Nobuaki Hamaguchi
Danielly Ramos *Editors*

Brazil–Japan Cooperation: From Complementarity to Shared Value

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Preface

At the time of writing this book, we are witnessing the unjustifiable Russian military invasion in Ukraine causing massive destruction and huge losses of lives. It is an additional blow to the world, which has already been suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic for more than two years.

Now more than ever, people in the world share anger, anxiety, fear, and sadness. The widespread sense of learned helplessness invokes the hope for regional and international cooperation. Even before the current crises, we have been challenged by climate change, poverty and inequality, infectious diseases, food security, water resources, population aging, and exacerbating China–US disagreements. However, we are stunned to learn that any practical cooperation is hard to be established. It is still puzzling for researchers to understand why and why not countries cooperate.

Globalization has advanced as technological progress has significantly reduced the costs of moving goods, money, people, and ideas across borders. International relations can be best viewed as a sequence of bilateral relations rather than a hierarchical polar structure under a hegemony, because the links between countries have become direct and intertwined. This transformation motivates scholars to study bilateral relations because each direct link has unique characteristics and differentiated implications for the global network.

In recent decades, studies in the field of International Relations (IR) have focused on identifying and encouraging the use of mechanisms for building trust and understanding between people from different countries with a view to achieving common goals. International Relations have become equally relevant for thinking about measures to reduce and combat social and economic inequalities between different countries around the world, which renders these studies a fundamental role in the construction of a more just, inclusive and peaceful international community.

This book is about the Brazil–Japan bilateral cooperation. The two countries raised the relation to strategic and global partnership in 2014. Since then, efforts have been made to structure bilateral cooperation. As influential powers both regionally and globally, Brazil and Japan can proactively work together to meet the expectation to lead the abovementioned global challenges. We humbly hope this book contributes to policymakers' understanding and stimulates further scholarly works.

In August 2016, being aware of the urgency of strengthening research on Asia, researchers from the University of Brasília (UnB) established the Asia–Latin America Center (Asialac). In the first year of existence, with the vital support of the Embassy of Japan in Brazil, Asialac held at UnB a series of lectures and seminars with Japanese scholars on international trade, international security, regional integration, and Asia–Latin America relations. Topics of mutual research interest among Japanese and Brazilian scholars arose from those events. These interactions led eventually to a joint research project entitled "Partnership for a Change: Toward a Framework of Brazil–Japan Cooperation," as a bilateral program co-funded by Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) and Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) with the project coded as Capes 88887.288857/2018-00 and JPJSBP120190104, respectively. The present book is the result of this joint research. On behalf of the contributors to this volume, we acknowledge the financial support from CAPES and JSPS and the institutional support from UnB and Kobe University.

We express our sincere gratitude to the former ambassador of Japan to Brazil, Ambassador Akira Yamada, for encouraging our work and giving an excellent lecture at the webinar in September 2021. We thank Mr. Hiroyuki Suzuki of the Embassy and his predecessor Mr. Hisayoshi Muto for their support to the Japanese team during their visit to Brazil. We would also like to thank Dr. Akio Hosono of the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development for the helpful suggestions to the project and the comments from participants of the 2021 webinar in September 2021 and the LASA/Asia Congress panel in February 2022. We would like to thank Editage (www.editage.com) for English language editing. Finally, without citing names, we are grateful to colleagues of the research community for sharing their valuable insights.

Kobe, Japan
Brasilia, Brazil
March 2022

Nobuaki Hamaguchi
Danielly Ramos

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Danielly Ramos is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations and director of the Center for Global Studies at the University of Brasília (UnB). She coordinates the Asia–Latin America and Caribbean research group (ASIALAC). Her research focuses on Brazil's foreign policy and Asia–Latin America relations. Her publications probe China's foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, inter alia, especially connections between Chinese multinational corporations' investments and Brazil's domestic political economy. She is the co-author of "Rise and Fall of Triumphalism in Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of the Workers Party's Governments" in *Status and the Rise of Brazil* (Springer, 2020) and "One Step Closer: The Politics and the Economics of China's Strategy in Brazil and the Case of the Electric Power Sector" in *China–Latin America Relations in the 21st Century* (Springer, 2020).

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Part I
Brazil–Japan Cooperation from General Perspectives

Chapter 1
Introduction

Nobuaki Hamaguchi

1.1 Why Is It Essential to Study Bilateral Cooperation in International Relations?

Cooperation helps countries build international institutions with others that hold similar preferences. Countries can realize mutual gains or prevent mutual losses from institutionalized cooperative relations. Growing bilateral cooperations constitute an evolving network of international relations. As Kinne (2013, p. 766) compellingly addresses, international cooperation is governed by an endogenous network of influences; that is, the probability of cooperation for any given pair of countries is endogenous to the third-party ties those countries have already established. Furthermore, when a pair of countries develop cooperation, countries in their third-party ties may subsequently alter their positions, changing the reward of the cooperation.

Given the complexity of bilateral cooperations construction, it is essential to address theoretical and empirical inquiries to understand why the intensity of cooperation and the areas in which they cooperate vary across countries. This book contributes to the literature on international cooperation by studying the relations between Brazil and Japan.

It can be said that Brazil and Japan are under the influence of the global hegemony of the United States and China, which is making inroads into international politics. They benefit from partnerships with the U.S. and China, but at the same time, they strive to maintain and expand political autonomy. They are economic powerhouses in the global economy and positioned as network hubs in economic and political ties at the regional level (South America for Brazil and Asia for Japan). Under such circumstances, Brazil and Japan have developed middle-power diplomacy in the last decades to widen their space for political autonomy through expanding strategic partnership networks. They avoid directly interfering with hegemons' interests but also aim at

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consolidating influential positions in international politics. Studying Brazil–Japan relations, paying attention to which directions they are structuring their partnership, offers a practical test for an argument on the positive role of middle powers in building cooperation networks amid crucial challenges that the world commonly faces today.

1.2 Concepts of Cooperation in Critical Theories of International Relations

According to Nye and Welch (2017), there are four dominant paradigms in International Relations (IR) theory: realism, Marxism, liberalism, and constructivism. All paradigms understand that the international system is anarchic, that is, the world consists of sovereign nations without higher-level authority. They stand on different assumptions on the interaction process and produce distinct theories of cooperation. In turn, critical theory was born in the 1980s, when IR discipline opened up to new approaches and themes such as hegemony, emancipation and inequality, environment, culture, ethics and civil society. Critical theory thus emerged as the most important alternative theoretical contribution of IR, in a context of turmoil characteristic of a period of transition to an increasingly globