyber Security Research, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria
Francisco J. Aparicio Navarro, Cyber Technology Institute, De Montfort University, UK
Georgios Kambourakis, University of the Aegean, Greece
Gerardo I. Simari, Universidad Nacional del Sur in Bahia Blanca and CONICET, Argentina
Harin Sellahewa, School of Computing, The University of Buckingham, UK
Hasan Yasar, Division of the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Hayretdin Bahsi, Center for Digital Forensics and Cyber Security, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
He (Mary) Hongmei, School of Computer Science and Informatics at De Montfort University, UK
Huiyu Zhou, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, UK
Ivan Silva, Instituto Metr pole Digital (IMD), Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN), Brazil
Jens Myrup Pedersen, University of Aalborg, Denmark
Jingyue Li, Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, NTNU, Norway
Kimberly Tam, Plymouth University, UK

Kostas Kyriakopoulos, Digital Communications, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, UK

Kumar Bandeli, Data Science, Walmart Inc., USA

Lakshmi Prayaga, Department of Applied Science, Technology and Administration, University of West Florida, USA

Lynsay Shepherd, Abertay University, Dundee, Scotland, UK

Maria Bada, Queen Mary University of London, UK

Marios Anagnostopoulos, University of the Aegean, Greece

Martin Gilje Jaatun, University of Stavanger, Norway

Michalis Diamantaris, Institute of Computer Science, Foundation for Research and Technology (FORTH), Greece

Panagiotis Trimintzios, Cyber Crisis Cooperation and Exercises Team Operational Security, ENISA, Europe

Petra Leimich, Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK

Phil Legg, University of the West of England, UK

Philipp Reinecke, Cardiff University, Wales, UK

Sean Mckeown, Edinburgh Napier University, Scotland, UK

Shamal Faily, Cyber Security Research Group (BUCSR), Bournemouth University, UK

Stefanos Gritzalis, University of the Aegean, Greece

Suleiman Yerima, Cyber Security, De Montfort University, UK

Susan Rea, Nimbus Centre at Cork Institute of Technology, Ireland

Tim D. Williams, University of Reading, Reading, UK

Ulrik Franke, Software and Systems Engineering Laboratory (SSE), RI.SE, Sweden

Uri Blumenthal, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, MIT, USA

Uwe Glässer, School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, Canada

Vanderson de Souza Sampaio, Fundação de Medicina Tropical Dr. Heitor Vieira Dourado, Brazil

Varun Dutt, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Mandi, India

Vasil Vassilev, School of Computing, London Metropolitan University, UK

Zisis Tsiatsikas, University of the Aegean, Karlovassi, Greece

Keynote and Industry Panel Speakers

Simone Pezzoli is a multilingual performance-driven executive focused on Digital Technology and Transformation, Cybersecurity, Audit, Risk and Compliance with international experience in consulting and top-tier financial and industrial institutions. Simone has held management roles with increasing responsibilities delivering large global-scale programs.

Simone is currently the Group Chief Technology Officer for Haier Europe. In addition to this role, Simone is currently:

- MBA Adjunct Professor at SAA Business School in Turin
- Chairperson—CISO European Community at ECSO (European Cyber Security Organisation)
- CISO Cloud Executive Committee Member at CSA Italy
- Advisory Board Member—Cybersecurity and Data Privacy at Osservatori Digital Innovation (Politecnico di Milano)
- Advisory Board Member—Cybersecurity and Risk Management at The Innovation Group
- Italy CIO Community Governing Body Member at Evanta, a Gartner Company

Simone has been recognized in the Global CISO 100 list for 2021 by the panel of CISO Judges for HotTopics.ht: <https://www.hottopics.ht/39434/meet-the-global-ciso-100-for-2021/>.

Simone is also an Executive MBA candidate (Class of 2023) at ESCP Business School—ranked #5 worldwide by Financial Times in 2022.

Thomas Flarup is head of the Danish Center for Cyber Security (CFCS). CFCS is the national IT security authority, Network Security Service, and National Centre of Excellence within cyber security in Denmark. The Centre’s mission is to advise Danish public authorities and private companies that support functions vital to society on how to prevent, counter, and protect against cyberattacks.

Previously, Thomas held management positions in the Danish private sector including VP and EVP roles in software development, project- and service delivery primarily at KMD—the largest Danish-based IT company developing and delivering

software and service solutions to public and private customers in the Nordics. A total of 20+ years of work experience including careers in Management consulting at The Boston Consulting Group (BCG), Telecommunications and Systems integration at the Danish incumbent telecommunication provider TDC, the Danish Ministry of Defence, and the Danish armed forces.

Dr. Aida Omerovic is an expert in risk management, information security, and technology innovation. She has over two decades of track record as a practitioner, researcher, and leader in R&D within private and public sectors in Europe. She works closely with technology-heavy organizations across Europe, from several domains (energy, transport, finance, and health), on enabling their secure digital transformation through applied research. She also actively disseminates best practices and research as a speaker/author/educator. She has published a textbook and 40+ peer-reviewed scientific articles. She serves in several public posts, fostering collaboration between professional and research communities. Aida is a research manager for cybersecurity at SINTEF and an associate professor at NTNU. Her previous roles include founder/CEO, consultant, and research scientist/director. Aida holds an M.Sc. in Engineering Cybernetics from NTNU and a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Oslo.

Linkedin: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/aidaomerovic>.

Ayo Næsborg-Andersen is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Southern Denmark. Her research focuses on the intersection between new technologies and human rights law, writing on topics such as data retention laws, artificial intelligence, and data protection. She has taught extensively on data protection laws, both for lawyers and non-lawyers, and has developed and taught a module on information security and data protection laws at the Danish Master of IT. Ayo is a member of the Steering Group at the Digital Democracy Center at the University of Southern Denmark, uniting such diverse disciplines as computer science, law, political science, journalism, economics, and more. Ayo Næsborg-Andersen is a member of the board of Rådet for Digital Sikkerhed and is often quoted by the media.

Sponsors and Partners



AALBORG UNIVERSITY





Cyber Science 2023 Theme

Multidisciplinary and Multidimensional Cybersecurity

Preface

Cyber Science is the flagship conference of the Centre for Multidisciplinary Research, Innovation and Collaboration (C-MRiC), a multidisciplinary conference focusing on pioneering research and innovation in Cyber Situational Awareness, Social Media, Cyber Security, and Cyber Incident Response. Cyber Science aims to encourage participation and promotion of collaborative scientific, industrial, and academic inter-workings among individual researchers, practitioners, members of existing associations, academia, standardisation bodies, and government departments and agencies. The purpose is to build bridges between academia and industry and to encourage the interplay of different cultures. Cyber Science invites researchers and industry practitioners to submit papers that encompass principles, analysis, design, methods, and applications. It is an annual conference with the aim that it will be held in the future in various cities in different countries.

Cyber Science as a multidisciplinary event is maturing as a mainstream and notable conference, first, for its quality, second, for its uniqueness, and finally, for its structure, contribution, and originality; something existing mainstream conferences do not normally possess. A testament to the significant interest Cyber Science has thus so far gained.

The first Cyber Science conference was held on June 8–9, 2015, at the Hotel Russell in Central London, UK. The conference was opened by the IEEE UK and Ireland Computer Society Chair, Professor Frank Wang, and featured four keynote speakers from academia, government, and industry.

The second episode of the Cyber Science conference was held on June 13–14, 2016, at the Holiday Inn in Mayfair London, London, UK. The conference was opened by the Chair, IEEE UK and Ireland, Professor Ali Hessami, and featured six keynote speakers from academia, government, and industry.

The third episode of the Cyber Science conference, in partnership with Abertay University, was held on June 19–20, 2017, at the Grand Connaught Rooms in Central London, UK. The conference was opened by the Secretary, IEEE UK and Ireland, Dr. Cyril Onwubiko, and featured eight keynote speakers from academia, government, and industry.

The fourth episode of the Cyber Science conference, in partnership with Abertay University and the University of Oxford, was held on June 11–12, 2018, at the Grand Central Hotel, Glasgow, Scotland. The conference was opened by the Minister for Public Health, Cabinet Secretary for Justice, and Member of the Scottish Parliament, Mr. Michael Matheson, MSP, and featured six keynote speakers from academia, government, and industry. At the conference, a Workshop organised by the Computer Science Department, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, on Cyber Insurance and Risk Controls (CIRC 2018) was co-located with the CyberSA 2018 conference.

The fifth episode of the Cyber Science conference, in partnership with the University of Oxford, University of Derby, and SINTEF Digital, Norway, was held on June 3–4, 2019, at the Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Wolfson Building Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD, UK. The conference was opened by the Chair of the IEEE UK and Ireland Section, Professor Mike Hinchey. A workshop organised by the Computer Science Department, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, on Cyber Insurance and Risk Controls (CIRC 2019) was co-located with the CyberSA 2019 conference, while a workshop organised by SINTEF Digital on Secure Software Engineering in DevOps and Agile Development (SecSE 2019) was co-located with the Cyber Security 2019 conference.

The sixth episode of the Cyber Science conference, in partnership with Dublin City University was held online (virtual) on June 15–19, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as the conference was initially planned to be held at the Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland. The conference was opened by Dr. Cyril Onwubiko, the IEEE Computer Society Distinguished Speaker. At the conference, a Workshop organised by the Computer Science Department, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, on Cyber Insurance and Risk Controls (CIRC 2020) was co-located with the CyberSA 2020 conference.

The seventh episode of the Cyber Science conference, in partnership with Dublin City University, was held online (virtual) on June 14–18, 2021, again due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The conference was officially opened through a welcome address delivered by the President of Dublin City University, Professor Daire Keogh.

In 2022, the eighth episode of the Cyber Science conference, in partnership with the Cardiff Metropolitan University, Wales was held a hybrid event (in-person and online) between June 20–21, 2022. The conference was officially opened by the Dean of the School of Technologies, Cardiff Metropolitan University, Wales, Professor Jon Platts.

This Cyber Science 2023 conference proceedings is a compilation of peer-reviewed and accepted papers submitted to the conference. The conference invited three keynote speakers who spoke at the event, namely:

I would like to thank the organisers—Aalborg University, Copenhagen, and special thanks to their academics who helped with organising the event and performing several tasks including moderating and chairing sessions; special thanks to Prof. Jens Myrup Pedersen and Dr. Marios Anagnostopoulos.

I am very grateful to the Programme Committee Members and the other Conference Reviewers for graciously contributing their time, assuring a scholarly fair, and

rigorous review process. I would also like to thank Springer for accepting to publish Cyber Science 2023 in their proceedings on Complexity book series.

I would like to thank Dr. Hanan Hindy, Prof. Aunshul Rege, Dr. Pierangelo Rosati, Dr. Arnau Erola, Dr. Xavier Bellekens, and Prof. Martin Jaatun for helping in many ways with the conference. Their continued support over the years has allowed me time to focus on the strategic vision of the conference.

Finally, I would like to thank the authors of the papers and the delegates present at the event; there would be no conference without you!

London, UK

Cyril Onwubiko, B.Sc., M.Sc., Ph.D.
Cyber Science 2023 Conference Chair

Contents

Data Science and Artificial Intelligence

Exploring the Performance of Machine Learning Models and Predictive Factors for Fetal Death: Preliminary Results	3
Maria Eduarda Ferro de Mello, Élisson da Silva Rocha, Flávio Leandro de Moraes, Barbara de Queiroz Figueiroôa, Marília Santana da Silva, Waldemar Brandão Neto, Theo Lynn, and Patricia Takako Endo	
GNSS Jamming Clustering Using Unsupervised Learning and Radio Frequency Signals	25
Carolyn J. Swinney and John C. Woods	
Using Data Analytics to Derive Business Intelligence: A Case Study	35
Ugochukwu Orji, Ezugwu Obianuju, Modesta Ezema, Chikodili Ugwuishiwu, Elochukwu Ukwandu, and Uchechukwu Agomuo	
Blockchain, Cyber Threat Intel and Malware Analysis	
Evaluation Factors for Blockchain Identity Management Systems	49
Bandar Alamri, Katie Crowley, and Ita Richardson	
A Hybrid Personal Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing Protocol Using Steganography and Secret Sharing	75
Arman Zand and Eckhard Pfluegel	
The Impact of Network Configuration on Malware Behaviour	91
Peyman Pahlevani, Marios Anagnostopoulos, Hafizur Rahman Anik, and Hamad Rafi Iqbal	

Cybersecurity, Usability and Ethics

Behavior Change Approaches for Cyber Security and the Need for Ethics 107
Konstantinos Mersinas and Maria Bada

Cybersecurity Training: Improving Platforms Through Usability Studies 131
Mubashrah Saddiqa, Rasmus Broholm, and Jens Myrup Pedersen

Rethinking Independence in Safety Systems 153
Vahiny Gnanasekaran, Tor Olav Grøtan, Maria Bartnes, and Poul E. Heegaard

Regional and National Cybersecurity

Understanding the United States Republicans’ Susceptibility to Political Misinformation 169
Rachel Bleiman

Awareness of Cybercrimes Among Postgraduate Facebook Users in a State University of Sri Lanka 193
M. A. J. Wijesekera, T. N. D. S. Ginige, and R. A. B. Abeygunawardana

Vulnerabilities That Threaten Web Applications in Afghanistan 205
Sayed Mansoor Rahimy, Sayed Hassan Adelyar, and Said Rahim Manandoy

Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

A Method for Threat Modelling of Industrial Control Systems 221
Lars Halvdan Flå and Martin Gilje Jaatun

A Checklist for Supply Chain Security for Critical Infrastructure Operators 235
Martin Gilje Jaatun and Hanne Sæle

Taxonomy of Emerging Security Risks in Digital Railway 251
Mohammed Al-Mhiqani, Uchenna Ani, Jeremy Watson, and Hongmei He

Cybersecurity Research and Innovation

Adoption of Cybersecurity Innovations—A Systematic Literature Review 285
Arnstein Vestad and Bian Yang

Achieving Optimal Performance and Quality in LAN and WLAN for Mission-Critical Applications 305
Tonderai S. Chidawanyika and Deepthi N. Ratnayake

Cyber Fraud, Privacy and Education

Love at First Sleight: A Review of Scammer Techniques in Online Romance Fraud 327

Marc Kydd, Lysnay A. Shepherd, Andrea Szymkowiak, and Graham I. Johnson

Privacy and Security Training Platform for a Diverse Audience 343

Mubashrah Saddiqa, Kristian Helmer Kjær Larsen, Robert Nedergaard Nielsen, Lene Tolstrup Sørensen, and Jens Myrup Pedersen

The Relevance of Social Engineering Competitions in Cybersecurity Education 365

Aunshul Rege, Rachel Bleiman, and Katorah Williams

Extended Abstracts

Hackers Weaponry: Leveraging AI Chatbots for Cyber Attacks 385

Kiran Maraju, RASHU, and Tejaswi Sagi

On Reviewing the NTFS Time Information Forgery and Detection 399

Alji Mohamed and Chougdali Khalid

Contributors

R. A. B. Abeygunawardana Department of Statistics, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Sayed Hassan Adelyar Salam University, Kabul, Afghanistan

Uchechukwu Agomuo Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Physical Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria

Mohammed Al-Mhiqani School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Keele University, Keele, UK

Bandar Alamri Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland;
the Science Foundation Ireland Research Centre for Software, Limerick, Ireland

Marios Anagnostopoulos Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Uchenna Ani School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Keele University, Keele, UK

Hafizur Rahman Anik Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Maria Bada Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK

Maria Bartnes NTNU—Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Rachel Bleiman Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA

Rasmus Broholm Electronic Systems Department, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Tonderai S. Chidawanyika University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, UK

Katie Crowley Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland;
the Science Foundation Ireland Research Centre for Software, Limerick, Ireland

Élisson da Silva Rocha Universidade de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

Marília Santana da Silva Programa Mãe Coruja Pernambucana, Recife, Brazil

Flávio Leandro de Morais Universidade de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

Barbara de Queiroz Figueiroôa Programa Mãe Coruja Pernambucana, Recife, Brazil

Patricia Takako Endo Universidade de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

Modesta Ezema Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Physical Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria

Lars Halvdan Flå SINTEF Digital, Trondheim, Norway

T. N. D. S. Ginige Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Vahiny Gnanasekaran NTNU—Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Tor Olav Grøtan SINTEF Digital, Trondheim, Norway

Hongmei He School of Science, Engineering and Environment, University of Salford, Salford, UK

Poul E. Heegaard NTNU—Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Kristian Helmer Kjær Larsen Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Hamad Rafi Iqbal Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Martin Gilje Jaatun Department of Software Engineering, Safety and Security, SINTEF Digital, Trondheim, Norway

Graham I. Johnson School of Design and Informatics, Abertay University, Dundee, UK

Chougdali Khalid Lab. Sciences de l'Ingenieur, National School of Applied Sciences Kenitra, Kenitra, Morocco

Marc Kydd School of Design and Informatics, Abertay University, Dundee, UK

Theo Lynn Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland

Maria Eduarda Ferro de Mello Universidade de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

Said Rahim Manandoy Salam University, Kabul, Afghanistan

Kiran Maraju Mumbai, India

Konstantinos Mersinas Royal Holloway, University of London, Surrey, UK

Alji Mohamed Lab. Sciences de l'Ingenieur, National School of Applied Sciences
Kenitra, Kenitra, Morocco

Robert Nedergaard Nielsen Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Waldemar Brandão Neto Universidade de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

Ezugwu Obianuju Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Physical Science,
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria

Ugochukwu Orji Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Physical Science,
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria

Peyman Pahlevani Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Jens Myrup Pedersen Electronic Systems Department, Aalborg University,
Copenhagen, Denmark

Eckhard Pfluegel Faculty of Engineering, Computing and the Environment,
Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, UK

Sayed Mansoor Rahimy Salam University, Kabul, Afghanistan

Rashu Mumbai, India

Deepthi N. Ratnayake University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, UK

Aunshul Rege Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA

Ita Richardson Department of Computer Science and Information Systems,
University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland;
the Science Foundation Ireland Research Centre for Software, Limerick, Ireland

Mubashrah Saddiqa Electronic Systems Department, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Hanne Sæle SINTEF Energy, Trondheim, Norway

Tejaswi Sagi Mumbai, India

Lynsay A. Shepherd School of Design and Informatics, Abertay University,
Dundee, UK

Carolyn J. Swinney Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of
Essex, Colchester, UK

Andrea Szymkowiak School of Design and Informatics, Abertay University, Dundee, UK

Lene Tolstrup Sørensen Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Chikodili Ugwuishiwu Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Physical Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Enugu State, Nigeria

Elochukwu Ukwandu Department of Applied Computing, Cardiff School of Technologies, Cardiff Metropolitan University, Wales, UK

Arnstein Vestad NTNU, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Jeremy Watson Department of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Public Policy, University College London, London, UK

M. A. J. Wijesekera Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Katorah Williams University of Scranton, Scranton, PA, USA

John C. Woods Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Colchester, UK

Bian Yang NTNU, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

Arman Zand Faculty of Engineering, Computing and the Environment, Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, UK

Data Science and Artificial Intelligence

Exploring the Performance of Machine Learning Models and Predictive Factors for Fetal Death: Preliminary Results



Maria Eduarda Ferro de Mello, Élisson da Silva Rocha, Flávio Leandro de Moraes, Barbara de Queiroz Figueiroôa, Marília Santana da Silva, Waldemar Brandão Neto, Theo Lynn, and Patricia Takako Endo

Abstract This study investigates the effectiveness of machine learning models in predicting fetal death and identifying significant predictive factors. The study utilized a dataset from the Programa Mãe Coruja Pernambucana (PMCP) that includes socio-demographic, prenatal, maternal, and family health history data. The data underwent pre-processing and was explored using four tree-based machine learning models, each of which was evaluated based on their performance and feature importance. The attributes that significantly impacted the learning process were the first prenatal week, maternal age, and months between pregnancies. The application of predictive models for fetal deaths in this context can enhance the ability to detect such occurrences thus representing a pivotal support tool for the PMCP to identify mothers with high risk of adverse outcomes and promote targeted interventions of monitoring during pregnancy, and ultimately increase the likelihood of positive outcomes for mothers and babies.

M. E. F. de Mello · É. da Silva Rocha · F. L. de Moraes · W. B. Neto · P. T. Endo (✉)
Universidade de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil
e-mail: patricia.endo@upe.br

M. E. F. de Mello
e-mail: mefm@ecom.poli.br

É. da Silva Rocha
e-mail: esr2@ecom.poli.br

F. L. de Moraes
e-mail: flavio.leandromorais@upe.br

W. B. Neto
e-mail: waldemar.neto@upe.br

B. de Queiroz Figueiroôa · M. S. da Silva
Programa Mãe Coruja Pernambucana, Recife, Brazil
e-mail: barbarafigueiroa@gmail.com

T. Lynn
Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: theo.lynn@dcu.ie

1 Introduction

Fetal death is a significant public health issue that affects millions of parents and families worldwide. Primary care for prenatal and neonatal health has a significant impact on the lives and health of mothers and developing babies. Increased investment in the provision of routine and emergency prenatal and neonatal care, basic sanitation, immunizations, and access to skilled health care has reduced the likelihood of neonatal and maternal death. Notwithstanding this, over two million pregnancies resulted in stillbirths in 2020; over 40% of which occurred during childbirth [1]. In the same year, a further 2.4 million children died in the first 28 d of life representing 47% of deaths of children under 5 years old [2].

Fetal and early neonatal mortality share the same etiology and conditions that result in the death of the fetus or newborn in the first hours of life. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), fetal death includes babies who die after the 22nd week of gestation, before expulsion or complete extraction from the mother's body [2, 3]. They can be classified as early or late (after the 28th week). The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has specific targets for reducing global maternal mortality [4], and ending preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age [5]. Fetal Mortality Rate (FMR) is one of the indicators that assess the quality of health care provided to pregnant women during pregnancy and childbirth. This index expresses the number of fetal deaths with fetuses weighing at least 500 g or 25 cm in height per total births in the population of a given area [3]. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to reduce the global neonatal mortality rate to at least as low as 12 deaths per 1000 live births by 2030, however it does not specifically address to fetal mortality rate.

Fetal deaths are considered potentially preventable but it is important to identify the determinants of fetal deaths. Highly cited risk factors associated with mothers include obesity, alcohol and tobacco use, HIV seropositivity, Specific Hypertensive Disorders of Pregnancy (HDP), gestational diabetes mellitus, and placental and amniotic complications, which can directly influence congenital malformation, growth restriction and fetal death [6–8]. Recent studies indicate that pregnant women infected with SARS-CoV-2 may increase the risk of premature delivery and fetal death [9, 10]. Additionally, social factors such as maternal age, low income, inadequate schooling, and prenatal care also contribute to higher risk fetal death [11]. Notwithstanding these factors, significant and preventable factors that contribute to high rates of fetal and early neonatal mortality relate to poor quality prenatal care service, late diagnosis of complications during pregnancy, difficulty accessing care for pregnant women, and inadequate obstetric management [12]. The risks associated with these factors are exacerbated where there in multi-fetal gestation. Such instances are associated with additional prenatal risks including higher risk of preterm labor, preterm premature rupture of the membranes, intrauterine growth restriction, intrauterine fetal demise, gestational diabetes, and pre-eclampsia [13]. In such cases, planning prenatal care is crucial to estimate benefits and minimize adverse outcomes including fetal or multi-fetal death [14].




Fig. 1 Fetal death rate per 1000 live births in Brazil, Northeast Region, and state of Pernambuco. Data is available on the DATASUS website provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Health

In 2010, the Ministry of Health (MoH) mandated fetal and infant death monitoring and investigation as part of the Brazilian unified health system, the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS). The data generated from this strategy enables researchers and policymakers to accurately gauge the scale of fatalities and categorize their root causes and contextual circumstances. This, in turn, facilitates the development of effective recommendations for targeted interventions aimed at preventing avoidable deaths [15, 16]. In 2010, the FMR for Brazil was estimated at 10.81 fetal deaths per 1000 live births; this decreased to 10.62 in 2020. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the fetal death rate per 1000 live births in Brazil, in the Northeast region, and in the state of Pernambuco from 2010 to 2020. As can be seen from 1, in 2020, the Northeast region presented the second highest FMR in the country with 12.50 deaths per 1000 live births; the index for the state of Pernambuco was 11.08 [17].

In Pernambuco, one of the initiatives to reduce prenatal and neonatal still child-birth is the Programa Mãe Coruja Pernambucano (PMCP). Launched in 2007, the PMCP aims to provide comprehensive care to pregnant women and children up to 5 years of age. The PMCP is active in more than 105 municipalities in Pernambuco, mainly in vulnerable areas. Through the creation of a support network, the program ensures that mothers and their children receive the necessary care, including health services, education, social assistance, and family support. As a result, the program has significantly contributed to the reduction of maternal and infant mortality rates as well as improving social indicators and the quality of life of many families in Pernambuco [2, 18].

Despite the availability of the increased data and the PMCP, Fig. 1 suggests that challenges remain in the detection and prediction of adverse outcomes during pregnancy. Against this backdrop, machine learning models, due to their high predictive potential, have been widely proposed as solutions to support early diagnosis and monitoring during pregnancy and postpartum [19]. Extant research has used machine learning models to predict preterm birth, birth weight, mortality, hypertensive disorders, and postpartum depression, among other factors [20, 21]. Machine learning has

also been used to predict vaginal births after cesareans, understanding the characteristics of past and current pregnancies, and consequently assisting in the mode and management of labor [19]. Also, recent studies point to the use of machine learning to identify risks of fetal death and perinatal mortality [20, 22].

Developing predictive models and identifying factors associated with fetal death can aid in reducing its occurrence and improving healthcare services for affected parents and families. The primary aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of predictive machine learning models based on data obtained from pregnant women who are receiving care at the PMCP. These initial findings represent a segment of an ongoing research project that seeks to establish decision support tools for healthcare professionals using predictive machine learning models in collaboration with the PMCP. In this work, we present the most significant clinical and socio-demographic attributes that contribute to the learning process of these models, thus enabling the selection of the most relevant features for further analysis. This study forms the foundation for future investigations aimed at developing practical tools to improve maternal health outcomes.

2 Related Works

Extant literature suggests that machine learning has significant potential for predicting fetal, neonatal, perinatal, and infant mortality [23]. In their review of the literature, Silva et al. [23] reviewed 18a publications from 2012 to 2021, however two publications by Shukla et al. [24] and Malacova et al. [22] focused on predicting fetal deaths.

Based on data from the NICHD Global Network for Women's and Children's Health Research Maternal and Newborn Health Registry, Shukla et al. [24] performed an analysis with data from women in the period of pregnancy up to the third day of delivery. The objective of the study was to predict the risk of fetal and neonatal mortality. For this, six machine learning models (Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine, Logistic Elastic Net, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Gradient Boosted, and Random Forest) were used in two different scenarios for the prediction of fetal death, i.e., prenatal care variables up to the first prenatal visit (scenario 1) and prenatal care variables up to just before delivery (scenario 2). The dataset used was composed of 472,004 records labeled live and 15,322 records labeled stillborn records for scenario 1, and 485,966 records labeled live and 1360 records labeled stillborn for scenario 2. The results for the prediction of fetal death identified the Random Forest as the best model with an Area Under the Curve (AUC) of 63% for scenario 1 and a 71% AUC for the gradient boosted model in scenario 2. It was also possible to identify the most important attributes in the analysis, i.e., gestational age, hypertension, severe pre-eclampsia or eclampsia, and maternal age.

Malacova et al. [22] identified the factors that contribute to the prediction of fetal death and evaluated the performance of different machine learning models. Using data sourced from the Data Linkage Branch of the Western Australia Depart-

ment of Health, the dataset comprised 952,813 pregnancy records from 1980 to 2015. 947,025 of the records were labeled live and 5788 were labeled stillbirth. The grid search technique was used with the k-fold cross-validation technique (k-fold = 10) to configure five models—Regularized Logistic Regression, Decision Trees, Random Forest, Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost), and a Multilayer Perceptron Neural Network (MLP). The AUC results of the models varied between 0.59 (CI95%; 0.58; 0.60) and 0.84 (CI95%; 0.83; 0.85). XGBoost and MLP exhibited the best performance. The most influential attributes in the prediction were pregnancy complications, congenital anomalies, maternal characteristics, and medical history.

The work by Ko et al. [14] performed a statistical analysis trends of multiple birth rates and fetal/neonatal/infant mortalities based on the number of gestations in Korea. The dataset used in the study comprised 41,214 fetal death records from the Korean Statistical Information Service. Logistic regression was used to identify the impact of gestational age on mortality in single or multiple pregnancies. Results showed higher fetal mortality rates for multiple pregnancies compared to single pregnancies and identified a higher risk of fetal death during the third trimester of a multiple pregnancy.

Koivu and Sairanen [20] proposed risk models to predict early and late term fetal deaths, as well as premature births, using two large United States (US) pregnancy databases sourced from the National Center of Health Statistics via their National Vital Statistics System (CDC) and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC). The CDC dataset comprised 11,901,611 records labeled normal pregnancies, 946,301 records labeled premature births, 7924 records labeled early stillbirths, and 8310 records labeled late stillbirths. The NYC dataset comprised 266,419 records labeled normal pregnancies, 19,203 records labeled premature births, 139 records labeled early stillbirths, and 110 records labeled late stillbirths. Classification models were developed using four different algorithms—logistic regression, gradient boosting decision trees, and two ANNs—a leaky-ReLU-based deep two-layer feed-forward neural network and deep feed-forward self-normalizing neural network based on the Scaled Exponential Linear Units (SELU) activation function. AUC was used to assess the effectiveness of the models. Performance ranged from 0.54 to 0.76; the SELU-based exhibited the best performance in predicting early stillbirth with an AUC of 0.76, while the leaky-ReLU-based ANN performed better for predicting late stillbirth with 0.63 AUC. The models were trained using various attributes, including social information, health, family history, and maternal habits. The results showed that the developed risk models were more effective in predicting early fetal deaths than late fetal deaths or premature births.

Our work contributes to the existing literature by examining data from the PMCP social project, which serves multiple cities across the State of Pernambuco. This approach offers a novel empirical context and perspective on the prediction of fetal death using machine learning. Therefore, investigating the clinical and socio-demographic data of Pernambuco is essential to mitigate this social problem in the future and contributing to Brazil's commitment to the SDGs. Our results provide insights into using machine learning with the PMCP dataset and evaluate the signif-

importance of the attributes used and identify the tree-based models that would be most effective in this scenario.

3 Background

3.1 *Machine Learning Models*

Machine learning is an area of artificial intelligence that encompasses methods that allow machines to train and learn from provided datasets. In this learning process, the model is allowed to learn to make decisions autonomously using sets of input and output data [25–27]. In this work, four tree-based machine learning models are used. The models evaluated for the prediction of fetal death are Decision Trees, Random Forest, AdaBoost, and XG Boost.

A decision tree model is a supervised machine learning algorithm that supports decision-making that can be used as a classification tree (to predict classes) or a regression tree (to predict numerical values). The structure of a decision tree is very similar to that of a flowchart, with steps that are easy to visualize and thus understand the conditions and probabilities that lead to results. The decision tree model consists of a root node (the most important node), internal nodes (nodes that are related to each other by a hierarchy), and leaf nodes (end results). The internal nodes split the dataset into smaller subsets based on the values of the selected feature. The internal nodes split the dataset into smaller subsets and each leaf node represents a numerical value for a regression problem [28, 29].

Random Forest is an ensemble model that combines multiple decision trees to improve prediction performance. It works by creating a set of decision trees using different subsets of the training data, and then averaging their predictions to make a final prediction. The random selection of features reduces the correlation between trees and results in a diverse set of trees with a lower probability of overfitting the data [30].

AdaBoost is a model that repeats the learning process and generates a final classifier that weighs the weak combinations of the model. This model is particularly effective at boosting the performance of weak classifiers and has the advantage of being able to be used on large datasets with many attributes [30].

The XGBoost model is a tree-based machine learning model that works by creating a set of decision trees iteratively, where each tree tries to correct the errors made by the previous trees. This technique has been effective in various machine learning tasks such as regression and classification [31].

3.2 Evaluation Metrics

For the evaluation of the model learning for predicting fetal death, quantitative metrics based on a confusion matrix were used. The confusion matrix presents the number of records classified correctly and incorrectly and is comprised of True Positive, False Positive, True Negative, and False Negative values [32].

Accuracy is widely used in extant research as a general measure of model performance [33]. This metric is based on the total ratio of samples correctly predicted by the classifier with the test data. In this scenario, the metric seeks to present the generalization capacity of the model. Accuracy is calculated by the equation:

$$\text{accuracy} = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + TN + FP + FN}. \quad (1)$$

Precision measures how many cases are classified by the model as positive and are truly positive in relation to all positive cases [34]. It is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{precision} = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}. \quad (2)$$

Recall (also referred to as sensitivity) is the ratio of positive cases that were correctly classified by the model [35] and is defined as

$$\text{recall} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}. \quad (3)$$

Specificity seeks to determine the proportion of actual negatives that were correctly predicted [35]. It is calculated using the following equation:

$$\text{specificity} = \frac{TN}{TN + FP}. \quad (4)$$

The f1-score is a metric that calculates the harmonic mean of two metrics (recall and precision) to calculate the total hit rate of the positive and negative classes performed by the model [36]. It is calculated as

$$\text{f1 - score} = 2 \times \frac{\text{precision} \times \text{recall}}{\text{precision} + \text{recall}}. \quad (5)$$

3.3 Hyper-parameter Optimization and Data Balancing

To improve the performance of the models, the grid search technique is used which seeks to define the best combination of hyper-parameters of a given model around

an analyzed problem based on a grid of initial parameters. Hyper-parameters are parameters used to configure the models such as the learning rate or the minimum number of samples that must exist in each leaf of a tree model. The execution of the technique results in a model that directly impacts its performance in data analysis [37].

Data imbalance is one of the obstacles that hinder learning in classification algorithms as it can lead to a learning bias. Where there is learning bias, the model will learn more about the majority class than the minority resulting in low-performance models due to the imbalance between classes [38, 39]. One of the ways to resolve this problem is to use the random undersampling technique, a heuristic method that randomly eliminates instances of the majority class until the quantity is reduced to the same quantity or the next minority class [40].

4 Materials and Methods

4.1 Dataset

This study utilized a dataset provided by the PMCP, covering the period from 2012 to 2022. Initially, the dataset contained 231,505 records and 71 attributes. It provides extensive information on various aspects of pregnant women's health including maternal history, comorbidities, socio-demographic factors, prenatal and postpartum care, residential and healthcare unit data, personal informative dates, and newborn information. These information was collected by a health specialist at the time of care for the pregnant woman. The dataset's multifaceted variables provide a comprehensive view of the health status and background of pregnant women receiving care from the PMCP thus providing a valuable resource for developing predictive models aimed at enhancing prenatal, postpartum, and maternal health outcomes.

To better understand the dataset, a dictionary¹ was created to describe the attributes based on the information provided by PMCP. The STILLBIRTH attribute was chosen as the target class and named TARGET; it is described with a value of 1 for fetal death and a value of 0 for survival.

4.2 Data Pre-processing

To enable the machine learning models to utilize the dataset provided by the PMCP, it is essential to undertake a set of pre-processing steps to clean and prepare the data for model training and testing. By performing these pre-processing steps, we can ensure that the dataset is suitable for use in training accurate and robust predictive models

¹ Available at: <https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/33utcbk29kcc11log4332/Dictionary-dataset-full-MorteFetal.docx?dl=0&rlkey=gbpuo7a4dgrl0r0tjqsjxvn>.




Fig. 2 Pre-processing steps performed on PMCP dataset

and consequently leading to better decision support for healthcare professionals. Figure 2 illustrates the steps involved in generating the pre-processed dataset used in this work.

During the attribute removal and selection stage, we began by excluding attributes related to residential data, service units, geographic environment codes, and other complementary information deemed irrelevant to the study. This step allowed us to streamline the dataset and remove extraneous variables that could potentially interfere with the accuracy and efficacy of the predictive models.

Subsequently, we removed attributes that contained more than 35% of missing values as well as those with low information content regarding the pregnant woman and the puerperium. This step allowed us to further refine the dataset by eliminating variables that could potentially introduce bias or noise into the predictive models.

Following these pre-processing steps, the resulting dataset was further reduced to 17 attributes containing information solely about the mother, current pregnancy, and family health history, as summarized in Table 1.

The next step in our analysis involved the assessment of the selected attributes for completeness and the treatment of outliers. We observed that the `PREVIOUS_WEIGHT` attribute contained several typing errors. This prompted us to define a maximum weight of 120 kg; any records that exceeded this value were marked as missing, to be treated in the subsequent pre-processing step. Similarly, we noted that the `FIRST_PRENATAL` attribute exhibited exceptionally high weekly values that did not accurately reflect the timing of the first prenatal care. Upon closer examination, we discovered that this attribute depended on the dates of pregnancy onset and first prenatal care thus inaccuracies in either date could affect the value in weeks of the first prenatal care. To address this issue, we established a maximum value of 35 weeks for the first prenatal care which corresponds to the eighth month of pregnancy. Any records found to be older than 35 weeks were also marked as missing and were designated to be handled in the subsequent step of pre-processing.

In the missing data handling step, we examined the 17 selected attributes and identified five attributes with missing data: `PREVIOUS_WEIGHT`, `GESTATIONAL_RISK`, `SCHOOLING`, `AGE`, and `FIRST_PRENATAL`. Of these, `PREVIOUS_WEIGHT` had the highest proportion of missing data (34.78%) which was close to the previously established threshold. `AGE` was the second most affected attribute (14.61% missing values) followed by `GESTATIONAL_RISK` (9.23%). The `SCHOOLING` attribute had the lowest proportion of missing data at 2.51%. To han-

Table 1 Dataset attributes

Attribute	Type	Description
PREVIOUS_WEIGHT	Numeric	Weight of the pregnant woman before pregnancy
GESTATIONAL_RISK	Numeric	High-risk pregnancy
SCHOOLING	Numeric	Pregnant woman's school level
HAS_HYPERTENSION	Categorical	Pregnant woman with hypertension
HAS_DIABETES	Categorical	Pregnant woman with diabetes
HAS_PELVIC_SURGERY	Categorical	Pregnant woman with pelvic surgery
HAS_URINARY_INFECTION	Categorical	Pregnant woman has urinary tract infection
HAS_CONGENITAL_MALFORMATION	Categorical	Family history of congenital malformation
HAS_FAMILY_TWINSHIP	Categorical	Family history of twins
AMOUNT_GESTATION	Numeric	Total number of pregnancies
AMOUNT_ABORTION	Numeric	Total number of abortions
AMOUNT_DELIVERIES	Numeric	Total number of deliveries
AMOUNT_CESAREAN	Numeric	Total number of cesarean deliveries
TARGET	Numeric	Birth or fetal death
AGE	Numeric	Pregnant's age
FIRST_PRENATAL	Numeric	First prenatal week
TIME_BETWEEN_PREGNANCIES	Numeric	Time in months between pregnancies

For handling the missing data, we adopted the median imputation technique which involves replacing missing values with the median value of the corresponding attribute [23]. By using this method, we were able to preserve the distribution and statistical properties of the data and ensure that the imputed values were consistent with the available data.

After completing the pre-processing steps, a new dataset was generated comprising 17 attributes and 231,505 records. Of these records, 224,076 related to live births and 7429 related to fetal deaths. The pre-processed dataset was then used to train and test the machine learning models for predicting pregnancy outcomes.

4.3 Experiment Design

Figure 3 outlines the methodology used to conduct our experiments. All tests were conducted using the Google Colab tool. As previously mentioned, the initial step was aimed at addressing the issue of data imbalance related to the target attribute. To solve this problem, we utilized the random undersampling approach to randomly select data from the majority class (live birth) and balance the dataset. After balancing the dataset, there were 7429 records for both live births and fetal deaths, 14,858 records in total.

Following the creation of the balanced dataset, we partitioned the dataset into two disjoint subsets: 70% of the data was allocated to the training set and the remaining 30% allocated to the test set. The test set was reserved exclusively for evaluating the performance of the models in the final stage, while the training set was used to train the models.

The grid search technique with 10-k-fold and accuracy as score was employed to determine the optimal hyper-parameters for each of the models.

The hyper-parameters of the four models used in this work (Decision Tree, Random Forest, AdaBoost, and XGBoost) in the grid search can be viewed in Table 2.

After executing the grid search, we obtain the optimal hyper-parameters for each model. We then proceeded to the model evaluation phase, where the test data that was set aside previously was utilized. To quantitatively evaluate the models, we used the evaluation metrics mentioned earlier in Sect. 3: accuracy, precision, sensitivity,




Fig. 3 Experiment design methodology

Table 2 Hyper-parameters used in the grid search

Model	Hyper-parameters	Values
Decision Tree	criterion splitter max_depth min_samples_leaf min_samples_split	['gini', 'entropy'] ['best', 'random'] [None, 1, 3, 5] [1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11] [2, 5, 8]
Random Forest	n_estimators criterion max_depth min_samples_leaf min_samples_split bootstrap	[100, 500, 700, 900] ['entropy', 'gini'] [None, 1, 3, 5] [1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11] [2, 5, 8] [True, False]
AdaBoost	n_estimators learning_rate	[50, 100, 200] [0.1, 1, 1.1]
XGBoost	max_depth learning_rate n_estimators gamma	[None, 1, 3, 5] [0.1, 1, 1.1] [50, 100, 200] [0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8]

specificity, and f1-score. In addition, an analysis was performed to determine the attributes that have the most impact on the learning process of the tree models. This contributes to better understanding the importance of each attribute in the overall model performance.

5 Results and Discussions

5.1 Models' Performance

Table 3 displays the hyper-parameters selected by grid search as the optimal hyper-parameters for the models. Accuracy was utilized as the metric to evaluate the performance and models demonstrated accuracy ranging from 59.55 to 61.95%.

After applying the results chosen by the grid search, all models presented relatively close results as presented in Table 4. Similarly, all models presented similar performance in testing. The XGBoost presented the highest precision when compared to other models (64.02%) while the Decision Tree at 61.93% presented the lowest precision in this experiment.

Regarding sensitivity and specificity, Random Forest demonstrated disparity in these metrics. The model exhibited a sensitivity of 67.86% indicating that it can accurately predict the probable fetal death, the target class of this experiment. However, there was a slight decrease in specificity (59.62%). This suggests a possible challenge in predicting live births and may result in an increase in false positives.

Table 3 Grid search results of the models

Model	Best hyper-parameters	Accuracy (%)
Decision Tree	criterion: 'gini', splitter: 'best', max_depth: 5, min_samples_leaf: 11, min_samples_split: 2	59.55
Random Forest	n_estimators: 900, criterion: 'entropy', max_depth: None, min_samples_leaf: 11, min_samples_split: 2 Bootstrap: True	61.43%
AdaBoost	n_estimators: 50, learning_rate: 1	61.72
XGBoost	max_depth: 5 learning_rate: 0.1 n_estimators: 50, gamma: 0.8	61.95

Table 4 Model performance results

Model	Precision (%)	Sensitivity (%)	Specificity (%)	Accuracy (%)	f1-score (%)
Decision Tree	61.93	62.55	61.30	61.93	61.93
Random Forest	63.84	67.86	59.62	63.80	63.72
AdaBoost	62.74	62.55	62.94	62.74	62.74
XGBoost	64.02	66.05	61.94	64.02	64.00

Despite this disparity, the Random Forest model remained consistent with an overall accuracy of 63% and other evaluation metrics.

Of all the models used in this experiment, XGBoost stood out as with the best performance metrics when compared to the other models. This model achieved the best results in precision (64.02%), accuracy (64.02%), and f1-score (64%). It also ranked second best in sensitivity (66.05%) and specificity (61.94%) metrics. Among the models tested, Decision Tree had the lowest overall performance. Given that the other tested models are improved versions of trees, this most likely explains why the Decision Tree exhibited slightly lower metrics than the other tree-based models. As presented previously, Random Forest exhibited superior sensitivity compared to the other models, while XGBoost achieved the highest f1-score. In general, all models displayed consistent performance with similar performance.

Figure 4 presents a comparison of the metrics among all models. The shape of the radar graph can provide insights into the performance of different models. A model with consistently high performance across all metrics creates a regular, symmetrical




Fig. 4 Comparison in percentage between model metrics

shape, while a model with significant variations in performance creates an irregular, non-symmetrical shape. Patterns in the shape can also suggest features of strength or weakness for a model, such as a model that performs well in certain metrics but poorly in others.

5.2 Attributes' Importance

In this study, we also identified the attributes that most influenced the learning process of the models. The importance of attributes lies in their ability to capture relevant information about the data that is useful for prediction. Choosing the right attributes for a particular problem is critical to achieving good performance. Identifying the most relevant attributes often involves a combination of domain expertise and experimentation with different attribute subsets. Figure 5 presents the eight attributes that were most important in this process. These attributes are primarily related to the pregnant woman’s socio-demographic information and medical history.

Specifically, data from the first prenatal visit, age, time between pregnancies, and pre-pregnancy weight had a significant influence on all models. On the other hand, the education level and number of abortions had a relatively lesser impact on all the models. Interestingly, the attributes of hypertension and gestational risk had no impact in the Decision Tree model but were found to be influential in the Random Forest, XGBoost, and AdaBoost models. These findings are consistent with a recent Systemic Literature Review (SLR) conducted by Silva Rocha et al. [23] which suggests attributes such as maternal age, mother’s education, prenatal care, number of pregnancies, and number of cesarean deliveries were used in studies predicting fetal




Fig. 5 Most important attributes in the model learning process

death. In Muin et al. [41], maternal demographic and obstetric characteristics were the ones that best explained prediction of women at risk for stillbirth.

To analyze the data distribution between live births and fetal deaths, we focused on the three most important attributes in the models’ learning. Figure 6 shows the data from the start of prenatal care, ranging from gestational week 1 to week 35. Notably, most of the records were concentrated in week 10, which is attributed to the use of median imputation to fill in the missing data. Our findings indicate that in cases where prenatal care began in weeks 5 to 9, the incidence of fetal deaths was considerably higher.

It is extremely critical that mothers have adequate and appropriate prenatal care to optimize the likelihood of a positive outcome in pregnancy. Studies associate inadequate prenatal care with an increased rate of fetal deaths [42, 43]. The lack of prenatal visits or visits without proper monitoring can increase fetal deaths. Conditions such as premature rupture of membranes, fetal growth restriction, and bleeding that can be detected with proper monitoring can prevent negative outcomes [43]. A systematic review conducted by Townsend et al. [44] revealed a total of 69 studies reporting on 64 different variables that were relevant to the development of stillbirth prediction models. Among these variables, the most frequently cited ones included maternal age, Body Mass Index (BMI), and previous history of stillbirth and diabetes. These results can provide important insights for healthcare providers in identifying high-




Fig. 6 Distribution of prenatal data between live births and fetal deaths




Fig. 7 Distribution of maternal age data between live births and fetal deaths

risk pregnancies and implementing targeted interventions to reduce the occurrence of fetal deaths.

Figure 7 displays the distribution of data relating to fetal deaths and live births based on maternal age. The highest concentration of records is observed at 23 years of age, again potentially attributed to the technique of imputing missing values through median substitution. Notably, from the age of 28, the frequency of fetal death data exceeds that of live births. A correlation is observed between maternal age and the disparity between the number of live birth and fetal death records, with an increasing maternal age demonstrating a wider discrepancy.

The risk of fetal death has been shown to increase with advancing maternal age (AMA), which may be attributed to the higher incidence of chronic diseases such as diabetes and hypertension in this population [45]. Several studies have reported that advanced maternal age, typically defined as 32 years or older, is a significant risk




Fig. 8 Distribution of data by time (months) between pregnancies for live births and fetal deaths

factor for fetal death, with ectopic pregnancy being one of the primary contributors to this association. In this age group, the chances of spontaneous abortion are also elevated [46]. AMA has been found to be a significant predictive factor in several studies, including those using Decision Tree models, for predicting fetal death and prematurity [47–49]. Our study also identified AMA as an important attribute in predicting fetal death.

Despite the increased risk of fetal loss associated with advanced maternal age, the use of assisted reproductive technology (ART) has enabled older women to conceive. To ensure the best possible outcome, it is crucial for women to have accurate information about the potential risks and make informed decisions about their health and pregnancy. Studies suggest that appropriate prenatal monitoring and adoption of a healthy lifestyle can improve the health outcomes of older pregnant women [50].

Another important factor for predicting fetal death is the interval between pregnancies (Fig. 8). The distribution of this data ranges from -1 (records that we were unable to identify the time between pregnancies) up to 12 months (where the time between pregnancies is at least 12 months). The records classified at 0 months are those that had no interval between one pregnancy and another.

A significant difference was identified between the number of live births and fetal deaths classified as -1 . Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine the duration of the pregnancy for these records. Additionally, we observed a high number of live births within a 0-month interval indicating that some women were able to carry the pregnancy to full term and achieve a positive outcome despite a short time between pregnancies. Between month 4 and month 11 the proportion of fetal deaths exceeded the proportion of live births. According to WHO, the recommended time for having a new pregnancy safely is 24 months. A shorter time than this period increases the risk of fetal, perinatal, and infant death [51].

The Interpregnancy Interval (IPI) is a measure of time between a woman’s previous delivery and the next conception. IPI is calculated by subtracting the date of the

previous delivery from the mother's last menstrual period. Studies have shown that an IPI of less than 6 months is associated with an increased risk of adverse outcomes such as premature birth, low birth weight, and fetal death [52]. Further, short IPIs may be associated with women who had a pregnancy loss in the previous gestation. With a short time period between a previous pregnancy and a new one, the woman's body is more likely to enter a reproductive cycle poor in nutrients during the pre-conception period, a factor associated with fetal growth restriction and congenital anomalies [53].

6 Conclusion and Next Steps

In several states in Brazil, social programs have been initiated to focus on maternal, fetal, and child care, providing not only clinical health support for mothers and babies but also psychological support and a network of assistance. These initiatives aim to prevent fetal deaths and improve the well-being of mothers and their babies. The Programa Mãe Coruja Pernambucana is a crucial initiative that reaches out to hundreds of families across more than a hundred cities in the state of Pernambuco. By conducting studies on fetal death, we can further assist and strengthen such programs to combat this social problem and minimize adverse outcomes in the lives of pregnant women and babies.

In the present work, machine learning models were used to predict fetal death and can be considered a promising tool in monitoring the maternal health and supporting clinical decision-making. Specifically, we utilized four tree-based models in our analysis—Decision Tree, Random Forest, AdaBoost, and XGBoost. Of these models, XGBoost demonstrated the best performance in terms of evaluative metrics, consistently achieving values between 61 and 66%, while exhibiting good sensitivity.

We also evaluated the importance of the attributes used in the models' learning process. In our study, socio-demographic information about the mother and health history were essential in the learning process. Data such as the start of prenatal care, maternal age, and time between pregnancies were important factors in this study. Laboratory data was not used in this study. Instead, all information used in the models was based on the pregnant woman and her family's inherent information. This decision was made with the aim of simplifying the data and avoiding the need for costly laboratory tests during the learning process. The approach used in this study is therefore considered to be of low cost and practical.

We emphasize that this study presented some preliminary results using the PMCP database. The identification of fetal deaths in regions with lower levels of socio-economic development, such as the Brazilian Northeast, is of paramount importance due to the likelihood of under-reporting of these events, limited access to quality healthcare services, and elevated maternal and infant morbidity and mortality rates linked to social determinants [54].

The usage of machine-learning-based systems for diagnostic, prognostic, and health assessment may allow a better performance of professionals to take their

decisions. Our work aims to assist health professionals in predicting fetal death; we do not aim to diagnose but to use the predictive model as an auxiliary decision support tool. Despite the limitations posed by incomplete data and limited information in the database, we were able to achieve promising results in terms of evaluation metrics.

As part of our future work, we plan to refine our methodology by improving the selection of attributes and exploring different techniques for handling missing data. Another critical aspect that can be considered is the impact of social and behavioral variables. For instance, situations where women experience domestic violence, stress, unemployment, and deprivation can significantly affect their health and well-being, and could be taken into account within a population-based conceptual framework [41]. We recognize that there is still much room for improvement and future studies could benefit from a more comprehensive datasets. Nonetheless, our current findings provide an encouraging starting point for further research into the detection of fetal death using predictive modeling.

Integrating machine learning solutions into clinical practice can be particularly beneficial in supporting obstetric counseling and prenatal care, especially in countries that face economic vulnerability and social fragility, improving maternal and fetal health outcomes. By leveraging advanced analytical tools and combining them with clinical expertise, we plan to develop more accurate and effective predictive models that can aid in the prediction and prevention of fetal death.

Acknowledgements This work was funded by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq), Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES), Fundação de Amparo à Ciência e Tecnologia do Estado de Pernambuco (FACEPE), and Universidade de Pernambuco (UPE). Patricia Takako Endo is funded by CNPq via PQ 2 grant.

References

1. UNICEF: A neglected tragedy: the global burden of stillbirths. Report of the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation;. www.unicef.org/reports/neglected-tragedy-global-burden-of-stillbirths-2020. Accessed 28 Apr. 2023
2. WHO: World Health Organization. Stillbirths. WHO, Geneva (2023). www.who.int/health-topics/stillbirth#tab=tab_1. Accessed 28 Apr. 2023
3. da Saúde, M.: Manual de vigilância do óbito infantil e fetal e do Comitê de Prevenção do Óbito Infantil e Fetal (2009). https://bvsm.s.saude.gov.br/bvsm/publicaç~oes/manual_obito_infantil_fetal_2ed.pdf. Accessed 28 Apr. 2023
4. Organization WH: SDG target 3.1: Maternal mortality. www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/sdg-target-3-1-maternal-mortalityTarget. Accessed 28 Apr. 2023
5. Organization WH: SDG target 3.2: Newborn and child mortality. www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/topics/indicator-groups/indicator-group-details/GHO/sdg-target-3.2-newborn-and-child-mortality. Accessed 28 Apr. 2023
6. Khan, M.N., Rahman, M.M., Shariff, A.A., Rahman, M.M., Rahman, M.S., Rahman, M.A.: Maternal undernutrition and excessive body weight and risk of birth and health outcomes. *Archi. Public Health* **75**, 1–10 (2017)

7. Aminu, M., Bar-Zeev, S., van den Broek, N.: Cause of and factors associated with stillbirth: a systematic review of classification systems. *Acta obstetrica et gynecologica Scandinavica*. **96**(5), 519–28 (2017)
8. Quibel, T., Bultez, T., Nizard, J., Subtil, D., Huchon, C., Rozenberg, P.: Morts fœtales in utero. *Journal de Gynécologie Obstétrique et Biologie de la Reproduction*. **43**(10), 883–907 (2014)
9. Yan, J., Guo, J., Fan, C., Juan, J., Yu, X., Li, J., et al.: Coronavirus disease 2019 in pregnant women: a report based on 116 cases. *Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.* **223**(1), 111-e1 (2020)
10. Lambelet, V., Vouga, M., Pomar, L., Favre, G., Gerbier, E., Panchaud, A., et al.: SARS-CoV-2 in the context of past coronaviruses epidemics: consideration for prenatal care. *Prenat. Diagn.* **40**(13), 1641–54 (2020)
11. Barbeiro, F.M.D.S., Fonseca, S.C., Tauffer, M.G., Ferreira, M.D.S.S., Silva, F.Pd., Ventura, P.M., et al.: Fetal deaths in Brazil: a systematic review. *Revista de Saúde Pública* **49**, 22 (2015)
12. de Santana, T.C.P., da Silva, L.M., da Silva, L.R.F.G., Rocha, L.M., Canhoto, C.T.S., da Silva, A.C.F.A., et al.: Dificuldades dos enfermeiros no atendimento ao pré-natal de risco habitual e seu impacto no indicador de morbimortalidade materno-neonatal. *Revista Eletrônica Acervo Saúde*. **20**, e711-1 (2019)
13. Norwitz, E.R., Edusa, V., Park, J.S.: Maternal physiology and complications of multiple pregnancy. In: *Seminars in Perinatology*, vol. 29, pp. 338–348. Elsevier (2005)
14. Ko, H.S., Wie, J.H., Choi, S.K., Park, I.Y., Park, Y.G., Shin, J.C.: Multiple birth rates of Korea and fetal/neonatal/infant mortality in multiple gestation. *PLoS One* **13**(8), e0202318 (2018)
15. Marques, L.J.P., Silva, Z.P.D., Alencar, G.P., Almeida, M.Fd.: Contribuições da investigação dos óbitos fetais para melhoria da definição da causa básica do óbito no Município de São Paulo, Brasil. *Cadernos de Saúde Pública* **37**, e00079120 (2021)
16. Oliveira, C.M.D., Bonfim, C.V.D., Guimarães, M.J.B., Frias, P.G., Medeiros, Z.M.: Mortalidade infantil: tendência temporal e contribuição da vigilância do óbito. *Acta paulista de enfermagem* **29**, 282–290 (2016)
17. da Saúde, M.: Sistema de Informações de Mortalidade—SIM. <http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/tabcgi.exe?sim/cnv/fet10uf.def>. Accessed 28 Apr. 2023
18. da Saúde, M.: Institui a rede cegonha. https://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/saudelegis/gm/2011/prt1459_24_06_2011.html. Accessed 28 Apr. 2023
19. Lipschuetz, M., Guedalia, J., Rottenstreich, A., Persky, M.N., Cohen, S.M., Kabiri, D., et al.: Prediction of vaginal birth after cesarean deliveries using machine learning. *Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.* **222**(6), 613-e1 (2020)
20. Koivu, A., Sairanen, M.: Predicting risk of stillbirth and preterm pregnancies with machine learning. *Health Inform. Sci. Syst.* **8**, 1–12 (2020)
21. Sheikhtaheri, A., Zarkesh, M.R., Moradi, R., Kermani, F.: Prediction of neonatal deaths in NICUs: development and validation of machine learning models. *BMC Med. Inform. Decis. Making* **21**(1), 1–14 (2021)
22. Malacova, E., Tippaya, S., Bailey, H.D., Chai, K., Farrant, B.M., Gebremedhin, A.T., et al.: Stillbirth risk prediction using machine learning for a large cohort of births from Western Australia, 1980–2015. *Sci. Rep.* **10**(1), 1–8 (2020)
23. Silva Rocha, E.D., de Moraes Melo, F.L., de Mello, M.E.F., Figueiroa, B., Sampaio, V., Endo, P.T.: On usage of artificial intelligence for predicting mortality during and post-pregnancy: a systematic review of literature. *BMC Med. Inform. Decis. Making* **22**(1), 1–17 (2022)
24. Shukla, V.V., Eggleston, B., Ambalavanan, N., McClure, E.M., Mwenechanya, M., Chomba, E., et al.: Predictive modeling for perinatal mortality in resource-limited settings. *JAMA Netw. Open* **3**(11), e2026750 (2020)
25. Jakhar, D., Kaur, I.: Artificial intelligence, machine learning and deep learning: definitions and differences. *Clin. Exp. Dermatol.* **45**(1), 131–2 (2020)
26. Pesapane, F., Codari, M., Sardaneli, F.: Artificial intelligence in medical imaging: threat or opportunity? Radiologists again at the forefront of innovation in medicine. *Eur. Radiol. Exp.* **2**, 1–10 (2018)
27. Helm, J.M., Swiergosz, A.M., Haerberle, H.S., Karnuta, J.M., Schaffer, J.L., Krebs, V.E., et al.: Machine learning and artificial intelligence: definitions, applications, and future directions. *Curr. Rev. Musculoskelet. Med.* **13**, 69–76 (2020)

28. Dietterich, T.G.: An experimental comparison of three methods for constructing ensembles of decision trees: bagging, boosting, and randomization. *Mach. Learn.* **40**, 139–57 (2000)
29. Murdoch, W.J., Singh, C., Kumbier, K., Abbasi-Asl, R., Yu, B.: Interpretable machine learning: definitions, methods, and applications (2019). arXiv preprint [arXiv:1901.04592](https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.04592)
30. Breiman, L.: *Classification and Regression Trees*. Routledge (2017)
31. Mitchell, R., Frank, E.: Accelerating the XGBoost algorithm using GPU computing. *PeerJ Comput. Sci.* **3**, e127 (2017)
32. Susmaga, R.: Confusion matrix visualization. In: *Intelligent Information Processing and Web Mining*, pp. 107–116. Springer (2004)
33. Hossin, M., Sulaiman, M.N.: A review on evaluation metrics for data classification evaluations. *Int. J. Data Min. Knowl. Manag. Process.* **5**(2), 1 (2015)
34. Olson, D.L., Delen, D.: *Advanced Data Mining Techniques*. Springer Science & Business Media (2008)
35. Parikh, R., Mathai, A., Parikh, S., Sekhar, G.C., Thomas, R.: Understanding and using sensitivity, specificity and predictive values. *Indian J. Ophthalmol.* **56**(1), 45 (2008)
36. Chicco, D., Jurman, G.: The advantages of the Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC) over F1 score and accuracy in binary classification evaluation. *BMC Genomics* **21**, 1–13 (2020)
37. Fuadah, Y.N., Pramudito, M.A., Lim, K.M.: An optimal approach for heart sound classification using grid search in hyperparameter optimization of machine learning. *Bioengineering* **10**(1), 45 (2022)
38. Prati, R.C., Batista, G.E., Monard, M.C.: Class imbalances versus class overlapping: an analysis of a learning system behavior. In: *Mexican International Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pp. 312–321. Springer (2004)
39. Batista, G.E., Prati, R.C., Monard, M.C.: A study of the behavior of several methods for balancing machine learning training data. *ACM SIGKDD Explor. Newsl.* **6**(1), 20–9 (2004)
40. He, H., Ma, Y.: *Imbalanced Learning: Foundations, Algorithms, and Applications*. Wiley (2013)
41. Muin, D.A., Windsperger, K., Attia, N., Kiss, H.: Predicting singleton antepartum stillbirth by the demographic fetal medicine foundation risk calculator—a retrospective case-control study. *PLoS One* **17**(1), e0260964 (2022)
42. Vintzileos, A.M., Ananth, C.V., Smulian, J.C., Scorza, W.E., Knuppel, R.A.: The impact of prenatal care on neonatal deaths in the presence and absence of antenatal high-risk conditions. *Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol.* **186**(5), 1011–6 (2002)
43. Heaman, M.I., Martens, P.J., Brownell, M.D., Chartier, M.J., Derksen, S.A., Helewa, M.E.: The association of inadequate and intensive prenatal care with maternal, fetal, and infant outcomes: a population-based study in Manitoba, Canada. *J. Obstet. Gynaecol. Canada* **41**(7), 947–59 (2019)
44. Townsend, R., Sileo, F., Allotey, J., Dodds, J., Heazell, A., Jorgensen, L., et al.: Prediction of stillbirth: an umbrella review of evaluation of prognostic variables. *BJOG: An Int. J. Obstet. Gynaecol.* **128**(2), 238–250 (2021)
45. Lean, S.C., Derricott, H., Jones, R.L., Heazell, A.E.: Advanced maternal age and adverse pregnancy outcomes: a systematic review and meta-analysis. *PLoS One* **12**(10), e0186287 (2017)
46. Attali, E., Yogev, Y.: The impact of advanced maternal age on pregnancy outcome. *Best Pract. Res. Clin. Obstet. Gynaecol.* **70**, 2–9 (2021)
47. Guarga Montori, M., Álvarez Martínez, A., Luna Álvarez, C., Abadía Cuchí, N., Mateo Alcalá, P., Ruiz-Martínez, S.: Advanced maternal age and adverse pregnancy outcomes: a cohort study. *Taiwanese J. Obstet. Gynecol.* **60**(1), 119–24 (2021)
48. Amini, P., Maroufzadeh, S., Samani, R.O., Hamidi, O., Sepidarkish, M.: Prevalence and determinants of preterm birth in Tehran, Iran: a comparison between logistic regression and decision tree methods. *Osong Public Health Res. Perspect.* **8**(3), 195 (2017)
49. Singh, A., Bhatia, M., Garg, A.: Prediction of abnormal pregnancy in pregnant women with advanced maternal age and pregestational diabetes using machine learning models. *IEEE* 262–267 (2022)

50. Correa-de Araujo, R., Yoon, S.S.: Clinical outcomes in high-risk pregnancies due to advanced maternal age. *J. Women's Health* **30**(2), 160–7 (2021)
51. Organization WH: Interpregnancy interval: effects on maternal and perinatal health. World Health Organization, Department of Reproductive Health and Research (2013). https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/73710/RHR_policybrief_birthspacing_eng.pdf
52. Gupta, P.M., Freedman, A.A., Kramer, M.R., Goldenberg, R.L., Willinger, M., Stoll, B.J., et al.: Interpregnancy interval and risk of stillbirth: a population-based case control study. *Ann. Epidemiol.* **35**, 35–41 (2019)
53. Regan, A.K., Gissler, M., Magnus, M.C., Håberg, S.E., Ball, S., Malacova, E., et al.: Association between interpregnancy interval and adverse birth outcomes in women with a previous stillbirth: an international cohort study. *The Lancet* **393**(10180), 1527–35 (2019)
54. Barros, P.D.S., Aquino, É.C.D., Souza, M.R.D.: Mortalidade fetal e os desafios para a atenção à saúde da mulher no Brasil. *Revista de Saúde Pública* **53** (2019)

GNSS Jamming Clustering Using Unsupervised Learning and Radio Frequency Signals



Carolyn J. Swinney  and John C. Woods 

Abstract Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide vital position and timing information to receivers on the ground. This service is relied upon worldwide for many industries including telecommunications, online banking and developing technologies such as driverless cars. GNSS signals are vulnerable to interference and low-cost devices called jammers purchased easily online create an interference signal so that the genuine signal cannot reach the receiver. Incidents of this nature are increasing in frequency with a report showing European interference incidents to have increased 20 times in the two-year period from 2018 to 2020. Timely identification of unwanted signals is paramount in dealing with this global issue. This paper shows that clustering graphical representations of the signal and utilising convolutional neural network (CNN) feature extraction with transfer learning produces a higher V-measure score than without the feature extraction. Further, CNN feature extraction reduces the processing time of the clustering. Overall, this paper shows that GPS jammer detection classes can be clustered using an unsupervised learning algorithm such as k-means clustering.

Keywords Convolutional neural network · Deep learning · GNSS jamming · Machine learning · Classification · RF signal analysis · Transfer learning

1 Introduction

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a type of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) that encompasses constellations of satellites that allow individual GNSS receivers to establish their own location. However, GNSS signals are inherently weak by the time they reach the receiver, and therefore, vulnerable to interference in the electromagnetic spectrum. Technologies such as driverless cars are critically reliant on these signals for safety. Alan O'Connor, senior economist at RTI International

C. J. Swinney (✉) · J. C. Woods
Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
e-mail: cjswin@essex.ac.uk

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_2

states “There is broader recognition of the role infrastructure plays in our economy, though many people are unaware of the connections between GPS, robust positioning, navigation and timing signals, and the apps and tools we use every day,” [1]. Even with the growing economic reliance on GPS, intentional interference incidents are increasing with a European report showing recorded events to have increased 20 times over a period of 2 years [2].

Sreeraj et al. [3] use power spectral density (PSD) data and an adversarial autoencoder (AAE) to detect synthetically generated anomalies in the wireless spectrum. The model is trained in an unsupervised manner for mean squared error reduction and then via semi-supervised learning to learn the features where they achieve 80% accuracy. Indian satellite constellation signals are considered by Lineswala and Shah [4] use PSD data to detect jamming but do not consider classification. Considering the signal in the time domain through a spectrogram is used by Ferre et al. [5] for detection and classification. For 6 types of jammers, their work produces 95% accuracy using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and 91% for a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). Swinney and Woods [6] use the same dataset to show that using a CNN with transfer learning for feature extraction and then a machine learning classifier can increase the accuracy up to 98%.

In this paper, we extend the contributions of Swinney in “Signal classification at discrete frequencies using machine learning” thesis [7] by considering the GPS jamming as a two class detection issue by including all the different jamming classes within the one class to allow for early warning. The work continues to consider CNN feature extraction using transfer learning in conjunction with the unsupervised clustering algorithm k-means using k-means ++, random and principle component analysis (PCA) dimensionality reduction initialisations. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology including graphical signal representation, CNN feature extraction, k-means clustering and performance evaluation metrics. Section 3 considers the results and Sect. 4 presents the conclusions of the work.

2 Methodology

2.1 Jamming Signal Dataset

The dataset used in this research can be found at [8] but the mathematical models used to generate the signals are explained in [5]. Equation (1) shows the received signal at the receiver as $r(t)$, jamming signal $j(t)$, GPS signal $g(t)$ and $w(t)$ represents random noise modelled using random additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN).

$$r(t) = g(t) + j(t) + w(t) \quad (1)$$

The carrier-to-noise ratio was calculated for $r(t)$ with a uniform distribution from 25–50 dB and a Jammer-to-Signal ratio from 40–80 dB. 800 samples for each class of jamming signal were produced in raw IQ form. Python3 Matplotlib was used to plot spectrograms, PSD, raw constellation and histograms for each sample to create separate image datasets. For the spectrogram and PSD, a FFT length of 1024 with a Hanning window function was used. Welch’s periodogram was used for the PSD. Raw data samples have a duration of 1 ms. The real and imaginary parts of the data are plotted on the x and y axis to represent a constellation. 500 bins are used to plot the occurrences of the real part of the signal for the histogram representation. The four plots are treated separately and as one by concatenating the graphs onto one 224×224 pixel image. Figure 1 shows the graphical signal representations for no jamming signal present so the baseline can be observed.

Figure 2 shows the graphical signal representations for an amplitude modulated (AM) jammer. AM jammers are one of the five jammer types included in the dataset used in this research.

Images for the datasets were saved as 224×224 pixels with 300 images per class. Classes included no jamming signal present and jamming signal present. The jamming signal present class included an even distribution from each of the jammer




Fig. 1 No jamming signal baseline; PSD (top left); spectrogram (top right); raw constellation plot (bottom left); histogram (bottom right)




Fig. 2 AM jamming signal baseline; PSD (top left); spectrogram (top right); raw constellation plot (bottom left); histogram (bottom right)

classes included in the original dataset so that the algorithm was not only trained exclusively against one type of jammer, but five different types within the one class.

2.2 CNN Feature Extraction

For the experiments, the data was considered in 2 formats. First, datasets were created from the images, as described and shown above for PSD, spectrogram, raw constellation, histogram and a concatenation of the four. Secondly, the images were fed to a pretrained CNN for feature extraction to understand if the process of transfer learning was able to increase accuracy. Transfer learning is when a CNN trained for one purpose is used for a different problem set.

A VGG-16 which is a type of CNN was first introduced in a paper called “Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognition” by the Oxford Visual Geometry Group [9]. It was shown to produce 92.7% accuracy with ImageNet. ImageNet is a dataset containing over 14 million images and 1000 classes, and is used for object detection. CNNs pretrained on ImageNet have been shown to generalise well using a process called transfer learning [10] and have been used

effectively in medical research [11, 12]. To utilise the VGG for feature extraction, the CNNs' forward propagation does not continue to the fully connected layer, rather the outputs are saved as a feature set. In [7], a VGG-16 was compared to a deeper architecture of ResNet-50. V-measure scores were comparable but the completion time for the ResNet-50 was quadruple that of the VGG-16. Therefore, to look at these experiments, it was decided to take forward the VGG-16 and if it is found to be a feasible research line in the future more CNN architectures can be compared.

2.3 *K-Means Clustering*

K-means clustering is an unsupervised type of machine learning whereby the training data does not have labels but the algorithm is used to classify inherent patterns in the data. Clustering uses a metric that represents the similarity of data, groups it, and uses a centroid for representation of that group. When given new information, the data will be assigned to the group based on the centroid it is closest to. K-means has been shown to be a robust choice in comparison to other clustering algorithms [13]. There are different ways of measuring similarity, and in these experiments, we use the Euclidean distance as it is standard in the Python3 scikit-learn library. K-means performance can be affected depending on how the centroids are initialized [14]. The three most common initialisations are k-means ++ , random and PCA-based; each has advantages and disadvantages in terms of both accuracy and the time to run the algorithm.

K-means ++ selects a random point in the data as its first centroid and then the following ones are calculated using a probability proportional to the squared distance. It effectively pushes the centroids as far as possible away from each other [15]. Random initialisation chooses the points completely at random from within the dataset and uses the average distance between each point and the initial centroids [16]. Lastly, PCA reduces the dimensionality of the dataset without losing any of the important information [17]. Some research has suggested a link between k-means clustering and PCA so that the clustering information remains after the dimensionality is reduced [18].

2.4 *Performance Metrics*

Normally with unsupervised learning, it is hard to understand how well the model is performing as it is using unlabelled data. With this dataset, we do have access to label information for each sample which allows the utilisation of certain cluster quality metrics to understand how well the model performed against the ground truth. The first two metrics that are considered are homogeneity score and completeness score. Homogeneity is defined as “each cluster contains only members of a single class” and completeness is defined as “all members of a given class are assigned

to the same cluster” [19]. Both scores return a value between 0 and 1 whereby 1 indicates perfect labelling. A v-measure score is a harmonic mean of the two and can be described in Eq. (2)

$$v = \frac{(1 + \beta)(homogeneity)(completeness)}{\beta(homogeneity + completeness)} \quad (2)$$

β represents a weight where when the value is less than 1 more weight will be assigned to homogeneity and when greater than 1 more weight will be assigned to completeness. $v = 1$ indicates a perfect score.

The next measurement considered is the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI). It directly measures the ground truth and the clustering of the sample. Adjusted means that the rand index has a baseline and close to 0.0 indicates random labelling and if the clustering matches up exactly, it would produce a score of 1.0. Adjusted Mutual Information (AMI) normalises against chance the agreement of two assignments. Again, a score of 0.0 indicates random labelling and 1.0 indicates perfect scoring.

3 Results

Tables 1 and 2 show the k-means clustering results for images in the form of PSD, spectrogram, histogram, raw IQ plot and concatenation. It further shows the feature extraction using VGG-16 for PSD, spectrogram, histogram, raw IQ plot and concatenation. Table 1 shows that if we only consider time as a performance metric, PCA reduces the clustering processing time when the input data is images between 1 and 4 s compared to k++ initialisation. If v-measure is considered, representing homogeneity and completeness, 0.791 is the highest v-measure using images with the concatenation of the four representations (PCA initialisation) and spectrograms follow this at 0.698 (all initialisations).

Table 2 shows VGG-16 feature extraction to produce the highest v-measure score of 0.915 with spectrogram graphical signal representations and by using PCA or random initialisation. Processing time was 0.526 s for PCA initialisation and 0.488 for random initialisation. This is an increase of v-measure score and a decrease in time compared to giving the clustering algorithm the images without the CNN feature extraction.

Figure 3 shows a plot of principle components 1 and 2 for the clustering with the spectrogram images. Figure 4 shows the clustering with FE using the VGG-16 neural network with spectrograms, both employing PCA dimensionality reduction. Spectrogram images produce a v-measure score of 0.698 and using CNN feature extraction with spectrograms a v-measure score of 0.915. This can be seen when comparing the two figures as there are fewer outliers in Fig. 4 and the clusters have a higher concentration.

Table 1 K-Means clustering results images

	Init	Time (s)	v-measure	ARI	AMI
PSD	k ++	1.060	0.118	0.134	0.116
PSD	rdm	0.966	0.118	0.134	0.116
PSD	PCA	0.904	0.185	0.218	0.184
Spec	k ++	1.085	0.698	0.742	0.697
Spec	rdm	0.803	0.698	0.742	0.697
Spec	PCA	0.801	0.698	0.742	0.697
Hist	k ++	0.927	0.147	0.039	0.145
Hist	rdm	1.264	0.150	0.041	0.148
Hist	PCA	0.906	0.487	0.456	0.487
Scatter	k ++	0.802	0.004	0.001	0.001
Scatter	rdm	1.170	0.016	0.003	0.013
Scatter	PCA	0.902	0.513	0.582	0.513
Concat	k ++	0.916	0.761	0.810	0.761
Concat	rdm	0.607	0.789	0.839	0.789
Concat	PCA	0.692	0.791	0.839	0.789

Table 2 K-Means clustering results VGG-16 feature extraction

	Init	Time (s)	v-measure	ARI	AMI
PSD	k ++	0.432	0.019	0.000	0.016
PSD	rdm	0.332	0.036	0.001	0.033
PSD	PCA	0.374	0.267	0.330	0.266
Spec	k ++	0.660	0.914	0.950	0.914
Spec	rdm	0.488	0.915	0.950	0.914
Spec	PCA	0.526	0.915	0.950	0.914
Hist	k ++	0.507	0.291	0.179	0.289
Hist	rdm	0.361	0.291	0.179	0.289
Hist	PCA	0.375	0.083	0.098	0.082
Scatter	k ++	0.439	0.004	0.001	0.001
Scatter	Rdm	0.535	0.155	0.069	0.154
Scatter	PCA	0.419	0.630	0.651	0.629
Concat	k ++	0.399	0.004	0.000	0.000
Concat	Rdm	0.303	0.004	0.000	0.000
Concat	PCA	0.460	0.641	0.712	0.641




Fig. 3 Image spectrogram K-means PCA initialization




Fig. 4 FE VGG-16 spectrogram K-means PCA initialization

4 Conclusion

Overall, this research shows that the use of CNN FE utilising transfer learning and employing the dimensionality reduction technique PCA, can reduce time and improve the performance metrics v -measure, ARI, and AMI of clustering for the detection of

GNSS jamming signals. Graphical signal representation in the form of spectrogram images produced the highest v-measure, ARI, and AMI scores with CNN FE using transfer learning, while the concatenation of the four representations produced the highest scores for graphical signal representation images using no CNN FE. With processing times generally under 1 s, this could be a valuable technique for early warning of potential jamming activity which could cue another sensor to provide higher accuracy classification.

Future work could consider a larger number of jammer classes within the ‘jammer present’ class and the system tested with real-world data. However, there are legal constraints surrounding both the collection of signal data and broadcasting signals in many countries. Future work could also consider the prevention or reduction of interference to improve early detection. The ability to cluster or classify signals such as those produced by GPS jammers remains paramount in an era of ever-increasing dependencies such as autonomous vehicles.

References

1. Datta A.: Modern civilization would be lost without GPS. SpaceNews, (2021).
2. Eurocontrol, Does radio frequency interference to satellite navigation pose an increasing threat to network efficiency, cost-effectiveness and ultimately safety?. Eurocontrol, (2019).
3. Rajendran, S., Meert, W., Lenders, V., Pollin, S.: Unsupervised wireless spectrum anomaly detection with interpretable features. *IEEE Trans Cogn Commun Netw* (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1109/TCCN.2019.2911524>.
4. Lineswala, P.L., Shah, S.N.: Performance analysis of different interference detection techniques for navigation with Indian constellation. *IET Radar Sonar Navig.* **13**(8), 1207–1213 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-rsn.2019.0091>.
5. Ferre, R.M., La Fuente, A.D., Lohan, E.S.: Jammer classification in GNSS bands via machine learning algorithms. *Sensors (Switzerland)*, **19**(22), (2019) <https://doi.org/10.3390/s19224841>.
6. Swinney, C.J., Woods, J.C.: GNSS jamming classification via CNN , transfer learning & the novel concatenation of signal representations. 2021 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA), pp. 1–9, (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1109/CYBERSA52016.2021.9478250>.
7. Swinney C.J.: Signal classification at discrete frequencies using machine learning, Univ. Essex Repos. (2023).
8. Swinney, C.J., Woods, J.C.: Raw IQ dataset for GNSS GPS jamming signal classification. Zenodo (2021). <https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4629685>.
9. Simonyan K., Zisserman, A.: very deep convolutional networks for large-scale image recognition. *ICLR 2015*, (2015).
10. Kornblith, S., Shlens, J., Le, Q.V.: Do better imagenet models transfer better?. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, **2019-June**, pp. 2656–2666, (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1109/CVPR.2019.00277>.
11. Thota, N.B., Umma Reddy, D.: Improving the accuracy of diabetic retinopathy severity classification with transfer learning. *Midwest Symp. Circuits Syst.* **2020-Augs** pp. 1003–1006, (2020) <https://doi.org/10.1109/MWSCAS48704.2020.9184473>.
12. Jayakumari, C., Lavanya, V., Sumesh, E.P. (2020) Automated diabetic retinopathy detection and classification using ImageNet convolution neural network using fundus images. In: 2020 International Conference on Smart Electronics and Communication (ICOSEC), pp. 577–582, (2020) <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICOSEC49089.2020.9215270>.

13. Pfitzner, D., Leibbrandt, R., Powers, D.: Characterization and evaluation of similarity measures for pairs of clusterings. *Knowl. Inf. Syst.* 2008 19:3, **19**(3), pp. 361–394, (2008) <https://doi.org/10.1007/S10115-008-0150-6>.
14. Atmiya, T.M.K.: Survey on exiting method for selecting initial centroids in k-means clustering survey on exiting method for selecting initial centroids in k-means clustering. *Int. J. Eng. Dev. Res.* **2**(2), (2014).
15. Arthur, D., Vassilvitskii, S.: k-means++: The advantages of careful Seeding.
16. Hamerly, G., Elkan, C.: Alternatives to the k-means algorithm that find better clusterings. In: *International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, Proceedings*, pp. 600–607, <https://doi.org/10.1145/584792.584890> (2002).
17. Jolliffe, I.T., Cadima, J.: Principal component analysis: a review and recent developments. *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A: Math., Phys. Eng. Sci.*, **374**(2065), (2016). <https://doi.org/10.1098/RSTA.2015.0202>.
18. Ding, C.: K-means clustering via principal component analysis, (2004).
19. Scikit Learn, “2.3. Clustering—scikit-learn 1.0.2 documentation,” *Scikit Learn*, <https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/clustering.html#clustering-evaluation> (2022). Accessed 17 Feb, 2022.

Using Data Analytics to Derive Business Intelligence: A Case Study



Ugochukwu Orji, Ezugwu Obianuju, Modesta Ezema,
Chikodili Ugwuishiwu, Elochukwu Ukwandu , and Uchechukwu Agomuo

Abstract The data revolution experienced in recent times has thrown up new challenges and opportunities for businesses of all sizes in diverse industries. Big data analytics is already at the forefront of innovations to help make meaningful business decisions from the abundance of raw data available today. Business intelligence and analytics (BIA) has become a huge trend in today's IT world as companies of all sizes are looking to improve their business processes and scale up using data-driven solutions. This paper aims to demonstrate the data analytical process of deriving business intelligence via the historical data of a fictional bike-share company seeking to find innovative ways to convert their casual riders to annual paying registered members. The dataset used is freely available as "Chicago Divvy Bicycle Sharing Data" on Kaggle. The authors used the R-Tidyverse library in RStudio to analyze the data and followed the six data analysis steps of; ask, prepare, process, analyze, share, and act to recommend some actionable approaches the company could adopt to convert casual riders to paying annual members. The findings from this research serve as a valuable case example, of a real-world deployment of BIA technologies in the industry, and a

U. Orji · E. Obianuju · M. Ezema · C. Ugwuishiwu · U. Agomuo
Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Physical Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka,
Enugu State, Nigeria
e-mail: ugochukwu.orji.pg00609@unn.edu.ng

E. Obianuju
e-mail: assumpta.ezugwu@unn.edu.ng

M. Ezema
e-mail: modesta.ezema@unn.edu.ng

C. Ugwuishiwu
e-mail: chikodili.ugwuishiwu@unn.edu.ng

U. Agomuo
e-mail: uchechukwu.agomuo.pg00090@unn.edu.ng

E. Ukwandu (✉)
Department of Applied Computing, Cardiff School of Technologies, Cardiff Metropolitan
University, Wales, UK
e-mail: eaukwandu@cardiffmet.ac.uk

demonstration of the data analysis cycle for data practitioners, researchers, and other potential users.

Keywords Data analytics · Data analysis cycle · Business intelligence · Big data analytics

1 Introduction

The continuous advancements in technological innovations are facilitating the enormous growth of heterogeneous data from multiple sources; thus, creating new challenges and even bigger opportunities for businesses and academics. These data being generated are both structured and unstructured, complex and simple, creating the boom of big data. Furthermore, nowadays, there are smart gadgets, the Internet of Things (IoT), and user-generated content (UGC) from social media, all contributing to the large data pool.

For academia, the dynamic nature of the data being generated is creating unprecedented research opportunities in several fields, including; social science, economics, finance, biology and genetics, etc. [1].

Data analytics has become a key enabler for business transformation for many businesses, no matter their size, and has already changed the way businesses operate through better customer service, payments, business models, and new ways to engage online [2]. In order to generate actionable insights, large volumes of structured/unstructured data can be analyzed from multiple sources using data analytics for business intelligence [3]. This ability to convert vast amounts of opaque data into refined and action-driven information in real-time offers a significant competitive advantage to these businesses and BIA is the leading technology driving this innovation.

Orji et al. [4] detail how organizations of all sizes are currently utilizing business intelligence tools and techniques to explore result-oriented ways to provide business value and improve decision-making for their businesses. According to Hočevar and Jaklič [5], for organizations to thrive and stay competitive, effective and timely business information is key, especially in today's rapidly changing business environment. Managers who are serious about maintaining their business competitiveness in this age of Digital Business Transformation (DBT) must not rely solely on their intuition or other unconventional business approaches. An organization's decision-making process no matter the size must be data-driven. This is especially important because a vital component of strategic planning and management for any organization is data. With data, they can analyze their strengths and weaknesses, those of their competitors, and then anticipate market developments and predict their competitive environment [3, 6].

A major industry where data analytics has widely and successfully influenced their mode of operation is e-commerce and e-services [7]. A TDWI survey of 2009 showed that 38% of the surveyed businesses and organizations are already practicing an advanced form of data analytics, and another 85% indicated their intentions of

deploying it in the future [8]. According to a 2020 Statista forecast [9], the BIA software applications' market size will see an enormous worldwide increase over a six years stretch. It is estimated to grow from \$14.9 billion in 2019 to \$17.6 billion in 2024. A different report by NewVantage Partners [10] suggests that 91.6% of Fortune 1000 companies are investing in Big Data Analytics (BDA) with 55% of firms already investing more than \$55 million. This shows great opportunity in BIA.

1.1 Research Objectives and Questions

The objective of this research is to derive business intelligence using data from a 'real-life' situation. Adopting the six data analysis steps, we examined data from a fictitious bike-share company (CYCLISTIC BIKE SHARE) over a period of one year; October 2020 to September 2021. The aim of the project is to design marketing strategies aimed at converting the company's casual riders into annual paying members using the historical dataset.

To achieve this objective, the following are some key issues to resolve from the data;

- i. Understand the riding pattern of annual members and casual riders
- ii. Find opportunities to convert casual riders to paying annual member
- iii. Find possible digital marketing strategies to convert casual riders into members.

2 Review of Related Works

This study investigated some available literature where data analytics was utilized in deriving business intelligence for various businesses in different industries.

The opportunities and possibilities opened as a result of data analytics are enormous. Malhotra and Rishi [11] explored these possibilities for e-commerce using an analysis of customer preferences and browser behaviors. They found a way to ensure seamless online purchase decisions with the aid of personalized page ranking order of web links from customer queries. Their research aimed to find solutions to the limitations of available search and page ranking systems of e-commerce platforms.

Increasingly, organizations are tapping into the potent power of social media to grow their business, gauge user sentiments on their products and services and stay ahead of trends. This is especially vital to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as they seek to break even bigger competitors. In [12] Orji et al. developed a framework where SMEs can see user sentiments on their products and services based on data generated from Twitter. This is regarded as "crowd wisdom" and helps businesses streamline their business processes accordingly to meet the needs of their customers.

Information has proven to be an essential resource for better decision-making and implementing robust business strategies. Caseiro and Coelho [13] while investigating the direct and indirect effects of Business Intelligence on organizations' performance,

surveyed 228 startups across European countries. Their result indicated the apparent influence Business Intelligence capacities have on network learning, innovativeness, and performance. The authors highlighted the need for startups to pay attention to business intelligence capacities, given their impact on the overall performance.

Hopkins and Hawking [14] used an intrinsic case study approach to examine the role and impact of BDA and IoT, in supporting the strategy of a large logistics firm to improve driver safety, reduce operating costs, and reduce the environmental impact of its vehicles. Based on the results of the BDA, truck routing will be improved, along with recommendations for optimal fuel purchases and locations, and a forecast for proactive and predictive maintenance schedules.

Furthermore, below are practical use cases where Data Analytics have been effectively utilized to derive Business Intelligence in various industries (Table 1).

3 Research Methodology

This study followed the six data analysis cycle as shown below:

Ask → Prepare → Process → Analyze → Share → Act

This section will deal with the first 4 stages of the data analysis cycle and the rest in the following sections.

- a. Ask: At this stage of the data analysis cycle, the task is to understand the stakeholder expectations and plan for how to go about the remaining stages of the process. The key tasks here are:
 - Identify the business task—this is the aim of the project which is to analyze the Cyclistic historical bike trip data to identify trends that will help the marketing team convert casual riders into annual paying members.
 - Consider key stakeholders—in this case study, the primary stakeholder would be the director of marketing, while the secondary stakeholders include; the marketing analytics team and the executive team of the Cyclistic company.

Figure 1 shows the steps taken to achieve our data analysis objectives in this research.
- b. Prepare: At this stage of the process, the task is to prepare the data for further analysis and, in doing so, must consider the following:
 - Choose data sources—the dataset consists of historical trip data of the Cyclistic bike-share company recorded between October 2020 and September 2021. The data has been made available by Motivate Inc. and is publicly available as “Chicago Divvy Bicycle Sharing Data” on Kaggle [21].
 - To begin, the analyst loads the data into the RStudio environment, then performs some basic Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) to better understand the data. We inspect the data to make sure that the data contains the right information needed for the task at hand. Here we check the column names, data types, and overall consistency of the data (Table 2).

Table 1 Different practical use cases of data analytics to improve business intelligence

Businesses	Impact of data analytics on the business intelligence process	References
Netflix	With its 151 million subscribers, Netflix implements data analytics models to determine customer behavior and buying patterns and then recommends movies and TV shows based on that information	[15]
Express scripts	Analyze patient data and alert healthcare workers to serious side effects before prescribing medications	[16]
McDonald’s Corporation	Based on McDonald’s Corporation sales data, the drive-through experience, kitchen operations, supply chain, menu suggestions, personalized menus, and deals are optimized	[17]
CitiBank	The online banking provider helps minimize financial risk by analyzing big data and pinpointing fraudulent behaviors using real-time machine learning and predictive modeling. Users can be notified of suspicious transactions, for example, incorrect or unusual charges, promptly by CitiBank. Besides being helpful for consumers, this service is also useful for payment providers and retailers in monitoring all financial activity and identifying threats to their businesses	[18]
Advanced radiology services	This private radiology practice built a data warehouse to improve its daily practice management. With over 100 radiologists in a wide area, the organization had limited data on which to base decisions before the DW was implemented. By investing in IT infrastructure they have since seen an increase of 10.4% in productivity in the first two years and experienced growth in existing sites and acquired new contracts	[19]
Various auditors	Auditors are using data analytics to perform audit procedures including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The metadata attached to transactions is used to identify combinations of users involved in processing transactions • Analyzing revenue trends by product and region • Matching purchase orders with invoices and payments • NRV testing—comparing the price at which an inventory item was purchased and sold last time 	[20]

c. Process: At this stage of the data analysis cycle, the data is cleansed and pre-processed for analysis. The following data cleansing and preprocessing procedures were taken:

- Remove duplicates: we first removed duplicates from the dataset
- Remove rows with missing values: next we handle missing values
- Parse datetime columns: i.e. convert the string representation of the date and time value to its DateTime equivalent so it stacks correctly.
- Next we manipulate the data further by adding new columns that will help improve calculations e.g. new columns to list the weekday, month, and year of each ride which will be useful to determine users’ riding patterns. We also




Fig. 1 Research flow

Table 2 Brief description of the dataset

S/N	Attribute	Description	Data type
1	ride_id	User ride ID	String
2	rideable_type	Type of bike (classic_bike, electric_bike and docked_bike)	String
3	started_at	Trip start date and time	Date
4	ended_at	Trip end date and time	Date
5	start_station_name	Trip start station name	String
6	start_station_id	Trip start station ID	String
7	end_station_name	Trip end station name	String
8	end_station_id	Trip end station ID	String
9	start_lat	Trip starting latitude	Numeric
10	start_lng	Trip starting longitude	Numeric
11	end_lat	Trip ending latitude	Numeric
12	end_lng	Trip ending longitude	Numeric
13	member_casual	Registration type (member or casual)	String

added new columns to calculate each ride length in hours which will be useful for intra-day analysis.

- Finally we removed the geographic coordinates date (Longitude and Latitude) because it was not needed for our analysis.

d. Analysis: At this stage of the data analysis cycle, the data analyst performs a descriptive analysis of the cleaned data. The key tasks at this stage include:

- Performing summary statistical calculations: summary statistics is done to provide a quick and simple description of the data.
- Aggregating the data so that it's useful and accessible: here, the data is sorted, normalized, and grouped accordingly to get insights.
- Identifying trends and relationships: this is the main aim of the data analysis process, to see the trends, patterns, and relationships in the data.

4 Result and Discussion

e. Share: After analyzing the data and identifying the trends, the next stage of the data analysis cycle is to share the findings and tell the data story to stakeholders who have been looking forward to it. For this case study, the data analyst used the ggplot library inherent in the R-tidyverse package to create visualizations and help the stakeholders better understand the data. Below are some snippets of the visuals from the data analysis (Figs. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).

Key takeaways:

- The average ride duration is higher for casual riders for all indices measured.
- Casual riders ride more during the weekends while annual paying members preferred the mid-week days.




Fig. 2 Average riding duration (in minutes) per day for both categories of riders




Fig. 3 Average number of rides per day for both categories of riders




Fig. 4 Average number of rides per hour for casual riders




Fig. 5 Average number of rides per month for casual riders




Fig. 6 Top 10 most used stations by casual riders

- Unsurprisingly, the summer months of June to September were the peak riding months for casual riders.
 - Streeter Dr. and Grand Ave. is the most used bike station for casual riders with over 100,000 rides almost twice as any other bike station.
- f. Act: Finally, at the Act phase of the data analysis cycle, the stakeholders are to be given actionable recommendations based on the findings from the data analysis. From our findings, the following recommendations were made to the stakeholders in their bid to convert casual riders to annual paying members:
1. Give incentives to members and offer rewards for achieving set riding milestones to attract casual riders since they already have huge riding numbers.
 2. Offer occasional membership discounts to newly registered members in summer, holidays, and weekends since most casual riders prefer to ride during those periods.
 3. Partner with local businesses within the top 10 most used bike stations for casual riders especially Streeter Dr. and Grand Ave. We recommend advertising with local businesses within the Streeter Dr. and Grand Ave. bike station targeting local riders and frequent visitors (commuters).

5 Conclusion

In this paper, the researchers have used the Chicago Divvy Bicycle Sharing dataset to demonstrate the process of deriving business intelligence via data analytics tools and techniques using the case study of the fictional Cyclistic bike-share company. This paper also demonstrates why data analytics and business intelligence have emerged as the new frontier of innovation for businesses and startups looking to be competitive in today's markets. We believe our findings make a significant contribution, to an emerging research area that is currently lacking in academic research. We hope that this paper bridges the gap between industry practice and academic theory.

Data-driven decision-making is essential for businesses of all sizes, especially SMEs, in order to remain competitive. Powerful data analytics tools such as Python, R, Tableau, and Power BI make it easy to manipulate and visualize data. However, it is important to recognize that successfully leveraging data analytics requires more than just technology investments and experimentation with new techniques. Other key components include having a deep technical and managerial understanding of big data analytics capabilities, cultivating an environment of organizational learning, as well as integrating big data decision-making into a firm's operations. It is ultimately the combined effect of these resources that will help organizations develop their big data analytics capability and gain value.

5.1 Limitations and Future Works

Further analysis could be done to improve the findings of this study; for example, sourcing additional data like climate data and customer demographics data could help better understand the customer persona and provide more insights. Further analysis might also be needed to understand the motivations behind the increase in the number of causal riders on weekends, and whether medical or health-driven issues may have influenced this choice.

Future work should consider predictive analytics of the data to find patterns, identify risks, and opportunities.

Additional Information

The datasets analyzed and complete documentation of the data analysis and programming process are available at: <https://www.kaggle.com/orjiugochukwu/cyclistic-data-analysis>

References

1. Huang, S.C., McIntosh, S., Sobolevsky, S., Hung, P.C.: Big data analytics and business intelligence in industry. *Inf. Syst. Front.* **19**(6), 1229–1232 (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10796-017-9804-9>
2. Akter, S., Michael, K., Uddin, M.R., McCarthy, G., Rahman, M.: Transforming business using digital innovations: the application of AI, blockchain, cloud, and data analytics. *Ann. Oper. Res.* 1–33 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03620-w>
3. Mikalef, P., Boura, M., Lekakos, G., Krogstie, J.: Big data analytics and firm performance: findings from a mixed-method approach. *J. Bus. Res.* **98**, 261–276 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.01.044>
4. Orji, U.E., Ugwuishiwu, C.H., Nguemaleu, J.C., Ugwuanyi, P.N.: Machine learning models for predicting bank loan eligibility. In: 2022 IEEE Nigeria 4th International Conference on Disruptive Technologies for Sustainable Development (NIGERCON), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1109/NIGERCON54645.2022.9803172>
5. Hočevar, B., Jaklič, J.: Assessing benefits of business intelligence systems—a case study. *Manag.: J. Contemp. Manag. Iss.* **15**(1), 87–119 (2010)
6. George, B., Walker, R.M., Monster, J.: Does strategic planning improve organizational performance? A meta-analysis. *Public Adm. Rev.* **79**(6), 810–819 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13104>
7. Sun, Z., Zou, H., Strang, K.: Big data analytics as a service for business intelligence. In: Conference on e-Business, e-Services and e-Society, pp. 200–211. Springer, Cham (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25013-7_16
8. Ram, J., Zhang, C., Koronios, A.: The implications of big data analytics on business intelligence: a qualitative study in China. *Procedia Comput. Sci.* **87**, 221–226 (2016). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2016.05.152>
9. Statista: Global BI & Analytics Software Market Size 2019–2024 (2020). <https://www.statista.com/statistics/590054/worldwide-business-analytics-software-vendor-market/>. Accessed 03 March 2023
10. NewVantage Partners: Big Data and AI Executive Survey 2019 (2019). <http://newvantage.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Big-Data-Executive-Survey-2019-Findings-122718.pdf>. Accessed 03 March 2023

11. Malhotra, D., Rishi, O.: An intelligent approach to design of E-Commerce metasearch and ranking system using next-generation big data analytics. *J. King Saud Univ. Comput. Inf. Sci.* **33**(2), 183–194 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2018.02.015>
12. Orji, U.E., Ezema, M.E., Ujah, J., Bande, P.S., Agbo, J.C.: Using Twitter sentiment analysis for sustainable improvement of business intelligence in Nigerian small and medium-scale enterprises. In: 2022 IEEE Nigeria 4th International Conference on Disruptive Technologies for Sustainable Development (NIGERCON), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1109/NIGERCON54645.2022.9803087>
13. Caseiro, N., Coelho, A.: The influence of business intelligence capacity, network learning, and innovativeness on startups performance. *J. Innov. Knowl.* **4**(3), 139–145 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jik.2018.03.009>
14. Hopkins, J., Hawking, P.: Big data analytics and IoT in logistics: a case study. *Int. J. Logist. Manag.* (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJLM-05-2017-0109>
15. Dixon, M.: How Netflix Used Big Data and Analytics to Generate Billions (2019). <https://seleritysas.com/blog/2019/04/05/how-netflix-used-big-data-and-analytics-to-generate-billions/>. Accessed 11 Feb 2023
16. Beall, A.: Big Data in Health Care: How Three Organizations Are Using Big Data to Improve Patient Care and More? (2020). https://www.sas.com/en_gb/insights/articles/big-data/bigdata-in-healthcare.html. Accessed 11 Feb 2023
17. Elmes, S.: Delicious Data: How Big Data Is Disrupting the Business of Food (2019). <https://adimo.co/news/delicious-data-how-big-data-is-disrupting-the-business-of-food>. Accessed 03 March 2023
18. Aleksandrova, M.: Big Data in the Banking Industry: The Main Challenges and Use Cases (2019). <https://easternpeak.com/blog/big-data-in-the-banking-industry-the-main-challenges-and-use-cases/>. Accessed 02 March 2023
19. Sigler, R., Morrison, J., Moriarity, A.K.: The importance of data analytics and business intelligence for radiologists. *J. Am. Coll. Radiol.* **17**(4), 511–514 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacr.2019.12.022>
20. Data Analytics and the Auditor | ACCA Global. <https://www.accaglobal.com/gb/en/student/exam-support-resources/professional-exams-study-resources/p7/technical-articles/data-analytics.html>. Accessed 3 March 2023
21. Chicago Divvy Bicycle Sharing Dataset. <https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/orjiugochukwu/cyclistic-dataset>

Blockchain, Cyber Threat Intel and Malware Analysis

Evaluation Factors for Blockchain Identity Management Systems



Bandar Alamri , Katie Crowley , and Ita Richardson 

Abstract Every system has specific functions to run appropriately to meet system requirements. Thus, Blockchain (BC) Identity Management (IdM) systems built for applications, such as Health Internet of Things (HIoT), should consider IdM technical aspects and HIoT application's requirements, standardisation and regulations. BC is the foundation of BC-IdM systems, and thus it is at the core of this study. The evaluation factors are essential in determining the reliability and suitability of such systems, particularly in security systems designed to be security guards, such as IdM systems. In addition, cybersecurity risk management for such systems should evaluate the security, technical, application requirements, and organisational aspects to mitigate security risks and ensure functional systems. In this article, we conducted a literature review on BC-IdM systems and identified the components of the BC-IdM ecosystem and the evaluation factors for BC-based IdM systems. The evaluation factors are divided into four main criteria: security and privacy, technical, application, and external factors. Moreover, a case study of BC-IdM in HIoT systems is discussed to show the application evaluation factors.

Keywords Blockchain · Evaluation factors · BC-IdM ecosystem · Health IoT · Identity management systems · Security risk management

B. Alamri (✉) · K. Crowley · I. Richardson
Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Limerick, Limerick,
Ireland
e-mail: bandar.alamri@ul.ie

the Science Foundation Ireland Research Centre for Software, Limerick, Ireland

K. Crowley
e-mail: katie.crowley@ul.ie

I. Richardson
e-mail: ita.richardson@lero.ie

1 Introduction

Blockchain (BC) is an emerging technology with potential in a variety of fields, including Identity Management (IdM) systems and domains such as healthcare. It has attracted researchers' and developers' attention for its potential to develop decentralised IdM systems to eliminate the need for Trusted Third Parties (TTP), which might lead to a single point of failure security issue. Therefore, there is a need to study the security and functionality of BC technologies and applications. Although employing BC to create IdM systems has shown promise, studies show that not all BC-IdM proposals could compete with Blockchain-less IdM systems. As a result, before implementing this form of a model, evaluation factors should be applied [1]. Furthermore, several studies in various domains that proposed such systems compare them to conventional IdM systems, and there are no such comprehensive evaluation frameworks or criteria currently in use in BC-based IdM systems [2]. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate these proposed solutions.

In previous work [3], we reviewed 106 studies, 60 on cybersecurity risks of BC and IdM systems and 46 on cybersecurity security risks of Health Internet of Things (HIoT). From this, we developed a cybersecurity risk management framework. We also identified a need for an evaluation phase in cybersecurity risk management when using evolving technology, such as BC. In the evaluation phase, evaluation criteria and factors for BC-based IdM systems should be identified. Thus, in this paper, we conducted a literature review on the evaluation criteria and factors for BC technologies and BC-IdM systems, including BC-IdM technical standards, such as Decentralised Identifiers (DID) and Verifiable Credentials (VC), and models, such as SSI Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI). Multiple studies studied the evaluation of BC used in specific applications and businesses such as healthcare, Electronic Health Records (EHR), IoT, and supply chain management, where businesses and applications' needs and requirements are considered in the evaluation process.

We conducted the literature review presented in this article to comprehensively identify the evaluation factors of the BC-IdM systems proposed for specific applications. The structure for the rest of this paper is as follows, Sect. 2 presents background, including an overview of BC-IdM, motivation and related work. Section 3 explains the research methodology. Section 4 presents an analysis of the results. Section 5 identifies the evaluation factors of BC-IdM systems and a case study of BC-IdM in HIoT applications, and Sect. 6 covers the conclusion and future work.


2 Background

2.1 BC-Based IdM Systems

IdM systems are critical in connecting system stakeholders to online services in various domains and applications, such as healthcare and HIoT. They apply two main processes to authenticate identities and manage access privileges, i.e., authentication and authorisation. There are three forms of identity management systems [4], as shown in Fig. 1:

- (A) Traditional IdM: in this model, an entity (users, things, organizations) authenticates to a system (relying party) using credentials separately. The credentials are stored by the relying party, from which they give access and privileges to entities. Users need to sign up differently for every system they use.
- (B) Federated IdM: in this model, a user deals with a service provider which manages the identity and access process on behalf of relying parties (i.e., business system). Although this model facilitates the identity and access management process between users and relying parties, they pose security and privacy concerns,

Fig. 1 IdM system models [4]



such as service provider misuse of user' credentials and the single point of failure security issue.

- (C) User-centric IdM: BC-IdM systems can provide this type of IdM model where a user does not need to rely on a trusted third party (TTP) in order to access a system's services. This type of IdM system can solve the issues addressed in the traditional and federated models.

BC-IdM systems promise to provide a user-centric IdM system which allows identity owners (i.e., data subjects) to have complete control over their digital identity and data, e.g., SSI. SSI IdM systems are decentralised BC-IdM built upon the BC network, on-chain and off-chain technologies. Technical standards around this type of IdM system, such as DID, are evolving quickly, along with standards around BC and Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) [1].

2.2 *Motivation and Related Work*

BC technology has shown potential through proof of concepts in different applications and domains, such as decentralised identity management systems, IoT and healthcare. However, when BC is applied to real-life case studies, BC functional and non-functional properties, such as cybersecurity, play a fundamental role in deciding its suitability. BC-IdM system works are evaluated differently from conventional IdM systems, as their operations rely on BC. As BC is an evolving technology, it is crucial to consider evaluating related technologies, application requirements, and influential external factors when studying such systems [5, 5]. Several BC-based IdM systems are proposed for different applications and domains, such as health systems [6–9], education [10], and IoT systems [11–13]. All these studies strive to harness BC capability and technical standards developed around it, such as in [14], to build decentralised IdM systems. However, there is no comprehensive evaluation framework in which BC-IdM for such systems can be evaluated, nor is there a framework in which decisions regarding the selection of the best option can be made.

Our previous work [15], shows security, privacy and functional concerns in the proposed BC-IdM systems in HIoT and identified a need for a cybersecurity risk management framework. In recent work [3], we reviewed studies around cybersecurity risks in BC-IdM systems, BC, IdM, and HIoT. The outcome of that work was a high-level cybersecurity risk management framework for BC-IdM systems in HIoT (recently edited slightly). The proposed framework consists of four phases, as shown in Fig. 2, preparation, assessment, evaluation and treatment, in which an evaluation phase is a central pillar of the framework. The evaluation phase is critical in the treatment and decision-making process when using evolving technologies such as BC. There are three sub-steps in the evaluation phase, (1) criteria identification (evaluation theme), (2) sub-criteria identification (evaluation factors), and (3) metrics identification. Evaluating BC-based solutions and deciding on these solutions should be part of cybersecurity risk assessment and management processes [16]. The




Fig. 2 Cybersecurity risk management framework, including the evaluation phase [3]

need for comprehensive evaluation factors motivates us to identify, categorise, and summarise evaluation factors in BC-IdM systems and presents a case study of HIoT.

While some studies, such as [17], discuss the security assessment of BC covering the Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability (CIA) triad in the light of using BC in public sector applications, several researchers conducted studies on Blockchain liability and suitability from a broader perspective. In such studies, researchers studied the assessment and evaluation of Blockchain’s technical, legal, and organisational aspects, such as security, privacy, functionality, standardisations, and performance. For instance, [18] proposed BC evaluation factors in general without concertation on a particular aspect, domain or application. However, some studies, such as [22], focused only on performance evaluation for BC in general. Other studies propose evaluation criteria in specific domains, such as [19], researchers studied evaluation factors for BC applications in EHR and researchers in [20, 21] studied the evaluation of BC in the logistic domain. Concerning BC-IdM systems, only one study [1] proposed evaluation factors for BC-IdM systems focusing only on the technical, user experience and regulation compliance. Other studies, such as [23], focused on evaluating the SSI BC-IdM model and technical standards such as DID and VC.

On the other hand, unlike previous studies (as we identified in our literature review), we integrate BC-IdM ecosystem components, i.e., BC, BC-IdM technical standards, models, and application-related evaluation factors. Therefore, in this paper, we are answering the following research questions to investigate previous studies that proposed evaluation factors for BC-IdM systems:

- RQ1: What are the BC-IdM ecosystem components, i.e., the main components of such systems for which evaluation factors should be considered?
- RQ2: What are the factors used to evaluate BC-IdM systems?

Table 1 Search terms, inclusion and exclusion criteria

Search terms	(Blockchain AND evaluation) OR (self-sovereign AND evaluation) OR (decentralised identity AND evaluation) OR (Blockchain AND assessment) OR (self-sovereign AND assessment) OR (decentralised identity AND assessment)
Inclusion criteria	(1) studies written in English and published after Jan 2016, and (2) secondary studies proposed evaluation factors for BC or BC-IdM technologies
Exclusion criteria	(1) studies that do not propose evaluation factors, (2) primary studies that only conduct an evaluation for one aspect of Blockchain performance, i.e., consensus mechanism performance, (3) studies that focus only on cryptocurrency applications evaluation, and (4) studies in which full text is unavailable or published before January 2016

3 Methodology

In this paper, we present a literature review which was undertaken to answer RQ1 and RQ2. To broaden our search process, we did not only focus on BC-IdM system evaluation factors but also covered BC evaluation factor studies because BC is the core of BC-IdM systems. Therefore, in this work, we used Blockchain/decentralised identity/self-sovereign and evaluation/assessment as alternative terms in the search process. All search terms are presented in Table 1. We used three electronic databases, IEEE Explore, Scopus and Google Scholar. As we only focused on studies that proposed evaluation factors, we needed to use the exclusion and inclusion criteria presented in Table 1. BC started to be used beyond cryptocurrency applications in 2016, so studies that focus on the evaluation of cryptocurrency applications and were published before 2016 are excluded as they only focus on BC financial applications, which can not be used for BC-IdM systems. Also, primary studies that conduct an evaluation of the performance of BC's consensus mechanisms are excluded as the focus of those studies is on the test-bedding results, not on the evaluation factors.

Initially, we identified 2284 studies from IEEE Explore, Scopus and Google Scholar. Based on the inclusion/exclusion criteria, also using a snowballing approach, 34 studies were selected. Table 2 shows their contributions, the domains and aspects in which the evaluation factors were identified, and whether the evaluation factors were assessed or not.

4 Results Analysis

We identified two main study themes from the reviewed literature, BC technologies evaluation (26 studies) and BC-IdM technologies evaluation (8 studies). Figure 3 depicts the BC and BC-IdM evaluation studies applications (left) and aspects (right). Regarding the BC evaluation factor studies, some are for general BC applications, and others are for specific applications. As shown in Fig. 3, some of the BC applications are covered in the reviewed studies for different domains and applications,

Table 2 The reviewed studies' contributions, showing the used/identified evaluation factors, the domains under investigation in every study, and whether the identified evaluation factors were assessed using evaluation methods such as Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques, game theory, expert opinions (via interviews or questionnaires), or were not assessed

Study	Contribution	Domain	Assessed?
[S1] Almeshal et al. [18]	Review of evaluation factors and dimensions. The factors are divided into Suitability to the business case, usability and adoption, platform selection, performance, and architectural design options	General evaluation for General BC applications	No
[S2] Smetanin et al. [24]	Main metrics related to the Blockchain performance evaluation, emulation and analytical performance evaluation approaches. Factors divided based on: (1) BC (Consensus-transaction throughput-transaction size-block size-latency), (2) Network (network size-volume of Peer 2 Peer (P2P) traffictraffic structure- packet loss ratio), (3) Node (Central Processing Unit (CPU)memory- storage -connectivity-read latency-read throughput-catch hit ratio)	Performance evaluation for General BC applications	No
[S3] Alzahrani et al. [19]	Evaluation factors for organizations' readiness in order to adopt Blockchain applications. Factors are divided to Financial, social, technical, organisational, and legal and regulations	General evaluation for Electronic Health Records (EHR)	Yes, using Hierarchical Decision the Model (HDM)
[S4] Fan et al. [22]	Evaluation criteria for Blockchain performance divided into Macro/application factors (throughput, latency, scalability, fault tolerance, transactions per CPU/memory second/disk Input Output/network data) and Micro/BC layers factors (such as peer discovery rate, RPC response rate, transaction propagating rate, contract execution time, state updating time, consensus-cost time, encryption and hash function efficiency.)	Performance evaluation for General BC applications	No
[S5] Kuperberg [1]	75 Evolution criteria for BC-IdM systems are divided into Compliance and liability, end-user experience, technology Implementation, integration and operation	BC-IdM system for general applications	No
[S6] Wang et al. [26]	Security evaluation criteria and subcriteria for BC P2P network, ledgers, contract, and consensus layers	BC security for general applications	No

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Study	Contribution	Domain	Assessed?
[S7] Naik and Jenkins [42]	15 specifications to evaluate SSI, including functional -non-functional	BC-IdM (SSI model) for General BC applications	No
[S8] Pattiyanon and Aoki [46]	42 properties are identified and divided into SSI principles, information security, information Privacy, system security, and ease of use criteria to evaluate the compliance of SSI systems to laws, regulations and technical standards	BC-IdM (SSI model) for General BC applications	Yes, via opinions expert
[S9] Satybaldy et al. [23]	8 requirements as evaluation factors for SSI systems	BC-IdM (SSI model) for General BC applications	No
[S10] Shuaib et al. [47]	Review study compares the SSI principles with laws of Identity and identifies eight SSI system evaluation factors	BC-IdM (SSI model) for General BC applications	No
[S11] Fdhila et al. [43]	Based on the W3C DID method Rubric and considering dimensions such as Network, registry, and specification, the evaluation criteria are divided to rule-making, operation, security, and implementation	BC-IdM (SSI model) for General BC applications	No
[S12] ColomoPalacios et al. [27]	19 evaluation factors divided into technical and business	General evaluation for General BC applications	No

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Study	Contribution	Domain	Assessed?
[S13] Qi et al. [26]	22 criteria are divided into five main criteria (P2P network security, consensus security, distributed ledger, SC, and application)	Security aspect for General BC applications	Yes, using theory and clustering game grey methods (statistics and expert opinions)
[S14] Lo et al. [27]	Seven criteria are used to evaluate the suitability of BC for different case studies, including health systems and IdM	General evaluation for General BC applications	No
[S15] Amine et al. [28]	11 criteria to evaluate the performance of BC-Based Security and Privacy Systems for the Internet of Things, 17 security requirements and 13 steps proposed when building BC-based security solutions for IoT	Performance evaluation for BC-Based security solutions in IoT	No
[S16] Scriber et al. [31]	Ten evaluation criteria for selecting BC (immutability, transparency, trust, identity, distribution, workflow, transactions, historical records, ecosystem, and inefficiency)	General evaluation for General BC applications	No
[S17] Zhang et al. [30]	Seven evaluation criteria for BC healthcare systems (HIPAA compliance, interoperability, user-centric, scalability, costeffectiveness, identification and authentication)	General evaluation for healthcare systems	No
[S18] Orji et al. [20]	18 sub-criteria are divided into three main criteria (technological, organisational, and institutional)	General evaluation for BC based systems in logistics industry	Yes, via MCDM the Analytic Network Process (ANP) technique

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Study	Contribution	Domain	Assessed?
[S19] Labazova. [31]	Four evaluation themes for BC implementation: Innovation (integrity -trust-availability-transaction costscalability-confidentiality), Design (consensus-anonymity-transparency-Permissioning -modularity), Interorganizational integration(governance-user adoption- interoperability), and Implementation environment (regulations-ecosystem requirements)	Implementation evaluation for General BC applications	Yes, via BC expert interviews
[S20] Frauenthaler et al. [5]	Eight metrics are divided into four main criteria (cost-related, performancerelated, security-related, and reputation) to evaluate and select BC platforms	General evaluation for General BC applications	No
[S21] Yang et al. [32]	Five main criteria (Key application Requirements, Data security, Process complexity, Application ecological completeness, and Technology performance requirements to evaluate the maturity of BC	General evaluation for general public service projects	Yes, via AH Pentropy technique and expert interviews
[S22] Wibowo and Hw [33]	Two main criteria (suitability and environmental (process, people and technology)) to evaluate IoT	General evaluation for IoT applications	No
[S23] Nabeeh et al. [36]	7 main criteria (logistics, implementation, customer, product, time, security and cost) and 20 secondaries to evaluate BC applications used in SCM systems	General evaluation for BC for SCM applications	Yes, via expert opinions and neutrosophic model with MCDM methods
[S24] Herrgos et al. [34]	26 sub-criteria divided into three main criteria (Technical, Organisational, Economic) to evaluate BC for manufacturing. BC solutions were compared to centralised DBs	General evaluation for BC applications in manufacturing	The BC usability was evaluated using AHP and experts' opinions, but the criteria were not evaluated

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Study	Contribution	Domain	Assessed?
[S25] Gourisetti et al. [35]	100 controls divided into 18 sub-criteria divided into five main criteria (data participation, security, technical, trust, and performance) to evaluate and select BC for applications such as IdM, IoT and healthcare	General evaluation for general BC (case studies given)	Mathematical weighted evaluation used to evaluate BC, but the criteria were not evaluated
[S26] Murat et al. [36]	8 criteria(scalability, privacy, security, interoperability, Audit, latency, visibility, and trust) to evaluate BC applications in logistics	General evaluation for logistics BC applications	Yes, via expert opinions and AHP and VIKOR techniques
[S27] Yang et al. [37]	Four criteria (decentralisation, storage and sharing, performance, and scalability) and eight sub-criteria to evaluate BC-based knowledge-based conversation systems	General evaluation for BC knowledgebased conversation system	No, criteria are proposed, and then BC platforms are evaluated based on experts' opinions and AHP, Fuzzy techniques
[S28] Moezkarimi et al. [38]	Four main criteria (governance, architecture, support, and application) and 14 subcriteria to evaluate BC platforms	General evaluation for general BC applications	No

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Study	Contribution	Domain	Assessed?
[S29] Erol et al. [39]	Ten criteria (Security, Interoperability, Community support, Business reputation and Resiliency, Multi-functionality, Developer availability, Capacity, Scalability, Throughput, and Latency) to evaluate suitable BC in healthcare	General evaluation for Healthcare BC applications	Yes, criteria are evaluated based on experts' opinions, and then MCDM techniques and experts are used to evaluate the most suitable BCs
[S30] Martin Schäffner [44]	Six main criteria (Maturity (status), System design, Functionality, SSI System Governance, Trust, and fee structure) to evaluate SSI systems	SSI BC-IdM evaluation for General BC applications	No
[S31] Erol et al. [40]	16 indicators are identified to evaluate BCs (regulations, technological maturity, The proportion of digitised assets, Richness of ecosystem, financial benefit, cost, security and data Integrity, trust, scalability, Speed, visibility, auditability, efficiency, The need for reduced fraud, investment, and traceability)	General evaluation for General BC applications (applicationon Turkey industries)	Yes, criteria are evaluated based on experts' opinions, fuzzy AHP and TOPSIS techniques are used to sign weights for indicators
[S32] Bal-asubramanian et al. [41]	12 criteria (Motivational Readiness, Engagement Readiness, Technical Readiness, Structural Readiness, Government, Business Entities, Blockchain Solution Providers, Customers, Regulatory and Legal, Innovation Propensity, Privacy and Trust, and Supportive Infrastructure) divided to 3 main sections	General evaluation for Healthcare BC applications	No, an application of the framework is done in the UAE healthcare sector

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Study	Contribution	Domain	Assessed?
[S33] Thanh N [21]	11 criteria (Costs of investment, Institution-based trust, Infrastructure facility, Compatibility, BC tools availability, Top management support, The capability of human resources, Government policy and support, Security and privacy, Ease of being tried and observed Firm size)to evaluate logistics BCs	General evaluation for BC logistic applications	Yes, via experts' opinions and MCDM techniques
[S34] Bolte P, Jetschni J [45]	Five criteria (Functionality, Flexibility, Operability, Dependency, and Involvement) to evaluate SSI from an implementation perspective	SSI BC-IdM evaluation for General BC applications	Yes, using questionnaires with experts





Fig. 3 BC and BC-IdM evaluation studies, showing the covered aspects and domains

as follows: Twenty-two studies (62%) presented evaluation factors for general BC. Four studies [19, 30, 39, 41] (11%) showed evaluation factors for healthcare systems, four studies [20, 21, 36, 36] (11%) showed evaluation factors for the logistics and Supply Chain Management (SCM) applications, two studies [28, 33] (6%) showed evaluation factors for IoT, and one study (3%) showed evaluation factors for public service [32], knowledge-based observation systems [37], and manufacturing [34].

Regarding the BC-IdM evaluation studies [1, 23, 42–47], all are for general applications (i.e., no one study focused on BC-IdM proposed for a specific application such as IoT). Only one study [1] covered evaluation factors for BC-IdM systems, and the other seven focused on the SSI model. The study focusing on BC-IdM system evaluation contributed to evaluating BC-IdM based on three main criteria: regulatory compliance, user experience, and implementation. Even though that study contribution was beneficial for our study, ours is more comprehensive as it covers the application and external factors in addition to the BC component factors, which were not covered in that particular study. The remaining seven studies focused on the SSI model only, mainly DID and VC technical standards. In terms of the aspects covered, most of the studies, 21 studies (62%), proposed evaluation factors for BC in general, eight studies (23%) proposed factors to evaluate BC-IdM systems, three studies [22, 24, 28] (9%) proposed factors concerning BC performance, and two studies [25, 26] (6%) proposed factors concerning BC security.

The main contribution of the studies found in this review is based on a need to evaluate BC applications before applying them. Most studies considered security and privacy assessment in general (i.e., security and privacy as main evaluation themes) or, in detail, as a main part of the evaluation process (i.e., security of every layer and technology used in BC). The evaluation process, including security and privacy factors, should be applied in the proof-of-concept stage and before the production stage of BC applications. The BC solution should pass the assessment process, which should consider the business requirements (i.e., application requirements) [18]. In addition, there are 13 steps to adopt and build BC-based security and privacy solutions (e.g., BC-IdM systems) for IoT systems, in which the evaluation of the solution, including security requirements and threat assessment, should be considered and conducted [28].

Fig. 4 BC-IdM ecosystem components



Among the 34 reviewed studies, only 12 used evaluation methods to assess the identified factors to ensure that the chosen evaluation factors are the most relevant to evaluate such systems. Varied evaluation methods were used, such as Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) techniques (e.g., Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), fuzzy AHP (FAHP), and the fuzzy technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (FTOPSIS)), game theory, or expert opinion via interviews or questionnaires. Table 2 shows the evaluation methods used in these studies.

To answer the RQ1, we identified the BC-IdM ecosystem components, as shown in Fig. 4. These components cover all aspects of the BC-IdM system: the BC platform used, the BC-IdM model followed, the technical standards and the application where BC-IdM is planned to be used. The BC-IdM system is divided into four major components as follows:

1. **BC technology:** is the foundation technology that provides a technology stack for the BC-IdM system. Multiple BC platforms exist that can be used to develop IdM systems, such as Ethereum, Hyperledger Fabric, MultiChain, and Corda. They can be public/private and can be permissioned/permissionless. The suitability of such platforms depends on their characteristics. It is essential to investigate these BC platforms and their technologies (onchain/offchain) and evaluate the most suitable for specific applications before applying them.
2. **BC-IdM models:** to develop a BC-based IdM system, there are several BC-IdM system models which a developer can follow, such as the most used model, i.e., SSI, in which the data owner is given full control of the custody of their identities. Other models rely slightly on a centralised party in which only the main rules of the BC-IdM system are set.
3. **Technical standards:** the technical standards that provide functionalities for the BC-IdM systems, such as DID and VC, which are developed by W3C, DIF and Hyperledger. These standards have specific requirements that should be met in

order to comply with the recommendations of the BC-IdM model used, such as SSI.

- 4. Application: the application in which the IdM system is built. It includes the application’s technical requirements, organisational policies, regulations and application extensions such as Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Based on the analysis of the results, BC used for applications in Logistics has specific tools, requirements and considerations different from healthcare settings, IoT, public service, or manufacturing.

5 BC-IdM Evaluation

5.1 Evaluation Factors

In addition to identifying the BC-IdM ecosystem components, to answer RQ2, four main factors which should be used to evaluate the BC-IdM systems were also identified. Using the identified evaluation factors to evaluate the BC-IdM system will increase the reliability of such systems. Figure 5 shows the main evaluation factors and sub-criteria, as follows:

Security and Privacy assessment factors are essential in every information system. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) specified a publication in this regard [46]. According to the reviewed studies, the security and privacy of BC infrastructure, IdM, and applications such as HIoT in healthcare and other applications in logistics, supply chain management, manufacturing, and knowledge-based observation systems should all be considered in the evaluation process. In addition, most of the reviewed studies proposed the security and privacy theme in their evaluation process [19, 23, 25, 26, 28, 42–47].




Fig. 5 The evaluation criteria and sub-criteria

- BC P2P network: identification (i.e., node access control), software fault tolerance (i.e., network self-protection and self-adaptation), resource control (i.e., connection timeout limit and concurrent connection restriction), data integrity (i.e., anti-tampering capabilities), and security audit (i.e., node information log is updated and functional).
- BC distributed ledger: software fault tolerance (i.e., whether data format standards are used to store transactions and block data), access control (i.e., availability of access policies), data integrity (i.e., availability of integrity mechanisms, e.g., hash mechanisms), data confidentiality (i.e., the data encryption mechanisms of storage), identity privacy (i.e., availability of privacy mechanisms to ensure identity and transaction privacy), and ledger function (i.e., data non-repudiation, synchronisation, and data consistency).
- BC consensus mechanism: resource control (i.e., use of computer resources), backup and recovery (i.e., availability of real-time backup and system continuity), and consensus effect (i.e., consensus consistency and effectiveness against illegal transactions).
- BC smart contracts: security audit (i.e., behavioral event audit and recording the audit information), malicious code protection (i.e., protection from malicious code using relevant mechanisms), data integrity (i.e., using cryptographic mechanisms to secure data transmission), and data confidentiality (i.e., using cryptographic mechanisms to ensure data confidentiality).
- BC-IdM Security: BC-IdM security evaluation factors which the BC-IdM model, such as the SSI, should support, include, (1) Existence: the existence of real users is a condition for creating a digital identity for them, (2) Sovereignty: the identity owner must have full control of the identity, (3) Single source: the identity owner should be the only source of creating credentials, (4) Data minimisation: a minimum amount of data should be disclosed when necessary, (5) Verifiability: credentials are the only method to verify the identity owner., (6) Decentralised: the identities should not be controlled using a centralised system, (7) Protection: the BC-IdM system should be protected using cryptographic mechanisms to ensure the CIA triad, (8) Authentication: only authenticated users can use the system, (9) Authorisation: specific privileges are given to specific users based on roles, attributes, or capabilities, (10) Confidentiality: the IdM system should use techniques to ensure user data confidentiality, (11) Availability: the IdM system should be available and accessible whenever a user identity needs it, (12) Integrity: methods to ensure data integrity in the IdM system against data tempering, (13) Accountability: using methods, such as logging systems to ensure the responsibility of users' actions, (14) Non-repudiation: the IdM systems should ensure data reputation by using techniques such as multi-factor authentication, digital signature, and log audit, (15) Data validation and sanitisation: validation and sanitisation techniques used to ensure data validity, and (16) Data classification: data classification tools to ensure the protection of data in the IdM system and mitigate security and privacy risks.
- BC-IdM Privacy: BC-IdM privacy factors which BC-IdM model principles, such as the SSI principle, should support, include, (1) Access control: access to user

data should be based on a list of access control, (2) Transparency: the IdM system and its collection and processing operations should be transparent to the user, (3) Persistence: the system should provide identity longevity as long as the identity owner wishes, (4) Consent: sharing identity data should be based on user consent, (5) Data recovery: mechanisms to ensure identity recovery should be used in the system, (6) Fairness and Lawfulness: user data should be used fairly and lawfully according to the data protection rules, (7) Purpose Specification and Limitation: user data should be used based on a specific purpose and enclosed to a specific limit, and (8) Notification: the user should be notified whenever data is collected.

- Application security and privacy: the application’s extensions’ security and privacy include off-chain technologies; storage capacity (i.e., ensuring system scalability), physical security (i.e., environmental security), communication security, error handling, key protection, malware protection, password, configuration and session security. In addition, privacy and Security risk management, i.e., the ability to mitigate and manage security risks, is another important factor in evaluating BC-IdM applications.

Technical evaluation factors concentrate on all factors related to the system functionality and end-user experience evaluation. Sub-criteria for this criterion include performance, functional, non-functional, standardisation, and end-user experience [1, 19, 22, 24, 28]. Details for the technical sub-criteria are as follows:

- **Performance factors:** studies cover BC performance according to BC platform benchmarking, such as Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric performance. They mainly focus on the performance evaluation of P2P networks, distributed ledgers, consensus mechanisms, and smart contracts [22, 24], as follows: (1) BC Performance: consensus type, transaction throughput, transaction size, block size, chain size, scalability and latency, (2) Network Performance: network size, the volume of P2P traffic, traffic structure, propagating transaction rate, contract execution time, and packet loss ratio, (3) Node Performance: CPU, memory, storage, connectivity, read latency, read throughput, cache hit ratio, and (4) BC-IoT solutions Performance [28]: communication cost, computation cost (ms), storage overhead (Bits), BC storage size, BC update time overhead (ms), the impact of BC consensus rate, and transaction generation time (ms).
- **Functional factors:** affect the functionality of BC-IdM, i.e., factors related to technology, implementation, and operations [1], as follows: (1) BC model, which it should be permissioned, (2) System governance: admission to the network should be regulated, and the ability to vote in changing the code of rules using smart contracts should be available, (3) Participation activity: incentivises to participate in the BC network process, (4) Data format and storage: identity data should be sharded or sliced, (5) Implementation backup: to ensure having a consortium to prevent product lock-in, (6) Keys and hashes storage: a public key and assertion hash keys and claims should be stored on-chain, (7) IdM protocols: such as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), should be exposed to the service providers, (8) Federation functionality: should be available to support cross-trust between users

and multiple service providers (using standards such as JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)), (9) Accessibility of the identity provider: it should be accessible from secured network environments, (10) API availability: should be available to allow communication with external services, (11) BC-IdM standards support: There should be support for standards such as DID and VC, (12) Data transmission and access control protection: traffic and access to/from and between the identity provider and users should be secured, (13) Identity credentials rollout and lifetime limitation: it should support credential time limitation and identity rollout and removal in managed devices, and (14) IoT system suitability: the IdM system should support applications, including IoT devices.

- **Non-functional factors:** in which the BC-IdM system must perform in order to achieve the main goals of the system, such as interoperability, scalability, and suitability [28], as follows: (1) Scalability: the ability to keep up with increased users/nodes, (2) Suitability: to what extent is the BC-IdM solution suitable for specific applications and domains, (3) Usability: the degree of efficiency, effectiveness, maturity and flexibility of the BC-based systems, (4) Interoperability: BC-based systems' ability to exchange data with other stakeholders or between different systems, (5) Sustainability: BC-IdM systems must be based on sustainable infrastructure, (6) Trust: trust can be evaluated based on availability -security- privacy-integrity -confidentiality requirements.
- **Standardisation:** Evaluation of the technical standards of BC-IdM systems, such as DID and VC, is vital. We identified and summarised them in a previous study [3]. These standards allow BC-IdM systems to function. Although there are many DID methods in theory, the practical ones are less than this number. They can be evaluated using criteria such as rulemaking/governance, DID security, and functionality and implementation maturity from a developer perspective [43–45], as follows: (1) DID Maturity (status): to what extent the SSI system is functional and ready to use?, (2) DID system design: the DID and related technologies design can be assessed via ledger integration and interaction levels, (3) DID functionality: it can be evaluated by assessing the proving ownership, control delegation between DIDs, and credentials support features, (4) SSI System governance: although SSI is meant to be independent, there must be an authority to set basic rules, (5) VC flexibility: to what extent can the developer deal with the VC standard freely?, (6) VC functionality: to what extent does the VC standard support the developer to achieve SSI tasks?, (7) VC operability: to what extent the VC standard is supportive for the developers, in terms, for instance, documentation, application considerations, and standards?, (8) VC dependency: to what extent the developer needs the VC creators' support, such as W3C?, and (9) VC creator involvement: to what extent are the VC solution creators involved in the SSI community and developing SSI technologies?
- **End-user experience:** user experience is fundamental to building an identity management system successfully. Several factors are identified which show the user-friendliness of such systems [1, 23], as follows: (1) Service cost: the end user should not pay for basic services, (2) Identity federation capability: an identity should support single-sign-on and single-logout capabilities, (3) Desktop and

mobile usability: the system should support desktop and mobile devices, (4) Identity usage statistics: dashboard showing the logins and identity data usage history, (5) Additional extension: there should be no need to install extensions to use the identity, (6) Multi-factor authentication: it should support multi-factor authentication, (7) Identity portability and synchronisation: it should support exporting identity and synchronising across devices, (8) Self-registration, Initial password and lost access recovery: should support user self-registration, the ability to select the initial password, and methods to recover issues of access and credentials, (9) Identity isolation: an identity should not be bound to an email address, device, etc., (10) Concurrently of multi identities/identifiers to one service provider: should support mutable multi identities/identifiers to be used in one service provider, and (11) the availability of a registry: a wide-ecosystem registry for searching identities by attributes or using the hierarchy.

Application evaluation factors play a role in evaluating the suitability of different BC for a specific application [31]. As shown in the previous section, 38% of studies focused on evaluation factors for specific applications, such as healthcare, IoT, logistics/SCM, knowledge-based observation systems, manufacturing, and public service, where application requirements and considerations were considered. This trend indicates the need for evaluation factors for BC's applications. The national regulations and organization policies, standardisation, and application requirements should be considered when using BC-IdM systems [18–20, 28, 32, 33, 36, 37]. Moreover, although the vast majority of studies, such as [18], presented evaluation factors for general BC, they recommended briefly considering the application needs and requirements. The evaluation process should consider the following sub-criteria:

- **Regulations** [19]: As there are national regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for healthcare applications, almost every application has specifically related regulations that BC-IdM systems should comply with such regulations.
- **Standardisation** [19, 33]: application standardisation factors assess compliance with the application-recommended standards, such as FHIR/HF7, for health data exchange.
- **Requirements** [28, 32, 36, 37]: application-related technical requirements, contrarians and considerations that are important to achieve the goal of the system in specific applications. Several studies covered this sub-criteria in some applications, for instance, (1) in IoT, requirements and constraints in IoT devices such as storage capacity and physical security, (2) in supply chain management, speed and inventory management requirements, and (3) in the knowledge-based conversation systems, content reliability requirements.

External evaluation factors are those unrelated directly to the security, privacy, and functionality of the BC-IdM system. However, they affect its functionality, quality, and suitability in the targeted domains and applications [18–20, 31, 34]. There are four sub-criteria of external factors, as follows:

- **Organisational:** organisational evaluation factors include IT strategy, skills/training, top management support and governance, and readiness of an organisation to adopt BC-IdM systems.
- **Legal/regularity:** factors to assess compliance with national/international regulations such as GDPR.
- **Social:** factors to evaluate stakeholders' awareness and acceptance of BCIdM systems.
- **Financial:** factors to evaluate individuals and organisations' financial benefits and cost.

5.2 *Specific to Health Internet of Things*

Selecting the most suitable security solution is essential to protect HIoT security and privacy and should be based on a concrete evaluation process [47]. Findings from [40] showed that healthcare alongside finance, logistics and supply chain management industries are the most feasible applications of BC. Although studies such as [40] showed the feasibility of potentials from using BC in healthcare, studies such as [50] recommended a concrete evaluation of BC in healthcare as they reviewed and refuted many studies that proclaimed potential promises. Studies such as [51] shed specific light on evaluating HIoT security in general.

Only four of the reviewed studies focused on the evaluation of BC applications in healthcare systems [19, 30, 39, 41], and only two focused on BC applications in IoT systems [28, 33]. IoT and healthcare systems have specific needs which must be considered when using new emerging technology such as Blockchain [19]. Even though these six studies showed the importance of HIoT application evaluation factors, they have not given enough details about the evaluation factors. They cover aspects such as HIPPA compliance, FHIR/HL7 data exchange standards for data interoperability, the patient-centric requirement, and IoT constraints.

With the limitation mentioned above, besides the BC-IdM system evaluation factors in the previous sub-section (i.e., security and privacy, technical, application and external factors), we focused in this sub-section on the application factors for the BC-IdM in HIoT applications, specifically. Based on our categorisation of the application factors in sub-Sect. 5.1, we added the identified factors in the relevant sub-criteria (i.e., regulations, standardisation, and requirements). as follows:

Regulations: HIoT applications process personally identifiable information (PII); thus, they must adhere to healthcare system regulations such as the health insurance portability and accountability act (HIPAA). Compliance with such regulations is an evaluation factor for BC-IdM systems used in HIoT.

Standardisation: There should be compliance with healthcare standardisations for aspects such as interoperability. For example, FHIR/HL7 are technical standards used to ensure interoperability between stakeholders exchanging the same data, such as HIoT user data.

Requirements: In addition to the security requirements-based evaluation factors for HIoT [51], three levels of interoperability must be guaranteed in HIoT applications; foundational, structural, and semantic interoperability [30]. On the other hand, IoT device constraints, such as memory capacity and physical security which might lead to functional and security faults, should be considered. Lastly, healthcare applications require applications to support patient-centric models [52].

6 Conclusion and Future Work

We conducted a literature review to investigate and identify the BC-IdM system evaluation factors. To answer RQ1, the BC-IdM ecosystem components have been identified. Every component in the BC-IdM ecosystem represents aspects in which evaluation factors should be considered. BC and its technologies are at the core of BC-IdM systems, models like SSI, technical standards like DID and VC, and applications in domains like logistics, supply chain, IoT, and healthcare.

To answer RQ2, several studies which evaluated BC solutions proposed for general or specific applications and domains are identified. However, only one study covered the BC-IdM system. This study did not cover BC performance and BC technologies, such as BC network and consensus mechanisms or more detailed aspects, such as SSI principles and technical standards. Moreover, it lacks application evaluation factors. Our study identified and divided the evaluation factors into four main criteria: security and privacy, technical, application, and external factors. Each criterion has a sub-criterion covering all aspects of the BC-IdM systems. Furthermore, our study has given special attention to HIoT applications that demonstrate the evaluation factors for HIoT applications: regulations, standardisation, and requirements. These should be considered when evaluating proposed BC-IdM systems for any HIoT application.

The work in our study will play a vital role in evaluating BC-IdM systems when selecting and making decisions on the suitability of BC-IdM solutions for specific applications and domains in the proof-of-concept stage i.e. before applying them in real-life applications. Future work will include using the Delphi methodology to interview experts to seek consensus on the evaluation factors for BC-based identity management systems. We also plan to use an MCDM technique to give weights to the identified factors. Finally, the BC-IdM systems proposed for HIoT applications will be prioritised in this evaluation.

Acknowledgements This research was funded by the Ministry of Education of Saudi Arabia, represented by the Saudi Cultural Bureau in Ireland. It was supported in part by a grant from Science Foundation Ireland to Lero – the SFI Research Centre for Software under Grant numbers 13/RC/2094 and 13/RC/2094 P2.

References

1. Kuperberg, M.: Blockchain-based identity management: a survey from the enterprise and ecosystem perspective. *IEEE Trans. Eng. Manag.* **67**(4), 1008–1027 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2019.2926471>
2. Ismail, L., Materwala, H., Sharaf, Y.: BlockHR - A blockchain-based healthcare records management framework: performance evaluation and comparison with client/server architecture,” in 2020 International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications, ISNCC 2020 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ISNCC49221.2020.9297216>
3. Alamri, B., Crowley, K., Richardson, I.: Cybersecurity risk management framework for blockchain identity management systems in health IoT. *Sensors* **23**(1), MDPI (2023). <https://doi.org/10.3390/s23010218>
4. Lesavre, L.: A taxonomic approach to understanding emerging blockchain identity management systems,” Gaithersburg, MD (2020). <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01142020>
5. Wen, Y., Lu, F., Liu, Y., Huang, X.: Attacks and countermeasures on blockchains: a survey from layering perspective. *Computer Networks*, vol. 191. Elsevier B.V (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2021.107978>
6. Fraunthaler, P., Borkowski, M., Schulte, S.: A framework for assessing and selecting blockchains at runtime,” in 2020 IEEE International Conference on Decentralized Applications and Infrastructures (DAPPS), pp. 106–113 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/DAPPS49028.2020.00013>
7. Chen, Z., Xu, W., Wang, B., Yu, H.: A blockchain-based preserving and sharing system for medical data privacy. *Futur. Gener. Comput. Syst.* **124**, 338–350 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2021.05.023>
8. Gibson, A., Thamilarasu, G.: Protect your pacemaker: blockchain based authentication and consented authorization for implanted medical devices. *Procedia. Comput. Sci.* **171**, 847–856 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2020.04.092>
9. Zaabar, B., Cheikhrouhou, O., Jamil, F., Ammi, M., Abid, M.: HealthBlock: a secure blockchain-based healthcare data management system. *Comput. Netw.* **200**, 108500 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2021.108500>
10. Tahir, M., Sardaraz, M., Muhammad, S., Saud Khan, M.: a lightweight authentication and authorization framework for blockchain-enabled IoT network in health-informatics. *Sustainability* **12**(17), 6960 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12176960>
11. Priya, N., Ponnaikko, M., Aantony, R.: An efficient system framework for managing identity in educational system based on blockchain technology,” in 2020 International Conference on Emerging Trends in Information Technology and Engineering (ic-ETITE), pp. 1–5 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/icETITE47903.2020.469>
12. Nuss, M., Puchta, A., Kunz, M.: Towards blockchain-based identity and access management for internet of things in enterprises, pp. 167–181 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98385-1-12>
13. Liu, H., Han, D., Li, D.: Fabric-iot: a blockchain-based access control system in IoT. *IEEE Access* **8**, 18207–18218 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2968492>
14. Novo, O.: Scalable access management in IoT using blockchain: a performance evaluation. *IEEE Internet Things J.* **6**(3), 4694–4701 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2018.2879679>
15. Kim, B.G., Cho, Y.S., Kim, S.H., Kim, H., Woo, S.S.: A security analysis of blockchain-based did services. *IEEE Access* **9**, 22894–22913 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3054887>
16. Alamri, B., Crowley, K., Richardson, I.: Blockchain-based identity management systems in health IoT: a systematic review. *IEEE Access* **10**, 59612–59629 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3180367>
17. Gupta Gouriseti, N., Mylrea, M., Patangia, H.: Application of rank-weight methods to blockchain cybersecurity vulnerability assessment framework,” in 2019 IEEE 9th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC), pp. 0206–0213 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1109/CCWC.2019.8666518>

18. Warkentin, M., Orgeron, C.: Using the security triad to assess blockchain technology in public sector applications. *Int. J. Inf. Manage.* **52**, 102090 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2020.102090>
19. Almeshal, T.A., Alhogaib, A.A.: Blockchain for businesses: a scoping review of suitability evaluations frameworks. *IEEE Access* **9**, 155425–155442 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3128608>
20. Alzahrani, S., Daim, T., Choo, K.K.R.: Assessment of the blockchain technology adoption for the management of the electronic health record systems. *IEEE Trans. Eng. Manag.* (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2022.3158185>
21. Orji, I.J., Kusi-Sarpong, S., Huang, S., Vazquez-Brust, D.: Evaluating the factors that influence blockchain adoption in the freight logistics industry. *Transp. Res. E. Logist. Transp. Rev.* **141** (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2020.102025>
22. van Thanh, N.: Blockchain development services provider assessment model for a logistics organizations. *Processes* **10**(6) (2022). <https://doi.org/10.3390/pr10061209>
23. Fan, C, Ghaemi, S., Khazaei, H., Musilek, P.: Performance evaluation of blockchain systems: a systematic survey. *IEEE Access*, vol. 8. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 126927–126950 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3006078>
24. Satybaldy, A., Nowostawski, M., Ellingsen, J.: Self-sovereign identity systems: evaluation framework, in *IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology*, vol. 576 LNCS, pp. 447–461 (2020)
25. Smetanin, S., Ometov, A., Komarov, M., Masek, P., Koucheryavy, Y.: Blockchain evaluation approaches: state-of-the-art and future perspective. <https://doi.org/10.3390/s20123358>
26. Wang, D., Zhu, Y., Zhang, Y., Liu, G.: Security assessment of blockchain in Chinese classified protection of cybersecurity. *IEEE Access* **8**, 203440–203456 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3036004>
27. Colomo-Palacios, R., Sa´nchez-Gordo´n, M., Arias-Aranda, D.: A critical review on blockchain assessment initiatives: A technology evolution viewpoint. *J. Softw. Evol. Process* **32**(11), John Wiley and Sons Ltd (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1002/smr.2272>
28. Qi, J., Guo, Z., Lu, Y., Gao, J., Guo, Y., Meng, F.: Security evaluation model of blockchain system based on combination weighting and grey clustering, in *Proceedings - 2022 7th IEEE International Conference on Data Science in Cyberspace, DSC 2022*, pp. 440–447 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1109/DSC55868.2022.00067>
29. Lo, S.K., Xu, X., Chiam, Y.K., Lu, Q.: Evaluating suitability of applying blockchain, in *2017 22nd International Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS)*, pp. 158–161 (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICECCS.2017.26>
30. Amine Ferrag, M., Shu, L., Member, S.: The performance evaluation of blockchain-based security and privacy systems for the internet of things: a tutorial, *IEEE Internet Things J.* **8**(24) (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2021.3078072>
31. Scriber, B.A.: A framework for determining blockchain applicability. *IEEE Softw.* **35**(4), 70–77 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1109/MS.2018.2801552>
32. Zhang, P., Walker, M.A., White, J., Schmidt, D.C., Lenz, G.: Metrics for assessing blockchain-based healthcare decentralized apps, *2017 IEEE 19th International Conference on e-Health Networking, Applications and Services, Healthcom 2017*, vol. 2017-December, pp. 1–4, (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1109/HEALTHCOM.2017.8210842>
33. Labazova, O.: Towards a framework for evaluation of blockchain implementations, 2019. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336135213>
34. Yang, Y., Shi, Y., Wang, T.: Blockchain technology application maturity assessment model for digital government public service projects. *Intern. J. Crowd Sci.* **6**(4), 184–194 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.26599/IJCS.2022.9100025>
35. Wibowo, S., Hw, E.P.: Blockchain implementation assessment framework, case study of IoT LPWA licensing in Indonesia, in *2018 International Conference on ICT for Smart Society (ICISS)*, pp. 1–5 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICTSS.2018.8549940>
36. Nabeeh, N.A., Mohamed, M., Abdel-Monem, A., Abdel-Basset, M., Sallam, K.M., ElAbd, M., Wagdy, A.: A neutrosophic evaluation model for blockchain technology in supply Chain

- management". In 2022 IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems (FUZZ-IEEE), pp. 1–8. IEEE (2022)
37. Herrgos, L., Lohmer, J., Schneider, G., Lasch, R.: Development and evaluation of a blockchain concept for production planning and control in the semiconductor industry, in 2020 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM), pp. 440–444 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEM45057.2020.9309979>
 38. Gourisetti, S.N.G., Mylrea, M., Patangia, H.: Evaluation and demonstration of blockchain applicability framework. *IEEE Trans. Eng. Manag.* **67**(4), 1142–1156 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.2019.2928280>
 39. Ar, I.M., Erol, I., Peker, I., Ozdemir, A.I., Medeni, T.D., Medeni, I.T.: Evaluating the feasibility of blockchain in logistics operations: a decision framework. *Expert Syst. Appl.* **158** (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2020.113543>
 40. Yang, W., Garg, S., Huang, Z., Kang, B.: A decision model for blockchain applicability into knowledge-based conversation system. *Knowl. Based Syst.* **220** (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2021.106791>
 41. Moezkarimi, Z., Abdollahei, F., Arabsorkhi, A.: Proposing a framework for evaluating the blockchain platform, in 2019 5th International Conference on Web Research (ICWR), pp. 152–160 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICWR.2019.8765280>
 42. Erol, I., Oztel, A., Searcy, C., Medeni, T.: Selecting the most suitable blockchain platform: a case study on the healthcare industry using a novel rough MCDM framework. *Technol. Forecast Soc. Change* **186** (2023) 1016/j.techfore.2022.122132
 43. Erol, I., Ar, I.M., Ozdemir, A.I., Peker, I., Asgary, A., Medeni, I.T., Medeni, T.: Assessing the feasibility of blockchain technology in industries: evidence from Turkey. *J. Enterp. Inf. Manag.* **34**(3), 746–769 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1108/JEIM-09-2019-0309>
 44. Balasubramanian, S., Shukla, V., Sethi, J.S., Islam, N., Saloum, R.: A readiness assessment framework for blockchain adoption: a healthcare case study. *Technol. Forecast Soc. Change* **165**, 120536 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.TECHFORE.2020.120536>
 45. Naik, N., Jenkins, P.: Self-Sovereign Identity specifications: govern your identity through your digital wallet using blockchain technology. *Proceedings 2020 8th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Cloud Computing, Services, and Engineering, MobileCloud*, pp. 90–95 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/MOBILECLOUD48802.2020.00021>
 46. Pattiyanon, C., Aoki, T.: Compliance SSI system property set to laws, regulations, and technical standards. *IEEE Access* **10**, 99370–99393 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3204112>
 47. Mohammed Shuaib, Noor Hafizah Hassan, Sahnus Usman, Shadab Alam, Surbhi Bhatia, Arwa Mashat, Adarsh Kumar, Manoj Kumar: Self-Sovereign identity solution for blockchain-based land registry system: a comparison. *Mobile Inf. Syst.* **2022**(8930472), 17 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/8930472>
 48. Fdhila, W., Stifter, N., Kostal, K., Saglam, C., Sabadello, M.: Methods for decentralized identities: evaluation and insights. *Lecture Notes Bus. Inf. Proc.* **428**, 119–135 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-858674>
 49. Schaffner, M.: Analysis and evaluation of blockchain-based self-sovereign identity systems. Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany (2020)
 50. Bolte, Philipp.: Self-Sovereign identity: development of an implementation-based evaluation framework for verifiable credential SDKs (2021)
 51. Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Information Systems and Organizations: Gaithersburg, MD (2022). <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53Ar5>
 52. Wang, L., Ali, Y., Nazir, S., Niazi, M.: ISA evaluation framework for security of internet of health things system using AHP-TOPSIS methods. *IEEE Access* **8**, 152316–152332 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3017221>
 53. Xiang, X., Wang, M., Fan, W.: A permissioned blockchain-based identity management and user authentication scheme for e-health systems. *IEEE Access* **8**, 171771–171783 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3022429>

54. Monrat, A.A., Schelen, O., Andersson, K.: Performance evaluation of permissioned blockchain platforms, in 2020 IEEE Asia-Pacific Conference on Computer Science and Data Engineering (CSDE), pp. 1–8 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/CSDE50874.2020.9411380>
55. Al-Sumaidae, G., Alexandridis, A., Alkhudary, R., Zilic, Z.: a technical assessment of blockchain in healthcare with a focus on big data, pp. 2467–2472 (2023). <https://doi.org/10.1109/bigdata55660.2022.10020962>

A Hybrid Personal Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing Protocol Using Steganography and Secret Sharing



Arman Zand and Eckhard Pfluegel

Abstract Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) sharing allows organisations, communities and individuals to respond to emerging threats quickly, provided secure and reliable communication can be ensured. However, privacy constraints, restrictive sharing policies, concerns about trust misuse and the lack of trustworthy tools limit the quality and quantity of information that are exchanged. This paper proposes a novel cryptographic protocol for sharing personal CTI information by private individuals based on hybrid information hiding and sharing techniques. Messages can be sent via an intermediary so that a passive monitoring attacker is misled, interpreting the intermediary as the dealer of a secret sharing scheme. Recipients can reconstruct the information as part of the secret sharing scheme. However, the true nature of the original messages being cover objects and pre-defined shares remain hidden. The protocol has been implemented, and our proof-of-concept system has been assessed for robustness and performance. Our evaluation shows that the system is efficient, secure and practical. Hence, our approach could be a valuable tool for real-world personal CTI sharing as an effective method to manage confidentiality, trust and risk of CTI owned by private individuals.

Keywords Personal Cyber Threat Intelligence · CTI sharing · Information sharing · Steganography · Secret sharing

This research has partially been supported by the Faculty of Engineering, Computing and the Environment, Kingston University.

A. Zand (✉) · E. Pfluegel
Faculty of Engineering, Computing and the Environment, Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames KT12EE, UK
e-mail: a.zand@kingston.ac.uk

E. Pfluegel
e-mail: e.pfluegel@kingston.ac.uk

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_5

1 Introduction

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is a broad collective term for information about potential or existing cyber threats collected, analysed or disseminated by an organisation or individual. This information can include so-called *indicators of tactics, techniques and procedures* (TTPs) and *indicators of compromise* (IOCs) and threat actor contexts such as motive and capability. CTI sharing is exchanging CTI to prevent, detect and respond to cyber attacks more effectively. Information may be exchanged among organisations, individuals, or communities to enhance overall situational awareness and response capabilities, leading to improved cyber security.

CTI sharing can be implemented based on several approaches, which can also be combined, depending on the individual requirements, resources available and time constraints. The main approaches are:

- *Structured sharing*: using predefined formats and structures for CTI following existing standards such as Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) and Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII).
- *Unstructured sharing*: in this approach, CTI is shared in free-form, unstructured forms such as emails, email attachments, instant messages or forums.
- *Hybrid sharing*: a flexible and scalable CTI hybrid sharing solution is adopted when combining structured and unstructured sharing.
- *Automated sharing*: this method uses technologies to automate the collecting, analysing and sharing CTI using specialist protocols and tools.
- *Manual sharing*: unlike the previous method, manual sharing relies on humans to collect and share CTI, typically using unstructured sharing.

In this paper, we are interested in automated, structured sharing of personal CTI—this is intelligence that individuals may receive, collect, analyse and share for establishing, improving and maintaining the cyber security of their personal devices, networks or digital home environment. Personal CTI may be obtained from various sources, such as security blogs, forums, the media, including online social networks and media, and personal communication with friends, colleagues or mentors.

The contributions of this paper are twofold. The first contribution is a novel hybrid cryptographic information hiding and sharing protocol that enhances the portfolio of methods currently available for combining the two mainstream cryptographic techniques of steganography and secret sharing. We show how this scheme can be realised based on a secret sharing scheme where players embed secret payloads in cover messages, which are then used as pre-defined shares by a third-party dealer. A different set of players can then reconstruct the secret sharing polynomial, allowing for the retrieval of the pre-defined shares and message extraction. Our results show that it is possible to send covert messages in such a way that they are embedded in a secret sharing scheme run by a third party. As such, they will be hidden from the dealer and external eavesdroppers. As a second contribution, we have implemented and evaluated the protocol. Our implementation demonstrates that the protocol is efficient and robust, and could be a viable CTI sharing solution for private individuals.

The paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 reviews related work in the literature. Section 3 presents our protocol, followed by implementation and evaluation in Sect. 4. Section 5 is the conclusion of this paper.

2 Related Work

In this section, we explore published work relevant to this paper. We start with reviewing tools for CTI sharing and explore the challenges individuals may face when using these. We then briefly summarise the cryptographic techniques used in existing tools and move on to the specialist area of cryptographic schemes at the interface of information hiding (steganography) and secret sharing as a background to the scheme we propose to apply to CTI sharing in the following sections.

2.1 *Automated Structured Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing*

We begin by reviewing tools and frameworks, and then arguing that there are challenges for individuals wanting to use these.

2.1.1 **Tools for CTI Sharing**

There is a range of tools for CTI sharing which can be manual or automated. Also, as various methods exist to collect, manage, analyse and share information, a defence strategy should combine different tools. Many commercial tools are available on the market; some popular solutions are ThreatConnect, Anomali, Recorded Future, Splunk, ThreatQuotient and EclecticIQ. These tools offer automated workflows, customisable dashboards and alerts, threat libraries, machine learning capabilities and integration with other security tools. We will not provide further details on these products; additional information can be found on the vendor's websites. In the remainder of this section, we will present an influential open-source threat intelligence platform called the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) [30], which is developed as part of a project run by the Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL). MISP automates the collection of CTI through various feeds, can analyse by finding correlations and indicators and allows synchronisation of malware information based on push and pull mechanisms between instances. MISP can also present information through graphs and tables through its graphical user interface. An interesting aspect of this tool is that communities are organised in a decentralised network. Users can be synchronised across multiple instances using an authentication key for an API to create connection points (nodes).

2.1.2 Frameworks for Structured CTI

There are also frameworks for structuring CTI. The Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) by REN-ISAC [22] combines threat intelligence to make it more easily actionable. For example, the data includes Geo, DNS and ASN tags and IP, email and URL information. The framework can be integrated with Intrusion Detection System (IDS) tools such as Snort [23]. To organise CTI information, a nomenclature is required, two examples of which are the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) [18] for general software and the Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) [17] for security software. For the aggregation of CTI, Alien Vault has a public resource known as the Open Threat Exchange (OTX) [3, 4]. This community openly shares threat intelligence, keeping members updated with trends and emerging threats. This is done through the OTX DirectConnect API, which can be integrated into other solutions. The specification of the data is STIX/TAXII. The private equity firm Symphony Technology Group completed a merger between FireEye and McAfee to form Trellix in 2022 [1] which resulted in an integrated Threat Intelligence Exchange (TIE) [28] containing vast amounts of data and updated virus information such as signatures and categorisation.

Regarding public sector communities, the UK Government notes that exchanging CTI must be done using STIX and TAXI [29] and recommends a MISP-STIX converter. The creation of models has also been used in CTI for various purposes, such as detecting and classifying threats to network organisations. The authors of [2, 5, 12, 13, 15] pursue the common goal of improving the quality of data that can be shared to enhance the effectiveness of tools utilising the information and creating actionable intelligence.

2.1.3 CTI Sharing Challenges for Private Individuals

There are several challenges that private individuals might face when using the above-mentioned professional tools and frameworks for CTI sharing. Perhaps the biggest obstacle is a lack of expertise, as many professional CTI sharing platforms require a level of technical understanding that private individuals may not possess. Furthermore, these platforms tend to be proprietary products that can be expensive, making them unaffordable for private individuals. Finally, there are many considerations that private individuals may be unfamiliar with and hence are hesitant to embrace: sharing sensitive information about their home environment or networks, the need to understand legal considerations such as data protection regulation or intellectual property rights, and generally, fear of privacy violations or other negative implications that they cannot anticipate or gauge. *We conclude that there is a need for novel, easy-to-use and ideally open-source tools for automated CTI sharing for private individuals.*

2.2 *Cryptography for CTI Sharing*

This section explores the role of cryptography as it is currently used in CTI sharing—an aspect not well discussed in the literature. Security challenges for CTI sharing are orientated around confidentiality, integrity and availability. A natural solution is employing cryptosystems to preserve privacy and data integrity. To secure the transfer of data, network security protocols are required. Multi-factor authentication is nowadays a standard requirement to establish origin integrity. Looking into specific CTI tools and seeing how cryptography is used is insightful.

Encryption is a standard cryptographic technique used by most commercial and open-source tools. Typically, this involves private–public key encryption and infrastructures and can be implemented as a proprietary system in a closed environment or as an open system. The open-source MISP tool, for example, has private keys for authentication to access the API, which can synchronise different installed instances between organisations. The private keys used for authentication in MISP are generated using OpenSSL. When a new instance of MISP is installed, a private key is generated for this instance. Very few other experimental, innovative cryptographic solutions as part of research prototypes for CTI exist. One such example is PRACIS [11], a scheme for CTI sharing that provides private data forwarding and aggregation using the STIX standard data format. The framework addresses privacy preservation when used in untrusted infrastructures a third party provides. It was shown to make efficient use of homomorphic encryption and to be affordable enough for real-world scenarios. A variation of CTI sharing was given in our previous work [31] where we have proposed a Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) Protocol to verify mutual CTI without disclosure in case of disagreement. In summary, it can be stated that encryption provides confidentiality but brings the burden and responsibility of authenticated public key distribution and the secure transmission of private keys, as further discussed in the next section. The use of other cryptographic techniques for CTI sharing is at an emerging stage.

In general, secure communication between organisations can be done using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, available as OpenSSL library for network application implementations. Another standard cryptographic protocol is the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) for logging into machines remotely to perform administrative commands, e.g. most commonly for UNIX-based systems. A critical component of SSH is authentication provided by public keys in a server-client connection. SSH might also be used generally to manage software agents on remote machines within an organisation. Using these protocols, the CTI sharing network can be set up with public-key cryptography using certificates to authenticate members and establish secure channels with symmetric key encryption. Most previously mentioned tools can connect to such networks for secure CTI sharing, for example, the Splunk tool as described in [26]. The MISP tool allows manual exchanging of private keys to enable data sharing between their respective MISP instances. As this is not an automatic, standardised protocol, the organisations are responsible for secure transmission and must tolerate associated risk.

In general, platforms that manage CTI such as MISP or Splunk have user authentication systems for logging in which can be configured to use multi-factor authentication. This can be combined with single sign-on to authenticate into multiple systems securely while using the same credentials.

2.3 Steganography Meets Secret Sharing

At first glance, steganography and secret sharing appear to be distinct cryptographic techniques, achieving different aims. In the most general sense, information hiding refers to embedding information (the payload) in a cover object. Strictly speaking, in the security domain, this technique also comprises watermarking for authenticity. However, this paper will see it as a synonym for steganography, where the purpose of hiding is to conceal confidential information. Suitable steganographic cover objects could be images, audio or plain text. A significant issue with covert communication is the low rate of information that can be sent [6]. This can be addressed, for example, through Shamir's Secret Sharing [24]. Secret sharing protects information by distributing it through multiple channels. To this end, an initial secret s will be divided into n shares by a central authority (the dealer). The shares will be sent to their recipients, the shareholders. A (k, n) -threshold secret sharing scheme has the property that less than k shares do not reveal any information about the secret, whereas a coalition of at least the threshold number of k shares can reconstruct s .

Despite these differences, several specialist methods at the interface of steganography and secret sharing have been proposed in the literature, further detailed below, investigating how different aims and resulting benefits can be achieved through a suitable modification and combination of these cryptographic techniques. Fundamentally, two different approaches can be distinguished.

2.3.1 Bi-directional Dealer–Shareholder Communication

The first approach masks cover message content and communication patterns from a passive warden trying to detect the existence of steganography in the network through steganalysis and traffic analysis.

The pioneering paper [32] investigates how using Shamir's Secret Sharing [24] can achieve properties akin to steganography. Using a covert secret sharing scheme, their method improves hiding properties in steganographic schemes. This scheme could also be seen as a form of distributed steganographic protocol, where scrutinising individual messages sent as part of the protocol would not raise suspicion, as they would resist steganalysis. The idea of the scheme is to use Shamir's secret sharing scheme, where a subset of points is pre-defined by third parties. Using these pre-defined shares with the dealer's chosen secret, the Shamir polynomial can be interpolated, and additional shares can be produced from this by evaluation. The authors in [32] suggest constructing pre-defined shares through data from the *Least*

Significant Bit (LSB) of online images published by third-party web servers. Still, other methods may be possible and do not fundamentally alter the scheme's properties.

The secret sharing scheme with pre-defined shares lends itself to information hiding, as a subset of shares can be arbitrarily defined without any hidden embedded payload. Furthermore, there is an element of hidden or "innocent" participants in the scheme, hiding typical communication patterns observed in a secret sharing scheme due to the reversed direction of information flow between the third-party web servers and the dealer.

2.3.2 Uni-directional Dealer–Shareholder Communication

The second, more recently developed approach focuses on concealing the existence of secret sharing schemes protecting a confidential message in the presence of an eavesdropper monitoring a dedicated communication channel. The main difference to the previous approach is the absence of communication from hidden shareholders to the dealer. All shares, including the pre-defined ones, are created by the dealer and then sent to the different shareholders in a semi-directional complication scheme. Compared to standard secret sharing, the scheme's advantage is that pre-defined shares can be crafted to match requirements imposed by semantic constraints of communication channels such as social networks or blockchain transactions. For example, social media posts expect messages containing textual natural language content, whereas blockchain transactions typically contain structured data. Several authors have contributed to this line of research, applying the idea of invisible or hidden communication through multiple channels initially to the domain of social networks [8–10], followed by secure instant messaging [19] and, more recently, the blockchain [20].

2.4 Robustness to Traffic Analysis

A monitoring agent or *warden* [16] can apply analytical capabilities to limit the effectiveness of a covert communication protocol. Two main types of analysis are relevant: traffic analysis and steganography detection. Traffic analysis methods can be classified by the information targeted, from application identification to personally identifiable information [21, 27]. Many techniques use machine learning, neural network and decision tree classification models. A taxonomy [14] on traffic analysis has determined five classifications of analytical methods: payload inspection, visual, simple statistical, statistical machine learning and miscellaneous. Detecting covert communication can be circumvented with steganography; however, significant challenges exist to this [6]. A monitoring agent can be deployed in multiple areas of a network and detect steganography based on its technique with well-trained machine learning algorithms [7, 25].

Traffic analysis might be less effective as a threat to the presented bi-directional scheme due to the monitoring agent's potential failure to capture all the required communication that is part of the secret sharing scheme. Data downloaded from the third-party web servers might not be included in the communications surveillance, which was the original motivation of [32]. Based on uni-directional communication, the second scheme seems less suited to withstand traffic analysis than the first. Its main strength is to increase the capacity of the information hiding scheme.

3 Novel Personal CTI Sharing Protocol

This section outlines our novel CTI sharing protocol's design, including the access structure, our method of pre-defined secret sharing and a high-level description of the protocol steps for sharing CTI from a set of source players to receiving players.

3.1 Access Structure

We first describe the access structure and components followed by the proposed protocol. There exists a set of players \mathcal{P} , split into two subsets \mathcal{V} and \mathcal{W} . We have $\mathcal{V} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$, the set of players that are the source of the CTI. The other subset is $\mathcal{W} = \{\mathcal{P}_{n+1}, \dots, \mathcal{P}_{n+m}\}$, the share receiving players. To recover the CTI successfully, we must have $m \geq n + 1$. An intermediate node between the two sets of $n + m$ players is the dealer \mathcal{D} , which distributes shares. A monotone access structure \mathcal{A} contains the authorised sets of \mathcal{P} where $\mathcal{A} = \{\mathcal{W} \in 2^{\{n+1, \dots, n+m\}} : |\mathcal{A}| \geq k\}$ where any coalition of at least k players $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{W}$ are authorised to combine the shares.

3.2 Secret Sharing with Pre-defined Secret Shares

As also illustrated by way of an example in Fig. 1, all players $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{V}$ send a hidden payload by using a suitable steganographic method to \mathcal{D} . These data are points of the form $(x_i, y_i) \in \mathbb{F}_p$ where x_i is a unique, distinct value such as the player's unique email address or IP address, and y_i is the player's stego-object. These shares are referred to as pre-defined shares because the players entirely decide upon their values. The dealer \mathcal{D} uses the pre-defined shares together with the point $(0, \hat{M})$ for some message \hat{M} in order to create a Shamir polynomial $f(x)$ of degree n

$$f(x) = \hat{M} + a_1x + \dots + a_nx^n \text{ mod } p \quad (1)$$

using Lagrange interpolation. This is done by computing the Lagrange basis polynomial $\ell_j(x)$ shown in Eq. 2 and using it to reconstruct the polynomial $L(x)$:

$$\ell_j(x) = \prod_{\substack{0 \leq m < k \\ m \neq j}} \frac{x - x_m}{x_j - x_m}, \quad (2)$$

$$L(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} y_j \ell_j(x) \pmod{p}.$$

Once f is obtained, it can be used by the dealer to create additional shares to be sent to the receiving players. Furthermore, given a coalition of receiving players with at least $n + 1$ members, they can reconstruct f and use it to create any other share, particularly those chosen as pre-defined shares. From this information, the original information can be reconstructed.

3.3 Hybrid Information Hiding and Sharing Protocol

The novel protocol in this section, compared to [32], can be labelled as a hybrid information hiding and sharing protocol, as the pre-defined shares are obtained from covers through the application of a steganographic method. The scheme in [32] achieved information hiding through the use of pre-defined shares derived from innocent online information. The dealer combines the pre-defined shares with its own message and proceeds by sending new shares. Our hybrid approach allows multiple players to choose messages rather than just the dealer. The messages are hidden in some cover medium which can be reconstructed later by share receivers. The use of steganography and secret sharing provides a degree of plausible deniability which makes it difficult for attackers to prove that a hidden message exists.

The individual steps followed by the protocol can be described as follows, where the aim for the source players is to send the message M to the receiving players via the dealer:

1. For all source players $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{V}$, generate and send pre-defined shares s_i to \mathcal{D} .
 - (a) Select a cover c_i , and a part of M .
 - (b) Hide the part of M in the c_i using a robust steganographic method to obtain the value y_i , part of a pre-defined share $s_i = (x_i, y_i) \in \mathbb{F}_p$ where x_i is the player's unique id. Send s_i to \mathcal{D} .
2. Dealer \mathcal{D} creates a Shamir polynomial $f(x) \in \mathbb{F}_p$ by interpolation.
 - (a) Select a message \hat{M} .
 - (b) Interpolate the set of pre-defined shares with the point $(0, \hat{M})$ to obtain a Shamir polynomial $f(x)$ of degree n .
3. For all $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{W}$, \mathcal{D} evaluates $y_j = f(x_j)$ and sends the share $s_j = (x_j, y_j)$ to \mathcal{P}_j .




Fig. 1 Example of a protocol instance with $n = 2$, $m = 4$ and $k = 3$. The set of source players $\mathcal{V} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2\}$ send points $(x_i, y_i) \in \mathbb{F}_p$ (where the x_i are distinct random values and the y_i encode the secret message) in a payload hidden by a suitable steganographic method. The data are sent as plaintext messages, represented as dotted arrows in the diagram. The dealer implements the secret sharing scheme with pre-defined shares by interpolating the points $\{(x_i, y_i)\}$ together with the point $(0, \hat{M})$ where the message \hat{M} is the dealer's secret to obtain the Shamir polynomial f . The dealer creates and distributes new shares to the set of receiving players, part of the set $\mathcal{W} = \{\mathcal{P}_3, \mathcal{P}_4, \mathcal{P}_5, \mathcal{P}_6\}$. A coalition of receiving players in \mathcal{W} can combine their shares and recover the original polynomial f . The players can obtain the secret messages by evaluating f at the distinct values x_i known from the players in \mathcal{V}

4. A coalition of size $k \geq n + 1$ of receiving players $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{W}$ can combine their shares to recover $f(x)$.
5. Any coalition member can obtain all pre-defined shares by evaluating $f(x)$ at the points x_j to reconstruct M eventually.

An example scenario is illustrated in Fig. 1.

Robustness to traffic analysis: similarly to the bi-directional secret sharing scheme described in the previous section, this proposed protocol assumes that the communication between the source players and the dealer is not exposed to traffic analysis, as the occurring traffic patterns are not typical to that of a secret sharing scheme with a centralised dealer, sending shares to shareholders.

4 Implementation and Evaluation

In this section, we present the implementation of our protocol, and we evaluate the performance of the secret sharing operations.

4.1 Implementation

The protocol was implemented as a networked application in C++ on Windows, compiled with MSVC 64-bit (v17.4.5 2022). The application can act as a node configured to be part of a network topology as in Fig. 1, with arbitrary sets of source

and receiving players. The nodes communicate via TCP/IP by sending messages containing structured data efficiently serialised by Protobuf (3.21.10), the sent message is a byte stream which can be parsed back to its original data structure. The Win32 API provides security tools; specifically, the Bcrypt function is used by us to obtain a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator. The GNU MP (6.2.1#16) multi-precision arithmetic library was also included to perform modular operations with large prime numbers. This has allowed us to use a 4096-bit prime number in our implementation.

Bcrypt and GNU MP are also used for interpolation, the method used is a Lagrange interpolation algorithm to obtain all coefficients of f , a functionality that is used by both the dealer and the receiving players.

4.2 Evaluation

The implementation was benchmarked for its execution time when performing polynomial interpolation and evaluation, the method for interpolation being Lagrange interpolation for recovering the entire polynomial f . Tests were performed on a Windows 11 machine with an i-9 10900k CPU @3.70 GHz (up to 5.30 GHz). Our results are shown in Figs. 2 and 3. The parameter evaluated in this test was the thresh-




Fig. 2 This graph shows mean and maximal execution time of the Lagrange interpolation method used in our implementation. This was tested using random integers as points in $\mathbb{F}_p \times \mathbb{F}_p$ where p is a 4096-bit prime integer. The magnitude of timings is in the range of microseconds for small threshold values; however, this execution time goes up as the threshold is increased




Fig. 3 A random polynomial, interpolated as in Fig. 2, is evaluated at a random value in \mathbb{F}_p where p is a 4096-bit prime integer. The results shown in the graph are mean and maximal execution times of the evaluation process, which initially requires timings in the range of $12 \mu\text{s}$ and increases linearly

old value of the secret sharing scheme, which is the number of points included for interpolation, equivalently, the number of coefficients to evaluate. Values between two and ten were considered, with a sample size of 1000 repeated tests with random polynomials. Evaluation was performed at random points. Analysing the Lagrange interpolation execution time, the smallest threshold of $k = 2$ has an execution time in the range of $476 \mu\text{s}$, which increases to 22ms for the maximal threshold value $k = 10$. The increase in execution time is non-linear, which reflects the time complexity of the Lagrange interpolation method being $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ for k numbers of points.

Polynomial evaluation has a time complexity of $\mathcal{O}(k)$, evaluation execution time starts at $12 \mu\text{s}$ for the smallest threshold of $k = 2$ up to $200 \mu\text{s}$ for a threshold value of $k = 10$, increasing linearly.

In summary, our evaluation results show that our protocol applies to scenarios where private individuals wish to share intelligence covertly and securely due to the possibility of conducting it quickly and efficiently. It becomes clear that interpolation is the most taxing part of the protocol implementation, particularly when using a higher threshold number. Polynomial evaluation has linear time complexity and is fast. On the other hand, even when using a large prime number to accommodate large secrets, polynomial interpolation is still fast for reasonable threshold values.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we have complemented existing work on using secret sharing for steganography by designing and implementing a novel hybrid protocol that conceals information hiding to two parties: an external passive attacker and a third-party dealer. This yields a sophisticated information-sharing method, which we have applied to personal CTI sharing. We argue that this will improve threat analysis and situational awareness capabilities for private individuals due to using cryptographic schemes that can be implemented and incorporated relatively easily rather than relying on ad hoc, semi-automatic mechanisms. While information hiding is not routinely used for such tasks and does not currently feature in standardised methods, we feel that the area of CTI is suitable due to the information's sensitive and potentially criminal nature. An evaluation of our implementation demonstrates that the protocol is efficient and robust. As part of future work, it is planned to include an implementation in an open-source tool that would enrich the set of tools currently available for CTI sharing with a particular focus on private individuals.

References

1. Symphony Technology Group Announces the Launch of Extended Detection and Response Provider, Trellix-STG. <https://stg.com/news/symphony-technology-group-announces-the-launch-of-extended-detection-and-response-provider-trellix/>. Accessed 03 April 2023
2. Al-Hawawreh, M., Moustafa, N., Slay, J.: A threat intelligence framework for protecting smart satellite-based healthcare networks. *Neural Comput. Appl.* 1–21 (2021)
3. AlienVault, I.: AlienVault—Open Threat Exchange (2023). <https://otx.alienvault.com/>. Accessed 03 April 2023
4. AT&T: What Is OTX? (2023). <https://cybersecurity.att.com/documentation/usm-appliance/otx/about-otx.htm>. Accessed 03 April 2023
5. Bromander, S., Swimmer, M., Eian, M., Skjotskift, G., Borg, F.: Modeling Cyber Threat Intelligence (2020)
6. Caviglione, L.: Trends and challenges in network covert channels countermeasures. *Appl. Sci.* **11**(4), 1641 (2021)
7. Chutani, S., Goyal, A.: A review of forensic approaches to digital image steganalysis. *Multimed. Tools Appl.* **78**(13), 18169–18204 (2019). Jul
8. Clarke, C., Pfluegel, E., Tsapsinos, D.: Confidential communication techniques for virtual private social networks. In: 2013 12th International Symposium on Distributed Computing and Applications to Business, Engineering & Science, pp. 212–216. IEEE (2013). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/DCABES.2013.45>
9. Clarke, C., Pfluegel, E., Tsapsinos, D.: Enhanced virtual private social networks: Implementing user content confidentiality. In: 2013 8th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions, ICITST 2013, pp. 306–312. IEEE, London (2013). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICITST.2013.6750212>

10. Clarke, C.A., Pfluegel, E., Tsaptsinos, D.: Multi-channel overlay protocols: implementing ad-hoc message authentication in social media platforms. In: 2015 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA), pp. 1–6. IEEE, London (2015). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CyberSA.2015.7166118>
11. de Fuentes, J.M., González-Manzano, L., Tapiador, J., Peris-Lopez, P.: PRACIS: Privacy-preserving and aggregatable cybersecurity information sharing. *Comput. Secur.* **69**, 127–141 (2017)
12. Ghaleb, F.A., Alsaedi, M., Saeed, F., Ahmad, J., Alasl, M.: Cyber threat intelligence-based malicious URL detection model using ensemble learning. *Sensors* **22**(9) (2022)
13. Hernandez-Ardieta, J.L., Tapiador, J.E., Suarez-Tangil, G.: Information sharing models for cooperative cyber defence. In: 2013 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON 2013), pp. 1–28 (2013)
14. Khalife, J., Hajjar, A., Diaz-Verdejo, J.: A multilevel taxonomy and requirements for an optimal traffic-classification model. *Int. J. Netw. Manag.* **24**(2), 101–120 (2014)
15. Kokkonen, T., Hautamäki, J., Siltanen, J., Hämäläinen, T.: Model for sharing the information of cyber security situation awareness between organizations. In: 2016 23rd International Conference on Telecommunications (ICT), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2016)
16. Mazurczyk, W., Wendzel, S., Hourib, M., Keller, J.: Countering adaptive network covert communication with dynamic wardens. *Future Gener. Comput. Syst.* **94**, 712–725 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2018.12.047>. www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167739X18316133
17. NIST: NCP-CCE Details (2022). <https://ncp.nist.gov/cce>. Accessed 03 April 2023
18. NIST: NVD-CPE (2023). <https://nvd.nist.gov/products/cpe>. Accessed 03 April 2023
19. Omego, O., Pfluegel, E., Tunnicliffe, M.J., Clarke, C.A.: Ensuring message freshness in a multi-channel SMS steganographic banking protocol. In: 2018 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security), pp. 1–7 (2018). IEEE, Glasgow. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CyberSecPODS.2018.8560688>
20. Onalo, S., Gc, D., Pfluegel, E.: Virtual private blockchains: security overlays for permissioned blockchains. In: Fifth International Conference on Cyber-Technologies and Cyber-Systems, IARIA (2020). <http://eprints.kingston.ac.uk/id/eprint/47782/>
21. Papadogiannaki, E., Ioannidis, S.: A survey on encrypted network traffic analysis applications, techniques, and countermeasures. *ACM Comput. Surv. (CSUR)* **54**(6), 1–35 (2021)
22. REN-ISAC: About Us: REN-ISAC: Research Education Networking Information Sharing & Analysis Center (2023). <https://www.ren-isac.net/about/index.html>. Accessed 03 April 2023
23. Roesch, M., et al.: Snort: lightweight intrusion detection for networks. In: *Lisa*, vol. 99, pp. 229–238 (1999)
24. Shamir, A.: How to Share a Secret, vol. 22, pp. 612–613. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY (1979). <https://doi.org/10.1145/359168.359176>
25. Smolarczyk, M., Szczypiorski, K., Pawluk, J.: Multilayer detection of network steganography. *Electronics* **9**(12), 2128 (2020)
26. Splunk: How to Secure and Harden Your Splunk Platform Instance (2022). <https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/9.0.1/Security/Hardeningstandards>
27. Tahaei, H., Afifi, F., Asemi, A., Zaki, F., Anuar, N.B.: The rise of traffic classification in IoT networks: a survey. *J. Netw. Comput. Appl.* **154**, 102538 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2020.102538>
28. Trellix: Threat Intelligence Exchange. <https://www.trellix.com/en-us/products/threat-intelligence-exchange.html>. Accessed 03 April 2023
29. UK Government: Exchanging Cyber Threat Intelligence (2022). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-standards-for-government/exchanging-cyber-threat-intelligence>. Accessed 03 April 2023
30. Wagner, C., Dulaunoy, A., Wagener, G., Iklody, A.: Misp: The design and implementation of a collaborative threat intelligence sharing platform. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Information Sharing and Collaborative Security. pp. 49–56 (2016)

31. Zand, A., Pfluegel, E.: Efficient cyber-evidence sharing using zero-knowledge proofs. In: Onwubiko, C., Rosati, P., Rege, A., Erola, A., Bellekens, X., Hindy, H., Jaatun, M.G. (eds.) *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, pp. 229–242. Springer Nature Singapore, Singapore (2023)
32. Zou, X., Sun, S.: Information hiding using secret sharing scheme. In: *First International Conference on Innovative Computing, Information and Control—Volume I (ICICIC'06)*, vol. 1, pp. 484–487 (2006). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICICIC.2006.102>

The Impact of Network Configuration on Malware Behaviour



Peyman Pahlevani[✉], Marios Anagnostopoulos[✉], Hafizur Rahman Anik, and Hamad Rafi Iqbal

Abstract Malware poses a serious threat against the Internet and the users. One way to examine and understand the malware's behaviour, with the purpose to detect and mitigate this issue, is to dynamically analyse them within a controlled and isolated environment, i.e. sandbox. Sandbox is a mechanism where suspicious programs and binaries are executed and monitored in isolation without the risk to spread to real and operational systems. However, the sandbox technology evolves also does the malware's sophistication. For this purpose, the malware's author deploy evasion techniques with the aim to keep the malware dormant under specific environmental factors and thus hinder the malware's analysis. To this day, there has been no investigation on the impact of the network topology on the malware's activity. To this direction, in our work, we utilize the Cuckoo Sandbox to study three different categories of malware, e.g. Backdoor, Net-worm and Trojan in four different network configurations. We examine different features of the malware's behaviour to showcase the effect of each configuration on the reported activated features. We observe that allowing Internet provides the best results in terms of threat score, which is expected given that the malware have full connectivity to perform their intended actions unrestricted. On the other hand, by limiting the Internet connection and allow only DNS resolutions for specific domains in an allow-list, generally activates the highest number of signatures of the volatility category, while the configuration with Internet triggers all possible signature categories.

Keywords Dynamic malware analysis · Sandbox · Cuckoo · Network configuration

P. Pahlevani (✉) · M. Anagnostopoulos · H. R. Anik · H. R. Iqbal
Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: ppah@es.aau.dk

M. Anagnostopoulos
e-mail: mariosa@es.aau.dk

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_6

1 Introduction

In the past recent years, we observed an immense growth in the number of malicious software, namely malware, and different variations of the way they spread. According to AV-Test [1], almost half a million new malware and potentially unwanted applications (PUA) are detected every day. Over time, there have been many examples of worldwide incidents affecting millions of users and causing huge financial damages to organizations and companies. From the notorious ILOVEYOU malware [6], which was estimated to cause a loss of \$10B, when it struck in 2009, to the recent case of Wannacry [10], which infected millions of systems, including those in hospitals, transportation and other critical infrastructures, we witness more sophisticated and impactful malware attacks.

For the detection and mitigation of malware, it is essential to study and understand their infection vector, their method of spreading and their behaviour within the infected machine. This can be achieved through the malware analysis process. Typically, there are two approaches, namely static and dynamic analysis. The static analysis focuses on analysing the source code of the malware without executing it, whereas the dynamic analysis entails the execution and monitoring of the malware in a controlled and isolated environment. In this case, run time evidence, such as system or API calls, processes and network traffic are observed and analysed [15]. Dynamic analysis can be conducted manually, using tools like Wireshark to monitor network traffic while the program is executed, or on a debugger. Automated tools for dynamic analysis include the sandboxing environments.

Although dynamic analysis requires more skills, time and computational resources, it provides comprehensive results regarding the overall behaviour of the examined malware sample [14]. The outcome of dynamic analysis could be signatures for malware detection and identification that can be incorporated into anti-malware solutions.

The most common technique is through the use of a sandbox environment, such as Cuckoo [12], which is the most popular platform for research and educational purposes. Cuckoo is an open-source malware analysis system, that facilitates the submission of suspicious executable files, executes them according to the configuration of the investigator in a virtualized environment within the Cuckoo platform and generates a full report with traces of API calls, captures network traffic and memory analysis. On the other hand, the main limitation of the sandbox technique is that, due to the advanced sophistication of the malware authors, the malware may circumvent the security mechanisms and escape the sandbox's isolated environment. This has as consequence that a malware is able to take advantage of the sandbox and use it as a stepping stone to create harmful network traffic to other networks. For instance, in the case that a malware under analysis in sandbox is allowed access to the Internet, maybe it can join a botnet network and generate network traffic related with a Denial of Service (DoS) attack [5].

Furthermore, in the cybersecurity game of cat and mouse between the malware investigators and the malware authors, the latter employs several evasion techniques

with the goal of the malware to detect, whether they are running on virtualized or isolated environment. This could be an indication that the malware is contained in a sandbox and thus, they remain dormant without triggering any functionality in an effort to avoid detection. Eventually, such behaviour can render the analysis unfruitful. A number of anti-evasion [8] techniques have been developed by the cybersecurity community, with the aim to create a sandbox environment as realistic as possible.

In our work, by leveraging the Cuckoo sandbox [2], we investigate the impact of networking configuration (Network Topology) on malware behaviour. In detail, the main contributions are summarized as follows:

- We design four network scenarios to analyse the malware samples. These are (1) Without Internet access, (2) With Internet access, (3) With Internet simulation (Inetsim) and (4) with DNS allow-list (white-list).
- We run in total 128 malware samples of three different types, namely Backdoor, Net-worm and Trojan in the Cuckoo sandbox using different settings and extracting relevant features of the malware. Features are selected to showcase the activity of the malware.
- We study the effect of the different network setting on analysing the behaviour of the 128 malware samples. Each type of malware exhibits different behaviours for different network settings.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the background and related work that explains the workings of malware and evasion techniques. The conducted experiment is described in Sect. 3, while Sect. 4 presents the results and highlights our main outcomes. Lastly, the paper concludes in Sect. 5.

2 Background and Related Work

2.1 Malware

As malware is considered any code that performs illegal or malicious actions to the device, that has infected, or other devices on the network. Malware can take many forms, such as executables or scripts, and typically infect computers without the users' knowledge, with the purpose to steal the user's data, conduct DoS attacks, cryptocurrency mining and similar. According to their malicious actions, the malware are classified into different types. Our work focuses on the Backdoor, Net-worm and Trojan types.

- **Backdoor** is a malware that creates and allows unauthenticated remote access to a system.
- **Net-worm** or worm replicates itself and spreads by exploiting known vulnerabilities. For its propagation, usually, a worm conducts network scanning to detect and infect other devices.

- **Trojan**, also called Trojan Horse, is a malware that disguises itself within a seemingly legitimate application. Trojan commonly spreads through social engineering, for example, when users are prompted to click and download email attachments. Once a Trojan malware infects a system, it can carry out a variety of malicious activities without the need for an Internet connection. However, many modern Trojans are designed to establish a connection with a remote Command and Control (C&C) server.

2.2 *Sandbox Environment*

The most typical case of dynamic malware analysis is the sandbox. The sandbox essentially creates a virtualized, contained environment, in which the malware is executed, and its behaviour monitored. This has been proven an appropriate strategy for analysing how an attack is launched, or how a malware propagates, as well as making analysis on certain types of malware to better strengthen existing systems and networks. In our work, we utilize the Cuckoo Sandbox [2], which is considered the de facto sandbox. It is able to operate locally on the user's computer, but can also be deployed in a system on the cloud. It can handle executable and binary files, documents, PDF files, e-mails, URLs and others. After the execution of the malware, it automatically generates the reports. In addition, it is able to analyse the network traffic and the memory usage.

2.3 *Evasion Techniques*

The current trend in malware evolution is the evasion techniques, where the malware actively aims to avoid being detected and analysed. Techniques used for evasion of detection include uninstalling/disabling security mechanisms, such as anti-virus/anti-malware and security monitoring tools, or obfuscating and encrypting data and scripts. The malware authors also try to leverage and exploit trusted processes to hide and masquerade the execution of their malware. Moreover, the malware is equipped with evasion capabilities, with the aim to prevent being executed and dissected in a virtualized environment, that potentially could be a sandbox environment. Such techniques could force the malware to change behaviour based on the presence of artefacts indicative of a Virtual Machine (VM). If a malware detects that it is running on a VM, it may stay dormant and avoid conducting its malicious purposes. In addition, the malware can check for user interactions or even use sleep timers and loops before starting execution. Investigating malware's evasion tactics, Chen et al. [9] discovered that from a number of 6,222 malware samples analysed with a debugger, the 40% exhibited minimal malicious behaviour, although they were not running in a virtualized environment.

At the very basic level, malware evasion techniques are divided into manual dynamic analysis evasion techniques (anti-debugger) and automated dynamic analysis evasion techniques (sandbox evasion) [4]. The first type of techniques is relevant in the case that the malware analysis is conducted manually by a human using a debugger tool, while the latter is applicable when the analysis is conducted within a monitored environment, such as a sandbox.

In our case, we focus on the evasion techniques related with the network configuration, and specifically how the malware behaviour evolves when it does or not have access to Internet. As it is reported in the literature, a malware could probe for network access by checking for fixed IP addresses [16]. A similar evasion tactic is when a malware investigates if it has access to an Internet connection or an unrealistically fast connection [7]. The latter is usually the case when the malware has network access through host-to-guest connections or host-only connections within hypervisors of VMs.

3 Implementation

For building the infrastructure of our experiment, we follow the typical setup of a Cuckoo sandbox environment [2]. Specifically, we install an Ubuntu 20.04.5 OS physical machine that hosts the Cuckoo. On that machine, we set up a VM machine with Ubuntu 20.04.5 OS, with the help of VirtualBox. This VM will contain the Cuckoo environment. Lastly, we set up a Windows 7 VM to be the guest OS with disabled the Windows Firewall, Anti-virus and Updates mechanisms. In addition, the Group Policy setting is configured to allow *Elevate without prompting* and *Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode*, among other functionalities. The communication between the host and the guest VMs takes place through the Cuckoo, since Cuckoo submits the malware for analysis in the Window VM for execution and infection. The VM is configured in a *Host-Only* mode, that allows the isolation of the local activity and controls the access to Internet. Finally, we install a number of applications in the Windows VM to make it look more realistic. The final state of the Windows VM is taken as a snapshot, which will enable a clean state to be reloaded for the analysis of each malware sample.

3.1 Scenario 1 (S1): Without Internet Access

This is the default configuration of Cuckoo sandbox environment. It does not provide Internet access to the sandbox, and therefore to the malware under analysis. In S1, we use host-only network adapter for both VMs, so that they are able to communicate only to each other. Such connection is required in order a malware sample to be submitted from the host to the guest and to fetch the results of the analysis from the

guest to the host. In this configuration, the guest VM is not able to connect to the Internet through the host.

3.2 Scenario 2 (S2): Internet Access

In S2, the objective is to provide the malware Internet access, so it can potentially communicate with its C&C server and try to spread to other devices in the network [13]. From this scenario, we expect to receive richer results from the analysis than the other scenarios. This setup makes use of two virtual network adapters, so both the host and the guest VM can communicate with each other, and the guest VM can have Internet access at the same time. The first adapter is similar to the previous scenario, while the second is a NAT adapter that provides Internet access to the guest VM.

3.3 Scenario 3 (S3): Internet Simulation

Inetsim is a tool for simulating common Internet services, like HTTP and DNS, in a virtual environment, and mainly is used in the analysis of malware [11]. The simulation of Internet access can deceive the malware to think that it is connected to the Internet, and it may try to communicate to the external network. However, the benefit compared to S2 is that the malware is not allowed to generate harmful network traffic towards Internet. To facilitate the installation of the Inetsim tool, we utilize the Remnux VM, that is a Linux toolkit for malware analysis with already installed and pre-configured the Inetsim tool. In our case, both Remnux and Windows VMs are connected to each other, so that the malware residing in the infected Windows VM can have access to the Inetsim.

3.4 Scenario 4 (S4): DNS Allow-List

In S4, the sandbox environment is configured with Internet access, but the malware is only provided with DNS resolution from an allow-list. This way, we restrict the malware to communicate with only legitimate domains. For the purpose of our experiment, we deploy the latest version of Alexa's Top 1M domain names. Specifically, we set up an internal DNS recursive resolver with BIND9, configured to forward requests for domain names in the allow-list to an external DNS recursive resolver, while the rest requests are blocked.

3.5 *Dynamic Analysis Procedure*

The procedure for the dynamic analysis of the malware samples follows these steps:

1. Reverting the guest VM with the Windows OS to the clean snapshot.
2. Submitting a malware binary. In this step, Cuckoo submits a malware to the Windows VM and executes it with administrator privileges.
3. Monitoring and output of the results. In the final step, Cuckoo monitors the Windows VM for a pre-configured time period and then collects the data and analyse them to determine the malware's behaviour and functionality.

4 Results

After the set-up of the sandbox environment, the analysis of malware behaviour can be conducted. Each malware is examined and compared to the four different network scenarios, as explained previously.

4.1 *Evaluation*

As we need to evaluate the various networking scenarios with several malware samples, we utilize the open and free virusShare DB [3]. VirusShare allows to download malware samples of specific types, namely Backdoor, Net-worm and Trojan, and we acquire a number of 128 samples in total. For each scenario, we conduct:

- Analysis of threat scores, as calculated by Cuckoo for each malware type, including threat highest, Threat lowest and average scores. The average is calculated based on averaging all the threat scores produced for all the samples examined for a specific scenario.
- Network analysis of connections to Unique hosts, DNS requests and UDP connections attempted by the malware.
- Analysis of Cuckoo's detected signatures based on predefined patterns that represent a specific malicious behaviour. The signatures are labelled and determined by Cuckoo, depending on the malicious activity.

Table 1 summarizes the threat score and network analysis, as calculated for each malware type and according to the corresponding network configuration, while, subsequently, we detail about the detected signatures for each malware category and scenario.

Table 1 Analysis of malware behaviour

Type of malware	Backdoor				Worm				Trojan			
No of samples	55				38				35			
Scenario	S1	S2	S3	S4	S1	S2	S3	S4	S1	S2	S3	S4
Highest threat score	5.8	7.4	5.8	7.4	5.2	7.2	5.2	5.2	7.2	7.8	7.2	7.2
Lowest threat score	4.2	4.2	1.0	3.6	0.6	2.6	1.6	4.0	0.2	3.4	4.0	3.6
Average threat score	4.8	5.4	4.7	4.8	4.7	6.0	5.0	5.1	4.0	6.8	4.9	4.8
Hosts	2.0	0.66	2.0	2.0	2.0	10.0	2.0	2.0	2.14	2.0	2.14	2.14
UDP connections	34.0	2.54	35.7	33.3	28.4	10.79	26.7	29.5	45.0	12.0	42.1	41.8
DNS requests	5.0	0.0	4.9	4.74	4.1	0.0	4.2	4.5	5.9	0.0	5.7	5.7

4.2 Malware: Backdoor

As we mentioned previously, Backdoor malware is a type of malware which tries to compromise the normal authentication procedure of a system and aims to gain remote access to the victim system.

S1: Regarding the network analysis, we see that the average number of DNS requests from each malware is five, while the range is 4–8 DNS request. For UDP connections, we observe an average of 34, which is expected as malware often utilizes the UDP protocol for various purposes, the range of the number of UDP connections is 21–75.

The main category of signatures detected by Cuckoo is that of volatility type, which is activated 323 times. The volatility category can reveal the behaviour of Backdoor malware. The five most triggered signatures are:

- ‘volatility_malfind_2’: this signature means that the sample tried to inject some process. The process injection is an indication that the malware attempted to get access to the process’s memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.
- ‘volatility_ldrmodules_2’: This signature is related with PEB (Process Environment Block) of Windows OS, which typically is not allowed to be accessed by other processes than OS. Based on this signature, it is evident that the malware sample tried to modify PEB to hide its activity inside the system.
- ‘volatility_svcscan_1’: This signature means that the Firewall and other general security services have been disabled by a process. Malware performs that in order to prevent detection by the built-in OS security systems.
- ‘volatility_svcscan_3’: This means that the Application Layer Gateway service is disabled. This service allows or denies access to the Internet with the purpose to block malicious network traffic.
- ‘volatility_modscan_1’: It is an evidence that a kernel module without a name is created, possibly to hide the presence of the malware.

Another significant signature category is that of packer, which means that compressed or encrypted executables are detected by Cuckoo. Usually, Cuckoo detects

such packers based on the respective section name on their script. The most common signatures of packer type triggered in our experiment are as follows:

- ‘packer_entropy’: This signature means that the binary sample contains encrypted or compressed data. Such types of malware samples are usually challenging to analyse via static analysis and reverse engineering.
- ‘packer_upx’: The signature denotes that UPX (Ultimate Packer for eXecutables) is used, which is a free tool for executable file compressor.
- ‘peid_packer’: It means that the malware binary utilizes a known packer.
- ‘pe_features’: It indicates that an unknown PE section name is detected.

S2: In S2, Backdoor type has an average of 0.66 hosts and an average of 2.54 UDP connections, ranging from 0 to 14. Average number of DNS requests remains at zero. Anew, in this scenario, the volatility type of signatures is the most common, which is an indication of similar behaviour with S1. In addition, we observe the nolookup_communication and dead_host signatures, which are related with the Internet access.

- ‘dead_host’: It is an alert that means the malware tried to connect to an IP address that does not respond to requests and can be used by a malware to assess if it is inside a monitored environment.
- ‘nolookup_communication’: It is triggered when the malware tried to communicate with a host without firstly performing a DNS query.

S3: In terms of the network analysis, with Inetsim simulation, Backdoor type has in average of 35.7 UDP connections, while it ranges from 27 to 76, and 4.9 DNS requests with a range between 4 and 7. Among the signature category, the volatility type is the most prominent and is triggered 252 times.

S4: In the DNS allow-list scenario, the Backdoor type has an average of 33.3 UDP connections within the range of 16–65 and an average of 4.74 DNS requests ranging from 3 to 8. Once again, the volatility type is the most common, with 330 appearances.

4.3 *Malware: Net-Worm*

Net-worm is a type of malware with the ability of self-replication. In other words, Net-worm can propagate throughout a local network or the Internet and spread to multiple computers.

S1: For a total of 38 worm malware investigated, we observe an average of 28.4 UDP connections, ranging from 38 to 21 and 4.1 DNS request with a range between 4 and 5. In regards to the signatures, most of the worm malware activated 198 of volatility type, like volatility_handles_1, volatility_ldrmodules_1, volatility_malfind_2, volatility_modscan_1, volatility_svcscan_1, volatility_svcscan_3.

S2: Net-worm malware analysis in S2 reports an average number of two hosts, 10.79 UDP connections ranging from 5 to 20 and zero DNS requests. The majority of the activated signatures are of volatility type, with 162 appearances. We observe some similar types of signatures found during the analysis of Backdoor malware with Internet configuration. Specifically, `nolookup_communication` and `dead_host` signatures are seen 39 times.

S3: The Net-worm malware analysis provides an average of 26.7 for UDP connections, which ranges between 18 and 32 connections, and an average of 4.2 of DNS requests with a range between 4 and 5. The volatility type of signatures is repeated in this scenario 246 times in total.

S4: The Net-worm malware analysis derives an average of 29.5 UDP connections in a range from 14 to 47. For DNS requests, the average is 4.5 with a range between 3 and 6. Regarding the signatures, the majority of the Net-worm malware showed volatility-type signatures in 234 occasions.

4.4 Malware: Trojan

Trojan malware is a deceptive type of malware, as it appears as a legitimate application, but in reality it infects and damages the devices.

S1: The 35 investigated Trojan samples in the without Internet access scenario demonstrate an average of 45 UDP connections ranging between 28 and 69, and 5.9 DNS request with a range of 4–9. Regarding the signatures' examination, Trojan also activates the volatility type of signatures in 150 alerts. An interesting outcome is that we find particular signatures, which are observed only in the Internet access scenarios on the Backdoor and Net-worm experiments. These are the `nolookup_communication` and `dead_host`, which appeared five times.

S2: In S2, the average number to unique hosts communication is two, while the average of UDP connections is 12, ranging from 5 to 21 and DNS requests is zero. Regarding signatures category, most of them are of volatility type, which is repeated 204 times. No other unique signatures are observed.

S3: For the network simulation configuration, the obtained average for UDP connections is 42.1 with an overall range between 14 and 67, whereas, the average of DNS requests is 5.7 with a range between 3 and 8. Among the activated signatures, the majority is of volatility type, which is repeated 252 times. The `nolookup_communication` and `dead_host` type appear 6 times.

S4: Trojan malware type in the DNS allow-list configuration demonstrates an average of 41.8 for UDP connections, that ranges from 23 to 70, while the average number of DNS requests is 5.7 with a range from 4 to 10. Once more, the signatures are of the volatility type, which are repeated 210 times.

4.5 Discussion

From Table 1, it is evident that the investigated malware are more active and produce a higher average threat score when they have access to Internet (S2), secondly, with DNS allow-listing (S4), followed by the network simulation with Inetsim (S3) and lastly the lowest threat score is achieved in the scenario when they do not have network connection at all (S1). When we focus separately on each malware type, we can notice that Net-worm generate the highest average threat score compared to the other malware types for each scenario, followed by Trojan malware and Backdoor.

Furthermore, as presented in Table 2, the volatility type is the most prevailing among the triggered signatures. Specifically, the majority of the alerts are activated in the DNS allow-listing, followed by Inetsim, without Internet and lastly with Internet access scenario, respectively. In terms of particular malware type, Backdoor malware generated the most signatures, then Trojan and finally Net-worm. Afterwards, as presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5, the categories of antivirus_virustotal, packer and at last pe_feature signatures are triggered. For specific type of malware, Backdoor triggered the most of the antivirus_virustotal category, while Net-worm the packer and pe_feature category. In terms of different network configuration, the antivirus_virustotal and packer signatures are most evident in the Inetsim scenario, whilst the pe_feature signatures in the DNS allow-listing scenario.

From the results of Table 6, we can deduce that only in the case of the unrestricted Internet access, all the investigated malware triggered the nolookup_communication and dead_host types of signatures. On the contrary, only Trojan malware activated these signatures in all the scenarios. Also, all the triggered signature categories are observed when Internet access is allowed. Trojan malware generated all the signature categories encountered in our experiments, Backdoor triggered dead_host and nolookup_communication only in DNS allow-listing scenario, whereas, Net-worm not at all.

Table 2 Volatility Signatures

Type	S1	S2	S3	S4
Backdoor	323	144	252	330
Worm	198	162	246	234
Trojan	150	204	252	210

Table 3 antivirus_virustotal Signatures

Type	S1	S2	S3	S4
Backdoor	53	23	42	53
Net Worm	37	36	43	36
Trojan	34	35	42	33

Table 4 packer Signatures

Type	S1	S2	S3	S4
Backdoor	29	15	24	30
Net Worm	38	39	43	39
Trojan	26	26	34	24

Table 5 pe_feature Signatures

Type	S1	S2	S3	S4
Backdoor	22	13	21	32
Net Worm	38	39	43	39
Trojan	17	16	21	15

Table 6 nolookup_communication and dead_host Signatures

Type	S1	S2	S3	S4
Backdoor	0	8	0	1
Net Worm	0	39	0	0
Trojan	5	35	6	5

Table 7 Average number of hosts

Type	S1	S2	S3	S4
Backdoor	0	1	2	2
Net Worm	2	2	2	2
Trojan	2	2	2	2

All in all, in terms of average threat score, Net-worm produced the highest score in the scenario that allowed Internet access. Regarding the network analysis, there are no main differences among the various malware types. Specifically, the number of the attempted connections are similar, except the case of Backdoor malware, where the samples do not try to connect to any hosts in the without Internet access scenario (Table 7).

As it is reported that malware often utilize the UDP protocol, the network analysis indeed indicates that UDP traffic is apparent (see Table 8). In more detail, Trojan malware has the highest amount of traffic in all scenarios. An assumption could be that the higher UDP traffic by Trojan malware is because the malware acts as spyware and aims to exfiltrate data. Overall, for all scenarios, the one with Internet access generates the least amount of UDP traffic, although expected to have more traffic. A possible reason for this is that the malware could detect that are running in a sandbox environment and make use of evasion techniques.

Table 8 Average number of UDP connections

Type	S1	S2	S3	S4
Backdoor	34	3	36	33
Net Worm	28	11	27	30
Trojan	45	12	42	42

Table 9 Average number of unique DNS requests

Type	S1	S2	S3	S4
Backdoor	5	0	5	5
Net Worm	4	0	4	5
Trojan	6	0	6	6

Finally, there are no significant differences on the DNS traffic between the various malware types on the same scenarios. Surprisingly, the scenario with allowed Internet access produces a zero DNS traffic. Overall, the DNS traffic is low, even though it is expected that malware typically utilize the DNS protocol (Table 9).

5 Conclusion

Concluding, the analysis of malware in different network settings using a sandbox environment is a valuable approach for assessing their behaviour and impact on a system. Backdoor, Net-worm and Trojan are common types of malware, that can pose a significant threat to organizations and individuals. Therefore, their dynamic analysis in a sandbox environment allows for a better understanding of their capabilities and functionalities. The networking scenarios implemented in our work, including without Internet access, Internet access, Inetsim and DNS allow-listing, enable the researchers to evaluate how these types of malware interact with different network environments.

The ‘With Internet’ configuration is reported to give the best results in terms of score, which is expected given that the malware has full Internet connectivity, allowing them to perform their intended actions unrestricted. Additionally, the ‘DNS allow-listing’ configuration generally triggered the most amount of signatures in the volatility category for each malware, while the With Internet’ configuration triggered all possible signature categories. These findings provide valuable insights into how the malware behaves in different network environments and how it adapts to various network restrictions. Furthermore, it is shown that ‘DNS allow-listing’ can be a more beneficial solution to provide Internet connectivity than network simulation through InetSim, since it triggers more signatures and higher scores for the malware. We can also deduce that Net-worm are more sensitive to Internet connection and perhaps

if we provide a more careful Internet connectivity, we may get better activity and results from this type of malware.

Overall, testing different malware types in different network settings using a sandbox environment, combined with Cuckoo sandbox signatures, is a powerful tool for identifying vulnerabilities, assessing risks and developing more effective defence mechanisms to protect against malware threats. These insights can be used to enhance network security protocols, improve malware detection and mitigation strategies and, ultimately, reduce the impact of malware attacks on network systems.

References

1. AV-Test. <https://www.av-test.org/> (2023). Accessed 16 April 2023
2. Cuckoo sandbox: Automated malware analysis. <https://cuckoosandbox.org/> (2023). Accessed 16 April 2023
3. Virusshare.com. <https://virusshare.com/>
4. Afianian, A., Niksefat, S., Sadeghiyan, B., Baptiste, D.: Malware dynamic analysis evasion techniques: a survey. *ACM Comput. Surv.* **52**(6) (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1145/3365001>
5. Anagnostopoulos, M.: Amplification DoS Attacks, pp. 1–3. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27739-9_1486-1
6. Awati, R.: Iloveyou virus. <https://www.techtarget.com/searchsecurity/definition/ILOVEYOU-virus>
7. Blackthorne, J., Bulazel, A., Fasano, A., Biernat, P., Yener, B.: AVLeak: fingerprinting antivirus emulators through black-box testing. In: Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Conference on Offensive Technologies. USENIX Association (2016)
8. Bulazel, A., Yener, B.: a survey on automated dynamic malware analysis evasion and counter-evasion: PC, Mobile, and Web. In: Proceedings of the 1st Reversing and Offensive-Oriented Trends Symposium. ROOTS, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1145/3150376.3150378>
9. Chen, X., Andersen, J., Mao, Z.M., Bailey, M., Nazario, J.: Towards an understanding of anti-virtualization and anti-debugging behavior in modern malware. In: IEEE International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks with FTCS and DCC (DSN). IEEE (2008)
10. Gregory, J.: What has changed since the 2017 wannacry ransomware attack? <https://securityintelligence.com/articles/what-has-changed-since-wannacry-ransomware-attack> (2021)
11. Hungenberg, T., Eckert, M.: Inetsim: internet services simulation suite. <https://www.inetsim.org/>
12. Jamalpur, S., Navya, Y.S., Raja, P., Tagore, G., Rao, G.R.K.: Dynamic malware analysis using cuckoo sandbox. In: 2018 Second International Conference on Inventive Communication and Computational Technologies (ICICCT), pp. 1056–1060 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICICCT.2018.8473346>
13. Kambourakis, G., Anagnostopoulos, M., Meng, W., Zhou, P.: Botnets: architectures, counter-measures, and challenges (2019)
14. Mahmoud, R.V., Anagnostopoulos, M., Pedersen, J.M.: Detecting cyber attacks through measurements: learnings from a cyber range. *IEEE Instrum. Meas. Mag.* **25**(6), 31–36 (2022)
15. Pircoveanu, R.S., Hansen, S.S., Larsen, T.M., Stevanovic, M., Pedersen, J.M., Czech, A.: Analysis of malware behavior: type classification using machine learning. In: 2015 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA), pp. 1–7. IEEE (2015)
16. Yoshioka, K., Hosobuchi, Y., Orii, T., Matsumoto, T.: Your sandbox is blinded: impact of decoy injection to public malware analysis systems. *J. Inf. Process.* **19**, 2011 (2011)

Cybersecurity, Usability and Ethics

Behavior Change Approaches for Cyber Security and the Need for Ethics



Konstantinos Mersinas and Maria Bada

Abstract Humans are reportedly exploited as the main attack vectors for security breaches. In order to minimize the susceptibility of humans to security attacks, it is not sufficient for individuals to just be aware; they need to change their behavior as well. Such behavior change, that is, the modification of user behavior, can occur via targeted interventions, which are gradually being introduced in cyber security. In this paper, we identify and categorize the main approaches used to change user behavior and portray the main limitations of these approaches. Other fields, like health sciences, psychology, and economics, have been traditionally more mature in ethics-related considerations. We suggest that although individual behavior change is increasingly being embraced by security practitioners and professionals, ethical aspects of the accompanied interventions are by large neglected in the field. We explore the ethical traditions of utilitarian, deontological, and virtue ethics and their relations with security. We posit that ethical frameworks are needed for cyber behavior change interventions as a means to enhance security hygiene on both an individual and an organizational level.

Keywords Cyber security · Behavior change · Behavioral interventions · Ethics

1 Introduction

In the past two decades, cyber behavior change (CBC) has been attracting attention, and theories, mainly from behavioral economics, have been employed to make choice architecture (the design by which choices are presented; [66]) more effective in an

K. Mersinas (✉)

Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK
e-mail: konstantinos.mersinas@rhul.ac.uk

M. Bada

Queen Mary, University of London, Mile End Road, London 1 4NS, UK
e-mail: m.bada@qmul.ac.uk

interconnected world. CBC interventions can be defined as both short- and long-term modifications in the security behaviors of individuals. Certain user behaviors, e.g., people falling victims to phishing attacks, increase cyber risks which can be minimized by altering users' behaviors and habits.

Organizations run frequent cyber security awareness campaigns to minimize cyber risks at organizational and individual levels. Cyber security awareness campaigns increase in amount and scope, however, security incident numbers are not being reduced significantly [5]. Additionally, despite the increasing focus on awareness campaigns, these often fail to achieve active user engagement [10]. A possible explanation for this lack of engagement might be the way cyber security mechanisms operate in workplaces, e.g., systems often allow users to be passive [16], instead of promoting engagement. A CBC intervention could be a risk message tailored to users, aiming to increase awareness, and, most importantly, to encourage specific behaviors. The need for shaping secure behaviors makes CBC an invaluable tool for security professionals and organizations.

CBC interventions have only been relatively recently introduced in cyber security [19, 27] and to the best of our knowledge, there is a relative lack of scholarship on the relevant ethical considerations. Namely, despite CBC attracting increasing attention in the past few years, there is no ethical framework in the field to direct and set boundaries for such practices. In this paper, first, we describe the main behavior change approaches. Second, we describe three dominant ethical traditions and link them to CBC. Finally, we evaluate CBC approaches through the lens of ethical traditions and aim to set the basis for the creation of concrete ethical practices for implementing CBC.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing approaches to behavior change. In particular, we focus on fear appeals, conceptual frameworks, the nudge and boost theories, nonconscious approaches, and incentives and disincentives. In Sect. 3, we link main ethical traditions with behavior change in security, and in Sect. 4, we discuss the limitations and ethical considerations of behavioral interventions. We suggest that there is a need for ethics in cyber behavior change interventions and present concluding remarks in the last section.

2 Approaches to Cyber Behavior Change (CBC)

It is reported that up to 80% of security breaches are caused by “human error” as the underlying attack vector [51, 97]. Thus, it is critical that professionals and practitioners strengthen the so-called “human defenses” of users. The most common approach is security awareness training campaigns. Defenses, however, are not just dependent on awareness, since, if someone is simply aware, this does not guarantee appropriate, secure actions. Behavior is the key to avoiding human-originating breaches, and consequently, CBC is needed. We define behavior change as a modification of individual behavior achieved via some type of intervention. As expected, such interventions vary to the degree that they influence people's choices.

The economist Herbert Simon proposed the theory of bounded rationality, according to which, as humans, we are not fully rational agents, and the optimality of our decisions is bounded by a number of factors. Namely, we have limited time and cognitive capacity, and access only to a fraction of information for any given problem [79]. This is not meant to diminish the influence of knowledge and understanding in optimizing decision-making, and more so in organizational contexts [80].

Beyond human error, other human-related factors have been studied in security. Namely, researchers aim to address the challenge of users not complying with policies due to a lack of understanding, negligence [82], and apathy [93]. In this section, we provide a selective review of the main approaches used to change user behavior.

2.1 Fear Appeals

Fear appeals have been a traditional tool in changing behavior. Witte defines fear appeals as “persuasive messages designed to scare people by describing the terrible things that will happen to them if they do not do what the message recommends” [106] or similarly, persuasive messages that convey the potential harm and danger if recommendations are not adopted [89].

There is a number of aspects that can influence the effects of fear appeals on behavior change. Namely, the conveyed message itself, the type of behavior that is proposed, and the characteristics of the audience [89]. In more detail, relevant variables can be:

- (a) The level of the conveyed fear;
- (b) The efficacy conveyed to the recipient, i.e., whether the solution is sufficient and/or effective;
- (c) The perceived efficacy of the individual, i.e., whether they are able to follow the recommended message;
- (d) The level of vulnerability and impact¹;
- (e) The style of the recommended action, i.e., whether the behavior is a one-off or repeated, and whether it has a preventive or detective nature; and,
- (f) The characteristics (often demographic, e.g., age, gender) of the targeted individuals.

There is a number of theories focusing on different parts of the above aspects and variables. One of the first theories discussing how individuals react to fear appeals is fear-as-a-drive, where individuals are motivated to avoid unpleasant situations [31], ideally, by accepting the proposed message [59, 74, 75, 88]. Consider fear arousal (emotional and physiological) as the decisive factor for behavior change, with higher levels of fear arousal being positively correlated with persuasion, but only if

¹ We use the cyber security terms *vulnerability* and *impact* here, although, in psychology and economics these are often termed as *susceptibility* and *severity*, although susceptibility is meant to have a strong personal relevance to the individual.

accompanied with high levels of perceived efficacy, i.e., beliefs that the conveyed solution (coping message) is effective [74, 76]. And it has been empirically confirmed that combining threat appeals with specific solutions increases the effect of the coping message [94]. Other theories pose a dichotomy between linear models, i.e., models in which increased conveyed fear leads to increased behavior acceptance [17], and curvilinear models, where high levels of fear are thought to cause the opposite effects to individuals [88, 107]. Linearity seems to be supported by meta-analysis, along with the effectiveness of conveyed one-off behaviors compared to repeated actions, and evidence shows that fear appeals are more convincing for women compared to men [89].

Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)

PMT was developed with the intention of exploring the effects of fear appeals on health-related behaviors of individuals [74]. PMT is based on four distinctive factors: the perceived severity of a threat, the perceived likelihood of the occurrence of such a threat, the efficacy of the recommended preventive behavior, and the way individuals perceive their self-efficacy in coping with the given threat [94]. PMT was revised in 1983 by Rogers to include different ways to “initiate a coping process” [65], p. 108). The coping process is based on the identified *response efficacy* which is individuals’ belief that they can deal with a threat effectively [75]. The theory is the first one to include the factor of self-efficacy for explaining human behavior in the light of a threat [101].

PMT has been applied in cyber security contexts; for example, by measuring employees’ resulting compliance to security policies [54, 83], and encouraging individuals to protect their systems, given that they know how to do so, but do not behave accordingly [109]. Figure 1 depicts the process of PMT adjusted for a cyber security awareness training application [63]. Namely, a message is conveyed along with the likelihood and the impact of a threat materializing. The recipient has a subjective perception of likelihood and impact, and also evaluates his or her self-efficacy, along with the efficacy of the proposed solution. The result can be either acceptance of the message, via protection motivation, and consequently a change of behavior according to the recommendation, or a message rejection with inaction or an opposite action as a response.

Structurally, PMT consists of two processes, the threat appraisal (threat message) and the coping appraisal (proposed solution). Van Bavel et al. [94] use a coping message to inform users on how to deal with the threat and experimentally examine the effectiveness of informed coping messages with fear appeals for minimizing exposure to online risks. While both fear appraisals and coping appraisals contribute to protection motivation and the adoption of secure behaviors, coping messages are shown to be comparatively more effective. Therefore, coping appraisals need to have a key role when designing behavioral interventions. Notably, PMT allows space for both environmental (observations, verbal persuasion) and intrapersonal factors (prior experience, personality traits) in the evaluation of threats and coping messages.

In security contexts, an individual’s maladaptive, non-compliant-with-the-coping-appraisal evaluation can include the rewards of convenience, speed, and simplicity,




Fig. 1 Fear appeals and the possible individual responses [63]

if these are perceived as larger than the risk. On the other hand, an individual’s adaptive coping decision might consider skills and capabilities (self-efficacy), and how effective the solution is (response efficacy) in comparison with the costs of the recommended behavior. Thus, in both cases, the usability of the proposed solution can play a role. The PMT model does not assume full rationality of individuals, but can equally work with, e.g., ecological rationality, i.e., interactions with the environment and usage of rules of thumb [62]. However, in parallel, biases are potentially introduced in the model, as the evaluation of threats and coping messages is inherently subjective.

Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)

The Theory of Reasoned Action was proposed by the psychologists Fishbein and Ajzen in 1975 as a model to explain human behavior. The model has three main components: belief, attitude, and intention, all of which produce a final behavior (Fig. 1). In more detail, *belief* is an assigned probability to a behavior governed by cause and effect. *Attitude* refers to the individual’s positive or negative evaluation of this behavior and it is a function of beliefs that lead to behavioral *intention*, which, in turn, is the willingness or readiness to follow the specific behavior. The model was further amended to include subjective norms, i.e., normative beliefs (the evaluation of what others expect) and motivation to comply (the degree to which the individual wants to comply with other people’s expectations); subjective norms are at the same hierarchical level as attitude (Fig. 2).

TPB is an expansion of the theory of reasoned action (TRA) and considers the additional component of perceived *behavioral control* as a factor which influences intention [4, 84]. This additional component is, as a construct, a synonym for self-efficacy, i.e., the level of control we believe we have over our own behavior, but in practice, it tends to be evaluated by how easy or difficult an action or behavior is perceived to be (Wallston, 2001). The addition of perceived behavioral control captures both relevant skills, e.g., digital literacy in security, and external conditions




Fig. 2 TRA model; adapted from [44]

to be met, e.g., the existence of IT support or the existence of security mechanisms to be utilized.

2.2 Conceptual Frameworks for Behavior Change

We identify two indicative examples in this category; the Fogg behavior model and the Hook model.

The Fogg Behavior Model

The Fogg Behavior Model (FBM) [38] attempts to capture the components that need to converge in order for a behavior to take place. The model proposes that the main three factors for successful behavior change are a person's motivation, sufficient ability (or simplicity), and effective triggers.

In more detail, Fogg's dichotomous variables for *motivation* can be pleasure and pain, hope and fear, and social acceptance and rejection. Ability can denote time, money, physical effort, brain cycles, social deviance, and non-routine. Brain cycles refer to the ability to think of a task while experiencing multiple thoughts. Social deviance refers to acting contrary to the norm. Routine activities are easy because individuals are used to follow certain patterns, whereas non-routine actions require additional energy. *Simplicity*, then, is a subjective factor of how easy or difficult it is to perform a behavior, because each person has a different concept of what simple is based on their background, skills, culture, etc. The main elements of *effective triggers* are sparks, facilitators, and signals. Fogg defines sparks as intervention designs focusing on motivating the individual. Facilitators are triggers for individuals who lack in ability, even though their motivation is high. Signals are reminders and are suitable for individuals who have both the motivation and the ability to perform an action. Finally, motivation and ability are the deciding factors for effective triggers.

The Hook Model

The Hook model [34] also includes triggers, along with actions, rewards, and investment, and it is oriented toward habit formation. In particular, there is a trigger (usually external, but can be internal too) that causes the user to perform an action. Thus, the trigger is the event that actuates the action. The action needs to be relatively easy and

is linked to an anticipated reward, which is then provided (at some point in time). So, the action is the expected or desirable behavior that is linked with the anticipation of the reward. Rewards can be of any kind, for example, material, social, or personal (e.g., gratification via achievements). Rewards can be variable, with the intention of creating an increasingly “addictive” feedback loop for the individual, so that they are motivated to repeat the action.

The main difference with Fogg’s model is that the user has an opportunity to invest, e.g., in time and effort. This notion comes from a context of product design, for which the model was intended, but it can be adjusted in other applications too. The *investment* creates a connection with the “system or product”, e.g., in the form of emotional attachment, commitment, or personalization, and, thus, increases the chances that the user will repeat the process the next time the external trigger is provided.

Although FBM is simple and intuitive, its main issue is that it is intended as a conceptual framework. The constructs of motivation and ability are of a high level, and are less practical to implement. The Hook model is more focused on applications or specific features, e.g., for online platforms. However, the model does not consider which triggers might be more effective and how to enhance them. Such models have been applied in social media and web applications and can be indeed powerful. But, as an example, user “addiction” associated with the feedback loop of a “like button” can be viewed as ethically manipulative because it relies on designed gratification via dopamine release in the brain, and thus may reinforce the need for ethics.

2.3 *Nudges and Boosts*

One of the main challenges of behavior change relates to choice architecture. Choice architecture refers to the multiple ways a choice can be presented to an individual and which can subtly direct them toward a specific choice. Choice architecture affects individuals’ choice without always requiring their consent or knowledge of that choice, which raises ethical considerations about users’ autonomy and have even been deemed anti-libertarian [110], p. 133). For example, a widely used intervention appears in the form of nudging. Nudge theory holds that governments and organizations can direct individuals toward optimal decisions by slightly changing their behavior.

A significant topic of debate surrounding nudges pertains to the contradictions of the interventions. Nudges are intended to be libertarian but are simultaneously paternalistic. Libertarian paternalism is defined as choice architecture stimulating choices believed to enhance the welfare of an individual, but at the same time maintaining the individual’s freedom to choose the deemed choice as a “suboptimal” course of action (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). For example, opt-out policies are a form of libertarian paternalism because they provide the user with the choice to not choose a default option. Opt-out policies can be effective because of the additional steps (the so-called transaction costs) an individual has to take in order to change the situation or default

option. Therefore, the success of such policies relates to human inertia, and the power of defaults, rather than persuasion.

Cram et al. [23] identify 23 ways to nudge human–computer interaction and link cognitive biases with the mechanisms of nudging in cyber security. These can be categorized into nudges targeting either the reflective or the automatic mind, and nudges which are transparent or non-transparent. Thaler and Sunstein, the creators of the nudge theory, advocate strong transparency via visibility and monitoring. This approach can avoid manipulative behavioral architectures, i.e., designs where targeted individuals do not know the intentions behind an intervention or even realize its implementation. However, strong transparency can be restrictive, even for policies beneficial to the public, e.g., doctors framing the risks of a medical treatment might be considered non-transparent [45]. Thus, it is argued that even if manipulation can be avoided, full or strong transparency might undermine the well-intended and beneficial outcomes of a nudge.

Another approach to transparency is based on the reflective or automatic functions of the mind. *Reflective* indicates the part of the mind that is processing information slowly, effortfully, and intentionally (called System 2). We can say that it is the controlled part of the mind. The automatic mind, on the other hand, processes information fast and without active deliberation (System 1). When a nudge stimulates the reflective part of the mind, the process is transparent because the individual can process the information and act accordingly. When the nudge targets the automatic mind, the process is non-transparent because individuals react intuitively to the nudge.

Although, in general, individuals' freedom of choice is maintained, an ethical concern is that some nudges lack transparency, because the process leading to the nudge “may be far more secretive”. In particular, Baldwin identifies three degrees of nudging, from simple information that maintains full autonomy of the target, to building on volitional limitations of individuals (e.g., by using defaults and opt-out policies), to the third degree that interferes with autonomy and reflection by utilizing salience, framing, and affect [11]. The effect of the aforementioned opt-out mechanisms has been explored by various researchers, and they can be considered as cunning, although, “not all opt-out mechanisms raise ethical questions” [23]. However, nudges can lie between coercion (full control of the influencer) and persuasion (no control over the influence), and it is debatable as to whether they maintain freedom of choice [77]. Indeed, for a fully autonomous choice individuals need to be rationally persuaded, since “only rational persuasion fully respects the sovereignty of the individual over his or her own choices”, however, rational persuasion is not completely independent of emotions [47].

The need to rationally persuade an individual leads us to boost theory (BT), a design aiming to improve people's decision-making by helping individuals reach their highest possible capacity to achieve goals. BT targets competencies and individuals' agency instead of immediate behavior [49]. The main difference with nudge theory is that BT allows individuals to reflect on the decision, while nudges change behavior mostly through the choice architecture. The individual is provided with the optimal course of action and is expected to decide actively and transparently [42, 49]. Boosts

are an enhanced form of nudges, as they are focused on longer-term behavior change. To achieve long-term results, subjects need to have access to all the intervention parameters.

Apart from long-term behavior change, boosts can be useful in short-term changes. Short-term boosts encourage the development of competence in a specific context, and they resemble a so-called “educative nudge”, aiming “to overcome or correct behavioral biases by promoting learning” [87]. Long-term boosts aim to render a competence readily used at will and in various contexts. The ideal result of a long-term boost is permanent behavior change. Long-term boosts are categorized depending on their goals. Namely, [49] distinguish long-term boosts into risk literacy, uncertainty management and motivational boosts. Risk literacy boosts aim to render people able to comprehend statistical information for a wide range of domains. Uncertainty management boosts focus on the ability of the subject to assess a situation in uncertain conditions and motivational boosts motivate subjects to act while maintaining their autonomy.

Boosts require the subject’s informed consent and value autonomy, however, they are sometimes criticized for inducing significant costs and effort to intervention recipients; and indeed BT interventions require time and cognitive resources. And even in the cases that boosts are low-cost for subjects, they can be challenging for policy makers. Policy makers bear the high cost of boosts due to the required complexity of the interventions. The main advantage of boosts is the formation of habits, which require active effort for their initial formation. The potential usefulness of boosts can be inferred given that, reportedly, up to half of our actions and decisions are the byproduct of habits [108].

Nudges can be considered to threaten the autonomy of individuals since policy makers do not know people’s true interests. This view is based on the definition of autonomy by John Stuart Mill, that autonomy is the ability of individuals to decide their own interests and make choices based on these interests [105]. More specifically, nudges can be seen to violate individuals’ freedom of choice and autonomy, especially if the influencer’s or policy maker’s intentions are unclear or if there is no recipient consent for the intervention [47, 104]. On the other hand, boosts require individuals to respond to interventions in a motivated, reflective fashion, and thus avoid considerations of limiting individuals’ autonomy.

2.4 *Nonconscious Behavioral Approaches*

Nonconscious behavior² is any behavior that is not processed consciously by the brain. Thus, the result of nonconscious interventions is not intended by the individual performing the associated action. Such interventions target the automatic part of the brain (System 1) rather than the reflective (System 2). System 1 is uncontrolled,

² We use the term *nonconscious* to cover both the term *subconscious* (processes not in focal awareness) and *unconscious* (deeper mental processes).

effortless, associative, fast, nonconscious, and skilled [91]. Nonconscious influence is often triggered by subliminal stimuli, e.g., usually visual or auditory stimuli that individuals are not consciously aware of, and which are either hidden or used in a way to *prime* individuals (i.e., use stimuli which influence subsequent actions).

Despite the disparity between conscious and nonconscious mental processes, nonconscious activity has been found to be important and beneficial in decision-making, e.g., by leading to fast and optimal decisions by experts, after years of accumulated experience [100], indicating that the value of underlying nonconscious processes should not be ignored.

Nonconscious approaches have not been explored in depth in cyber security, apart from certain nudges targeting the automatic part of the brain (such as opt-out policies, to an extent) [23]. However, studies targeting nonconscious behavior are appearing in digital behavior change interventions, in particular, with the aim to avoid decision reliance on motivation and ability, since these are volatile [3]. Interventions based only on conscious cognition or only on automatic nonconscious processes are considered less effective in forming long-term behavior change. For that reason, (digital) interventions which utilize both the automatic and the reflective parts of the brain are proposed in the literature [71].

From an ethical perspective, in nonconscious interventions subjects are by definition manipulated and are unaware of this manipulation. Therefore, nonconscious approaches can be viewed as undermining the autonomy of the individual, and thus raise ethical considerations. This aspect is similar to a category of nudges that are not controlled by the targeted individual, and thus undermine freedom of choice [77]. It should be noted, however, that intervention recipients' responses are not necessarily purely automatic or nonconscious. There is evidence that individuals' conscious volitional decisions are influenced by nonconscious environmental factors [70].

Additionally, nonconscious interventions also lack transparency by definition, and thus may lead to suspicion or mistrust in various settings, resulting in more harm than benefit. In fact, similarly to the discussion on nudges, a lack of transparency can allow for the goals behind the intervention to be questioned. In that sense, interventions which are directly communicated to users and are accompanied by persuasion techniques, overcome these considerations.

2.5 *Incentives and Disincentives*

An incentive or reward (or praise), in the broader sense, can be anything that motivates an action and can be intrinsic or extrinsic. A disincentive or a punishment (or blame), symmetrically, is anything that withholds or removes a reward or applies some "painful" stimulation. There is an ongoing debate on the relative effectiveness of either approach. However, research evidence indicates that rewards work better for motivating action, whereas punishment is more efficient for deterring individuals from taking an action; this finding is explained by the evolutionary adaptation of our brain to our environment [43].

Incentives are used by organizations as the first step to policy compliance, including security policy compliance. The reasoning behind punishments (or sanctions) is to an extent based on the criminological General Deterrence Theory (GDT) which has been used widely, including the cyber security field, to examine whether punishment is an effective means to change behavior. According to GDT, an individual chooses to obey or break “the rules” based on rationally analyzing potential consequences [6], and the certainty, quickness, and severity of punishment influence the decision.

The predictive power of rewards and punishments to encourage security policy compliance is found to be weak, especially when these are imposed through specific guidelines (e.g., specific policies related to antivirus) [28]. An issue with the reasoning of GDT also, is that fully rational agents are not necessarily observed in real-world scenarios, especially with regards to probability estimations [56], i.e., the *certainty* aspect of GDT.

Cram et al. [28] point out the need for new research to understand what type of incentives would be the most effective for organizations to implement in order to balance effects on the organization and the individual, in a security context. Goel et al. [41] provided financial rewards to a small sample of employees and the result was an improvement in hygienic security behavior, namely, stronger passwords. Once the program was over, however, employees showed signs of increasing non-compliance due to the limited temporal effects of extrinsic incentivization.

Outside cyber security, experiments examining extrinsic (financial) incentivization effectiveness have been conducted in health sciences, indicating that participants fall back to their previous behaviors, long-term (Carrera, 2018). Financial incentives are impactful for the duration of their implementation, but they do not lead to habit formation. Due to the failure to form habits, employees potentially become non-compliant once the reward intervention ends.

Punishment, as a means to change behavior, can also be viewed by employees as an unjust measure of organizational control, and the extent of such a perception is also culture-dependent. Namely, in the more individualistic western cultures [68], such perceptions of control might be more prominent. Punishment, on the other hand, is perceived as necessary sometimes to ensure the smooth operation of an organization. However, punishment, if utilized, should be balanced with incentivization by rewarding conformity in order to build trust relationships within an organization [95]. It should be noted that punishment, in an organizational security context, mostly refers to sanctions (i.e., assignment of liability) rather than penalties or monetary fines.

On a neurological level, rewards can have similar effects to punishment, if their provision is halted. Shabel et al. [78] experimentally evaluated stress effects on the lateral habenula, the part of the brain responsible for decision-making. Results indicate that stress causes the brain to react with punishment signals when a reward is withdrawn, thus equating the lack of rewards with punishment. That is, the signal for reward omission is the same as that for punishment. Security practitioners who wish to use incentives could consider mixed methods, i.e., both rewards and punishment, but with a long-term orientation.

3 Behavior Change Ethics

In this section, we utilize three main ethical traditions and draw links with cyber security and interventions for behavior change. Ethics and philosophical approaches have been used in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), but they are usually focused on product or policy design [14, 18, 81] and are not utilized as a lens to identify how users need to be treated in a field which has a polemic (attacker-defender) nature, and thus specific narratives are conveyed to users, which can influence their attitudes. We explore the applicability of three main philosophical and ethical traditions, which are dominant, at least in the West [14], namely, virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and utilitarian ethics.

4 Utilitarian Ethics

Utilitarian ethics are a special case of a moral view called *consequentialism* and they focus on the common good or the “overall consequences”. The individual is expected to act in fashions that can be deemed “good” if they contribute to the greater good. In this tradition, it is the outcomes that matter, i.e., there is a focus on ends, not how they are achieved. *Utility*, a term mostly used in economics, can be the equivalent of happiness and well-being, or anything of value, and is what needs to be maximized under utilitarianism [15, 64]. Therefore, the tradition is based on rational decisions regarding the overall good and assumes the use of a cost–benefit analysis for decision-making which weighs whether the utility of most people is maximized in comparison to one or a few.

One aspect of this approach is that a utilitarianist will always choose “society” over the individual and this might create a series of issues relating to individual rights. In particular, if the individual is of secondary importance compared to the group, individual rights like privacy rights and control over personal information, might be undermined for the sake of the majority, or the greater good of an organization. Assuming that there is no regulation violated, utilitarian ethics are in line with most business practices, considering the organization as the analogous of “society”. Thus, practices such as mergers, departmental restructures, human resource management, relocation, and employee firing are considered ethical in these terms.

In more specific security settings, employees of an organization with utilitarian ethics in place must follow organizational policies. Thus, compliance with security policies is justified under the goal of the overall protection of the organization. However, this does not exclude non-compliant behaviors. In the case that employees are not to comply, they should do so by having in mind the benefit of the majority of the organization’s members of staff or the overall good. An immediate consideration here is the subjectivity of the justification for non-compliance and its potential confirmation only in hindsight.

In this ethical tradition, beyond maximizing the overall utility, avoiding harm for the majority is equally a main goal of individual actions. This does not necessarily exclude approaches like sanctions, or “blaming and shaming” of individuals. Consider the scenario of an internally executed phishing campaign. Suppose that senior management decides to publicly shame employees who were tricked by the phishing emails. If this action is considered a means for the overall good of the organization, then it is in line with utilitarian ethics. There is, however, one issue with this reasoning; namely, it is difficult to measure the effects on the *overall* utility. It might be the case, e.g., that more employees comply out of fear, thus the desired observable behavior is achieved, but other ‘side effects’ influencing the overall utility might be neglected. In such a scenario, e.g., many employees may be disillusioned with senior management and lose any sense of trust, a result which might defy the whole point. Thus, in practice, it is hard to justify this approach, especially, if the well-being of individuals is directly affected.

5 Deontological Ethics

The second tradition is deontological ethics, a thought system promoting the single ideal of acting in ways that an individual wants the whole society to follow. It is a human-oriented system and promotes collective thinking and a “universal moral obligation”. The term deontology derives from the Greek words *deon* and *logos*, meaning duty (or necessity) and reason, respectively, and indeed, universalizable rules of conduct (or morality) are based on reason in deontology. This tradition is attributed to Immanuel Kant and his Categorical Imperative which states: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” [57], p. 422). In contrast to utilitarianism, here it is the nature of an act, rather than the outcome that matters.

Every individual must follow the universal rules established by the deontological system of thought. Morality and ethics become an obligation, however, there is a reported misconception about deontology, namely, that individuals cannot have incentives or freedom of choice [96]. In fact, individuals are assumed to voluntarily comply with the accepted moral rules, in line with Kant’s imperative. For example, consider the scenarios where employees accept a decision by senior management, or citizens comply with election results, or taxpayers accept to pay additional contributions during an economic crisis. All these behaviors can contradict individuals’ utility maximization, but they have some accepted underlying morality, therefore, individuals voluntarily agree to behave accordingly. This underlying morality corresponds to the *belief* and *attitude* stages of the fear appeal theories TRA and TPB.

Since deontology has the notion of “ought” to do something, it is linked with individuals’ moral obligation, because individuals have a sense of duty in their ethical actions. Consequently, and to the extent that deontology might influence individuals to act in certain ways by inducing a feeling of guilt [29], there can be well-being

considerations in organizational settings. This issue is similar to the individualized effects of utilitarian ethics already discussed.

A possible conflict of deontology with traditional security risk management can be the fact that actions are inherently either right or wrong, independently of their potential impact. Impact (and likelihood) is an established way of thinking in information security and a core notion of fear appeals, for that matter. The notion, however, is not a core one in deontology, but it could be introduced under the deontological ethics angle of rationality. On the other hand, since reason plays a role in deontology, individuals are not expected to comply with policies without justification, it is just a matter of establishing that it is, e.g., a universal and accepted rule to protect organizational information assets, without necessarily focusing on the impact of, say, regulatory fines.

Finally, organizationally, deontology presupposes some form of authority, and thus might be in line with security top-down approaches and typical business hierarchies. Moreover, behavioral interventions based on deontology can be more practical in their implementation within the commonly established organizational hierarchical structures.

6 Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is a branch of ethics founded by Aristotle, according to whom, humans strive for *eudaimonia*, that is for happiness and flourishing. *Eudaimonia* is the highest of the goods and it is worth pursuing it for its own sake [8]. Virtue ethics are applied contextually, in contrast to deontological ethics, which, as we have seen, attempt to define universal rules. This context-dependency and the voluntary nature of decisions create a component of *responsibility* [96].

Virtue ethics have an individualistic angle which allows for voluntary action. For example, this can mean users to have the freedom to follow or ignore security policies, exceptionally [81], or that employees can act based on their own judgment. However, virtue ethics cannot be considered purely individualistic as humans are considered social beings who act in relation to others [96]. The other strong characteristic of this ethical tradition is that virtues are self-sufficient, and thus people follow “good” actions for their own sake, not as a means to other goals [8].

In the latter case, actions can be considered acceptable if they satisfy three criteria: be just, honest, and courageous [81, p. 454]. In that sense, employees need to have a sentiment of justice, their intentions to be guided by honesty, and be courageous and take the lead in an autonomous manner without needing supervision. These notions are highlighted by Aristotle as practical and concrete behaviors, e.g., in daily interactions, and not as abstract rules [96]. Thus, virtue ethics can work under the assumption that users are educated in security, and have a self-efficacy level and behavioral control over potential actions, which would allow them to judge situations independently.

The contextual role of responsibility can be pivotal in a security setting. Namely, security and risk perceptions of employees who have responsibility and involvement with security mechanisms and processes are found to be more positive than that of individuals who are not involved with these mechanisms and processes [32].

Moreover, virtue ethics attempt to establish a middle way between reason and emotion (often termed intuition), therefore, they are antithetical to approaches like the Hook model, which target emotional reactions. The self-sufficiency of virtues might be in contrast with behavioral interventions and models which utilize rewards and incentivization. Instead, self-sufficiency of virtues implies that, e.g., compliance messages to individuals are self-evident. Such an attribute might be incompatible with most organizations, since it is hard to imagine, e.g., security policy compliance, because “it is a good thing”. Thus, we see a possible mismatch with cyber security.

In parallel, there are arguments that emotions do have a role in ethical reasoning by recognizing human limitations and vulnerabilities [69]. In that sense, approaches like fear appeals which utilize emotions can be in line with virtue ethics, and in particular, if we expand Nussbaum’s arguments, as a way for individuals to reflect on their own vulnerability and their role in the security context, via fear of a conveyed message about a potential security incident. Virtue ethics, thus, relate to character, and therefore, the tradition is well-suited for behavior change interventions, to the extent that these take into account individual characteristics, like personality traits. This is not to say that all behavioral interventions take this approach, but it is one that is most promising given the aforementioned variables of fear appeals and the Fogg model, in particular.

From the social angle of virtue ethics, and the importance of agent relationships and a voluntary commitment to shared values [96], we derive that they require established security practices. In particular, virtue ethics might work better with established (or developing) security cultures, ideally positive ones. Thus, virtue ethics might be more appropriate in relatively mature security environments as they can reinforce behaviors via interactions and norms.

7 Discussion on the Limitations and Ethical Considerations of Behavioral Interventions

In this section, we highlight limitations and ethical considerations that span across CBC approaches, that is, fear appeals, conceptual frameworks, nudges and boosts, nonconscious interventions, and rewards and sanctions. Some considerations are uniquely associated with a CBC approach, while others apply to more than one approach. The identified points of consideration, along with the key notions within the ethical traditions, indicate a structure for the development of an ethical framework, that is, the limitations and considerations, along with the key notions from the ethical traditions, are meant as insights and a basis to shape specific ethical frameworks in future research. More specifically, this basis is comprised of autonomy, social

responsibility, the common benefit, individual rights, non-harm, transparency, and a justification of the interventions.

Fear appeals limitations. A number of ethical considerations surround the fear appeals literature outside security. Indicatively, the violation of autonomy in health-promoting strategies [90], the causing of distress to the targeted individuals in anti-smoking campaigns [46], and the causing of anxiety and other negative emotions in the context of emotion-arousing advertisements [53], are all ethics-related reported issues. But also, specifically in security, researchers have proposed ways to enhance behavior change models. For example, Jonston et al. (2015) suggest that fear appeals and PMT models are inadequate for security and propose the incorporation of personal relevance in the conveyed messages as a means to enhance compliance. Indeed, research findings indicate that both environmental and individual factors need to be accounted for, along with behavioral interventions, e.g., a lack of time, knowledge or skills can affect self-efficacy levels [72].

Neglected influencing factors. Thus, the main limitation of fear appeals is that they do not consider behaviors that necessitate a wide range of additional factors like skillsets, opportunities, and context. TPB has some useful features, namely, it attempts to capture situations where individuals have reduced control. For example, it considers the situation where, despite being motivated, an individual might fail to perform an action if the required environmental conditions are not present. But a significant limitation of both TRA and TPB is that volition and conscious will are presumed; the difference between the two theories is that TRA assumes full volition, whereas TPB introduces behavioral (internal and external) control which can hinder full volition. That is, individuals utilize beliefs, evaluate them via attitudes, and thus consciously form intentions. Thus, there is a consideration for the so-called intention-behavior gap in TPB, in line with the observation that the causal relationship between intentions and behavior is not straightforward. Interestingly, the presumption of this relationship is compatible with the assumptions of most ethical traditions.

Short-term, non-habitual effects. While fear appeals can be successful in changing behaviors, they do not necessarily form habits. Habitual conduct is largely unaffected by intentions only, whereas small and gradual behaviors can form habits. Notably, the formation of habits is associated with the long-term effectiveness of interventions and the goal of a positive security culture. Extrinsic incentivization alone is shown to be ineffective in this direction, but a combination of components might be useful; namely, voluntary action, engagement, and responsibility within social interactions are in line with virtue ethics and might shape a security culture. The “societal utility” of utilitarianism might be in line with organizational goals and an overall security culture at first glance, however, a positive security culture needs to be built equally on individualism, and thus the individualistic nature of virtue ethics and deontology might be a better fit. We have discussed that the security culture maturity might also be a contextual factor, e.g., a positive security culture with an established notion of security as a “good” might be in line with virtue ethics.

Non-plurality of choices. Behavioral interventions can be seen to violate users’ autonomy because users are led to follow a specific route of action, the so-called

coping appraisal, dictated by, e.g., security professionals. The problem with this attitude is the creation of a paternalistic approach, i.e., dictating specific solutions, since a specific action might be imposed on users leading to choice restriction. That is, a lack of alternatives, might take place since users are usually presented with two choices, the one being “optimal” (via the provided coping appraisal), whereas the other being framed as “dangerous” or “irresponsible”. The “optimal” option is presented as the only logical and legitimate choice provided by intervention designers.

Distress. Fear appeals can also cause distress and those exposed to fear may be unable to act on the relevant advice. “Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt” (FUD) has been criticized as an unethical and unhelpful practice because many of the factoids shared through FUD aim to create an unpleasant atmosphere for the recipient along with the elicitation of fear [36]. Beyond the ethical issue raised by FUD, and although it is not an unusual appeal in cyber security, its effectiveness is not clear. Namely, security breach reports and headlines often utilize FUD to convey messages possibly leading to fatigue.

Cognitive biases. Another factor that potentially diminishes the effectiveness of interventions is cognitive biases, like the overconfidence bias, also called the “it will not happen to me” bias. Thus, e.g., fear-based approaches can be seen as an attempt to inflate the perceived probability and impact of threats, but cognitive biases may work in the opposite direction, affecting the overall objectivity in assessing risk. The role of cognitive biases is more complex, but we do not address it here.

Opposite effects. The use of fear in behavioral interventions might be ineffective as, for example, in certain occasions people tend to respond to fear with humor, and, thus, undermining the effectiveness of the interventions. This finding is observed in Twitter posts [1] an online platform which might resemble an environment that conveys security messages to employees. Humor responses to fear are called fear control responses and are a psychologically legitimate way of coping with fear and unpleasant feelings [60], but their existence confirms the ethically questionable instigation of unpleasant feelings.

Well-being risks. The well-being of individuals, in the broader sense, is a main concern as fear and disincentives can induce unpleasant emotions, either directly or via peer pressure. The same considerations hold for the application of rewards and sanctions, i.e., these can affect the well-being of employees. Additionally, disincentives as responses to user behavior can affect security culture. Namely, the demonization of those behaving insecurely can have a negative impact on long-term security behaviors by, e.g., targeting or blaming individuals or creating stereotypes [73].

Manipulation. Certain nudges, as well as nonconscious approaches, raise concerns about depriving autonomy and manipulating individuals. Since nudge theory works on the mantra that people can choose to act upon the nudge or not, most commonly, behavior change theories assume that individuals form intentions by processing information via their reflective (System 2) rather than the automatic mind (System 1). The effects and ethics of subliminal messages have raised concerns in our societies decades ago, especially in advertising contexts, but seem largely neglected, with some occasional exceptions. Indicatively, in US politics, George W. Bush’s campaign portrayed images of Al Gore along with the word “RATS” repeatedly

flashed for fractions of seconds on the screen (BBC, 2000). But, by large, although experimental research indicates the influence of subliminal messages on individuals, there does not seem to be a broader societal concern. Maybe the prevalence of cyber security across societal functions can refocus discussions on nonconscious messages.

Non-specificity. Conceptual models of behavior change might be useful for educational purposes, but their generic nature reduces their practical value. Therefore, they can guide behavioral interventions at a high level, but lack the specificity needed in industry implementations. For the Hook model, in particular, ethical considerations can be raised on the mechanisms underlying the provided rewards. Namely, rewarding feedback loops with unexpected but desirable rewards are shown to be associated with surges of the neurotransmitter dopamine in the brain. Dopamine suppresses reasoning and triggers behavior based on desire. Bypassing System 1 thinking is a consideration of similar nature to subliminal messages and could undermine the autonomy of individuals.

Our aim was to showcase that behavior change approaches entail ethical considerations for their application. In our exploration, we ultimately aimed to show that creating ethical frameworks for cyber security interventions is not a straightforward endeavor, but requires a synthesis of various components, as ethical traditions might need to be, first, consulted, then, adapted, and later expanded to serve the security field and the contextual characteristics of organizations.

8 Conclusion

The way to utilize behavioral interventions in cyber security in an ethical fashion has not been fully explored yet. In this paper, we first highlight that such interventions are complex and no approach is free from limitations in its implementation. Second, we portray the ethical considerations related to these interventions, advocating that ethics need to be introduced in security research and security awareness training practice. We present the ethical issues and the limitations surrounding behavior change approaches and posit that ethical frameworks need to be considered for utilizing the increasingly recognized need for behavioral interventions in security. The security field does not have a tradition of such approaches, and therefore, we argue that a set of widely accepted principles, synthesized from well-studied ethical traditions, is needed as a guide for professionals, practitioners, and behavioral intervention designers.

We posit that a discussion on ethical behavioral interventions can be initiated in security and that a synthesis of the aforementioned ethical traditions can be adapted to the requirements of the security field and the organizational environments. In our analysis, a number of components are identified as possible building blocks for ethical frameworks for changing security behaviors. Namely, user independence and autonomy, social responsibility, the appropriate use of rewards or sanctions, and the transparency of interventions. Additionally, through the exploration of ethical

traditions, we portray that individual rights need to be protected and balanced with the greater organizational benefit.

Interdisciplinary research would further contribute in this area via, at least, two directions. First, by studying each of the aforementioned components of autonomy, responsibility, rewards and sanctions, transparency, and individual rights in specific security contexts with different requirements, to identify how well they “fit” in real-world settings. Second, by analyzing and/or formalizing the ethical traditions and contrasting them to organizational cultures and hierarchies, to map characteristics of the traditions with real-world *modi operandi*.

Finally, we draw links between behavioral interventions and ethical traditions on the one hand, and security culture on the other. We hypothesize that different groups might have preferences for different ethical frameworks; for example, a perceptual dichotomy between policy-makers and end-users could exist. Thus, in future research, we aim to examine the perceptions and feedback of security professionals and users to crystalize such an ethical framework for behavioral interventions in cyber security.

References

1. Abril, E.P., Szczyпка, G., Emery, S.L.: LMFAO! humor as a response to fear: decomposing fear control within the extended parallel process model. *J. Broadcast. Electron. Media* **61**(1), 126–143 (2017).
2. Adams, A., Sasse, M.A.: Users are not the enemy. *Commun. ACM*, **42**(12) (Dec. 1999), pp. 40–46 (1999).
3. Adams, A.T., Costa, J., Jung, M.F., Choudhury, T.: Mindless computing: designing technologies to subtly influence behavior. *UbiComp '15, ACM*, 719–730 (2015).
4. Ajzen, I.: Theory of planned behavior. *Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process.* **50**, 179–211 (1991).
5. Alshaikh, M., Humza, N., Atif, A. Maynard, S.B.: Toward sustainable behavior change: an approach for cyber security education training and awareness. In *Proceedings of the 27th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)*, Stockholm and Uppsala, Sweden (2019).
6. Andenaes, J.: Punishment and deterrence. *Ann Arbor* (1974).
7. Ariely, D.: Predictably irrational: The hidden forces that shape our decisions. New York (2008).
8. Aristotle.: *Nichomachean Ethics*, trans. Oxf. Univ. Press., D. Ross and rev. J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson (1980).
9. Armitage, C.J., Conner, M.: Social cognition models and health behavior: A structured review. *Psychol. Health* **15**(2), 173–189 (2000).
10. Bada, M., Sasse, A., Nurse J.R.C.: Cyber security awareness campaigns: why do they fail to change behavior?. In: *International Conference on Cyber Security for Sustainable Society* (2015).
11. Baldwin, R.: From regulation to behavior change: giving nudge the third degree. *Mod. Law Rev.* **77**(6), 831–857 (2014).
12. Barford, L.: Contemporary virtue ethics and the engineers of autonomous systems. In *2019 IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society (ISTAS)* (pp. 1–7). IEEE (2019).
13. BBC News, 13 September 2000. RATS ad: Subliminal conspiracy? http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/americas/2000/us_elections/election_news/923335.stm (Accessed: 25/01/2023).

14. Bednar, K., Spiekermann-Hoff, S.: The power to design: exploring Utilitarianism, Deontology and Virtue Ethics in three technology case studies. *ETHICOMP* **2020**, 396 (2020).
15. Bentham, J.: An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1876).
16. Blythe, J.M.: Cyber Security in the Workplace: Understanding and Promoting Behavior Change. *Proceedings of CHI* 2013. Doctoral Consortium, Trento, September 16th 2013, pp. 92–101 (2013).
17. Boster, F.J., Mongeau, P.: Fear-arousing persuasive messages. *Ann. Int. Commun. Assoc.* **8**(1), 330–375 (1984).
18. Brey, P.: Design for the value of human well-being. *Handbook of ethics, values, and technological design: Sources, theory, values and application domains*, pp.365–382 (2015).
19. Briggs, P., Jeske, D., Coventry, L.: Behavior change interventions for cybersecurity. In: Little, L., Sillence, E., Joinson, A. (eds.) *Behavior Change Research and Theory*, pp. 115–136. Elviesier, Amsterdam (2017).
20. Camerer, C.: Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. New York (2003).
21. Camerer, C.F.: Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the field. In Camerer, C.F., Loewenstein, G., Rabin, M. (eds.). *Advances in behavioral economics*. Princeton and Oxford, pp. 148–161 (2004).
22. Caplin, A.: Fear as a policy instrument. *Time Decis.*, pp. 441–458 (2003).
23. Caraban, A., Karapanos, E., Gonçalves, D., Campos, P.: 23 ways to nudge: A review of Technology-Mediated Nudging in Human-Computer Interaction. *CHI* 2019 (2019).
24. Carpenter, P. Roer, K.: The security culture playbook: an executive guide to reducing risk and developing your human defense layer. John Wiley & Sons (2022).
25. Carrera, M., Royer, H., Stehr, M., Syndor, J.: Can financial incentives help people trying to establish new habits? experimental evidence with new gym members. *J. Health Econ.* **58**, 202–214 (2018).
26. Conner, M., Sparks, P.: The theory of planned behavior and health behaviors. In: Conner, M., Norman, P. (eds.) *Predicting health behavior*, pp. 121–162. Buckingham, UK (1996).
27. Coventry, L., Briggs, P., Jeske, D., van Moorsel, A.: SCENE: A Structured means for creating and evaluating behavioral nudges in a cyber security environment. In A. Marcus (Ed.), *Design, User Experience, and Usability. Theor., Methods, Tools Des. User Exp.*, pp. 229–239 (2014).
28. Cram, W.A., Proudfoot, J., D’Arcy, J.: Seeing the forest and the trees: A meta-analysis of information security policy compliance literature. In: *Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*, (2017), 4051–4060 (2017).
29. Cronan, T.P., Al-Rafee, S.: Factors that influence the intention to pirate software and media. *J. Bus. Ethics* **78**, 527–545 (2008)
30. Devine, D., Gaskell, J., Jennings, W., Stoker, G.: Exploring trust, mistrust and distrust (Unpublished work). Univ. Southampt., UK (2020).
31. Dillard, J.P.: Rethinking the study of fear appeals: an emotional perspective. *Commun. Theory* **4**(4), 295–323 (1994).
32. Durojaiye, T., Mersinas, K. Watling, D.: What influences people’s view of cyber security culture in higher education institutions? an empirical study. In: *The Sixth International Conference on Cyber-Technologies and Cyber-Systems* (2020).
33. Emery, S.L., Szczypka, G., Abril, E.P., Kim, Y., Vera, L.: Are you scared yet? Evaluating fear appeal messages in tweets about the Tips Campaign. *J. Commun.* **64**, 278–295 (2014).
34. Eyal, N.: *Hooked: How to build habit-forming products*. Penguin (2014).
35. Fishbein, M., Ajzen, I.: *Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research*. Reading, MA (1975).
36. Florêncio, D., Herley, C., Shostack, A.: FUD: A plea for intolerance. *Commun. ACM* **57**(6), 31–33 (2014).
37. Floyd, D.L., Prentice-Dunn, S., Rogers, R.W.: A meta-analysis of research on protection motivation theory. *J. Appl. Soc. Psychol.* **30**(2), 407–429 (2000).
38. Fogg, B.J.: A behavior model for persuasive design. In *Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Persuasive Technology ACM* (2009).

39. Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M., and the ABC Research Group. Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford (1999).
40. Godin, G., Kok, G.: The theory of planned behavior: A review of its applications to health-related behaviors. *Am. J. Health Promot.* **11**, 87–98 (1996).
41. Goel, S., Williams, K., Huang, J., Warkentin, M.: Understanding the role of incentives in security behavior. In: Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, **3**, 4241–4246 (2020).
42. Grüne-Yanoff, T., Hertwig, R.: Nudge versus boost: How coherent are policy and theory? *Mind. Mach.* **26**, 149–183 (2016).
43. Guitart-Masip, M., Duzel, E., Dolan, R., Dayan, P.: Action versus valence in decision making. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* **18**(4), 194–202 (2014).
44. Hale, J.L., Householder, B.J., Greene, K.L.: The theory of reasoned action. the persuasion handbook: developments in theory and practice **14**(2002), 259–286 (2002).
45. Hansen, P.G., Jespersen, A.M.: Nudge and the manipulation of choice: A framework for the responsible use of the nudge approach to behavior change in public policy. *Eur. J. Risk Regul.* **4**(1), 3–28 (2013).
46. Hastings, G., Stead, M., Webb, J.: Fear appeals in social marketing: Strategic and ethical reasons for concern. *Psychol. Mark.* **21**(11), 961–986 (2004).
47. Hausman, D.M., Welch, B.: Debate: To nudge or not to nudge. *J. Polit. Philos.*, pp. 123–126 (2010).
48. Held, V.: The ethics of care: personal, political. Global, Oxford (2006).
49. Hertwig, R., Grune-Yanoff, T.: Nudging and boosting: steering or empowering good decisions. *Perspect. Psychol. Sci.* **12**, 973–986 (2017).
50. Hogarth, R.M., Soyer, E.: Providing information for decision making: Contrasting description and simulation. *J. Appl. Res. Mem. Cogn.* **4**, 221–228 (2015).
51. Humaidi, N., Balakrishnan, V.: Leadership styles and information security compliance behavior: The mediator effect of information security awareness. *Int. J. Inf. Educ. Technol.* **5**(4), 311 (2015).
52. Hursthouse, R.: Normative Virtue Ethics., In Crisp, R. (ed.): How should one live?. Oxford, pp. 19–36 (1996).
53. Hyman, M.R., Tansey, R.: The Ethics of Psychoactive Ads. *J. Bus. Ethics* **9**(2), 105–114 (1990).
54. Johnston, A.C., Warkentin, M.: Fear Appeals and Information Security Behaviors: An Empirical Study. *MIS Q.* **34**(3), 549–566 (2010).
55. Johnston, A.C., Warkentin, M., Siponen, M.: An enhanced fear appeal rhetorical framework: Leveraging threats to the human asset through sanctioning rhetoric. *MIS Q.: Manag. Inf. Syst.* **39**(1), 113–134 (2015).
56. Kahneman, D.: Thinking fast and slow. New York (2011).
57. Kant, I.: 1785. Cambridge University Press, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1998).
58. Kraemer, S., Carayon, P., Clem, J.: Human and organizational factors in computer and information security: pathways to vulnerabilities. *Comput. Secur.* **28**, 509–520 (2009).
59. Leventhal, H.: Findings and theory in the study of fear communications. In L. Berkowitz (ed.). *Advances in experimental social psychology.* **5**. New York, pp. 119–186 (1970).
60. Martin, R.A.: The Psychology of Humor: an integrative approach. Burlington MA (2010).
61. McGuire, W.: Personality and attitude change: an information processing theory. In Greenwald, A.G., Brock, T.C., Ostrom, T.M. (eds.). *Psychol. Found. Attitudes*, pp. 171–196 (1968).
62. Mersinas, K., Sobh, T., Sample, C., Bakdash, J.Z. and Ormrod, D.: Training Data and Rationality. In: Proceedings of the European Conference on the Impact of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (p. 225) (2019).
63. Mersinas, K. Chana, C.D.: Reducing the Cyber-Attack Surface in the maritime sector via individual behaviour change. In: The Seventh International Conference on Cyber-Technologies and Cyber-Systems (2022).
64. Mill, J.S.: Utilitarianism. London (1859).

65. Milne, S., Sheeran, P., Orbell, S.: Prediction and intervention in Health-related behavior: a meta-analytic review of protection motivation theory. *J. Appl. Soc. Psychol.* **30**(1), 106–143 (2000).
66. Münscher, R., Vetter, M., Scheuerle, T.: A review and taxonomy of choice architecture techniques. *J. Behav. Decis. Mak.* **29**(5), 511–524 (2016).
67. Nickerson, C.: Theory of reasoned action. Available at: <https://www.simplypsychology.org/theory-of-reasoned-action.html> (Accessed: 22/12/2022) (2022).
68. Nisbett, R.: *The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently—and why.* London (2004).
69. Nussbaum, M.: *Upheavals of thought: the intelligence of emotions.* Cambridge University Press (2001).
70. Parkinson, J., Haggard, P.: Subliminal priming of intentional inhibition. *Cognition* **130**(2), 255–265 (2014).
71. Pinder, C., Vermeulen, J., Cowan, B.R., Beale, R.: Digital behavior change interventions to break and form habits. *ACM Trans. Comput.-Hum. Interact.*, 25(3), 66 pages (2018).
72. Reid, R., van Niekerk, J.: Decoding audience interpretations of awareness campaign messages. *Inf. Secur.* **24**(2), 177–193 (2016).
73. Renaud, K., Dupuis, M.: Cyber Security fear appeals: unexpectedly complicated. *New Secur. Parad. Work. (NSPW '19)*, September 23–26 (2019).
74. Rogers, R.W.: A protection motivation theory of fear appeals and attitude change. *J. Psychol.* **91**, 93–114 (1975).
75. Rogers, R.W.: Cognitive and psychological processes in fear appeals and attitude change: a revised theory of protection motivation. *Soc. Psychophysiol.: Sourceb. pp.* 153–176 (1983).
76. Ruiters, R.A.C., Kessels, L.T.E., Peters, G.-J., Kok, G.: Sixty years of fear appeal research: current state of the evidence. *Int. J. Psychol.* **49**(2), 63–70 (2014).
77. Saghai, Y.: Salvaging the concept of nudge. *J. Med. Ethics* **38**, 487–493 (2014).
78. Shabel, S.J., Wang, C., Monk, B., Aronson, S., Malinow, R.: Stress transforms lateral habenula reward responses into punishment signals. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.* **116**(25), 12488–12493 (2019).
79. Simon, H.A.: Theories of bounded rationality. In McGuire C.B., Radner, R. (eds.). *Decis. Organ.*, pp. 161–176 (1972).
80. Simon, H.A.: Bounded rationality and organizational learning. *Organ. Sci.* **2**(1), 125–134 (1991).
81. Siponen, M., Iivari, J.: Six design theories for is security policies and guidelines. *J. Assoc. Inf. Syst.* **7**(7), 445–472 (2006).
82. Siponen, M., Vance, A.O.: Neutralization: new insights into the problem of employee systems security policy violations. *MIS Quarterly*, (34: 3), pp. 487–502 (2010).
83. Siponen, M., Mahmood, M.A., Pahlila, S.: Employee's adherence to information security policies: an exploratory field study. *Inf. Manag.* **51**, 217–224 (2014).
84. *Staats*, H., Spielberger, C., *Encyclopedia of applied psychology.* Academic press (2004).
85. Suh, M.M., Hsieh, G.: Designing for future behaviors: understanding the effect of temporal distance on planned behaviors. In *Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, pp. 1084–1096 (2016).
86. Sunstein, C.R.: *Why nudge? The politics of libertarian paternalism.* New Haven CT (2014).
87. Sunstein, C.R.: *The ethics of influence. Government in the age of behavioral Science,* New York (2016).
88. Sutton, S.R.: Fear-arousing communications: A critical examination of theory and research. In J. R. Eiser (ed.). *Social psychology and behavioral medicine.* London, pp. 303–337 (1982).
89. Tannenbaum, M.B., Hepler, J., Zimmerman, R.S., Saul, L., Jacobs, S., Wilson, K., Albarracin, D.: Appealing to fear: A Meta-Analysis of fear appeal effectiveness and theories. *Psychol. Bull.* **141**, 1178–1204 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039729>
90. Tengland, P.A.: Behavior change or empowerment: on the ethics of health-promotion strategies. *Public Health Ethics* **5**(2), 140–153 (2012).

91. Thaler, R.H. Sunstein, C.R.: *Nudge. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness.* Yale (2008).
92. Theocharidou, M., Kokolakis, S., Karyda, M., Kiountouzis, E.: The insider threat to information systems and the effectiveness of ISO17799. *Comput. Secur.* **24**, 472–484 (2005).
93. Thomson, K., van Niekerk, J.: Combating information security apathy by encouraging prosocial organizational behavior. *Inf. Manag. Comput. Secur.* **20**(1), 39–46 (2012).
94. van Bavel, R., Rodríguez-Priego, N., Vila, J., Briggs, P.: Using protection motivation theory in the design of nudges to improve online security behavior. *Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud.* **123**, 29–39 (2019).
95. van den Akker, L., Heres, L., Lasthuizen, K., Six, F.: Ethical leadership and trust: it's all about meeting expectations. *Int. J. Lead. Ship Stud.* **5**(2), 102–122 (2009).
96. Van Staveren, I.: Beyond utilitarianism and deontology: Ethics in economics. *Rev. Polit. Econ.* **19**(1), 21–35 (2007).
97. Waldrop, M.M.: How to hack the hackers: the human side of cybercrime. *Nature*, 533 (7602) (2016).
98. Wallston, K., in Smelser, N.J. and Baltes, P.B. (eds.): *International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences* (Vol. 11). Elsevier, Amsterdam (2001).
99. Webb, T.L., Sheeran, P.: Does changing behavioral intentions engender behavior change? a meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. *Psychol. Bull.* **132**(2), 249–268 (2006).
100. Wegner, D.: *The illusion of conscious will.* London (2002).
101. Weinstein, N. D.: Testing four competing theories of health-protective (1993).
102. behavior. *Health Psychology*, **12**, 324–333.
103. Weirich, D., Sasse, M.A.: *Persuasive Password Security.* CHI, 139–140 (2001).
104. Wilkinson, T.M.: Nudging and manipulation. *Polit. Stud.* **61**, 341–355 (2013).
105. White, M.: *The manipulation of choice: Ethics and libertarian paternalism.* Springer (2013).
106. Witte, K.: Putting the fear back into fear appeals: the extended parallel process model. *Commun. Monogr.* **59**(4), 329–349 (1992).
107. Witte, K., Allen, M.: A meta-analysis of fear appeals: implications for effective public health campaigns. *Health Educ. Behav.* **27**(5), 591–615 (2000).
108. Wood, W., Quinn, J.M., Kashy, D.A.: Habits in everyday life: thought, emotion, and action. *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **83**(6), 1281 (2002).
109. Workman, M., Bommer, W.H., Straub, D.: Security lapses and the omission of information security measures: a threat control model and empirical test. *Comput. Hum. Behav.* **24**, 2799–2816 (2008).
110. Yeung, K.: Nudge as Fudge. *Mod. Law Rev.* **75**(1), 122–148 (2012).

Cybersecurity Training: Improving Platforms Through Usability Studies



Mubashrah Saddiqa , Rasmus Broholm, and Jens Myrup Pedersen 

Abstract The combination of technological advancements and gaps in cyber awareness is behind the increasing problem of cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks are no longer just a concern for businesses and governments; they are also a concern for the public, especially the young, who are true digital natives. In this age of rapid technological advancement and access to various forms of social media and games, it is critical for the youth and private companies to acquire IT skills to protect their digital privacy. As new IT subjects are introduced in Middle School and Secondary Education, teachers will need access to hands-on environments with relevant exercises within the concepts of cybersecurity education (such as web exploitation, forensics, cryptography, binary, etc.) based on students' level of understanding. In this paper, we study how to design a cyber training platform to assist teachers in accessing relevant exercises for cybersecurity education. As a case study, we are testing the Haaukins administrative cybersecurity training platform, along with the connected learning material platform that will guide how to use the cybersecurity training platform along with supporting learning material. The usability of these two platforms has been investigated in a cybersecurity educational environment with high school teachers. The results show that the use cases assist teachers in providing training environments for students by utilizing ready-to-use exercises relevant to cybersecurity subjects and by providing access to learning material covering a wide range of cybersecurity topics aimed at students at a beginner and intermediate level.

Keywords Cybersecurity · Haaukins training platform · User studies · High schools · Teachers

M. Saddiqa (✉) · R. Broholm · J. M. Pedersen
Electronic Systems Department, Aalborg University, Copenhagen Campus, Copenhagen, Denmark

e-mail: mus@es.aau.dk

R. Broholm

e-mail: rbr@es.aau.dk

J. M. Pedersen

e-mail: jens@es.aau.dk

1 Introduction

With the advancement of technology and the expansion of the Internet, people can now experience two paradigms: real life and the virtual world. The virtual world is in the form of social networks, games, and applications. The digital transformation has transformed society with deepening effects on everyday life [1]. However, the advancement and development of digitization makes us more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, raising the demand for cybersecurity knowledge among young students (high school and onwards). The objective of cybersecurity is safeguarding computers, networks, programs, and data against cyber-attacks. With increasing dependence on computer systems and networks, cyber-attacks have become more common, advanced, and destructive in recent years [2]. There is a growing demand for a well-trained cybersecurity team to address holistic cybersecurity problems [3].

With the rise in cyber-attacks, cybersecurity professionals use enhanced cyber infrastructure techniques and platforms such as big data, machine learning, and cloud computing to analyze cyber risks, detect threats, and optimize protection. However, the gap between students' understanding of cyber-attacks and cybersecurity skills is widening due to a lack of training programs in their curricula [4]. Over the last decade, the demand for experts in the field of cybersecurity has steadily increased, exceeding the pool of qualified professionals [5].

Cybersecurity education is becoming increasingly important for the development of proficient cybersecurity experts and an engaged public, and there is a growing demand for cybersecurity education among young people who have an elevated level of general and expert knowledge. High school education plays a critical role in addressing this shortage by increasing awareness and interest in cybersecurity as well as providing students with the fundamental knowledge required to pursue cybersecurity career paths [1]. For example, CTF (Capture the Flag) competitions, in which students complete a variety of tasks ranging from basic programming exercises to hacking a server to steal data (usually to find a specific piece of text, that is hidden on the server or behind a webpage, that will trigger a point reward mechanism), can pique students' interest in the subject [6]. A US national survey involving over 900 K-12 educators revealed that most of them have limited knowledge of cybersecurity education [7]. The survey assessed participants' understanding of cybersecurity, which encompasses knowledge of digital device interactions, vulnerability protection, and ethical considerations. In response to the growing demand for cybersecurity, several higher education institutions worldwide have started to develop cybersecurity curricula, whereas others have implemented cybersecurity into their existing teaching curricula [8].

However, these courses mainly place a greater emphasis on theoretical teaching and offer fewer opportunities for students to practice their skills [9]. Since practical exercises are an important part of such curricula, several instructional platforms have been developed in recent years [8, 10, 11] to help teachers and students acquire skills in the field of cybersecurity. The Haaukins CTF platform [10] is an educational cyber training platform for high school students which was further upgraded to target

students at higher education levels [8]. The platform provides a fully automated setup of secure and closed environments, where students can solve a wide range of exercises related to hacking and insecure systems—while gaining points to support a gamified experience.

Nonetheless, there are challenges in ensuring that students have opportunities to experience real-world modern technology, tools, and techniques while making sure to comply with budget and physical space limitations [9, 12]. Furthermore, many existing platforms are mostly run by technical experts or developers, and teachers are less flexible when it comes to creating a practical environment that meets their needs and requirements [8, 13]. As a result, it becomes critical to provide teachers with cyber training platforms that allow them to create relevant creative exercises and enable them to assign exercises to multiple students with ease. At the same time, it is essential to provide teachers and students with cybersecurity education learning materials that make it simple for teachers to learn how to use cyber training platforms, i.e., how to access, create, and deploy relevant exercises for students without the help of developer/technical experts of the training platforms. To understand how to design such platforms, we will investigate the following research questions in this paper:

RQ1. *How to design a cyber training platform to facilitate teachers to easily create a hands-on environment/event for practicing cybersecurity by selecting cybersecurity exercises for students relevant to their subject without the assistance of technical professionals or the developers of the cyber training platform?*

RQ2. *How to design a learning material platform to assist both teachers and students in relation to cyber education and supporting the use of a cyber training platform?*


To answer the research questions, we evaluated the design of a cyber training platform as a use case (developed by a team of developers of Aalborg University), that has an interface targeted toward students and teachers, as well as another platform with an interface and content directed toward educators of cybersecurity.

The study's main goal is to test the usability of the cyber training platform that makes it easier for teachers to provide practical exercises for students, in the form of CTF games, so they can better understand cybersecurity topics. To enhance the overall education process, the platform allows teachers to select tasks/exercises with complexity levels ranging from easy to difficult and includes various cybersecurity topics such as cryptography, online exploitation, forensics et al. In this research paper, we conducted usability tests on the below-mentioned platforms with high school teachers as participants to better understand the design for cyber training platforms and obtained their perspectives on integrating these platforms into cybersecurity education curricula. The two platforms are as follows:

1. **Haaukins Administrative Platform for Teachers**
2. **Cyber Training Learning Material Platform**

The Haaukins CTF platform [8] is an accessible and automated virtualization platform for security education and empowers both teachers and students with little technical knowledge of cybersecurity. To assist teachers in providing the best learning

Fig. 1 Overview of cyber training platforms



environment for cybersecurity education, an evolved version of the Haaukins Administrative Platform for Teachers has been developed, allowing teachers and professionals to create and monitor various cyber training events on Haaukins CTF platform for students whenever needed. The Haaukins Administrative Platform for Teachers is open source and can be accessed from the link <https://admin.ntp-event.dk:8003/login>. Users require sign up keys to register on the platform.

In addition, to familiarize both teachers and students with the functionality of the Haaukins CTF platform, a supporting Cyber Training Learning Material Platform (<https://www.cybertraining.dk/haaukins/>) has also been developed that facilitates teachers and students through self-paced cybersecurity learning materials and guide the use of the Haaukins CTF and Haaukins Administrative platforms.

An overview of Haaukins CTF, Haaukins Administrative, and Cyber Training Learning Material Platforms is shown in Fig. 1. In this study, we will investigate the usability of Haaukins Administrative Platform for Teachers and Cyber Training Learning Material Platforms. The two platforms can also facilitate other subjects within Information Technology but are more appealing to cybersecurity education because of CTF features which provide a practical experience to the students to understand several types of cyber-attacks.

In the rest of the paper, we will use Haaukins-APT to refer to the Haaukins Administrative Platform for teachers and CTLM to refer to the Cyber Training Learning Material Platform. The document is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the background of the research work, Sect. 3 presents the research methodology and test setups, Sect. 4 presents the usability results of the use cases, and Sect. 5 presents the implications of the results. Section 6 discusses the limitations of the study, while Sect. 7 concludes the paper.

2 Background

Ethical hacking, security auditing, digital forensics, network security, cryptography, malware analysis, and secure-software development, are common topics in cybersecurity education. To support this, teachers can create real-world exercises by applying theoretical knowledge and gaining access to industry challenges for hands-on learning activities [14]. With the lack of technical expertise and resources,

however, creating exercises is a time-consuming and arduous task. Since practical training is part of cybersecurity education, cloud-based virtualization approaches to cybersecurity education are becoming more popular, and research has shown that this type of training benefits students' learning [13]. Such cloud-based virtualization platforms offer game-based cyber training exercises to students to test their cyber skills in real-world scenarios. However, in our experience, most teachers lack the technical skills and time required for designing security and risk-based challenges that are relevant to their chosen security subject while matching the students' level of understanding. Consequently, there is a need to design cyber training platforms where the teachers can easily identify and select challenges that meet teaching requirements.

To address these challenges, the Haaukins-APT platform was designed for teachers to help them provide the best training experiences for their students through game-based challenges. The CTML platform, on the other hand, provides relevant learning materials for the Haaukins CTF platform and cybersecurity education. We will investigate how the Haaukins-APT and CTML platforms can support teachers in the best way possible without the need for technical expertise, how to utilize Haaukins-APT, and how the learning materials available on the CTML platform help teachers and students understand how to use cyber training platforms. The two platforms are briefly described in the following sections.

2.1 Haaukins-APT (Haaukins Administrative Platform for Teachers)

The Haaukins CTF platform [10] was created to make cybersecurity training easily accessible for Danish students. It works by creating virtual labs, which contain virtual machines representing computers or devices with various vulnerabilities. By accessing these labs, students get the chance to work with vulnerable machines/devices in a closed and secure environment. On top of this is a layer of gamification through challenges that must be solved in the virtual labs, and the teacher can customize the labs for a class by choosing which machines/challenges to include.

The platform is event-based, where an event can be a class or another type of training session. When a Haaukins cyber training platform is set up for an event, students are provided with several exercises/challenges that can be solved to gain points—and everyone in the event can see a scoreboard showing total points and who solved which exercise. It can be used for both teams and individuals and once an event is created, students simply register themselves (or their teams) to gain access to the challenges. This is similar to other “Capture the Flag” platforms. What makes this platform stand out, is that it provides each student/team access to a virtual lab, which is a collection of connected virtual machines that are used in the exercises. These are automatically created upon sign up and provide an easy and secure way access to a setup that provides a realistic “hacker experience” but would be very time-consuming to create in an ad-hoc manner. The platform has been used by several

high schools receiving consistent positive feedback over the last few years, and to support higher education it has been revised and improved [8].

While the previous version provided an all-browser experience focused on ease of use, the most recent version for example includes an optional VPN (Virtual Private Network) feature, allowing students to use their own virtual machines and tools. Teachers can also access pre-defined profiles, i.e., sets of challenges often used together, for example, relevant for a typical introductory class in high schools and fitting those learning objectives. It not only saves time, but also serves as inspiration. Finally, the platform has been made more scalable to handle more students and longer concurrent events.

The Haaukins-APT supports the teachers' administrative role and enables educators without technical knowledge of the training platform to set up events as described above. Teachers should first sign up using the credentials provided by the Haaukins-APT administrator. The teacher can name the events, and specify the event's end date and capacity of the event (number of students). The teacher can also select challenges from pre-defined profiles or topics with complexity levels ranging from very easy to extremely difficult. An overview of the Haaukins-APT, showcasing a list of current events, is shown in Fig. 2. Once a teacher has created an event, the virtual labs are automatically created along with an event website representing the challenges to the students. The teacher chooses the subdomain address, where students can sign up for that event.

However, to better understand teachers and professional users of the Haaukins-APT, we will test the usability and user-friendliness of the Haaukins-APT to investigate the user experience and the requirements for improvements.

Event Tag	Name	# Team	# Exercises	Availability	Capacity	Status	Action	Stop	Secret Key	Created By	Created
mastervpn	mastervpn	2	10	2	20	RUNNING	Suspend	Stop	therealjens	18/1	
master	Master	0	10	1	25	RUNNING	Suspend	Stop	therealjens	18/1	
dockergang	dockergang	1	1	1	2	RUNNING	Suspend	Stop	krausertje	19/1	

Memory 3.52% ● CPU 0.20% ●

Powered by Haaukins

Fig. 2 Overview of Haaukins-APT platform. This view shows the current events and their properties

2.2 *Cyber Training Learning Material Platform (CTLM)*

The Cyber Training Learning Material Platform (CTML) (<https://www.cybertraining.dk/haaukins/>) has learning material for self-paced learners to gain knowledge of the different subjects within cybersecurity, to solve the challenges of the Haaukins cyber training platform. The learning material is also targeted toward teachers who would like to know more about cybersecurity subjects and Kali Linux, in pursuance of utilizing the platform in their teaching. The learning material consists of a course with a walkthrough of the Haaukins-APT (Administrative Platform for Teachers) where the user is introduced to the platform, what it is about, how to create an event (from a teacher), which challenges to choose from, and how to start teaching students in cybersecurity. The course overview is given below.

1. Introduction

The first chapter of the course introduces the Haaukins-APT (Administrative Platform for Teachers), how teachers can use the administrative platform to create events, and how students can register to participate in the challenges event. The first chapter is divided into three sub-chapters:

- (a) What is an Haaukins CTF platform?
- (b) How to create an event?
- (c) How to register as a student?

The course is in Danish and includes details and walkthrough videos that explain and demonstrate various steps for creating a relevant event for students. The course covers forensics, web exploitation, cryptography, binary, and other cybersecurity topics. The course also explains the learning objectives associated with a variety of challenges ranging from very simple to difficult. The challenges and descriptions, on the other hand, are available in English.

2. Challenges overview

The second chapter provides a walkthrough of how to solve some specific CTF challenges. The challenges chosen are from various themes, including Linux walkthrough (Starters Challenges), network scanning and Sniffing (Forensics), convincing visitation of URL, impersonating colleagues, and abusing credentials (Web Exploitation). The course includes introductory information as well as text and screenshots about the topics, challenges, associated learning objectives, and walkthrough videos (length from 4 to 18 min) explaining different steps to solve the challenges.

3. About the material

The final chapter of the course provides details about how the learning material was created. The material was developed with the support of Denmark's central and northern educational authorities.

3 Research Methodology

To test the usability of the Haaukins-APT with high school teachers, a variety of settings and methods can be used, such as controlled settings and natural settings, as described in [15]. In controlled settings, users perform tasks in a controlled environment and researchers observe certain behaviors related to the research questions. Usability tests and experiments are the main methods used for this setting. However, in a natural setting, there is little or no control over users' activities, making it possible to evaluate how a digital platform is used in the real world.

For our evaluation of the Haaukins-APT and associated learning materials, we chose controlled settings that directly involve users. We used both qualitative and quantitative research techniques, such as one-on-one interviews, usability tests, workshops, and online surveys, to gather participant responses and investigate our research questions. The two main research questions were subdivided into further sub-questions and investigated in two parts, with focused research areas:

Research Investigation 1: Focused on examining the usability of the Haaukins-APT as a use case. To better understand research question 1 (RQ1), we split it into further sub-questions as follows:

- (1) What are the teachers' perspectives on utilizing the Haaukins-APT concerning cybersecurity teaching activities?
- (2) What are the major or minor issues that will hinder the usability of the Haaukins-APT?
- (3) What are teachers' views on the content of the challenges concerning cybersecurity education?

Research Investigation 2: Focused on the usability of the learning materials associated with the cyber training platform (using the CTML platform as a use case). Research Question 2 (RQ2) was further divided into sub-questions to provide additional clarity. The sub-questions are defined as follows:

- (1) What are the teachers' perspectives of the current learning material on the CTML platform?
- (2) How useful are the learning material and the guide for the Haaukins-APT?
- (3) Improvement suggestions for the learning material available at the CTML platform to best meet teachers' requirements?

3.1 Test Setups

The various methods used to investigate the research questions, i.e., testing the usability of the Haaukins-APT and the learning materials available on cyber training platforms for teachers and professionals are described below.

1. **In-Person Usability Test:** The usability test is used to gain knowledge about the user experience [16]. We use in-person testing methods to evaluate the usability of the Haaukins-APT platform and learning materials on the CTLM platform.
2. **One-on-One Interviews:** The interviews aimed to gather direct user feedback on the Haaukins-APT and its associated learning materials. The primary objective was to investigate participants’ overall perceptions of using Haaukins-APT for teaching, including administrative roles, content relevance, and the usefulness of the learning materials.
3. **Workshops:** Workshops are widely used as a qualitative research approach, where researchers can work with participants to gather a rich collection of data about participants’ views on an innovation [17]. We use this method to inform teachers about the CTF platform and how to use it in real scenarios.
4. **Online Surveys:** We also use the online survey method as it can help to poll individual customers as well as industry clients, and to collect concrete feedback from users about specific products [18].

3.2 Participants

According to previous research [19], four or five participants can reveal approximately 80% of the usability problems in most web interfaces. We recruited 4–5 participants for each test to assess the usability of the Haaukins-APT and the CTLM platforms. The participants of the data gathering process were all teaching the subject of Informatics at HHX (Higher Commercial Examination Program), which is equivalent to higher school education with a focus on commerce. They had varying levels of IT skills, with some having prior experience using CTF platforms and others being beginners. The interviews were conducted in both Danish and English and were recorded with the participant’s consent. Participants were recruited using a simple random sampling method, and those who were willing to volunteer. Participant details are presented in Table 1.

Invitations were sent to potential test participants for both the Haaukins-APT and CTLM platforms. Upon acceptance, detailed instructions were provided through calendar invitations. In some test setups, the same participants who tested the Haaukins-APT also provided feedback on the learning materials available on the

Table 1 Data collection setup and participants

Test setup	Participants	Location	Duration (min)
Usability test	5	Aalborg, Viborg	30–45
One-on-one interviews	9	Aalborg, Aarhus, Viborg	20–30
Workshop	2	Aarhus	30–60
Online survey	11	Aalborg, Aarhus, Viborg, Odense, Horsens	5–10

CTLM platform. The procedural details are given in Table 2. A brief description of various tasks performed during the usability test is given in Table 3.

Table 2 Procedural details for test setup in research investigations 1 and 2

Test setup	Procedure
Usability test	Research investigation 1: Three physical tests and two online tests are being conducted based on participant availability. In both cases, participants' screens are recorded while they perform various tasks. Before the in-person usability test, participants receive a brief introduction to the Haaukins-APT, including guidance on using administrative features for teachers. They are then provided with a sign-up key to register and log in to the Haaukins-APT. Participants begin by testing various features of the Haaukins-APT before proceeding to different tasks to assess platform usability. Table 3 provides a brief description of the tasks performed during the usability test
One-on-one interviews	Research investigation 1: Participants participated in in-person usability tests in which they performed several tasks using the Haaukins-APT. Afterward, a short interview was conducted to investigate the participants' general perspective about the Haaukins-APT's cybersecurity education capabilities. Teachers provide their feedback on the content, tasks/exercises, and the overall design of the Haaukins-APT Research investigation 2: Participants engaged in individual interviews to examine distinct features of the CTLM platform. The interviews were conducted in Danish, with participants' consent for recording. The duration of the interviews ranged from 20 to 30 min, contingent upon participants' familiarity with the Haaukins cyber training platform and associated materials. Teachers provided feedback about the relevance of the learning material content, the identification of issues, and an evaluation of the overall design of the CTML platform
Workshop	Research investigation 2: The workshops aimed to test the revised format of learning materials with Informatics teachers. The revised format included shorter videos demonstrating challenges on the Haaukins CTF platform, an introduction to Kali Linux, an overview of the Haaukins-APT platform, and a guide for operating the virtual machine and troubleshooting errors. During the workshop, participants evaluated the current learning materials on the CTLM platform. Subsequently, they were presented with the new materials, comprising shorter videos, online content, and printed versions, to determine if the revised format constituted an improvement
Online survey	Research investigation 2: A survey was created to gather more data about the teachers' opinions of the learning materials available on the CTML platform https://www.cybertraining.dk/haaukins/ . The survey is designed to shed light on the usability of the material and to figure out the focus points when initiating the improvement phase. Another goal of the survey is to discover which subjects the teachers prioritize, to guide new material development

Table 3 Task descriptions for the Haaukins-APT usability test

Task No.	Brief description
Task 1	Create a No VPN event
Task 2	Create a VPN only event
Task 3	Create an event with easy challenges
Task 4	Create an event using a profile
Task 5	Create an event with the hardest challenge within the subject Binary
Task 6	List all the ‘very easy’ challenges for the cryptography category
Task 8	Identify which challenges belong to a specific profile

4 Usability Results of Use Cases

In this section, we will discuss the key findings corresponding to the two main research questions. The findings demonstrate how the Haaukins-APT can assist teachers and young professionals in achieving their learning goals, as well as how the cyber training platform CTML can aid in understanding the Haaukins-APT and facilitate cyber education. The main themes that emerged from the findings are discussed in-depth in the following sub-sections.

Overall, the participants did not experience major usability issues with the Haaukins-APT. All participants were able to navigate and use both platforms and to solve all tasks with zero or minimal help from the observer. The two major themes and corresponding sub-themes are discussed below.

4.1 Usability of the Haaukins-APT

We have categorized the results under this major theme into four sub-themes that will accomplish research question 1. Overall, the results indicate that the Haaukins-APT benefits teachers and cybersecurity professionals in their teaching activities as well as in organizing independent Haaukins cyber training events for students. According to the feedback from teachers, the contents of the Haaukins-APT are relevant to informatics subjects and provide students with valuable practical experience. The feedback of one of the participants was:

The Haaukins-APT is relevant to what we teach students as part of the cybersecurity subject, and the administrative role allows us to create practical tasks for students based on their level and knowledge. (Teacher 1, 17-01-2022)

Teachers’ Perspective About the Haaukins-APT. The findings of the study revealed that there are perceived opportunities associated with the use of the Haaukins-APT in teaching activities. Some teachers have previous experience with general CTF platforms, which piques both students’ interests and provides a platform for them to practice their knowledge. Teachers will have more flexibility in

selecting challenges based on students' levels and subjects with the administrative role. However, the usability tests reveal some minor and major issues that must be addressed to provide the best experience for teachers and professionals. All five participants during one-on-one interviews acknowledge that the Haaukins-APT not only saves time for teachers in finding relevant exercises and challenges for the students, but it also provides access to labs according to students' curricula and level of understanding, with challenges ranging from easy to hard. One of the participants said:

Haaukins-APT is an excellent training platform for cybersecurity education. With access to an administrative role, it becomes even more convenient because I can easily create a practical environment for students relevant to a topic using ready-to-go challenges whenever I want without spending time designing relevant exercises and challenges. (Teacher 2, 21-12-2021)

Usability and User-Friendliness Issues for the Haaukins-APT. This theme focuses on specific usability issues discovered during the usability tests of the Haaukins-APT platform. Our aim is to provide a list of issues for designers and developers to improve the platform's utility and ease of use for teachers. Participants tested various features of the Haaukins-APT through different tasks and experienced some issues while solving them. We discuss these issues in detail below.

Issues with labels: While creating an event on the Haaukins-APT, users reported issues. Some labels required a more detailed description or a new name. Participants, for example, are perplexed by the terms "event capacity" and "event availability."

Proposal: Participants suggest having more detailed descriptions or labels on buttons. Figure 3 shows corresponding suggestions for different issues while creating an event.

Issues with dates: There are issues with the start and end dates. For example, if a user entered an incorrect date, the participant is still allowed to proceed, and the issue is only indicated at a later step when the user creates the event.

Proposal: This issue could be solved by not allowing users to proceed to the next step before the date and time entries have been validated. Also, if a user selects an incorrect date or time, the color should be changed to red to alert the user that they need to correct the date input.

Issues with selecting challenges from profile: Users identified another problem when choosing a challenge profile. This feature allows users to select a profile with a pre-defined set of challenges. The user can add or delete challenges from the profile when creating an event. Challenges in the profile are listed alongside the other available challenges. Users indicate that insufficient information is presented regarding the difficulty level of the available challenges, making it difficult to select appropriate challenges to include in the profile.

Proposal: Users suggest categorizing challenges in the profile based on difficulty level, as described on other Haaukins-APT pages, by using different colors for easy, hard, and very hard. A more detailed description of the challenges that are not in the profile, but can be added, could also aid the user in selecting additional appropriate




Fig. 3 Proposal addressing issues on event creation page of Haaukins-APT

challenges. Users are unsure whether the current form is just listing the challenges for the profile or if it can be modified. Both lists of available challenges and those included in the profile should be consistently categorized by difficulty level using color codes. Figure 4 shows the issues on the profile page along with the proposed solutions.

Issue while selecting frontends: Users also have difficulties selecting a frontend from the available options. Three of five users are unfamiliar with these frontends; however, if a brief description of each frontend is provided, they can easily select a relevant frontend for their event.

Proposal: Users suggest including a brief description when a user clicks or hovers the mouse over a frontend.

Any web platform needs to be both user-friendly and visually appealing. When using the Haaukins-APT, the goal is to provide users with a clear and easy-to-follow structure. The Haaukins-APT can be accessed by users from a variety of internet-capable devices. In general, users are comfortable with the Haaukins-APT design, text, color, and layout. However, users also report a lack of user-friendliness features in some cases. For example, beginner Haaukins-APT users may not understand how to create an event and add challenges. One of the participants described his experience of using the Haaukins-APT as:

I believe that the interface is very useful for cyber training education, but it lacks user-friendly functions for a first-time user, and more details and descriptions about how to use




Fig. 4 Suggestion corresponding to challenges' profile page of the Haaukins-APT

the various useful features of this platform are needed. For example, when I create an event using a pre-defined profile, I do not know which challenges are easy and which are difficult unless I navigate to the challenges list on another page. Furthermore, I'm not sure which frontends to use while creating an event. (Teacher 3, 28-02-2022)

First-time users accessing the Haaukins-APT require guidance to navigate the platform effectively. Specific areas where guidance is needed include event creation, VPN usage, and profile selection. User feedback suggests the inclusion of a short introductory video upon login, providing an overview of the Haaukins-APT and its various features. Additionally, users recommend a quick tour video on the event creation page to assist with navigating available options. A proposed solution addressing these user suggestions is depicted in Fig. 5.

Content Quality and Performance of the Haaukins-APT. Through one-on-one interviews, users provide valuable insights into the performance and content of the Haaukins-APT in the context of cybersecurity education training. Feedback indicates that the platform's content aligns with its cybersecurity curricula, and students benefit from the practical cyber training experience offered by the Haaukins-APT challenges. However, teachers recommend the inclusion of steps or hints specifically for their use in solving the challenges. One of the participants said:

When students are engaged in solving challenges available on Haaukins cyber training platform and are confronted with one of the difficult/tricky challenges, and the teacher or organizer (especially if the teacher is new to Haaukins cyber training platform) is also unable




Fig. 5 Suggestions for improving usability of the Haaukins-APT

to assist them, motivation and overall learning environment suffer, and student attention is diverted. However, if hints or step-by-step solutions are included on the Haaukins-APT version, the teacher can easily guide the students through the tough challenges. (Teacher 4, 17-12-2021)

The Haaukins-APT's overall performance was viewed as satisfactory according to users' feedback, including response time, wait time, load time, CPU utilization, and memory utilization.

4.2 Usability of the CTLM Platform's Learning Materials

The feedback highlighted a fundamental issue that teachers face when using the platform in a class setting. Teachers want to use the platform as an introduction to the subject, giving the students actual hands-on experience with real-life challenges to inspire them to pursue further studies in the field. Given that a teacher is likely to be working with students of various skill and interest levels, enough guidance must be available for the teacher to assist all students with completing the task based on individual ability.

Teachers’ Perspective on the Usability of the Current CTLM Platform. The data collected from the survey indicates that the currently available learning materials of CTLM are considered useful to the teachers. All the participants agree that the language of the material is easy to understand, therefore when designing new material, it should match the current level of difficulty. Furthermore, Fig. 6 indicates that the overall title, introduction, and description are considered quite easy to understand by the teachers. This provides a positive foundation for further development of the CTLM. Figure 7 shows that most respondents stated that the length of the educational videos is very long.

Figure 8 shows the teachers’ opinions on the usefulness of the available learning materials on the CTML platform. This demonstrates that it is considered a useful feature by most of the respondents, but it would gain a considerable increase in rating by being shortened and more focused. The interviews with the teachers uncovered similar points to the interview responses. Regarding the learning material, a teacher stated:

You have to point out that there are some things that need to be explained before you get started. (Teacher 5, 17-10-2021)




Fig. 6 Participants’ response to the title, introduction, and description of the course on the CTML platform ($N = 11$)




Fig. 7 Participants responses about the length of videos on CTML platform ($N = 11$)




Fig. 8 Participants response about the use of CTML platform ($N = 11$)

The teacher is referring to the various terms in IT and cybersecurity that the students are familiar with before being introduced to the material. This is accomplished by supplying the teacher with a list of terms and brief descriptions that can be presented before or during the lecture. Another teacher states:

There must be solutions to all challenges, it is really useful for the teachers and preferably an overview of Linux commands. (Teacher 6, 23-10-2021)

In addition to providing a comprehensive terminology list, it would be beneficial to create an overview of the required Linux commands, relevant to the Haaukins CTF platform-based challenges. Another key point raised by the teachers is to provide solutions to the challenges to assist their students without spending extra time. Another teacher’s statement emphasizes this:

It’s a good idea to provide material that demonstrates how to solve various challenges so that you, as a teacher, can focus on teaching rather than on the platform – simply using Kali will be a big challenge and a potential show-stopper for some teachers. (Teacher 7, 23-09-2021)

Using the Haaukins-APT platform and related learning materials, the teacher emphasizes the importance of providing educators with a clear solution to each challenge, so they do not lose interest or confidence in their teaching. If a teacher spends extra time solving the challenges on their own in Kali Linux, they may prefer other learning platforms, where they do not need to solve the challenges or can easily solve them.

I would like a more detailed description of what you can do with the platform. (Teacher 8, 15-11-2021)

The teacher emphasizes the importance of creating an introduction for educators, describing how the platform helps them teach cybersecurity and how the Haaukins CTF platform can be used to provide students with hands-on experiences working in the field. Regarding creating events using the Haaukins-APT a teacher said

There is no email address for the person to whom a teacher must write to be added to the system as a user. (Teacher 8, 15-11-2021)

This is essential, as teachers need to have a Haaukins-APT platform login to create events with varying challenges for their students. User studies indicate that the teacher must feel confident in presenting the material and guiding students of different skill levels through the challenge-solving process. Considering the subject's novelty, teachers can't be expected to have extensive experience teaching it, so the provided guidance must be detailed enough to empower them to confidently assist their students.

Hypothesis Focused on the Usability of the Cyber Training Learning Material (CTLM) Platform. The ensuing hypothesis was conceived based on one-on-one interviews and survey feedback:

1. Enhancing the learning materials by enabling teachers to download the content as PDF files and print them would be beneficial, given that this is their preferred method of accessing the material.
2. Shortening the videos would facilitate a better comprehension of the content by teachers.

To validate these hypotheses, PDF descriptions of selected challenges were provided to two target audience members. Both found this to be an invaluable resource, assisting them in assessing the suitability of the challenges and supporting their students during these challenges. Additionally, revised descriptive videos were created for the same challenges, detailing the solutions step-by-step without delving into the underlying theory or the learning platform's mechanics. This was perceived as immensely useful by the users, who saw step-by-step solutions for teachers as a critical tool for building confidence when aiding their students in task completion.

Testing New Materials in Feedback Workshops. Participants provided extensive feedback on the structure of the introductory materials available to teachers. They expressed that an 18-min video was overwhelming and preferred a more concise approach. On-site workshops were conducted with a group of target high school computer science teachers, forming the basis for subsequent analyses. Mock-ups based on the original analysis and hypothesis were then presented to the same group of teachers, resulting in significant improvements in the perceived usability of the learning material platform for this audience. Key recommendations include:

1. Introduce the platform's capabilities and explain how it can be used in the classroom to support learning objectives. Predefined profiles should be presented, allowing teachers to choose the one that aligns with students' learning goals and skill level. A brief explanation of the covered technologies should accompany the profiles.
2. Provide detailed step-by-step solutions to the challenges to assist teachers in supporting their students. Additionally, offer guidance and hints at each step to aid students in solving the challenges. The guidance material should enable teachers to support their students without requiring in-depth technical knowledge of the challenges.

5 Implication for Cybersecurity Training Platforms

The rapid expansion of the cybersecurity industry has led to a global shortage of cybersecurity professionals. However, the lack of efficient and accessible real-world hands-on training platforms has created significant challenges for both students and teachers in cybersecurity education. In response to this challenge, it is essential to provide teachers with easy-to-use and accessible training platforms to provide a practical real-world emulating environment for cybersecurity education.

The study results reveal that cyber training platforms, such as Haaukins-APT and CTML, can be beneficial for teachers in providing ready-to-go challenges for their students. However, the current versions of these platforms require modifications before they can fully achieve their potential as learning tools. The study emphasizes the importance of having a learning material platform that supports both teachers and students in their cybersecurity education. To answer the first research question, the study recommends that the design of a cyber training platform should prioritize ease of use for teachers, enabling them to easily select relevant cybersecurity exercises for their students without technical assistance from developers. A user-friendly interface and ready-to-go challenges that are easily accessible would help achieve this. Additionally, the platform should be modular, allowing for customization and flexibility in terms of the content and level of difficulty of the exercises.

Regarding the second question, the study suggests designing a learning material platform that supports both teachers and students by including cybersecurity topics relevant to both parties, presented in a clear and accessible format. The platform should also offer support for teachers, such as training modules, lesson plans, and other resources to facilitate classroom teaching. For students, the platform should provide interactive and engaging content, such as gamification and simulations, to enhance their learning experience. The platform should aim to create a connected learning environment, where both teachers and students can easily collaborate and share resources.

The study findings suggest that a well-designed cyber training platform and learning material platform can greatly facilitate the teaching and learning of cybersecurity, even for those without technical expertise. The results highlight the importance of providing teachers with easy-to-use and accessible training platforms to provide a practical real-world emulating environment for cybersecurity education. As the cybersecurity industry continues to expand, and the global shortage of cybersecurity professionals persists, the need for such platforms has become even more critical.

6 Discussion and Limitation

This study demonstrates that cyber training platforms like Haaukins-APT and CTML can facilitate hands-on cybersecurity training for students, irrespective of their technical expertise. These user-friendly and flexible platforms allow more teachers to

incorporate cybersecurity education into their subjects, thereby increasing student participation. The platforms offer customization of cybersecurity exercises based on students' needs and knowledge levels. The learning material platform incorporates interactive and engaging content, such as gamification and simulations, to enhance the learning experience.

However, certain limitations should be acknowledged. The study had a small sample size limited to Danish teachers, making it unclear if the platforms would be equally effective for educators from other countries or cultures. Some features may need adaptation for different educational systems or curricula. While Haaukins-APT and CTML are available in English, certain CTML platform walkthrough courses are in Danish, specifically targeting a Danish audience. Moreover, the study primarily focused on platform usability and did not assess their impact on improving students' cybersecurity skills. Future research should evaluate the platforms' effectiveness and compare them with other available cyber training platforms.

Lastly, although this study identified some usability issues, a larger sample size or more extensive testing could uncover additional concerns. Continuous evaluation and refinement of the platforms will be necessary to ensure their ongoing usability and effectiveness.

7 Conclusion

As digitization advances, the need for cybersecurity education grows due to the increasing prevalence of cyberthreats. Ongoing initiatives aim to raise awareness and support teachers in this field. To facilitate cybersecurity education, it is crucial to provide educators with training and learning platforms.

This research study focuses on the usability of two cyber training platforms, Haaukins-APT and CTML, in the classroom. It aims to design platforms that assist teachers in cybersecurity education and highlights the importance of a connected learning environment for collaboration and resource-sharing. The study emphasizes the necessity of training and learning material platforms to support teachers and students in cybersecurity education.

The study findings suggest that a user-friendly cyber training platform is essential for teachers, allowing them to easily select relevant exercises without technical assistance. The platform should be modular, customizable, and adaptable in terms of content and difficulty level. Clear and accessible presentation of cybersecurity topics is crucial for both teachers and students. Additionally, the platform should provide support for teachers, such as training modules and lesson plans, and engage students with interactive and captivating content to enhance their learning experience.

8 Future Work

In future research, we intend to investigate the effectiveness of cyber training platforms in enhancing students' cybersecurity skills. Additionally, we plan to expand the scope of the current study to include other cybersecurity learning platforms and conduct a more comprehensive evaluation. This would involve larger sample sizes and participants from neighboring countries, allowing for a broader assessment of the platforms' efficacy.

References

1. Rahman, N.A., Sairi, I.H., Zizi, N.A.M., Khalid, F.: The importance of cybersecurity education in school. *Int. J. Inf. Educ. Technol.* **10**, 378–382 (2020)
2. Center for Cyber Security. The Cyber Threat Against Denmark 2020. <https://www.cfcs.dk/en/cybertruslen/reports/the-anatomy-of-targeted-ransomware-attacks/>. Last accessed 05 April 2023
3. Jin, G., Tu, M., Kim, T.H., Heffron, J., White, J.: Game based cybersecurity training for high school students. In: Proceedings of the 49th ACM Technical Symposium on Computer Science Education, SIGCSE '18, pp. 68–73. Association for Computing Machinery, New York (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1145/3159450.3159591>
4. Purwanto, W., Wu, H., Sosonkina, M., Arcaute, K.: Deapsecure: Empowering Students for Data- and Compute-Intensive Research in Cybersecurity Through Training. PEARC '19. Association for Computing Machinery, New York (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1145/3332186.3332247>
5. Banerjee, S., Mazur, N.: Cybersecurity virtual summer workshop for secondary school teachers: an experience report. Faculty poster. *J. Comput. Sci. Coll.* **36**(8), 101–103 (2021)
6. Hanafi, H.A., Rokman, H., Ibrahim, A.D., Ibrahim, Z.A., Zawawi, M.N.A., Rahim, F.A.: A CTF-based approach in cybersecurity education for secondary school students. *Electron. J. Comput. Sci. Inf. Technol.* **7**(1) (2021). <https://doi.org/10.52650/ejcsit.v7i1.107>
7. The EdWeek Research Center. The State of Cybersecurity Education in k-12 Schools. <https://cyber.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/The%20State%20of%20Cybersecurity%20Education%20in%20K-12%20Schools.pdf>. Last accessed 04 April 2023
8. Mennecozzi, G.M., et al.: Bridging the gap: adapting a security education platform to a new audience. In: 2021 IEEE Global Engineering Education Conference (EDUCON), pp. 153–159. IEEE (2021). <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9453985>
9. Arora, A., & Mendhekar, A.: Innovative techniques for student engagement in cybersecurity education. In: Pattnaik, S.S., Mishra, A.R., Das, B. (eds.) *Data Management, Analytics and Innovation: Proceedings of ICDMAI 2020*, vol. 1, pp. 395–406. Springer Singapore (2021)
10. Panum, T.K., et al.: Haaukins: a highly accessible and automated virtualization platform for security education. In: 2019 IEEE 19th International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies (ICALT), pp. 236–238. IEEE (2019). <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8820918>
11. Tobarra, L., Trapero, A.P., Pastor, R., Robles-Gómez, A., Hernández, R., Duque, A., Cano, J.: Game-based learning approach to cybersecurity. In: IEEE Global Engineering Education Conference (EDUCON), pp. 1125–1132 (2020)
12. Beason, R.E., Phelan, M., Devine, S., Aiken, M., Orban, J.: Evaluation of Hands-on Cybersecurity Skills Development. Technical Report, Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (2021). <https://doi.org/10.2172/1825671>

13. Vykopal, J., Čeleda, P., Seda, P., Švábenský, V., Tovarňák, D.: Scalable learning environments for teaching cybersecurity hands-on. In: IEEE Frontiers in Education Conference (FIE), pp. 1–9 (2021). <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9637180>
14. Topham, L., Kifayat, K., Younis, Y.A., Shi, Q., Askwith, B.: Cyber security teaching and learning laboratories: a survey. *Inf. Secur.* **35**(1), 51–80 (2016). <https://procon.bg/article/cyber-security-teaching-and-learning-laboratories-survey>
15. Sharp, H., Preece, J., Rogers, Y.: *Interaction Design: Beyond Human-Computer Interaction*, 5th ed. Wiley (2019)
16. Hertzum, M.: Usability testing: a practitioner’s guide to evaluating the user experience. *Synth. Lect. Hum. Cent. Inform.* **13**(1), i–105 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.2200/S00987ED1V01Y202001HCI045>
17. Ørngreen, R., Levinsen, K.: Workshops as a research methodology. *Electron. J. E-learn.* **15**, 70–81 (2017). <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1140102>
18. Wright, B., Schwager, P.H.: Online survey research: can response factors be improved? *J. Internet Commer.* **7**(2), 253–269 (2008). <https://doi.org/10.1080/15332860802067730>
19. Lindgaard, G., Chattratichart, J.: Usability testing: what have we overlooked? In: *Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, pp. 1415–1424 (2007). <https://doi.org/10.1145/1240624.1240839>

Rethinking Independence in Safety Systems



Vahiny Gnanasekaran, Tor Olav Grøtan, Maria Bartnes,
and Poul E. Heegaard

Abstract The independence in safety systems ensures that the rest of the OT system possesses the ability to resume normal operation or revert to a safe state during a failure. The requirement was previously sustained by isolating systems, mechanical sensors, and the fact that failures occur randomly and sporadically. However, IT/OT integration, the surge of outsourced IT/OT services, and cyberattacks are forcing the previous requirements to become superseded by rapid optimization and digitization of the safety functions, without addressing the consequences from a non-technical context. This paper presents an initial survey of the challenges in the independence requirements with non-technical (human and organizational aspects) and technical context. The main contribution is to identify future, research directions by using different perspectives, such as resilience, robustness, anti-fragility, and digital sovereignty for retaining independence.

Keywords Independence · Safety systems · Cybersecurity · IT–OT convergence

1 Introduction

The recent years, Operational Technology (OT) is developing from isolated networks with little to no outside access to becoming integrated into third-party applications and IT systems for increased efficiency, remote access, and simplifying production.

V. Gnanasekaran (✉) · M. Bartnes · P. E. Heegaard
NTNU—Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
e-mail: Vahiny.Gnanasekaran@ntnu.no

M. Bartnes
e-mail: Maria.Bartnes@ntnu.no

P. E. Heegaard
e-mail: Poul.Heegaard@ntnu.no

T. O. Grøtan
SINTEF Digital, Trondheim, Norway
e-mail: tor.o.grotan@sintef.no

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_9

Previously, sensors and actuators were powered by gravitational force and chemical reactions, which are currently replaced and controlled by industrial control systems (ICS), including essential safety functions (e.g., process, flaring, emergency shut-down, fire/gas detection, etc.). The rapid implementation of IT systems and cloud computing further increases the complexity and affects the independence of critical safety systems, which ensures that the process systems operate regardless of other systems failing. Even though the systems face rigorous risk and fault analyses backed up by statistics and historical data, they are subject to cascading effects (e.g., a failure in one system propagating as an error/failure into another system [1]) and joint use of a component or software (e.g., design flaws and software errors [2]). In addition, even geographically co-located, critical systems may pose a vulnerability from humans (e.g., accidental misconfiguration) or environmental impact (e.g., weather and natural disasters).

Previous work [3–6] emphasizes technical measures (e.g., redundancy), system integrations, and IT/OT convergence contributing to challenge the independence requirement. However, the ever-increasing threat picture, geopolitical issues, fewer personnel, and cyberattacks increase the necessity of exploring non-technical factors. The safety systems are expected to operate regardless of unintentional incidents or cyberattacks. The unpredictability of a failure (e.g., frequency, intensity, and probability) highlights the importance of the OT system to “absorb” errors and failures, by observing, learning, and eventually anticipating future incidents [7]. The current technological era addresses the unambiguous need for non-technical factors and the utilization of interdisciplinary knowledge.

This paper aims to conduct an initial survey on the challenges in retaining independence between digitalized OT safety (sub)systems. The focus is primarily on challenges concerning non-technical aspects (e.g., human, organizational structures, and societal factors), in conjunction with the relevant technical aspects. One goal is to raise awareness in the OT research community of the importance of a broad set of perspectives, including system resilience, robustness, anti-fragility, and digital sovereignty. Open research questions and directions are derived from the literature and industry reports, and summarized at the end of the paper.

2 Background

This section explains independence in a safety context and the current digitization of OT systems and the proceeding ramifications in the current circumstances. In addition, a brief introduction is given for relevant concepts, namely, robustness, (cyber-)resilience, anti-fragility, and digital sovereignty.

2.1 Independence Requirements of Safety Systems

In the traditional safety perspective, the independence requirements of safety systems are defined [5] as “whose ability to function is not influenced negatively by other systems or its interaction with the environment”.

Four dependency types are defined:

1. *Functional dependency*, denoting the need for another system function.
2. *Cascading failures*, i.e., failure in one system, result in failure in other systems.
3. *Common components*, meaning that the same component of a subsystem is part of multiple systems.
4. *Common cause failures*, originating from environmental, operational, design, installation, and/or maintenance.

Independence requirements of safety systems are referred to *independence* in the remaining sections. It ensures that during a failure, the rest of the system can return to a (fail)safe state or continue normal operation [8]. Validating the independence between components/sub-systems is performed by (1) analyzing each component and then evaluating the total dependency in the system to observe if it holds a certain threshold, or (2) applying a risk analytical approach to holistically assess if the requirements of the complete system’s independence is met [9].

Functional dependencies are often a trade-off between adequate service and economic cost [5]. However, dependencies in physical components, equipment, or utilizing the same location are difficult to discover. Usually, the dependencies occur due to operational advantages, rapid technological advancements, standardizations, the use of common software modules, and an increasing amount of software upgrades. Achieving complete independence requires additional equipment, which advances the logical connections, thereby expanding the possibility of physical faults and complexity. Independence in a safety context denotes a reciprocation in sufficient redundancy and negative safety consequences.

Dependencies caused by non-technical factors are not discussed to the same extent as technical factors [8]. This stems from insufficient knowledge or a lack of adequate quantitative frameworks to assess the dependencies introduced by humans and processes. In addition, human actions are treated as being prone to faults and accidents and are usually regarded as the “weakest link” in cybersecurity. Safety often emphasizes random, mechanical defects and degradation as the primary causes of failure, but accidental misconfiguration and misunderstandings have been reasons for interrupted production [10, 11]. The rapid shifts in technology increase the possibility of the industry employees misunderstanding, creating inaccurate knowledge of the technology to accommodate the industry’s needs.

2.2 OT/IT Convergence

Historically, OT systems were developed when online access was limited. The safety systems were designed considering the nature of the occurring faults and errors; they appear randomly and consecutively. Nowadays, OT systems have benefited from digitalization, thus allowing, e.g., remote control during production or even maintenance on/offshore. However, the increasing amount of connections to public networks raises the likelihood of cyberattacks, since the adversary possesses an extended attack surface by using outdated software from commercial systems [12]. Latent errors may induce cascading effects, by affecting several systems and resulting in failure. Pure ICT systems usually resort to a system restart or reboot in such circumstances, while, for OT systems, the shutdown of a plant may result in prolonged downtime and severe production losses. In addition, equipment may be unnecessarily stressed during downtime, and leakages may occur during the restart. Ensuring an ongoing operation makes a shutdown the least viable option for OT systems.

This introduces a greater demand for cybersecurity measures and safety and reliability in barrier management. The issue has also been raised and resulted in standards, frameworks, and guidelines concerning cybersecurity within OT systems, such as IEC 62443 [13], NOROG 070 [14], and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) [15]. The frameworks contribute to identifying cybersecurity threats by considering both IT and OT systems.

2.3 Current Safety Architecture

Independence is crucial in OT systems, in particular *Safety Instrumented Systems* (SIS). They consist of multiple *safety functions*, which automatically act to preserve the facility's safety during adverse conditions. *Process Control System* (PCS) monitors, regulates, and controls the ongoing operation for potential deviations, and may activate other SIS. *Safe and Automation Systems* (SAS) comprise PCS and SIS systems. Figure 1 highlights the distinctions between SIS and SAS, and where independence is required. The SIS might deploy one or several *Safety Instrumented Functions* (SIF) while active, to safeguard against hazards [16]. Examples of various SISs are provided by a SINTEF report [17]:

1. **Process Shutdown System (PSD)** responds properly to incidents if the measurements (e.g., within the pressure, temperature, flow control, etc.) deviate from the default values, for instance, by blocking valves and shutting down pumps and compressors.
2. **Emergency Shutdown System (ESD)** isolates ignition sources, closes the safety valves, and shuts off the power supply to the facility. The plant equipment automatically proceeds to safe mode without power (e.g., electricity, air, hydraulic).
3. **Fire and Gas System (F&G)** detects fire or gas leakage at the facility. The system may initiate actions managed by the system itself (e.g., blocking air




Fig. 1 Independence of safety systems and functions

supply, and signaling other fire pumps and extinguishing systems) or the ESD system. When F&G invokes the ESD system, it removes any ignition sources and reduces pressure.

The purpose of SIS systems is to manage potential hazards, detect discrepancies, prevent abnormal conditions from developing into any hazardous incident(s), or decrease the consequences of the incident(s). Examples of hazardous incidents are Process Control System (PCS) malfunction, over-pressure, and leakage. All SISs comprise three sub-systems; sensors, logical controllers, and actuators [17]. Furthermore, the ESD and PSD system requires a *fail-safe* design, denoting the need for the systems to remain in a safe mode regardless of faults or failures. SISs are expected to operate independently despite the failure of other systems [17].

The SIS systems are realized according to the *barrier model*, where each barrier possesses one task (*barrier function*), which is further deconstructed into *barrier sub-functions* [18]. The sub-function denotes a task performed by SISs. The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority states that “Where more than one barrier is necessary, there shall be sufficient independence between barriers” [19]. Nonetheless, the current safety design contains some known dependencies to reduce the economic and operational toll [5]. The safety systems rely mostly on the same firewalls, network components, configuration tools, and domain controllers. In addition, the critical safety systems rely on each other by using the same components (e.g., valves and pumps).

The recent years the *Purdue model* has been adopted in ICS [5, 20]. In general, the network topology model ensures that non-critical systems, such as office and IT systems are located at the top layer, while OT systems are placed in lower layers. The *demilitarized zone (DMZ)* is located between OT and IT systems to provide adequate segregation (e.g., firewall, dedicated communication channels, access control, etc.).

In addition, *zones* are placed across layers, while *conduits* grant secure connections between the zones [13].

The lower OT layers contain a distinct collection of modern and legacy equipment. Since legacy systems are constructed with the assumption of being isolated, they possess limited security controls. When digital services (e.g., cloud, remote access, data analytics) are directly connected to the lower layers, they could easily be exploited by adversaries. The zones and conduits contribute to increasing the overall, security protection against spoofing, but it does not guarantee that the requirements of independence are met [5]. This increases the possibility of an adversary discovering exploitable dependency, targeting and eavesdropping on the secure channel, and attempting to modify data. Thus, the independence is compromised since the proposed “air-gapping” between critical layers diminishes.

2.4 Robustness, Resilience, and Anti-fragility

In Munoz et al. [21], a taxonomy triangle is introduced, which is applied in this paper to discuss different desired properties of a safe and secure system:

- *robustness*—avoid being affected
- *resilience*—bounce back quickly
- *anti-fragility*—bounce back stronger

Robustness depicts a system’s ability to maintain operations after an incident [21]. The term implies that strategic and contingency plans are already incorporated into the system, such that any consequences of certain (known) accidents are accounted for. Robustness is key for safety barriers since each barrier attempts to ensure safe operation regardless of abnormal conditions [6]. In addition, redundancy (e.g., additional components or alternative procedures) or different locations contribute to enhancing robustness.

Cyber-resilience denotes the research field increasing a socio-technical system’s combined preventive and adaptive nature to ultimately tolerate cyberattacks [22]. Resilience explains the ability to “bounce back” to its general functionality succeeding an abrupt incident and implies a fostering of the *intrinsic ability* inherent in a system or organization [22]. The difference between robustness and resilience is that resilience operates proactively in continuously absorbing and improving to prepare for upcoming incidents.

A main challenge in achieving cyber-resilience is the discrepancy between measures required by the system defenders versus the perpetrators; it is simply not enough for an organization to introduce general security mechanisms (e.g., adequate password hygiene, performing system updates, patching, etc.), and develop sufficiently extensive incident plans. The adversaries only require one opportunity to exploit newly identified vulnerabilities. In addition, the defender may struggle to distinguish if a disturbance is due to a technical malfunction or hostile intentions.




Fig. 2 After an adversary / failure

Anti-fragility represents *graceful extensibility* from resilience [23]. Not only should the system possess the capability to return to the ordinary state but also be able to thrive in adverse conditions, by increasing its tolerance for disruptions [24]. Regardless of any assessment and validation, misconfigurations and defects in the safety systems always exist. Hence, the systems should always exist in some form of stressful state to not extensively rely on automated systems.

Munoz et al. [21] distinguish between the robustness, resilience, and anti-fragility of a system, depending on how it behaves after an adversary (undesired) event. Figure 2 illustrates the taxonomy triangle. Although robustness depicts insensitivity toward instability, resilience describes the ability to fully recover from incidents, after a larger decrease in performance. However, resilience seeks to minimize the exposure to volatility, and anti-fragility *pursues* the volatility and exploits it toward positive gain. The three distinct properties suggest potential approaches to observing, mitigating, and gaining an advantage from a cyberattack.

2.5 Digital Sovereignty

Digital sovereignty is an emerging research field discussing the ability to maintain services while protecting them from structural dependencies [25]. The dependencies are entrenched in economic autonomy, competition, political interests, and/or individual self-determination. US ban on TikTok and other Chinese apps, and prevention of US commercial actors to benefit from European customers’ data are two instances related to digital sovereignty [26]. A recurring challenge within digital sovereignty is the *turn-key solutions* provided by a system vendor [27]. Such solutions include

the entire integrated IT/OT system, maintenance, service, and upgrades, and are economical and effortless for the benefiting industry actors. However, they are reliant on the same vendors to ensure operations and safety systems in an industry-wide emergency. Hence, the industry actors are compelled to surrender their potential experience and knowledge in exchange for receiving third-party turn-key solutions.

3 Key Safety Independence Challenges

The following section provides a brief introduction to the challenges in determining compliance with the independence requirements in a technical and non-technical context, respectively.

Technical Challenges

Concurrency. Safety literature [6, 8] assumes that safety incidents occur one at a time. The initiating causes are random, and the barriers degrade independently. Simultaneous incidents (i.e., breaching multiple barriers) occur rarely in safety (e.g., black swans). In contrast, this is highly probable in a cybersecurity context, where seemingly unintentional faults might be triggered by an adversary. The attacker could potentially sabotage the operations, in addition to gaining access to sensitive information. The cyberattack of multiple barriers could thus make the safety system easier to compromise and lead to malfunction, affecting independence.

Consequences of increasing digital connections. Cloud services, remote control, and data analytics increase the possibility of the industry being targeted by cyberattacks. If an attack occurs at the respective service providers, this could hold unprecedented consequences for the operations on site. The reliance on digital services from external providers and the consequences of a cyberattack on their premises should be considered a part of the independence requirements.

Control of the digital supply chain. Independence is further affected by digital sovereignty and the issue of selecting only one manufacturer for the critical components. The industrial actors usually consider a partnership with one SIS system vendor, due to cost and convenience. However, such integrated solutions are condemned, due to the high risk of cyberattacks, unintentional failures, and increasing complexity [3]. Alternatively, adopting solid-state SIS systems and pursuing quality assurance evidence in the product, relevance, management, and software are advocated, since complete control of the hardware, interactions, and software is vital to ensure independent safety operations. Nonetheless, it remains challenging to pursue the trade-off between the number of vendors and the cost of maintaining sufficient independence.

Assessment of the technical independence requirement. Lastly, the assessment of independence (e.g., the probability of being compliant with the independence requirement) is seemingly a remaining, critical issue, due to the increasing complexity of

OT/IT systems [28]. The development of novel safety independence assessments is necessary since the underlying safety assumptions are constantly being challenged. Onshus et al. [5] raises the question of whether the Purdue model and zones from IEC 62443 are still sufficient to provide independence of the safety systems since it does not provide all communication within the associated zone/layer. Although the report presents alternative solutions, such as dedicated, secure communication channels, and encryption, it remains to observe whether these measures are sufficient, or need improvement to increase independence (reduce the probability that the independence requirement is violated).

Non-technical Challenges

Organizational structures and roles. The upsurge of cybersecurity incidents is not reflected in the tasks and expected knowledge of the OT personnel [20, 29, 30]. The OT personnel and operators perceive any system anomalies but struggle to identify the origin of the anomaly (e.g., (un)intentional faults). This challenge is particularly apparent for ICAS operators, which usually carry a lead role in all emergency responses [31]. Previously, their responsibility concerned monitoring and operating the physical processes, while, nowadays, it has extended to ensuring the behavior of the ICAS system itself [32].

Knowledge and competence gap. The necessary competencies within the OT personnel address the safe usage of the process systems, without clearly highlighting potential cybersecurity risks (e.g., open ports, unidentified 4G dongles/USB sticks). This increases the need of cybersecurity knowledge required by the ICAS operator and demands considerable cooperation between the rest of the IT and OT personnel, and coordination with external actors (e.g., Critical Emergency Response Team (CERT), Security Operations Center (SOC)).

Unclear responsibility of OT system vendors. OT system vendors delay the deployment of system patches from known security vulnerabilities, thereby leading to neglected procedures [33]. The maintenance and patching may also consider only the OT processes running on the IT components, such that the IT components are completely disregarded. Overlooking the IT components might result in exposure to known IT system vulnerabilities, which makes the OT processes no more secure than the weakest IT component. Thus, the independence might be in jeopardy if the IT part of the OT-IT converged systems is vulnerable.

Procurement of proprietary components and equipment. Selecting various vendors with distinct production locations could limit any economic or environmental disruptions (e.g., financial crisis, natural disasters) [3]. During critical malfunctions demanding a rapid component replacement, or using the same IT services places dependencies on external circumstances, ultimately affecting the independence. Possessing distinct manufacturers and service providers reduces the dependency on one system/actor, which implies more autonomy and an increase in safety independence.

Geopolitical picture and national interests. Vendors could be bribed to possess backdoors to retrieve information on behalf of others. In addition, the data might not only

be monitored by a foreign state but also subject to modification, causing damage to critical infrastructure [26]. Even relying on production in one state might affect operations, if the transportation, economy, or labor is weakened due to external circumstances. The independence is challenged by digital sovereignty; the ever-growing globalization and its reliance on multi-national trading and innovation.

Increased human contribution. Since the attacker is human and subject to personal motivation, a human defense might improve the issue, to better gauge the adversary's motivation and anticipate potential targets [34]. Furthermore, the converged IT/OT system still includes technical staff to work separately [20]. Industrial actors should emphasize the importance of collaboration during unforeseen incidents. Disclosing the competence, experiences, and safeguarding techniques across the staff may improve the detection, identification, and mitigation of future cyberattacks with fewer consequences to the system's independence.

4 Plan and Prepare with Robustness, Cyber-Resilience and Anti-fragility in Mind

This paper argues that cyberattacks, digital services, and increasing system complexity are highly affecting the independence requirement of safety systems. This section presents how robustness, (cyber-)resilience, and anti-fragility could contribute to ensure that the independence requirement in the current digitalization context from a non-technical perspective is sustained.

The cyber-incident management system in ICS must be robust and resilient and should even learn from attacks and failures and become stronger (i.e., an anti-fragile system) [23, 24]. In the safety system, isolation, protection, and barriers are present to reduce the spatial consequences (e.g., the number of affected objects or users), while detection and mitigation reduce the temporal consequences (e.g., the time from an attack until the system returns back to normal operation). Further, the incident management system in ICS depends on an efficient communication sequence of information exchange between the different stakeholders and roles (e.g., process-control operators, SOCs, vendors). The key roles have to be well-defined and well-known to all stakeholders. Communication must be available for knowledge and experience sharing for all stakeholders.

Reducing the consequences of cyberattacks on safety operations requires early identification and sending of appropriate alerts to all involved stakeholders, and the provision of means to continue (safe) operations of OT during an attack. The latter is extremely challenging because the attack might trigger physical accidents, or modify values, which might put the system in an unsafe operation mode. Reducing the impact of escalating faults originating from cyberattacks requires organizational procedures, access to information, well-defined roles, and point-of-contacts [29]. The operation might be able to withstand the attack and still continue its operations if the frontline staff (e.g., key personnel closest to the attack) have means, knowledge, and skills to

perform appropriate mitigation. For instance, if an OT provider is not affected by an ongoing cyberattack, disconnecting the OT from the ICS and running the system in *island mode* ensure continuous operation, provided that island mode functionality is enabled.

Mitigating consequences requires a swift and resilient response to disruptions since cyberattacks inevitably occur in ICS, ultimately affecting the independence requirement of safety functions. Multidisciplinary knowledge contributes to raising awareness among the initial response team to identify and detect safety incidents that originate from the cyber domain. Furthermore, frequently practicing preparedness exercises where the personnel is trained to understand and identify possible alternatives might improve their resilient behavior. The joint effort between OT and IT personnel and external service providers requires training and exercise to communicate effectively. This reduces the time spent on the rescue, by increasing the staff's tolerance for disruption, expanding their experience in bouncing back from cyberattacks. Withstanding severe cyberattacks allow graceful extensibility by overstretching the adaptive capacity to manage surprises [23].

The steps acquired after the cyberattack are crucial in how the upcoming attacks are managed and affect safety independence requirements. Anti-fragility urges the organization to grasp the feedback and learn from the incident to improve the countermeasures [24]. The phases toward returning to normal operations could be provided through debriefs. The system changes and updates should be examined through risk analysis to estimate how the system changes influence safety independence. Due to the increasing complexity of OT systems, these experiences should be shared across stakeholders at all levels. Although organizations are weary of disclosing cyberattacks, all relevant actors should share experiences to develop sufficient measures to minimize the impact on safety independence.

5 Future Research Directions

The independence requirement was designed based on previously held assumptions about the existing technology, paradigms, and incidents occurring in the industry. Due to emerging technologies, and rapid digital implementation, these foundations need disruption to address the imminent challenges. The following section presents future research directions that should be considered by the ICS cybersecurity community.

Challenging the Independence Requirement. Since digital IT/OT systems are more interconnected, and the OT industry is more reliant on third-party software, components, and standardized systems, it is necessary to revisit the independence requirement. The existing safety regulations demand independence levels not quite reflected in the current solutions. Cyberattacks further inflate the issue, since they are subject to intentional motivation. This raises the issue of whether the independence itself should be assessed to accommodate the current digital advancements [5]. Achieving true independence is cumbersome and expensive, and not always necessary. However,

incorporating non-technical aspects, such as personnel, exchanging competence and experiences, choice of vendors, and even the geopolitical picture as a part of the independence might prove essential in the upcoming safety systems. Exploring the proper validation and assessment of safety independence could contribute to an improved holistic perspective of the IT/OT systems.

Silent Knowledge in IT/OT. If the Purdue model fails to satisfy the independence requirement, there might be other approaches suitable for increasing the independence, outside the existing literature. The industrial actors might possess solutions or practices within their organizational processes that could contribute to clarifying their procedures ensuring that the independence is met. Furthermore, the work culture influences the ICAS operator's performance on critical tasks. The skill and know-how acquired during operations among the facility personnel are usually not written but could be extracted with qualitative studies. Observations and interviews with relevant operators could provide previously unknown insights and solutions to preserve safety independence.

Multi-role Coordinated Knowledge Exchange. Necessary actors do not possess sufficient knowledge to retain independence. First, OT personnel lacks the relevant competency to identify cyberattacks. Second, service providers and system integrators require knowledge to provide customized cybersecurity services and design OT systems with security controls. By increasing the level of knowledge of all involved actors, they foster their cybersecurity and OT awareness, which increases collaboration and common understanding before, during, and after a cyber incident. Stability is key to providing good integration in the business processes, along with increased consistency. Future research should explore the sufficient knowledge needed by all involved parties to preserve the independence of ICS.

Human Factors. Humans face the same criteria as technical safety measures, however, it is nearly impossible to satisfy the independence requirement in human factors [8]. They are prone to fatigue, mood changes, changing energy levels, and stress levels. Likewise, cybersecurity usually regards humans performing malicious actions. However, in contrast to technical systems, humans possess the ability to suggest brilliant strategies that become crucial during a cyberattack. Utilizing human knowledge and experience in handling unforeseen incidents increases the possibility of rapidly returning to a normal state. Upcoming work should consider humans as a potential solution in redefining safety independence in the context of cyber-attacks.

6 Concluding Remarks

The IT/OT integration, the increasing digital connections, and the upsurge of cyberattacks change the inherent premise for independence in safety-critical systems. This paper presents potential, non-technical research directions challenging independence, by introducing the related technical challenges and assessing the current literature and industry reports. Perspectives from robustness, resilience, anti-fragility, and

digital sovereignty provide insights into future work. Non-technical factors should be included to propose a novel and viable assessment method for the revised independence requirement. Securing the current independence is a collaboration between traditional safety and cybersecurity measures, and between humans, processes, and technology.

Acknowledgements This research was funded by the Norwegian Research Council through the Cybersecurity Barrier Management project, grant number 326717.

References

1. Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E., Havlin, S.: Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks. *Nature* **464**(7291), 1025–1028 (2010)
2. Avizienis, A., Laprie, J.C., Randell, B., Landwehr, C.: Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing. *IEEE Trans. Dependable Sec. Comput.* **1**(1), 11–33 (2004)
3. Donnelly, P., Abuhmida, M., Tubb, C.: The drift of industrial control systems to pseudo security. *Int. J. Crit. Infrastruct. Prot.* **38**(November 2021), 100535 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2022.100535>
4. Kriaa, S., Pietre-Cambacedes, L., Bouissou, M., Halgand, Y.: A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems. *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.* **139**, 156–178 (2015). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.res.2015.02.008>
5. Onshus, T., Bodsberg, L., Hauge, S., Jaatun, M.G., Lundteigen, M.A., Myklebust, T., Ottermo, M.V., Petersen, S., Wille, E.: Security and independence of process safety and control systems in the petroleum industry. *J. Cybersec. Priv.* **2**(1), 20–41 (2022). Feb
6. Hauge, S., Øien, K.: Guidance for barrier management in the petroleum industry. Technical report, September 2016, SINTEF (2016)
7. Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.D., Leveson, N.: *Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. (2006)
8. McLeod, R.W.: Human factors in barrier thinking. In: McLeod, R.W. (ed.) *Designing for Human Reliability*, pp. 235–253. Gulf Professional Publishing, Boston (2015). <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128024218000163>
9. Hauge, S., Onshus, T., Øien, K., Grøtan, T.O., Lundteigen, M.A., Jersin, E.: Uavhengighet av sikkerhetssystemer offshore—status og utfordringer. Technical report, SINTEF, Trondheim (2006)
10. U.S. Chemical Safety Board: U.S. Chemical Safety Board Concludes “Organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP corporation” Caused March 2005 Texas City Disaster That Killed 15, Injured 180, March 2005. <https://www.csb.gov/u-s-chemical-safety-board-concludes-organizational-and-safety-deficiencies-at-all-levels-of-the-bp-corporation-caused-march-2005-texas-city-disaster-that-killed-15-injured-180>. Accessed 26 Jan. 2023
11. Macalister, T.: Piper Alpha disaster: how 167 oil rig workers died. *The Guardian*, February 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/04/piper-alpha-disaster-167-oil-rig>
12. Jaatun, M.G., Wille, E., Bernsmed, K., Kilskar, S.S.: Grunnprinsipper for IKT-sikkerhet i industrielle IKT-systemer. Technical report, SINTEF (2021)
13. Industrial communication networks—Network and system security—Part 1-1. Standard, International Electrotechnical Commission, March 2009
14. Application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry. Standard, Norwegian Oil and Gas Association (2001)
15. Shen, L.: The NIST cybersecurity framework: overview and potential impacts. *Scitech Lawyer* **10**(4), 16 (2014)

16. Functional safety—Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector—Part 1: Framework, definitions, system, hardware and application programming requirements. Standard, International Electrotechnical Commission, August 2017
17. Myklebust, T., Onshus, T., Lindskog, S., Ottermo, M.V., Lundteigen, M.A.: Datakvalitet ved digitalisering i petroleumssektoren. Technical report, SINTEF, Trondheim (2021)
18. Johansen, I.L., Rausand, M.: Barrier management in the offshore oil and gas industry. *J. Loss Prev. Process Indus.* **34**, 49–55 (2015). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2015.01.023>
19. Petroleum Safety Authority: The Management Regulations § 5 Barriers. Regulation, Petroleum Safety Authority (2001). <https://www.ptil.no/en/regulations/all-acts/the-management-regulations3/II/5>
20. Zanutto, A., Shreeve, B., Follis, K., Busby, J., Rashid, A.: The shadow warriors: in the no man's land between industrial control systems and enterprise IT systems, pp. 1–6. USENIX (2017)
21. Munoz, A., Billsberry, J., Ambrosini, V.: Resilience, robustness, and antifragility: towards an appreciation of distinct organizational responses to adversity. *Int. J. Manag. Rev.* **24**, 181–187 (2022)
22. Grøtan, T.O., Antonsen, S., Haavik, T.K.: Cyber resilience: a pre-understanding for an abductive research agenda. In: *Resilience in a Digital Age*, pp. 205–229. Springer (2022)
23. Woods, D.D.: Four concepts for resilience and the implications for the future of resilience engineering. *Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.* **141**, 5–9 (2015). Sep
24. Taleb, N.N.: *Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder*, vol. 3. Random House (2012)
25. Edler, J., Blind, K., Frietsch, R., Kimpeler, S., Kroll, H., Lerch, C., Reiss, T., Roth, F., Schubert, T., Schuler, J., Walz, R.: Technology sovereignty: from demand to concept. Technical report, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI, Karlsruhe (2020)
26. Floridi, L.: The fight for digital sovereignty: what it is, and why it matters, especially for the EU. *Philos. Technol.* **33**(3), 369–378 (2020)
27. H+M Industrial EPC: Turnkey Project Advantages and Disadvantages: What to Know Before Signing A Contract. *Insights* (2021)
28. Wäfler, J., Heegaard, P.E.: Interdependency modeling in smart grid and the influence of ICT on dependability. In: Bauschert, T. (ed.) *Adv. Commun. Netw.*, pp. 185–196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2013)
29. Green, B.R., Prince, D.E., Roedig, U., Busby, J.S., Hutchison, D.: Socio-technical security analysis of industrial control systems (ICS). In: *Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research*, pp. 10–14 (2014)
30. Michalec, O., Milyaeva, S., Rashid, A.: When the future meets the past: can safety and cyber security coexist in modern critical infrastructures? *Big Data Soc.* **9**(1) (2022)
31. Green, B., Krotofil, M., Hutchison, D.: Achieving ICS resilience and security through granular data flow management. In: *CPS-SPC 2016—Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy*. pp. 93–101. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. (2016)
32. Miyachi, T., Yamada, T.: Current issues and challenges on cyber security for industrial automation and control systems. In: *Proceedings of the SICE Annual Conference*, pp. 821–826 (2014)
33. Hanssen, G.K., Onshus, T., Jaatun, M.G., Myklebust, T., Ottermo, M., Lundteigen, M.A.: Principles of digitalisation and IT-OT integration. Technical report, SINTEF (2021)
34. Bodsberg, L., Grøtan, T.O., Jaatun, M.G., Wærø, I.: HSE and cyber security in remote work. In: *2021 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA)*, pp. 1–8 (2021)

Regional and National Cybersecurity

Understanding the United States Republicans' Susceptibility to Political Misinformation



Rachel Bleiman

Abstract Political misinformation is a danger to society, and echo chambers exacerbate the spread and exposure to misinformation, creating harms as severe as those associated with the January 6 US insurrection. Thus, it is important to understand who is most susceptible to believing it. The current study builds on previous work from Rhodes (Polit. Commun. Commun. **39**(1), 1–22 (2021) [3]) and aims to explore whether certain groups within the US Republican Party are more susceptible to believing political misinformation than other groups within the Republican Party. Findings indicate that Republicans who identify as having a ‘strong’ political affiliation are significantly more likely to believe political misinformation than those Republicans who identify as having a ‘not very strong’ political affiliation. While Rhodes (Polit. Commun. Commun. **39**(1), 1–22 (2021) [3]) found that echo chambers did not impact the entirety of Republicans in their sample, the current study examined whether echo chambers interacted significantly with the strength of political affiliation. However, no significant interaction was found, indicating that echo chambers impacted neither ‘strong’ Republicans nor ‘not very strong’ Republicans. The results provide implications for which groups of people are most susceptible to believing political misinformation and should be the priority in directing ways to mitigate their believability.

Keywords Misinformation · Fake news · Echo chambers · Participatory disinformation

1 Introduction

On January 6, 2021, insurrectionists stormed the US Capitol building in protest of the 2020 presidential election results, interrupting the congressional meeting that would confirm President Biden’s victory. During the insurrection, the security and safety of

R. Bleiman (✉)
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
e-mail: Rachel.bleiman@temple.edu

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_10

169

some of the country's top officials were jeopardized, and lives were lost during the attack. This event and its associated harms resulted from former President Trump and his supporters spreading misinformation about the election [1].

Misinformation is a broad term that refers to false or inaccurate information. It encompasses disinformation, which involves the intent to mislead or manipulate. The two exist along a continuum, as various people can spread it, with some knowing it's false and others unaware. Political misinformation, also referred to as 'fake news,' has created a stark polarization between members of the Democratic and Republican Parties within the United States. This polarization is amplified as political misinformation is often reinforced through echo chambers, which are situations in which someone only receives information that aligns with their existing viewpoints. As political misinformation continues to spread rapidly online, society has seen direct impacts, such as those related to the 2020 presidential election and the ensuing January 6 insurrection, which are prime examples of how political misinformation can have physical and harmful consequences.

Starbird [1] discusses how widespread misinformation about a 'rigged election' originated and spread to and from former president Trump and his supporters, leading to the physical consequences of January 6. She asserts that as a political elite, Trump had the voice and power to "prime" [2] his supporters to make them more likely to believe and spread misinformation. This priming occurred even before the 2020 election when Trump repeatedly urged his supporters to be on the lookout for 'fake news' and often overused the term 'witch hunt,' implying a defensive, victim mindset and igniting his supporters' fear of misinformation being used against them. Further priming occurred through his repetitive warnings about the possibility of a 'rigged election' leading up to the presidential vote. This priming made his supporters more likely to genuinely believe that such a conspiracy, which is a form of misinformation, exists in everyday life [1]. Then, some of his primed supporters mistakenly created and spread misinformation about the election. One such incident occurred in Arizona; because his supporters were primed to be on the lookout for vote tampering, they started to believe that certain Sharpie pens were bleeding through the ballot, affecting their vote. When these voters shared that misinformation on social media, the conspiracy worked its way back up to the political elites, and Trump's insistence on a rigged election further primed and reinforced the belief [1]. That priming, reinforcement, and confidence in the rigged election created anger and exacerbated his supporters' sense of victimhood, which led to calls to action and violence [1]. Finally, through hashtags (e.g., #StopTheSteal) on social media, protests, and rallies, influencers could direct their anger into physical action. In this case, the physical action did not stop at demonstrations but an insurrection at the US Capitol.

Because there are real harms associated with political misinformation, as seen in the case of January 6, it is important to examine which groups of people are most susceptible to believing it. The insurrection made it clear that some members of the Republican Party are certainly susceptible to believing political misinformation, as they falsely believed and even contributed to the misinformation that purported the 2020 election was fraudulent. Indeed, while Republicans are not alone in believing misinformation, existing research indicates that Republicans believe

significantly more fake news than Democrats; however, within the Republican Party, there is no significant difference in susceptibility between those inside and outside of echo chambers, as there is for Democrats [3]. Nevertheless, while Republicans, in general, believe more political misinformation than Democrats, not all members of the Republican Party are influenced by political misinformation to the same extent as those who engaged in the January 6 insurrection. Thus, it is important to examine which groups of people within the Republican Party are more likely to believe political misinformation and if echo chambers significantly impact any groups within the Republican Party. Determining which group is most vulnerable/susceptible can help policymakers or educators try to combat misinformation to identify where their focus needs to shift to create specialized mitigation techniques. As such, this paper seeks to understand whether the strength of one's political affiliation is associated with susceptibility to political misinformation. Additionally, it will examine how placement in an echo chamber impacts believability, particularly when interacting with partisan strength.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Susceptibility

Baptista and Gradim [4] conducted a review of the literature and found, although not unanimously, the following main factors that influence the belief in online misinformation from 2016–2020: lower education or digital literacy, testimony/proximity of the relationship with the person spreading the fake news, political ideology, cognitive ability, and (dis)trust in the media [4]. The existing literature suggests overlap among some of these factors. For instance, research has shown that some factors that can aid in predicting how strongly people distrust the media include their extremity of attitudes and political ideology, among others [5]. Indeed, research has shown that people's political affiliation impacts which news sources they believe spread more fake news than other news sources, and that political affiliation might drive distrust of the media [5]. In fact, research has shown that Conservatives, more so than Liberals, believe that news sources provide fake news [5]. As of 2021, only 35% of Republicans were found to have at least some trust in national news organizations; this number is just half of what it was five years previously [6].

In comparison, over the past five years, the percentage of Democrats who have at least some trust in national news organizations is between 78–86% [6]. Despite Republicans' supposed distrust of the media, research has found that not only is fake news most prominently believed among Republicans as compared to Democrats, but they are also most likely to spread fake news [3, 5]. These findings align with the statistic that fake news stories favoring Trump were shared 30 million times on Facebook. In comparison, those favoring Clinton were shared only 8 million times, demonstrating Republicans' tendencies to spread political information online [7].

Another study, which also examined the relationship between susceptibility to misinformation and political ideology, found that ideology's effect on judging misinformation was mediated by the credibility of the source of the information [8]. Liberals were more affected by source slant (whether a source is more favorable to a certain group) than Conservatives in their news judgment, but Liberals and Conservatives both thought sources similar to their own ideology to be less slanted [8]. Interestingly, the same study found that people were more susceptible to misinformation from a source aligned with their political ideology. In contrast, sources incongruent with one's political ideology resulted in increased resistance to believing the information [8]. For example, the results from this study suggest that someone who identifies as a Republican would be more susceptible to misinformation coming from Fox News, a Republican-leaning news outlet. Meanwhile, those same individuals would be resistant to believing information from CNN, a left-leaning news source. This finding highlights some of the dangers associated with echo chambers, which are important to study because they can amplify the spread and believability of misinformation.

2.2 Echo Chambers and the Role of Social Media in the Spread of Misinformation

Social media is littered with misinformation, and while simply using social media does not equate with believing misinformation, research suggests that reading a headline of misinformation just one time can increase perceptions of its accuracy at later times, suggesting that prior exposure to fake news stories increases perceived accuracy of fake news [9, 10]. They also found that belief in fake news stories is bred by social media platforms, as long as the fake news stories are within reason and not entirely implausible. Even a study as early as 2008 found that people's media exposure helps form their political beliefs, which are then used to motivate their media use patterns [11]. The influence of social media is widespread. With that, social media exposes people to misinformation and can influence opinions and future media use. As such, online echo chambers have the potential to be especially dangerous. An echo chamber is "an environment in which somebody encounters only opinions and beliefs similar to their own and does not have to consider alternatives" [12]. They can exist online and offline, although they are especially prominent on social media, as algorithms contribute to and shape the content that users view. For instance, a Twitter user who supports Trump might be in an echo chamber if the only content that appears on their timeline that is related to Trump is positive and aligned with their existing beliefs on the matter.

Inside and outside of echo chambers, fake news stories are typically written to motivate users to share the content, making misinformation more likely to go viral and reach a wider audience than real news stories [4, 13]. Indeed, research has shown that people are more likely to share and engage with false information than legitimate information [4, 10, 13, 14]. Further, social media facilitates the spread of

misinformation and the creation of echo chambers, as engaging with a post by liking, reacting, or commenting on it influences the algorithms and results in those posts being viewed by more people [4, 10, 13–15]. Additionally, social media sites use algorithms to provide more posts similar to ones someone likes, reacts to, comments on, or shares [15]. This makes it easy for people to be manipulated via social media and be put into echo chambers of similar posts [16]. Social media platforms do not show all users identical posts or ads, unlike a television news channel, radio station, or newspaper [16]. Social media platforms have a strong influence over what people see, as posts are personalized to the individual by the information collected about someone from using the platform [16]. Further, misinformation can create beliefs that are hard to reverse and echo chambers often reinforce that misinformation [17]. Once such misinformation is believed, harm can occur such as in the form of political violence.

The large extent that communication occurs and that misinformation spreads online opens the door to the potential for physical harm, as seen with the January 6 insurrection. Thus, it is important to understand the context of how such a group interacts online and how that influences their placement inside of an echo chamber. A 2012 study found that Republican or Republican-leaning users on Twitter showed higher levels of political activity, a tighter interconnected social structure, and a communication network that makes spreading political information quick and easy [18]. Tight communication networks and interconnected social structures are important to keep in mind, as they create suitable environments for echo chambers. Such an environment is dangerous, as research has shown that people process information more efficiently when the information confirms their existing beliefs and desires. In contrast, the opposite is true for information that challenges their current beliefs and desires [19]. During elections, for instance, people are more likely to believe a news story in which their preferred candidate is favored; this is particularly true if they are in a social media echo chamber where they only receive ideologically affirming information with no rebuttals presented against their preferred candidate [7]. Given the research on misinformation on social media and echo chambers, especially in the context of Republican communication networks, it is clear that there is a potential to influence people in dangerous ways.

2.3 Harms and Motivations Related to the Spread of Misinformation

There are various purposes and harms of the intentional spread of misinformation [16]. No matter the context of the misinformation, it is often used to manipulate people, which has been seen throughout history, even before the widespread use of social media platforms. For example, the United States government has historically spread misinformation through propaganda, such as during the Cold War and the Red Scare about communism and capitalism [20]. This was to build a sense of fear

and distrust among the ‘enemy’ and a sense of trust and loyalty among the people [21]. Moreover, lobbyists for corporations with factories that have large amounts of carbon emissions may have the motivation to spread misinformation related to climate change, as a way to minimize any outcry against the environmental damage that their company is creating [22]. Further, people have used misinformation to contribute to antisemitism by spreading Holocaust denial claims, and the Holocaust itself was a result of Nazi propaganda, resulting in the deaths of millions of people [23]. Other examples of misinformation in history come from journalists looking for newspaper sales by sensationalizing rumors into facts in what would now be considered ‘click-bait’ [24].

Misinformation is not a new occurrence; however, social media platforms have facilitated the reach and speed at which misinformation can be disseminated. There is evidence that agent provocateurs from Russia used online misinformation campaigns via Facebook to influence elections and cause civil unrest and political polarization in the United States [25]. In this situation, social media allows a foreign nation to influence the citizens of another country without ever having to be physically present. Meanwhile, white supremacist groups had the motivation to spread misinformation online about the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted tangibly in violence and discrimination against Asian populations [26]. It has even been found that misinformation via social media enhances political polarization in a way that drives domestic terrorism [25]. Of course, one example of political misinformation driving domestic terrorism is the January 6 insurrection.

While in existence and relevant online and offline, the spread of misinformation is facilitated and exacerbated with the development of social media platforms. Regardless of online or offline, and no matter the intention behind a piece of misinformation, there will be potential harm associated with its spread. Thus, it is important to better understand who is most susceptible to believing misinformation and being affected by echo chambers. Understanding these dynamics may ultimately help reduce or eliminate threats to democracy.

3 Methodology

The current study aims to expand on the findings from Rhodes [3] that found that Republicans have significantly higher political misinformation believability scores than Democrats, and that echo chambers do not significantly influence Republicans. Using a subset of the Rhodes [3] dataset, the current study will aim to answer the following research questions related to Republicans’ believability of political misinformation:

1. Does the strength of political affiliation within the Republican Party (i.e., strong or not very strong) correlate with Republicans’ susceptibility to political misinformation?

- a. H_0 : There is no difference in the susceptibility to political misinformation between Republicans who identify as 'strong' Republicans and those who identify as 'not very strong' Republicans.
- b. H_1 : Those who identify as 'strong' Republicans will be less susceptible to political misinformation than those who identify as 'not very strong' Republicans.

It is hypothesized that 'strong' Republicans are less susceptible to believing political misinformation than 'not very strong' Republicans because the literature indicates that Republicans who identify with a more extreme affiliation have lower levels of trust in the media [5].

2. Is there a significant interaction between the strength of one's political affiliation within the Republican Party and their placement in an echo chamber on their susceptibility to believing political misinformation?
 - a. H_0 : There is no significant interaction between political affiliation strength and placement in an echo chamber on susceptibility to political misinformation.
 - b. H_1 : There is a significant interaction between political affiliation strength and placement in an echo chamber on susceptibility to political misinformation.

As noted in the literature review, Republicans tend to be more suspicious of news that is not agreeable with their partisan beliefs, indicating that they have low believability levels when outside of an echo chamber. While Rhodes [3] found Republicans not to be significantly impacted by echo chambers, the researcher hypothesizes that 'strong' Republicans outside of an echo chamber will be significantly less susceptible than any other group.

3.1 Data and Measures

This study uses secondary data from the Rhodes [3] dataset, collected through a web-based survey experiment via Amazon MTurk. Rhodes [3] collected data from 3,321 individuals across the United States and its territories from June 2019 through September 2020. The survey collected demographics, political affiliation and strength, frequency of social media use, knowledge of current American politics, and believability of political misinformation (referred to as fake news in this study).

The current study seeks to answer questions only about those who identify as belonging to the Republican Party. Additionally, this study is only interested in individuals residing within the 50 states (excluding territories), as political affiliation and fake political news are most relevant for elections, and those living in American territories do not vote. As one of the main harms associated with political misinformation involves election integrity, this study is only interested in respondents living in locations that participate in elections. Thus, after only keeping Republicans who reside

Table 1 Condition groups

Condition group	Legitimacy	Political alignment
0	Fake	Republican
1	Fake	Democratic
2	Mixed	Republican
3	Mixed	Democratic
4	Fake	Mixed

in the 50 United States, the number of observations in this study's sample dropped to 1,205.¹ From this sample subset, there was no missing data; thus the analytic sample remained the same as the subset sample. Each of the relevant measures is briefly described below. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the analytic sample.

3.1.1 Dependent Variable

Believability: The survey introduced each respondent to ten short political news stories—each story aligned with either a Republican or Democratic viewpoint. The legitimacy of the news stories varied as well, as some respondents received a mix of five real and five fake stories, while others received ten stories that were all fake. Similarly, some respondents received a mix of five Republican-leaning and five Democrat-leaning stories. In contrast, others received ten stories that all aligned with the same party, making up five different condition groups (see Table 1).

After reading each short story, respondents were asked to rate the legitimacy of each story on a scale of 0 to 100. None of the stories were egregiously fake, with the 10 Democrat-aligned stories and 10 Republican-aligned stories having high internal reliability ($\alpha = 0.94$; $\alpha = 0.93$, respectively). The fake news stories were assembled from BuzzFeed's December 2018 list of most popular fake news stories posted online, which were gathered using Buzzsumo web-scraping technology that identifies articles with the highest levels of engagement (i.e., likes, comments, shares) across social media networks. These fake news stories were coded as either agreeable to a Democratic or Republican viewpoint. For example, one fake story coded as agreeable to a Republican viewpoint was titled 'Puerto Rico Mayor Facing Fraud Charges Over Millions In Gov't Funds,' while one story coded to be Democratically agreeable was titled 'Evidence Emerges That Hawaii Eruptions Caused By Fracking.' The researcher used each respondent's average believability score across all assigned fake stories to generate a believability measure ranging from 0 to 100, with higher scores representing higher levels of believability in fake news stories. See Fig. 1 for the distribution of believability scores across the sample.

¹ 2,111 individuals were excluded based on party affiliation and 5 individuals were excluded based on location.




Fig. 1 Distribution of believability scores

3.1.2 Independent Variables

Echo chamber: The purpose of the condition groups receiving different stories was to simulate an echo chamber for some respondents. Because an echo chamber is when someone is only exposed to information that they are agreeable with, Republican respondents who were given all stories agreeable with a Republican viewpoint were considered to be in an echo chamber. For example, participants in condition groups 0 or 2 all received stories aligned with a Republican viewpoint. Thus, all respondents in the subset in condition groups 0 or 2 were considered to be in an echo chamber (n = 480), as the stories they were given were all agreeable to their partisan beliefs. All of the respondents of the subset who were in condition groups 1, 3, and 4 were not in an echo chamber (n = 730), as the stories were all agreeable with either a Democratic viewpoint or a mix of Republican and Democratic viewpoints. The echo chamber variable was dichotomous, with each respondent either being in an echo chamber or not being in an echo chamber.

Partisan Strength: Respondents in the subset were asked about the strength of their political affiliation (“Would you consider yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?”). Response options were binary (“Strong” or ‘Not very strong’).

3.1.3 Control Variables (Covariates)

Race: The race measure consisted of 6 categories: White, Hispanic/Latino, Black or African American, Native American or American Indian, Asian or Pacific Islander, or other, for which they specified. Most of the respondents in the subset were white

(66%). The researcher acknowledges that ‘Hispanic/Latino’ is an ethnicity and not a race but uses the variables as coded by Rhodes [3].

Training: Before reading the fake stories, some respondents were trained with a short priming video on ways to identify misinformation and fake news, such as improper spelling or lack of citations. This variable was dichotomous, with each respondent either being trained or not being trained.

Age: A measure for age was calculated by birth year, as data was collected over an extended period of time. The ages in the sample ranged from 19 to 99 years old.

Political Knowledge: The survey asked respondents five questions to measure their political knowledge. The questions encompassed the following: “How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?”; “Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington, D.C.?”; “Would you say one of the parties is more Conservative than the other at the national level?”; “Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by Mike Pence?”; and, “Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not?”. Each question had 2–3 answer choices and an additional “don’t know” option. For each of the five questions, Rhodes [3] created a dichotomous variable for whether the respondent was correct or incorrect. Those dichotomous variables were then summed to create the political knowledge scale. Respondents received 1 point on the political knowledge scale for each question they answered correctly, which made a scale ($\alpha = 0.60$) ranging from 0–5, with 0 indicating the lowest levels of political knowledge and 5 indicating the highest levels of political knowledge.

Battleground State: The survey recorded the state location of each respondent. Respondents were distributed across the country. Using this, the researcher created a new categorical variable to measure whether the state was considered a swing state, Republican safe state, or Democrat safe state for the 2020 election. Swing states are those that switch back and forth between political parties and often serve as deciding factors in elections. For the purposes of this study, the following states were coded as swing states: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. Some of these states such as Texas and Georgia are not historically swing states, and some states that are historically swing states such as Iowa, Ohio, New Hampshire, and Virginia were not included as such in this study. While there are no official metrics to determine a swing state, the researcher selected them based on the state’s margin of victory percentage in the 2020 presidential election. If a state’s margin of victory in the 2020 presidential election was less than 7%, which was a natural break in the margins of victory among a list of battleground states, then it was considered a swing state. Otherwise, states were coded Republican safe if the state voted in favor of the Republican Party and their margin of victory was greater than 7%, and other states were coded Democrat safe with the same constraints toward the Democratic Party. Research notes that people living in swing states during the time of political elections were exposed to more misinformation, making it an important demographic factor to examine [27]. If people living in swing states are

more believing in and more susceptible to political misinformation, that could be a threat to national elections that needs to be addressed.

Social media use: The survey asked each respondent for their frequency per week of using various social media platforms including Facebook/Facebook Messenger, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit, Snapchat, and Pinterest. Each social media platform had its own survey question, with eight response choices ranging from 0 to 7, with 0 indicating the respondent using that platform 0 days a week and 7 indicating the respondent using that platform seven days a week. These six different items (one for each platform) were averaged into a single social media use scale, with 0 indicating low social media use and 7 indicating high social media use. The reliability of this measure was high ($\alpha = 0.77$), showing high internal consistency.

The descriptive statistics (Table 2) show that the average believability score is about 63 units on a scale of 0–100; however, there is a large standard deviation of about 23 units. About 40% of the sample was placed in the echo chamber condition, while 60% of the sample was not. About 74% of the sample was identified as a 'strong' Republican, while about 26% reported their partisan strength as 'not very strong.' As for the control variables, the mean social media use score was about 3.7 on the 7-point scale, while political knowledge was slightly higher, with the mean being 3.35 on a 5-point scale. About a third of the sample resided in a swing state, while the other two-thirds did not. The majority of the sample was identified as White, and about a quarter of the sample was identified as Black or African American. The mean age of the sample was about 40 years old, while all ages ranged from 19 to 99 years old. Finally, half the sample was initially trained on identifying fake news with the priming video, while the other half was not.

Additional descriptive statistics of the fake news items noted the political alignment of the news items and the mean believability for 'strong' Republicans and 'not very strong' Republicans. Aggregated by political alignment, the mean believability of fake Democrat items was 62.01, and the mean believability of the fake Republican items was 64.24 on the 100-point scale. When breaking the means down by partisan strength of the respondents, the mean believability of the Democrat items was 67.75 for 'strong' Republicans, and only 44.69 for 'not very strong' Republicans. The mean believability of the Republican items was 70.29 for 'strong' Republicans and 47.15 for 'not very strong' Republicans. These initial descriptive statistics suggest that Republicans are slightly more believable of fake news items that align with their own political ideology. However, for all of the fake questions, these initial descriptive statistics suggest that 'strong' Republicans seem to have much higher believability scores than 'not very strong' Republicans.

3.2 Analytic Plan

To answer the research questions, the researcher used bivariate analysis and an OLS regression model to examine if people who identified as 'strong' Republicans had

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Believability	62.960	23.457	0	100
<i>Echo chamber</i>				
No	0.603	0.489	0	1
Yes	0.397	0.489	0	1
<i>Partisan strength</i>				
Strong	0.739	0.439	0	1
Not very strong	0.261	0.439	0	1
Social media use	3.663	1.887	0	7
Political knowledge	3.346	1.396	0	5
<i>Battleground state</i>				
Swing state	0.337	0.473	0	1
Republican safe	0.236	0.425	0	1
Democrat safe	0.427	0.495	0	1
<i>Race</i>				
White	0.628	0.484	0	1
Hispanic or latino	0.043	0.203	0	1
Black or African American	0.256	0.437	0	1
Native American or American Indian	0.031	0.173	0	1
Asian or Pacific Islander	0.033	0.179	0	1
Other	0.008	0.091	0	1
Age	39.366	12.301	19	99
<i>Training</i>				
No	0.499	0.500	0	1
Yes	0.501	0.500	0	1

significantly different believability scores than those who identified as ‘not very strong’ Republicans. Further, to test the moderation of the echo chamber in these two groups, the researcher also ran an OLS regression using an interaction between political strength and placement in an echo chamber. In both regression models, the researcher controlled for social media use, political knowledge, swing state, age, race, and training.

Model 1 contains the unadjusted associations between believability levels and political strength. Because the variances were not assumed to be equal, the researcher ran a t-test with unequal variances. Next, to determine whether political strength affects the believability of fake political news while controlling for demographic factors and other covariates, Model 2 shows the main effects of OLS regression. Model 2 contains the main effects model between believability levels and political strength while holding constant covariates, including echo chamber, swing state, age, race, social media use, political knowledge, and training. Lastly, to determine

whether echo chambers moderate the effect of political strength on believability, Model 3 adds a product term between echo chambers and political strength while still controlling for demographic factors and other covariates to examine the effects on the believability of political misinformation in Republicans. For both regression models, the three continuous predictor variables (political knowledge, social media use, and age) were all mean-centered.

4 Results

Results from Model 1 (the bivariate relationship between partisan strength and believability) showed that the mean difference in the believability of fake political news between 'strong' Republicans and 'not very strong' Republicans was significant ($t = 17.42; p < 0.0001; 95CI [19.98-25.06]$). The size of this effect was large ($d = 1.06$). Republicans with a 'strong' political affiliation averaged 22.5 believability points higher than 'not very strong' Republicans (see Fig. 2). Additional bivariate associations with believability were tested on the social media use and political knowledge variables. The association between political knowledge and partisan strength was significant ($t = -10.38; p < 0.0001$), indicating that on average, 'strong' Republicans scored 0.85 points lower on the political knowledge scale than 'not very strong' Republicans. The relationship between social media use and partisan strength was also significant between partisan strength groups ($t = 11.15; p < 0.0001$). On average, 'strong' Republicans scored 1.21 points higher on the social media use scale than 'not very strong' Republicans.

Results from Model 2 (Table 3) showed that while holding constant the variables for echo chamber, training, age, race, social media use, political knowledge, and




Fig. 2 Believability scores by partisan strength

swing states, the effect of the political strength of the respondent was still significant ($t = 9.24$; $p < 0.001$; 95CI [9.18–14.13]). Those who identify as ‘strong’ Republicans are predicted to average 11.66 points higher in believability of fake political news than those who identify as ‘not very strong’ Republicans. That is, ‘strong’ Republicans as compared to ‘not very strong’ Republicans score 0.5 standard deviations higher in believability. Unsurprisingly, the echo chamber condition is insignificant even with the control variables remaining constant. Social media use and political knowledge were both significant. For each 1 unit increase in social media use, believability scores are predicted to increase by 3.44 units. Better noted, for each one standard deviation increase in social media use, believability scores increased by 0.28 standard deviations. Conversely, there is a negative association between believability scores and political knowledge. With each 1 unit increase in the political knowledge scale, believability scores are expected to decrease by 3.81 points; better noted, for each 1 standard deviation increase in political knowledge, believability scores decrease by 0.23 standard deviations. The battleground state variable was also significant. Those who live in a Democrat safe state averaged 2.57 points higher on the believability scale than those who live in swing states (0.11 standard deviation difference), and those who live in Democrat safe states averaged 3.36 points higher on the believability scale than those who live in Republican safe states (0.14 standard deviation difference). There was no significant relationship between those who live in swing states and those who live in Republican safe states. The variables age,² training, and echo chamber were not significant. Despite the significant findings, the effect sizes for all significant measures were low (see Table 4).

The interaction term in Model 3 (Table 5) was not significant ($p = 0.12$). Echo chambers did not moderate the relationship between partisan strength and believability scores. Although it is not significant those who identified as having ‘not very strong’ partisan beliefs were slightly more impacted by the presence of an echo chamber; in comparison to those with ‘strong’ beliefs, the margins demonstrate that the echo chamber had barely any impact. This is the direction that was hypothesized and expected, as those with more extreme political ideologies have been found to be less trusting of news that does not align with their beliefs [5].

Model diagnostics were conducted, and sensitivity analyses led to substantively similar conclusions.³

² Sensitivity analyses revealed a nonlinear relationship between age and believability, with the logarithmic function of age fitting the model most parsimoniously. The models were updated, and age remained non-significant.

³ Model diagnostics led the researcher to conclude that assumptions regarding influential observations, normality, linearity, and no multicollinearity were reasonable. There were some influential cases, but they seemed to have only minimally impacted the findings. There was no theoretical reason to suspect a problem of independence. Additionally, there was no missing data, so there were zero concerns about the analytic sample being different from the rest of the sample, as it was all the same. The researcher did not compare the subset of the sample to the original sample, as they are expected to be inherently different. Model diagnostics showed a problem with homoscedasticity in that the political knowledge predictor variable may have been measured with error; however the assumption did not seem to be violated for social media use. Thus, the researcher ran some sensitivity analyses that overall corroborated the findings of the models, with slight differences to note.

Table 3 Main effects model

Believability	Coef.	St.Err.	t-value	p-value	Sig.
Echo chamber	1.403	1.046	1.34	0.180	***
Partisan strength	-11.701	1.262	-9.27	0	
Social media use	3.441	0.307	11.21	0	***
Political knowledge	-3.833	0.416	-9.22	0	***
Battleground state	0	.	.	.	
Republican safe	-1.047	1.375	-0.76	0.447	
Democrat safe	2.457	1.185	2.07	0.038	**
Race	0	.	.	.	
Hispanic or Latino	4.752	2.555	1.86	0.063	*
Black or African American	11.736	1.320	8.89	0	***
Native American or American Indian	2.030	3.003	0.68	0.499	
Asian or Pacific Islander	-3.281	2.903	-1.13	0.259	
Other	4.235	5.671	0.75	0.455	
Age	1.479	1.742	0.85	0.396	
Training	-1.062	1.024	-1.04	0.300	
Constant	73.679	2.049	35.96	0	***
Mean dependent var	62.96	SD dependent var	23.46		
R-squared	0.44	Number of obs	1205		
F-test	71.01	Prob > F	0.00		
Akaike crit. (AIC)	10359.08	Bayesian crit. (BIC)	10430.40		

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 4 Main effects model effect sizes

	Eta-squared	df
Model	0.437	13
Echo chamber	0.002	1
Partisan strength	0.067	1
Social media use	0.096	1
Political knowledge	0.067	1
Battleground state	0.007	2
Race	0.065	5
Age	0.001	1
Training	0.001	1

Table 5 Interaction effects

Believability	Coef.	St.Err.	t-value	p-value	(95%Conf Interval)		Sig.
Echo chamber	0
Yes	0.376	1.221	0.31	0.758	-2.020	2.772	
Partisan strength	0	
Not very strong	-13.273	1.588	-8.36	0	-16.389	-10.158	***
Echo chamber#Strong	3.853	2.366	1.63	0.104	-0.789	8.494	
Social media use	3.454	0.307	11.26	0	2.852	4.055	***
Political knowledge	-3.836	0.415	-9.23	0	-4.651	-3.021	***
Battleground state	0	
Republican safe	-1.092	1.374	-0.79	0.427	-3.788	1.604	
Democrat safe	2.464	1.185	2.08	0.038	0.140	4.788	**
Race	0	
Hispanic or latino	4.719	2.554	1.85	0.065	-0.292	9.729	*
Black or African American	11.770	1.319	8.92	0	9.182	14.358	***
Native American or American Indian	1.941	3.001	0.65	0.518	-3.946	7.1829	
Asian or Pacific Islander	-3.191	2.902	-1.10	0.272	-8.884	2.5018	
Other	4.701	5.674	0.83	0.408	-6.432	15.834	
Age	1.514	1.749	0.87	0.385	-1.901	4.929	
Training	-1.007	1.024	-0.98	0.326	-3.016	1.002	
Constant	62.339	1.265	49.28	0	59.857	64.821	***
Mean dependent var	62.96	SD dependent var			23.46		
R-squared	0.44	Number of obs			1205		
F-test	66.22	Prob > F			0.00		
Akaike crit. (AIC)	10358.40	Bayesian crit. (BIC)			10434.82		

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Violations of the assumption of homoscedasticity resulted in running a robust sensitivity test, which showed no influence on substantive conclusions. Similarly, the concerns about measurement error for the political knowledge construct resulted in no changes to substantive conclusions, although they did show that age and echo chamber were underestimated. While still non-significant, both variables had lower p-values than they initially appeared. Minor departures from linearity had effectively no influence on substantive conclusions as well. Most notably perhaps were some clear differences with sensitivity tests for normality. While no substantive conclusions differed, these tests showed that the political knowledge confidence interval was further from 0, and coincidentally, the coefficient. Overall, the political knowledge covariate was underestimated.

5 Discussion

The results showed that 'strong' Republicans were more likely to believe the fake news stories than 'not very strong' Republicans. While the difference in believability between these two groups decreased after control variables were added to the model, the difference between the groups was still significant. This finding goes against the hypothesis that was based on the literature. The literature stated that Republicans who identify as having a more extreme affiliation have lower levels of trust in the media, implying that they would be less susceptible to believing fake news stories [5]. However, as the January 6 insurrection highlighted, it is evident that many 'strong' Republicans are very susceptible to political misinformation, which aligns with the result of the current study. Perhaps the opposing facts- that 'strong' Republicans are less trusting of the media but most susceptible to fake news- can be explained using Starbird's [1] participatory disinformation theory. It is known that in recent years, 'strong' Republicans, especially Trump supporters, have been primed to believe something is 'fake news' when they are told it is. As discussed earlier, they are also adept at creating their own conspiracies. Interestingly, Republicans are unable to identify such misinformation when asked to determine it on their own, regardless of whether the information aligns with their beliefs or not. Interestingly, the initial bivariate models showed that 'strong' Republicans score lower on political knowledge but higher on social media use scales than do 'not very strong' Republicans. While on social media, they are not gaining any knowledge of political information.

The results from the main effects model showed that echo chamber conditions had no significant impact on believability, which was consistent with the finding from Rhodes [3], albeit with slightly different control variables. Even when echo chamber conditions and partisanship strength on believability scores were considered simultaneously via the interaction, there were no significant differences in believability among the groups. This means that 'strong' Republicans are not impacted by echo chambers significantly different than 'not very strong' Republicans, and that neither group was significantly impacted by being placed in an echo chamber. This finding goes against the hypothesis that Republicans outside of the echo chamber would have lower believability scores, as per the literature. It is particularly interesting that echo chambers seem to have no impact on Republicans, even when interacting with their partisan affiliation strength. This suggests that only being exposed to information that aligns with their viewpoints does not make them any more or less susceptible to believing what they read. It seems that Republicans have high believability rates regardless of whether the information aligns with their viewpoints. However, because their mean believability score is high both inside and outside of an echo chamber, perhaps they need more context or discussion with other people in order to determine the legitimacy of the news. Another explanation for this finding is that the scale for believability was subjective to the respondent. That is, multiple respondents could rate a news story as 50% believable, but they could each interpret that number differently. It is possible that Republicans find it difficult to determine the legitimacy of a

story without outside opinions. Such a controlled version of an echo chamber might be improved with the presence of comments attached to each news story, whether in agreement or disagreement. That could be a better indicator of an echo chamber, as the scenario used in this study had no concept of other people providing their opinions.

Interestingly, the main effects model showed that the more someone used social media, the more fake news stories they believed. This is not surprising, as social media users are often exposed to misinformation, and this finding corresponds with what the existing literature has concluded. Perhaps people with high social media use already saw the headline in question, as research indicates that even just reading a fake headline makes people more likely to believe it is real in the future [10]. Another possibility is that their overexposure to misinformation via their social media use led them to be desensitized to such misinformation to the extent that they can no longer recognize it. This positive relationship between believability and social media use may indicate a need for social media platforms to better regulate their content. Because there is no governmental mandate of social media platforms for content regulation policies, each social media platform uses its own version of ‘community guidelines’ to regulate content posted on its site [28]. While not mandated, many social media platforms still take steps to combat misinformation on their sites [28]. For example, according to Meta’s blog, Facebook uses an independent third-party fact-checking group, which is certified through the non-partisan International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) [29]. These independent fact-checkers identify misinformation by gathering content about a topic based on reported posts or trending keywords [29]. The fact-checkers independently use original reports to review and rate the accuracy of posts [29]. If the content is found to be inaccurate, it is not removed from the website [29]. Instead, it is flagged as false, and Facebook lowers the distribution of the content so fewer people see it [29]. Facebook also applies a warning label and notifies users who have shared the content [29]. While platforms like Facebook and Twitter have guidelines and teams in place for attempting to manage or censor misinformation, other social media websites, like Reddit, instead have selected users to serve as moderators [28–30]. These moderators have the power to disapprove of posts, remove comments, or even remove accounts, and can be in charge of the content to which millions of viewers subscribe [30]. Because people are more likely to censor online content that is incongruent with their own political views, this opens the door for echo chambers and misinformation [30]. Even for platforms with fact-checking regulations, misinformation is still often rampant on these sites.

The model also showed that the more political knowledge someone had, the less they believed fake news stories. This finding was also not surprising, as someone with more political knowledge would be expected to have more context clues to identify whether a political story is true or not. While this is a measure of a specific type of education, this finding aligns with previous research that indicates that lower education levels influence belief in online misinformation. Because this suggests that better education about politics decreases the likelihood of believing political misinformation, policymakers or educators may want to push for better education in such areas in school or better access to such information in general. One solution

could be for platforms to provide baseline educational information and news to their users in an accessible way; however, if certain groups of people are already distrustful of the media, there may be distrust of this information as well. Some platforms have similar regulations already in place, with trending news stories from verified sources easy to access.

Together, the significant social media and political knowledge findings fit into the framework identified by Starbird [1]. Because social media is a communication tool that can spread misinformation widely and quickly, when individuals with high social media use also have low levels of political knowledge, they are particularly susceptible. They are frequently exposed to political misinformation, but they do not have the political knowledge to see past the falsehoods. Regardless of the variety of content seen on social media (i.e., not in an echo chamber), this group of individuals believes what they are told. They are primed to be wary of fake news in everyday life and may even create fabrications of misinformation out of primed paranoia, but they are incapable of identifying it when it is in front of them.

Interestingly, the location was significant. Those who resided in Democrat safe states believed more political misinformation than those who lived in swing states and those who lived in Republican safe states. It is important to keep in mind that this subset only consists of Republicans. Republicans who lived in Democrat safe states believed more misinformation than Republicans elsewhere. It was expected that Republicans living in Democrat safe states would believe less misinformation, as they likely lived in areas where their beliefs did not align with the majority. However, states are large in area, so it is likely there are Republican parts of Democrat safe states. Perhaps this speaks to the news in these states or the amount of misinformation that is spread. It is still problematic that Republicans living in certain areas of the country are more susceptible to misinformation than those living in other parts of the country. Meanwhile, the fact that residing in a swing state did not seem to increase someone's believability of misinformation can be viewed positively as these states often have a bigger influence on the outcome of elections. Although there is research that indicates swing state areas are exposed to more misinformation, perhaps the nature of the political divide in those states results in more discourse and less of an echo chamber effect on a grander, state-level scale. It is also important to keep in mind the coding of this variable as it was based on the margin of victory in the 2020 election. This will change with each election, so the way the states are coded in this study may not result in the same coding from different election results.

The finding that age had no significant impact on believability was interesting, especially as digital literacy has been found to be an influence on people's believability of misinformation [4] and it is common to associate older people with less digital literacy. A future study should have a construct that intentionally encapsulates digital literacy to examine its impact on misinformation believability. Age may also have been expected to be negatively associated with believability, as older people have more experience and knowledge to give them context, perhaps helping them detect misinformation. Nevertheless, there was no significant association found between age and believability. If age serves as a general indication of digital literacy, it is

interesting that this form of education was not significant but education in the form of political knowledge was significant.

Next, the model showed that the initial training video made no difference in someone's believability of political misinformation. The ineffectiveness of the initial training video could be seen as a potential concern, as a significant finding would have indicated that training could be used to mitigate the dangers of misinformation or to teach media literacy. That is not to say that misinformation detection awareness is not valuable. Rather, it is interesting that being told of the possible warning signs that something is misinformation was ineffective in increasing participants' abilities to detect it. Perhaps the content of the training video was not sufficient, or the fake news stories were written in such a believable way that made the content of the training video irrelevant. This may also indicate that a different or more extensive process, rather than only a short video, is necessary to help people become less susceptible to believing misinformation. A more thorough video may have sufficed or even a hands-on training workshop could be necessary. More research should be done on the effectiveness of different types of interventions aimed at improving people's misinformation detection capabilities. If such an intervention were to work, it would also be important to keep in mind the length of time that it remains effective.

Overall, the results showed that among Republicans, the following factors were significantly associated with the believability of political misinformation: strength of political ideology, social media use, political knowledge, location (battleground state), and race. Meanwhile, echo chambers, training, and age, did not have a significant relationship with believability, nor was there a significant interaction of partisan strength and echo chambers.

5.1 Implications

Understanding that a certain group of people is more susceptible to believing political misinformation can inform practices, policies, or programs that can be put in place to help teach media literacy and combat people's acceptance of political misinformation as legitimate news. As this study extended the work of Rhodes [3] that Republicans have higher believability than Democrats, it becomes clear that self-identified 'strong' Republicans have the highest levels of belief, seemingly regardless of whether they agree with what is presented to them. These results are important because the implication that 'strong' Republicans believe much of what they read is a characteristic that can easily be manipulated, and they can have their opinions changed by fake news. These opinions can result in physical acts, whether that is voting in an election or storming the US Capitol in protest of an election. It is especially important that those with stronger beliefs are more susceptible, as people with stronger political beliefs may be the people who are more often voting and are more politically active, impacting society more than those who do not identify as having a strong political affiliation. Furthermore, if such a group is more susceptible to believing fake news, they will then have greater influence on sharing such fake news with others or making

decisions based on what they believe. This group needs to be kept in mind as the target of any mitigation efforts, whether that is mitigating the presence of online misinformation or mitigating the impacts through awareness campaigns and digital literacy education.

Another implication comes from the significance of the social media use scale. As social media is only gaining in popularity, it is going to become increasingly important to curtail the fake news being spread via its platforms. Social media is easily accessible and active 24/7. People from all over the world can take part, even anonymously, making it incredibly easy to spread fake news on such a platform. Social media has allowed communication to reach a wider audience than has been possible in the past, and it poses a legitimate threat as it becomes a platform for misinformation to spread quickly. Social media companies need to continue to improve their fact-checking services; however, even with proper fact-checking services, the discussion on censorship remains a consideration, as there are several counterarguments to censorship. The first is that it is in violation of the first amendment's right to free speech. There are also laws, such as Sect. 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which allow social media platforms discretion in what content they choose to censor. Finally, even if censorship were agreed upon as a solution, the intricacies of such misinformation can make it difficult for computer programs or artificial intelligence to identify it from legitimate information, especially on a scale as large as a social media platform with global outreach and millions of users. Misinformation uses rhetoric such as humor, metaphors, visuals, and sarcasm, which makes it hard to identify with just keyword searches.

In addition to these policy implications, there are also some theoretical implications. This research adds to Rhodes' [3] work by clarifying that the impact of echo chambers was not significantly different based on partisan strength and was indeed not significant for either group of Republicans. It also brings to light the importance of high social media use and low political knowledge. Further, it contributes to Starbird's [1] participatory disinformation theory by narrowing down the group that is most susceptible to misinformation and consequently, most susceptible to the priming effects that Starbird [1] uses to explain the process of disinformation dissemination. It provides an opportunity to refine the theory by better describing the group of individuals who are more likely to be susceptible to believing misinformation spread to and from political elites. The group of individuals who are more likely to be susceptible to political misinformation includes 'strong' Republicans with high social media use, low political knowledge, and those who live in Democrat safe states.

There were some limitations to this study. First, is the choice in sampling, as the researcher chose to limit the sample to those who reside in the 50 US states, excluding US territories. While this decision was justified, it does create some limitations with regard to generalizability. A second limitation emerged from the analytic process, which could have used the existing data to further capture the echo chamber and better understand its impact. To do this, the researcher could have used an analysis that compared an individual's believability at the beginning of the survey (i.e., upon entering the echo chamber) to their believability by the end of the survey (i.e., after

being in the echo chamber for a duration of time). While these are limitations, the present study was meant to be exploratory in nature with the objective of determining the group that is most susceptible to political misinformation. Nonetheless, this research can now be used as a foundation for future work. There were also some limitations associated with using secondary data, including the inability to control for gender, education, and religion. Relatedly, using just a subset of Rhodes [3] may have led to constrained bias in the results. Another limitation is the subjective nature of the partisan strength construct. No definition was provided for a ‘strong’ versus ‘not very strong’ Republican, and thus the question may have been viewed differently among respondents. Some people may have considered themselves to be strong Republicans if they were politically active. In contrast, others may consider themselves as strong Republicans if they strongly agree with Republican viewpoints. This subjectivity was also present in the believability scale. A further limitation was the below-adequate reliability score of the political knowledge construct. However, this limitation and some deviations in normality and homoscedasticity were considered and addressed through sensitivity tests.

6 Conclusion

This study used data from Rhodes [3] to examine the impact of partisan strength and echo chambers on Republicans’ susceptibility to believing political misinformation. Strong partisan beliefs were a contributing factor to susceptibility but echo chambers were not. In general, the believability of misinformation was high, suggesting a need for a call to action so that people are not being continuously manipulated by fake news. Combatting political fake news through censorship is becoming increasingly impractical and offers many challenges. Instead, the focus should shift to help make people less susceptible to believing such misinformation. Indeed, a better framework may be to understand the process that occurs when believing fake news from various sources and to identify what makes people fortified against fake news. As such, below are several avenues for future research.

One direction for future research is to expand upon Starbird’s [1] breakdown of the January 6 insurrection, which helps to understand how such misinformation spreads between the general population and political elites. Mitigation may do well to intercept this process at the priming stage, as trying to censor misinformation that is already online will prove to be difficult. Future research can also examine the process by which someone becomes primed, enters an echo chamber, believes misinformation, and acts on those beliefs. Additionally, research on the impacts of priming would help to inform the easiest place to prevent people from being susceptible to fake news. Another important direction for future research would be to use qualitative methods to understand users’ decision-making processes in deciding whether a piece of information is legitimate or not. A better understanding of this process may help with creating better training or mitigation techniques.

Misinformation will continue to remain relevant as online communication via social media advances and gains popularity. Its impact and extent need to be addressed as it is associated with concrete harms, including the January 6 insurrection. This study identified several factors that can be used to predict who is most susceptible to political misinformation, particularly the strength of political affiliation, social media use, and political knowledge. However, future research needs to be implemented to better understand this phenomenon and the role that social media platforms play in amplifying or mitigating its spread and impact. If left unchecked, political misinformation will only continue to divide the people of the United States and serve as a threat to democracy.

References

1. Starbird, K.: [@katestarbird]. Working on some visuals to help explain the dynamics of “Participatory disinformation” and how that motivated the January 6 attacks [Tweet] (2021). Twitter. <https://twitter.com/katestarbird/status/1390408145428643842>
2. Molden, D.C.: Understanding priming effects in social psychology: an overview and integration. *Soc. Cogn.* **32**(Special Issue), 243–249 (2014)
3. Rhodes, S.C.: Echo chambers, echo chambers, and fake news: how social media conditions individuals to be less critical of political misinformation. *Polit. Commun. Commun.* **39**(1), 1–22 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2021.1910887>
4. Baptista, J.P., Gradim, A.G.: Understanding fake news consumption: a review. *Soc. Sci.* **9**, 185 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9100185>
5. Michael, R.B., Breaux, B.O.: The relationship between political affiliation and beliefs about sources of “Fake news.” *Cogn. Res. Princ. Implic.* **6**, 6 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41235-021-00278-1>
6. Pew Research Center. Partisan Divides In Media Trust Widen, Driven by a Decline Among Republicans (2021). <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/30/partisan-divides-in-media-trust-widen-driven-by-a-decline-among-Republicans/>
7. Allcott, H., Gentzkow, M.: Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. *J. Econ. Perspect.* **31**(2), 211–236 (2017)
8. Steenbuch Traberg, C., van der Linden, S.: Birds of a feather are persuaded together: perceived source credibility mediates the effect of political bias on misinformation susceptibility. *Pers. Individ. Differ.* **185**, 111269 (2021)
9. Pennycook, G., Cannon, T.D., Rand, D.G.: Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news. *J. Exp. Psychol.* **147**(12), 1865–1880 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000465>
10. Pennycook, G., Rand, D.G.: Who falls for fake news? The roles of bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, familiarity, and analytic thinking. *J. Pers.* **88**, 185–200 (2019)
11. Stroud, N.J.: Media use and political predispositions: revisiting the concept of selective exposure. *Polit. Behav. Behav.* **30**(3), 341–366 (2008). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-007-9050-9>
12. Oxford University Press. (n.d.). Echo chamber. In [oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com](https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/echo-chamber) dictionary. <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/echo-chamber>. Last accessed 27 July 2022
13. Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., Aral, S.: The spread of true and false news online. *Soc. Sci.* **359**, 1146–1151 (2018)
14. Lee, T.D.: Combating fake news with “Reasonable standards.” *Hast. Commun. Entertain. Law J.* **43**(1), 81–108 (2021)

15. Cobbe, J.: Algorithmic censorship by social platforms: power and resistance. *Philos. Technol.* **34**, 739–766 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-020-00429-0>
16. Tucker, J.A., Guess, A., Barbera, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D., Nyham, B.: Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: a review of the scientific literature. William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (2018)
17. Napoli, P.M.: What if more speech is no longer the solution: first amendment theory meets fake news and the echo chamber. *Fed. Commun. Law J.* **70**(1), 55–104 (2018)
18. Conover, M.D., Bruno Gonclaves, A., Flammini, A., Menczer, F.: Partisan asymmetries in online political activity. *EPJ Data Sci.* **1**(6), 1–19 (2012). <https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds6>
19. Collins, T.P., Crawford, J.T., Brandt, M.J.: No evidence for ideological asymmetry in dissonance avoidance: unsuccessful close and conceptual replications of Nam, Jost, and van Bavel (2013). *Soc. Psychol.* (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000300>
20. Bradshaw, S., Howard, P.N.: The global organization of social media disinformation campaigns. *J. Int. Aff.* **71**(1.5), 23–32 (2018)
21. Panczova, Z.: Conspiracy theories and rumours as key elements of political propaganda: the cold war in the USA and Czechoslovakia in the 1950s. *Forum Hist.* **15**(2), 15–37 (2021). ISSN 1337-6861. <https://doi.org/10.31577/forhist.2021.15.2.3>
22. Beder, S.: Lobbying, greenwash and deliberate confusion: how vested interests undermine climate change. Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts-Papers. 1972 (2014). <https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1972>
23. Hilliard, R.L., Keith, M.C.: Waves of Rancor: Tuning into the Radical Right: Tuning into the Radical Right, 1st edn. Routledge (1999). <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315503172>
24. Center for Information Technology and Science (CITS, 2022). A brief history of fake news. University of California Santa Barbara. <https://www.cits.ucsb.edu/fake-news/brief-history>
25. Piazza, J.: Fake news: the effects of social media disinformation on domestic terrorism. *Dyn. Asymmetric Confl.* **15**(1), 55–77 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2021.1895263>
26. Kim, J.Y., Kesari, A.K.: Misinformation and hate speech: the case of anti-Asian hate speech during the COVID-19 pandemic. *J. Online Trust. Saf.* (2021)
27. Howard, P., Kollanyi, B., Bradshaw, S., Neudert, L.M.: Social Media, New and Political Information during the US Election: Was Polarizing Content Concentrated in Swing States? (2017). <https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1802/1802.03573.pdf>
28. Hooker, M.P.: Censorship, free speech and Facebook: applying the first amendment to social media platforms via the public function exception. *Wash. J. Law Technol. Arts* **15**(1), 36–73 (2019)
29. Meta. How Facebook’s Third-Party Fact-Checking Program Works. Meta Journalism Project (2021). <https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-fact-checking/how-it-works>
30. Ashokkumar, et al.: Censoring political opposition online: who does it and why. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **91** (2020)

Awareness of Cybercrimes Among Postgraduate Facebook Users in a State University of Sri Lanka



M. A. J. Wijesekera, T. N. D. S. Ginige, and R. A. B. Abeygunawardana

Abstract Today social media, mainly Facebook, has become the greatest method of communication through the world by connecting people. Accordingly, the academic student has been using Facebook for exchanging information with friends, family, and relatives. Therefore, this study proposes to investigate the awareness of cybercrimes among postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka. To do this study, a Google Form questionnaire was disseminated to the willingness students and the full answered 291 responses were analyzed by using SPSS. The study used an Independent Sample T-Test method of data analysis to understand the cybercrime awareness on Facebook by determining the variance between the mean gender of the student. According to the results of the analysis indicated that there is a significance in the difference between the gender in all dimensions on the dependent variable. However, there was no significant difference between the gender and age on Facebook. Relatively, the result of the study showed that the respondents were confident in protecting themselves from cybercrime on Facebook. Finally, the output of this study will be used as input for academics, students, and researchers by integrating the social interaction and attitude of Facebook users.

Keywords Cybercrime · Facebook · Social media

1 Introduction

By connecting people around the world, social media has now become the most popular method of communication. In fact, these platforms facilitate connectivity among individuals despite geographical distance. As a result, everyone irrespective of their gender, age, or social status shared information with friends and family

M. A. J. Wijesekera (✉) · T. N. D. S. Ginige
Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka
e-mail: maneka.wijesekera@gmail.com

R. A. B. Abeygunawardana
Department of Statistics, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_11

through social media. However, despite all its advantages social media has become breeding grounds for cybercrime that is caused by inappropriate use of social media. Hence, this study aims to find out the awareness of cybercrimes among postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka. In order to carry out this study, a paper-based questionnaire was distributed to willing students, and SPSS was used to analyze the full 291 responses. The Independent Sample T-Test method of data analysis was used in the study, to determine the variance between the mean gender of students to understand the cybercrime awareness on Facebook. By incorporating social interaction and attitude of social media users, the results of this study will be used as input for academics, students, and researchers.

Social media has a big impact on people's lives and businesses in the modern world. Thanks to the quick growth of information and communication technology, it has become a necessary element of people's lives and the management of their activities (such as the Internet and smartphones). In contrast, social media is challenging to describe because it hasn't been consistent since its inception, despite the fact that it was designed to facilitate global communication and information sharing.

In today's world, a computer is among the essential general functions for a variety of reasons. It is used by almost all businesses, organizations, and individuals today. The development of technology brings both advantages and disadvantages, and both are really beneficial. This rapid progress also produces problems and difficulties as a result. Many crimes have been committed through taking advantage of computer networks. Money fraud crimes, cyberextortion, cyberwarfare, hacking, illegal downloading, and piracy of software and websites are all examples of computer crimes. These types of crimes involve the online environment and also compromise mobile, data, and laptop security.

Cybercrime is the use of a laptop and the Internet to harm another individual or a group of people. As early as the late 1970s, it was a depressant. The first spam e-mail appeared in 1978, and the first malware infected an Apple notebook in 1982. In 2006, there were about 2000 complaints of cybercrime. The three main issues were financial fraud, infections, and hackers. Unwanted erotica is being exposed to children, and reports of online abuse and harassment are constantly overstated.

Many individuals all across the world now use the Internet as part of their daily lives (Kritzinger 2010). There is no question in the world that the abundance of technology and information empower people. The majority of prior research (Langat and Davies 2016) addressed the use of web-based entertainment as opposed to its consequences on the clients, with a primary focus on user reasons for utilizing social media. Due to the surge in academic students use of social media, it is crucial to look at how aware they are of cybercrime. One of the gaps in the literature was about the cybercrime awareness on certain social media, namely, Facebook.

According to Rekha [6], cybercrime is currently a widespread problem that affects every aspect of modern life. Popular social networking sites like Facebook have developed into more than just a way to stay in touch with friends both old and new; instead, they have become a public arena for expressing thoughts and organizing people for a worldwide uprising. The National Analysis Agency elaborates that social media is responsible for every sixth cybercrime in India.

The growth and enhancement of online entertainment have profoundly altered the ways in which customers interact with one another. The Internet and the media claim that social media are expanding at an alarming rate because of the related problem. If social media is not effectively managed, these hazards are likely to become catastrophic and difficult to prevent. According to Mingle and Adams (2015), cybercriminals have made social media their main focus in order to gather and spread a lot of information on businesses and people.

The Internet evolvement in Sri Lanka is remarkable and most of the Internet-related latest technologies were introduced to Sri Lanka sometimes even before the other countries in the region [1]. Both the government and the corporate sectors of Sri Lanka have also incorporated the cyberspace into their operations. Thus, operations of the government and private sector institutions heavily rely on computers and the Internet. However, there are many threats and risks incorporated with the Internet (Riem 2001). Furthermore, the Internet has exposed to criminal activities due to private information on it. Hence, there is a risk of misusing and compromising personal data on the Internet.

1.1 Hypotheses of the Study

Hypothesis 01:

H0: There is no relationship that the Gender and the Age has heavily impacted on the growth of cybercrime in postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka.

H1: There is a relationship that the Gender and the Age has heavily impacted on the growth of cybercrime in postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka.

Hypothesis 02:

H0: There is no relationship that the Facebook usage and Gender have been affected by the various kinds of cybercrimes on postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka.

H1: There is a relationship that the Facebook usage and Gender have been affected by the various kinds of cybercrimes on postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka.

Hypothesis 03:

H0: There is no relationship that the Facebook usage and Age have been affected by the various kinds of cybercrimes on postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka.

H1: There is a relationship that the Facebook usage and Age have been affected by the various kinds of cybercrimes on postgraduate Facebook users at in a state university of Sri Lanka.

Hypothesis 04:

H0: There is no relationship that the Gender and the Hours spent have been affected by the various kinds of cybercrimes unknowingly, since they are not aware of the precautions and the awareness methods that have to be taken by the postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka.

H1: There is a relationship that Gender and the Hours spent have been affected by the various kinds of cybercrimes unknowingly, since they are not aware of the precautions and the awareness methods that have to be taken by the postgraduate Facebook users in a state university of Sri Lanka.

2 Literature Review

2.1 *Cybercrime*

The major contributor to cybercrime increment is the Internet. The adoption and usage of Internet, cybercriminals often use images, programs, or digital communication in order to run malicious attacks [2]. Some of the crimes on the Internet are identity theft, financial theft, espionage, pornography, eavesdropping, denial-of-service attacks, or copyright infringement.

The Internet creates unlimited opportunities for commercial, social, and other human activities. But with cybercrime the Internet introduces its own critical risks. The usage of Internet and other digital technologies have enhanced the risk of attack from cybercriminals across the globe. Computer crime is not limited by the geographical boundaries, they operate globally in the digital world; the attacker only needs an access to a computer that is connected to network. The attacker needs no passport and passes through no checkpoints as he commits his crime. Automation gives the attacker the ability to commit many computer crimes very quickly. The constraints that govern action in the physical world do not restrict the attackers of computer crime (Aslan 2006). Cybercrimes vary from computer fraud, theft, and forgery to infringements of privacy, the propagation of harmful content, the falsification of prostitution, and organized crime. Financial crimes, sale of illegal articles, pornography, online gambling, intellectual property crime, e-mail spoofing, forgery, cyberdefamation, and cyberstalking (Asma 2013).

Cybercrime has evolved into a concern for public policy, as Paternoster [5] demonstrated in his study, it has been studied using criminal theories, situational elements, and individual characteristics. Also, a laptop cannot connect to the Internet on its own, therefore it is important to understand the various devices that are linked to the Internet for data delivery and acquisition, such as cyberthreats and cellular objects.

2.2 Facebook Privacy

Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross of Carnegie Mellon University have conducted a significant amount of research on Facebook security, including Imagined Communities Awareness, Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook. When social networking was just beginning to catch on around the world in 2006, these writers conducted a survey of their fellow university students who were also using Facebook. The researchers examined the influence of privacy concerns and searched for underlying demographic or behavioral differences between the populations of network members and nonmembers (Acquisti and Gross 2006).

According to the study, a person's privacy concerns are merely a marginal indicator of whether or not they will join the network. In reality, people who are worried about their privacy join the network and reveal a lot of private information. Several people dealt with their privacy worries by having faith in their capacity to govern the information they offer and the outside party's access to it. Yet, researchers discovered that some participants had serious misconceptions regarding the scope of the online community and the visibility of their profiles (Acquisti and Gross 2006).

2.3 Facebook Privacy Concerns

The Ohio University study used a report on 23 Internet service providers and found that Facebook has serious privacy issues, ranking it in the second-lowest category for a significant, all-encompassing privacy danger (Debatin et al. 2009). Facebook and six other businesses were connected. Concerns about data mining, transfers to other businesses, and, in particular, Facebook's policy of raising doubts about how the company might gather information about website users from other sources, such as publications, blogs, instant messaging services, or any other external Facebook service, were the basis for this rating (Debatin et al. 2009). Professor of law at Columbia University, Dr. Eben Moglen supports the practice of distributed data sharing, which makes research easily accessible to investigators.

2.4 Cybercrime Awareness Related to Graduates

The knowledge, laws, and security surrounding cybercrime are briefly covered in this section. According to Malhotra and Malhotra [3], gender and location have a strong independent impact on teacher candidates' understanding of cybercrime.

Sukanya and Raju's [7] study on cyber law awareness among young people in the Malappuram District of India revealed that a large minority (41%) of undergraduates from rural areas have no knowledge at all of the Information Technology Act of

2000. In assessing the cyberlegal awareness of the IT Act, 2000 in India, gender, education, and region of residence do not demonstrate any meaningful association.

From their study, Parmar and Patel [4] deduced that most graduates, regardless of their affiliation with the IT industry, were unable to actively keep themselves abreast of the most recent information regarding cyberlaw and computer security. They believed that the situation among graduates who are not involved in the technology area could become even worse. They suggested teaching graduates the fundamentals of ethics and raising knowledge of India's cyberlaws.

3 Methods and Materials

This study aims to identify the level of cybercrime awareness among postgraduate Facebook users in a state university in Sri Lanka. Data for this study were collected through self-administered questionnaires, and processed by SPSS to generate interpretable results. The results were then utilized to extract the ultimate findings of this research.

3.1 Conceptual Framework Model

In Fig. 1, the conceptual framework is divided into two variables into one dependent variable and four independent variables.




Fig. 1 Conceptual framework

In order to analyze the results, we have done the Chi-Square test to test the hypotheses of the study. In order to test the significance of the variables, the One-Way ANOVA test was conducted. The Pearson correlation was conducted to check whether there is a positive or negative linear relationship between variables. The skewness and the Kurtosis was measured to check the distribution of the shape. Finally, an independent sample T-test was done to find the mean gender of the respondents.

Using the Morgan table, a sample size of 291 is calculated, with a 20% non-responsive rate and a 5% error rate. Nevertheless the “Rule of 100” from Gorsuch (1983) and Kline is included in this research, and this sample size is sufficient to generate an accurate and dependable output (1979). The ideal sample size for a study with more than two independent variables, according to Gorsuch (1983) and Kline (1979), is over 100. There were 291 participants in the study, which is a sample size that is reasonably close to 100.

Quantitative research techniques will be useful for gathering a wide variety of reliable data from a much smaller sample of respondents. This will actually happen in the main data sources, where a questionnaire will have a lot of questions yet only be meant for a small number of responders. This will make it possible to identify the study’s most intricate elements.

4 Data and Results

4.1 Awareness on Cybercrime and Security

Figure 2 expressed the respondents’ view of whether they have ever been cyberbullied or not. According to the analysis results, we found out that only 6.9% of the respondents said that they strongly agree with whether they have been cyberbullied in some manner. 28.9% of the respondents mentioned that they would strongly disagree with the statement of whether they have been cyberbullied or not. 22.3% disagreed with the statement of whether they have been cyberbullied or not. Whereas 10.7% of the respondents mentioned that they would agree that they have been cyberbullied in some manner. Only 31.3% of the respondents gave the responses as neutral of whether they have been cyberbullied or not.

4.2 Facebook Usage Data

Figure 3 expressed the respondents’ FB usage. As shown in Fig. 3, 3.44% of the respondents have been using Facebook for 0–3 months, 18.6% of the total respondents have been using Facebook for 3–6 months, and 50% were using Facebook




Fig. 2 Respondents view of having being cyberbullied

more than (>1) years. This value indicated most of the respondents selected for this study have been using Facebook for a long period of time.




Fig. 3 Respondents' FB usage

4.3 Hypothesis Testing Using Chi-Square Test

A statistical technique called the chi-square test is used to compare actual outcomes with predictions. The goal of this test is to establish whether a discrepancy between observed and expected data is the result of chance or a correlation between the variables.

According to Table 1, the *p*-value (**0.239**) appears in the same row in the Asymptotic Significance. In this case, the *p*-value is larger than the standard alpha value, so we do not reject the null hypothesis that asserts the two variables are independent of each other.

According to Table 2, the *p*-value (0.043) appears in the same row in Asymptotic Significance. In this case, the *p*-value is smaller than the standard alpha value, so we reject the null hypothesis that asserts the two variables are independent of each other.

According to Table 3, the *p*-value (**0.259**) appears in the same row in the Asymptotic Significance. In this case, the *p*-value is larger than the standard alpha value, so we do not reject the null hypothesis that asserts the two variables are independent of each other.

According to Table 4, the *p*-value (**0.548**) appears in the same row in the Asymptotic Significance. In this case, the *p*-value is larger than the standard alpha value, so we do not reject the null hypothesis that asserts the two variables are independent of each other.

Table 1 Chi-square test between the age and the gender of the respondents and their awareness on cybercrime

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	4.216 ^a	3	0.239
Likelihood ratio	5.206	3	0.157
Linear-by-linear association	2.377	1	0.123
No. of valid cases	291		

Table 2 Chi-square test between the FB usage and the gender of the respondents and their awareness on cybercrime

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	8.169 ^a	3	0.043
Likelihood ratio	8.135	3	0.043
Linear-by-linear association	3.469	1	0.063
No. of valid cases	291		

Table 3 Chi-square test between the FB usage and the age of the respondents and their awareness on cybercrime

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	11.249 ^a	9	0.259
Likelihood ratio	12.856	9	0.169
Linear-by-linear association	1.433	1	0.231
No. of valid cases	291		

Table 4 Chi-square test between the hours spent and the gender of the respondents and their awareness on cybercrime

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square	2.118 ^a	3	0.548
Likelihood ratio	2.206	3	0.531
Linear-by-linear association	0.245	1	0.620
No. of valid cases	291		

5 Discussion

The landscape of the Internet is evolving and getting more relevant with time. All users have a way to connect with one another in the digital world. Many people engage in social media, mainly Facebook, and it is increasingly necessary to have access to it for both personal and professional purposes. The purpose of this study was to find out how much postgraduate users knew about Facebook crime and their awareness. It has been established through data collecting and statistical analyses that Facebook does really facilitate cybercrimes.

This research shows that cybercrime is still a significant trend. Facebook also exposes the negative aspects of online users. While debating contentious issues, everyone whose opinion differs from the other person is automatically attacked. Oddly, vulgar language and individualized remarks are present. Many people decide to respond in the same way in response to this instead of using Facebook capabilities. Few people will decide to report these comments to the site or request that they be taken down. In response, cyberbullying is raising increasing concerns among parents and the universities their children attend. Many parents believe their child may end up being the victim rather than the offender. Several people believed that other authorities should take greater action to combat cyberbullying and cybercrime, though. Many believe that law enforcement handles these crimes ineffectively.

This is significant since cyberbullying is still on the rise. There aren't many tools or specific laws that can be used to stop or lessen these cybercrimes. Also, many of the current regulations against traditional bullying and harassment are incredibly out of date. Judges and law enforcement officials are unable to give the victim the proper measure of justice. Businesses and public institutions can only keep a limited

eye on their workers' conduct. Even if they took the activity on their own time or with their own money, they might not be able to stop. If no solutions are developed, the trend and the number of victims will continue to increase. It might be preferable for social media sites to offer resources to those who have been the victims of these cybercrimes. This could contribute to raising knowledge of their rights on the site, much to how universities offer services to bullied students. The acts of offenders and their communication with their victims can also be reduced by more explicit site policies.

6 Conclusion

Social media users may suffer several types of harm as a result of cybercrime. The author conducted a survey of postgraduate users to learn more about cybercrime awareness among postgraduate Facebook users at the ABC faculty in a state university of Sri Lanka. The study's predictions aid students and researchers in their understanding of Facebook cybercrime and self-defense measures.

Since there are so many people with various viewpoints, it appears that insulting language and personal attacks by complete strangers are becoming the norm. It represents the ambiguity around what constitutes free speech as well as the fact that anonymity gives users the impression that they can act in such a cruel manner. Politics and other controversial subjects show how people would choose to act poorly toward others because there are rarely any immediate repercussions and it is more common to avoid face-to-face interactions with the victims. Since like-minded people frequently decide to act in ways that are similar to their peers, mob mentality can also be applied in these circumstances.

Cyberbullying is more prevalent than ever today. Any bullying that takes place online will simply transfer offline, and vice versa. Due to social media's growing popularity, more people can now see online bullying of children. Violent comments are written in the hopes that the creator will see them if their audience does not like the person or the content they are posting. The question of whose job it is to prevent or curtail social media crime is still up for dispute. There is some degree of accountability for the crimes on the part of all parties, including social media platforms.

The victims ought to utilize their account settings and select their privacy options. If another user feels threatened or uncomfortable, they should use tools like unfriending, blocking, and reporting. If at all possible, try to stay away from the offender and use filters to block any comments or messages from them. Theoretically, offenders shouldn't act abhorrently online. It is unrealistic to think that criminals will refrain from committing these crimes because of social norms. Even though these people are acting inhumanely, the results of their actions will still happen, even if they are unaware of what they have done.

Cybercrime is, however, a complex subject area usually surrounded by a lot of misuse of online victims. For this reason, awareness creation is avoidable in the fight

against cybercrime. This, therefore, necessitates the need for a national cybercrime awareness policy that focuses on students as key stakeholders in the education sector.

Acknowledgements This research is an ultimate outcome of huge amount of research effort contributed by the authors where a number of people stand behind and supported immensely. Authors would like to acknowledge all the lecturers of the Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Colombo for their dedicated support toward the research was intensely appreciated.

References

1. Abeyskara, E.R.D., Liyanarachchi, M., Wijesinghe, W.S., Jayarathne, N., Wijethunga, M.T.N., Perera, M.: Cyber Terrorism; Is Sri Lanka Ready. General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, Sri Lanka (2012)
2. Chauhan, A.: Preventing cyber crime: a study regarding awareness of cyber crime in Tricity. *Int. J. Enterp. Comput. Bus. Syst.* **2** (2012)
3. Malhotra, T., Malhotra, M.: Cyber crime awareness among teacher trainees. *Sch. Res. J. Interdiscip. Stud.* **4**(31), 5249–5259 (2017)
4. Parmar, A., Patel, K.: Critical study and analysis of cyber law awareness among graduates. In: *International Conference on ICT for Sustainable Development*, vol. 409 (2016). http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-981-10-0135-2_32
5. Paternoster, P.: Social media impact and implications on society and students. *J. Media Lit. Educ.* **32**, 1–17 (2017)
6. Rekha, M.: Impact of social networking on cybercrimes. *Int. J. Multidiscip. Res.* **4**(4), 9–14 (2018)
7. Sukanya, K.P., Raju, C.V.: Cyber law awareness among youth of Malappuram district. *IOSR J. Humanit. Soc. Sci.* **22**(4), Ver. 5, 23–30 (2017)

Vulnerabilities That Threaten Web Applications in Afghanistan



Sayed Mansoor Rahimy, Sayed Hassan Adelyar, and Said Rahim Manandoy

Abstract Familiarizing web developers with different types of vulnerabilities lead to the creation of secure web applications. In the last few decades, there has been considerable interest in web hacking which leads to different types of web attacks that can cause financial damages, privacy loss, data loss, and life-threatening situations. This study aims to discover the most common web vulnerabilities that exist in Afghanistan's web applications and websites. We conducted this study by using Netsparker, Skipfish, and Acunetix web vulnerability scanners with the standard web vulnerability assessment (WVA) method. The result shows that almost all the web applications in Afghanistan are vulnerable to different types of cyber-attacks. A total of 997 instances of various types of vulnerabilities were detected on 109 web applications from three different domains. This study presents 24 common vulnerabilities, which is more than prior studies. The results of this study familiarize web developers with the most common vulnerabilities that can exist in a typical web application. Therefore, this study will encourage them to consider these vulnerabilities during the software development life cycle.

Keywords Cyber-attacks · Vulnerability assessment · Web vulnerability scanners · Web application

1 Introduction

Web applications become one of the most dominant technologies for delivering dynamic services over the Internet. They are used for delivering various types of services such as e-government, financial, social, and Learning Management Systems (LMSs). For this reason, a huge amount of sensitive data is exchanged through web applications. Web applications are cross-platform, responsive, interactive, remotely accessible, fast deployable, and user-friendly. The web platform is composed of

S. M. Rahimy (✉) · S. H. Adelyar · S. R. Manandoy
Salam University, Kabul, Afghanistan
e-mail: s.mansoor@salam.edu.af

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_12

205

different parts. The web server provides web application services. Web clients access the web application via HTTP protocol in a web browser. A wide range of technologies are available for web application development.

However, widespread adoption has led them to face numerous security threats due to their complex infrastructure for hosting and deployment coupled with diverse development technologies available on both server side (e.g., PHP or ASP) and client side (e.g., HTML, CSS JavaScript, or Flash). As a result, developing and deploying a secure web application is rigid [13]. Hereby, web security is a vital component to be considered by all organizations over the world.

Here in Afghanistan, most web designers and developers focus on product functionality and Quality of Experience (QoE) rather than security requirements and best practices. Lack of security awareness and experts in the organizations in Afghanistan lead to a wide range of security breaches in their web applications. Lack of due diligence in most web users from cyber-attacks causes them to lose their sensitive information and even threaten their life. Consequently, we assume that a high number of web vulnerabilities exist in most of the web applications in Afghanistan [7, 12, 18].

To the best of our knowledge, there are insufficient studies in the literature regarding vulnerability assessment and security of web applications in Afghanistan. Therefore, the present work aims to discover the most common web vulnerabilities in mostly used Afghani web applications. The results of this study provide web designers and developers with a productive method for web vulnerability assessment at minimum cost, time, and effort. Moreover, it will help them to be aware of some common web vulnerabilities. The following are the three most important research questions, which are answered in this paper:

What are the most common web vulnerabilities in Afghani web applications?

Which security vulnerability assessment method is suitable for identifying these vulnerabilities?

What are the threats that are associated with the most commonly detected vulnerabilities?

The remaining parts of the paper are structured as follows. Section 2 provides related works and additional information relevant to the vulnerabilities of web applications. Section 3 presents the methodology and tools used for the vulnerability assessment of web applications. Section 4 presents the result of the vulnerability assessment. Section 5 presents a detailed discussion and implications. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes this paper by summarizing the research work, giving the contributions achieved, and showing directions for future work.

2 Literature Review

In this era of digitalization, most businesses are relying on web applications. Service providers use web applications to communicate with their subscribers. Therefore, web applications become interesting targets for most of the attackers on the Internet.

In the following subsections, we briefly review some of the existing literature regarding web application security vulnerability assessment and web vulnerability scanners.

2.1 Web Application Vulnerability Assessment

Vulnerability assessment is a proactive approach through which we can identify and scan for the existing vulnerabilities in the system before they could be exposed by attackers with malicious intents [6, 22]. There are different methods for identifying vulnerabilities. Static analysis, attack graph analysis, and vulnerability scanners are the most well-known methods for vulnerability assessment. Static analysis analyzes the structure of the program and the code of the program to detect flaws. Some techniques used in static analysis are lexical analysis, type reference, constraint analysis, and many more. Attack graph analysis represents all the paths followed by attackers to achieve their desired goals. This method is used for identifying vulnerabilities inside a network. For instance, some techniques which are used for generating the attack graphs are clustered adjacency matrix, hierarchical aggregation, minimization analysis, ranking graphs, and game theoretics. Vulnerability scanners are software tools used to identify vulnerabilities in a network system and/or in a software application. There are different vulnerability scanners used for network vulnerability scanning, operating system vulnerability scanning, and web vulnerability scanning [6].

Farah et al. performed black-box testing in (2018) to identify XSS and CSRF vulnerabilities in 500 Bangladeshi web applications. This study showed that 30% of Bangladeshi web applications are vulnerable to XSS and CSRF attacks. Of 500 web applications, 335 of them were found vulnerable to either XSS or CSRF or both attacks. Their results have shown that about 65% of the 335 web applications were vulnerable to XSS attacks and 75% of them were vulnerable to CSRF attacks.

Moniruzzaman et al. conducted black-box and white-box testing research [11] on identifying common vulnerabilities in Bangladeshi websites. This study aimed to represent a framework for identifying maximum vulnerabilities at minimum cost and effort. They considered six different attack vectors which are SQLi, XSS, BAS, CSRF, Unusual Ports, and Deprecated TLS. Black-box testing was conducted with the help of Kali Linux penetration testing tools and white-box testing was conducted with the help of static code analysis techniques. In this study, they found that 36% of the websites in Bangladesh are secure and 64% of them are running with various vulnerabilities.

Ahmed and Murah analyzed the security of 16 Libyan governmental websites [1]. This study proposed a safety classification matrix for the 16 websites using 4 safety categories: safe, somewhat unsafe, unsafe, and highly unsafe. To classify a website in one of these safety levels, they first assessed the website for vulnerability using Netsparker and Acunetix. Secondly, they determined whether sensitive information is encrypted or not during transactions. Finally, they evaluated SSL encryption using

the Qualys SSL Labs tool. They analyzed one website as highly unsafe, six websites as unsafe, eight websites as somewhat unsafe, and one website as safe.

Nirmal K. et al. stated in [14] that it is very critical to hardened web applications due to their existence in various businesses. This paper focuses on performing vulnerability assessment and penetration testing during various phases of the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC). Security considerations and best practices should be embedded in each phase of the web application development life cycle.

Sri Devi and Kumar executed a vulnerability analysis on 100 websites in [21]. This study used Nikto and OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) vulnerability scanners and provides a comparison of these scanners. The study shows that both vulnerability scanners identify various vulnerabilities. Some vulnerabilities are detected by the Nikto but not by the ZAP and vice versa. Nikto provides some additional information such as server, SSL information, and ciphers.

Trapti Jain and Nakul Jain conducted an experimental study on implementing multithreading concepts using multiple vulnerability scanners [10]. They used Python as a scripting engine in which Whatweb, Nikto, Dirb, and Nmap are executed parallel. Furthermore, they performed data normalization and parsing techniques on the result of the scanners and stored them in a database. Lastly, they used ModSecurity WAF to mitigate the discovered vulnerabilities by implementing custom configuration rules. This study shows that running multiple scanners at the same time reduces the execution time and provides an effective result.

2.2 Web Application Vulnerability Scanners

Web vulnerability scanners are used to identify various flaws and weaknesses such as misconfigurations, outdated files, and common vulnerabilities that can be found in a web application. Various web vulnerability scanners are available in the market. Some of the most well-known web vulnerability scanners are Netsparker, Acunetix, Nessus, Nikto, Skipfish, Dirbuster, Burp Suite, Vega, OpenVAS, ZAP Proxy, Sslmap, W3af, Xsser, and many more.

Antunes and Vieira conducted a comparative study of penetration testing tools and static code analyzers on the detection of SQLi in a set of web services [5]. Three commercial web penetration testing tools: HP WebInspect, IBM Rational AppScan, and Acunetix WVS compared with three static code analyzers: FindBugs, Yasca, and IntelliJ IDEA against eight web services. The result has shown that static code analyzers can detect more vulnerabilities than penetration testing tools and have better coverage. On the other hand, static code analyzers have a high rate of false positives than penetration testing tools.

Bairwa et al. have conducted a comparative study on five vulnerability scanners in [6]. Their observation has shown that different scanners identify different types of vulnerability but a single tool is not capable of detecting all types of vulnerabilities. They identified the capability of each vulnerability scanner by running each one of them against several web applications. They highlighted that Nessus is the only

scanner that has detected most of the vulnerabilities followed by Acunetix and Burp Suite.

Qianqian and Xiangjun discussed in [16] about open-source vulnerability scanners. By comparing these open-source scanners, they select the W3af vulnerability scanner for enhancing the capability of identifying Clickjacking vulnerability in HTML5 pages. They made a custom script and used it in an actual test, the result has shown that vulnerability can be detected.

Rajan and Erturk conducted a case study on Acunetix WVS (web vulnerability scanner) in [17]. In this study, they focused on how important it is to scan web applications for their vulnerabilities with the help of WVSs. This study has shown that WVSs help to speed up the web applications' vulnerability scanning process.

Patel and Gosavi present a vulnerability scanning system architecture based on HTTP methods [15]. The ingredients of the system are URL Crawling, Domain Reputation, CMS Scan, URL Scan, Search Engine, Remote Site, and 3rd Party Databases. The system provides the following features: 1—BackdoorWebShellLocator; 2—domain reputation in Google, SURBL, Malware Patrol, Clean-Mx, and Phistank; 3—Mail Server IP Check-in 58 repositories; 4—Scan SQL Injections for MySQL, MSSQL, PGSQL, and Oracle databases; 5—Scan XSS; 6—Scan Malware; 7—Detect and Scan CMS; 8—Scan for Directory Indexing.

Wang et al. studied the detection technology of common application vulnerabilities and the way vulnerability scanning tools work [22]. This paper designed and implemented the vulnerability scanning system for Web Applications of Power Company. The system is scalable and can scan multiple target websites at the same time.

Huang et al. introduced a new vulnerability scanner, VulScan in [9]. VulScan automatically generates test data and can discover injection and cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities by using penetration testing and evasion techniques. This study also proposes three main categories of countermeasures for mitigating SQL injections and XSS attacks. The countermeasures are secure implementation, defense mechanism deployment, and penetration testing.

Alzahrani et al. conducted a comparative study on ten different web vulnerability scanners [3]. Netcraft is a tool that can be used for web server fingerprinting. It can be used by attackers to gather information about web servers, underlying operating systems, server uptime, and much more information. SSLyze, Qualys SSL Labs, and OpenSSL are the tools that can be used for vulnerability detection in the transport layer. XSS Server, XSSer, and Xenotix XSS are the scanning tools used for XSS vulnerability detection. SQL Inject-ME, SQLninja, and Havij are the tools that can be used for the detection of SQLi vulnerabilities. A comparison of some of the well-known web vulnerability scanners that has been conducted by [2, 8] are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Comparison between well-known web vulnerability scanners

WVS	Attack vector support (%)	Automated crawling (WIVET score) (%)	Detection accuracy of backup/hidden file (%)	Detection accuracy of RFI (%)	Detection accuracy of reflected XSS (%)	Detection accuracy of SQLi (%)
Burp Suite Professional	19	96.00	25.00	72.22	96.97	100
IBM AppScan	30	92.00	5.43	100	100	100
NTOSSpider	19	94.00	42.00	79.63	100	97.06
Tinfoil Security	19	94.00	100	100	100	100
WebInspect	29	96.00	100	100	100	100
ZAP	17	73.00	38.04	100	100	
Netsparker	30	92.00	100	100	100	100
Acunetix	25	94.00	32.61	77.78	100	100

3 Methodology

An empirical research study was conducted based on a standard vulnerability assessment method described in the literature [4, 8, 20]. In brief, this section reviews the method with some minor modifications. The vulnerability assessment was conducted on 109 web applications from three top-level governmental (.gov.af), educational (.edu.af), and commercial (.com.af) domains. The vulnerability assessment was carried out in four steps as shown in Fig. 1.

3.1 Step One—Reconnaissance

It was carried out to identify the targets and gather as much information as possible from targeted web applications. The black-box testing techniques are used in this step. Tools that were used for this step are the Whois, Dig, Nslookup, theHarvester, Robtex, and Netcraft. A brief description of these tools is provided in Table 2.




Fig. 1 Vulnerability assessment method

Table 2 Reconnaissance tools

Name	Description	Environment
Whois	Extracts domain information	Kali Linux
Dig	Provides DNS information	Kali Linux
Nslookup	Provides DNS interrogation and zone transfer services	Kali Linux
Robtex	Provides DNS information	https://www.robtx.com
Netcraft	provides a web server and web hosting market-share analysis	https://www.netcraft.com
theHarvester	Searches for domains in various search engines	Kali Linux

Table 3 Enumerations and scanning tools

Name	Description	Environment
Nmap	Utility for network discovery and security auditing	Kali Linux
Recon-ng	Web reconnaissance framework is written in Python	Kali Linux
Knockpy	Python for DNS brute forcing	Kali Linux
Netcat	Used for banner grabbing	Kali Linux

3.2 Step Two—Enumeration and Scanning

The purpose of this step is to enumerate and scan for information such as the web server, underlying operating system, virtual host environment, load balancers, and proxies. The tools that were used in this step are the nmap, recon-ng, Knockpy, and Netcat. A brief description of these tools is provided in Table 3.

3.3 Step Three—Vulnerability Scanning

This step was carried out to find vulnerabilities in the target web applications. Using a single vulnerability scanner can lead to false positive results. Therefore, three different web vulnerability scanners were used. The Netsparker and Acunetix are commercial and have a nice graphical user interface. Skipfish is a free command line tool available in Kali Linux. Table 4 presents the environments in which these scanners are installed.

Table 4 Vulnerability scanners

Name	Description	Environment
Netsparker	Commercial web vulnerability scanner	Windows 10
Acunetix	Commercial web vulnerability scanner	Windows 10
Skipfish	Free web vulnerability scanner	Kali Linux

3.4 Step Four—Vulnerability Analysis and Reporting

This step provides an in-depth analysis and statistics of the detected web vulnerabilities. Furthermore, detailed descriptions of the vulnerabilities are presented and reported to all governmental, educational, and commercial organizations.

4 Result

In this study, a total of 109 web applications from three different domains were selected in the reconnaissance phase. Of 109 web applications, 62 of them are governmental, 39 of them are educational, and 8 of them are commercial. Figure 2 shows the percentage of these three different types of web applications for various domains. Significantly, 997 instances of different types of vulnerabilities were detected by Netsparker, Skipfish, and Acunetix WVSs in the vulnerability scanning phase. These WVSs classified vulnerabilities according to CVE and CVSS into High, Medium, Low, and Informational levels. From 997 instances of vulnerabilities, 86 instances are High level, 167 instances are Medium level, 311 instances are Low level, and 433 instances are Informational level. Vulnerabilities that are in informational level are not real vulnerability rather they help an attacker to further investigation. Figure 3 presents the dominance of these levels in percentages using a pie chart.

In this study, we found 55 different forms of vulnerabilities. Among them, some of them have a high frequency. Table 5 presents some common of them that exist across multiple web applications.

Fig. 2 Percentages of web applications





Fig. 3 Percentages of vulnerabilities



5 Discussions

This study aimed to discover the most common web vulnerabilities in the most commonly visited web applications in Afghanistan. The results highly supported our hypothesis, and we found that all 109 web applications vulnerable to one or more cyber-attacks. It was assumed that high numbers of web vulnerabilities exist in most of the web applications in Afghanistan. While not all of the vulnerabilities were high level, the overall results present a large number of vulnerabilities across multiple web applications in various domains.

In 2020, Naier et al. conducted security testing on 135 websites under the.af domain using the OWASP risk rating methodology. They have shown that 92% of the websites had below 3 high-risk level vulnerabilities, 13% of the websites had below 3 medium-risk level vulnerabilities, most of the websites had low-risk level vulnerabilities, and 60% of websites had information-risk level vulnerabilities. In this study, we have used a more standard and accurate methodology. In addition, the sample size in our study is smaller than their study, but we have gathered more vulnerabilities. This indicates that our results are more accurate than them. We have discovered 997 instances of web vulnerability by Netsparker, Acunetix, and Skipfish WVSs.

A similar study is conducted by Ali and Murah in 2018. They discovered a total of 522 instances of different types of vulnerabilities in 16 Libyan governmental websites using Netsparker and Acunetix WVSs. We discovered a total of 997 instances of different types of vulnerabilities on 109 web applications using Netsparker, Skipfish, and Acunetix WVSs. Thus, the number of vulnerabilities in Libyan governmental websites is more than the Afghani websites. However, Ali and Murah presented 9 common web vulnerabilities in 16 Libyan governmental websites and we presented 24 almost different common web vulnerabilities in 109 web applications.

With the existence of these vulnerabilities in web applications, a huge set of threats can be launched. Here, we use STRIDE threat modeling to categorize these vulnerabilities [19]. For example, the existence of SQL Injection vulnerability in a web application could cause a massive financial loss (tampering). Table 6 shows

Table 5 Common web vulnerabilities

Vulnerability	Level of severity	Instances	Number of web applications
Cross-site scripting	High	73	5
SQL injection	High	3	1
Microsoft IIS tilde directory enumeration	High	6	2
Long password denial of service	High	1	1
Elasticsearch service accessible	High	1	1
Vulnerable JavaScript libraries	Medium	48	27
TLS 1.0 enabled	Medium	24	24
User credentials are sent in clear text	Medium	12	12
Slow HTTP denial of service attack	Medium	11	11
Source code disclosures	Medium	8	8
TLS/SSL Sweet32 attack	Medium	7	7
TLS/SSL weak cipher suites	Medium	7	7
Clickjacking: X-Frame-Options header missing	Low	60	60
Unencrypted connection	Low	45	45
HSTS not implemented	Low	32	32
Cookies with missing, inconsistent, or contradictory properties	Low	31	31
Login page password-guessing attack	Low	26	26
Cookies without the HttpOnly flag set	Low	24	24
Cookies without secure flag set	Low	23	23
Insecure referrer policy	Informational	76	76
Content Security Policy (CSP) not implemented	Informational	74	71
No HTTP redirection	Informational	38	38
Outdated JavaScript libraries	Informational	38	23
Subresource Integrity (SRI) not implemented	Informational	30	27

vulnerabilities and their related threats. Furthermore, additional study is required to find measures and mitigation techniques to defend against these threats.

As mentioned in the Introduction, most web designers and developers focus on product functionality rather than security considerations. The results of this study will familiarize and encourage them to take some security considerations during the software development life cycle.

Table 6 Associated threats with common detected vulnerabilities

Vulnerability	Threats
Cross-site scripting	Tampering
SQL injection	Tampering
Microsoft IIS tilde directory enumeration	Information disclosure
Long password denial of service	DoS
Elasticsearch service accessible	Information disclosure
Vulnerable JavaScript libraries	One or more
TLS 1.0 enabled	Information disclosure
User credentials are sent in clear text	Spoofing
Slow HTTP denial of service attack	DoS
Source code disclosures	Information disclosure
TLS/SSL Sweet32 attack	Information disclosure
TLS/SSL weak cipher suites	One or more
Clickjacking: X-Frame-Options header missing	Spoofing, information disclosure, and elevation of privileges
Unencrypted connection	Information disclosure
HSTS not implemented	Information disclosure
Cookies with missing, inconsistent, or contradictory properties	Elevation of privileges
Login page password-guessing attack	Spoofing
Cookies without the HttpOnly flag set	Tampering
Cookies without secure flag set	Information disclosure
Insecure referrer policy	Information disclosure
Content Security Policy (CSP) not implemented	Tampering
No HTTP redirection	Information disclosure
Outdated JavaScript libraries	One or more
Sub Resource Integrity (SRI) not implemented	Spoofing

6 Conclusion

A vulnerability assessment was completed against 109 web applications and a total of 997 different instances of web vulnerabilities were discovered. Additionally, a detailed description of these vulnerabilities was reported and presented to all related organizations. Furthermore, a statistical analysis of these vulnerabilities has been presented using pie charts and tables. The result of this study will help web designers and developers to build secure web applications. Moreover, the results of the identified vulnerabilities will be shared with their corresponding web application owners to be addressed soon. Although our results are limited to Afghanistan web applications. However, it remains to be further clarified whether our results could be applied to other web applications in other countries. Future work will mainly cover the presentation of countermeasures that will help to mitigate these web vulnerabilities.

References

1. Ahmed Ali, A., Murah, M.Z.: Security assessment of libyan government websites. In: 2018 Cyber Resilience Conference (CRC). IEEE (2018)
2. Alsaleh, M., Alomar, N., Alshreef, M., Alarifi, A., Al-Salman, A.M.: Performance-based comparative assessment of open source web vulnerability scanners. *Secur. Commun. Netw.* (2017)
3. Alzahrani, A., Alqazzaz, A., Fu, H., Almashfi, N., Zhu, Y.: Web application security tools analysis. In: 2017 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Big Data Security on Cloud (2017)
4. Ansari, J.A.: *Web Penetration Testing with Kali Linux: Build Your Defense Against Web Attacks with Kali Linux 2.0*. Packt Publishing (2015)
5. Antunes, N., Vieira, M.: Comparing the effectiveness of penetration testing and static code analysis on the detection of SQL injection vulnerabilities in web services. In: 2009 15th IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing, PRDC 2009, pp. 301–306 (2009)
6. Bairwa, S., Mewara, B., Gajrani, J.: Vulnerability scanners: a proactive approach to assess web application security. *Int. J. Comput. Sci. Appl.* **4**(1), 113–124 (2014)
7. Dilipraj, E.: South Asian cyber security environment: an analytical perspective centre for air power studies. In: *Asian Defence Review*, pp. 161–190. Knowledge World Publishers (2014)
8. Felderer, M., Büchler, M., Johns, M., Brucker, A.D., Breu, R., Pretschner, A.: Security testing: a survey. In: *Advances in Computers*, vol. 101, pp. 1–51. *Web Application Vulnerability Scanner & Sap Security Tools*. Academic Press Inc. (2023). <https://piterOff.wordpress.com/web-application-vulnerability-scanner-sap-security-tools/>
9. Huang, H.-C., Zhang, Z.-K., Cheng, H.-W., Shieh, W.S.: *Web Application Security—Threats Countermeasures and Pitfalls*. IEEE Computer Society (2017)
10. Jain, T., Jain, N.: Framework for web application vulnerability discovery and mitigation by customizing rules through ModSecurity. In: 2019 6th International Conference on Signal Processing and Integrated Networks (SPIN) (2019)
11. Moniruzzaman, M., Chowdhury, F., Ferdous, M.S.: Measuring vulnerabilities of Bangladeshi websites. In: 2019 International Conference on Electrical, Computer and Communication Engineering (ECCE). IEEE (2019)
12. Naier, M.M., Hamidi, A., Momand, R.: *Analysis of Web Application Security Vulnerabilities: A Case Study of Web Applications in Afghanistan*, vol. 4 (2020)
13. Nath, H.V.: Vulnerability assessment methods—a review. *CCIS* **196**, 1–10 (2011)

14. Nirmal, K., Janet, B., Kumar, R.: Web application vulnerabilities—the hacker’s treasure. In: 2018 International Conference on Inventive Research in Computing Applications (ICIRCA) (2018)
15. Patil, H.P., Gosavi, P.B.: Web vulnerability scanner by using HTTP method. *Int. J. Comput. Sci. Mob. Comput.* **4**(9), 255–260 (2015)
16. Qianqian, W., Xiangjun, L.: Research and design on web application vulnerability scanning service. In: 2014 IEEE 5th International Conference on Software Engineering and Service Science (2014)
17. Rajan, A., Erturk, E.: *Web Vulnerability Scanners: A Case Study* (2017)
18. Salamzada, K., Shukur, Z., Abu Bakar, M.: A framework for cybersecurity strategy for developing countries: case study of Afghanistan. *Asia-Pacific J. Inf. Technol. Multimed.* (2015)
19. Shostack, A.: *Threat Modeling—Designing for Security*. Wiley (2014)
20. Singh, H., Sharma, H.: *Hands-on Web Penetration Testing with Metasploit—The Subtle Art of Using Metasploit 5.0 for Web Application Exploitation*. Packt Publishing (2020)
21. Sri Devi, R., Mohan Kumar, M.: Testing for security weakness of web applications using ethical hacking. In: 2020 4th International Conference on Trends in Electronics and Informatics (ICOEI) (48184) (2020)
22. Wang, B., Liu, L., Li, F., Zhang, J., Chen, T., Zou, Z.: Research on web application security vulnerability scanning technology. In: 2019 IEEE 4th Advanced Information Technology, Electronic and Automation Control Conference (IAEAC) (2019)

Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity

A Method for Threat Modelling of Industrial Control Systems



Lars Halvdan Flå and Martin Gilje Jaatun

Abstract In this paper, we propose a new method for threat modelling of industrial control systems (ICS). The method is designed to be flexible and easy to use. Model elements inspired by IEC 62443 and Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) are used to create a model of the ICS under consideration. Starting from this model, threats are identified by investigating how the confidentiality, integrity and availability of different functions in the ICS can be attacked. Finally, threats are prioritised and mitigations are proposed for those threats that are not accepted by the ICS owner. We briefly illustrate the use of the method on a simplified and fictitious power grid secondary substation case.

Keywords Threat modelling · Industrial control system · IEC 62443 · Cybersecurity · Cyberphysical system

1 Introduction

The identification of threats to an Industrial Control System (ICS) is an important part of assessing the cybersecurity risk. We argue that the key to a successful method for identifying threats is to find an appropriate level of abstraction. A too detailed method will be resource demanding, while a method with too few details leaves threats unidentified.

In this paper, we propose a method for performing threat modelling of ICS, and provide a brief example of the use of the method. The method draws inspiration from existing methods, such as STRIDE [16] and Cyber-HAZOP [3], as well as the IEC 62443 standard on industrial control system security. The method is intended

L. H. Flå (✉) · M. G. Jaatun
SINTEF Digital, Trondheim, Norway
e-mail: lars.flaa@sintef.no

M. G. Jaatun
e-mail: martin.g.jaatun@sintef.no

to facilitate a suitable level of abstraction, be flexible and easy to understand. These are all properties that we regard as important for a threat modelling method.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of existing approaches to threat modelling of ICS. Section 3 presents the proposed method. Section 4 shows how the method can be applied to a fictitious power grid secondary substation. Section 5 discusses the different steps of the proposed method. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Background

In this section, we give an overview of existing approaches for threat modelling of ICS or cyberphysical systems (CPS).

Several contributions use some form of STRIDE [14, 16] to perform the threat modelling. STRIDE is an mnemonic for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege. These categories indicate the types of threats which should be considered when analysing a system (originally software) for threats. This process is often supported by a DFD of the system. More recently, STRIDE has been applied to a broader context. Khalil et al. [11] propose a nine step threat modelling method where they adapt STRIDE to CPS. The method uses an enhanced version of DFD to create a model of the system, among other things introducing support for combining physical processes and software processes, similar to what we propose in our method. Threats are identified using STRIDE-per-element, and ranked based on their impact on different consequence categories. Kim et al. [13] propose a seven-step method for threat modelling of an ICS. The system is modelled using standard DFD elements and trust boundaries. The trust boundaries appear in their example to group DFD elements according to physical equipment. Threats are identified using STRIDE and prioritised using DREAD. Another adaptation of STRIDE to a cyberphysical system is proposed by Khan et al. [12]. They advocate creating a data flow diagram per component in a system, identifying threats based on STRIDE, mapping threats to predefined consequences, and identifying vulnerabilities to plan for security controls. Jbair et al. [10] propose a five-step threat modelling method for cyberphysical systems. The method includes well-known methods for identifying threats, among them STRIDE. It does however also include several other activities, including quantifying risk and describing threat actors. Their scope is therefore wider than what we propose in this paper. When it comes to application in industry, an interview study of 11 security professionals working with CPS security revealed that STRIDE was by far the most popular method for threat modelling [9].

We argue that the STRIDE method for threat modelling has some weaknesses, both generally and specifically related to its use on ICS. Sion et al. [15] claim that DFD, which STRIDE typically relies on, among others have an inability to model security controls and information on where systems are deployed. We furthermore argue that STRIDE may appear confusing as it mixes categories that directly violate

security properties with categories which can be seen as a preparation for violating security properties. One can, for instance, argue that spoofing in itself does not violate confidentiality, integrity and availability, but that it can be a prerequisite for violating all three.

Furthermore, we believe that the detailed approach taken by STRIDE can cause the number of threats to become high and therefore resource demanding to handle. Holik et al. [4] identify 92 threats to a digital secondary substation using STRIDE, although this number also greatly depends on the Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool template [2] used to perform the threat modelling. Regardless, the number of threats is likely to become significant for complex systems, especially if detailed DFD are created for all software processes present in all devices.

Other methods for identifying cyberthreats to ICS exist, but they typically do so without referring to the term threat modelling. One class of such methods are safety-related methods which have been adopted to security, for instance, STPA-Sec [17] and Cyber-HAZOP [3]. STPA-Sec takes a more top-down approach and starts with organisational purposes and goals, and ends up with identifying scenarios which may violate security requirements [17]. Cyber-HAZOP is inspired by the original Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) method, which combines guide words (e.g. more, less, low, high) and process parameters (e.g. flow, pressure) to aid in the identification of dangerous situations. The team performing the assessment would then typically consider different parts of the process and investigate what the effects of deviations such as “more flow, less flow, low pressure, high pressure” could be. Cyber-HAZOP, as described by Risktec [3], adapts this method to security. Instead of considering different parts of the process, the method first considers the organisation as a whole, and then individual zones and conduits. For zones, cyber-guide words can, for instance, be “Engineering Workstation”, or “Control Server”, and cyber-parameters can, for instance, be “Execution”, “Initial Access” or “Persistence”. For conduits, the only cyber-guide word is data, while security parameters are “Confidentiality”, “Integrity” and “Availability”. The Cyber-HAZOP then creates deviations such as “Engineering workstation—Execution” or “Data—Integrity”. According to the authors, this can in turn be used to reason about consequences of such deviations, but also about vulnerabilities and security controls.

While STPA-Sec can be used to identify security relevant scenarios, we argue that a greater level of detail is needed to reason about how an attacker may cause such scenarios. Cyber-HAZOP has similarities with our method in that it also appears to consider zones and individual components, such as an engineering workstation, and through their use of guide words. This is particularly true for how Cyber-HAZOP treats conduits, where violations of confidentiality, integrity and availability are considered for the transmitted data. However, we argue for the need to establish a more detailed context for evaluating threats (e.g. which ICS functions rely on which devices or what does the ICS function control), along with standardised elements for expressing this context. According to the authors in [3] “A CyHAZOP will identify areas where more detailed investigations around controls and vulnerabilities should be undertaken”, and we intend, among other, that our proposed method can aid in this more detailed investigation of an area.

The method proposed in this paper allows for a relatively detailed modelling of an ICS, giving the team performing the threat modelling a good foundation for discussing methods for attack and consequences. However, by identifying threats at the level above individual processes and data flows, we believe the method also results in a manageable number of threats.

3 Threat Modelling Method

In this section, we propose a threat modelling method for ICS. The method consists of three main steps: creating a model of the system, identifying threats and evaluating threats. The goal of the method is to give a prioritised list of threats in need of mitigation, given the state of the ICS under consideration.

3.1 Creating a Model of the System

The method starts with creating a model of the industrial control system under consideration. The model is built using the seven model elements: ICS function (which internally consists of a set of software processes and data flows), standalone security control, host device, network device, embedded device, external entity and zone. These elements are shown in Fig. 1 and described as follows:

ICS function: Inspired by the definition of an application in IEC 62443-4-2 [6]: “one or more software programs and their dependencies that are used to interface with the process or the control system itself [...]”. The ICS function performs




Fig. 1 The seven model elements of the proposed method

a function in the ICS, and is implemented with potentially distributed software processes and the communication between these processes. The communication between these processes is modelled with data flows. However, we do not explicitly model the software dependencies.

Standalone security control: This element represents security controls that are implemented outside of ICS functions. Examples include VPN, IDS and firewalls. Security controls implemented in ICS functions, such as, for example, application level authentication, are modelled as an attribute of the relevant ICS function.

Host device: Inspired by the definition in IEC 62443-4-2 [6]: “*general purpose device running an operating system [...] capable of hosting one or more software applications, data stores or functions from one or more suppliers*”. It typically has a human–machine interface (i.e. keyboard and mouse) and does typically not have a real-time scheduler.

Network device: Inspired by the definition in IEC 62443-4-2 [6]: “*device that facilitates data flow between devices, or restricts the flow of data, but may not directly interact with a control process*”. It typically runs an embedded OS or firmware and is configured through an external interface.

Embedded device: Inspired by the definition in IEC 62443-4-2 [6]: “*special purpose device designed to directly monitor or control an industrial process*”. Examples include Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), field sensors, actuator devices, and safety instrumented system controllers. It is typically configured through an external interface, and typically has a real-time scheduler.

Zone: Defined in IEC 62443-3-3 [8] as “*grouping of logical or physical assets that share common security requirements*”. We use the zone to aid the threat modelling process in managing complexity and to help prioritise the threat modelling effort. More critical zones may, for instance, be threat modelled in a more detailed way than less critical zones.

External Entity: This element represents an actor outside the control of the ICS asset owner, for instance, a company doing system maintenance.

These seven elements can be assigned a set of attributes. As examples, an ICS function may have an attribute such as “Implements authentication”, or a firewall may have the attribute “Only allows inbound and outbound traffic over the protocols X and Y”. However, we leave it to the team performing the threat modelling to decide exactly what attributes they consider interesting and necessary.

3.2 Identify Threats

The second step of the proposed method is the identification of threats. Inspired by how HAZOP analysis uses guide words to detect potential dangerous conditions related to safety, we define a set of guide questions to aid in the identification of threats, listed in Table 1. These guide questions are grouped according to the well-known categories of integrity, availability and confidentiality.

Table 1 Threat guide questions

Integrity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – How can an attacker send false data to any of the processes that are part of the ICS function, or tamper with legitimate data being sent from any of the processes that are part of the ICS function? – How can an attacker program/change logic (e.g. trip values, set points) in any of the processes that are part of the ICS function?
Availability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – How can an attacker deny the arrival of data sent between the processes that are part of the ICS function? – How can an attacker deny the service of the processes that are part of the ICS function? – How can an attacker deny the service of the devices involved in realising the ICS function?
Confidentiality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – How can an attacker obtain sensitive information from the ICS function?

The identification of threats is structured according to ICS functions. This means that the method considers everything needed to realise the function under consideration, instead of focussing on individual processes or data flows. During the threat identification process, threats that can be the answer to any of the guide questions should be listed.

3.3 Evaluate and Mitigate Threats

Starting from the identified threats, the team performing the threat modelling should make a prioritised list of threats. The criteria selected for prioritising threats are left to the team performing the threat modelling. One approach is to compare the assumed consequence and likelihood of each threat against risk matrices defined by the team performing the threat modelling. Regardless of the method chosen, a justification for the priority of each threat should be provided.

Based on the list of prioritised threats, the threat modelling team should determine which of the threats can be accepted, and which require mitigation. Mitigating these threats may involve making changes to the ICS, including new standalone security controls or include/configure security controls in software implementing the different ICS functions. The details surrounding how each threat should be mitigated is left to the team performing the threat modelling.

4 Application to Power Grid Secondary Substation Example

This section provides an example of how the proposed method can be applied to identify cybersecurity threats to a power grid secondary substation. We acknowledge that this is a simplified example with regard to the complexity of the ICS, the number of threats identified and the evaluation of those threats.

4.1 Creating a Model of the Secondary Substation

In Fig. 2, we illustrate how the elements can be used to create a model of a secondary substation being controlled from a control room. An ICS function monitors and controls a circuit breaker in the grid. Sensor readings are sent from the sensor to monitoring and control workstation, and control commands are sent from the workstation to the circuit breaker. Since equipment in the control room can interact with many secondary substations, this equipment is deemed to be more critical than the equipment in the secondary substation. Consequently, two different zones




Fig. 2 An example model of the control of a power grid secondary substation

are established. In addition to devices, ICS functions and zones, the example has a set of standalone security controls. The routers implement a VPN between them, in addition to running their own firewalls. The monitoring and control workstation in the control room runs an antivirus application and collects logs of events relevant for the cybersecurity of the workstation.

4.2 Identifying Cyberthreats to the Secondary Substation

Using the guide questions in Table 1, we identify cyberthreats to the secondary substation. The identified threats are listed in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The control room in this example is modelled as quite secure, based on the attributes and standalone security controls. Most of the threats are therefore identified in the secondary substation zone, which we assume does not enforce physical access control. To keep the number of threats low for the sake of simplicity and to limit the number of false positives, we do not include threats which exploit vulnerabilities that are not included in the model.

Table 2 Integrity-related cyberthreats to the secondary substation case

How can an attacker send false data to any of the processes that are part of the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function, or tamper with legitimate data being sent from any of the processes that are part of the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function?

- I1: An attacker can get access to the secondary substation network and perform a man-in-the-middle attack between the devices involved in the communication
 - I2: An attacker can get access to the secondary substation network, observe sequence numbers and hijack the communication
-

How can an attacker reprogram/change logic (e.g. trip values, set points) or otherwise attack the integrity of any of the processes that are part of the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function?

- I3: An attacker can target the supply chain to tamper with the integrity of the software
 - I4: An attacker can get access to the secondary substation and install malicious software on the devices in the secondary substation network
-

Table 3 Availability-related cyberthreats to the secondary substation case

How can an attacker deny the arrival of data sent between the processes that are part of the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function?

- A1: An attacker can get access to the secondary substation network and flood the control room engineering workstation with IEC 104 packets
 - A2: An attacker can flood the control room and secondary substation routers with large amounts of traffic from an external network
 - A3: An attacker can change the policies for routing across the network between the control room and the secondary substation
-

How can an attacker deny the service of the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function?

- A4: An attacker can target the supply chain for any of the software component which the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function relies on
 - A5: An attacker can target the supply chain for software needed for the correct functioning of the devices on which the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function relies
-

Table 4 Confidentiality-related cyberthreats to the secondary substation case**How can someone obtain sensitive information from the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function?**

- C1: An attacker can get access to the secondary substation networks, and sniff process parameters, commands and settings sent between the processes in the “circuit breaker monitoring and control” function
- C2: An attacker can get access to the secondary substation and extract process parameters, commands and settings directly from the remote terminal unit, sensor or circuit breaker

For our model, an example of such a threat would be “An attacker may exploit a vulnerable configuration in the firewall to obtain access to the control room network”, since this vulnerability is not included in the model.

4.3 *Evaluating the Identified Threats to the Secondary Substation*

In this section, we prioritise the threats listed in Tables 2, 3 and 4. As mentioned in Sect. 3, our method does not mandate how this should be done, but leaves it to the team performing the threat modelling. In this simplified example, we prioritise the threats based on whether they have the potential to cause a blackout, whether they are scalable (meaning that they can affect several substations) and whether the attack can be executed without alerting operators. For each of these categories, we indicate whether the threat applies to it or not. Threats are then firstly prioritised according to whether they can cause a blackout, then according to whether they are scalable, and lastly according to whether the attack can be executed without alerting operators. The result is shown in Table 5. Regarding the threats to availability, we assume that a loss of availability can cause a blackout, but this may not be the case more generally.

For this example, we assume that the ICS owner does not accept the threats that can cause a blackout affecting a larger portion of the grid. In accordance with the method, we therefore propose some mitigations for these threats, as shown in Table 6.

5 Discussion

In this section, we discuss the three phases of the method, along with more general considerations regarding the context in which the method can be used.

5.1 *Creating the Model*

By basing some of the model elements on IEC 62443-4-2 [6], we ensure that the team performing the threat modelling can (1) easily evaluate the level of security

Table 5 List of prioritised threats

Threat	Blackout	Scalable	Undetectable	Justification
I3	x	x	x	The threat can modify software to open breakers at a specific time, modify status updates to operators to hide itself, and does scale to many substations.
A1	x	x		The threat can cause a blackout, does affect several substations, but is easily detectable
A2	x	x		The threat can cause a blackout, does affect several substations, but is easily detectable
A3	x	x		The threat can cause a blackout, does affect several substations, but is easily detectable
A4	x	x		The threat can cause a blackout, does affect several substations, but is easily detectable
A5	x	x		The threat can cause a blackout, does affect several substations, but is easily detectable
I1	x		x	The threat can inject breaker commands, modify status data to operators, but does not scale beyond one substation
I4	x		x	The threat can install software to open breakers at a specific time, modify status updates to operators to hide itself, but does not scale beyond one substation
I2	x			The threat can inject breaker commands, but does not scale beyond one substation and is assumed to be less stealthy
C1			x	The threat cannot cause a blackout, is only executed against one substation, but may not be detectable
C2			x	The threat cannot cause a blackout, is only executed against one substation, but may not be detectable

Table 6 Proposed mitigation for threats that are not accepted

Threat	Proposed mitigation
I3, A4, A5	Require suppliers to implement a information security management system and have it certified
A1, A2	Install routers who can handle the necessary amount of traffic
A3	Implement two-factor authentication for configuration of routers

of these elements simply by comparing the state of the element to IEC 62443-4-2 requirements and (2) have a set of recognised requirements to increase the level of security, if the threat modelling process deems this necessary.

We furthermore note that the model creation step of the method can benefit from existing network diagrams of the ICS as a starting point. Creating various forms of

network diagrams is already required by IEC 62443-2-1 [5] (Requirement 4.2.3.5). A zone and conduit drawing, required by IEC 62443-3-2 [7] (Requirement 4.7.4.1), can likely also be used as input to the threat modelling process. The same goes for asset inventories of hardware and software in an ICS.

The method we propose includes support for explicitly expressing security controls that are independent of ICS functions. To avoid that the model becomes overly complex, different types of controls are modelled with the same symbol, but with the possibility to add further details in the form of attributes.

As stated in Sect. 3.1, we only give examples of attributes, but do not include a specific list of attributes for each element. This is because we anticipate that different use cases may have different needs in terms of the number of attributes and the level of details of the attributes. As an example, a model of a remote access function from a vendor into an ICS with potential for major health, safety and environmental (HSE) consequences may require a high level of detail in its element attributes. A model of an ICS providing auxiliary functions with no potential for HSE consequences may require less detailed and numerous attributes.

5.2 Identifying Threats

The method groups threats according to whether they violate confidentiality, integrity or availability. These categories were chosen as they are easily relatable and commonly understood. An alternative would have been to use STRIDE. However, we argue that STRIDE may appear confusing as it mixes categories that directly violate security properties with categories which can be seen as a preparation for violating security properties. While information disclosure, tampering and denial of service map directly to violation of confidentiality, integrity and availability, this is not the case for spoofing, repudiation and elevation of privilege. Spoofing, the impersonation of someone or something else, does not in itself violate confidentiality, integrity and availability. But successful impersonation of a ICS operator may allow for both information disclosure, tampering and denial of service. A similar argument can be made for elevation of privilege. Repudiation can be defined as the possibility for an actor to deny having performed an action. Non-repudiation may have some relevance in the protection towards insider threats, and if logs are used to ensure non-repudiation, these may be useful for forensics after an incident. However, to avoid the method becoming too resource intensive, we choose to exclude repudiation threats.

As described in Sect. 3.2, the ICS functions are what drives the threat identification phase. By doing so, the abstraction level of the method sits between ICS/CPS adaptations of STRIDE, which identifies threats to individual processes and data flows, and Cyber-HAZOP, which models zones and conduits. We argue that considering individual processes and flows may result in an overwhelming number of threats, whereas considering only zones and conduits may hide important details of the system.

The method does not explicitly include a step for determining attacker tactics, techniques and procedures as described in [10], or for establishing an attack taxonomy

as in [11]. Instead we regard domain and cybersecurity knowledge as a prerequisite for identifying threats. A potential source of inspiration for this phase may be the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for ICS [1].

As we do not strictly define what attributes should be included in a model, we also do not define detailed steps for how they should be included in the threat identification phase. One approach, as illustrated in the example in Sect. 4.2, is to only take modelled vulnerabilities into account. Another approach may be to also consider potential vulnerabilities for more critical zones. This implies that threats exploiting vulnerabilities that may be present (but uncertain and not modelled as an attribute) are also included. These threats should then come in addition to those threats exploiting vulnerabilities expressed through attributes.

5.3 Evaluating Threats

We do not specify how identified threats should be evaluated, beyond stating that they should be prioritised and that mitigation should be proposed for those who are not accepted by the ICS owner. We choose this approach to keep the method lightweight and flexible. Different industries and environments may have different aspects which should be emphasised. Industries facing the risk of major accidents with loss of life may choose to have this as a specific focus when evaluating threats. There might also be differences as to how thoroughly this step should be carried out. As an example, assessment of an ICS in operation may require a more thorough approach than the first of several iterations in the design of a new ICS.

Regardless of the approach chosen, it should be performed by a team including both cybersecurity and domain specialists, in order to cover both the identification of threats and the process of determining potential consequences.

5.4 Use of the Method in Different Contexts

We argue that the method is applicable both in the design phase and the operation phase of an ICS. In the design phase, the method can be applied without any security controls to provide input to what security controls should be included, and where they should be placed. In the operations phase, the method can offer insight into what threats face the ICS in its current state.

We furthermore argue that the method can be used in combination with more extensive risk assessment methods, for instance, IEC 62443-3-2 on security risk assessment for system design. The first step of the detailed risk assessment for a zone, ZCR 5.1, requires the threats which can affect the assets in a zone or conduit to be listed. Threats are then used as inputs to the steps determining consequence and likelihood.

5.5 *Limitations of the Method and Future Work*

A limitation of the method is its inability to contextualise how isolated threats can be combined into a larger attack (differently from how, for instance, the ICS Kill Chain models attacks). Another limitation of the methods is that it is heavily reliant on the knowledge and imagination of the team performing the threat modelling.

We plan to validate the method on a another case study from the smart grid domain. Furthermore, inspired by Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool and the OWASP Threat Dragon, we believe that the method can successfully be implemented in software, an advancement that likely will reduce barrier to use of the method. Furthermore, an implementation of the method in software can include measures to assist the user in managing complexity (for instance, by introducing zones which can be collapsed or expanded, based on what zones the user is studying).

6 Summary and Conclusions

In this paper, we have proposed a new method for threat modelling of an ICS. The method is based on creating a model of the ICS, including both physical devices and software-based functions, and on identifying threats violating the confidentiality, integrity and availability properties. We argue that the method allows for threat modelling at a suitable abstraction level, balancing the need for detail with the need for an efficient process.

Acknowledgements This work has been supported by WP2 of CINELDI—Centre for intelligent electricity distribution, an 8-year Research Centre under the FME-scheme (Centre for Environment-friendly Energy Research, 257626/E20). The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Research Council of Norway and the CINELDI WP2 partners.

References

1. Alexander, O., Belisle, M., Steele, J.: Mitre att&ck® for Industrial Control Systems: Design and Philosophy, p. 29 . The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA, USA (2020)
2. Flå, L.H., Borgaonkar, R., Tøndel, I.A., Jaatun, M.G.: Tool-assisted threat modeling for smart grid cyber security. In: 2021 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA), pp. 1–8. IEEE (2021)
3. French, S.: Cyhazop—bringing cyber to the hazop. <https://risktec.tuv.com/risktec-knowledge-bank/business-continuity-management/cyhazop-bringing-cyber-to-the-hazop/>. Accessed 7 April 2023
4. Holik, F., Flå, L.H., Jaatun, M.G., Yayilgan, S.Y., Foros, J.: Threat modeling of a smart grid secondary substation. *Electronics* **11**(6), 850 (2022)
5. IEC: Industrial Communication Networks—Network and System Security—Part 2-1: Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control System Security Program. Geneva. International Electrotechnical Commission (2010)

6. IEC: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems. Part 4-2: Technical Security Requirements for IACS Components. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva (2019)
7. IEC: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems. Part 3-2: Security Risk Assessment for System Design. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva (2020)
8. IEC: Industrial Communication Networks—Network and System Security—Part 3-3: System Security Requirements and Security Levels. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva (2021)
9. Jamil, A.M., Ben Othmane, L., Valani, A.: Threat modeling of cyber-physical systems in practice. In: Risks and Security of Internet and Systems: 16th International Conference, CRiSIS 2021, Virtual Event, Ames, USA, November 12–13, 2021, Revised Selected Papers, pp. 3–19. Springer (2022)
10. Jbair, M., Ahmad, B., Maple, C., Harrison, R.: Threat modelling for industrial cyber physical systems in the era of smart manufacturing. *Comput. Ind.* **137**, 103611 (2022)
11. Khalil, S.M., Bahsi, H., Ochieng’Dola, H., Korötko, T., McLaughlin, K., Kotkas, V.: Threat modeling of cyber-physical systems-a case study of a microgrid system. *Comput. Secur.* **124**, 102950 (2023)
12. Khan, R., McLaughlin, K., Laverty, D., Sezer, S.: Stride-based threat modeling for cyber-physical systems. In: 2017 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe (ISGT-Europe), pp. 1–6 (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGTEurope.2017.8260283>
13. Kim, K.H., Kim, K., Kim, H.K.: Stride-based threat modeling and dread evaluation for the distributed control system in the oil refinery. *ETRI J.* (2022)
14. Kohnfelder, L., Garg, P.: The threats to our products. <https://shostack.org/files/microsoft/The-Threats-To-Our-Products.docx>. Accessed 3 June 2023
15. Sion, L., Yskout, K., Van Landuyt, D., van Den Berghe, A., Joosen, W.: Security threat modeling: are data flow diagrams enough? In: Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM 42nd International Conference on Software Engineering Workshops, pp. 254–257 (2020)
16. Swiderski, F., Snyder, W.: Threat Modeling. Microsoft Press, Redmond, WA (2004)
17. Young, W., Leveson, N.: Systems thinking for safety and security. In: Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pp. 1–8 (2013)

A Checklist for Supply Chain Security for Critical Infrastructure Operators



Martin Gilje Jaatun and Hanne Sæle

Abstract Critical infrastructure applications do not emerge fully formed, but generally rely on components and services from third-party vendors. This paper presents a brief survey on good practice for security requirements to be put on vendors delivering products and services to power distribution system operators and other critical infrastructure operators.

Keywords Supply chain · Critical infrastructure · Power distribution networks · Security

1 Introduction

The objective of this work is to identify good practice on requirements related to ICT security in tender documents on procurement of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT), and how this can be followed up in operation. An important result will be recommendations and/or good practices that can improve supply chain safety for small- and medium-sized players, and we have taken this into account when assessing the summary of the selected articles.

This work has been performed in the context of Norwegian power Distribution System Operators (DSOs), but we believe that our recommendations to a large extent will be applicable to other critical infrastructure operators in Europe.

M. G. Jaatun (✉)

Department of Software Engineering, Safety and Security, SINTEF Digital, Trondheim, Norway
e-mail: martin.g.jaatun@sintef.no

H. Sæle

SINTEF Energy, Trondheim, Norway

2 Method

We have reviewed and assessed recommendations from reports and academic literature that are relevant to the assignment. In the first instance, we have studied three reports (in Norwegian) commissioned by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE):

- Elisabeth Kirkebø, Mathias Ljøsne, ICT security in procurement and outsourcing in the energy industry (in Norwegian), NVE Report 90:2018 [1].
- Maren Maal, Katrine Krogedal and Arthur Gjengstø, ICT security in procurement and outsourcing in the power industry—checklist (in Norwegian), NVE Report no. 1/2020 [2].
- Sigrid Haug Selnes, Sina Rebekka Moen, Siyang Emily Ji and Ove Njå, Power industry supply chains—digital security and vulnerability in the age of globalisation (in Norwegian), NVE-External Report 18:2021 [3].

The review of the reports from NVE described important topics related to security, focused on the most relevant topics related to supply chain security. NVE report 90:2018 [1] showed how dependent the energy business is related to their vendors, for example, related to use of cloud services and outsourcing resulting in long digital value chains. The NVE report 1:2020 [2] is a checklist for procurement and outsourcing within the energy business, based on how increased digitalization affects the risk picture for the business. The checklist is focusing on different phases such as preliminary phase, procurement, implementation and management, and termination. The third report (18:2021 [3]) describes a study of supply chain vulnerability and security, performed in the summer 2021, and based on interviews with relevant persons from the energy business, literature survey, and questionnaires. The report gives recommendations related to how the energy business can understand digital vulnerability in the supply value chains, and how enterprises can work to reduce these vulnerabilities. Additionally, we have studied NVE's guide to the Norwegian Power Contingency Regulation [4].

Furthermore, we conducted a literature search in Scopus, as described in Sect. 3. In addition, we have conducted a small number of informal interviews with players in the power industry to obtain feedback on preliminary results and new input.

3 Literature Search

We have used a simplified version of the guidelines for systematic literature analysis [5], where we first sort by title, then by abstract, and finally by the full text of the article. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.

Selnes et al. [3] performed a literature review on supply chain security in 2021. They provide examples of search strings, but it is not obvious how these are linked, as they state that “The searches have resulted in a relatively small number of hits.”



Fig. 1 Search strategy

If we refine the search indicated in the offer to articles published after 2020, we get 322 hits, which is still too many for our purposes.

We therefore choose to refine the search to Selnes and colleagues. By searching Scopus with the criteria (“supply chain risk management” OR “supplychain energy power supply” OR “supply chain attack”) AND “cybersecurity” AND (LIMIT-TO (PUBYEAR, 2022) OR LIMIT-TO (PUBYEAR , 2021)) we get 227 hits.

Scopus provides the ability to refine the search within subject areas. Through a spotcheck we found that if we narrow the search down to social science, business, and decision science, the results are largely irrelevant to our purpose, and by excluding these instead we come down to 119 hits:

(“supply chain risk management” OR “supplychain energy power supply” OR “supply chain attack”) AND “cybersecurity” AND (LIMIT-TO (PUBYEAR , 2022) OR LIMIT-TO (PUB- YEAR , 2021) AND (EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA , “BUSI”) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA , “DECI”) OR EXCLUDE (SUBJAREA , “SOCI”))

After reviewing all titles, the number of articles is reduced to 31 (see Sect. 6 for the full list). We have also excluded all articles dealing with the use of blockchains, as we do not consider this to be mature technology.

We then reviewed abstracts for the 31 articles.

3.1 Search Results

Among the 31 articles that were relevant based on title, we have considered 4 as relevant and a further 9 as possibly relevant to our work. Due to the limited time available, we have initially only looked into the 4 articles we initially considered to be relevant.

3.1.1 Struggling with Supply-Chain Security

Viega and Michael [6] highlight that the most important supply chain security tool stands out as a standardized questionnaire/checklist for vendors, and point to the Vendor Security Alliance as a good example. They highlight that the wide range of service-based solutions represents a challenge for supply chain security.

They recommend using a risk rating of vendors, and then ensuring that those at greatest risk are reassessed at a higher frequency (e.g., annually). However, they point out that asking vendors for self-evaluation has significant challenges. They report on their own experiences where vendors have been caught lying about their security solutions. It motivates a desire for more automated solutions or monitoring of a vendor's solutions, in order to verify that the delivered security level harmonizes with the alleged security level. This may also include, for example, that the customer¹ can conduct monitoring of online forums where security leaks are shared, in order to detect security incidents before they are notified through official channels.

3.1.2 On the Feasibility of Detecting Software Supply Chain Attacks

Wang [7] describes an experimental method for detecting supply chain attacks, but does not contribute anything that can be used to make demands on customers or vendors.

3.1.3 SoK: Combating Threats in the Digital Supply Chain

Nygård and Katsikas [8] present a systematic review of literature with search terms: ((Cybersecurity OR security) AND supply AND chain). Search results are further refined several times using keywords like “attack” OR “vulnerability” OR “trojans” OR “trust.”

The article mentions advice from NIST, but little that can be used to set requirements for vendors. One exception: “Implement a documented vulnerability management program.”

3.1.4 SolarWinds Software Supply Chain Security: Better Protection with Enforced Policies and Technologies

Yang et al. [9] describe a specific case, where the vendor SolarWinds who developed a popular management tool, Orion, was compromised by a group that accessed the source code of the product, and had a backdoor (known as SunBurst) added, which was then distributed by the provider as a valid update.

¹ Note that in this paper we use the term “customer” to refer to the critical infrastructure operator who is buying goods or services from a vendor.

Table 1 Problems identified by Yang, Lee, and McDonald

Problem	Proposed solution	Our comment
The market focuses on profit, not security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The government should set minimum security standards for software development and deployment – Improving the state’s purchasing processes so that firms ensure security – Introduction of liability for software companies 	Common guidelines may be beneficial, but we are skeptical whether introducing liability will have the desired effect—will be an expensive process, and in the end, large firms with many lawyers will be able to do as they please anyway
“Additive” security adds new tools that potentially create new vulnerabilities	“Reductive” security that removes unnecessary services, libraries, etc.	This is in practice what is known as “hardening,” and is something that can be recommended in general
Need to update to the next version	Refrain from updating if updating is unnecessary	Potentially a dangerous recommendation, as updates often correct detected security flaws
Customers rely on digitally signed updates	Create tools to easily assess the security of updates	Naïve approach that could cover this particular case, but in the general case, signed updates must be trusted. In the same way that today’s antivirus tools are not 100% accurate, such a tool the authors recommend could not be
Too much emphasis is placed on firewalls and antivirus and public cloud confidentiality requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Use strong encryption everywhere – Move data stored in the cloud around 	Here it seems that the authors do not know what they are talking about
Major challenge to carry out damage assessment and detection of modified components	Use AI to detect reconnaissance, command and control, and other signs of compromise	This is in practice a recommendation to use intrusion detection systems (IDS)

The authors discuss causes and consequences for SolarWinds and their customers, and identify a number of factors with proposed solutions. These are summarized in Table 1, with our comments.

The authors have additional recommendations on detecting vulnerabilities in open source dependencies, which is consistent with others’ recommendations to use the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) [10].

4 Recommendations for IT and OT Procurement Requirements, with a Particular Focus on Supply Chain

In the following, we will provide requirements for vendors, divided into “must-requirements” and further recommendations.

The requirements are assessed as “must” and “additional recommendations” based on the following criteria:

- **Obligatory requirements:** The requirements are based on requirements in current regulations (regulatory requirements). Please note, however, that we interpret this further than just NVE’s area of authority, so that, for example, requirements that come from GDPR also apply here. Please also note that Sect.6.9 of the Power Contingency Regulation [4, 11] lays down relatively broad guidelines for securing of digital information systems.
- **Additional recommendations:** Based on recommendations from a limited number of interviews with players in the power industry, recommendations from previous NVE reports, and recommendations from peer-reviewed literature in the last 2 years.

The requirements as presented must be regarded as a first draft, and we recommend that a major “consultation round” be conducted with DSOs and vendors to obtain feedback before the NVE formalizes the requirements. A critical infrastructure operator is free to upgrade “should” requirements to “must” requirements in a specific tender.

4.1 Prerequisites for DSOs

An important prerequisite for successful procurement of goods and services is to have sufficient procurement competence [12]. Procurement competence is a broad term, and includes general business competence, ICT security competence, integration competence, competence in procurement, and legal competence. In order to make good orders, you need interdisciplinary expertise. According to NSM [12], business competence is needed to be able to define needs and set relevant requirements, and ICT security competence is therefore needed to be able to set reasonable security requirements. Knowledge of the business is also important in order to assess how what you order can be integrated into existing systems, and it is necessary to have knowledge of existing APIs, protocols, and other interfaces. For example, if existing systems communicate with a given set of protocols, it can be disastrous if something is ordered that requires completely different protocols—we have seen several examples of this in recent times. General knowledge of procurement processes in the business is important to ensure that procurements fit into established patterns and routines (see also in the context of business understanding).

However, it is difficult to formulate universal requirements for this, and this is also difficult to measure. Large DSOs will typically have better access to ordering expertise than small DSOs. It will be important to collaborate between those responsible for the operation of IT/OT and the purchasing department. For example, in connection with the roll-out of smart meters in Norway, many DSOs joined forces in alliances to meet the competence requirements in the procurement process.

4.2 Obligatory Requirements

The following requirements must be met by all power industry vendors.

4.2.1 Periodic Risk Assessment

Vendors must be subject to periodic risk assessment so that DSOs can fulfill their duty of protecting their critical infrastructure [4]. The DSO can use checklists as described by Maal et al. [2].

4.2.2 Identify How Vendors Can Assist in an Emergency Situation

The vendor must document how it can assist the customer in an emergency situation involving the vendor's products or services, including incident management. This must be specified in the vendor contract or equivalent agreement.

4.2.3 Exercises

Vendors must be involved in emergency preparedness exercises affecting their products and/or services [13], in accordance with what has been determined in Sect. 4.2.2. This must be specified in the vendor contract or equivalent agreement.

This is not intended to be interpreted to mean that it should not be possible to arrange exercises without involving all vendors if the critical infrastructure operator considers it appropriate to also carry out more limited emergency preparedness exercises.

4.2.4 Location of Servers

If the service provided is to process sensitive information (personal data), the servers used by the service must be located in a country that satisfies the current rules for

servers and personal data required by the GDPR law, which is currently EU/EEA [1].² This also applies to various forms of cloud solutions [15].

4.2.5 Power-Sensitive Information

If the service provided is to process power-sensitive information (as defined in relevant regulations [4, 11]), servers used by the service must be located in a country that satisfies requirements for the procurement of operational control systems for classes 2 and higher.

4.2.6 Location of Employees

If the service provided is to process sensitive information, the vendor's employees who gain access to such information must be physically located in the EU/EEA [1].

Beyond this requirement, vendors must also make additional assessments of nationality, depending on the type of tasks to be performed, even when there is no need for security clearance. Strategic/leading roles shall not be filled by employees with nationality from countries with which we do not have security policy cooperation.

4.2.7 Data Ownership

For services that involve the vendor processing the DSO's data in the vendor's infrastructure, it must be explicitly stated in the vendor contract that ownership of such data is retained by the grid company.

4.3 Additional Recommendations

The following requirements should be met if possible, and justification should be given in cases where they are disregarded.

² The GDPR does not strictly speaking require storing and processing of sensitive data within EU/EEA, but rather that such data can only be stored and processed in jurisdictions that have *sufficient protection*. However, with the Schrems II invalidation of the Privacy Shield agreement [14], it would be prudent to adopt a more conservative approach.

4.3.1 Software Bill of Materials

All software should have a mechanism to trace the different parts of the software back to origin, and to keep track of which versions of software libraries, etc. have been used, so that one can determine whether updating is necessary when new vulnerabilities are discovered. This can be in the form of a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) [10] or equivalent solution. The vendor is responsible for maintaining an overview of the version that the customer is using at any given time, but this does not mean that the customer should have real-time insight into the details of the vendor's solution (e.g., in a SaaS solution). When a new vulnerability becomes publicly known, the provider should be able to immediately answer whether the service/product is affected by the vulnerability. This also means that the grid company should be able to monitor changes in products and/or services.

4.3.2 NSM Basic Principles or Equivalent

Vendors should document the extent to which they satisfy NSM's basic principles for ICT security [16] (level 1 and 2) or equivalent frameworks, such as ISO/IEC 27001 [17] or NIST CSF [18]. These two are examples of management standards/guidelines that have largely served as inspiration for NSM's basic principles. There are also more technology-oriented system standards such as IEC 62443 [19] that may be relevant.

4.3.3 VSA Checklist

New vendors should document their delivery in accordance with the Vendor Security Alliance (VSA) checklist.³ The literature confirms that solutions such as questionnaires to vendors are among the primary tools used [6]. The checklist from the VSA is updated periodically.

The checklist from VSA can be downloaded for free if you register on their website. There is an extended version and a kernel version, the latter consisting of a spreadsheet with nine tabs:

- Introduction to the checklist.
- Introduction to the service to be provided.
- Data overview.
- Security checks.
- Introduction to privacy.
- United States Privacy Policy.
- GDPR privacy.
- Definitions.

³ <https://www.vendorsecurityalliance.org/>.

- Legal terms.

The data overview is used to clarify what types of data the provider collects from its users, e.g.:

- Age (presumably not relevant for a DSO),
- Address,
- Education (presumably not relevant for a DSO),
- Email address,
- ...

During security checks, there are questions such as

- How do you encrypt [end user] customer data (in transit, at rest)?
- Which groups of employees (permanent and contracted) have access to personal and sensitive information about [end user] customers?
- Do you have a dedicated information security team? If so, how is it put together, and what report structure is in place?
- Do all personnel have to sign a non-disclosure agreement?
- How are regular updates evaluated for your infrastructure?
- Describe their incident management program.

4.3.4 Vulnerability Management Process

The vendor should have a documented process for managing vulnerabilities in accordance with good practice, including a mechanism for deploying patches [7, 20].

4.3.5 Redundancy Between Subcontractors

The vendors should ensure redundancy so that alternative subcontractors can be used in the event of a loss of a subcontractor.

4.3.6 Transfer of Data and Configuration upon Termination of Contract

The vendor contract should specify how the vendor will assist with the transfer of data and configuration to a new vendor upon termination of the contract.

4.3.7 Supply Chain Overview

The vendors should be able to document the complete (sub) supply chain of their product or service, especially across borders. NSM's recommendations on country

assessment [21] (or similar guidance for other jurisdictions) should be taken into account when assessing the overall value chain.

4.3.8 Automated Monitoring of Services

It will be beneficial if the provider can facilitate automated monitoring of the offered service to ensure that it meets the agreed security requirements at all times [6]. This may also include access to third-party audit reports. The DSO and/or relevant authorities should be able to perform audits.

4.3.9 Secure Development

It would be beneficial if the vendor could document a process for secure development in accordance with good practice [20, 22], e.g., as stated in IEC 62443 [19, 23]. The process must be appropriate for the product or service in question.

4.3.10 Hardening

It will be beneficial if the products and services provided are “hardened” by removing all components and subsystems that are not strictly necessary [17].

4.3.11 Separation Between Customers

It will be beneficial if the vendor can document how it ensures separation between customers, both technically and with regard to the extent to which personnel have access to data for several customers.

5 Conclusion and Further Work

This report presents results from a review of previous NVE reports on the topic of supply chain security, supplemented by a literature search among recent academic literature and discussions with a small selection of industry players, and recommends based on this a set of recommendations for requirements related to procurement of IT and OT, with a particular focus on supply chain.

Requirements and recommendations (must- and should-requirements) have been drawn up, aimed, in particular, at small- and medium-sized grid companies for use in procurement processes. The requirements presented above must be regarded as a first draft, and we recommend that a major “consultation round” be conducted with

DSOs companies and vendors to obtain feedback before the NVE formalizes the requirements.

For more detailed requirements, more work should be done related to more empirical data and dialogue with different players in the industry—of different sizes. We see that there is a need for more coordination of procurement processes, and probably a consolidation must take place in the industry in the form of procurement alliances or the like in order to meet the challenges of making demands on the major vendors.

Requirements and recommendations should not only be based on historical experience, but also include assessments based on different scenarios and more proactive measures to ensure supply chain security.

Acknowledgements This paper is based on research performed for the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, expanded with support from the Research Council of Norway through FME CINELDI (project no. 257626) and SFI NORCICS (project no. 310105).

6 Relevant Papers Based on Title

Table 2 enumerates the papers that were identified as possibly relevant based on the title alone (listed in the order provided by Scopus). The final column reports the assessment of relevance after reading the abstract.

Table 2 Relevant paper titles

Nr	Title	Author(s)	Relevant?
1	Cyberattack Ontology: A Knowledge Representation for Cyber Supply Chain Security	Yeboah-Ofori, A., Ismail, U.M., Swidurski, T., Opoku-Boateng, F.	No
2	On the Feasibility of Detecting Software Supply Chain Attacks	Wang, X.	Yes [7]
3	Struggling with Supply-Chain Security	Viega, J., Michael, J.B.	Yes [6]
4	Information Security Assessment and Certification within Supply Chains	Santos, H., Oliveira, A., Soares, L., Satis, A., Santos, A.	No
5	SoK: Combating threats in the digital supply chain	Nygård, A.R., Katsikas, S.	Yes [8]
6	Software supply chain attacks, a threat to global cybersecurity: SolarWinds' case study	Martínez, J., Durán, J.M.	Maybe
7	Cybersecurity Certification Requirements for Supply Chain Services	Kyranoud, P., Kalogeraki, E.-M., Michota, A., Polemi, N.	Maybe
8	Economics of Supply Chain Cyberattacks	Kshetri, N.	No
9	Analytic hierarchy process (ahp) for supply chain 4.0 risks management	Zekhnini, K., Cherrafi, A., Bouhaddou, I., BENGHABRIT, Y.	Maybe
10	SolarWinds Software Supply Chain Security: Better Protection with Enforced Policies and Technologies	Yang, J., Lee, Y., McDonald, A.P.	Yes [9]

(continued)

Table 2 (continued)

Nr	Title	Author(s)	Relevant?
11	Risk Indicators and Data Analytics in Supply Chain Risk Monitoring	Stampe, L., Hellingrath, B.	No
12	IoT and Supply Chain Security	Kieras, T., Farooq, J., Zhu, Q.	No
13	Applying NIST SP 800-161 in supply chain processes empowered by artificial intelligence	Al-Alawi, L., R. Al-Busaidi, and S. Ali.	No
14	Energy Resilience Impact of Supply Chain Network Disruption to Military Microgrids	Anuat, E., D.L. Van Bossuyt, and A. Pollman.	Maybe
15	Alice in (Software Supply) Chains: Risk Identification and Evaluation.	Benedetti, G., L. Verderame, and A. Merlo.	Maybe
16	Integrating Zero Trust in the Cyber Supply Chain Security	Do Amaral, T.M.S., and J.J.C. Gondim	Maybe
17	Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management and Performance in Industry 4.0 Era: Information System Security Practices in Malaysia	Fernando, Y., M.-L. Tseng, I.S. Wahyuni-Td, A.B.L. de Sousa Jabbour, C.J. Chiappetta Jabbour, and C. Foropon	Maybe
18	Supply Chain Flows and Stocks as Entry Points for Cyber-Risks	Filho, N.G., N. Rego, and J. Claro.	Maybe
19	Functional Requirements and Supply Chain Digitalization in Industry 4.0	Han, L., H. Hou, Z.M. Bi, J. Yang, and X. Zheng.	No
20	A Survey on Supply Chain Security: Application Areas, Security Threats, and Solution Architectures	Hassija, V., V. Chamola, V. Gupta, S. Jain, and N. Guizani	No
21	I-SCRAM: A Framework for IoT Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Mitigation Decisions	Kieras, T., J. Farooq, and Q. Zhu.	Maybe
22	A Systematic Review of 2021 Microsoft Exchange Data Breach Exploiting Multiple Vulnerabilities	Pitney, A.M., S. Penrod, M. Foraker, and S. Bhunia	No
23	Internet of Things in Supply Chain Management: A Systematic Review Using the Paradigm Funnel Approach	Rajabzadeh, M., S. Elahi, A. Hasanzadeh, and M. Mehraeen.	No
24	A Taxonomy for Threat Actors' Delivery Techniques	Villalón-Huerta, A., I. Ripoll-Ripoll, and H. Marco-Gisbert	No
25	A Data Processing Pipeline for Cyber-Physical Risk Assessments of Municipal Supply Chains	Weaver, G.A.	No
26	Cyber Threat Predictive Analytics for Improving Cyber Supply Chain Security	Yeboah-Ofori, A., S. Islam, S.W. Lee, Z.U. Shamszaman, K. Muhammad, M. Altaf, and M.S. Al-Rakhani.	No
27	Supply Chain 4.0 Risk Management: Bibliometric Analysis and a Proposed Framework	Zekhnini, K., A. Cherrafi, I. Bouhaddou, and Y. Benghabrit	No
28	On the Impact of Security Vulnerabilities in the Npm and RubyGems Dependency Networks	Zerouali, A., T. Mens, A. Decan, and C. De Roover	No
29	Cyber-Security Risk Management and Control of Electric Power Enterprise Key Information Infrastructure	Zhang, G., Y. Xu, Y. Hou, L. Cui, and Q. Wang.	No
30	Summary of Risk Warning of Electric Power Material Supply Chain	Zhang, Z., S. Feng, and T. Hu.	No
31	Evaluation Indicators for Open-Source Software: A Review	Zhao, Y., R. Liang, X. Chen, and J. Zou.	No


References

1. Kirkebø, E., Ljøsne, M.: IKT-sikkerhet ved anskaffelser og tjenesteutsetting i energibransjen. Tech. Rep. Nr. 90/2018, NVE (2018). https://publikasjoner.nve.no/rapport/2018/rapport2018_90.pdf
2. Maal, M., Krogedal, K., Gjengstø, A.: IKT-sikkerhet i anskaffelser og tjenesteutsetting i kraftbransjen - sjekklister. Tech. Rep. Nr. 1/2020, NVE (2020). https://publikasjoner.nve.no/rapport/2020/rapport2020_01.pdf
3. Selnes, S.H., Moen, S.R., Ji, S.E., Njå, O.: Kraftbransjens leverandørkjeder—digital sikkerhet og sårbarhet i globaliseringens tidsalder. Tech. Rep. 2021:18, NVE (2021). https://publikasjoner.nve.no/eksternrapport/2021/eksternrapport2021_18.pdf
4. NVE: Veiledning til kraftberedskapsforskriften (2022). <https://www.nve.no/energi/tilsyn/kraftforsyningsberedskap-og-kbo/veiledning-til-kraftberedskapsforskriften/>
5. Kitchenham, B.A.: Systematic review in software engineering: where we are and where we should be going. In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Evidential Assessment of Software Technologies, pp. 1–2 (2012)
6. Viega, J., Michael, J.: Struggling with supply-chain security. *Computer* **54**(7), 98–104 (2021). <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85112675156&doi=10.1109%2fMC.2021.3075412&partnerID=40&md5=9891b633e2cc6d2fcb9595acbfad99ac>
7. Wang, X.: On the Feasibility of Detecting Software Supply Chain Attacks, vol. 2021, pp. 458–463 (2021)
8. Nygård, A., Katsikas, S.: SoK: Combating threats in the digital supply chain. In: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, Vienna, Austria (2022)
9. Yang, J., Lee, Y., McDonald, A.: SolarWinds Software Supply Chain Security: Better Protection with Enforced Policies and Technologies. *Studies in Computational Intelligence, SCI*, vol. 1012, p. 58. Springer (2022)
10. Muiri, E.O.: Framing Software Component Transparency: Establishing a Common Software Bill of Material (SBOM) (2019). https://ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/framingsbom_20191112.pdf
11. NVE: Forskrift om sikkerhet og beredskap i kraftforsyningen (kraftberedskapsforskriften) (2019). <https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2012-12-07-1157>
12. Sikkerhetsfaglige anbefalinger ved bruk av tjenesteutsetting og skytjenester (2020). <https://nsm.no/getfile.php/133998-1593590999/NSM/Filer/Dokumenter/Rapporter/2020-07-01%20-%20Temarapport%20-%20Tjenesteutsetting.pdf>
13. Tøien, F.K., Fagermyr, J., Treider, G., Remvang, H.: IKT-sikkerhetstilstanden i kraftforsyningen 2021. Tech. Rep. Nr. 19/2021, NVE (2021). https://publikasjoner.nve.no/eksternrapport/2021/eksternrapport2021_19.pdf
14. European Parliament: The CJEU judgment in the Schrems II case. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/652073/EPRS_ATA\(2020\)652073_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/652073/EPRS_ATA(2020)652073_EN.pdf)
15. Cybersecurity—Supplier relationships—Part 4: Guidelines for security of cloud services (2016). <https://www.iso.org/standard/59689.html>. Last reviewed in 2022
16. Grunnprinsipper for IKT-sikkerhet 2.0 (2020). <https://nsm.no/getfile.php/133735-1592917067/NSM/Filer/Dokumenter/Veiledere/nsms-grunnprinsipper-for-ikt-sikkerhet-v2.0.pdf>
17. ISO: Information technology—security techniques—information security management systems—requirements. ISO/IEC Standard 27001:2013 (2013). <https://www.iso.org/standard/54534.html>
18. NIST: Framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity (2018). <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf>
19. IEC: Understanding IEC 62443. IEC Blog (2021). <https://www.iec.ch/blog/understanding-iec-62443>
20. Threat Landscape for Supply Chain Attacks. Report/Study (2021). <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/threat-landscape-for-supply-chain-attacks>

21. Anbefaling om landvurdering ved tjenesteutsetting - Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet (2020). <https://nsm.no/regelverk-og-hjelp/rad-og-anbefalinger/anbefaling-om-landvurdering-ved-tjenesteutsetting/>
22. CISA: Defending Against Software Supply Chain Attacks (2021). https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/defending_against_software_supply_chain_attacks_508_1.pdf
23. IEC 62443-2-4:2015 | Security for industrial automation and control systems—Part 2-4: Security program requirements for IACS service providers (2015). <https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/22810>

Taxonomy of Emerging Security Risks in Digital Railway



Mohammed Al-Mhiqani , Uchenna Ani , Jeremy Watson ,
and Hongmei He 

Abstract The railway industry has embraced digitisation and interconnectivity by introducing Information and Communication Technologies into traditional operational technology infrastructure. This convergence has brought numerous advantages, including improved visibility, reliability, operational efficiency, and better passenger experience. But it has also introduced new cyber risks and amplified the existing ones in Digital Railways (DRs) and the entire supply chain. The threat and vulnerability landscape has become wider than ever. To better understand the scope of security risks, impacts on normal operations, and appropriate solutions, a security taxonomy that covers the broader views and contexts around DRs can help. Recorded attacks show that railway systems/networks are clearly intolerant to network interference, and require strong security, resilience, and safety. Cyber attack impacts on DRs can take economic or financial, reputational, environmental, and/or physical dimensions, and can target rail Operational Technology OT data and functionality, rail Information Technology IT data and functionality, rail IT and OT workforce, and rail organisational structures, cultures, and exploit policies, especially when they are either weak or non-existent. Attacks can come from a range of malicious threat actors driven by their diverse motives. DR is a socio-technical system that is complex, large, and distributed, comprising technologies, humans, organisational structures, policies elements and attributes, etc. Thus, a socio-technical security approach is required to effectively mitigate cyber threat impacts. DR stakeholders must collaborate to make the system functions work properly so that a successful implementation of change, security, resilience, and safety operations depends on the ‘joint optimisation’ of the system’s organisational/operational, technology, physical, and human or people security controls.

M. Al-Mhiqani · U. Ani (✉)

School of Computer Science and Mathematics, Keele University, Keele, UK
e-mail: u.d.ani@keele.ac.uk

J. Watson

Department of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Public Policy, University College London, London, UK

H. He

School of Science, Engineering and Environment, University of Salford, Salford, UK

Keywords Railway · Rail cyber security · Rail security risks · Digital railways · Railway cyber incidents · Taxonomy

1 Introduction

Technological advances in the telecommunications business have provided significant benefits in the organisation and management of communication networks. The railway industry with its digital adoption and transformation agenda is a key beneficiary of this development. Railways have played a crucial part in the normal functioning of society since the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, operators have faced mounting pressures to satisfy the gradually recovering services performance, productivity, and safety demands from the public reduced by the pandemic [1]. The key essential services provided by today's railway system include operating traffic on the rail network, ensuring the safety and security of passengers and/or goods, maintaining railway infrastructure and/or trains, managing invoicing and finance (billing), planning operations and booking resources, providing information to passengers and customers about operations, carrying goods and/or passengers, and selling and distributing tickets [2].

To keep up with the delivery of these essential services, rail systems have evolved significantly, mostly due to technological developments, towards new technology and communication-based systems. The transforming and new railway systems are now becoming more reliant on information and communication technology ICT systems—open platform, standardised equipment built with Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components, and high-speed radio communications [3]. Internet of things (IoT), cloud and edge computing, big data, Artificial Intelligence (AI), ubiquitous computing, blockchain, high-speed network technologies, etc., [4], are a range of new technological capacities finding their way into rail systems and operations aiming to optimise logistics, speed up operations, enhance passenger experiences, boost capacity for carrying freight, and enhance confidence in the new digital railway [5]. However, despite these benefits, the new digitisation and transformation also introduce new and significant cyber security risks—comprising threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts—that threaten the operations of digital railway [4, 6, 7]. These are widening the attack surface of DRs, implying that these systems in their modern or improved functional states can be compromised once a malicious actor gains access to any vulnerable part of the system. The increasing spate of cyber attacks targeting DRs must not be allowed to thrive if the visions for DRs are to be sustained. DRs must be cyber secure and resilient.

Cyber security has been defined as “how individuals and organisations reduce the risk of cyber attack” [8]. In rail, it involves the protection of the rail system's physical and digital assets from unauthorised access, manipulations, and damage, which includes infrastructure, rolling stock, and their linking assets that constitute the entire rail operating system. Cyber security encompasses the protection of all forms of networked technologies, digital activities, and participating users (humans)

with the goal of maintaining control of all rail system assets to ensure their safe operations. On the other hand, cyber resilience describes the ability of a system or a network to withstand, adapt, and recover from a cyber attack or invasion in a timely manner and with minimal service disruption to network performance [9]. In rail, cyber resilience is crucial as it prepares the providers of rail essential services, so they can respond appropriately during sudden or unplanned disruptive events such as a cyber attack.

Thus, to be effective, cyber security (and resilience) for DRs needs to be holistic, i.e., encompassing technology, people, organisation, and environment. More specifically, this needs to cover software, hardware, human factors, and organisational (including physical), as these all form part of the overall rail system operational architecture [10]. Every railway operator has the massive challenge of mitigating or eliminating security exposures in their systems and environments by adopting and implementing security in their rail infrastructure and rolling stock.

Security taxonomies are one way of contextualising information related to cyber security deployment and management [11]. In the past, taxonomies have been used to identify and analyse cyber-related security risks from a generic view [12]. Security taxonomies are useful for exploring new security aspects when dealing with security concerns or incidents by categorising the problem or cause based on similar past situations or scenarios [13]. Taxonomies and classifications related to cyber security risks in Digital Railway are limited, and often appear to address only a part of the wider security risk landscape or sector. For instance, a classification of attack types presented in Schlehner et al. [14] focuses on threats to railway signalling systems, categorising them into directed and undirected attacks. While this approach provides a high-level overview of threat categorisation, it solely focuses on attack types and does not encompass the broader security risk landscape or sector. Furthermore, Rekik et al. [15] delves into the detailed description of actors and their motivations. It explores the various types of actors who pose threats to railway systems, identifying their motivations as political or economic. However, a taxonomy that covers the entire range of cyber security risks in the digital railway domain is still lacking.

This study provides newer insights on the emerging and broader cyber security risks—threats, vulnerabilities, and potential impacts—associated with evolving ICT and modern communications-driven technologies in railway systems, drawing from the analysis of cyber security incidents, in order to guide the identification and outline of applicable specification for baseline security objectives, countermeasures, and competency requirements needed to achieve and maintain security and resilience. This contribution is achieved through a survey of recorded rail-related cyber incidents in the public domain, and a critical analysis of the emerging aspects of security risks in railways systems. These are combined into a cohesive whole to provide a broader overview of the current state of cyber security risk attributes in DRs. This can provide a usable reference to railway critical infrastructure stakeholders—developers, researchers, owners, operators, regulators, and users—when considering and applying security and resilience solutions for their rail systems.

The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used in the research. Section 3 covers the construction of security risk taxonomy,

Sect. 4 discusses control measures, Sect. 5 highlights the future directions, and Sect. 5 concludes the article and outlines future work.

2 Methodology

To achieve our research objectives, a critical review-type research approach [16] was adopted. This type of review technique is considered relevant as it is typically used to explore and address mature or emerging topical areas. Our study leans towards the mature pathway as it is based on firmly established security concepts. Thus, the area involves investigating the knowledge base of interest, critically reviewing, re-conceptualising, and further explaining the theoretical bases of the solution ideas and concepts. For the emerging area, the integrative review technique encompasses the creation of preliminary views and/or theoretical concepts on the area of discourse from a more creative collection of data not covering all articles published in the area, but rather combining the views and insights from different works considered relevant to the topic [16, 17]. To achieve our research objectives, a critical review-type research approach [16] was adopted. This type of review technique is considered relevant as it is typically used to explore and address mature or emerging topical areas. Our study leans towards the mature pathways as it is based on firmly established security concepts. Thus, it involves investigating the knowledge base in the area of interest, critically reviewing, re-conceptualising, and further explaining the theoretical bases of the solution ideas and concepts. For the emerging area, the integrative review technique encompasses the creation of preliminary views and/or theoretical concepts on the area of discourse from a more creative collection of data not covering all articles published in the area, but rather combining the views and insights from different works considered relevant to the topic [16, 17]. We adopted the latter approach for our study as we consider this to be more relevant for the scope of work being explored.

2.1 Literature Gathering

In employing the integrative or critical review approach, searches were conducted for relevant articles that either would help in identifying the key security risk attributes associated with railway systems and associated cyber incidents from Scopus and Web of Science (WoS) databases. Further searches were conducted online using the Google search engine to identify other sources that capture records of cyber incidents that have targeted railway system assets. Sources sought included organisational websites, online news magazines, newspapers, journals, etc. WoS and Scopus were chosen because of its standing for maintaining supervised selection and inclusion of materials drawing from high-quality and high-impact indexing by humans, consistent and structured documentation, improved accuracy of results, and reduced




Fig. 1 Research literature filtering process

duplicates and false positives [18]. Furthermore, it is the preferred choice employed by most organisations [19]. Figure 1 presents the literature-gathering process flow.

Key search phrases such as “Rail Cyber security”, “Railway cyber attacks”, “Railway Cyber incidents”, “Railway security risks,” “Railway security vulnerabilities”, and “Railway security threats” were used. These phrases were more suitable (from prior test searches) to help in finding relevant articles for the study. As anticipated, the search for articles turned out a large number of articles and online resource results. To optimise the results, further article sifting was carried out using appropriate inclusion and exclusion criteria such as article titles related to railway system security threats, vulnerabilities, attacks, and impacts, to identify and select the more relevant articles and online resources that support the research objectives. Unrelated articles and online resources were discarded, and only one instance each of resource was retained.

3 Results and Discussions

The four context areas covered in the study include (i) cyber security incidents in railway systems, (ii) technologies and architectures for DRs, (iii) security objectives, and (iv) cyber security risk factors—attacks (types and agents), vulnerabilities, and impacts. The results of analysing these four contexts are thus presented.

3.1 *Railway Cyber Security Incidents*

With digital connectivity, railway system assets that can be accessed, operated, and managed remotely or over an internetworked medium can increase the risks of compromises. In the last couple of years, a steady growth in cyber attacks on railway assets has been recorded. Some of these cyber security incidents, which cover both OT and IT aspects of the railway, are outlined in Table 1 below. Furthermore, rail cyber incidents are characterised based on the perceived security objectives and vulnerabilities exploited, the railway infrastructure aspect targeted, the motivation of attackers, and the recorded impact. Although not an exhaustive list, 22 records of railway cyber incidents were found in the public domain and presented in Table 1.

From the analysis of the cyber incidents in Table 1, it can be observed that most (55%) of the recorded attacks compromised the availability of railway systems, followed by the compromise of system confidentiality (36%). Out of the 22 attack incidents, most (up to 90%) of them appeared to target and impact information technology (IT) infrastructure aspects or components of the railway system which resulted in the IT systems and associated services being put out of operation. However, the attacks that targeted operational technology (OT) rail infrastructure resulted in a more severe impact, for example, the attack on a train network in Lodz, Poland, where 12 people were injured and rail infrastructure was damaged. This highlights the potentially grave consequences feasible when railway OT infrastructure is directly attacked, which could be more severe than the potential consequences of compromising railway IT. This highlights the potentially grave consequences when railway OT infrastructure is directly attacked, which could be more severe than the potential consequences of compromising railway IT. This further emphasises the need to ensure more secure implementations in railway systems, especially the OT, to guard against any such possible attacks succeeding. It is also crucial to be aware of, and guard against, direct attacks on certain IT infrastructure whose impact can extend to the OT infrastructure with potentially devastating consequences. For example, the CSX Transportation railroad company virus attack affected the computers managing rail signalling operations. The compromise of the IT system affected 23,000 miles of one railway line and disrupted railway signals for 15 min–6 h. A variant of such disruption could cause train accidents that could further lead to damage or destruction of train and track equipment, damage to the environment, injury, or loss of lives.

Table 1 Incidents analysis

Year	Incident description	Country	Key security objective affected	Types	Vulnerabilities	Attack target	Impact
2021	UK Northern Rail—Ransomware Attack—Took offline self-service touchscreen & tablet-like ticketing machines (420 stations across the network). No disruption to rail service, manual purchase of tickets possible	UK	Availability	N/A	Technology	Rail IT	Reputational
2021	Iran’s Railroad System—takeover of station service display boards with fake delays and cancellations—Rail Service disrupted (delays and cancellations), thousands of passengers left stranded	Iran	Integrity	N/A	Technology	Rail IT	Financial/reputational
20	Network Rail and C3UK service provider—Breach and online exposure of database—containing 146 million records (personal contacts, DoB, email addresses, and travel details) of free wifi users [2]	UK	Confidentiality	Undirected	N/A	Rail IT	Reputational

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Year	Incident description	Country	Key security objective affected	Types	Vulnerabilities	Attack target	Impact
2020	Spanish Infrastructure Manager of Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (ADIF)—Ransomware Attack—Exposed gigabytes of personal and business data. No disruption to critical infrastructure operations [2]	Spain	Confidentiality	Undirected	Technology	Rail IT	Reputational/ economic/financial
2020	The Egregor ransomware attack hit TransLink, forcing the company to shut down several IT services including part of payment systems	Canada	Availability	Undirected	Technology	Rail IT	Reputational/ economic/financial
2020	Stadler (Swiss manufacturer of railway rolling stock)—Malware attack on IT networks—Stole (exfiltration of) sensitive customers or employees' data/information [2]	Switzerland	Confidentiality	Undirected	Technology	Rail IT	Reputational
2020	A ransomware attack hit OmniTRAX. It was the first publicly disclosed case of a so-called double-exhortation ransomware attack against a US freight rail operator [1]	US	Confidentiality	Undirected	Technology	Rail IT	Reputational

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Year	Incident description	Country	Key security objective affected	Types	Vulnerabilities	Attack target	Impact
2020	A ransomware attack hit the Société de transport de Montréal (STM) compromising 624 operationally sensitive servers. The outage also affected STM for over a week [1]	Canada	Availability	Undirected	Technology	Rail IT	Economic/financial
2020	Mitsubishi Electric Corporation—Massive cyberattack—Compromise of documents related to projects with private firms, including utilities and railway operators	Japan	Confidentiality	Direct	Technology	Rail IT	Reputational
2019	China Railways (CR)—Huge data breach of online booking platform—Stole personal information of nearly 5 million people including names, ID numbers, and passwords	China	Confidentiality	Direct	Technology	Rail IT	Reputational

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Year	Incident description	Country	Key security objective affected	Types	Vulnerabilities	Attack target	Impact
2018	Danish State Railways (DSB)—Attack on ticketing systems—Danish travellers unable to purchase tickets from ticket machines, online application, website, and certain station kiosks [2]	Denmark	Availability	Direct	Technology	Rail IT	Operational/ economic/financial
2017	A series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks targeted Sweden's transportation services, resulting in train delays and significant disruptions to travel services. Crashed IT system that monitors trains' locations, the federal agency's email system, website, and road traffic maps. Customers unable to make reservations or receive updates on the delays (Supply Chain) [2]	Sweden	Availability	Direct	Technology	Rail IT	Operational/ economic/financial
2017	Germany Deutsche Bahn – Ransomware Attack – WannaCry ransomware took over IT systems [2]	Germany	Availability	Undirected	Technology	Rail IT	Economic/financial

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Year	Incident description	Country	Key security objective affected	Types	Vulnerabilities	Attack target	Impact
2016	A ransomware attack on the San Francisco light rail transit system (SF Muni) resulted in the temporary shutdown of ticket machines and the opening of gates for free rides. However, the incident did not impact transit service, safety systems, or compromise customers' personal information	US	Availability	Undirected	Technology	Rail IT	Economic/financial
2016	A study reported that the UK Network Rail had been hit by at least four significant cyberattacks over 12 months, including intrusion in rail infrastructure itself. According to such a study, these attacks seemed to be exploratory [2]	UK	Confidentiality	Direct	Technology	Rail IT	N/A
2016	BlackEnergy and KillDisk malware infected the systems of a prominent Ukrainian rail company [25]	Ukraine	Availability	Undirected	People and Technology	Rail IT & OT	Operational

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Year	Incident description	Country	Key security objective affected	Types	Vulnerabilities	Attack target	Impact
2012	The HoneyTrain Project recorded 2,745,267 logins illegals accesses to the human machine interface (HMI) of a virtual train control system in the space of six weeks	UK & Germany	Confidentiality	Direct	Technology	Rail OT	Operational
2011	Cyber attack on a Northwest rail company's computers disrupted railway signals for two days	US	Availability	Direct	Technology	Rail IT	Operational
2010	Unknown attackers hacked the official website of "Russian Railways" company and replaced some of the web pages	Russia	Availability, Integrity	Direct	Technology	Rail IT	Operational
2008	The official website of Eastern Railway, which is a part of the state-owned Indian railway network, fell victim to an SQL Injection attack	India	Availability	Direct	Technology	Rail IT	Reputational

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Year	Incident description	Country	Key security objective affected	Types	Vulnerabilities	Attack target	Impact
2008	In Lodz, Poland, a teenager managed to hack the city's tram system using a self-made transmitter. The transmitter disrupted rail switches and redirected trains, causing a prank that derailed four trams and injured a dozen people	Poland	Confidentiality and integrity	Direct	Technology	Rail OT	Operational
2003	A computer virus disabled the CSX Transportation headquarters in Florida, affecting signalling in thousands of km of railway line. A computer virus infected the computer system at CSX Transportation (a railroad company) in Florida which affected 23,000 miles of one railway line and disrupted railway signals for 15 minutes to 6 h	US	Availability	Undirected	People and Technology	Rail IT	Operational

For the outlined incidents in Table 1, the approach for attacks ranged from directed attacks to undirected attacks, based on a perceived end goal of impacting rail operational technology function and/or service. Most of the undirected attacks used ransomware as their attack form. The ransomware type of attack appears to be gaining prominence as a new form of attack across other sectors with the motivation of financial gains for the attackers. This has evidently found its way into the railway sector with occurrences gradually increasing. In terms of targeted vulnerabilities, rail IT-based vulnerabilities appear to be the common initial vectors of growing attacks. A significant proportion of the attacks on rail IT also appear to be enabled by failure scenarios associated with a non-technical element or part of the rail system asset. Some attack instances appear to have exploited the actions or inactions of humans—railway stakeholders—in the loop due to a lack of effective security competency or response, stress, or discontent. Some attacks also seemed to be exploiting weak, or the absence of, appropriate security policies and standards, or strong organisational security processes. These limitations appear to have enabled attackers to execute and progress their attacks on targeted rail assets and to actualise the damaging outcome recorded. These suggest that the prospects of a successful cyber breach or compromise of railway asset/infrastructure is as likely via the exploitation of human-factor attributes, which can include less security consciousness, incompetence, non-responsiveness, and/or security negligence of the target individual or organisation as by the competence and skills of the attacker(s). Clearly, the capabilities of attackers contribute to the occurrence of cyber incidents. This reaffirms the view from the routine activity theory of cybercrime [20]. Thus, the capabilities of attackers contribute to enhancing the occurrence of cyber incidents according to the routine activity theory of cybercrime [20]. To effectively protect DRs from emerging forms of cyber threats, we posit that social and technical security factors (and attributes) and measures are equally important to be considered.

The dominant focus of attacks on IT infrastructure suggests that the integration of IT into DRs may have created a new attack vector that attackers consider more attractive, more easily reachable, more accessible, and less arduous to yield success. This is because, traditionally, OT was not designed with security in mind, thus relying upon security by isolation, IT-OT integration enables connectivity that was initially non-existent and makes the OT environment more open and reachable. Traditionally, OT was not designed with security in mind, thus relying upon security by isolation, IT-OT integration enables connectivity that was initially non-existent and makes the OT environment more open and reachable. The increasing number of attacks targeting rail IT assets could imply that IT in DRs may also have meant transferring typical IT vulnerabilities into rail OT. The current dominant focus on IT can imply that current attackers are more knowledgeable in IT technology. They could be more aware of the security vulnerabilities in IT, or better skilled in the application of IT cyber threat approaches—tools and technologies—than of OT technology. Thus, this could be a period of learning more about OT security risks in rail for attackers, and once they are done, more direct attacks on OT could begin to surface.

The wider target on rail system availability suggests that most of the attacks aimed to disrupt or completely shut down certain railway functions and operations; aiming

to make unavailable associated railway essential service(s). These availability attacks caused the functions of one or more components of the larger railway operations to be unavailable for a period, which evidently interfered with the consistent delivery of one or more railway essential services. Common examples included the compromise of computers and another IT system(s) coordinating rail signalling (CXT Transportation virus attack and Northwest rail company system attack) or monitoring train locations, attacks on rail organisation websites (Russian Railway attack) and email systems, compromise of ticketing machines (San Francisco Municipal Transport Authority ransomware attack) and online booking platforms (Danish State Railways attack). Clearly, these attack situations affected some key train services such as the operation of traffic on the railway network, managing of invoicing and finance (billing), planning of operations, and booking of resources, providing information to passengers and customers about operations, carriage of goods and/or passengers, and sales and distribution of tickets. All of these have been identified as part of railway essential services [2], that need to be consistently maintained and safeguarded.

Also, the significant focus on confidentiality compromise suggests the growing interest of cyber criminals in the data and information generated and used to drive the operations of DRs. The interests further highlight the value of such data and information, especially in the hands of malicious actors. As observed in some of the incidents, there can be immediate or direct economic and financial losses for the victims and gains for the attackers. However, for the victims, the impacts can also be operational and reputational. Aside from the immediate motivations and gains to attackers, the compromise of rail operations data may not just be the end, but perhaps a means to a more insidious end. This could just be a reconnaissance activity for better knowledge of the system, which can lead to further perpetration of more damaging attacks on the rail infrastructure.

Evidently, there are some clear insights and lessons that can be drawn from analysing the railway cyber incidents outlined in Table 1. These include: (i) DRs like other Industrial Control System ICS-controlled industrial system infrastructures are availability-critical systems and intolerant to network communication latency. The slightest delay or disruption in the transmission or exchange of process data, especially amongst the OT components can lead to significant service and operational losses, damage, injury, and death. (ii) To be reliably operational, DRs require a high degree of security relating to availability, integrity, confidentiality, resilience, and safety. (iii) For DRs, cyber attacks can target railway IT data and functionality assets, as well as railway OT data and functionality assets. (iv) The consequences and impacts of cyber attacks on rail IT could be critically disruptive or destructive, but on rail OT, the scope of disruption or destruction can be larger and needs to be avoided as much as possible. (v) Successful attacks on rail IT can cause direct, indirect, or cascading impacts on rail OT with potentially critical consequences. (vi) Cyber attack delivery directions on DRs are evolving towards exploiting the gaps and weaknesses in non-technical (social) elements or part of the rail system—weak human factors and organisational policies and structures—to target technical assets. This is characterised by weak, or a complete lack of security consciousness or competence, and/or security negligence of applicable railway system stakeholder(s) individually

or corporately. (vii) A socio-technical approach that considers solutions addressing people-related (human factors), processes-related, and technology-related can offer better security and resilience that addresses emerging forms of risk attributes in DRs. (viii) The broader consequences of cyber attacks on DRs can lead to operational, economic, reputational, environmental, and physical impacts.

3.2 Technologies and Architectures for DRs

A Digital Railway is digitalised. Typically, it is managed and controlled by an industrial control system, which is a complex system that relies on various components and technologies to control and maintain physical processes, and many related management, administrative, and regulatory requirements [22]. Broadly, the key technologies involved can be divided into operational technology and information technology.

OT is commonly associated with engineering functions, often deployed in railway field environments to manage field operations, and commonly associated with safety. In rail, these include Control and Command Systems, Signalling Systems, Rail Traffic Management Systems, On-train systems, and Maintenance systems. We see from this study that these types of systems are becoming the end targets of attacks on rail. IT refers to the business or corporate information processing components and systems that interface to/with OT, such as scheduling systems, ticketing systems, email exchange system, data exchange and storage systems, etc. In DRs, IT can be used for a variety of purposes, starting from the train control systems and the improved safety mechanisms to more efficient digital booking and ticketing system [23]. In DRs, when OT and IT integrate, the outcome reflects a largely closed cyber-physical system and includes mobile assets, minute-level dynamics, limited reconfigurability, human interactions, and single or multiple stakeholders managing the infrastructure [24].

Contextually, the DR OT and IT components can be further categorised into five groups based on their physical areas and functional criticality. These include Command and Control, Signalling, Auxiliary, Comfort, and Public [10]. These groups highlight the various types of asset functions in DRs. Often, assets that have similar or different functions and groups are more likely to be interlinked. Also, they can be separated or segregated by different virtual or physical networks. For example, a connection is often maintained between interlocking and traffic management systems.

Command and Control systems include subsystems associated to the operational control, management, and maintenance of railway infrastructure, e.g., subsystems for managing traffic, communications, hot box detection, lighting, traction, braking system, etc. Signalling system includes a range of subsystems that interact and work together to enable the efficient control of railway traffic movements. Examples include subsystems for interlocking, Automatic Train Protection (ATP), level crossing, signal, track vacancy detection, etc. The auxiliary system includes the range of subsystems that support the normal and safe functioning of signalling, the systems

for signalling, and command and control operations systems. For example, energy management system, facility management, diagnostics, public address system, video surveillance, driver advisory systems, etc. Comfort systems include the subsystems integrated into the railway system to enable relaxation and ease to passengers during journeys. For example, Passenger Information System (PIS), digital signage, Heating Ventilation, Air Conditioning (HVAC), toilet system, etc.

Public Interface systems include those subsystems that enable passengers onboard trains or on platforms to interact with the rail organisation system, and with other external parties, and help to enhance service support. Examples include the entertainment system including the Wifi and internet connectivity systems, etc. Evidently, the above categorisation of rail into command and control, signalling, auxiliary, comfort, and public interface subsystems suggest that the DR is a ‘Complex Adaptive System (CAS)’, i.e., comprising a collection of interacting components where change often occurs due to learning processes, and where each component of the railway infrastructure constitutes a small part of the bigger/wider complex network [26]. OT and IT components of DRs do not function in isolation, but are interconnected to enable faster inspection of station installations via virtual channels, automated condition-based monitoring and maintenance of onboard and on-platform rail components, automated faults and failures prediction for proactive actions, automatic monitoring systems for rolling stock conditions, automated planning and implementation of corrective maintenance on rail assets, real-time estimation and control of passenger flow, etc.

Also, evident is that DRs do not comprise technologies (hardware and software) assets alone, but include non-technical or social elements such as people (who operate or use the technologies), processes (that run due to the interaction between people and technologies to actualise component and subsystem functions), policies (that provide rules and guides for how specific functions and operations need to be carried out to meet minimum standards, etc.). These function and interact to enable the normal operations of the railway system and the delivery of railway essential services.

3.3 Security Objectives

Establishing and maintaining availability, integrity, and confidentiality of technology, processes, and technology are the primary security objectives of DRs, like in other Critical National Infrastructures CNIs [27]. ICT-integrated ICSs for DRs are concerned with data integrity and preventing unplanned system disruptions that might impact accurate operations availability and profitability. The prioritisation of security objective in DRs is dependent on the specific essential rail business or operational objective or service(s) being considered or safeguarded. For example, if the movement of trains becomes a top concern or interest, then availability takes priority, followed by integrity and confidentiality in the order. The loss of availability can result in immediate threat and impact of critical rail operations and associated service(s) being partially or completely unavailable and leading to system and service failures

or halt. For this reason, availability is considered the topmost priority requirement in IoT and ICS-enabled DRs [28].

Furthermore, the transportation industry including rail, places a strong emphasis on cyber resilience [29], because the continuous availability of each rail subsystem is of a top concern [1]. Thus, availability can be expounded to relate to timeliness, recoverability, redundancy, graceful degradation, utility, robustness, etc. Integrity may be decomposed into accountability, authentication, non-repudiation, dependability, truthfulness, reliability, veracity, trustworthiness, etc, while confidentiality can be related to authorisation, access control, privacy, possession, etc., [27, 28]. In all, the capacity to protect against cyber attacks, detect the attacks when they are imminent, develop appropriate security knowledge, skills, and culture, manage security risk, and minimise the impact of attacks on the rail infrastructure, are all crucial to be built and maintained [30].

3.4 Digital Railway Cyber Security Risk Taxonomy

A security risk taxonomy outlines a broad collection of security risk contexts, attributes, or applications that can be used for security risk characterisations and/or evaluations. Such groupings can support the effective identification, aggregation, and analysis of security risks that can impact organisational objectives over time [21]. In this study, we define cyber security risk as the likelihood of occurrence of an event leading to the loss of critical assets and/or sensitive information, or reputational harm due to exploiting a vulnerability to cause a cyber attack or breach within an organisation's network. Thus, cyber security risk can be described as a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and likelihood. Also, we consider cyber security risks to involve operational risks to people, processes, and technology assets and associated information that constitute an operational system, and to have consequences affecting the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of the functional or operational assets.

In exploring cyber security risk taxonomy for modern digital railway, we combine insights from our analysis of rail cyber incidents and references from prior work related to aspects of risks in railway system, in doing this, care was taken to ensure that there were no overlaps in the numerous subcategories under the main classes. The aggregated information is then reorganised into a harmonised taxonomy, as shown in Fig. 2.

i. Cyber Threats in Digital Railways

From the outline and analysis of cyber incidents targeting DRs, it is clear that several types of cyber threats or attacks are feasible against rail systems and infrastructure. Cyber threats applicable to DRs can be classified into two main categories: directed and undirected attacks [14].

Directed attacks on DRs refer to the types of attacks that are targeted and capable of directly triggering hazardous physical conditions on railway infrastructure and typically affect OT infrastructure and train movements. This can include threat actions




Fig. 2 Security risk taxonomy

related to spoofing, compromised or false data injection, or improper commands directed at the signalling, command and control, auxiliary, or safety instrumented parts of the DR infrastructure. As shown in Fig. 1, directed attacks can include the gathering of technical operational information to facilitate cyber attacks, impersonation to gain illegal and unauthorised access and/or control to trackside components and interlocking systems, manipulation of information and communication exchanges amongst train operating components that tampers with the integrity of data or devices, the instrumentation of attacks that impede the functions or operations of one or more rail system components, etc. [14].

Undirected attacks on DRs refer to the types of attacks that are not targeted directly but could lead to physically hazardous consequences on operational technology systems, functions, and processes. These often can affect business and enterprise management systems, functions, and processes. Examples of these can include viruses, worms, trojan, social engineering activities to access business systems or influence wrong/unintentional misbehaviours from system users and operators. Typically, these are cyber attacks that target IT and the corporate/business parts of DRs, which in the immediate may not have tangible physical impacts on train movements but could do so on the long term. The assumption is that undirected attacks by themselves alone and in the first or immediate instance, hardly generate an unsafe state in the OT part of the railway such as signalling, command and control system, since they do not often circumvent current safety measures. However, this type of attack may have an impact on the system’s availability [14]. Thus, spoofing is considered

to be one of the common examples of this type of attack since it may result in casualties, where an attacker can forge authentic messages of a network entity such as an Operations Control Center (OCC) or the interlocking system (ILS) computer itself.

On the specifics, other named common cyber attack forms targeting railway signalling, command and control, auxiliary infrastructure, and others, and for which research in public is proffering potential solutions include; Man-in-the-Middle, jamming, eavesdropping, data tampering, blackhole, badmouthing, clustering, poisoning, ultrasound, balise cloning, fake telegram, transmission extension, relay, replay, displacement, known plaintext, chosen plaintext attacks [4]. Due to the dispersed nature of the physical topology of DRs, its attack surface is wide, and it is susceptible to many forms of physical and logical intrusion activities.

ii. Cyber Threat Actors in Digital Railways

From our study, some common cyber threat actors targeting DRs include nation-states, non-state actors, cybercriminals, hacktivists, insider threat agents, business-oriented attackers, casual cyber attackers, or thrill-seekers.

Nation-state actors are often very determined attackers who are supported by the authority and resources of a state. Often, they aim at systems that provide critical services that support the normal running of society, e.g., transport, health, economy, etc. [15]. Non-state organised threat groups mostly engage in malicious activities using their own or private resources. Threat actors in this threat class often can be arranged locally, nationally, or internationally, with varied goals, resources access, and skillsets.

Cybercriminals are people or organisations that employ technology to conduct crimes online with the aim of obtaining private or sensitive corporate data and making money out of it. They are the very common and aggressive form of attackers emerging [15]. Hacktivists are threat agents who often lack technical expertise and rely on pre-made attack kits, services, or even outside botnets to disrupt systems, as a form of protest. Business-oriented attackers are a classical type of threat agents that seek to inflict concrete damage and obtain business benefits by engaging in abusive behaviours against competitor-controlled cyber-physical rail systems [15]. Insider threat agents are threat actors who have legitimate permission to access a rail company's network or data and can use it maliciously to compromise the system's security.

iii. Cyber Attack Motivations in Digital Railways

A range of reasons can drive different cyber threat actors into executing their malicious actions against DRs. The motivations can be both intrinsic and extrinsic and can be political, financial, ideological, recognition, discontent, or terrorism-driven.

Politically motivated threats are intended to damage the reputation of an organisation or government body involved with running the targeted rail infrastructure. Railway transportation systems are mostly government-run, thus attacking railway systems is often considered a strategic warfare weapon since they are a vital component of a nation's infrastructure and may have significant consequences that can include threats to human lives and damage to the economy. Attack activities can

involve compromising traffic information, e.g., turning off alarms or any other failure-related information that could lead to physical accidents [31]. Financially motivated threats are intended to disrupt operations, cut off or reduce associated business or revenue, i.e., sales. When the reputation of those who operate the railway system and the confidence of users are interfered with, this can have a substantial long-term economic impact. As a key component of the wider transportation systems that connect people and goods, offer access to employment and services, and support commerce and economic progress, attacking and sabotaging DRs can attract negative financial consequences for service providers, which can cascade onto other works and services domains [31]. Recognition-driven threat actors are inspired by the sense of accomplishment that can come with successfully compromising a major rail system. Cybercriminals are often very competitive and often enjoy the challenge(s) and fame that their actions generate. The practice of outdoing one another in more complicated attacks is common amongst this group, who are always seeking greater recognition or popularity. Discontent-driven motivation drives attack agents—typically, internal employees, vendors, contractors, partners, etc.—who have some level of legitimate access to a railway asset. These insider threat actors can misuse their legitimate access to sabotage their systems or organisation. Ideologically motivated threats are driven by an attacker’s belief or principles and their self-efforts to establish or reaffirm such beliefs or principles. This type of attackers can target railway assets to assert their views, embarrass, or shame the victim organisation. Terrorism-motivated threats are aimed at driving aggressive activities to cause wide public fear, and anxiety for personal, community, or environment safety.

Understanding and classifying rail cyber attacks based on their applicable motivation classes can offer a starting point for determining the appropriate countermeasures to mitigate the intended harm.

iv. **Cyber Attack Targets in Digital Railways**

Cyber attack targets refer to any entity—person or group—who can enable attackers to achieve their goal as a potential attack target. Our rail incidents analysis shows that potential attack targets in rail can include, but are not limited to (i) rail OT data & functionality, (ii) rail IT data & functionality, (iii) rail IT & OT workforce (weak human factors) and stakeholders, and (iv) rail organisational structures and policies.

In the past, IT breaches are thought to be the main targets of cyber security incidents in Digital systems. However, it has become apparent that industrial-level assets and functionality are also common attack targets, given their less secure nature and the scale of impact of their exploitation.

Railway IT and OT workforce and other stakeholders are also common targets of cyber attacks. These include signallers and controllers (electrical, infrastructure fault, and traffic), train drivers, station and on-train staff, planners, engineers, managers, track (maintenance) engineers and workers, lookouts, site safety/security controller, passengers, and general public (legitimate at level crossings, and illegitimate as trespassers). Most of these actors are involved with, and in the planning and (re)building of railway networks, operating, and maintaining the railway infrastructure, as well as, using the services provided by the railway infrastructure.

Rail organisational security structures, security cultures, procedures, and policies can also be exploited. Rail organisational security structures outline how specific rail operations activities or functions are directed to help achieve the security goals of the railway organisation, i.e., the secure maintenance of rail essential services. For example, organisational structures can include the outline of how security checks, safety checks, recruitment and vetting, security investment processes, etc., are carried out. When such non-technical factors are weakly defined or absent, the limitation can easily be exploited to cause harm to an associated rail system asset. Security culture describes how security is imagined, understood, and acted upon or upheld within an organisation by the various rail organisation stakeholders. Security policies refer to rules defined (in text or software) to ensure the attainment of specific security objectives.

v. Cyber Vulnerabilities in Digital Railways

Vulnerabilities are flaws in systems, system procedures, information systems, security measures, or implementations that can be exploited by a threat actor to trigger a cyber security incident or event. From our study, we find that in DRs, policy and procedure, architecture and design, configuration and maintenance, physical intrusion, system software and product development, communication and networks, and security competencies or awareness, are just a few of the numerous areas where vulnerabilities can exist. Because DRs comprise these aspects and more, cyber security and resilience are made even more difficult as the complexity in the interactions amongst these various components is greatly increased across physical, organisational, human, and technology fronts, and for both attack and defence.

Physical/Environment Vulnerabilities are flaws within or caused by physical characteristics or attributes of DRs. This can occur from the existence of unguarded access by illegitimate agents or due to blind trust from/by legitimate railway system personnel. For example, where employees often allow visits from strangers or unknown staff members accessing, managing, and maintaining a component or the entire system without performing formal identity verification and confirmation before authorising access. Another example is where tailgating/piggybacking attack strategies can also be explored within DR environments to trick legitimate users into assisting attackers in gaining illegitimate access to the railway system and infrastructure workplace or environment. This can easily occur in environments without access control security measures and tight access policies based on personal identity and verification, or where attackers can induce trust from legitimate workers, etc.

Organisational/Operational vulnerabilities refer to exposures linked to how railway activities and functions are organised, provisioned, and managed to ensure secure, smooth, and resilient operations. The lack of, or weaknesses in security procedures and policies regarding supply chain security, weak corporate security culture, people vetting/screening, and weak cyber security awareness and training, can all enable opportunities for cyber attackers to attempt and succeed in attacking a railway system infrastructure. Often, when given the choice between ‘completing the task’ and ‘adhering to security’, employers motivated by efficiency usually choose

the latter. Performance is often prioritised over security due to greater demand and pressures on productivity, operational efficiency, and profit maximisation.

People or human vulnerabilities refer to weaknesses in human actors that can enable cyber attacks on DRs to succeed. This can include weak cyber security competency, i.e., knowledge and skill, which can lead to weak cyber security consciousness and responsiveness to cyber threats. This can be demonstrated by an inability of the authorised system users to recognise and/or respond appropriately to cyber threat indicators or instances in such a way that effectively minimises or eliminates the attacks and/or their impacts. The absence of this vulnerability can mean railway organisation employees at various role levels can view digital data, processes, and functions, and recognise when there are indicators of cyber threat activities or incidents within their work environment and know when and how to respond appropriately. It must be noted the one human-oriented vulnerability can lead to others, for example, limitations in cyber security knowledge and skills can lead to weak password designs and cognitive biases, as well as wrong or erroneous security threat inferences, perception, interpretation, and response. Thus, it is necessary to understand and map the human-level vulnerabilities and their dependencies in order to achieve more effective countermeasures.

Technology vulnerabilities refer to design flaws in rail technology hardware, software, and associated schemes, which offer cyber attackers access to systems and enable them to compromise the system, alter or take total control. Both IT and OT railway systems are critical components of modern railway infrastructure, and they are both vulnerable to cyber threats. IT systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks that exploit weaknesses in network security, inadequate access controls, and outdated software. On the other hand, OT systems used in railway systems are also vulnerable to cyber threats due to weak identity and access control management, open communication channels, inadequate authentication and access control mechanisms, and a lack of security monitoring on the railway signalling network. Additionally, the communication protocol used in some OT systems can be insecure, allowing unauthorised changes to sensitive data, and hardcoded passwords can be exploited by attackers.

The use of social media (channels and forums) by railway system employees at various role levels amplifies the risks of falling victim to targeted attacks. Complete or excessive trust and reliance on technology security providers, e.g., Security Anomaly Detection Systems, Intrusion Detection and Prevention System, etc., can lead to a false sense of security, enable threats and vulnerabilities to go unnoticed, and can easily be exploited by intelligent attackers. Some railway system vulnerabilities link to the wireless and cellular communications used in DRs and services. Some of the devices use radio frequencies for communications, and it is often difficult to restrict physical access to the devices that enable these types of communications, especially in open and accessible locations like public railway systems. The risk of threats like interception and intrusion is greater in the wireless context than in the wired. Increasing system automation can also enable security vulnerabilities. While reducing human error, enhancing safety and overall system operations, automated control also presents new vulnerabilities as their implementation often increases the

attack surface, as well as the probability of attacks. Despite the capacity of IoT devices to support greater visibility and predictive maintenance to enhance the railway business in DR, IoT devices also open up a considerable number of access points for cyber actors to steal, distort, destroy, or tamper with rail operational resources including data [31]. The analysis of attacks shows that cyberattacks can also affect railway system online passenger services including timetabling, passenger data, and ticket booking.

vi. **Impacts of Cyber Attacks on Digital Railways**

Cyber attack impacts describe the resulting scenario(s) when cyber attacks happen on DRs. It is critical for railway operators to understand the potential impact of cyber-physical attacks in order to help assess and prioritise their efforts to secure their infrastructure [32]. One way of classifying cyber attack impacts is based on the loss of associated security objectives of the DRs; (i) loss of railway function and service integrity which can lead to accidents or collisions, (ii) loss of railways function and service availability which can lead to halting of trains, (iii) loss of railway information, function, and service confidentiality which can lead to leaking or unauthorised or unintended disclosure of sensitive operational information, and (iv) the loss of reliability of train service which can lead to a loss of public confidence in the railway operators.

Thus, the broader impacts of cyber attacks on DRs can include; (i) operational disruption to the rail network or services operating on it, (ii) physical damage or destruction of railway infrastructure supporting the rail operation and services, (iii) reputational damage to rail companies or the hosting country due to the cyberattacks on their railway systems, (iv) economic loss to rail operators and suppliers—the loss of commercial or sensitive information from the rail industry or suppliers, and (v) psychological harm to the mental well-being and psyche of affected individuals—railway system stakeholders. Also, attack impacts can span across physical and digital domains, which can threaten health and safety, i.e., injury and death to those working on, or using the rail networks, damage to the environment, and social harm that may affect the society more broadly.

In understanding cyber attack impacts on DRs, key occurrences that need to be avoided or prevented include; collision accidents involving multiple trains, train derailment accidents, widespread disruption of train services over a large or wide geographical area, disruption to trains within a local area, threat or incident situations leading to panic and potential loss of life (e.g., an emergency stop and uncontrolled evacuation onto train track), situation leading to passenger discomfort and dissatisfaction (e.g., stopping a train indefinitely in a tunnel), loss of public confidence in the railway system due operational failures affecting service reliability, leaking of sensitive service or customer information, etc.

4 Cyber Security Controls in Digital Railways

Cyber security controls refer to structures or processes that rail organisations can use to protect rail assets from cyber compromises, thereby avoiding the negative impacts on their business and operations. Security controls can include implementing actions, procedures, policies, or technologies, that can help to minimise the occurrence of threats and vulnerabilities. These measures can help with attaining desired security objectives for DRs.

Generally, given the heterogeneity of resources, components, processes, and interactions in DRs, different types and classes of security controls are required to establish and maintain security and resilience. As shown in Fig. 3, applicable security controls in DRs would comprise a range of interventions. These include compliance with applicable cyber security standards, establishing security for personnel (people), physical security, media and data security, platform and application security, network security, security policy and procedure, secure network architecture/design specifications, penetration testing, and incidence response and recovery, etc.

Cyber security standards outline both functional and assurance requirements within a rail system component, process, or technology, and provide guiding frameworks for establishing security management implementation. Well-developed security standards can enable consistency among technology developers and serve as a reliable tool for selecting, procuring, and establishing security within organisations [33], including rail. Complying with multiple standards is advised to help establish robust security covering a broader system and operational scope of the rail infrastructure. The likes of the ISO family (27001, 27001, etc.), NIST family (800–82 r2, 800–30, etc.), ISA/IEC 62443, EN family (50159, 50126, 50128, etc.), IEC family (62443–3-, 61508, 62279, etc.), CLS/TS50701, NIS Directive, etc., are some of the applicable security standards and guides that are relevant to the railway sector.




Fig. 3 Security requirements and measures

Personnel (people) security outlines measures aimed at mitigating or preventing insider threats. Personnel security enables some protection against terrorists, criminals, or the media using insiders. Measurements can include user verification and authentication, backup to critical roles and responsibilities, thoroughly documented processes, succession planning, training and awareness, restricted access to systems, and user renewal [34]. When implemented properly and adequately, personnel security measures can reduce operational vulnerabilities, and support building a strong security culture. Physical security deters cyber threat agents from physically accessing and orchestrating their malicious actions on rail assets. Implementing physical security measures at the early design stage of a new or large redevelopment of a rail infrastructure can drive efficiency and cost-cutting benefits, and can better support the demands of the rail users [34]. Media and data security involves establishing measures that can guarantee that rail information and devices and systems that host them are only available and accessible to authorised users (including people, software processes, and devices). Data confidentiality must be maintained in storage, transit, and use. Thus, communication links and data storage must be protected from eavesdropping, unauthorised access, or modification. Some applicable security measures in this regard include; establishing service level agreements, change control, data backups and storage locations, faults/failure logging, monitoring & alerting, activity logging, user security administration (principles of least privilege and separation of duties), etc.

Platform and application security ensures that the software-level assets that facilitate digital functions and operations are protected from compromise. Actively monitoring for and resolving operating system and application-level flaws is crucial in DRs. Security measures can include identity authentication using strong passwords and encryption, access control on users, hardening systems and servers, and more. Network security controls protect against unauthorised access, misuse, malfunction, alteration, destruction, or improper disclosure of the underlying networking infrastructure. This includes all components of the telecommunication network's protection as a signalling data carrier [35]. Establishing network security requires a variety of technologies and protective measures, including activity logging, firewalls, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS), Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANS), strong multi-factor authentication, secure gateway, and remote access authentication, etc. Security policies and organisations ensure that the right stakeholder engagements and formations are established to maintain the necessary security for DRs. Partnerships with national authorities are crucial to security policy. Railway operators concentrate on their vulnerabilities, while authorities determine the amount of threat. Authorities must implement policies that meet organisational and management requirements, such as documented in-house policies on data/information security (to govern security procedures and role definitions) and policies on security monitoring, access, threats, vulnerability, and incident response management.

Secure network architecture/design specifications should be established. A cyber security requirements specification must be evaluated and approved by the railway asset owner and responsibility holder against general security standards based on the

organisation's specific policies, standards, and relevant legislation [36]. Penetration testing at both network and application levels is essential for determining how secure internal and external environments are for business. Network penetration testing aims to compromise the internal network to evaluate its flaws, while application penetration aims to compromise the evaluated host by utilising common web application vulnerabilities, in accordance with industry best practises such as Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM), and RightSec internal testing methodology [37]. However, in the event of a cyberattack, a robust incident response plan is critical to assuring resilience, safety, and operational continuity. A cyber security response playbook ensures that the actions, protocols, and processes for mitigating incidents targeting the railway's unique and mission-critical assets, such as rolling stock components, signalling systems, and telecommunications, are always available and ready for use [38].

5 Future Directions

To enhance security in DRs, several areas of future research are suggested. Firstly, the DRs rely heavily on the integration of various technological components, including hardware, software, communication networks, and data systems. Traditional security measures that solely focus on technical aspects may not effectively address the complex and interconnected nature of these systems. Therefore, it is important to explore the adoption of socio-technical security approaches in DRs. By considering the interplay between technology, people, and organisational factors, these approaches can provide a more comprehensive and effective security solution for DRs. Secondly, adopting AI techniques with security and privacy in mind can ensure future-proof operations and safeguard railway services and users, including the detection of anomalies and anticipation of attacks. Thirdly, shifting to scalable cloud infrastructure can improve security by sharing responsibilities like computational capabilities and data security, with a focus on big data technologies that prioritise security and privacy. Additionally, exploring the use of blockchain-based applications can enhance security, resilience, transparency, and data traceability, utilising smart contracts for secure communication among different parties [4]. Lastly, the workforce plays an important role in the cyber security process. Currently, there is a lack of sufficient studies addressing the cyber security competencies required by the DR workforce, including the necessary skills and knowledge, as well as generalised cyber security standards and guidelines to be followed by the workforce in the railway industry. Conducting research in this area is crucial to providing railway workers with the necessary education on cyber security guidelines. This will enable them to enhance their cyber security practises and contribute to a more secure and resilience railway environment.

6 Conclusion and Future Work

The growing demand for better functionality, performance, and productivity by rail system stakeholders is driving the transition to digital railways. IT-OT convergence (enabling open/connected platforms), use of standardised devices and equipment built using Commercial Off-The-Shelf (CoTS) components, adoption of emerging digital technologies, and trends such as IoT, cloud, and edge computing, big data, and AI are some of the technologies driving the new change. The Internet protocol-enabled devices and services are now in onboard trains, and in on-ground infrastructures, enabling capabilities such as; remote command and control on the ground or onboard trains, remote monitoring, data acquisition, analysis, real-time maintenance, information-sharing, etc.,. However, in addition to the above benefits, the digitisation trend also makes DR systems more vulnerable, leading to an increased probability of cyber attacks. The growing records of attacks on rail assets prove this to be true. The impacts of the attacks often lead to the loss of integrity which can result in accidents or collisions, loss of availability which can lead to illegal and unplanned halting of trains, loss of confidentiality which can lead to unauthorised disclosure of sensitive rail operations information, and the loss of reliability of train service which can further lead to the loss of public confidence in the railway operators.

The lessons which can be drawn from the analysis cyber incidents on DRs include that; cyber attacks are feasible on DRs and can cause severe consequences and impacts. DR attacks can come from a range of malicious threat agents or actors—from those resourced and sponsored by states to individuals working independently and driven by their diversified motives. Also, railway IT & OT systems/networks are clearly intolerant to network communication latency (delay) or disruption. Any failure or unavailability of a DR function or component service can lead to severe consequences ranging from product/service losses, to damages, injuries, and death in the worst case. Cyber attack impacts on DRs can take economic or financial, reputational, environmental, and/or physical dimensions. Cyber attacks on DRs can target data and functionality related to both IT and OT aspects of DRs. Attacks can also target the rail IT and OT workforce, rail organisational structures, cultures, and policies, especially when they are either ineffective or non-existent. Thus, security and resilience are necessary objectives to help prevent or reduce the occurrences and impacts of cyber attacks, where to recover when failures happen. The existence of technologies, humans, organisational structures, policies elements and attributes, etc., in DRs identifies DRs as a socio-technical system that is complex, large, and distributed.

Thus, solutions that cover both technical and social dimensions are necessary to effectively protect DRs from damaging cyber attacks. To effectively guard against cyber attacks on DRs, it is crucial to understand the potential cyber security risk associated with DRs, and on the back of such knowledge, apply appropriate security controls that address organisational/operational, technology, physical, and human or people security risks.

From a technological perspective, it is essential to address security issues related to design flaws in hardware and software. Additionally, the use of social media for discussing and sharing work-related information poses a risk to confidentiality and may lead to the leaking of sensitive operational data. Over-reliance on technology can breed negligence, while blind trust in technology can also create vulnerabilities that need to be resolved.

From a physical security standpoint, it is crucial to address security issues related to social blind trust, which can result in unauthorised access and compromise of infrastructure. Politeness, social compliance, and friendliness can inadvertently lead to security breaches. Diffusion of security responsibility and uncontrolled access management are areas that require attention. Additionally, preventing tailgating and piggybacking incidents is important to enhance physical security.

From a human perspective, it is necessary to address security issues associated with weak cyber security competency, including knowledge and skills. Inappropriate security responses due to stress and cognitive overloads need to be mitigated. Insecure behaviour and attitudes can contribute to vulnerabilities, as well as human errors in recognising and addressing potential cyber security threats. Resolving these issues requires attention and emphasis.

Therefore, we propose that a socio-technical security reasoning and approach would be more appropriate to address security issues in modern railway systems. It is evident that DR stakeholders must collaborate to make the system work such that a resulting implementation of change, security, resilience, and safety relies on the 'joint optimisation' of the system's technical, social, physical, and organisational factors.

For future research, our aim is to investigate the issues that affect the adoption of socio-technical security approaches in DRs. We intend to explore potential pathways and solutions to address these issues. Our approach will involve gathering insights from experts to understand the adoption of socio-technical security approaches in DRs, focusing on their knowledge, perceptions, practices, enablers, and barriers.

Additionally, we plan to examine the cyber security competencies required by the DR workforce to effectively manage cyber security and resilience within their operational environments. This investigation will involve exploring the various actors within the DR workforce and identifying their relevant security competencies. We will adopt a broad grouping of occupational profiles to capture the diverse roles, access, and utilisation of assets across multiple stakeholders.

Acknowledgements The research leading to the results presented in this paper is from the Cognitive and Socio-Technical Cyber security in Modern Railway System (CoSTCMoRS) research theme under the PETRAS National Centre of Excellence in IoT Systems Cyber Security.

Disclosure Statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding This work was supported by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) via PETRAS internal Grant No. A11HH466.

References

1. Soderi, S., Masti, D., Lun, Y.Z.: Railway Cyber-Security in the Era Of Interconnected Systems: A Survey, pp. 1–13 (2022). <https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.13412>
2. Liveri, D., Theocharidou, M., Naydenov, R.: Railway Cybersecurity–Security measures in the Railway Transport Sector (2020)
3. Fraga-Lamas, P., Fernández-Caramés, T.M., Castedo, L.: Towards the internet of smart trains: a review on industrial IoT-connected railways. *Sens. (Switz.)* **17**, (2017)
4. López-Aguilar, P., Batista, E., Martínez-Ballesté, A., Solanas, A.: Information security and privacy in railway transportation: a systematic review. *Sensors* **22**, 1–25 (2022)
5. UNIFE: UNIFE Vision Paper on Digitalisation Digital Trends in the Rail Sector UNIFE-The European Rail Supply Industry Association. Brussels (2019)
6. Badhessa, K., Basi, A., Fodey, D.: Cyber-Security in the Rail Industry. *Rail Professional* (2016)
7. Department of Transport: Rail Cyber Security Guidance to Industry. (2016)
8. NCSC.GOV.UK: What is cyber security? <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-ncsc/what-is-cyber-security>. Last accessed 02 Jan 2023
9. Kott, A., Linkov, I.: To improve cyber resilience, measure it. *Comput. (Long. Beach. Calif)* **54**, 80–85 (2021)
10. European Standards: CLC/TS 50701:2021-Railway applications-Cybersecurity
11. Pool, J.H., Venter, H.: A harmonized information security taxonomy for cyber physical systems. *Appl. Sci.* **12**, (2022)
12. Derbyshire, R., Green, B., Prince, D., Mauthe, A., Hutchison, D.: An analysis of cyber security attack taxonomies. *Proc.-3rd IEEE Eur. Symp. Secur. Priv. Work. EURO S PW 2018*, 153–161 (2018)
13. Syafrizal, M., Selamat, S.R., Zakaria, N.A.: AVOIDITALS: enhanced cyber-attack taxonomy in securing information technology infrastructure. *Int. J. Comput. Sci. Netw. Secur.* **21**, 1–12 (2021)
14. Schlehner, C., Heinrich, M., Vateva-Gurova, T., Katzenbeisser, S., Suri, N.: A Security architecture for railway Signalling. In: *Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security: 36th International Conference, SAFECOMP 2017*, pp. 320–328. Springer International Publishing, Trento, Italy (2017)
15. Rezik, M., Gransart, C., Berbineau, M.: Cyber-physical threats and vulnerabilities analysis for train control and monitoring systems. *2018 Int. Symp. Netw. Comput. Commun. ISNCC 2018* (2018)
16. Snyder, H.: Literature review as a research methodology: an overview and guidelines. *J. Bus. Res.* **104**, 333–339 (2019)
17. Torracco, R.J.: Writing integrative literature reviews: guidelines and examples. *Hum. Resour. Dev. Rev.* **4**, 356–367 (2005)
18. de Winter, J.C.F., Zadpoor, A.A., Dodou, D.: The expansion of Google scholar versus web of science: a longitudinal study. *Scientometrics* **98**, 1547–1565 (2014)
19. Kendall, S.: PubMed, Web of Science, or Google Scholar? A Behind-The-Scenes Guide for Life Scientists
20. Choo, K.-K.R.: The cyber threat landscape: challenges and future research directions. *Comput. Secur.* **30**, 719–731 (2011)
21. Guide to Risk Taxonomies-Canada.ca, <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/corporate/risk-management/taxonomies.html>. Last accessed 05 Jan 2023
22. Hahn, A.: Operational technology and information technology in industrial control systems BT. In: *Cyber-Security of SCADA and Other Industrial Control Systems*, pp. 51–68. Springer International Publishing, Cham (2016)
23. Soejima, H.: Railway technology in Japan—challenges and strategies. *Japan Railw. Transp. Rev.*, 4–13 (2003)
24. Temple, W.G., Li, Y., Tran, B.A.N., Liu, Y., Chen, B.: Railway system failure scenario analysis. *Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. (Incl. Subser. Lect. Notes Artif. Intell. Lect. Notes Bioinform.)* **10242(LNCS)**, 213–225 (2017)

25. Assante, M., Conway, T., Lee, R.: Analysis of the cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid. *SANS Ind. Control Syst. Secur. Blog*. 1–26 (2016)
26. Pescaroli, G., Alexander, D.: Critical infrastructure, panarchies and the vulnerability paths of cascading disasters. *Nat. Hazards* **82**, 175–192 (2016)
27. Ani, U.P.D., He, H. (Mary), Tiwari, A.: A framework for operational security metrics development for industrial control environment. *J. Cyber Secur. Technol.* **2**, 201–237 (2018)
28. Ani, U.D., Daniel, N., Oladipo, F., Adewumi, S.E.: Securing industrial control system environments: the missing piece. *J. Cyber Secur. Technol.* **2**, 131–163 (2018)
29. Rehak, D., Senovsky, P., Slivkova, S.: Resilience of critical infrastructure elements and its main factors. *Systems* **6**, (2018)
30. HM Government: Government Cyber Security Strategy: 2022 to 2030 (2022)
31. Kour, R., Aljumaili, M., Karim, R., Tretten, P.: eMaintenance in railways: Issues and challenges in cybersecurity. *Proc. Inst. Mech. Eng. Part F J. Rail Rapid Transit.* **233**, 1012–1022 (2019)
32. Teo, Z.T., Tran, B.A.N., Lakshminarayana, S., Temple, W.G., Chen, B., Tan, R., Yau, D.K.Y.: SecureRails: Towards an open simulation platform for analyzing cyber-physical attacks in railways. *IEEE Reg. 10 Annu. Int. Conf. Proc./TENCON*, 95–98 (2017)
33. Scarfone, K., Benigni, D., Grance, T.: *Cyber Security Standards* (2020)
34. Department for Transport: *Light Rail Security Recommended Best Practice* (2014)
35. ALEXE, L., Pereira, H., Ribeiro, P., Bonneau/Marqués: *Cybersecurity in the Railway Sector* (2017)
36. Alderlieste, L., Amato, D., Benjumea, O., Ciancabilla, A., Cosic, J., Garnier, Y., Khatchik, A.S.H., Magnanini, G., Meyer, A.: *Zoning and Conduits for Railways* (2022)
37. RightSec Penetration Testing Services (2021). <https://rightsec.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/RightSec-Testing-Introduction-September2021.pdf>. Last accessed 07 Dec 2022
38. Cervello Team: Don't Overlook These Important Factors in Your Rail Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan, <https://cervello.security/resources/how-to-ensure-your-rail-cybersecurity-incident-response-plan-meets-top-safety-standards-2/>. Last accessed 07 Dec 2022

Cybersecurity Research and Innovation

Adoption of Cybersecurity Innovations—A Systematic Literature Review



Arnstein Vestad  and Bian Yang 

Abstract The adoption of new cybersecurity capabilities in an organization can be seen as an example of the adoption of technological innovations. While regulators use rules, standards, and codes of practice to influence the state of cybersecurity in regulated organizations—other factors, such as technological complexity, organizational size, and management support have been shown to influence technological adoption. Limited empirical research exists on factors influencing cybersecurity implementation in organizations. Existing models have focused on productivity or leisure applications—adoption of security innovations is fundamentally different because their adoption is founded on the intention to prevent incidents in the future with a limited direct positive gain. A systematic literature review on existing research on adoption of security innovations is presented and suggestions for further research in more quantitative measures for the drivers of organizational cybersecurity technology adoption is suggested.

Keywords Cybersecurity · Technology adoption · Innovation

1 Introduction

Cybersecurity is an arms race between attackers and defenders continually driven by innovations in both attacker and defender techniques, tools, and tactics. For each new attack technique organizations, and the security industry, is driven to innovate, develop, market and adopt new countermeasures in a continually changing risk landscape. The continually increasing interconnectedness through IoT, industry 4.0, smart cities, and cyber-physical systems change attack and defense possibilities and capabilities giving little pause for defenders.

For organizations seeking to protect their information assets, IT systems, and services, there is no lack of advice, frameworks, standards, products, and services.

A. Vestad (✉) · B. Yang

NTNU, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

e-mail: arnstein.vestad@ntnu.no

As in all marketplaces, some innovations succeed while others fall by the wayside. But for organizations choosing to adopt innovative cybersecurity technologies, the adoption inherently implies risk—the risk of adopting technologies that don't live up to their purported potential or that lose support from their vendors as well as the potential of wasted time and resources on building product specific skill and competencies in the internal organization.

The rate of innovation in the cybersecurity market is high—by innovation, we understand implementing something new or significantly improving upon the existing products, services, and processes—this will be time dependent, while firewalls were once an innovation, implementing SaaS and cloud-based security technologies may now be classified as innovations. This rate of innovation is posing several challenges for organizations wanting to adopt them—both in identifying relevant innovations, understanding how the innovations fit existing technologies in the organization, integrating them as well as educating the cybersecurity workforce to be able to operate and take full advantage of the innovations. Cybersecurity investments also primarily show their value in a reactive way by preventing incidents—and as cybersecurity attacks and incidents are often complex and can take many paths, it can be hard to estimate the precise value and contribution of each investment.

Several theoretical frameworks exist to explain how and why organizations adopt technologies and innovations—from the initial theories of Diffusion of Innovation [1] explaining various characteristics of innovations (complexity, trialability, observability, etc.) and the social mechanisms through which innovations spread, to variants of the Technology Acceptance Model [2] where perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use affects attitude and intention to use new technology. Traditional technology acceptance models have been critiqued for not being sufficient when the technology adopted is a security technology, and the value of the product is not related to its usefulness directly, but to its ability to prevent future harm—theoretical models with roots in preventive medicine has therefore also been used, such as Protection Motivation Theory [3] and Health Belief models, that account for how perceptions of vulnerability and the effectiveness of preventive measures affect attitudes toward preventive measures.

Understanding the drivers of cybersecurity adoption has the potential to increase societal security by allowing policy makers, regulators, and industry stakeholders to develop policies and engage in activities that promote organizational uptake of cybersecurity technology. While previous surveys have reviewed organizational security on the policy level [4], and reviewed literature on specific types of adoption theories, such as Deterrence theory [5], the intention of the current paper is to give a survey and a broader overview of the existing main theories used to explain the drivers behind cybersecurity technology adoption, to describe their main concepts and how they have been adapted by researchers to fit cybersecurity specific issues, and give suggestions for further development of the understanding of organizational cybersecurity adoption.

The contributions of this research are mainly to:

- Contribute to a better understanding of the factors affecting cybersecurity innovation implementation in organizations
- Allow stakeholders and practitioners to focus on the adoption measures that most significantly affect the adoption and implementation of innovative cybersecurity capabilities
- Serve as a foundation to develop improved approaches to measuring and improving cybersecurity innovation adoption in organizations

This paper first presents the theoretical background of the major technology adoption models, firstly general technology adoption theories followed by adoption theories rooted in preventive health that take into account risk, vulnerability, etc. We then present the literature review methodology before presenting our findings, including the research based on the various models, as well as what extensions researchers have suggested to adapt their research models toward cybersecurity.

2 Theoretical Background

Rogers' Diffusion of Innovation [1] (DoI) framework has been the leading theoretical framework for understanding the diffusion and adoption of innovations from an individual and organizational perspective. Rogers describes a five-phased adoption process for individual adoption of innovations consisting of the following phases: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation/continuation. Likewise, on an organizational level, he described a process consisting of agenda setting, matching, redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing, where the organization moves from initial problem awareness and identification of the need for innovation to the innovation becoming a normal part of the organizations work processes. To explain the rate of adoption, Rogers described five primary characteristics of an innovation that contribute to the adoption—the innovation's relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability.

Innovation adoption has been studied from both a process and a factors perspective [2]. The process perspective studies the behavior and progression over time of the organization in its adoption of innovations, while the factors perspective studies the attributes that influence, facilitate or inhibit the adoption process. From the organizational perspective, the adoption of technology in an organization is often divided into two main phases; the first phase is the organizational decision process, where, typically, the organization's management decides on introducing new technology, and in the later phase, the technology needs to be implemented and assimilated into the organization, affecting routines, work processes, and organizational culture.

2.1 Technology Acceptance Models

While DoI is a generic model for the diffusion of ideas and innovations of all kinds, the Technology Acceptance Model [3] (TAM) has been one of the leading frameworks for reasoning about technological acceptance and adoption [4]. The framework builds on Aizen and Fishbein's Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) [5] as a theoretical basis. While TRA is a very generic model, useful for explaining general behavior, the TAM was designed to apply only to computer usage behavior. TRA is based on the concept that a person's behavior is determined by the person's *behavioral intention*, which again is determined by *attitude* toward the behavior and *subjective norm* (the perception of what others around the person think about the behavior, as well as the persons motivation to comply with this social pressure).

In the Theory of planned behavior (TPB) [6], Aizen added the concept of *Perceived behavioral control*, to improve the predictive power of TRA, a concept grounded in psychological theories of self-efficacy—the individuals perceptions of their own abilities to successfully implement the behavior. This perception interacts with *attitude* and *subjective norm*, and collectively these concepts affect behavioral intention.

TRA and TPB leaves open exactly what contributes to the beliefs for a specific behavior. To address this, TAM seeks to develop a model directly related to computer use and technology acceptance. TAM leaves out TRA's subjective norm, arguing that this is less understood and difficult to disentangle from the subjective norms' indirect effects via attitude. In TAM, the attitude toward technology use is determined by the perception of *Ease of use* and the perception of *Usefulness*. In the original TAM, usefulness is described as "the subjective probability that using a particular application system will increase his or her job performance within an organizational context".

Venkatesh and Davis extended the TAM to better explain the concept of *Perceived usefulness* in TAM2 [4], also reintroducing the *subjective norm* from TRA affecting both *perceived usefulness* and *intention to use*. Subjective norm was however found to be dependent on the degree of *voluntariness*—when use is mandatory, as is often the case in an organizational setting, the *social norm* has little effect on the intention to use (but may still influence *perceived usefulness*—leaving room for improving adoption through social persuasion). *Subjective norm* also influences *image*, that is the individual's perception of how the innovation affects their social status among peers, and *image* influences *perceived usefulness*. The user's direct *experience* with the innovation over time also reduces the effect of *subjective norm*. *Job relevance*, *output quality* and *result demonstrability*, the more direct experience that the technology contributes to the job performance of the user. The user's *experience* also affects the *social norm*—as a user is more acquainted with the system he or she is more likely to rely on personal evaluation to determine usefulness.

TAM2 was further developed into TAM3 by Venkatesh and Bala [7] seeking to better explain *perceived ease of use* from the original TAM. Here determinants of perceived ease of use are *Computer self-efficacy*, *perception of external*

control, computer anxiety, computer playfulness, perceived enjoyment, and objective usability.

In the Unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) [8], Venkatesh et al. reviewed eight theories of user acceptance and developed a unified model. The original concepts of *Behavioral intention* leading to *Use behavior* are consistent with TRA, but four new concepts that drive behavioral intention are *Performance expectancy* (largely similar to *perceived usefulness* from TAM), *Social influence* (similar to *subjective norm* from TRA and TAM), *Effort expectancy* (similar to perceived ease of use from TAM), and *Facilitating conditions* (defined as “the degree to which an individual believes that an organizational and technical infrastructure exists to support the use of the system”)—this concept influencing *actual use behavior*, that is, when the necessary conditions for forming a behavioral intention is present, the actual use is also modified by the facilitating conditions in the organization. The concepts of *gender, age, experience, and degree of voluntariness* also serve as moderators of the interactions in the model. While the original UTAUT was originally defined in an organizational context, the model was further developed into UTAUT2 [9], to better account for behavior in a consumer context, removing the moderating effect of *voluntariness* and adding the new concepts of *hedonic motivation, price value, and habit.*

Another framework widely used to explain technology adoption in organizations is the Technology–organization–environment (TOE) framework [10]. The framework seeks to explain innovation adoption through three contextual influences that affect the organization. Firstly the technology itself, secondly intraorganizational factors such as internal communication, management communication, organizational structure and size, and slack capacity in the organization, and thirdly environmental factors such as the structure of the industry, availability of service providers to aid in implementation as well as regulatory pressures that inhibit or promote innovation.

The TOE framework is a very generic framework, and researchers have used the framework to explain technological adoption in many different settings and adapted the framework to account for the technologies being researched [11], which is considered both a strength and a weakness of the model. Since the model is rarely similar across research areas, direct comparisons can be difficult, but the flexibility and continued use have also shown their power to serve as a theoretical framework for understanding organizational adoption processes.

2.2 Preventive Models

The application of general technology adoption frameworks has been critiqued for not properly accounting for cybersecurity technologies, in particular because their initial focus on adoption of productivity technologies in organizations, or in later iterations, more consumer oriented, hedonistic applications [9]. For example, [12] argue that TAM models do not include the concept of threat. Also, [13] found limited support for the concepts of *ease of use* and *attitude*, and between *self-efficacy* and

perceived behavioral control—arguably because the use of protection technologies is driven more by the threat of unwanted incidents than by the direct benefits of the technology.

There are several factors that contribute to making cybersecurity innovations different from “normal” innovations:

- There is little immediate, visible gain from security technologies so the value of security may be seen as more abstract, especially compared to the directly observable costs of implanting the technology [14].
- Adoption of security technologies is often seen as a way to manage risk and can be seen from an economic perspective to be a calculation comparing the cost of the security technology against an assumed cost of a security incident, and this cost is an expected value of the likelihood of the incident (as driven by threats and vulnerabilities) and the impact (driven by the valuation of the impacted assets).
- Cybersecurity is adversarial and the threats that need to be defended against are continually changing; new vulnerabilities and attack tactics are continuously developed, hence—the adoption of security technologies has to be a continuous process for evaluating and prioritizing investments.

Adoption of cybersecurity innovations may be seen as an example of the adoption of preventive behavior, and several theories with roots in preventive health theory have been used to explain the adoption, on individual or organizational level, of cybersecurity innovations. These theories are based on a concept of security behavior being similar to adopting positive health behaviors, such as taking up exercise and quitting smoking, that like security technology is prescribed to prevent unwanted incidents (a disease, bad health) that constitute threats, and imply a perception of the threat, the patients perception of their own susceptibility to the threat as well as their perception of how they might avoid the threat.

The Health belief model (HBM) was initially developed in the early 1950s to explain the behavior surrounding the adoption of disease prevention measures in the population, or participating in screening tests for diseases. The model posits that in order to take action to prevent a disease, the individual must first have a perception of *susceptibility* to the disease as well as the *severity*. The individual would also have a perception of the *benefits* of taking action as well as take into account any *barriers* to taking action. In addition, *cues to action*, internal or external, such as symptoms or public health warnings, facilitate the action.

Protection motivation theory [15] (PMT) is a similarly grounded theory that posits a protection motivation calculus based on a *threat appraisal* that takes into account the *severity* and the *vulnerability*, in addition to the *rewards*, or benefit of taking action, as well as a *coping appraisal* that takes into account the perception of *response efficacy*, that is how likely the action is considered to be successful, as well as *self-efficacy*, an evaluation of the individuals ability to perform the action.

The Fear Appeals Model [12] (FAM) is an extension of protection motivation theory that incorporates TAM concepts of *social influence* and *behavioral intent* (but not *performance expectancy* which was found insignificant in pilot testing of the model). The model is intended to explain the intention of performing protective

behaviors (in the study, implementing protection against spyware) recommended through “fear inducing persuasive communication”. One central finding was that people react differently to fear communication, some may be inspired to take protective action, while others reject the fear appeal and take action to reduce their fear instead.

The Technology Threat Avoidance Theory builds on the health belief model and risk analysis models to posit the following three main processes: *threat appraisal*, *coping appraisal*, and *coping*. The threat appraisal is an evaluation of the perceived threat taking into account the perceived *susceptibility* and perceived *severity*. The coping appraisal takes into account the perceived *effectiveness*, perceived *costs*, and *self-efficacy* giving rise to a perceived *avoidability*, that is, how likely is the adoption of the preventive measure to succeed in avoiding the unwanted outcome. The threat appraisal and the coping appraisal drive the *avoidance motivation* and *avoidance behavior* in a problem-focused *coping* process, however, if the perceived *avoidability* is low, the individual might resort to emotion-focused coping behavior (for example, hoping to avoid or choosing to accept the unavoidable).

3 Literature Review on the Diffusion of Cybersecurity Innovations

In order to investigate how the cybersecurity literature has approached the question of motivation to adopt cybersecurity measures, a literature review was performed. Two major databases, Scopus.com and the AIS Digital Library, were searched, as these together give good coverage in both the IS and CS domains.

Title, abstract, and keywords were searched for the terms:

```
("cyber security" OR "cybersecurity" OR "information security") AND
("technology acceptance" OR "technology adoption")
```

Articles not describing adoption processes, and articles describing the effect of security/trust evaluations on the adoption of other technologies were excluded from the survey. As our focus is on the drivers of adoption, papers describing the effect of adoption, for example, on corporate profit have been excluded.

The search resulted in 158 papers from Scopus.com and 824 papers from the AIS digital library (in addition to two papers found by snowballing method from the reviewed papers). After screening of abstracts 904 papers were excluded according to the inclusion criteria and 9 papers were not available for access. Sixty-nine papers were assessed for eligibility by full-text reading. After reading, an additional 28 papers were excluded, resulting in a total of 41 papers included in this review. A high number of papers were excluded in the initial abstract screening process, due to the quite generic search terms. A PRISMA diagram of the review process is presented in Fig. 1.

A summary of the reviewed papers as to what main model they are based on (“Main model”), the central concepts of the main models (“Central Concepts”), and




Fig. 1 PRISMA diagram

extensions that researchers have added (“Suggested extensions”) to the models are given in Table 1. Several studies used more than one framework and are mentioned under more than one “main model”. Several also referenced some of the precursor frameworks to the main framework(s) of the research, these are not mentioned in the table.

4 Discussion

The literature review has identified two main lines of conceptualizing cybersecurity innovation adoption—through the general technology accept theories (mainly TAM, UTAUT, TOE) or through the preventive health models (mainly PMT and TPB). Researchers have frequently found it necessary to extend the base models by including additional constructs relevant to cybersecurity. Several concepts from other disciplines such as psychology and sociology have been used, such as institutional theory, behavioral/cognitive factors such as culture, trust, social influence, awareness, decision-making under uncertainty, and overconfidence. Structural issues, such as

Table 1 Summary of identified papers, the central concepts used, and the authors suggested extensions to the main models

Main model	Central concepts	References	Suggested extensions
Health belief model [16]	Perceived susceptibility, Perceived seriousness, Perceived benefits, Barriers, Cues to action	[17, 18]	Normalization Process theory to explain continued adoption: Tool cohesion, Adoption willingness, Increase in understanding [18]
Protection motivation theory (Rogers 1975)	Perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, perceived response efficacy, perceived self efficacy	[19–23]	Trust (only partially) [20] Herd behaviour [19], Gender [22], psychological ownership [23]
Theory of reasoned action (Ishbein and Ajzen 1975)	Attitude, subjective norm	[24]	No added extensions
Theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991)	Attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioural control	[13, 25–29]	General security awareness (price level not significant) [26], Social influence, usefulness, self-efficacy, facilitating conditions [28], culture [29]
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory [30]	Perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived threat, perceived effectiveness, perceived costs, self-efficacy, avoidance motivation, avoidance behaviour, and emotion-focused coping	[31–33]	Distrust of security, theft of privacy, vulnerability, security threats, and security self-efficiency [32]
Fear Appeal Model [12]	Perceived threat severity, threat susceptibility, response efficacy, self efficacy, social influence	[34]	

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Main model	Central concepts	References	Suggested extensions
Technology acceptance model	Perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness	[13, 21, 24, 25, 27, 33, 35–39, 41, 42]	External environment, security budget, prior experience, perceived risks, security planning, confidence in information security, and security awareness and training [37] Organizational support, personality traits [38] Perceived risk [35] Security knowledge [39] Negatively framed messaging [40] Security knowledge [24] Psychological ownership, gender [21], Technology awareness [27] Technology-specific aspects (biometric) [42]
TOE (Technology—Organization—Environment) framework	Technology, organization, environment	[25, 43]	Cyber catalysts, practice standards [43]

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Main model	Central concepts	References	Suggested extensions
UTAUT (and variants)	Performance expectancy, Effort expectancy, social influence, facilitating conditions, hedonic motivation, price value, habit, behavioural intention	UTAUT [41, 44] UTAUT2 [36, 45, 46]	Trust [46]
Other or no specific framework		[47–56]	Institutional forces (regulatory, external consultants, other companies), Market forces (consumer concern, size) [47] Personal propensity to trust, structural assurance, and firm reputation [48] Awareness, budget, security policy, and management support [49] Social influence, observability [50] Economic, organizational, environmental, behavioral/cognitive aspects [51], Culture [52], Task-Technology fit [53], Decisions under uncertainty [54], Size, ICT use, telework, innovativeness [55], Decision-maker overconfidence [56]

size and technology use, as well as the perceived fit between technology and task have also been used.

Of the two main approaches, the preventive health based approach is the approach more conceptually close to cybersecurity risk with its concepts of threats and vulnerabilities. The TAM model of ease-of-use and usability is conceptually easy, and the concept of usability is easily capable of being seen as a formative concept based on different preceding concepts, such as a technology's task-fit and its perceived ability to reduce risk. However several authors find the traditional TAM models lacking in regard to cybersecurity adoption issues [9, 12], and have pointed to the preventive health models as a better theoretical framework because of their inclusion of risk-related constructs. We start by discussing the research based on the general models before moving on to the preventive models.

4.1 Research Based on General Technology Acceptance Models

Among the general technology adoption frameworks, 14 of the identified studies used the Technology Adoption Model as the main (or a major) theoretical framework, making this the most frequently used framework, trailed by UTAUT/UTAUT2 with 5 studies and TOE with 2 studies among the general technology adoption frameworks. With its concept of ease of use and usefulness, the model is very generic and applicable for many types of technology adoption studies, but its generic nature may also be its weakness, as illustrated by the fact that many studies added new concepts to make the framework more security-specific. We summarize some of these studies as follows.

The main additions suggested to the TAM framework were concepts around the perception of risk (perceived risks, security knowledge, general or more specific security technology awareness), organizational aspects (budget, planning, organizational support), and psychological aspects (confidence, ownership, negatively framed messaging).

The UTAUT-based studies rarely added concepts, with the exception of one study on password managers, adding trust as a new concept. The UTAUT framework has received criticism for having too many variables and moderators [57], which may explain a lesser need to extend the framework.

The TOE framework (Technology-Organization-Environment) is also a very generic framework where the TOE aspects are specified for the specific research area. For example, [25] in the organizational adoption phase of their adoption framework, suggest the classical DoI technology factors (relative advantage, complexity, compatibility, visibility, and trialability) for the technology concept, for the organization factor top management support, size, and security readiness, expertise and culture, and for the environment concept, government regulations, and risks of outsourcing. Wallace et al. [43] also, through qualitative interviews with IT leaders in various

industries, expanded on the TOE framework with cybersecurity-specific themes as well as expanding it with two main areas, cyber catalysts (containing cyber risk, privacy, and cyber vulnerability) and practice standards (containing ethics, insurance, legal, and assessment).

4.2 Preventive Models

Among the models with roots in preventive health, the Theory of Planned Behavior with 6 studies and its predecessor, and the Theory of Reasoned Action with one study were most frequently used. Both these models are quite parsimonious with few, but generic variables (attitude, subjective norm, and self-efficacy) that are usually tailored to the specific technology or problem domain they are used in, for example, questions specific to cybersecurity knowledge [27], or by adapting the survey questions on attitude, subjective norm, etc., directly to the topic (anti-malware or home security software) [24, 26, 28]. The survey questions in these studies may serve as examples to researchers of how to adapt the generic model to the specific research questions.

Protection motivation theory (5 studies) and Health Belief Model (2 studies), with the security relevant concepts of perceived susceptibility/vulnerability and perceived severity/seriousness, perceived benefits/response efficacy, barriers/perceived self-efficacy show how the risk management process of evaluating threats and vulnerabilities affect security adoption decisions. For these studies as well, the survey questions reflecting or forming the concepts were modified from existing scales to be fit for cybersecurity. The main additions to the models are primarily modifiers to the original relationships, such as trust, gender, and psychological ownership.

For the Fear Appeals Model, only one study, a replication study performed via Amazon Mechanical Turk, was identified [34]. This replication study found opposite effects for two of five hypotheses in the original study in that they found threat severity to have a positive effect on both response efficacy and self-efficacy, suggesting that there are differences in the populations in the studies that may explain this, for example, familiarity with technology or cultural differences in the samples.

Technology Threat Avoidance Theory, with three identified studies, have several common concepts with protection motivation theory, such as perceived susceptibility and perceived severity, perceived effectiveness, perceived costs and self-efficacy, and the main new contribution is the division between problem-oriented and emotional coping behavior. One such emotional coping (or rather, non-coping) mechanism, is capitulation, studied in [32], looking at how experiences with privacy loss and distrust of security lead employees to capitulate when faced with a threat landscape, they do not feel capable of managing or contributing to, again leading to a lack of compliance with internal security policies. A division between internal coping mechanisms (self-efficacy) and external coping mechanisms (based on the concepts from TAM) is suggested in [33] to extend the TTAT in a study on the acceptance of email authentication services.

4.3 *Other Approaches to Security Innovation Adoption*

In addition to the studies based on the identified major frameworks, 10 studies used some other theoretical framework, or used other approaches such as qualitative or mixed methods to elicit new concepts or constructs relevant to security adoption.

The authors of [47] suggest a research design that uses institutional theory to investigate factors impacting regulatory compliance in the US healthcare sector, specifically HIPAA compliance, and the effects of institutional forces (regulatory requirements, use of consultants, and other hospitals compliance) and market forces (consumer concern and firms relative size). Institutional theory describes how organizations tend to organize in a similar fashion (isomorphism), mainly driven by three forms of pressure—coercive pressure, for example, regulations, laws, and cultural expectations in the society they operate, mimetic pressure, when organizations operating under uncertainty, decide to mimic other successful organizations, and normative pressure, often driven through stakeholders, professional organizations and networks that set standards of professionalism an organization is expected to adhere to.

The authors of [49] investigated factors influencing the implementation of information security management systems (ISMS) in universities in Indonesia and found that awareness, budget, information security policy, and top management support were significant factors. The authors of [52] also investigated the use of ISMSs—specifically ISO27001, but from a cultural perspective—and found higher use of the standard in countries with higher ICT development and discussed cultural aspects such as future orientation, power distance, and low institutional collectivism to explain this difference.

The authors of [46] investigated the intention to use password managers based on initial trust of the technology based on the Initial Trust Model from [58]. The study found that initial trust, as based on the concepts of structural assurances (guarantees of technical measures, certifications, etc.) and firm reputation were found to significantly relate to initial trust (but not the user's personal propensity to trust), and initial trust had a significant effect on the intention to adopt password managers.

In [50], the role of social influence in the adoption of security measures, specifically three Facebook security features, was investigated. The study suggested that social influence (the effect of peers, friends adoption) affects security feature adoption, but this was moderated by both the technology's individual attributes, the overall adoption among friends as well as the number of distinct social spheres the friends originate from.

The authors of [51] highlight that traditional, cost-based risk analyses does not adequately address the factors that contribute to cybersecurity investment decisions, and neglect the importance of economic, organizational, environmental, and behavioral/cognitive aspects. Based on a series of expert interviews, they elaborated on some of these themes and conducted a literature survey on decisions around security investments. Also highlighting cognitive aspects, [56] investigated how the overconfidence of executives affects information security investments and posits that existing

models are overly reliant on the decision makers rational behavior. They found through a survey that overconfidence had a negative effect on security investments.

The authors of [55] suggested a theoretical model for the adoption of a security technology, InfoCards, based on the Task-Technology Fit model [59] a research model that seeks to explain technology adoption based on the fit between the task to be performed and the technology. The task and technology factors that make up the concept of “fit” need to be tailored to the specific area/technology under adoption, but the authors also suggest TAM as a model that should be integrated. In a similar way, [55] investigated the adoption of PKI as a security technology in European firms, the study found high use of ICT, telework, company innovativeness, and size to be factors contributing to the adoption.

With a behavioral economics approach, [54] investigated the adoption of security products as a process of decision under uncertainty, the uncertainty being related to the environment (knowledge of threats) and the product (level of information about the effectiveness of the product), and suggested an experiment to evaluate this model.

4.4 Adoption in an Organizational Context

Several of the diffusion and acceptance models focus on adoption and acceptance in a voluntary context and as a personal choice—something which is often less relevant in an organizational context where choice of technologies is more dependent on managerial and organizational decision processes, organizational strategies, acquisition processes, and financial investment choices. In this setting, the individual employee might have less of a say in what innovations are adopted, but their role in the implementation of the innovation is crucial to the final outcome or success of the total innovation process.

In an organizational setting, the adoption process is generally divided into three stages: initiation (pre-adoption), adoption-decision, and implementation (post-adoption). In the organizational context, the first two phases may be said to mostly follow and be influenced by organizational policies and practices and are, therefore, best understood by frameworks focusing on organizational adoption, while the implementation and post-adoption phase is to a larger extent dependent on individual behavior and thereby better understood by more individually oriented frameworks such as TAM and TPB. This is also supported by [2], who reviewed 151 innovation adoption studies, and found the DoI framework and the TOE framework to be the most frequently used frameworks for organizational level adoption studies, while TAM, TRA, and TPB were most frequently used to study adoption on an individual level.

The difference between organizational and individual adoption, and the stagewise process from decision to implement to actual organizational user acceptance is also discussed in [60], which suggests that traditional Diffusion of Innovation models fall short when it comes to explaining adoption in organizational settings where users are mandated to use the technology, or where there is a high need for knowledge or

coordinated action to implement the technology or the implementation. Hameed and Arachchilage [25] also suggest a two-phased model of IS security innovation where the organizational adoption is described by factors from the TOE framework, while the user acceptance phase is determined by user attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, computer self-efficacy, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use and image, concepts largely found in the UTAUT framework.

5 Further Work

As illustrated, a range of theories and frameworks have been used to explain cybersecurity adoption decisions, and no unified framework exists. While the parsimonious models from the general technology adoption models and the preventive health-based models have had success in explaining adoption on an individual level, research on organizational adoption has utilized more complex models like TOE, but at the cost of predictive power and more quantitative measures on the effect of the various drivers. Further work should focus on developing more quantitative measures, first by identifying good measures for organizational cybersecurity innovations and identifying relevant metrics to measure the effect of these concepts. While several frameworks have been suggested to build metrics for cybersecurity maturity, like certification schemes such as ISO 27001, or capability maturity models like the NIST Cybersecurity Framework CSF, or C2M2), these frameworks are extensive and time-consuming, and the reliability at times questionable. To operationalize the concept of cybersecurity adoption, the scoring of the number of implemented technical cybersecurity controls from a set of validated advanced capabilities, technologies not in general use, as judged from the complexity scores from relevant cybersecurity frameworks that rate complexity to implement (like the Critical Security Controls), as well as from a set of cybersecurity experts with practical knowledge of control implementation across a large set of organizations, may be suggested as one measure of cybersecurity innovation adoption.

Further research should also focus on measuring the effect of other factors identified from the survey to evaluate the effect of concepts such as perceived severity and perceived vulnerability (organizational threat assessments), the effects of social norms, for example in the context of knowledge sharing networks often suggested for sectors and industries. More research should also be done to identify the suitability of different models for different use cases, and how the effect of the different constructs may vary according to the situation the model is applied to.

6 Conclusion

Several approaches were employed to describe and model the adoption of cybersecurity innovations, and our literature review identified two main approaches—the technology adoption model-based approaches, and the behavioral health-based approaches. Most of the identified studies focused on the adoption of a single technology, and many discuss adoption in a voluntary, non-organizational setting, but collectively they contribute to a better understanding of factors driving cybersecurity technology adoption from various viewpoints.

Based on the literature review, we have identified several relevant factors to study cybersecurity innovation adoption in an organizational setting and suggest how these concepts may be used in later research to build better models for the technological adoption of cybersecurity innovations.

Acknowledgements This work has received funding from the Research Council of Norway through the SFI Norwegian Centre for Cybersecurity in Critical Sectors (NORCICS) project no. 310105.

References

1. Rogers, E.M.: *Diffusion of Innovations*. Free Press, New York, NY (2003)
2. Hameed, M.A., Counsell, S., Swift, S.: A conceptual model for the process of IT innovation adoption in organizations. *J. Eng. Technol. Manag.* **29**(3), 358–390 (2012). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jengtecman.2012.03.007>
3. Davis, F.D., Bagozzi, R.P., Warshaw, P.R.: User acceptance of computer technology: a comparison of two theoretical models. *Manag. Sci.* **35**(8), 982–1003 (1989)
4. Venkatesh, V., Davis, F.D.: A theoretical extension of the technology acceptance model: four longitudinal field studies. *Manag. Sci.* **46**(2), 186–204 (2000). <https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.2.186.11926>
5. Ajzen, I., Fishbein, M.: *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior*, Pbk Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1980)
6. Ajzen, I.: The theory of planned behavior. *Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process.* **50**(2), 179–211 (1991). [https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978\(91\)90020-T](https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T)
7. Venkatesh, V., Bala, H.: *Technology Acceptance Model 3 and a Research Agenda on Interventions* (2008). <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5915.2008.00192.x>
8. Venkatesh, V., Morris, M.G., Davis, G.B., Davis, F.D.: User acceptance of information technology: toward a unified view. *MIS Q.* **27**(3), 425–478 (2003). <https://doi.org/10.2307/30036540>
9. Venkatesh, V., Thong, J.Y.L., Xu, X.: Consumer acceptance and use of information technology: extending the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology. *MIS Q.* **36**(1), 157–178 (2012). <https://doi.org/10.2307/41410412>
10. Tornatzky, L.G., Fleischer, M., Chakrabarti, A.K.: *The processes of technological innovation*. In: *Issues in Organization and Management Series*. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass (1990)
11. Baker, J.: *The technology–organization–environment framework*. In: *Information Systems Theory: Explaining and Predicting Our Digital Society*, vol. 1; Dwivedi, Y.K., Wade, M.R., Schneberger, S.L. (Eds.) *Integrated Series in Information Systems*. Springer, New York, NY, pp. 231–245 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6108-2_12

12. Johnston, A.C., Warkentin, M.: Fear Appeals and information security behaviors: an empirical study. *MIS Q.* **34**(3), 549–566 (2010)
13. Dinev, T., Hu, Q.: The centrality of awareness in the formation of user behavioral intention toward protective information technologies. *JAIS* **8**(7), 386–408 (2007). <https://doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00133>
14. West, R.: The psychology of security. *Commun. ACM* **51**(4), 34–40 (2008). <https://doi.org/10.1145/1330311.1330320>
15. Maddux, J.E., Rogers, R.W.: Protection motivation and self-efficacy: a revised theory of fear appeals and attitude change. *J. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* **19**(5), 469–479 (1983). [https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031\(83\)90023-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(83)90023-9)
16. Rosenstock, I.M.: Historical origins of the health belief model. *Health Educ. Monogr. Monogr.* **2**(4), 328–335 (1974). <https://doi.org/10.1177/109019817400200403>
17. Wynn, D., Williams, C., Karahanna, E., Madupalli, R.: Preventive adoption of information security behaviors. In: *ICIS 2013 Proceedings* (2013). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2013/proceedings/SecurityOfIS/5>
18. Pickering, B., Boletsis, C., Halvorsrud, R., Phillips, S., SurrIDGE, M.: It's Not My Problem: How Healthcare Models Relate to SME Cybersecurity Awareness. In: *HCI for Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust*; Moallem, A (Ed.) *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol. 12788. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp. 337–352. (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77392-2_22
19. Vedadi, A., Warkentin, M.: Can secure behaviors be contagious? a two-stage investigation of the influence of herd behavior on security decisions. *J. Assoc. Inf. Syst.* **21**(2) (2020). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/jais/vol21/iss2/3>
20. Ayyagari, R., Lim, J., Hoxha, O.: Why do not we use password managers? a study on the intention to use password managers. *CMR* **15**(4), 227–245 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.7903/cmr.19394>
21. Ho, K.K.W., Au, C.H., Chiu, D.K.W.: Home computer user security behavioral intention: a replication study from guam. *AIS Trans. Replication Res.* **7**(1) (2021). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/trr/vol7/iss1/4>
22. Sonnenschein, R., Loske, A., Buxmann, P.: Gender Differences in Mobile Users' IT Security Appraisals and Protective Actions: Findings from a Mixed-Method Study (2016). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2016/ISSecurity/Presentations/12>
23. Smith, C., Agarwal, R.: Practicing safe computing: a multimedia empirical examination of home computer user security behavioral intentions. *MIS Q.* **34**(3), 613–643 (2010)
24. Wang, P.A.: Information security knowledge and behavior: an adapted model of technology acceptance. In: *2010 2nd International Conference on Education Technology and Computer*. IEEE, Shanghai, China, pp. V2-364–V2-367 (2010). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICETC.2010.5529366>
25. Hameed, M.A., Arachchilage, N.A.G.: A model for the adoption process of information system security innovations in organisations: a theoretical perspective. In: *ACIS 2016 Proceedings* (2016). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2016/45>
26. Vafaei-Zadeh, A., Thurasamy, R., Hanifah, H.: Modeling anti-malware use intention of university students in a developing country using the theory of planned behavior, vol. 48, no. 8, pp. 1565–1585 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1108/K-05-2018-0226>
27. Dinev, T., Hu, Q.: The centrality of awareness in the formation of user behavioral intention toward preventive technologies in the context of voluntary use. In: *SIGHCI 2005 Proceedings* (2005). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/sighci2005/10>
28. Ng, B.Y., Rahim, M.: A socio-behavioral study of home computer users' intention to practice security. In: *PACIS 2005 Proceedings* (2005). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2005/20>
29. Dinev, T., Goo, J., Hu, Q., Nam, K.: User behavior toward preventive technologies—cultural differences between the United States and South Korea. In: *ECIS 2006 Proceedings* (2006) <https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2006/9>
30. Liang, H., Xue, Y.: Avoidance of information technology threats: a theoretical perspective. *MIS Q.* **33**(1), 71–90 (2009)

31. Young, D.K., Carpenter, D., McLeod, A.: Malware avoidance motivations and behaviors: a technology threat avoidance replication. *AIS Trans. Replication Res.* **2**(1) (2016). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/trr/vol2/iss1/8>
32. McLeod, A., Dolezel, D.: Toward Security Capitulation Theory (2020). https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020/info_security_privacy/info_security_privacy/2
33. Herath, T., Chen, R., Wang, J., Banjara, K., Wilbur, J., Rao, H.R.: Security services as coping mechanisms: an investigation into user intention to adopt an email authentication service: security services as coping mechanisms. *Inf. Syst. J.* **24**(1), 61–84 (2014). <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2575.2012.00420.x>
34. Samtani, S., Zhu, H., Yu, S.: Fear appeals and information security behaviors: an empirical study on mechanical turk. *AIS Trans. Replication Res.* **5**(1) (2019). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/trr/vol5/iss1/5>
35. Groner, R., Brune, P.: Towards an empirical examination of it security infrastructures in SME. In: *Secure IT Systems*; Jøsang, A., Carlsson, B. (Eds.) *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol. 7617. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 73–88 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34210-3_6
36. Tafokeng Talla, L., Kala Kamdjoug, J.R.: Factors influencing adoption of information security in information systems projects. In: *New knowledge in information systems and technologies*; Rocha, A., Adeli, H., Reis, L.P., Costanzo, S. (Eds.) *Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing*, vol. 931. Springer International Publishing, Cham, pp. 890–899 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16184-2_84
37. Seuwow, P., Banissi, E., Ubakanma, G.: User acceptance of information technology: a critical review of technology acceptance models and the decision to invest in information security. In: *Global Security, Safety and Sustainability—The Security Challenges of the Connected World*; Jahankhani, H., Carlile, A., Emm, D., Hosseinian-Far, A., Brown, G., Sexton, G., Jamal, A. (Eds.) *Communications in Computer and Information Science*, vol. 630, pp. 230–251. Springer International Publishing, Cham (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51064-4_19
38. Shropshire, J., Warkentin, M., Sharma, S.: Personality, attitudes, and intentions: Predicting initial adoption of information security behavior. *Comput. Secur.* **49**, 177–191 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2015.01.002>
39. Lui, S.M., Hui, W.: The effects of knowledge on security technology adoption: Results from a quasi-experiment. In: *The 5th International Conference on New Trends in Information Science and Service Science*, pp. 328–333 (2011)
40. Shropshire, J.D., Warkentin, M., Johnston, A.C.: Impact of negative message framing on security adoption. *J. Comput. Inf. Syst. Comput. Inf. Syst.* **51**(1), 41–51 (2010). <https://doi.org/10.1080/08874417.2010.11645448>
41. Warkentin, M., Shropshire, J., Johnston, A.: The IT security adoption conundrum: an initial step toward validation of applicable measures. In: *AMCIS 2007 Proceedings* (2007). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2007/276>
42. Ho, G., Stephens, G., Jamieson, R.: Biometric authentication adoption issues. In: *ACIS 2003 Proceedings* (2003). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2003/11>
43. Wallace, S., Green, K.Y., Johnson, C., Cooper, J., Gilstrap, C.: An extended TOE framework for cybersecurity-adoption decisions. *Commun. Assoc. Inf. Syst.* **47**(1) (2020). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol47/iss1/51>
44. Lidster, W.W., Rahman, S.S.M.: Identifying influences to information security framework adoption: applying a modified UTAUT. In: *2020 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data)*, pp. 2605–2609. IEEE, Atlanta, GA, USA (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1109/BigData50022.2020.9378283>
45. Alqahtani, M., Braun, R.: Reviewing influence of UTAUT2 factors on cyber security compliance: a literature review. *JACS* **2021**, 1–15 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.5171/2021.666987>
46. Maclean, R., Ophoff, J.: Determining key factors that lead to the adoption of password managers. In: *2018 International Conference on Intelligent and Innovative Computing Applications (ICONIC)*, pp. 1–7. IEEE, Plaine Magnien (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICONIC.2018.8601223>

47. Appari, A., Johnson, M.E., Anthony, D.L.: HIPAA compliance: an institutional theory perspective. In: AMCIS 2009 Proceedings (2009). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2009/252>
48. Farooq, A., Dubinina, A., Virtanen, S., Isoaho, J.: Understanding dynamics of initial trust and its antecedents in password managers adoption intention among young adults. *Procedia Comput. Sci.* **184**, 266–274 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2021.03.036>
49. Sari, P.K., Nurshabrina, N., Candiwan (2016) Factor analysis on information security management in higher education institutions. In: 2016 4th International Conference on Cyber and IT Service Management, pp. 1–5. IEEE, Bandung, Indonesia (2016). <https://doi.org/10.1109/CITSM.2016.7577518>
50. Das, S., Kramer, A.D.L., Dabbish, L.A., Hong, J.I.: The role of social influence in security feature adoption. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing, pp 1416–1426. ACM, Vancouver BC Canada. <https://doi.org/10.1145/2675133.2675225>
51. Heidt, M., Gerlach, J., Buxmann, P.: A Holistic View on Organizational IT Security: The Influence of Contextual Aspects During IT Security Decisions (2019). https://aisel.aisnet.org/hicss-52/os/information_security/5
52. Mirtsch, M., Pohlisch, J., Blind, K.: International diffusion of the information security management system standard ISO/IEC 27001: exploring the role of culture. In: ECIS 2020 Research Papers (2020). https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2020_rp/88
53. Alkhalifah, A., D’Ambra, J.: Applying task-technology fit to the adoption of identity management systems. In: ACIS 2011 Proceedings (2011). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2011/31>
54. Egorova, K.S., Adoption of information security as decision-making under uncertainty: a behavioural economics approach. In: ECIS 2015 Research-in-Progress Papers (2015). https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2015_rip/21
55. Loukis, E., Kokolakis, S., Anastasopoulou, K.: Factors of PKI adoption in European firms. In: MCIS 2011 Proceedings (2011). <https://aisel.aisnet.org/mcis2011/29>
56. Dong, K., Lin, R., Yin, X., Xie, Z.: How does overconfidence affect information security investment and information security performance? *Enterp. Inf. Syst.* **15**(4), 474–491 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1080/17517575.2019.1644672>
57. Bagozzi, R. P.: The legacy of the technology acceptance model and a proposal for a paradigm shift. *J. Assoc. Inf. Syst.* **8**(4) (2007). <https://doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00122>
58. McKnight, D.H., Choudhury, V., Kacmar, C.: Developing and validating trust measures for e-commerce: an integrative typology. *Inf. Syst. Res.* **13**(3), 334–359 (2002). <https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.13.3.334.81>
59. Goodhue, D.L., Thompson, R.L.: Task-technology fit and individual performance. *MIS Q.* **19**(2), 213–236 (1995). <https://doi.org/10.2307/249689>
60. Gallivan, M.J.: Organizational adoption and assimilation of complex technological innovations: development and application of a new framework. *SIGMIS Database* **32**(3), 51–85 (2001). <https://doi.org/10.1145/506724.506729>

Achieving Optimal Performance and Quality in LAN and WLAN for Mission-Critical Applications



Tonderai S. Chidawanyika and Deepthi N. Ratnayake

Abstract Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) properties are vital for its reliability in mission-critical applications. This research aims to find network topology, call signalling and voice codecs property combinations that meet reliability targets of VoIP communication in a Small Office Home Office (SOHO) environment where network resources may be limited but reliable and secured operation is essential. Local Area Network (LAN) and Wireless LAN (WLAN) scenarios are evaluated using Quality of Service (QoS) and Mean Opinion Score (MOS) measurements to find which property combinations satisfy predefined classes; best quality and best performance. The research extended Roslin et al. [1] on LAN VoIP to WLANs, and validated Khiat et al. [2] s and Guy [3]’s work that argued SIP was effective in optimal set up. This research found that VoIP combinations offer some desirable characteristics, but at the cost of other properties required, leading to categorisation being based on the interpretation of the results, concluding that though, not ideal for mission-critical applications, combinations function well in replicating real-world scenarios. The analysis also established VoIP’s scalability for application-based configurations, impact of VoIP’s modularity and ease of configuration in achieving user expectations. Further property testing can solidify VoIP’s capabilities to function for mission-critical environments.

Keywords VoIP · LAN · WLAN · Security · Mission-critical · QoS · MOS

T. S. Chidawanyika (✉) · D. N. Ratnayake
University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire AL10 9AB, UK
e-mail: tonderaichidd@gmail.com

D. N. Ratnayake
e-mail: d.ratnayake@herts.ac.uk

1 Introduction

Internet-based Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communication has been popular for interactive communication services like video and voice conferencing along with traditional dedicated, wired systems like public switched telephone network (PSTN) and Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN) for many years. However, wired and dedicated infrastructure is expensive and challenging in the modern world, where mobility and flexibility have become increasingly important. Therefore, with the growth of the internet, most businesses opted for VoIP which relies only on an internet connection. As a result, PSTN and ISDN are likely to be phased out, if not globally, in the United Kingdom within the next five years [4]. Nevertheless, VoIP is susceptible to network conditions like packet loss, jitter and end-to-end delay, and implications can create critical reliability and security issues, especially in the Small Office Home Office (SOHO) Local Area Network (LAN) and Wireless LAN (WLAN) environments where network bandwidth may be limited. Poor network conditions directly impact availability in the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) triad. Existing research suggests that using VoIP property combinations such as call signalling, voice codecs and encoders properties, network topology and type, network conditions can be managed, including its quality and performance [1, 5–8]. This research aims to find property combinations that have ideal characteristics to meet SOHO user quality or performance requirements by using Quality of Service (QoS) and Mean Opinion Score (MOS), respectively, in LAN and WLAN environments. Additionally, results can indicate the most appropriate VoIP properties for mission-critical applications like emergency services or military communications that require VoIP performance and reliability.

The experiment also enhances the work of the following. Roslin et al. [1] carried out a similar experiment on LAN architecture. This research aims to develop their research further including WLAN architecture. [2] argued that SIP was effective in optimal set up times when evaluating VoIP protocols in IEEE 802.11 networks. This experiment intends to validate if SIP is optimal in both LANs and WLANs. [3] findings show that end-to-end delays are high in VoIP over wireless networks. This research also seeks to examine their findings on how and why WLAN topologies introduce undesirable network conditions like end-to-end delay.

The organisation of this paper is as follows. The next section presents the background and related research. Section 3 defines the experimental design, how the experiment is conducted and what is being simulated. The simulation results and discussions are presented in Sect. 4. Significant findings and future work are outlined in Sect. 5. Lastly, Sect. 6 concludes the paper.

2 Background and Related Research

QoS and MOS are methods for analysing the performance and quality of VoIP traffic. MOS can be both objective and subjective [9, 10]. QoS is objective when measuring network conditions, service performance and quality characteristics [7, 11–13]. Investigated VoIP QoS performance in Wireless mesh networks by testing different VoIP properties. When evaluating MOS and QoS results, they found combinations of 802.11 g standard with G.711 and G.729 codecs using Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP) decreased VoIP QoS performance. [5] looks at coupling signalling protocols and codecs scheme in achieving VoIP QoS over LAN. It concludes that G.723.1 codec had higher jitter variation when compared to G.711 and G.729A in their LAN-based study when evaluating performance using MOS and QoS. Both studies do not investigate WLAN infrastructure topologies or compare WLAN to LAN topologies when considering VoIP QoS and MOS measurements. Infrastructure-based WLAN combinations may offer desirable performance or quality characteristics ideal for user requirements and VoIP applications.

Gongjian [14] finds that call signalling property H.323 is more complex than call signalling property SIP, and that SIP is excellent for development and is cheaper than H.323. It also finds that SIP is most suitable for internal use in large and mid-sized enterprises. [15] survey findings conclude that SIP is an alternative to H.323 due to the protocol's complexity of H.323, and SIP is more popular than H.323. [5] has a similar approach to this survey. Their study concluded that the combination of G.711 and signalling SIP produced the best jitter and call quality results when testing multiple codecs over SIP and H.323.

Khalifa [16] looks at the combination of VoIP properties to improve QoS over two LAN topologies. They investigate network conditions for property combination performance characteristics like jitter and end-to-end delay. However, the study does not cover the set-up times over WLAN and LAN topologies for each combination. Set up times can contribute to the evaluation of VoIP performance. The call initiation speed can be a user requirement, especially in mission-critical applications.

Roslin et al. [1] investigates QoS for VoIP property combinations over LAN-based topologies; LAN H.323 topology and LAN SIP topology. Network conditions results show each combination's performance characteristics over their test model. However, the study does not record the amount of traffic data sent and received over the network topologies used for their simulation. Traffic loss is also a contributing factor to VoIP quality and performance. The amount of traffic loss could determine if the network topology is robust enough to be able to handle VoIP telephony and multiple services at the same time. Traffic loss can evidence the effect on network conditions.

VoIP can be applied both on infrastructure and ad hoc networks. This reflects positively on its ability to phase out PSTN and ISDN. However, traditional internet infrastructures' quality and performance are superior to that of ad hoc networks. Ad hoc networks do have limitations but are likely to further integrate into society if

VoIP becomes application-based and newer standards of IEEE 802.11 are developed to ensure reliability [8].

Khiat et al. [2] found that SIP was effective in optimal set up times when evaluating VoIP protocols in mobile 802.11 networks. [3] showcases high levels of end-to-end delay after additional calls are added over infrastructure and ad hoc networks in their VoIP simulation.

Mentions that VoIP continues to be adopted into the industry as it can offer features similar to Private Branch eXchange (PBX) when looking at VoIP application security issues [17]. It is important to deploy VoIP appropriately, especially when meeting user requirements and subsequently finding ideal use case applications like industrial, public or private services and SOHO environments. VoIP properties should showcase ideal characteristics to achieve requirements that could encourage further VoIP adoption. Furthermore, VoIP application type can also play a part in the choice of property combination. It's possible that industry and public services are likely to opt for performance-orientated characteristics as high traffic and multiple call handling requirements heavily increase packet loss and network congestion [18, 19].

End-to-end delay and jitter are important factors of VoIP QoS and MOS research. Table 1 outlines the acceptable ranges for network conditions defined by standards/proposed by the research community;

There are several popular simulators available like NS3 and NETSIM [17, 23]. However, Riverbed Modeller is an efficient simulator that provides both MOS and QoS analysis options which helps create more extensive results that better represent the performance and quality characteristics of VoIP property combinations [24].

Table 1 Network condition Recommended ranges

Network condition	Acceptable ranges
End-to-end delay	[20] defines acceptable End-to-end delay ranges as follows; 0 to 150 ms is acceptable for most user applications, and 150 to 400 ms is acceptable if administrations are aware of the transmission time impact on the transmission quality of user applications. Above 400 ms is unacceptable for general network planning purposes. However, it is recognised that in some exceptional cases, this limit will be exceeded
Jitter	[21] defines acceptable jitter should be between the values of 0 ms and 50 ms and unacceptable jitter is anything above this range
ITUT MOS objective score	[1, 9] defines MOS user satisfaction based on <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4.3–5.0 = Very satisfied • 4.0–4.3 = satisfied • 3.6–4.0 = Some users satisfied • 3.1–3.6 = Many users dissatisfied • 2.6–3.1 = Nearly all users dissatisfied • 1.0–2.6 = Not recommended
Packet loss	[22] defines that acceptable packet loss between 1 and 3%, and acceptable data loss between 0% and 1.5%. This experiment will use 3% as the higher threshold

However, Riverbed Modeller only supports up to WiFi 4 (802.11n). The newer protocol WiFi 6 (802.11ax) can handle multiple devices [25], ideal for the VoIP simulation environment.

3 Experiment Design

The experiment is designed to simulate VoIP property combinations of WLANs and LANs to determine which property combinations satisfy predefined best quality and best performance conditions. In Sect. 2, the research established that; VoIP mainly uses SIP and H.323 call signaling. Different voice codecs have varying attributes suited for different use cases, such as high bit rate quality or low bandwidth requirements. The research incorporates VoIP properties of LAN topology used in Roslin et al. [1] as the control set whilst VoIP WLAN topology is defined by this research based on most common ways that VoIP infrastructures are set up. This experiment follows Roslin et al. and records one and three frames for each combination. Test sets of property combinations are populated using the use cases. Figure 1 outlines the overview of the experiment design.

The inputs to the simulation are call signaling, voice codec, encoder properties and network topology information of both WLANs and LANs, which are defined as follows:

- Topologies: LAN H.323 and LAN SIP (Fig. 2a and b, topology from [1]), WLAN H.323 and WLAN SIP (Fig. 3a and b, topology designed based on the most common ways that VoIP infrastructures are set up)
- Call signaling properties: H.323 and SIP dataset (Fig. 2, dataset from [1])
- Signalling and codec types (Table 2, dataset from [1])




Fig. 1 Experiment design




Fig. 2 Signalling topology for **a** H.323 LAN and **b** SIP LAN from the dataset [1]




Fig. 3 Signalling topologies (a)WLAN H.323 and (b) WLAN SIP for test variables

Table 2 Control VoIP Properties for call signalling and codec type

Signalling Type	Voice Codec Type
H.323 ITU-T [26]	G.711 @ 64Kb/s PCM Narrowband ITU-T [28]
SIP [27]	G.726 @ 32Kb/s ADPCM Narrowband ITU-T [29]
	G.729 @ 8Kb/s ACELP Narrowband ITU-T [30]

3.1 LAN Topology for H.323 and SIP

Figure 2 shows the LAN architecture proposed by Roslin et al. [1] for H.323 and (b) SIP. This experiment uses data for the control set and extends their work by simulating LAN topologies to collect more QoS results like set-up times and packet loss that are not recorded in [1]. Details of devices are explained in Appendix A.

3.2 *Control VoIP Properties for Call Signalling and Codec Type*

The VoIP property combinations proposed by [1] are used as the control set in this experiment. Test combinations use similar call signalling and voice codecs for both LAN and WLAN. Properties simulated are listed in Table 2.

3.3 *WLAN Topologies for H.323 and SIP*

Figure 3 has two WLAN topologies simulated and evaluated in this experiment against the control combinations. Details of devices are explained in Appendix A.

During a call, the receiver and sender will alternate roles. The simulation will not include external interferences like radio waves to help remove the bias towards isolated application scenarios. This will aid in getting a more general depiction of the combinations tested. This experiment uses Roslin et al. [1] data including codec frame size, speech detection, packet loss concealment and topologies used to construct the control variables.

3.4 *Network Conditions to Be Simulated*

Network conditions are used for analysis when determining the ideal VoIP property combinations for user requirements criteria best performance and quality. Table 3 lists QoS and MOS network conditions recorded in the experiment for control and test combinations. The conditions of the calculations are listed in Appendix B.

Table 3 Network condition

Network conditions
Packet end-to-end delay (sec)
Mean Opinion Score (MOS)
Jitter (sec)
Packets sent and received (packets/sec)
Set up time (sec)
Network conditions

3.5 Classification of User Requirement Categories

The results are classified into two categories; best performance and best quality. The best performance is geared towards network conditions that improve the performance characteristics of VoIP and focuses on applications that are based on user functional requirements like speed. The best quality is geared towards the quality characteristics of VoIP and focuses on applications that are based on non-functional user requirements like sound quality.

The two proposed categories give a general overview of VoIP use case scenarios where the availability of quality or performance is a requirement. The categories will also act as a guide to identifying use case applications that benefit from the combinations. The classification focuses on each combination’s network condition value. Table 4 outlines the classification categories.

Table 5 shows the proposed use case criteria utilised to identify possible use cases; best performance and quality. In this experiment, use case applications of [1] which is similar to SOHO are used with one and three VoIP frame combinations.

Table 4 Classification of categories

Category	Classification
Best performance combination	The combination that offers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The least amount of jitter • The fastest set-up time • The least amount of packet end-to-end delay
Best quality combination	The combination that offers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The least amount of jitter • The highest Mean Opinion Score • The least amount of traffic loss with the highest amount of traffic received

Table 5 Use cases

Use case (user requirement) application	Proposed criteria
Small Office Home Office (SOHO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Light load services running like FTP and Email servers • Allows for more bandwidth availability with fewer conservation concerns • The availability of bandwidth enables higher quality requirements for user satisfaction
Industrial and Commercial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simultaneous VoIP call handling capabilities • Low VoIP impact for bandwidth conservation • Ability to operate VoIP over large amounts of service data traffic like high load FTP and Email servers
Public and private services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service availability and performance is mission-critical • Communication quality is ideal

In the simulation environment, devices are configured and connected to form the network topologies WLAN and LAN through which the VoIP property combinations are tested. Background traffic for FTP and email server simulates a network load when VoIP is used [1]. The devices used in the simulation environment for control and test combinations create the topologies outlined in Fig. 2a and b, Fig. 3a and b. These device nodes are listed in Appendix B.

3.6 Simulation and User Requirement Classification

The simulation is iterative and processes both control and test property combinations to obtain QoS and MOS results. The Discrete Event Simulation (DES) method is used to create the effect of a real-world system in the simulated environment. QoS and MOS results are generated at the end of the DES events. Then, the network condition results like end-to-end delay, jitter and packet loss are evaluated to identify if they are in acceptable recommended ranges outlined in Table 1. The results are also evaluated to classify the ideal combinations for the quality and performance categories. The voice attributes are configured in the simulation environment. Each combination's details are implemented as seen in Table 6.

Once the simulation is completed, the resulting network conditions are sent to the classifier. Classifier analyses the network conditions and classifies them based on the best combination for user requirement, quality and performance. The classification of categories is explained in Table 4. Pandas in Python are used to automate the sorting of network condition results. The process uses 'Max' and 'Min' to sort the values in line with optimal network conditions according to the predefined classification criteria.

Table 6 Simulation conditions

Attribute	Value
Silence length (sec)	Exponential (0.65) (default)
Talk spurt length (sec)	Exponential (0.352) (default)
Encoder schemes	G.711 64kb/s PCM, G.726 32kb/s ADPCM, G.729 8kb/s CS-ACELP
Voice frames per packet	1 and 3
Signalling	H.323 and SIP
Type of service	Interactive Voice
Frame size/duration	5 ms, 10 ms
Voice activity detection	Comfort Noise Generation (CNG), No

4 Results and Discussion

4.1 Simulation Output

Figure 4 shows the packet end-to-end delay(sec) recorded for property combinations. Overall, the highest end-to-end delay 0.71 s is shown in G.729 when using H.323 over WLAN at 1 frame. This is considered “unacceptable” by the network condition recommended ranges (Table 1). End-to-end delay ranged from 0.12 to 0.43 s shown for combinations using three frames. They performed considerably better than one frame combinations that ranged from 0.21 to 0.71 s showcasing that frame size does improve delay. [3] finds that an increase in calls negatively affected results when simulating VoIP over WLAN infrastructure. [18, 19] also mention that heavy traffic with multiple concurrent communication sessions can heavily increase packet loss rate. This experiment has a total of eight VoIP devices for each combination tested in the simulation environment. These devices run alongside other FTP and email services which may have caused high end-to-end delay seen in Fig. 4.

Figure 5 shows the MOS (ITU_T score). The MOS score is outlined in Table 1. Across all combinations simulated, the codec G.729 shows the highest overall MOS score results around 4 “satisfied” when compared to G.711 and G.726 which average around 1 “not recommended”. Overall, the codec G.711 generally performed marginally better than G.726 but still in the MOS range of “not recommended”.

This experiment’s findings contradict Roslin et al. [1]’s MOS results as the codecs G.711 and G.726 performed poorly, averaging around 1 “not recommended “ in this experiment when compared to “satisfied” and “nearly all users dissatisfied” in Roslin et al. results. However, the following results agree with Roslin et al. [1]: the lower bit rate codec G.729 at 8 kb/s had a similar MOS score averaging 3.81 “some users satisfied” in their results and 3.87 in this experiment also resides in the same range.




Fig. 4 Packet end-to-end delay(sec) 1 and 3 Frames




Fig. 5 Voice MOS Value (ITU-T) 1 and 3 Frames

This could be due to the network topology’s inability to withstand higher demand codecs like G.711 at 64 kb/s and G.726 at 32 kb/s whilst supporting running other services. This also could explain the low MOS scores displayed by the higher bit rate codecs. Alternatively, it is also possible that unmentioned simulated factors and/or software version could have caused inconsistencies. The academic edition used in this study limits the number of simulated events, Roslin et al. [1]’s work has no mention of a specific version used.

Figure 6 shows the Jitter(sec) results. Acceptable jitter should range between 0 and 50 ms as outlined in Table 1. All combinations showcased jitter within the acceptable margins with H.323 over WLAN using codec G.711 at 1 frame showing the highest jitter at 2.113086 ms and WLAN H.323 G.729 at one frame having the lowest jitter at 0.003552 ms. Roslin et al. [1]’s work in LANs recorded different jitter levels compared to this experiment with jitter results ranging from 0.00040 s to 0.00000 s for G.729 over SIP at 3 frames. Overall, both experiment results were within the acceptable range outlined in Table 1. Differences between combinations may be indistinguishable, but further research can be carried out to confirm.

Figure 7 shows traffic sent and received (packets/sec). Acceptable data loss calculated from the difference between traffic sent and traffic received should be between 0 and 3% as outlined in Table 1. WLAN combinations show higher amounts of traffic loss when compared to LAN combinations. For example, WLAN using G.729 over H.323 at 1 frame had 30,021.7 packets lost. Combinations like G.729 over SIP at 1 frame had around 5000 to 10,000 packets sent and received in comparison to combinations like G.711 over H.323 at 1 frame which have an average of 15,000 to 25,000 packets sent and received. The reduction in traffic sent and received could indicate some network congestion.




Fig. 6 Jitter (sec) 1 and 3 Frames




Fig. 7 Traffic sent (packets/sec) 1 and 3 Frames

For data sent and received, the expectation was that G.711 operating at a bandwidth of 64 kbps would consistently send more data than the codecs G.726 with a bandwidth of 32 kbps and G.729 at 8 kbps data rate. Results indicated that whilst different bit rate codecs are simulated, some had very similar amounts of data sent. For example, H.323 operating over WLAN using codecs G.726, G.729 and SIP over WLAN using the codec G.711 sent around 8000 to 10,000 packets. It is possible that the higher bit rate codecs caused bottlenecks when queuing during the transmission of packets from sender to receiver leading to a reduction in packets sent. This is apparent by results like LAN, H.323 and G.729 at three frames compared to LAN H.323 G.711 at three frames. Newer types of WiFi protocols like WiFi 6 IEEE 802.11ax could help mitigate the amount of data loss. WiFi 6 is the new version of WLAN that is reliable and can support multiple devices, making it ideal for the simulated environments throughput requirements [25].

Figure 8 shows network setup times of frames. Overall combinations with 3 frames have a set-up time ranging from 0.033 s to 0.37 s which performed faster than 1 frame variants that ranged from 0.035 s to 0.52 s. Combinations using H.323 over WLAN, both tested frames had the longest set up times when compared to other combinations, averaging around 0.518 s. Codecs using SIP offered faster set-up times ranging from 0.003 s to 0.17 s compared to H.323 combinations ranging from 0.035 s to 0.52 s. Similarly [2] recorded that SIP had the most optimal set up time, suggesting that SIP is ideal for set up time depending on requirements. They proposed that this could be due to the fewer messages exchanged at the establishment of the session as opposed to H.323.




Fig. 8 Set-up Time (sec) 1 and 3 Frames

4.2 Classification of Simulation Output

After collecting the QoS and MOS results as illustrated in Figs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, the simulation output of the property combinations is classified into one of the user requirement classes; best quality or performance combination.

Table 7 shows the best performance combination for each network condition when considering the criteria listed in Table 4. The classification output shows that the SIP over WLAN using G.726 at one frame is the ideal performance combination for the best performance. It has acceptable end-to-end delay, quick set up time and low jitter. The combination offers network condition mitigation and performance characteristics best suited for use in industrial and commercial applications where performance is the key to ensuring service availability. This may not be a major concern in a SOHO environment where bandwidth is less conserved. Industrial applications can have many services running concurrently, including multiple VoIP call handling. This can be mission-critical, so characteristics like fast set-up time and lower packet end-to-end delay are essential. The research assumes that fast set up time is desirable but not essential in a SOHO environment. Network congestion is more likely in industrial settings, making VoIP jitter and end-to-end delay mitigation essential alongside bandwidth conservation which this combination can offer. These characteristics are less of a requirement in SOHO setups but are desirable, especially when implementing redundancy and future network expansion capabilities.

Table 8 shows the best quality combination for each network condition when considering the criteria listed in Table 4. The classification output shows that H.323 over WLAN using G.729 at one frame was the ideal quality combination. It offered low jitter, “fair” to “good” MOS scores, high traffic throughput, and low traffic loss. This combination is best suited for consumer or small business applications where user satisfaction and non-functional requirements like quality are preferable. This could include SOHO environments where bandwidth is available, and quality is the main requirement. Applications that would benefit from this combination are unlikely to support high-load services or many simultaneous VoIP calls meaning bandwidth conservation is not a priority over quality. The combination had higher traffic sent when compared to some of the other combinations but suffered from a considerable amount of traffic loss, but a simplified SOHO network set-up could solve

Table 7 Best performance combinations

Condition	The best combination for condition	Condition
Lowest Jitter (Fig. 6)	WLAN H.323 G.729 @ 1 Frame	Lowest Jitter (Fig. 6)
Quickest Set-up time (Fig. 8)	WLAN SIP G.729 @ 3 Frames	Quickest Set-up time (Fig. 8)
Lowest End-to-end delay (Fig. 4)	LAN SIP G.726 and WLAN SIP G.726 @ 3 Frames	Lowest End-to-end delay (Fig. 4)
Overall best performance combination	SIP over WLAN using G.726 at one frame	Overall best performance combination

this, for example, lower load server applications. A high MOS indicates better sound quality characteristics. Minimising jitter is also an essential quality requirement for increasing call quality and clarity. It is vital to note that some industrial applications could have quality requirements that outweigh performance requirements. In this case, the infrastructure needed for VoIP to deliver the best quality characteristics needs to be very robust, primarily if other services like high load traffic such as FTP or email servers use the same available bandwidth. Quality can also be a mission-critical requirement. Some applications may rely on call quality as a functional requirement, for example, communication of sensitive data over VoIP in specialised services like military or emergency service scenarios.

Further analysis revealed that using objective QoS and MOS measurement method adequately captured each combination’s performance and quality characteristics. However, it could have also been beneficial to get a subjective measurement as human perception of VoIP performance as then quality would be more realistic. The differences in results between the combinations could be indistinguishable through a subjective test. The use case categorisation technique worked well to represent a general set VoIP of use cases but could be improved and expanded. There are many use cases applicable to VoIP, making it challenging to simulate and classify all of them.

Overall results do not conclusively highlight a superior best performance or best quality combination that fulfils all the classification criteria proposed for both conditions. Instead, classification is based on the interpretation of results to classify the most ideal combination for each criterion. This was not ideal but functioned well in replicating a real-world selection scenario.

Lastly, the experimental process ran well. The riverbed modeller had the correct tools and performed as expected to carry out this project which agrees with [1, 24]. The simulation environment functioned well when implementing the devices into the topologies LAN and WLAN. The network condition data selection and collection process simplified analysis tasks particularly when exporting the MOS and QoS results for automated sorting.

Table 8 Best quality combinations

Condition	The best combination for condition	Condition
Lowest Jitter (Fig. 6)	WLAN H.323 G.729 @ 1 Frame	Lowest Jitter (Fig. 6)
Highest MOS (Fig. 5)	WLAN H.323 G.729 @ 1 Frame	Highest MOS (Fig. 5)
The least amount of traffic loss with the highest amount of traffic received (Fig. 7)	LAN H.323 G.729 @ 3 Frame	The least amount of traffic loss with the highest amount of traffic received (Fig. 7)
Overall best quality combination	H.323 over WLAN using G.729 at one frame	Overall best quality combination

5 Significant Findings and Future Work

This paper enhanced Roslin et al.'s [1] work on LAN, extending it to WLAN topologies. The reconstruction of [1]'s work on MOS for G.729 over LAN SIP produced similar results, however, the QoS results differed. Codecs using SIP over LAN offered the fastest set-up times, which agrees with the study of Khiat et al. [2]. This suggests that SIP is ideal for set up time requirements instead of H.323. This experiment also further examined Guy et al.'s [3] findings to understand how and why WLAN topologies introduce undesirable network conditions and concluded that packet loss and reduced throughput could contribute to the network conditions found in WLAN combinations. This study found VoIP property combinations that offered ideal characteristics to match the best performance and quality user requirements.

This experiment found characteristics of VoIP property combinations that are ideal for the proposed use cases. Results indicated that VoIP is versatile and can suit many applications, including SOHO, industrial and emergency services, which could be mission-critical. SOHO environments could benefit from a hybrid blend of multiple network types and a property combination focused on performance and quality requirements. The overall experiment findings support VoIP as a popular telephony method for its versatility and ease of configuration. Moreover, both SOHO and industrial user requirements have met the availability, performance and quality expectations. This may contribute to the broader adoption of VoIP as the primary mode of telephony communication.

The simulation was limited to WiFi 4 in the simulation model. This study can be enhanced by implementing WiFi 6 in WLAN scenarios which could help mitigate the high end-to-end delay and data loss amounts. It can also support more significant amounts of client end devices than WiFi 4 or WiFi 5. This study was non-human based, and therefore, objective MOS was used. This experiment can be further enhanced by a subjective MOS experiment where the end-user can give more realistic measurements of VoIP voice quality. Furthermore, using both subjective and objective measurements could help find the optimal VoIP property combinations to match the user requirements better than just objective measurement.

Further testing and development would be beneficial as VoIP has an extensive range of property combinations and configurations that could offer more desirable characteristics for SOHO and other use case environments. To better meet user requirements, especially in adaptive environments where network configurations need to be adaptable. An AI or machine learning module could be utilised to analyse network conditions and alter VoIP property combinations in real-time to ensure user requirements. This can help mitigate the bottlenecks and traffic loss highlighted by the results to help maintain functional or non-functional requirements, especially in mission-critical applications. It is also possible that independent basic service set (IBSS) or ad hoc networks could mitigate WLAN traffic loss.

6 Conclusions

This experimental research successfully found optimal VoIP property combinations that showcased ideal QoS and MOS characteristics for user requirements; best performance and quality. By expanding on existing research, good comparisons between LAN and WLAN connectivity types for VoIP in the simulated environment were highlighted. The proposed mission-critical use cases helped visualise the best applications for VoIP when achieving the defined user requirements. Both SOHO and industrial applications showed promising results on availability, performance and quality for VoIP deployment. However, user requirements can be better achieved by the implementation of newer WiFi technology and further property testing, which can solidify VoIP's capabilities to function for mission-critical environments. VoIP qualities like availability, versatility and reliability were apparent throughout the experimental processes which support existing research for VoIP's future.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement: In this study, a publicly available dataset from a published peer-reviewed paper [1] was used to construct the control test VoIP properties. This data set can be found.

Acknowledgements: This work was produced based on a final year project completed at the University of Hertfordshire by the 1st author. We acknowledge the guidance and feedback received from the module leader and the 2nd markers.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

See Table 9.

Appendix B

See Table 10.

Table 9 Simulation device legend








Node icon	Node name	Description
 <p>Workstation</p>	<p>Ethernet workstation (IEEE 802.3)</p>	<p>IEEE 802.3 ethernet standard workstation running VoIP profile. Uses SIP User Agent Client (UAC) and H.323 Gatekeeper routed signalling (GKRCS)</p>
 <p>Workstation</p>	<p>WLAN Workstation (IEEE 802.11 g)</p>	<p>IEEE 802.11 g workstation running VoIP profile. Uses SIP User Agent Client (UAC) and H.323 Gatekeeper routed signalling (GKRCS). Set to non-roaming</p>
 <p>IP Phone Wireless IP Phone</p>	<p>IP phone and Wireless IP phone</p>	<p>Client devices for VoIP telephony. IP phone used for an ethernet connection and wireless phone used for the WIFI connection. It also uses SIP UAC or H.323 (GKRCS)</p>
 <p>Switch Router</p>	<p>Ethernet Router and Ethernet switch (IEEE 802.3)</p>	<p>This router supports PPP to IP cloud and ethernet links to end devices and services</p>
 <p>Wireless router</p>	<p>WLAN Ethernet Router (IEEE 802.11)</p>	<p>IEEE 802.11 with Basic Service Set (BSS) identifier allows wireless end devices to communicate to the correct wireless router. In addition, it supports one ethernet link to connected devices</p>
 <p>H.323 Gatekeeper</p>	<p>H.323 Gatekeeper</p>	<p>H.323 management tool to facilitate communication between clients. The gateway is set to gatekeeper routed signalling to accomplish this</p>
 <p>SIP Proxy Server</p>	<p>SIP Proxy Server</p>	<p>Proxy is used to facilitate communication between addresses or nodes. This enables the devices to talk to each other after the proxy initiates the communication channel</p>

Table 10 Network conditions and condition information

Network condition	Condition calculation
Packet end-to-end delay (sec)	$\text{delay} = \text{network_delay} + \text{encoding_delay} + \text{decoding_delay} + \text{compression_delay} + \text{decompression_delay} + \text{dejitter_buffer_delay}$
Mean Opinion Score (MOS)	Global statistic captures the minimum MOS value collected in the network
Jitter (sec)	If two consecutive packets leave the source node with time stamps t_1 & t_2 and are played back at the destination node at time t_3 & t_4 , then: $\text{jitter} = (t_4 - t_3) - (t_2 - t_1)$ Negative jitter indicates that the time difference between the packets at the destination node was less than that at the source node
Packets sent and received (packets/sec)	Traffic sent: Average number of packets per second submitted to the transport layers by all voice applications in the network Traffic received: Average number of packets per second forwarded to all Voice applications by the transport layers in the network
Set up time (sec)	H.323: This statistic holds the average set-up time (in seconds) for a H.323 call in the network SIP: Time to set-up a call

References

- Roslin, R.J.B., Khalifa, O.O., Bhuiyan, S.S.N.: Improved voice over internet protocol for wireless devices, In: 2018 7th International Conference on Computer and Communication Engineering (ICCCCE), 2018: IEEE, pp. 498–503.
- Khiat, A., El Khaili, M., Bakkoury, J., Bahnasse, A.: Study and evaluation of voice over IP signaling protocols performances on MIPv6 protocol in mobile 802.11 network: SIP and H. 323. In: 2017 International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC), 2017: IEEE, pp. 1–8.
- Guy, C.G: VoIP over WLAN 802.11b simulations for infrastructure and ad-hoc networks. In London Communications Symposium (LCS 06), London, United Kingdom, pp. 61 -64. (2006). Available: <http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/15008/>.
- BT: The UK's PSTN network will switch off in 2025, ed: BT, (2020).
- Mekki H.A.S., Mohammed, Y.A.: The impact of coupling signaling protocols and codecs scheme in achieving VoIP Quality. Am. Sci. Res. J. Eng., Technol., Sci. (ASRJETS), **32**(1), pp. 192–199, (2017).
- Miraz, M.H., Molvi, S.A., Ali, M., Ganie, M.A., Hussein, A.H.: Analysis of QoS of VoIP traffic through WiFi-UMTS networks. arXiv preprint [arXiv:1708.05068](https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.05068), (2017).
- Meeran, M.T., Annus, P., Alam, M.M., Moullec, Y.L.: Evaluation of VoIP QoS performance in wireless mesh networks. Information **8**(3), 88 (2017)
- Yihunie, F., Abdelfattah, E.: Simulation and analysis of quality of service (QoS) of Voice over IP (VoIP) through Local Area Networks. in 2018 9th IEEE Annual Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference (UEMCON), IEEE, pp. 598–602 (2018).

9. Recommendations ITU-T P.800.1 (07/2016) :Mean opinion score (MOS) terminology, ITU-T, (2016). Available: <http://handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/12972>
10. Streijl, R.C., Winkler, S., Hands, D.S.: Mean opinion score (MOS) revisited: methods and applications, limitations and alternatives. *Multimedia Syst.* **22**(2), 213–227 (2016)
11. AL-Mahadeen, B.M., Al-Msedan, A.: Improving the QoS of VoIP over WiMAX networks using OPNET modeler. *IJCSNS Int. J. Comput. Sci. Netw. Secur.* **17**(8), pp. 132–142, (2017).
12. Bahasse, A., Malainine, Z., El Azzaoui, H.: Study and evaluation of VoIP Scalability Performances. *Int. J. Comput. Appl.*, **182**(47), p. 5, (2019), <https://doi.org/10.5120/ijca201918702>.
13. Elamin, S.O.: Performance Analysis of VoIP Quality of Service in IPv4 and IPv6 Environment. *Sudan Univ. Sci. Technol.* (2017).
14. Gongjian, Z.: The study and implementation of voip intelligent voice communication system based on SIP protocol. in *Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Intelligent Information Processing*, pp. 1–9 (2016).
15. Shaw, U., Sharma, B.: A survey paper on voice over internet protocol (VOIP). *Int. J. Comput. Appl. Comput. Appl.* **139**(2), 16–22 (2016)
16. Khalifa, O.O., Roslin, R.J.B., Bhuiyan, S.S.N.: Improved voice quality with the combination of transport layer & audio codec for wireless devices. *Bull. Electr. Eng. Inform.* **8**(2), 665–673 (2019)
17. Tetcos.com, NetSim-Network Simulator and Emulator, ed. N.D.
18. Abou Haibeh, L. Hakem, N., Safia, O.A.: Performance evaluation of VoIP calls over MANET for different voice codecs, In *2017 IEEE 7th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC)*, 2017: IEEE, pp. 1–6.
19. Boussen, S., Tabbane, N., Tabbane, S.: Performance analysis of SCTP protocol in WiFi network. In *2009 First International Conference on Communications and Networking*, 2009: IEEE, pp. 1–5.
20. ITU-T, G. 114: One-way transmission time, *Tech. Rep.*, **5** (2003).
21. Al-Sayyed, R., Pattinson, C., Dacre, T.: VoIP and database traffic co-existence over IEEE 802.11 b WLAN with redundancy. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer, Information and Systems Science and Engineering*, 2007: Citeseer, pp. 25–27.
22. Ibrahim, N.K., Abd Razak, M. R., Ali, A.H., Yatim, W.M.S.M.: The performance of VoIP over IEEE 802.11. In *2013 European Modelling Symposium*, 2013: IEEE, pp. 607–610.
23. Nsnam: Ns-3: A Discrete-event network simulator for internet systems, (2006–2020).
24. Mounika, P.: Performance analysis of wireless sensor network topologies for Zigbee using riverbed modeler. In *2018 2nd International Conference on Inventive Systems and Control (ICISC)*, 2018: IEEE, pp. 1456–1459.
25. Zreikat A.: Performance evaluation of 5G/WiFi-6 coexistence. *Int. J. Circuits, Syst., Signal Process.* NAUN. pp. 904–913, (2020).
26. ITU-T: H. 323, Packet based multimedia communications systems. *Telecommun. Stand. Sect.* ITU, (2003).
27. Rosenberg, J. et al.: SIP: session initiation protocol, ed: RFC 3261, (2002).
28. ITU-T, G.: 711: Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) of voice frequencies, ITU-T Recommendation G, **711**, (1988).
29. ITU-T, Recommendation G. 726, 40, 32, 24, 16 kbit/s adaptive differential pulse code modulation (ADPCM), ITU, Geneva, (1990).
30. ITU-T, R.G.: 729; Coding of speech at 8 kbit/s using conjugate structure algebraic-code-excited linear-prediction (CSACELP), Março de, (1996).

Cyber Fraud, Privacy and Education

Love at First Sleight: A Review of Scammer Techniques in Online Romance Fraud



Marc Kydd, Lynsay A. Shepherd, Andrea Szymkowiak,
and Graham I. Johnson

Abstract Romance fraud, where a scammer exploits a victim for monetary gain under the guise of ‘true love’, is a relatively new form of cybercrime which has become increasingly prevalent. Attempts to tackle romance fraud have been made by law enforcement and dating platforms. The latter commonly utilise awareness campaigns, informing users about the risks associated with online dating and how to spot warning signs. However, such campaigns tend to be overly generic, repeatedly giving the same advice. Other campaigns provide vague or outdated advice, which leaves readers unable to protect themselves. This paper presents a state-of-the-art review of the varying approaches that scammers can take on the path to exploiting their victims both in selecting a suitable target and keeping them engaged as part of the scam. Findings highlight that methods by which scammers target, select, and exploit victims of romance fraud can vary greatly. Rather than following a strict structure as depicted in awareness campaigns, romance fraud is a continually evolving and unique form of cybercrime with multiple variations at each stage of the process. These variations also lay the foundations for future studies on the overlap of cybercrime and abuse, and the role of organised crime in romance fraud.

Keywords Romance fraud · Online dating · Scams · Cybercrime · Human-centred cybersecurity

M. Kydd (✉) · L. A. Shepherd · A. Szymkowiak · G. I. Johnson
School of Design and Informatics, Abertay University, Bell Street, Dundee DD1 1HG, UK
e-mail: m.kydd1800@abertay.ac.uk

L. A. Shepherd
e-mail: lynsay.shepherd@abertay.ac.uk

A. Szymkowiak
e-mail: a.szymkowiak@abertay.ac.uk

G. I. Johnson
e-mail: g.johnson@abertay.ac.uk

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_18

1 Introduction

Romance fraud is a form of social engineering, whereby fraudsters create a fake profile on dating platforms and strike up a relationship with potential victims, with the end goal of conning them out of money. The resulting damage to victims can be devastating. Although the victim is most often targeted for financial exploitation, romance fraud has also been leveraged for blackmail, sexual abuse, and drug smuggling [1–3]. It is a cruel form of cybercrime where victims experience both heavy financial losses and the end of a relationship which felt real to the victim [2, 4, 5].

Dating platform users are also perhaps uniquely vulnerable, given the emphasis often placed on being ‘authentic’ and ‘open’ about their life when creating a profile and interacting with others. This typically translates into users being much more transparent about their lives with other users to increase the chance of a match [6]. However, such transparency also makes users prime targets for scammers.

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, many across society have turned online like never before for work, entertainment, and to forge connections [7, 8]. Online dating platforms have seen a considerable increase in users as many have decided they would rather not go through these challenging times alone [9]. While many of these new users are looking for love, some seek monetary gain through romance fraud. Although instances of romance fraud have been steadily climbing over the past decade, the onset of the pandemic has exacerbated the occurrence of this type of crime.

Attempts have previously been made to tackle romance fraud by law enforcement and the dating platforms themselves, using awareness campaigns informing users about the risk of online dating and warning signs to look out for. However, such campaigns tend to continually provide the same advice. In an attempt to remedy this, other campaigns instead seek to make the advice given so vague that individuals are left confused and unable to protect themselves [5].

This paper explores romance fraud from the scammers’ perspective and highlights that it does not always follow the set pattern often portrayed in typical awareness campaigns. Previous attempts to clearly define what is and is not a romance scam have often left users confused to the extent that victims of these scams do not recognise that they have been scammed in the manner the awareness campaign is supposed to guard against [5]. Romance scams are a complex and adaptive form of cyber-enabled scams that are specifically crafted for maximum effectiveness against each victim. This state-of-the-art review on scammer techniques highlights the varying approaches scammers can take on the path to exploiting their victim, both in selecting a suitable target and keeping them engaged as part of the scam. Ultimately, this paper seeks to deepen the broader understanding of why romance fraud continues to be so effective by examining and classifying the techniques and tactics used by scammers, with a view to create a framework that allows to identify techniques to address this form of cybercrime.




Fig. 1 Overview of scammer techniques in romance fraud

2 Overview of Scammer Techniques

An overview of the approaches and the different phases involved in romance fraud are shown in Fig. 1, including finding a potential victim and potential exploitation phases, which are discussed in the following sections.

2.1 Finding Potential Victims

Romance fraud is perhaps unusual compared to other forms of cybercrime because it typically requires sustained involvement from the scammer and buy-in from the victim. Rather than sending out thousands of non-specific phishing emails, romance fraud requires that the scammer be actively involved over an extended time period, interacting with an intended victim. Scammers may spend a considerable amount of time building rapport with a potential victim who may cease communication when they realise a scammer attempts to exploit them. Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness of the attempted fraud, there are several approaches the scammer can draw from to lure the “right” kind of victim.

2.1.1 Mass Messaging

The most straightforward approach is to message as many accounts on dating platforms as possible. By ‘matching’ with every available account, scammers can rely on the fact that, statistically, someone will reply. In a study of user behaviour on the Chinese dating platform Jiayuan (世纪佳缘), it was found that scam accounts were much more active than legitimate users [10]. Most users contacted less than five accounts concurrently, with particularly active users reaching around 30 concurrent matches. Scammers, however, frequently contacted over 100 accounts at once, much more than that of the typical user. Such high numbers are likely to be a conservative estimate, as these accounts were flagged as suspicious and blocked before their owners could contact more users.

Flooding a wide range of users with messages from the scammer is one approach to finding a victim. However, this ‘brute force’ method has the potential to be easily detected and blocked. Thus, scammers have instead attempted a subtler, but potentially more effective approach, exploiting features of the dating platforms.

2.1.2 The Match-Making Process

Many platforms have simplified the user matching process down to a single swipe on the individual’s mobile device: swipe right for yes, expressing interest for a potential romantic candidate, and swipe left for no interest. A match is made if two users mutually swipe right on each other’s profiles. Rather than engaging in online chat over an extended period, the swiping gesture dramatically increases the speed with which users can indicate their interest or not in another user. However, by reducing the matching process down to indicating mutual interest with a single gesture, such a practice is also ripe for exploitation by scammers. By leveraging the speed at which connections to new users can be made, scammers can reach a wider range of users in a much shorter time span than with traditional chat-oriented dating platforms. In fact, by simply swiping to indicate interest in every available user, scam accounts can significantly increase their pool of victims [11]. Such disingenuous behaviour is challenging to detect on dating platforms, allowing scammers to build up a collection of potential victims within a relatively short time frame.

2.1.3 Tailoring Profiles

Simply attempting to ‘game’ the dating platforms does not mean the scammer will find a suitable victim, however. The scammer requires a means of tailoring how they appear on the platform to maximise the likelihood of a suitable victim getting in contact. The profile plays a critical role in online dating, often being the first thing that users see about a potential match. It is a place for users to express themselves, to share hobbies, interests, and what they are looking for in a potential partner. These factors also make the profile an opportunistic place for scammers to target their victims.

Considerable thought goes into crafting a deceptive profile, and the details thereof can vary significantly depending on the targeted victim. In a study of over 5,000 known scam accounts, scammers were found to adjust almost every facet of their profiles to appeal to the victim’s profile [12], for example, matching their interests. Further, the location of the scammer appears to influence the style of misleading profiles they create. Scammer profiles originating from Nigeria, Malaysia and South Africa typically presented false male profiles featuring individuals around the age of 50. Ukraine, Senegal and the Philippines, meanwhile, were more likely to present false female profiles of individuals closer to 30. Female profiles were also less likely to declare themselves divorced or widowed, compared with male profiles.

Although the scammers' location shaped some aspects of the profile, the target country also influenced what kind of scam profiles were presented to users [12]. Each country appeared to have a unique archetype of a scam profile. Globally, the most common was that of a white male or female working in the military or an engineering occupation. However, users in the United Kingdom were typically presented with fake accounts claiming to be a divorcee. Indian users tended to see males who were in a 'businessman'-type role. Meanwhile, accounts in Eastern Europe most commonly saw white males or females working in the accounting profession.

2.1.4 Multiple Profiles

A singular profile will not work for every kind of potential victim. Therefore, it is not uncommon for scammers to have multiple accounts across multiple dating platforms [10, 13]. The practice of creating multiple accounts is not wholly unique to scammers; legitimate users are also known to engage in such practice [14]. In some instances, users create multiple accounts with differing details to appeal to a broader range of potential partners. The details altered could mean misconstruing factors such as relationship status, age, weight, socio-economic status, and interests.

The profile picture, arguably the first piece of information many potential partners will see, was also a point of intense consideration. In interviews with users, it was noted that they wanted 'something decent' to use for their profile [14]. What 'decent' means in this context appeared to vary between users. Some used an image of themselves where they were clearly visible in a generally tidy environment; others went so far as to get professional photos taken.

This practice of 'slightly' adjusting how users present themselves is widespread enough that 51% of users confirmed that at least one aspect of their profile could be considered misrepresentative [14]. Users did state that they were not doing this for malicious purposes but as a means of managing impressions such that someone they believed was genuinely interested in them would be attracted.

Although using multiple accounts shows similarities between legitimate users and scammers, a key difference between users and scammers is that illegitimate accounts were significantly more verbose in their profile descriptions than those of genuine users [15]. While users would keep to around 54 words in their profile descriptions, scammers used approximately 105 words. This variance is likely due to dating platform users being conscious of how online platforms can use their data [16]. While legitimate users were concerned about how the information they present about themselves could pose a privacy issue, scammers producing fake accounts appear not to be affected by this. As such, fake scammer profiles can be much more expansive as the details presented do not pose any privacy or security concerns to the scammer themselves.

2.2 *Towards Exploitation*

Scammers can utilise a wide range of approaches to lure victims. Whether it be mass messaging users or hijacking recommendation systems, targeting specific demographics via account profiles or testing dozens of variations of tailored profiles, it is only a matter of time before a scammer finds a potential victim. Once a potential victim has been identified, the focus shifts to building an authentic connection with the victim which can later be exploited. The following sections detail the varying approaches to exploitation once a contact with a potential victim has been established.

2.2.1 **Overarching Approach**


Though there are many steps that scammers can take their victims through in an attempt to exploit them, the speed with which this goal is realised will vary. The bluntest approach is to ask for a large amount of money early in the conversation—the ‘face-in-the-door’ approach [17]. Although risky to the scammer, attempting to defraud the victim in this manner offers several potential benefits. For one, it avoids the need for building a false narrative and general trust with the victim before attempting to make a request, allowing the scammer to exploit the victim much faster. ‘Face-in-the-door’ also acts as a test of the victim’s suggestibility to the scammer. If the victim complies with such a large request so readily, the scammer can be reasonably confident that future requests will also be met. Requesting a large amount of money also sets the victim up for future exploitation, as subsequent requests for money can be rationalised much more easily, if they are less than the initial large sum the victim transferred and if there is already buy-in from the victim.

Alternatively, a subtler approach can be found within the ‘foot-in-the-door’ approach. As the converse of the ‘face-in-the-door’ method, this tactic sees the scammer request small amounts of money that are likely to increase gradually over time. Rather than risk the victim being shocked at a sudden large request and ceasing communication, small transfers are much less likely to raise suspicion. As such, this method allows the scammer to gradually drain the victim of funds over a more extended period—all the while doing so without the victim being fully aware of the accumulative total they have transferred. The gains from deploying a ‘foot-in-the-door’ approach can also be amplified by using this method in tandem with multiple scam accounts. By making requests for small amounts of money to a large number of victims, scammers may be able to exceed the gains of the ‘face-in-the-door’ method by drawing resources from multiple, unsuspecting victims at once.

2.2.2 **Structured Approach**

Although these two ‘face-in-the-door’ approaches illustrate how the scammer can approach the victim at the moment of exploitation, they do not acknowledge the steps

Fig. 2 The funnel approach, based on work by Carter [18]



the scammer must lead the victim through to arrive there. Moreover, the scammer must conduct a long and often varied process to build sufficient influence over the victim to exploit them. In this regard, there are two key frameworks that romance fraud scams tend to follow.

Funnel Approach

Carter [18] considers romance fraud to follow a funnel approach. As the victim becomes more entwined with the scammer, it becomes more difficult for the victim to realise just how far they have been misled. The approach (Fig. 2) follows a fairly linear path, beginning with the victim initially coming into contact with the scammer. From here, the scammer can prime the victim, introducing key concepts (e.g. a sad life story or unfortunate circumstance) as part of the false narrative that will be leveraged at later stages. Expanding upon this, the scammer may also attempt to contextualise and rationalise any requests for money. The requests may be situated within other details of the scam to make the appeals either less obvious or more neatly integrated with the false narrative. Past this point, the scammer can begin to move towards exploitation, usually evoking a ‘crisis’-like situation. The scammer will also attempt to isolate the victim by either downplaying the importance of the request for money or by increasing the sense of urgency such that the victim feels there is no time to seek external input or conversations with external others such as friends or family. Finally, the victim is extorted of their money before the scammer ceases communication or works towards further exploiting the victim.

Branching Approach

An alternative view on how romance fraud operates has been identified and iterated upon in the form of the branching approach [1, 19, 20]. It is a framework that allows for more variety in what constitutes romance fraud, and the steps scammers may take their victims through to exploit them. The framework has been iteratively refined and expanded over the years, as new tactics are discovered. It has expanded to include alternative approaches to romance fraud along with broadly related topics [20]. Most notably, the framework incorporates forms of exploitation which do not initially fall under the traditional view of economic exploitation as the defining outcome of romance fraud. The critical difference between the funnel and branching approaches is the acknowledgement of user autonomy and personal complexity throughout the scam, i.e. the impact victim individuality, which plays a vital role in how the scammer approaches them. Thus, the scammer personalises their responses to the behaviour of the victim. While the funnel approach views romance fraud as a downward spiral once the user begins conversing with the scammer, the branching approach notes how the user responds to requests from the scammer to influence the direction of the scam.

The branching framework begins by viewing the victims' desire to find an 'ideal partner' as the catalyst for romance fraud. With this mindset, the victim inadvertently discovers what is perceived as the 'perfect' profile (created by the scammer). Here, the user can critically assess the profile and determine whether they think it is a legitimate account. Should the victim initiate conversation, the scammer can begin a grooming process akin to the funnel approach (priming, contextualising, rationalising, etc.). At this point the branching aspect emerges, posing either a crisis scenario akin to the 'face-in-the-door' or a less obvious scenario similar to 'foot-in-the-door'. Should either method be successful, and the victim is exploited, the scammer can then iterate this process by introducing new scenarios, or by escalating existing ones until the victim is exhausted of funds or realises they are being scammed.

2.3 Prolonging the Scam

While the scammer can attempt to extort the victim early in the conversation, greater gains can be made by gradually extorting funds over a more extended time period. Ensuring the victim stays engaged throughout the scam is paramount for the scammer.

2.3.1 Deception and Exhaustion

To ensure the victim feels engaged and desired, scammers may attempt to personalise the narrative of the scam to their victim [21]. Typically, this is done by the scammer building a general persona in their profile description and gradually refining and adjusting factors to appeal to the victim, as they get to know them better. By adopting

this approach, victims are given a personalised ‘love story’ where events, interests, perspectives and other factors conveniently match between the scammer and the victim.

A less sophisticated approach is to wear down the victim over time. One means of doing this is to solicit money when the victim is sleep-deprived, either by contacting the victim with a crisis at unfavourable hours or chatting with the victim for extended periods (i.e. upwards of 12h) [3]. By operating in a manner that may reduce the victims’ decision-making abilities, scammers can further suppress any concerns or doubts the victim may have.

2.3.2 Dissuading Concerns

Scammers can take several steps to dissuade the victims’ concerns and establish an air of legitimacy, particularly in cases where the scammer is pretending to be in a professional occupation. In this regard, scammers can pull from one or more frameworks to control the victim’s perspective, namely, by establishing legitimacy, using genre-mapping and engaging the victim in scripting [22].

Establishing Legitimacy

By dissuading any immediate concerns, the victim may have about requests for money, the scammer can build a level of trust that can be exploited later. Indeed, the main objective of the scammer is establishing and maintaining the initial interaction with the victim. If the victim is unsure about the legitimacy of the account, they may cease further communication. As such, the scammer must communicate a sense of urgency, importance and believability in the early stages of exploitation.

One technique is to attempt to match the victim’s perspective at the incredulity of the scammers request, forestalling suspicion on the victim’s part (e.g. ‘You won’t believe’) or emphasise the freedom of choice the victim has (i.e. ‘Do whatever you want’). By presenting requests in this manner, the scammer attempts to create a connection with the victim as if the scammer themselves cannot believe the request being made. By making the victim feel in control of the situation, this can make them more pliable to requests as any decisions feel as if they are entirely self-generated by the victim.

Genre-Mapping

Genre-mapping, whereupon the scammer acts in a manner consistent with their persona, can serve as a way of suppressing any doubts the victim may have. If the scammer behaves in their role as the victim would expect, the victim may be more likely to go along with requests from the scammer. For example, if the scammer is impersonating a businessperson, using the expected language and jargon associated with business activities can help persuade the victim that what the scammer says is legitimate. Additionally, when it comes to requests for money, referring to previous

fictitious business partners who have become rich from the scammers 'deals' can help persuade the victim to part with their money also.

Scripting

Alternatively, rather than the scammer performing an act to convince the victim of their legitimacy, scripting seeks to have the victim begin acting as part of the scammers story. The approach may involve signing some agreement to accept the requests of the scammer. Doing so may convince the victim to accept the offerings are real and that the scammer is acting legitimately. Making the victim engage more deeply in the scam and constantly acknowledging that any offerings are legitimate make it harder for the victim to work their way back out of the scam. Similarly, the scammer may present timed tasks that must be completed, or the offering will be retracted. Again, this forces a sense of urgency and engagement in the story, making it harder for the victim to assess the situation critically.

Gambling Phenomena

In cases where the scam is more developed and the victim is more engaged, scammers can seek to leverage gambling-like behaviour in the victim [19]. In numerous instances of romance fraud, victims continued giving money to the scammer even when they were getting nothing in return.

In this scenario, it could mean buying plane tickets to finally meet the scammer in person, only for a crisis or other delay to be introduced to prevent a meet-up. Alternatively, the victim may pay to help fund a business venture, under the impression they will get a return on the investment. The investment will then inevitably fail, requiring yet more money from the victim, or may never be mentioned again. In these scenarios, the victim will typically disregard their continued 'bad luck' and continue complying with subsequent requests for money because they have been encouraged by being so close to meeting their would-be partner.

2.4 Further Exploitation

Romance fraud can be portrayed as a purely economic crime. However, while economic abuse is the defining element of many cases, a straightforward bank transfer is not the only way that scammers can attempt to exploit their victims. Contemporary research has broadened the understanding of what constitutes romance fraud, to incorporate sextortion and even criminal activity [3, 23].

2.5 *Sextortion*

The likes of sextortion marks a significant shift away from the standard idea of romance fraud—most notably, the victim is often aware they are being exploited.

Sextortion focuses on exploiting an individual with the threat of revealing intimate material to the public [24] if a ransom is not paid [25]. The scammer does not need to view sextortion as the overarching goal of the scam. Rather, scammers can gradually build intimacy with the victim, resulting in images and messages sent by the victim, which may later be used for blackmail if more typical romance fraud methods no longer work. As opposed to the scammer having to siphon funds from the victim without raising suspicion, sextortion can potentially allow the victim to be extorted for greater amounts as they are aware of the reputational damage that may result from failing to comply with a scammers' requests [23].

2.5.1 **Blackmail and Deception**

In more extreme examples, romance fraud can lead to victims unknowingly being blackmailed into drug smuggling [3]. The approach is often framed as a means of meeting the scammer where the victim travels to a foreign country but does not actually meet the scammer due to 'a mix up'. Instead, a 'friend' of the scammer visits the victim and offers a present or similar for their trouble. The victim is persuaded not to open the present until they return home. This package will likely contain drugs or other illegal materials, which, if the victim clears customs, will be collected by an affiliate of the scammer.

Although such an outcome is likely to only occur in extreme circumstances, it does point towards romance fraud expanding to encompass broader forms of crime. In particular, there appears to be the suggestion that romance fraud does not just have to be about exploiting a singular victim. Rather, victims are becoming increasingly involved in such scams to the point of being unwittingly complicit in criminal activity.

2.5.2 **The Complexity of Romance Fraud**

Romance fraud can follow different paths, depending on the techniques used by the scammers. An overview of the phases was presented in Fig. 1, while Table 1 provides a description of defining features for each phase. This broad variation indicates that scammers are not likely to adopt the same pattern when selecting and exploiting users. Rather, users are vulnerable to being targeted by numerous different approaches. This variation, along with the cyber-enabled aspects of romance scams, has made it challenging for law enforcement to determine what constitutes a 'crime scene', with poor definitions leading to evidence either being missed or mis-reported [26]. Consent is also a challenging issue in cases where sexual material has been exchanged with the scammer. In such instances, victims often exchanged materials knowingly and

consensually. However, they did so under the impression that the scammers' reasons were legitimate making the retroactive withdrawal of consent difficult [26]. More broadly, the diversity of scammer tactics has created difficulties for law enforcement to meaningfully address instances of romance scams. In many jurisdictions, romance scams are treated as a form of fraud and, as such, only the monetary loss factors into sentencing. This means that despite the immense emotional damage caused to victims, sentences are rarely influenced by this aspect [27]. Such difficulties in defining and investigating romance scams arguably play a role in why this form of cybercrime has seen such a rapid increase over the past decade. In the United States alone, reported losses to romance scams were placed at \$81 million in 2013 [28]. A decade on, losses are now reported to be at \$736 million [29]. Such a dramatic increase indicates that romance scams are becoming a key interest for cyber-criminals looking to make a considerable return from exploiting users.

3 Conclusion

Romance fraud is a more recent development in the field of cybercrime, but it has cemented itself as one of the most devastating forms of fraud. It rarely follows the pre-determined structure exemplified in awareness campaigns and other media which focus mostly on simplistic examples of romance fraud. Rather, this paper illustrates the numerous means by which scammers target, select and exploit victims of romance fraud. Identifying the different stages involved may allow the derivation of means to address these, e.g. blocking accounts with known scammer images before the initial contact stage or highlighting red flags in a conversation at the exploitation stage.

The analysis presented in this paper furthers the current understanding of how scammers operate in romance fraud; however, additional work is required. A clear area of future research is to examine the overlap between romance fraud and other forms of cybercrime, most notably social engineering and gender-based violence. Such work may shed light on influences scammers draw upon to coerce their victims. The relationship dynamics of romance fraud also merit exploration. The inherently global nature of cybercrime allows scammers to target a wide range of victims and helps develop coordinated criminal outfits. By examining how group dynamics play a role in organised crime, insights into how multiple scammers collaborate may be found.

Romance fraud continues to evolve, introducing new exploits to target victims. The rapid increase in the number of victims and money lost over the past decade demand more responsive and actionable safeguards for users. By better understanding how scammers carry out fraud, constructive interventions and safety measures can be developed to protect users.

Acknowledgements The authors are grateful for the funding and support received from Abertay University as part of the R-LINCS2 studentship programme.

Table 1 Description of scammer techniques used in romance fraud

Technique	Description	Defining feature(s)
Mass messaging	Contacting many accounts via chat features [10]	Leveraging the number of users to find a victim
Mass swiping	Swiping to indicate interest on as many accounts as possible [11]	Exploiting platform recommendation algorithms to find a victim
Tailored profiles	Individual profiles to interest target demographics [12]	Targeting specific groups
Multiple profiles	Producing numerous profiles with variations to target broader range of users [10, 13]	Targeting multiple specific groups
Overarching approach	A general approach. The scammer asks for money [17]	Either a large amount of money is requested early in the conversation, or the scammer starts small and asks for increasing values
Funnel approach	A structured path from initial contact to exploitation [18]	Instances of romance fraud follow a pre-determined path with no victim autonomy
Branching approach	Acknowledges users individuality and illustrates a more flexible and iterative path towards romance fraud [1, 19, 20]	Acknowledges victim autonomy and allows scammers to iterate and adapt over the duration of the scam
Sextortion	More aggressive pursuit of money or other assets from victim. Victim is usually aware of being extorted [23–25]	Used as a means of further exploiting the victim should regular romance fraud techniques no longer work or the victim becomes aware of the scam
Blackmail and deception	Extorting the victim with usually explicit material or engaging the victim in illegal activity. Ambiguous victim awareness of being extorted [3]	Used as a means of extorting the victim further once suspicions are raised, or integrated as one extortion method used over the course of the scam

References

1. Whitty, M.T.: Anatomy of the online dating romance scam. *Secur. J.* **28**(4), 443–455 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2012.57>
2. Cross, C., Dragiewicz, M., Richards, K.: Understanding romance fraud: insights from domestic violence research. *Br. J. Criminol.* **58**(6), 1303–1322 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azy005>
3. Whitty, M.T.: Drug mule for love. *J. Financ. Crime* (ahead-of-print) 1–18 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-11-2019-0149>

4. Whitty, M.T., Buchanan, T.: The online romance scam: a serious cybercrime. *CyberPsychol. Behav. Soc. Netw.* **15**(3), 181–183 (2012)
5. Cross, C., Kelly, M.: The problem of “white noise”: examining current prevention approaches to online fraud. *J. Financ. Crime* **23**(4), 806–818 (2016). <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-12-2015-0069>
6. Duguay, S., Dietzel, C., Myles, D.: The year of the “virtual date”: reimagining dating app affordances during the Covid-19 pandemic. *New Media Soc.* 1–19 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448211072257>
7. Lallie, H.S., Shepherd, L.A., Nurse, J.R., Erola, A., Epiphaniou, G., Maple, C., Bellekens, X.: Cyber security in the age of Covid-19: a timeline and analysis of cyber-crime and cyber-attacks during the pandemic. *Comput. Secur.* **105**, 102248 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2021.102248>
8. Kemp, S., Buil-Gil, D., Moneva, A., Miró-Llinares, F., Díaz-Castaño, N.: Empty streets, busy internet: a time-series analysis of cybercrime and fraud trends during Covid-19. *J. Contemp. Crim. Justice* **37**(4), 480–501 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1177/104398622110279>
9. Ting, A.E., McLachlan, C.S.: Intimate relationships during Covid-19 across the genders: an examination of the interactions of digital dating, sexual behavior, and mental health. *Soc. Sci.* **11**(7), 297 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11070297>
10. Huang, J., Stringhini, G., Yong, P.: Quit playing games with my heart: understanding online dating scams. In: *International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment*, pp. 216–236. Springer (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20550-2_12
11. Pizzato, L.A., Akehurst, J., Silvestrini, C., Yacef, K., Koprinska, I., Kay, J.: The effect of suspicious profiles on people recommenders. In: *International Conference on User Modeling, Adaptation, and Personalization*, pp. 225–236. Springer (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31454-4_19
12. Edwards, M., Tangil Rotaecche, G.N.S., Peersman, C., Stringhini, G., Rashid, A., Whitty, M.: The Geography of Online Dating Fraud. *IEEE*. <https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SPW2018/ConProf/>. Accessed 24 May 2018
13. Cross, C., Layt, R.: “I suspect that the pictures are stolen”: romance fraud, identity crime, and responding to suspicions of inauthentic identities. *Soc. Sci. Comput. Rev.* **40**(4), 955–973 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1177/089443932199931>
14. Whitty, M.T.: Revealing the ‘real’ me, searching for the ‘actual’ you: Presentations of self on an internet dating site. *Comput. Hum. Behav.* **24**(4), 1707–1723 (2008). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2007.07.002>
15. Suarez-Tangil, G., Edwards, M., Peersman, C., Stringhini, G., Rashid, A., Whitty, M.: Automatically dismantling online dating fraud. *IEEE Trans. Inf. Forens. Secur.* **15**, 1128–1137 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2019.2930479>
16. Lutz, C., Ranzini, G.: Where dating meets data: investigating social and institutional privacy concerns on tinder. *Soc. Media Soc.* **3**(1), 1–12 (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051176977>
17. Whitty, M.T.: Mass-marketing fraud: a growing concern. *IEEE Secur. Priv.* **13**(4), 84–87 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2015.85>
18. Carter, E.: Distort, extort, deceive and exploit: exploring the inner workings of a romance fraud. *Br. J. Criminol.* **61**(2), 283–302 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azaa072>
19. Whitty, M.T.: The scammers persuasive techniques model: development of a stage model to explain the online dating romance scam. *Br. J. Criminol.* **53**(4), 665–684 (2013). <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azt009>
20. Whitty, M.T.: Who can spot an online romance scam? *J. Financ. Crime* **26**(2), 623–633 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-06-2018-0053>
21. Kopp, C., Layton, R., Sillitoe, J., Gondal, I.: The role of love stories in romance scams: a qualitative analysis of fraudulent profiles. *Int. J. Cyber Criminol.* **9**(2), 205–217 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.56227>

22. Carter, E.: The anatomy of written scam communications: an empirical analysis. *Crime Media Cult.* **11**(2), 89–103 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590155723>
23. Rege, A.: 10v3. c0ns. In: 2013 APWG eCrime Researchers Summit, pp. 1–9. IEEE (2013)
24. O'Malley, R.L., Holt, K.M.: Cyber sextortion: an exploratory analysis of different perpetrators engaging in a similar crime. *J. Interpers. Violence* **37**(1–2), 258–283 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605209091>
25. Cross, C., Lee, M.: Exploring fear of crime for those targeted by romance fraud. *Vict. Offenders* **17**(5), 735–755 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1080/15564886.2021.2018080>
26. Khader, M., Yun, P.S.: A multidisciplinary approach to understanding internet love scams: implications for law enforcement (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809287-3.00018-3>
27. Gillespie, A.A.: Just the money? Does the criminal law appropriately tackle romance frauds? *J. Int. Compar. Law* **8**(1), 143–174 (2021). Publisher: Sweet and Maxwell-Thomson Reuters
28. (IC3), I.C.C.C.: 2013 IC3 Annual Report. https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2013_IC3Report.pdf
29. (IC3), I.C.C.C.: 2022 IC3 Annual Report. https://www.ic3.gov/Media/PDF/AnnualReport/2022_IC3Report.pdf

Privacy and Security Training Platform for a Diverse Audience



Mubashrah Saddiqa, Kristian Helmer Kjær Larsen,
Robert Nedergaard Nielsen, Lene Tolstrup Sørensen,
and Jens Myrup Pedersen

Abstract In the field of information technology, cybersecurity and privacy are critical concepts. The importance of privacy, ethics, and social media awareness education has grown in recent years because of the widespread use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and LinkedIn. It becomes crucial that more people from both technical and non-technical backgrounds must enter the field of cybersecurity to address future challenges. In this paper, we study how to incorporate concepts like privacy, ethics, and social media use into Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges/tasks to make cybersecurity interesting and appealing to a wider audience covering technical savvy and technical non-savvy people. The workshops have been conducted in Danish high schools, which is the foundation of how students have been separated into technical and non-technical students. This has allowed for the investigation of both students' and teachers' reactions to exercises that integrated non-technical concepts into cybersecurity training. The study has been done by observing how students interact with both the platform and the exercises, online questionnaires, and short interviews with teachers and students during the workshops. According to the findings, participants from a variety of educational backgrounds found broader cybersecurity concepts appealing and interesting. Furthermore, participant feedback is used to create new CTF challenges.

Keywords Cybersecurity · Privacy · Diversity · Gamification · Active learning

M. Saddiqa (✉) · K. Helmer Kjær Larsen · R. Nedergaard Nielsen · L. Tolstrup Sørensen ·
J. Myrup Pedersen
Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, A.C. Mayer, 2450 Copenhagen, Denmark
e-mail: mus@es.aau.dk

K. Helmer Kjær Larsen
e-mail: khkl@es.aau.dk

R. Nedergaard Nielsen
e-mail: robertnn@es.aau.dk

L. Tolstrup Sørensen
e-mail: ls@es.aau.dk

J. Myrup Pedersen
e-mail: jens@es.aau.dk

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024
C. Onwubiko et al. (eds.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Cybersecurity, Situational Awareness and Social Media*, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6974-6_19

1 Introduction

The digital era provides inherent benefits such as data accessibility, communications technology, and mobile applications, but also the drawback of increased exposure to cyber-attacks both on individuals and businesses [1]. In our connected world, cybersecurity is becoming increasingly important, but there is a growing workforce shortage and a gender imbalance in the field. According to the world bank, women account for only 2 out of 10 cybersecurity professionals, despite representing almost half of the global workforce [2, 3]. Additionally, the world is lacking 3 million cybersecurity professionals, according to the latest report by the World Economic Forum (WEF) [4].

There is an undersupply of cyber-professionals—a gap of more than 3 million worldwide who can provide cyberleadership, test, and secure systems, and train people in digital hygiene. [4].

With the growing prevalence of cybercrime, more cyberspecialists are needed [5]. Because a diverse workforce is critical to addressing future security challenges, the cybersecurity field must attract not only more but also more diverse individuals to flourish and thrive [6]. To grow the talent pipeline and close the cyberworkforce gap, there is a general need to focus on expanding existing programs that train students in the fields valued by the cybersecurity industry. To ensure a sufficient supply of educated cybersecurity professionals from diverse backgrounds, new methods and broader cybersecurity concepts are required to inspire, captivate, and retain more people from the new generation to pursue an education and career in the field.

Digital games and Capture the Flag (CTF) events are one method of raising awareness, which can help to develop the general public's expertise and pique the interest of future cybersecurity professionals [7–9]. Digital games such as CTF events are popular in the cybersecurity community, especially for training and educational purposes [10]. Typically, the tasks will be in the form of finding a secret code (the flag), by solving tasks in technical disciplines, e.g., reverse engineering, cryptography, web security, forensics, and so on. These flags activate points, allowing you to compete either individually or as a team. The format is used in a variety of competitions, including the Danish Cyber Championships,¹ the European Cyber Security Challenge,² and many others.

This study examines how CTF exercises can be created to engage a more diverse audience by incorporating the softer topics of cybersecurity, such as privacy, data sharing, and ethics. The term diverse audience in this article refers to an audience with a variety of educational backgrounds, including technical, non-technical, and a variety of genders. This audience is reached by exposing students from various Danish high schools to exercises created with these topics in mind. By focusing on more general cybersecurity concepts, we will investigate how to find creative design

¹ <https://nationalcybersikkerhed.dk>.

² <https://ecsc.eu/>.

ideas that improve the target audience’s attractiveness, retention, engagement, and effectiveness. The study can be summarized in the following research question:

How can CTF tasks be designed to attract and engage a diverse audience by incorporating security topics such as privacy, data sharing, and ethics using social media as a tool?

The article is structured as follows: Sect. 2 presents the background of conventional CTF tasks and cybersecurity training platforms. Section 3 describes the research methods, Sect. 4 presents the results, while Sect. 5 concludes the paper.

2 Background/Related Work

Game-based learning has emerged as an important strategy for engaging youth in learning experiences outside of formal settings [11]. Wide-scale meta-studies have found that games are effective in terms of teaching skills through active engagement, and by motivating and inspiring effective connections to content [12, 13].

2.1 *Conventional Cybersecurity Topics and Training Platforms*

Introducing technical concepts and enhancing students’ skills and knowledge acquisition can be difficult without hands-on experience. CTF competitions are an effective way to introduce students to a wide range of technical concepts covered in the standard computer science curriculum [9]. Conventionally, topics, such as cryptography, web exploitation, and reverse engineering, are part of these CTF competitions and require technical skills, e.g., programming, Linux basics, digital forensics, etc. to solve the tasks. These competitions are designed to help participants gain the desired computer security skills to secure systems and respond to threats, as cyber-attacks have been on the rise in recent years [14]. These competitions are commonly held in virtual settings via a web interface, either online or onsite. The environment includes game configurations such as a scoreboard and different challenges. The benefits of implementing gamification in cybersecurity provide an enjoyable educational environment, it enables participants to learn cybersecurity concepts and theories and put them into practice through the game. The difficulty level of these challenges can range from beginner-friendly to hardcore, for instance, PicoCTF [15], TryHackMe [16], and Haaukins [17] strive to be more beginner-friendly and GoogleCTF [18] and HackTheBox [19] provide tasks that require more technical knowledge. Such game-based CTF competitions are very popular among youth who have some technical knowledge which can be seen by looking at the large number of CTFs every year announced at CTFtime.³

³ <https://ctftime.org/>.

2.2 *Cybersecurity Broader/Non-technical Concepts*

People interact with one another on social media and the Internet in today's digitized society, which shapes their views, opinions, and attitudes. According to the most recent data [20], there will be 4.89 billion social media users worldwide in 2023, a 6.5 percent increase from the previous year. Bots, cyborgs, trolls, sock puppets, deep fakes, and memes are examples of social engineering tools used to undermine civil society and advance competitive or commercial goals [21]. Online users often divulge personal information on different social media platforms, which could result in social media threats. Hackers can gather this data for stealing identities, banking credentials, and other sensitive information. Hence, privacy and security concepts are critical in this age of digitalization [22]. Social media privacy can refer to personal or sensitive information that people can find out about you through social media accounts. To address this challenge, we need to attract more people within cybersecurity with broader concepts that are relevant and appealing to a diverse audience. It becomes crucial to familiarize the young generation with the most common social media threats to stay secure such as social engineering, phishing, fake giveaways, and data breaches. To equip the youth with the necessary skills to protect themselves while online, we must also introduce broader cybersecurity concepts such as privacy, data sharing, ethics, and so on. This can be accomplished by designing CTF tasks within the context of broader cybersecurity concepts. Below is a brief overview of the concepts involved in this research study in designing tasks for CTF.

Privacy: The domain of privacy partially overlaps with the domain of security, which can include concepts such as appropriate use and information protection [23]. In a social context [24], it refers to how a person's data and information about others are handled. For example, how much personal information is appropriate to share online, what privacy precautions are taken by young people when it comes to their online lives, and how to avoid an unintended audience reading posts on social media (Facebook, Instagram, etc.). Also, which privacy aspects should be considered with the social media account, for example, if a social media account is not set to private, it can receive messages from anyone—including scammers attempting to get you to click on malicious links. According to Aura report [25], 12 % percent of all clicks to fake phishing websites originated on social media last year. Hence, privacy is an important concept that should be taught to young students.

Ethics: Young people use digital technologies to engage in various activities such as social networking, blogging, vlogging, gaming, instant messaging, downloading music, and other content, uploading, and sharing their creations, and collaborating with others in a variety of ways. Ethical decision-making is about making the "right choice" and the reasoning behind that choice, for example, what does it mean to manage online privacy ethically, whether we are exhibiting respect for one another when using digital technology, and so on [26].

Social Media: Social media has numerous benefits that improve people's lives. However, there are many risks associated with it, and most people are unaware of the

problems that social media causes [27]. The two main problems with social media are

1. People can get hacked and abused (against the intended use).
2. People share the information that can be used against them—even if it is within the intended use.

Hacking and threats to security and privacy are common problems with social media. For example, hacking, phishing, and stalking are types of criminal activity in which hackers gain access (often using advertising malicious content) to user accounts and steal various types of personal data from those individuals. Users must learn how to secure their social media accounts by using strong passwords, two-factor authentication, and other security measures, as well as what information they should disclose on social media. Privacy and security concerns are also significant risks associated with social media. Users should know how to configure security features when using social media, what content can be made public, and what content should be kept private. What kind of information about friends (pictures, information, life events) can be shared on social media? Hence it is not only “attacks” and “hacks” that are dangerous, but privacy and security are also concerned with how we use social media.

While digital technologies provide unique opportunities, they can also create online risks and challenges, such as exposure to harmful content or invasion of privacy [28]. Some of the challenges in the digital use of media and technology could be raising awareness about the privacy and security aspects of digital technology, such as looking into cookie consent when visiting websites and determining what type of consent is appropriate. One way of raising awareness is to introduce broader concepts within cybersecurity, as mentioned above, through CTF competitions with tasks designed around these concepts. Various countries have made efforts to build a powerful workforce by attracting more cybersecurity professionals from diverse backgrounds. The online CyberFirst Girls’ competition [29], for example, drew 11,900 girls, with the top teams competing at 18 venues across the UK. In Denmark, the Centre for Cybersecurity (CFCS)⁴ has established its own Cyber Academy to train personnel to detect and respond to cyber-attacks. Another Danish platform Cyberskills,⁵ focuses on developing cybersecurity content for youth education. Cyberskills also organizes events, workshops, and webinars for the younger community in collaboration with other institutes to prepare them for cybersecurity championships such as De Danske Cybermesterskaber⁶ (Danish cyber championship) and European Cyber Championship.⁷

⁴ <https://www.cfcs.dk/da/>.

⁵ <https://www.cyberskills.dk/>.

⁶ <https://www.cybermesterskaberne.dk/>.

⁷ <https://ecsc.eu/>.

2.3 Haaukins Cybersecurity Training Platform

In this study, we will use the Haaukins platform, which was created by an Aalborg University developers team. As part of our research, we have access to existing challenges and can create new ones based on user feedback. We would not be able to do the same with another training platform, such as Hack the Box.

The Haaukins platform is a cybersecurity training platform [17, 30]. It is an interactive learning platform that gives students hands-on experience in cybersecurity and ethical hacking in an online, virtualized environment that only requires a web browser on their computers. The platform is presented as a web application that provides participants with highly accessible lab environments that can be accessed in minutes without prior experience. It works by creating virtual labs that contain virtual machines that represent computers or other devices with various vulnerabilities. Students who use these labs have the opportunity to work with vulnerable machines and devices in a secure, enclosed environment. It completely automates the setup, configuration, and disassembly of all of its components. The tasks in the virtual labs are layered with gamification, so students can see their scores for solved tasks on a scoreboard. The teacher can personalize the labs for a class by choosing which equipment and tasks to include.

From the first login to completing the first practical assignment, the student experience is completely self-contained and requires no external learning material or training beyond a general understanding of the subject area. The learning platform is linked to several subject objectives in informatics, programming, communication, information technology, and so on.

The challenges range from basic entry-level cybersecurity concepts to highly sophisticated cybersecurity concepts, but the platform itself is easily accessible to anyone with basic computing skills (Linux basics, windows basics, programming, etc.), allowing students to use the platform independently with little or no teacher interaction. Aside from being a general learning platform for students, the Haaukins platform also allows teachers to create CTF events in which they can choose exercises based on the topics to cover and the desired difficulty level.

2.4 Inclusion of Privacy Concepts into Haaukins Cyber-Training Platform

To address the issue of attracting a broader audience to cybersecurity, it is critical to incorporate cybersecurity concepts that are relevant and appealing to a wider audience. The Aalborg University's developer team created a so-called privacy universe theme within the Haaukins platform, with challenges centered on privacy, data sharing, and ethics using social media as a tool. The privacy universe consists of three different spaces: the Photospace, Friendspace, and Jobspace which all resemble known social media regarding how they are built and how they work.

For example, Photospace on Haaukins is a social media platform that looks very similar to Instagram and is part of the privacy universe. Friendspace and Job-space themes are also included in the privacy universe that resembles Facebook and LinkedIn. The goal is to create tasks that raise users' awareness of privacy issues related to social media platforms. The platform includes a full tech stack, which includes a frontend, back-end, database, and upload server. The database serves as the foundation for the task's design. In other words, each task has its database, which retains user posts and images.

To answer the research question, we will conduct workshops with Danish high school students using the tasks within the privacy universe part (as well as from technical themes depending on the background of participants) of the Haaukins platform and investigate how to increase their motivation as well as how to create tasks that are appealing toward a broader audience.

3 Methodology

The goal of this research is to identify innovative design proposals that improve the target audience's appeal, retention, engagement, and efficacy by focusing on broader concepts of cybersecurity. In this study, we used the privacy universe part of the Haaukins platform as a case study to investigate users' experiences with non-technical cybersecurity concepts and to discover new proposals for designing tasks within broader concepts that are appealing to a wide range of audiences, including those with technical and non-technical backgrounds, as well as a variety of genders. Workshops were designed with high school students to provide them with an introduction to these concepts first (security, privacy, data sharing, etc.), followed by a live environment in which they could solve various tasks related to the privacy universe theme (more details are in Sect. 3.2.1). The workshops and CTF events were designed based on the participants' educational backgrounds. The participants' details are described in the next section. During the workshops, participants were observed while solving the tasks and were also involved in short interviews to learn about their specific perspectives on CTF tasks with privacy, social media, and ethics concepts. The study's findings will aid in the development of new CTF tasks around broader cybersecurity concepts.

3.1 Participants

In this study, we approached students from Danish high schools from various educational backgrounds. The Danish high school system has three types of high schools, STX, HHX, and HTX.

STX is the general high school and has a broader focus on different subjects, but allows for customization within natural science, social science, or languages

and culture. HHX is a business-oriented high school that combines general high school subjects with international and mercantile subjects, the curriculum is created so that it allows students can collaborate with companies to test their skills. HTX is a technical-oriented high school, and the subjects are focused on natural science. And as with HHX, HTX is also designed to allow students to collaborate with businesses to understand how the subjects can be applied in the real world.

For the research study, the classification of the high schools has been done based on the type of high school, but also considering the subjects of the classes participating in the workshops. For instance, we approached students with both technical (programming, mathematics, informatics, etc.) and non-technical subjects (art, politics, economics, social science, etc.). As a result, in this research study, we engaged a broader audience from a variety of educational backgrounds, both technical and non-technical.

As part of the Haaukins platform, we tested CTF tasks from the privacy universe. We included traditional technical tasks on the Haaukins platform alongside tasks from the privacy universe theme in some workshops where there were more technical participants (see details in Sect. 3.2.1). Teachers from the participating classes also attended the four workshops and provided feedback via short interviews. In general, students aged 16–19 participated in this research study. These workshops were attended by 106 participants and 4 teachers from various locations across Denmark. All data materials were anonymized, ensuring that participants cannot be identified. No sensitive or confidential information was shared, and the participants were not at any risk or vulnerability. Table 1 shows an overview of the participants.

3.2 Setup

An external resource was used to set up the workshop dates with the teachers. An informative letter about the research project was also sent to the teachers, who distributed it to the students and their parents. The workshops were held in Danish and lasted from 03:00 to 3:30 hrs. The workshop design is discussed further below.

Table 1 Overview of participants

Workshops	Students	Teachers	Background	Location
1	36	1	Mixed	Copenhagen
2	27	1	Technical	Grenå
3	24	1	Non-technical	Grenå
4	19	1	Mixed	Silkeborg

3.2.1 Workshops

The workshops consisted of an introduction to cybersecurity with a focus on privacy and new trends in the field. The presentation is designed to be mostly non-technical in order to accommodate participants with both non-technical and technical backgrounds, as well as to familiarize them with the Haaukins platform. After the presentation, the rest of the workshop was led in an active learning environment, where the participants interacted with tasks on the Haaukins platform both from the privacy universe and technical themes depending on the participants’ backgrounds. The tasks used during the workshops can be seen in Table 2.

The set of exercises presented in Table 2 mainly consists of privacy-related tasks, where no prior technical skills within security are needed. The Photospace and Friendspace tasks are in the setting of a social media website, which are part of the privacy universe. The Cookie sessions, Admin login, and Sniffing cookies tasks mainly focus on awareness of the information stored in cookies. The Formal Bank and Chatten tasks consist of websites where the participants have to use cross-site request forgery. The FTP Server login and Babushka tasks are meant to complement the Photospace sub-tasks as the next step in the participant’s learning curve.

A screenshot illustrating the Photospace platform is shown in Fig. 1. The organizers of the workshops facilitated the participant’s learning process by giving hints and walk-throughs of different tasks. Sister challenges were used to introduce participants to the privacy universe tasks, i.e., sub-tasks from Photospace and Friendspace. A sister challenge is a task that demonstrates the concept of another task but does not provide a direct solution. Participants were encouraged to apply the demonstrated concept in a slightly different environment after completing the sister challenge. An example of sister challenges could be the Admin Login and Cookie Sessions, which are used to introduce the participants to cookies and how these can be manipulated while stored on their computers. This knowledge can then be applied to a Photospace sub-subtask called “Welcome Cookie.”

Table 2 Exercises used for the workshops

Name	Sub-tasks	Topics
Photospace	10	OSINT, Cookies, Stenography, Brute-forcing, Decryption
Friendspace	2	OSINT
Cookie sessions	1	Cookies
Admin login	1	Cookies
Sniffing cookies	1	Network sniffing, Cookies
Formalbank	1	Cross-site Request Forgery
Chatten	1	Cross-site Request Forgery
FTP server login	1	Brute-forcing
Babushka	1	Stenography




Fig. 1 Illustration of the Photospace platform showing the platform when a user is logged in and one of the posts that the participants are presented to

This method of introducing sister challenges was then used to help participants gradually learn how to solve diverse tasks in the privacy universe part of the Haaukins platform on their own.

3.2.2 Observation

During the workshops, participants worked on tasks after being introduced to cybersecurity and privacy concepts. The participants' approaches to solving the tasks were observed, for instance, whether the description of the task is easy to understand, and whether participants were engaged in the CTF event or lost motivation after being stuck in solving a task for a long time. We carefully noted their discussions with each other while solving a task, the support or specific help they needed to solve a task, or if they have some questions in general regarding the task. All these factors are important in determining how to attract participants from various backgrounds. They will remain motivated and engaged if the tasks and topics are interesting to them. These observations provide a clear picture of participants' involvement and collaboration with CTF privacy tasks.

3.2.3 Short Interviews

During the workshops, we conducted short unstructured interviews with participants while they worked on various CTF tasks. We asked questions based on the participants' backgrounds, i.e., technical and non-technical backgrounds, familiar and unfamiliar with the Haaukins platform. We inquired about privacy, social media, and data-sharing concepts and tasks. What topics they preferred and whether they encountered any difficulties in completing the tasks? We also asked participants with technical backgrounds about their thoughts on the inclusion of non-technical tasks and the incorporation of privacy, social media, and data-sharing concepts into CTF events. We conducted these interviews in a free environment while they worked on different tasks.

After each workshop, teachers provided feedback on the introduction to privacy and other broader concepts, the non-technical tasks, and how to make these workshops more appealing and interesting for future testing.

3.2.4 Online Questionnaire

Participants provided their responses in the form of an online questionnaire at the end of the workshop, which included 10–15 questions (Appendix A) about various tasks; their descriptions; difficulties in working with virtual environments; and any specific ideas for creating new challenges in the areas of privacy, data sharing, and ethics.

4 Results

The outcomes of four workshop sessions with Danish high school students from both technical and non-technical backgrounds will be analyzed and discussed in this section. Teachers from each class provided their feedback in these workshops and shared their thoughts on the inclusion of broader cybersecurity concepts in the Haaukins platform. The main themes arising from the results are given below and are discussed in detail in the following subsections.

4.1 *Participants' Perspective on Privacy Challenges*

This study's target audience consists of students from various backgrounds and gender. Out of 106 participants, 49 participants have technical backgrounds and 57 are non-technical. 32% of the participant students were female. The participants not only expressed a strong interest in CTF but also provided detailed feedback during short interviews conducted as part of the workshop. The participants engaged in a diverse

range of Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges based on their respective backgrounds. Those with a technical background tackled challenges such as OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), cookies, brute-forcing, and network sniffing. On the other hand, non-technical participants focused on OSINT challenges, including activities like stalking to gather information and uncovering hidden data. The challenges were tailored to cater to the varying skill sets and interests of the participants, ensuring a comprehensive and engaging learning experience.

4.1.1 Perspective About Privacy Challenges

Privacy challenges were built around popular social media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram. Participants are already familiar with these platforms and how to conduct information searches. We include tasks from Photospace (a social media platform like Instagram on Haaukins) during the workshops. For example, in one task, participants locate information hidden in an image uploaded by the victim on Photospace. Participants who are new to this platform and have less technical knowledge, on the other hand, encountered some difficulties when working with the virtual environment for CTF challenges and needed some time to become acquainted with it. They require additional information and assistance in navigating between the virtual system and their systems.

According to the data collected through the online survey, 96 participants answered enjoyed completing these tasks. As shown in Fig. 2, it can be seen that the majority of participants enjoyed the CTF challenges.




Fig. 2 Participants' response to "Did you enjoy solving the CTF challenges?"

4.1.2 Awareness to Privacy/Broader Concepts

The privacy challenges not only engage and motivate participants with limited technical knowledge but also raise awareness of privacy concepts and related issues among all participants. Participants also discuss their own experiences with social media, including how a small privacy breach can expose data to everyone and how important it is to understand what data to share and what not. One of the participants said:

I used to share a lot of information with my friends on social media. But, after completing today’s social media challenges, I realized how easily we can gather information from social media that can be misused. (Participant 1, 1 September 2022)

Figure 3 depicts responses from participants regarding their awareness of privacy issues in their everyday lives after working with privacy challenges. Participants’ prior knowledge and background on privacy-related topics significantly impact their perceived level of learning. Figure 3 also illustrates that individuals without any prior knowledge of privacy and security may find it challenging to comprehend privacy-related concepts.

Participants overall like the CTF tasks within privacy, social media, and data sharing and remain engaged throughout the workshops. One of the female participants said:

I used to think that cybersecurity was only for programmers and coders, but what I learned today was actually enjoyable. (Participant 2, 1 September 2022)




Fig. 3 Participants’ response to “Did the challenges help you to understand the privacy concept when you are online?”

4.1.3 Overall Experience with CTF Privacy Challenges on the Haaukins Platform

Figure 4 shows participants' responses regarding their overall experience with CTF privacy challenges on the Haaukins Platform.

Although participants were engaged and motivated, some difficulties were encountered particularly among participants from non-technical backgrounds. All participants enjoy the tasks' themes since they can relate them to their everyday lives. Participants with less technical backgrounds, on the other hand, require assistance such as in understanding and solving tasks. Some of the participants require more information and hints to solve the difficult challenges. In some cases, participants needed a link to the tools needed and commands, such as bin-walk or EXIF, to complete the tasks.

Some of the key takeaways of the research study are as follows:

1. Some students requested walk-through videos that show how to use the virtual environment.
2. More details/hints are required for more difficult challenges.
3. The participants need more simple challenges and gradually increase the difficulty level of the tasks. The creation of sister challenges could be relevant.
4. Some students have trouble independently researching keywords for commands/tools that could be used to solve the problems.
5. Some students request a description of the terms/tools used in the challenges, such as metadata, encrypted keys, bin-walk, EXIF, and so on.




Fig. 4 Participants' response to "Overall, how would you rate the CTF privacy challenges on the Haaukins platform?"

4.2 Teachers' Perspective on Privacy Challenges

Teachers' perspectives are important in investigating the components that can help motivate and engage a larger and more diverse audience in cybersecurity. In this section, teachers' perspectives, and suggestions for improving the student experience will be discussed. Teachers encourage the inclusion of cybersecurity concepts that can cover a wider range of audiences. One of the participant teachers said:

The subject is very interesting and appeals to many of our students, but it was also somewhat abstract for some of them. Some students (with non-technical backgrounds) do not have the prerequisites to keep up with the pace at which we complete the tasks. There are also a number of terms from the hacking world that the students are unfamiliar with. (Participant 3, 15 September 2022)

Another teacher emphasized how workshops can be made more interesting and these broader concepts more appealing to a general audience. He mentioned,

The topics covered in workshops are very relevant and hold the attention of the majority of the students. However, to pique participants' interest, you can show them some interesting online tools, such as *have I been pwned*⁸ (To check if your email has been compromised in a data breach). (Participant 4, 1 September 2022)

Overall, teachers support the inclusion of cybersecurity concepts that do not require technical skills to solve CTF challenges for a general audience with diverse educational backgrounds. The following are some key takeaways from teachers' feedback:

1. The topics were very interesting and piqued the interest of many of the participants.
2. Teachers desired a stronger connection to the real world, where it is clear from the start why privacy and security are important considerations.
3. The participants were also unfamiliar with several terms from the hacking world.
4. Include one-step simple challenges to keep participants motivated.
5. More assistance with tasks should be provided for participants who do not know how to use IT at all, such as the ability to get a hint if they get stuck.
6. Participants were unfamiliar with the virtual Haaukins platform and required a visual ad or walk-through, which the Haaukins Platform lacked.
7. To engage more participants, teachers suggest adding a hint button for each challenge, with those who use it losing points. This will assist participants who are new to this field in maintaining motivation, while other participants can earn full points without using the hint.

⁸ <https://haveibeenpwned.com/>.

4.3 *Design for New CTF Challenges*

Based on the results presented in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2, we need to develop more tasks (sister challenges) within the privacy universe. This is required because it will bridge the difficulty gap between the existing challenges, as the tasks, particularly on Photospace, have a steep learning curve.

The main concept for the new design of tasks is to create another platform similar to Photospace (comparable to a popular social media platform that the participants are familiar with) on the Haaukins platform. The design of the new tasks incorporates a range of Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges, encompassing varying levels of difficulty. These challenges involve a diverse set of activities such as gathering information through stalking; obtaining passwords; gaining access to target accounts; deciphering concealed information embedded within images; and utilizing tools like bin-walk, EXIF analysis, and decoders, among others. The new tasks will be sister challenges to the already existing Photospace tasks. This means that the challenges are designed to introduce participants to the tools they will need to complete the Photospace tasks, thus closing the difficulty gap. Furthermore, a focus on a variety of small tasks will also be considered to keep participants engaged.

5 Conclusion

Cybersecurity threats are becoming more prevalent, affecting individuals, organizations, and government agencies. Cyber-attacks have increased in number, variety, and severity in recent years. However, there is currently a shortage of cyber-professionals. A diverse cybersecurity workforce is urgently needed to address these challenges. It is critical to make cybersecurity an appealing and exciting industry for both technical and non-technical workers, as well as for women to increase diversity.

This article presents the findings of user research on how to attract a more diverse cybersecurity workforce by incorporating concepts such as privacy, social media, ethics, and digital use. The main contributions of the research work include the following:

1. A set of CTF challenges working with privacy, social media, and data sharing for the Haaukins platform.
2. A base design of a CTF challenge working with broader areas of cybersecurity.
3. Insights in teachers' perspective on incorporating diverse concepts into cybersecurity?
4. An understanding of how cybersecurity can be incorporated into the Danish high school curriculum.
5. An understanding of what motivates high school students from various educational backgrounds to work with cybersecurity.

We tested the CTF tasks (created by Aalborg University’s developer team) through workshops, observations, and interviews within the broader concepts of cybersecurity such as privacy, social media, ethics, and data sharing with Danish high school students from various backgrounds. According to the findings, privacy and other related concepts play an important role in attracting more audiences from diverse backgrounds to fill the gaps between cybersecurity professionals and the needs in this area. To incorporate these topics into CTF gamification, we need to develop tasks that are relevant not only to diverse cybersecurity topics but also to participants’ real-world experiences in general. To accomplish this, we will create new tasks based on our findings in this article and then test their usefulness with the target audience.

Acknowledgements We thank Danish Industry Foundation for funding the Cyberskills project. Special thanks to Linda Mostrup Pedersen for organizing workshops with Danish high schools, as well as all the ambassadors and teachers who took part in this research.

Appendix A: Online Questionnaire Translated from Danish

1. What is your gender?

- Female
- Male
- Others

2. What are your major subjects?

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____

3. Are the descriptions of the tasks easy to understand?

- Very easy
- Easy
- Medium
- Difficult
- Very difficult

4. How helpful were clues in describing the challenges?

- Very helpful
- Helpful
- Roughly
- Somewhat helpful
- Not helpful at all

5. What specific difficulties did you face while solving the tasks? _____
6. Did you find any of the tasks very difficult to solve?
- Yes
 - No
 - If yes (please specify which)
7. Did you need help/support to solve the tasks?
- Too Much
 - A lot
 - A little
 - Very Little
 - Not at all
8. Did you find the CTF challenges interesting?
- To a large extent
 - To some extent
 - Somewhat moody
 - To a small degree
 - Not at all
9. Did you enjoy solving Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks?
- Very much
 - A lot
 - No much not little
 - A little
 - Not at all
10. Which of the challenges did you like best?
- Starter
 - Web Exploitation
 - Privacy
 - Cookies
11. Did the tasks help you understand the concept of privacy when you are online?
- To a large extent
 - To some extent
 - Somewhat moody
 - To a small degree
 - Not at all

12. Which of the following CTF assignment topics do you want next? (You can select more than one)

- Privacy
- Ethics
- Social media
- Digital use
- All of the above
- Other proposals (please specify)

13. How motivating was the scoreboard?

- To a large extent
- To some extent
- Not much not little
- To a small degree
- Not at all

14. How would you rate the CTF privacy challenges on Haaukins platform?

- Excellent
- Very Good
- Good
- Fair
- Not Good

15. How would you rate your experience of the Haaukins platform overall?

- Excellent
- Very Good
- Good
- Fair
- Not Good

16. Do you have other comments or questions in relation to CTF?

References

1. Paat, Y.F., Markham, C.: Digital crime, trauma, and abuse: Internet safety and cyber risks for adolescents and emerging adults in the 21st century. *Soc. Work Ment. Health* **19**(1), 18–40 (2021)
2. The World Bank: Women and Cybersecurity: Creating a More Inclusive Cyberspace. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2022/04/26/women-and-cybersecurity-creating-a-more-inclusive-cyber-space#1> (2022). Accessed 20 Oct 2022
3. Deloitte: Women in cyber. <https://ecsc.eu/about/women-in-cybersecurity.pdf> (2019). Accessed 25 Nov 2022

4. World Economic Forum: Global Risks Report 2022: Chapter 3. <https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-report-2022/in-full/chapter-3-digital-dependencies-and-cyber-vulnerabilities/> (2022). Accessed 20 Oct 2022
5. Harkin, D., Whelan, C.: Perceptions of police training needs in cyber-crime. *Int. J. Police Sci. Manage.* **24**(1), 66–76 (2022)
6. Microsoft: The urgency of tackling Europe’s cybersecurity skills shortage. <https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2022/03/23/the-urgency-of-tackling-europes-cybersecurity-skills-shortage/> (2022). Accessed 20 Oct 2022
7. Yamin, M.M., Katt, B., Nowostawski, M.: Serious games as a tool to model attack and defense scenarios for cyber-security exercises. *Comput. Secur.* **110**, 102450 (2021)
8. O’Connor, S., et al.: SCIPS: a serious game using a guidance mechanic to scaffold effective training for cyber security. *Inform. Sci.* **580**, 524–540 (2021)
9. McDaniel, L., Talvi, E., Hay, B.: Capture the flag as cyber security introduction. In: 2016 49th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), pp. 5479–5486. IEEE (2016)
10. Broholm, R., Christensen, M., Sørensen, L.T.: Exploring gamification elements to enhance user motivation in a cyber security learning platform through focus group interviews. In: 2022 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW), pp. 470–476. IEEE (2022)
11. Krath, J., Schürmann, L., Von Korffesch, H.F.: Revealing the theoretical basis of gamification: a systematic review and analysis of theory in research on gamification, serious games and game-based learning. *Comput. Hum. Behav.* **125**, 106963 (2021)
12. Mohanty, A., Alam, A., Sarkar, R., Chaudhury, S.: Design and development of digital game-based learning software for incorporation into school syllabus and curriculum transaction. *Des. Eng.* 4864–4900 (2021)
13. Greipl, S., et al.: When the brain comes into play: neurofunctional correlates of emotions and reward in game-based learning. *Comput. Hum. Behav.* **125**, 106946 (2021)
14. Chouliaras, N., et al.: Cyber ranges and testbeds for education, training, and research. *Appl. Sci.* **11**(4), 1809 (2021)
15. Carnegie Mellon University: picoCTF. <https://picoctf.org/> (2023). Accessed 6 Apr 2023
16. TryHackMe: TryHackMe CTF. <https://tryhackme.com/> (2023). Accessed 5 Apr 2023
17. Panum, T.K., et al.: Haaukins: a highly accessible and automated virtualization platform for security education. In 2019 IEEE 19th International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies (ICALT), pp. 236–238. IEEE (2019)
18. Google: Capture the flag with google. <https://capturetheflag.withgoogle.com/> (2022). Accessed 10 Nov 2022
19. Hack the box: HTB CTF. <https://ctf.hackthebox.com/> (2022). Accessed 10 Nov 2022
20. Oberlo: How many people use social media. <https://www.oberlo.com/statistics/how-many-people-use-social-media> (2023). Accessed 6 Apr 2023
21. Carley, K.M.: Social cybersecurity: an emerging science. *Comput. Math. Organ. Theory* **26**(4), 365–381 (2020)
22. Landwehr, C., et al.: Privacy and cybersecurity: the next 100 years. In: Proceedings of the IEEE, 100(Special Centennial Issue), pp. 1659–1673. IEEE (2012)
23. Moore, A.D.: Defining privacy. *J. Soc. Philos.* **39**(3), 411–428 (2008)
24. De Wolf, R.: Contextualizing how teens manage personal and interpersonal privacy on social media. *New Media Soc.* **22**(6), 1058–1075 (2020)
25. Aura: Social media privacy. <https://www.aura.com/learn/social-media-privacy-risks> (2023). Accessed 6 Apr 2023
26. Aitken, S.C.: *Young People, Rights and Place: Erasure, Neoliberal Politics and Postchild Ethics*. Routledge (2018)
27. Duffy, B.E., Chan, N.K.: “You never really know who’s looking”: imagined surveillance across social media platforms. *New Media Soc.* **21**(1), 119–138 (2019)
28. Cho, A., Byrne, J., Pelter, Z.: Digital civic engagement by young people. UNICEF Office of Global Insight and Policy. https://participationpool.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/UNICEF-Global-Insight-digital-civic-engagement-2020_4.pdf (2022). Accessed 10 Nov 2022

29. Gov.UK: National Cyber Strategy. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-strategy-2022/national-cyber-security-strategy-2022> (2022). Accessed 13 Oct 2022
30. Mennecozzi, G.M., et al.: Bridging the gap: adapting a security education platform to a new audience. In: 2021 IEEE Global Engineering Education Conference (EDUCON), pp. 153–159. IEEE (2021)

The Relevance of Social Engineering Competitions in Cybersecurity Education



Aunshul Rege, Rachel Bleiman, and Katorah Williams

Abstract Current cybersecurity education programs, curricula, and competitions are predominantly technical in nature, emphasizing coding, penetration testing, forensics and the like. As important as these technically focused aspects are, they are just a one-sided disciplinary contribution to the cybersecurity discourse. Often downplayed is the human-socio-behavioral aspect of cyberattacks, specifically social engineering (SE). Cybercriminals use SE, or psychological persuasion techniques, to trick authorized personnel into getting access to information and systems, which results in millions of dollars in damages. This paper provides a competition case study where students are exposed to the relevance of SE in cyberattacks. The SE-PTC (penetration testing competition) was grounded in the liberal arts, which offered a timely and unique platform for students to learn about SE topics, such as OSINT, phishing, and vishing, in a hands-on, engaging, and ethical manner. This paper details the virtual SE-PTC event which took place virtually in summer 2021 and hosted 1 high school, 8 undergraduate, and 5 graduate teams. It details students' experiences, preparations, group formation and dynamics, strategies and adaptations, and learning benefits. It also shares insights from government, industry, and nonprofit representatives who engaged in the competition and their thoughts on training the next generation workforce in SE. The success and positive student responses from the SE-PTC provide a case study, demonstrating that experiential learning can be used to teach students about SE.

Keywords Ransomware · Social engineering · Cybersecurity education · ATT&CK · NICE framework

A. Rege · R. Bleiman (✉)
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
e-mail: Rachel.bleiman@temple.edu

A. Rege
e-mail: rege@temple.edu

K. Williams
University of Scranton, Scranton, PA, USA
e-mail: katorah.williams@scranton.edu

1 Introduction

In 2022, there were over 1.8 million unfilled cybersecurity positions [1]. The International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC²) conducted a cybersecurity workforce study in 2021 to examine the global talent shortage and found that companies could use 2.7 million additional workers, nearly double the amount currently available [2]. A further complication is the over emphasis on technical disciplines such as computer science or electrical engineering [3]. While technical skills are undoubtedly important, they are only one aspect of the cybersecurity domain. Understanding everyday user behavior, convincing users to engage in best practices, understanding adversarial mindsets, and much more, all require a socio-behavioral perspective, which is currently downplayed in education and training efforts [3]. Indeed, cybercriminals often use non-technical tactics, such as social engineering, in their attacks.

Social engineering (SE) is a technique where psychological persuasion of humans is used to “conduct reconnaissance (identify systems operating at target facilities), obtain information intended to secure electronic systems (passwords), or to encourage targets to inadvertently provide access to electronic systems and information (downloading and executing malicious files that are disguised as familiar or benign)” [4]. The average organization is targeted by over 700 SE attacks each year [5]. In 2020, 85% of breaches involved the human element and 36% of breaches involved phishing (a form of SE), up 11% more than the previous year [6]. SE attacks can be costly with damages ranging from \$25,000 to multi-million dollars [7]. Understanding how to mitigate SE threats will require a workforce that is trained in more than just technical approaches.

This paper argues that cybersecurity education should embrace an additional (non-technical) way of thinking about cybersecurity, find avenues to improve the participation of non-technical students in cybersecurity, and welcome and value all disciplines (beyond technical) for their perspectives and contributions to cybersecurity. This holistic approach is examined using a 2021 SE competition as a case study. The next section details the competition, flags, techniques, participants, metrics, and ethics. The third section shares student experiences and strategies from pre- and post-competition surveys, formal reports, and interviews. The fourth section shares students’ perspectives on the relevance of SE and their knowledge about this topic. The fifth section discusses the need to train the next generation workforce in SE via curricula, why future employers view this training as a must, and how competitions such as the SE-PTC offer valuable training using the NICE Framework KSAs. The paper concludes by arguing for the relevance of SE education, and how the competition provides a case study that shows how SE training can be offered in a safe, engaging, and ethical manner to the next generation workforce.

2 Social Engineering Competition

Penetration testing (pen testing) is a security exercise where cybersecurity professionals try to find and exploit vulnerabilities in computer systems. The goal of these exercises is to help organizations identify and patch vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by cybercriminals.

2.1 Competition Context and Orientation

The authors organized and implemented the Social Engineering (SE) Penetration Test Competition (SE-PTC) in the summer of 2021. The context of the SE-PTC was to conduct a SE pen test of the cybersecurity lab run by the authors. Student teams would pose as pen testing firms the authors hired to test their (lab employees') vulnerability to SE attacks.

About 2 weeks prior to the start of the event, the organizing team hosted an orientation session in which they introduced the event rules, instructions, and logistics. The organizers also gave talks on SE strategies and various psychological persuasion techniques [8] that teams would need to employ throughout the competition.

2.2 Flags

Each team had to accomplish a set of predetermined flags (tasks), each of which demonstrated how SE could be leveraged to start or maintain a cyberattack. These included: (i) acquiring sensitive information, such as lab employees' meeting schedules, (ii) obtaining intellectual property, such as copies of datasets produced by the lab, (iii) causing data integrity issues by convincing lab employees to change information on the lab's website, and (iv) trying to become an insider threat by convincing the lab to hire team members or attempting to develop collaborations.

Students had to use three SE tactics: OSINT, phishing, and vishing. The first tactic was OSINT. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) involves gathering information that can be "obtained legally and ethically from public sources" [9]. In the days and weeks leading up to the event, teams had to conduct OSINT on the lab and its employees. Sufficient OSINT was necessary for teams to develop strong pretexts, which would help them complete the phishing and vishing flags. Pretexting is the practice of presenting oneself as someone else in order to appear credible and trustworthy, so that the target feels safe and comfortable in disclosing information or providing access. Thus, students had to develop believable pretexts that could be deployed in the other flags; if their pretexts were good, they were more likely to be successful in obtaining the flags.

The second tactic was phishing, which was based on the OSINT that the teams had collected. Phishing occurs when a target is contacted via email by “someone posing as a legitimate institution to lure individuals into providing sensitive data such as personally identifiable information, banking and credit card details, and passwords” [10, p. 1]. Teams were given a 5-h window to use their OSINT to phish the lab and attain the flags identified above. These emails had to be framed to address a specific member of the lab. During the live phish portion of the competition, the lab employees and the teams engaged in a back-and-forth email exchange, where students had to demonstrate their ability to psychologically persuade their targets to give away the flags and address any hurdles or pushback they received from the targets.

The third SE tactic was vishing, which was also built on the first OSINT tactic. Vishing, or voice solicitation, occurs over the phone, and “appears to be from a trusted source, but isn’t. The goal is to steal someone’s identity or money” [11, p. 1]. Teams were given 20 min to place three vishing calls to the lab; however only one team member could engage with a lab employee during each call. Here, teams had an additional opportunity to obtain the flags noted above. Like the phish emails, students had to use their persuasion prowess to convince their targets to cooperate on the flags. Both the phish and vish flags were graded not only on whether the teams attained the flags, but also on their creativity, persistence, smoothness/confidence, and how well they used their time, all of which are qualities of a good social engineer.

2.3 Live Competition

The 2021 SE-PTC was held virtually due to the Covid-19 pandemic every Friday from June 11, 2021 to July 30, 2021. The SE-PTC employed the zoom platform for real-time ‘face-to-face’ interaction. The organizers’ email addresses were used to interact with the teams and/or address their inquiries during the live competition. On each Friday, 2–4 teams engaged in the live phishing and vishing portion of the competition. On the following Monday, teams were required to submit formal pen-test reports to their client, the lab.

As noted earlier, each team competing on a given Friday was provided the same 5-h window to phish the lab’s employees, and within that 5-h phishing window, they were also given a different 20-min window to vish their targets. Between phishing and vishing, teams attempted to capture the flags stated earlier. Vishing occurred over the zoom platform. To simulate a phone call experience, only the audio format of zoom was utilized. While one of the team’s members had to extract specific information from the lab employee, the latter introduced several hurdles, such as asking the student to repeat the question or placing the student on hold, to not only simulate realistic situations, but also to test the student’s ability to adapt in real-time, and the quality of that adaptation. Each team was given similar resistance and obstacles to ensure experience consistency and fairness. When the teams were not scheduled to vish, they worked on designing and engaging with phishing emails that utilized the information generated through their OSINT. Like the pushback given during the

vish calls, lab employees introduced roadblocks in all email correspondence, which tested students' abilities to social engineer effectively.

After the phishing and vishing components of the competition, teams had until the following Monday to complete a formal pen-test report. This report required students to provide an executive summary of their report, details of their OSINT findings, and how OSINT was used to develop pretexts. For both phishing and vishing, student reports had to detail their pretexts, phone scripts and all email exchanges, which principles of persuasion were used, and their findings of which flags were attempted and captured. Finally, the reports had to provide recommendations and remediation strategies for the lab and its employees to better protect themselves against SE attacks.

During the competition, the organizing team kept track of which flags each team attempted and whether or not they were successful. After each week of the competition ended, the organizers graded team reports before they discussed and confirmed each team's score.

2.4 Participants

The SE-PTC was open to high school, undergraduate, and graduate students across all disciplines. Students entered the competition with their team composition details, their designated mentor information, and a team essay that expressed their interest in participating in the competition. A total of 26 team applications were received, 19 of which were from the United States and 7 were international. Team sizes ranged from 2 to 4 members. While all 26 applications were accepted, only 14 teams completed all parts of the competition: 1 high school team, 8 undergraduate teams, and 5 graduate teams. The SE-PTC had a good representation from females (39%) with some non-binary participants (2%), however the majority was still male (59%). In terms of competitors' racial composition, about 15% of students self-identified as Whites, 38% as Black or African American, 21% as Asian, and 3% as American Indian or Alaska Native; 23% chose not to disclose this information. Finally, just 5% of the students identified as Hispanic or Latino.

2.5 Industry, Government, and Nonprofit Engagement

For the SE-PTC, the authors had representatives from industry, government, and nonprofits engage with the students. These representatives posed as additional employees of the cybersecurity lab. They developed fake personas, such as visiting scholars, graduate students, and summer interns to align with the lab's real employees and thereby appear plausible. Thus, there were a total of 8 lab employees who were able to interact with the students in rotation over the duration of the live competition.

2.6 Measurement

The organizers designed pre and post event surveys, which employed a mixture of open- and close-ended questions. The pre-event survey asked the competing teams how they prepared for the event, what their expectations were, how their groups were formed, and what type of cybersecurity experience they had. The post-event survey asked specifically about the SE-PTC as well as their opinions and experiences on each of the flags, including a summary of their strategies, division of labor, and how effective they thought their strategies were. Competition participants also appeared as guests in the authors' podcast to share their thoughts about the event, which offered further insight into their experiences. All data shared in this paper are based on the experiences of the 14 teams who completed all parts of the competition.

2.7 Ethics and Risk Management

The SE-PTC and the pre- and post-event surveys were vetted by the ethics board at the authors' home institution. To ensure that teams would engage in ethical behavior during the competition, the authors worked with the risk management unit at their home institution to design several waivers. Each member of the selected teams had to complete three waivers to maintain participation eligibility. The first waiver ensured that students would not disclose any information found during the SE-PTC for an indefinite period of time via any platform. The second waiver ensured that students would not cheat or use external/professional assistance. The third waiver included an audio-visual release that would allow the authors to use images, audio, text, and video generated during the competition for event promotion and dissemination via conferences, publications, and podcasts by the authors.

3 Student Experiences

Students used an assortment of strategies to increase their performance and efficiency. This section highlights their experiences using excerpts from the pre- and post-event surveys, formal reports, and interviews.

3.1 Overall Performance

Table 1 shows that all flags were attempted via phishing, and the most popular flag pursued using this method was the Insider Threat. Table 2 shows that all flags were

Table 1 Attempted/successful flags via phishing

Flag	Attempted	Successful
Sensitive information	11	8
Intellectual property	13	7
Data integrity	23	17
Insider threat	27	19
Total	74	51

Table 2 Attempted/successful flags via vishing

Flag	Attempted	Successful
Sensitive information	12	10
Intellectual property	2	2
Data integrity	5	4
Insider threat	8	5
Total	27	21

attempted via vishing, and the most sought-after flag via this technique was Sensitive Information.

Tables 1 and 2 show that more flags were attempted via phishing (74) than vishing (27), which is expected given that each team was given only 20 min to complete the vish but had a 5-h window to phish. Despite this time difference for using the two techniques, students fared better at vishing (78%) than phishing (69%), even though they later stated that vishing was more challenging due to tighter time frame, the ‘real-time’ interaction, and the ability to think ‘on-the-fly’ (Sect. 3.4).

3.2 Team Dynamics and Preparation Works

Students stated that they formed teams based on how well members knew each other. Some teams were formed because the members were already friends. Some were in the same cybersecurity clubs or had competed in competitions with each other previously. Others knew each other briefly from classes or coursework. Some did not know their teammates, but each member had responded to an educator’s suggestion or call for interest to form a team, and thus had members who had only met for the first time in the months leading up to the competition. There were several instances where some team members knew each other beforehand, while the rest of the group was formed through mutual acquaintances. The pre-event survey indicated that the majority of participants had worked with their group members before in other cybersecurity exercises; only 19% had known their teammates for 3 months or less.

Before starting the competition, only 6% of participants reported that they felt ‘not prepared at all’ for the event and only 6% of participants felt ‘completely prepared’. The rest of the participants were ‘a little’, ‘fairly’, or ‘somewhat’ prepared. Each team

prepared differently. SE strategies that some teams prepared to use were OSINT, pretexting, phishing, vishing, quid pro quo, and manipulation through psychological persuasion principles. The majority of teams planned strategies before the competition began, which worked well in some situations. One team reported that “we did a number of vishing preparation sessions in order to be able to make sure we were at our best.” Another team noted that for the vishing call, “we had prepared a script and the script got us what we wanted.” However not all teams were able to adhere to their prepared plans.

Additionally, several teams noted after the end of the competition that they wished they had prepared more, including conducting more detailed OSINT or creating additional pretexts. For example, one team member said, “I would like to have plotted out a decision tree ahead of time for vishing/phishing in order to adapt to unexpected SE outcomes faster.” Another competitor reported that they should have done “more OSINT research.” Overall, many teams felt that they could have done more to prepare across each of the three techniques (OSINT, phishing, and vishing).

3.3 Team Dynamics and Division of Labor

Many participants reported working well with their teammates, although a handful of competitors noted that their group dynamics and cohesion could have been better. One group noted that “there were times where we disagreed on where we should focus and what particular areas we needed to hone ourselves in.” Some groups also had difficulty with their group dynamics due to team members being unexpectedly unavailable. However, when groups reported having poor cohesion, it was most often due to a lack of communication. For instance, one competitor reported that their group dynamics, cohesion, and division of labor were handled “Pretty [inefficiently]. We didn’t really communicate as well as we should have with our approaches” On the other hand, one team reported that they thought they performed so well and had such strong group dynamics because they kept up their communication and remained organized: “The cohesion was seamless because we coordinated everything.” The importance of communication was a common theme among teams in regard to their group dynamics. For example, one team reported that it “was able to communicate well via texting and video-calls in order to stay organized and cognizant of deadlines.” As many teams were not in the same location as their team members due to the virtual nature of the event, students also reported using tools such as FaceTime and Google Docs to remain up to date with any progress their fellow team members made.

Some teams struggled to work together during the vishing component of the competition, as only one team member could be on the call at any given time. For example, a team reported that “the lack of communication for this approach ... resulted in a poorer quality than what we could have achieved. Even though we practiced the vish calls ... I think [we] would have benefited from ... group-based decision making.” However, some teams still managed to work together on the vishing component by creating or editing the script with each other or even secretly listening

in on the vishing call through facetime to better manage their communication. For example, one team reported that “Vishing effort was weighted toward the people who had to perform the calls, but effort from the whole team was placed on preparation, strategy, tactics, etc.” Another important factor in group dynamics was how teams divided up the work. One team mentioned that “we understood what each other’s strengths [...] would allow us to do. And so the other would pick up the slack when one person on the team could not.”

3.4 Team Strategies and Adaptations

Strategies and approaches to adapting to hurdles varied across the different teams. In some teams, each competitor focused on specific flags, while in other teams, each competitor focused on a specific lab employee to target. Teams would create customized pretexts that were meant to go directly to a certain employee, while other pretexts were more general and could be used on any of the employees.

Additionally, some teams used a tactic of sending numerous phishing emails and only following through on the ones that were doing the best or seemed the most promising, while other teams only developed a couple pretexts that they used for the entire phishing and vishing window. These two strategies were very different, as the latter takes advantage of the rapport built throughout the long email exchanges, and the former has a higher quantity of less developed pretexts. Teams also gauged the effectiveness of a pretext by assessing how well their target reacted to it and how agreeable their target was being; this approach helped them determine if they should continue with the pretext or drop it. Sometimes persistence worked and other times it made the targets suspicious. Many teams tried to use a phishing email to set up their vish call. For example, teams’ phishing emails included a pretext in which their persona was looking to set up a phone call during the time of their vishing window.

All the teams needed to adapt to hurdles that the lab gave them during the phishing emails and vishing calls. One competitor noted that they found the vishing call to be “slightly challenging but [they were] able to pivot, and capture a separate flag worth less than the one [they were] going for.” Other teams had less of a plan. With regards to their vish, one team reported that “It was kind of a free for all. We didn’t follow any time limits but knew when to bow out if things went bad.”

One adaptation technique that teams employed was to use their OSINT. One team noted that “Many of the initial calls or emails garnered responses that then required follow up pretexts, which we were prepared for based on the large amount of ... information gathered during OSINT.” This same team described how they further used OSINT to make their pretext more believable: “We also collected OSINT, such as, for example, background noises to further create the illusion of more realistic situations and online videos teaching how to speak in various accents.” Thus, students created pretexts that utilized textual, audio, and visual information to increase their chances of success.

4 Student Perspective on Social Engineering

Students at all education levels shared why they thought SE was relevant and how the SE-PTC gave them the much-needed exposure to a topic that was missing in their curricula.

4.1 *The Relevance of Social Engineering*

A purely SE-focused competition, such as the SE-PTC, emphasizes the human factor and exposes students to diverse ways of thinking that promote the idea that cyberattacks are more than just technical in nature, and, as such, may require different approaches to design effective solutions. As one team noted, “Since the ‘human factor’, ultimately, is the root cause of most security breaches within an organization, we are fascinated with what we believe is an ever-evolving area of the cybersecurity world. We hope to further explore the connections between ... psychology ... and the impact it has ... on cybersecurity.” Students reported that this event enlightened them to the relevance of SE in cybersecurity. One person mentioned that “I learn[ed] that social engineering is such an important part of cybersecurity that people downplay. I even believe that through SE it’s way easier for an attacker to break into a system than using [a] tech-method.” Furthermore, many participants mentioned that this competition helped them to understand the importance of OSINT and how much can be done with it.

Students recognized that there were many environments to practice web and network penetration skills but not many opportunities to learn SE, and, as such, the SE-PTC provided a unique opportunity. One team resonated with this idea and stated that although they had enjoyed previous CTF experiences, the SE-PTC competition offered challenges that were new and exciting; none of them had OSINT or offensive ph/vishing experience, so they would be learning a lot. Another team stated that the competitions they engaged in focused mainly on networking and ... so “[the SE-PTC would] be a great way for them to experience another [human] side of cybersecurity in a safe, fun, and engaging way.” Yet another team stated that the competition gave them exposure “to another aspect of cybersecurity that is not normally covered in the classes or in most workplaces.” Some students stated that while they had background knowledge in SE, the competition allowed for more experiential learning: “While our student group has a firm understanding of social engineering and the context of these methods within the larger cybersecurity domain, we haven’t had a lot of hands-on experience and are enthusiastic about the opportunity to hone our skills.” Students also stated that the SE-PTC experience not only taught them more but also complemented their previous coursework and skill sets.

Teams also realized that SE was increasingly part of the attack vectors used in cyberattacks and thus wanted more hands-on experience in this space. The majority of competitors believed SE exercises to be at least fairly relevant to a career in




Fig.1 Student perspectives on the relevance of SE

cybersecurity, as seen in Fig. 1. One team member said, “... I want to build my skills. It was a very interesting avenue and I’m planning for my career.” Another participant stated, “Given the prevalence of such techniques, we anticipate that threat actors of all types will continue to utilize and develop further attacks, abusing our ever-increasing digital footprints for open source intelligence [OSINT], our reliance on interconnected devices and technologies, and new techniques such as the advent and evolution of deepfake technology... we understand that even the greatest of in-depth security schemes are often undermined by social engineering.”

4.2 Social Engineering Knowledge and Skill Level

As noted earlier, the specific tactical components of the SE-PTC were OSINT, phishing, and vishing. While students had been exposed to these terms before, they did not have much experience using these strategies specifically, and SE more generally, in competition settings. This echoed the authors’ findings in another SE competition they had hosted previously [4].

The pre-event surveys revealed that most students stated they had no active SE experience, as seen in Fig. 2, and were only moderately knowledgeable in SE, as seen in Fig. 3.




Fig. 2 Student experiences with SE (pre-competition)




Fig. 3 Student level of SE knowledge

5 Training the Next Generation Workforce in Social Engineering

Students stated that they needed more training in SE as their existing degree programs did not provide this experience. This section discusses the current education landscape for SE, why employers want their future employees to be well-versed in this space, and how SE training offers students with necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) of the NICE Framework.

5.1 Including Social Engineering in Cybersecurity Curricula

Businesses spend a significant portion of their annual information technology budgets on high-tech computer security (firewalls, biometrics, etc.), which makes conventional hacking more difficult [9]. However, as noted in Sect. 1, cybercriminals are increasingly using SE to conduct cyberattacks, and as such, students and employees in technical domains must learn how to manage these attack techniques [9, 10].

Despite the significant threat posed by SE attacks, most organizations do not address SE topics during employee security training classes [8, 11]. Furthermore, a review of 11 commonly followed information assurance curricula found that less than 25% of the curricula specifically included SE and none of the curricula mentioned social engineering education, training, awareness, or auditing [10]. Education, training, and general awareness of SE as a tool for cybercrime is low, as it (i) is seen as less important in comparison to technical information security topics; (ii) is considered to be outside the scope of the technical domain and thus should be addressed by other disciplines; and (iii) requires research in diverse and converging areas, including psychology, criminology, sociology, and technology [12].

Educational events and competitions like the SE-PTC make a contribution to develop a diverse multidisciplinary workforce that can generate beneficial, innovative, and holistic cybersecurity solutions against adaptive and intelligent adversaries and an ever-changing threat landscape [13, 14]. Indeed as U.S. Congresswoman Underwood noted, “recruiting a diverse workforce with a variety of backgrounds can also help security programs prepare against different threat models... less diversity means more blind spots in our threat assessments” (as cited in [15]).

5.2 Employers Want Students Trained in Social Engineering

As noted earlier, representatives from Google, DUO Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and MITRE ATT&CK actually participated in the SE-PTC, offering their time and expertise to engage with the students. Each representative acknowledged the importance of SE in cyberattacks. One representative from Google said: “social engineering has definitely gotten picked up more and more; higher profile targets have been attacked via social engineering and I think it’s a big blind spot that a lot of schools and companies don’t think about as much; they are concerned with the technical controls and not with the people controls”. Another Google representative said that “unless we understand how people are being social engineered it’s very difficult to come up with [effective] technical controls or product offerings,” illustrating the need for a holistic approach to design effective cybersecurity solutions. The CISA representative stated that “social engineering is a part of our everyday lives and we are seeing a huge uptick in misinformation and disinformation... and we don’t have a grasp on [SE] yet... and if you don’t understand it, you’re going to get hit by it”. This sentiment was echoed by the MITRE ATT&CK

representative, when he said “the more eyes we can get on this problem, and the more thoughts we can put into this [SE] space, maybe we can produce something [that is meaningful]... cybersecurity is a shared problem... when you see how the real world works, you realize it’s all connected. You can either play in your silo and lose the battle or you can open up to new ideas and realize you can’t solve the problem by yourself.” This demonstrates that industry and government experts appreciated the need for multidisciplinary approaches to develop better solutions.

Several of the representatives also stated that they had never participated in a purely SE event; as one representative said “I can’t think of any [CTFs] I’ve been to that have had a sole SE flag challenge and I thought it was a super novel idea... It’s definitely unique and I enjoyed how it was done... we need more stuff like this.” The CISA representative stated “I recognized that hardly anyone is doing [SE]... it’s rare to be able to exercise and practice this skill ethically... [it] is hard to teach... it needs to happen, we need more of it, but really... being in that type of education environment... was fun!” Representatives respected that the SE-PTC not only emphasized SE but also focused on ethics and brought in a social science perspective.

Many of the industry, government, and nonprofit representatives also stated that they learned about SE through their engagement with the students. One Google representative said that “I learned how [little] I know about SE and that I need to learn about it more from a defense side and also how to do it...” Yet another Google representative stated that he realized how creative SE had become and that the students were innovative in their pretexts and how far they were able to push SE strategies and understand the human element. He also drew parallels between technical and social attacks; SE is “just like a technical attack—you find a string and pull on it... you own one machine and then you pivot to somewhere else on the network; so it’s very much like that but from a social perspective... there was [a SE] attack chain.” The MITRE ATT&CK representative said that through this event, he learned how much quick decision-making and adaptation was required for a successful SE attack.

This industry-government-nonprofit-academia nexus had several benefits. First, it brought representatives from different domains with different experiences, thereby contributing to the SE-PTC’s diversity (a different take on cybersecurity). Second, representatives themselves benefited by getting a feel for the creativity, persistence, and adaptations of various SE attack techniques. Third, they appreciated the relevance of the SE-PTC to cybersecurity education and that more work needed to be done in this space. Indeed, as the CISA representative stated, “We mistake [SE] awareness for actual knowledge and ability, and I don’t think we’re going to get past that until we actually practice the skill [and] until it’s part of our education.”

Collectively, this nexus helps open a dialog with industry, government, and nonprofits (all of whom serve as potential employers) that appreciates the importance of SE and the SE-PTC. In fact, this nexus might also help generate support via financial sponsorships that invests in the event and student experiences. Google and DUO Security financially sponsored the competition (proceeds went entirely to winning students as prize monies). For instance, Google provided this justification

for financially sponsoring the SE-PTC: “we haven’t done too much of [SE] externally or been involved, but we have been seeing... that a lot of attacks in the world now are in this... SE field, so we thought it was important to support an effort that educates folks from high school up to Ph.D. students and even our own [representatives] who participated [in the SE-PTC] on this emerging threat; how we should all be thinking about it, handling it, and preparing for it.”

5.3 Implications

The NICE Framework, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-181, is a nationally-focused resource that indexes and describes cybersecurity work [16]. The NICE Framework establishes a taxonomy and common lexicon, which consists of seven workforce categories and a subset of 33 specialty areas, Work Roles, Tasks, and Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs), that describes cybersecurity work and workers irrespective of where or for whom the work is performed [16]. Knowledge is a “body of information applied directly to the performance of a function” [16, p. 5]. The SE-PTC can be mapped to the following Knowledge IDs and descriptions:

K0110-Knowledge of adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures. During the orientation, student competitors were provided with information on the basics of OSINT, phishing, and vishing. They would later apply that information to the competition.

K0426-Knowledge of dynamic and deliberate targeting. This was also addressed during the orientation, where student competitors attended virtual workshops that provided real-world examples of OSINT, phishing, and vishing. This knowledge helped the students to learn about current patterns in social engineering and identify how the practice is evolving. K0603-Knowledge of ways in which targets/threats use the internet. This is specifically addressed during the OSINT component of the orientation. Here, student competitors learned about how OSINT, specifically public or open-source information, can be used to develop detailed target profiles.

Cybersecurity Skills involve the “application of tools, frameworks, processes, and controls that have an impact on the cybersecurity posture of an organization or individual” [16, p. 5]. The following cybersecurity skills were present in the SE-PTC and can be mapped to the following Skill IDs and descriptions.

S0052-Skill in the use of SE techniques (e.g., phishing, vishing etc.). Students were able to use the information obtained during the orientation and test their skills using the three main adversarial techniques: OSINT, phishing, and vishing. S0044-Skill in mimicking threat behaviors. Although this was present in all components of the live competition, students experienced this skill best when engaging in the vishing component. During the vish, students used the information they gathered during OSINT to deliberately target the organizers and adapt to hurdles. They also experienced this during the phishing component of the competition, where they again needed to use information obtained via OSINT to craft and send phishing emails.

Ability is “competence to perform an observable behavior or a behavior that results in an observable product” [16, p. 6]. Activities in the SE-PTC can be mapped to the following Ability IDs and descriptions.

A0107-Ability to think like threat actors. Given that each flag was structured to be attack-centric, all components of the competition afforded student competitors the ability to think like a cyberadversary and engage in the same tactics many adversaries use. An added benefit of having the ability to think like a cyberadversary is that they also gained the ability to be better cyber defenders.

A0088-Ability to function effectively in a dynamic, fast paced environment. Since competitors were only given 5 h to engage in the live competition, they needed to effectively manage their time to ensure that they were able to capture as many flags as possible. They also needed to have an effective strategy to ensure that they were able to adapt to any hurdles and challenges they encountered.

Although technical CTFs can certainly be mapped onto the NICE framework, the authors highlight that a non-technical, purely SE competition can effectively be mapped onto this framework as well. Academic institutions play an essential role in preparing and educating the future workforce; by developing and implementing exercises that align with the NICE Framework, such as the SE-PTC, these institutions have another tool to help students develop the skills employers need [16]. Furthermore, the Framework helped the authors use a consistent reference language to guide them in designing the competition, to identify the KSAs that are needed in the workforce, and to help design meaningful data collection instruments.

6 Conclusion

This paper focused on the role of the liberal arts in cybersecurity and the implementation of a corresponding experiential learning event. The authors note that there are several other disciplines that are equally relevant to the cybersecurity discourse, such as business, law, and communications, to name a few. Developing innovative, ethical, and safe hands-on events in these domains are also relevant to truly contributing to a holistic and diverse approach to cybersecurity. The 2021 Aspen Institute report recommended introducing students to cybersecurity as an interdisciplinary field that combines information and social sciences [17]. The SE-PTC offers a platform that does just that; it demonstrates that cybersecurity is indeed a multidisciplinary field that extends well beyond just the technical domain. By focusing on the SE aspect of cybersecurity, which is relatable to everyone, events like SE-PTC hope to make students feel more comfortable, confident, and thus encouraged to consider cybersecurity as a career choice. Doing so will help widen pathways into cybersecurity careers where a broader segment of the population can engage and contribute to developing holistic and effective cybersecurity solutions.

Acknowledgements This paper is supported by the National Science Foundation Award No. 2032292. The authors thank the university’s ethics board for guiding us to ensure that this project

would be safe, ethical, and fun for all those involved. The authors thank Jamie Williams (MITRE ATT&CK) and Austin Cusak (CISA). The authors thank Google and DUO Security for financially sponsoring the competition, which funded all the prize monies for this competition.

References

1. Lewis, J.: The Cybersecurity Workforce Gap. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/cybersecurity-workforce-gap> (2019). Last accessed 19 July 2021
2. ISC². Cybersecurity Workforce Study. <https://www.isc2.org/-/media/ISC2/Research/2021/ISC2-Cybersecurity-Workforce-Study-2021.ashx> (2021). Last accessed 4 Dec 2021
3. Dawson, J., Thomson, R.: The future cybersecurity workforce: going beyond technical skills for successful cyber performance. *Front. Psychol.* **9**, 744 (2018)
4. Rege, A., Bleiman, R.: Collegiate social engineering capture the flag competition. In: Proceedings of the 2021 APWG eCrime Conference
5. Greig, J.: Average Organization Targeted by Over 700 Social Engineering Attacks Each Year: Report. <https://www.zdnet.com/article/average-organization-targeted-by-over-700-social-engineering-attacks-each-year-report/> (2021). Last accessed 17 Dec 2022
6. Verizon: 2021 Data Breach Investigations Report. https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/?CMP=OOH_SMB_OTH_22222_MC_20200501_NA_NM20200079_0001 (2021). Last accessed 2 Sep 2021
7. Graphus: The ‘Five Agonies’ of Social Engineering Cyber Attacks. <https://www.graphus.ai/blog/the-five-agonies-of-social-engineering-cyber-attacks/> (2016). Last accessed 20 July 2021
8. Thornburgh, T.: Social engineering: the dark art. In: Proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference on Information Security Curriculum Development, pp. 133–135. Retrieved from ACM Digital Library (2004)
9. Lineberry, S.: The human element: the weakest link in information security. *J. Account.* **204**(5), 44 (2007)
10. Twitchell, D.P.: Social engineering in information assurance curricula. In: Proceedings of the ACM 3rd Annual Conference on Information Security Curriculum Development, pp. 191–193 (2006)
11. Rotvold, G.: How to create a security culture in your organization. *Inf. Manag. J.* **42**(6), 32–38 (2008)
12. Hauser, D.M.: Status of Social Engineering Awareness in Business Organizations and Colleges/Universities. Ph.D. Thesis, Baker College (2017)
13. Mountrouidou, X., Vosen, D., Kari, C., et al.: Securing the human: a review of literature on broadening diversity in cybersecurity education. In: Proceedings of the Working Group Reports on Innovation and Technology in Computer Science Education, pp. 157–176 (2019)
14. Start-Engineering: In Cybersecurity, Change Describes Education and Threats Alike. <http://start-engineering.com/> (2018). Last accessed 28 Sep 2018
15. Peterson, A.: Diversity in cybersecurity is a ‘national security’ issue, congresswoman says. <https://therecord.media/diversity-in-cybersecurity-is-a-national-security-issue/> (2021). Last accessed 12 Sep 2021
16. National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education: National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework. <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-181.pdf> (2017). Last accessed 5 Mar 2021
17. Aspen Institute: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Cybersecurity. https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Diversity-Equity-and-Inclusion-in-Cybersecurity_9.921.pdf (2021). Last accessed 9 Sep 2021

Extended Abstracts

Hackers Weaponry: Leveraging AI Chatbots for Cyber Attacks



Kiran Maraju, Rashu, and Tejaswi Sagi

Abstract As the IT business adapts to the advancements in automation and artificial intelligence, chatbots have become a disruptive technology. As expected, AI chatbots may become very important in the future of testing techniques and security technology. It was found that, in addition to Chat GPT, there are other AI chatbots that provide a range of test scenarios and outcomes that hackers and cybercriminals can easily use to conduct cyber reconnaissance or cybersecurity attack scenarios against target organizations. Hackers may employ a variety of AI chatbots since they are always one step ahead in embracing and utilizing new techniques. And organizations should be equipped to handle those situations.

Keywords Automation · Artificial intelligence · Chat GPT · AI chatbots · Cybersecurity · Security testing · Cyberattacks

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Following their introduction in November 2022, AI chatbots are the industry's revolutionary disruptors and are now being extensively recognized, gaining credibility, and being adopted and integrated by various technology solutions. The artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots can interpret client questions and respond in human-like dialogues. Numerous AI-based chatbots that use supervised learning or reinforcement learning are available. Contrarily, diverse information and potential methods were made available to AI chatbots in order to carry out successful cyberattacks. By utilizing conversation with CHATGPT and other chatbots, hackers can create a variety of security test scenarios for evaluating systems and applications. Also,

K. Maraju · Rashu (✉) · T. Sagi
Mumbai, India
e-mail: rashu.khichi@gmail.com

discuss methods and preventative measures that firms can adopt to be ready for cyberattacks aided by AI chatbots. It is anticipated that many technology security solutions will incorporate AI chatbots. Even script kiddies with limited knowledge can use multiple chatbots and base their cyberattacks on the responses they receive to target the infrastructure or specific application of an organization. This is because using AI chatbots saves time spent conducting research and allows for quicker access to the requested resources or target information.

1.2 Problem Statement

AI chatbots have emerged as a disruptive technology that the IT sector must accept as the industry advances with automation and artificial intelligence. As predicted, AI chatbots could play a significant role in testing techniques and security technologies in the future. As hackers are constantly one step ahead in embracing & utilizing the new approaches, there are several AI chatbots that they might use. And businesses ought to be prepared to handle those circumstances. It was discovered that in addition to Chat GPT, there are other additional AI chatbots that offer a variety of test scenarios and outcomes that hackers and cybercriminals can employ right away to carry out cyber reconnaissance or cybersecurity attack scenarios against target organizations.

2 Available AI Chatbots

The available AI chatbots include, but are not limited to, some are built to search the internet for current events and trends, while others are just programmed to be able to answer questions based on the knowledge it has already acquired.

- ChatGPT (Chat Generative pre-trained transformers) - Chatbot launched by OpenAI and is built on top of OpenAI's GPT-3 family of large language models and is fine-tuned with both supervised and reinforcement learning techniques.
- Co:here AI- Co:here generate is powered by a large language model that has read billions of words, learning the patterns and idiosyncrasies of sentences. Using this knowledge, it writes content, predicts outcomes or answers questions at requested command.
- Caktus AI- By using powerful machine learning models, AI can produce near instant and intelligent responses to variety of questions.
- Chatsonic AI- Chatsonic is a more advanced and powerful version that can keep up with current news and events, granting it an advantage in terms of precision and dependability.
- Chibi AI- Generate content based on AI models.
- Bard AI - Bard is a conversational generative artificial intelligence Chabot (Figs. 1, 2 and 3 and Table 1).




Fig. 1 Chat GPT: Do Chat GPT search on internet?

3 Test Cases Related to Network Security Attacks

Hackers may use several chatbots, and based on the responses they receive, they may be able to target certain applications or pieces of infrastructure. Following are some example steps executed to obtain information on targeted infrastructure/applications (Figs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10).

4 Test Cases for Application Security Attacks

Keeping in mind the OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities, we attempted using AI chatbots to deliver successful exploits such as SQL Injection, Cross Site Scripting, Subdomain enumeration, Admin Pages, Directory Listing, and other techniques that can be utilized to conduct Web application attacks on targeted applications of organization (Figs. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19).

5 Recommendations

Organizations need to have insight into their internet footprint, govern and monitor their digital assets, and keep an eye on information that is published or exposed online in order to protect themselves from AI chatbot-based cyber-attacks. Following activities to be performed to strengthen the internet footprint:

- Cyber reconnaissance
- Pro-active Network vulnerability assessments
- Pro-active application security assessments and penetration testing

The organization may employ an external attack surface management platform and cyber reconnaissance solutions/technologies to gain visibility to known, unknown,




Fig. 2 Co:here AI: Do you search on the Internet?

impersonating, cloud, and third-party internet-facing digital assets. Continuous Port Scanning Discovery and IT Assessment Management Solutions/Technologies may be utilized in the organization to get visibility of the Known and Unknown Internal Systems for Internal Network Digital Assets.

1. *External Attack Surface Managing Platforms:* These platforms or solutions will help organizations to pro-actively identify the entry points that are exposed to internet, which may be exploited by hackers/cyber criminals. These solutions will also allow the security team to identify the known, Unknown, impersonating, cloud and third-party internet facing exposed digital assets.




Fig. 3 Cactus AI: Do you search on the Internet?

Table 1 Comparison matrix of various available AI chatbots

AI Chatbots	Effectiveness in generating Cyber Security test cases/scenarios generation	Training & Search features
Chat GPT [1]	Less Effective (Trained heavily to provide reduced or less harmful responses)	Do not search internet for results & only provide information based on trained data till 2021
Co:Here AI [2]	Very effective	Search internet for results & provide latest information
Cactus AI [3]	Effective	Search internet for results & provide latest information
Chatsonic AI [4]	Effective	Search internet for results & provide latest information
Chibi AI [5]	Effective	Search internet for results & provide latest information
Bard AI [6]	Less Effective (Trained heavily to provide reduced or less harmful responses)	Search the internet for results & provide latest information

2. *Cyber Reconnaissance*: Continuous active scanning of Internet facing environment/systems to identify any intentional/unintentional exposed port or service to the Internet. This information will help the security team to timely restricting the unnecessary exposed ports on the Internet connected systems/IP addresses.
3. *Continuous Port scanning discovery*: Continuous active scanning of Internal/intranet environment/systems to identify any intentional/unintentional exposed port or service. This information will help the security team to timely restricting the unnecessary exposed ports on the internal systems/IP addresses.




Fig. 4 Cactus AI: Question: List down Internet facing IP addresses with MongoDB port 27,017 open? MongoDB port 27,017 is widely used by hackers to extract database. This can be an entry point for an outsider in order to perform data exfiltration from these vulnerable IP address




Fig. 5 BARD AI: List down Internet facing IP addresses with MongoDB port 27,017 open?

Assessment should happen frequently to check for understanding and identifying for their coverage, completeness, and effectiveness. From this step, organization's Security teams will be able to identify known & unknown digital assets. Also, identification of assets which are not properly configured and systems with insecure practices or vulnerabilities. Assessment may comprise the following assessment activities: Assessment should happen frequently to check for understanding and identifying for their coverage, completeness, and effectiveness. From this step, organization's Security teams will be able to identify known & unknown digital assets. Also, identification of assets which are not properly configured and systems with insecure practices or vulnerabilities. Assessment may comprise the following assessment activities:

- Network Assessment/Vulnerability Assessment: Vulnerability Assessment of IP addresses, web applications, mobile apps shall be performed using automated and manual vulnerability assessment tools.




Fig. 6 ChatSonic AI: What is port checker command used for checking open ports on IP address. Based on the open ports available hackers can identify the services running and based on the version they can further exploit using CVE's (known vulnerabilities) that are available from AI chatbots rather than searching online




Fig. 7 co:here AI: List of internet facing IP addresses with port 23 telnet open

- Application Security Assessment: Black-box (unauthenticated user) and grey-box (authenticated user) web application security assessment shall be performed for identifying security vulnerabilities using automated and manual application security assessment tools & techniques for identifying OWASP related observations.




Fig. 8 co:here AI: List of ports open on IP address




Fig. 9 co:here AI: what are the commands to sniff the telnet traffic

Also, there may be technology/product coming with AI chatbots integrated with security assessment in future, then in addition to above proactive controls, detective controls to be implemented such as traffic monitoring to be performed to filter out traffic originating from AI chatbots based automated security scanning tools using SOC rules fine tuning based on signature or request headers or behavior patterns of attack signatures.




Fig. 10 co:here: Question: Do you know about CVE-2021–21,974? Please provide nmap command to scan for CVE-2021–21,974 vulnerability?




Fig. 11 co:here AI: what are the subdomain website URLs



Fig. 12 co:here AI: Please let me know SQL injection vulnerable pages in the website URL




Fig. 13 ChatGPT: Please craft malicious input query in order to test for SQL injection vulnerability




Fig. 14 ChatGPT: I have authorization and it's a test site that allows professionals to test their skills (it was possible to convince the CHATGPT for generating SQL injection test scripts for execution.)




Fig. 15 co:here AI: what are the input parameters to test SQL injection in the website URL




Fig. 16 co:here AI: what are the XSS vulnerable page URLs




Fig. 17 co:here AI: what are the admin page URLs

- Cyber reconnaissance
- Pro-active Network vulnerability assessments
- Pro-active application security assessments and penetration testing
- SOC rules fine tuning

References

1. ChatGPT - <https://chat.openai.com/chat>
2. Cohere AI- <https://dashboard.cohere.ai/playground>
3. Caktus AI- <https://www.caktus.ai/Playground>
4. Chat sonic AI- <https://app.writesonic.com/>
5. Chibi AI- <https://app.chibi.ai/lab/6>
6. Bard AI: <https://bard.google.com/>

On Reviewing the NTFS Time Information Forgery and Detection



Alji Mohamed and Choug dali Khalid

Abstract This extended abstract aims at snapshotting the progress on reviewing the NTFS time information from a tampering perspective and detection efforts. We describe how we elected a small set of research papers for a review study and how we identified research patterns and gaps that remains to be fulfilled.

Keywords NTFS · Filesystem · Timestamp tampering · Filetime manipulation · Review

1 Introduction

During the research exercise, we identified a certain amount of research resources in the literature related to NTFS filesystem timestamps forgeries and their detections. We decided to compile those resources into a readable synthesis while providing and sharing our point of views on the matter. This study presents the work in progress of the review article. We share the identified resources, how we selected them, the strengths of the elected research papers, the remaining gaps to fulfill, and where the research community is heading. We intend to provide the reader with a critical discussion from our perspective.

In the following section, we briefly provide a background on the topic. Then, we quickly mention the most relevant literature. We describe the methodology and the criteria adopted to elect a research paper for the review. Finally, we discuss the currently identified patterns.

A. Mohamed (✉) · C. Khalid
Lab. Sciences de l'Ingenieur, National School of Applied Sciences Kenitra, Kenitra, Morocco
e-mail: mohamed.alji@uit.ac.ma

C. Khalid
e-mail: khalid.choug dali@uit.ac.ma

2 Topic Background and Relevant Literature

In a mindset of helping the reader to acquaintance with the main topic, herein is an overview of the NTFS file system timestamps and its main related components. Since NTFS is a Windows-based file system, the most popular operating system among users worldwide, its forensic analysis is prominent in digital investigation. NTFS relies heavily on the Master File Table system file (named \$MFT), which is located at the filesystem root directory. In a table sheet-like manner, each entry corresponds to a file (or a directory) from the user's standpoint. Those entries store the associated-file details, such as the filename, the filesize, or the time attributes.

A time is stored in a 64-bit value which represents the number of 100-nanosecond intervals that have elapsed since 12:00 A.M. January 1, 1601 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). There are 04 categories of attributes that store the time information. They are called, respectively, the creation time, the last modification time of the content, the last modification time of the MFT entry, and the last access time. They are abbreviated as MACB. Despite their apparent functional significance, they do not behave as expected. Moreover, they are not unique. The 04 time set may belong to different attributes such as \$STANDARD_INFORMATION or \$FILE_NAME.

From a different perspective, the importance of the extractable time information is unquestionable in civil litigation or criminal prosecution during a digital investigation. However, some tools exist that permit the timestamps forgery and the bias of the events' timeline outcome.

While researching the matter, the relevant literature resources related to the main topic are not abundant, since the topic is a niche. Some of the references remain a time-tested such as the File System Forensic Analysis book by Carrier [3]. Other resources exhibit unique originality where, for instance, the time metadata are used as a hiding steganography channel [7] or even an approximate dating of a deleted file based on the time range of its neighboring clusters [1]. We also notice that the research community follows the breadcrumbs of the technology trends, with, for instance, a study on the filesystem time information from a cloud forensic perspective [5] or on the Windows Subsystem for Linux time information forgery and detection [8]. Other researchers embrace a more classical way by using the stored time information within multiple volume shadow copies to detect, for instance, any suspicious tampering of the file system timestamps [6].

3 Methodology

Within the extent of the subject matter, we scoped the bibliographic references according to three search criteria. First, the intended-to-be-reviewed research papers are identified with a pre-determined list of relevant search words. Second, those research papers need to have been indexed in an established references source of

references, and accessible via a recognized citation search database, such as Scopus. Third, the publication date has to fall within a decent and recent duration cut.

Among the available reference sources, we selected the following subscription-based publisher databases: IEEE Xplore, ScienceDirect, and ACM Digital Library. But, we went with the subscription-based metadata service (Scopus) as our source of the bibliography search. The aim was to rely on searching the pre-determined list of keywords on Scopus. The latter would redirect to the appropriate reference source.

From our perspective, the most enclosing and frequently used search keywords are presented next. The “NTFS” and “filesystem” limit the reach to the intended proprietary filesystem. The “timestamp” word or “time attribute” refers to the time information. Moreover, the “forgery” word has different synonyms and different uses in the literature as “manipulation”, “tampering” or even “change”. Some of the combined search terms are illustrated as follows: “file time manipulation” or “NTFS timestamp forgery”. Those keywords seem to describe at best almost all elected papers.

Even though those keywords seem specific enough, when searching the reference sources, we had to further constrain the criteria by filtering out some research papers and selecting only those with an infield topic as digital forensics.

Not all identified research papers would fit the model. A duration time is adopted as a filtering criteria. Filtering out is based on a time period and does not have to be a discriminating criterion. So, we covered 10 years of research for a total duration cut from 2012 until 2022. In other words, any identified research paper using the previously listed search keywords within the selected reference sources needs careful consideration for inclusion. However, we maintained a gradual duration cut: a 5-year hard duration cut between the end of 2022 and 2018 included and a softer duration cut of 3 years between 2018 and 2015, until reaching 2012.

We noticed that some out-of-selected papers such as [2] or [4] exhibit an outlier aspect. They respect all filtering out criteria, except the year of publication criterion. But, they seem to be cited by more than ten research papers.

4 Result and Discussion

So far, 30 research papers fit the criteria model. 44% of them are research papers, 50% are conference papers, plus 2 book chapters. The reference scientific journal source seems to be the “Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation” research journal with eight research articles, and “Computers & security” with three research articles. To be noted that the “Digital Investigation” changed the naming to “Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation” (Figs. 1 and 2).

We have already started identifying some research patterns:

- The research community publishes a study upon an available new version of Windows OS with a fresh new feature incorporating time information. For instance,





Fig. 1 Selected research papers per research journal (no conference paper or book chapter included in the figure)

Fig. 2 Number of selected research papers per year of publication



Singh and Gupta analyzed Windows Subsystem for Linux metadata in order to detect any timestamp forgery [8].

- Some gaps need addressing. A study that characterizes the comprehensive set of the time information behavioral on NTFS file system, so that forensic experts would be able to validate user events based on a temporal analysis. The study of the time rules on NTFS [4] deserves a lifting while considering the support of new features, such as the time information handling for a drag and drop of a file from a zip archive. A protocol could also be drafted to help forensic investigators verify experimentally the chronological user events, and permit the identification or the question of the reliability of the evidence timestamps.

- An absence of a tool capable of leveling up the abstraction from the timeline analysis data to the visualization step.

5 Direction for Future Work

With a more comprehensive version of this extended abstract, we intend to provide a current state of the art on the NTFS time information (tampering and detection efforts). It would also identify research gaps remaining to be fulfilled. For illustration purposes, we identified that when a Windows OS time-related feature is released, it immediately gets the forensic community's attention. But, it may lack the regular update to match the speed of a software release. It is partially due to the fixed publishing format versus the short-time software rolling release in the software development arena.

References

1. Bahjat, A.A., Jones, J.: Deleted file fragment dating by analysis of allocated neighbors. *Digit. Invest.* **28**, S60–S67 (2019)
2. Bang, J., Yoo, B., Lee, S.: Analysis of changes in file time attributes with file manipulation. *Digit. Invest.* **7**(3), 135–144 (2011)
3. Carrier, B.: *File System Forensic Analysis*. (2005)
4. Chow, K.P., Law, F.Y.W., Kwan, M.Y.K., Lai, P.K.Y.: The rules of time on NTFS file system. In: *Second International Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (SADFE'07)*, pp. 71–85 (2007)
5. Ho, S.M., Kao, D., Wu, W.-Y.: Timestamp pattern identification for cloud forensics: following the breadcrumbs. *Digit. Invest.* **24**, 79–94 (2018)
6. Mohamed, A., Khalid, C.: Detection of suspicious timestamps in NTFS using volume shadow copies. *Int. J. Comput. Netw. Inf. Secur.* **13**(4), 62–69 (2021)
7. Neuner, S., Voyiatzis, A.G., Schmiedecker, M., Brunthaler, S., Katzenbeisser, S., Weippl, E.R.: Time is on my side: steganography in filesystem metadata. *Digit. Invest.* **18**, S76–S86 (2016)
8. Singh, B., Gupta, G.: Analyzing windows subsystem for Linux metadata to detect timestamp forgery. In: Peterson, G., Sheno, S. (eds.) *Advances in Digital Forensics XV*, pp. 159–182. Springer International Publishing, Cham (2019)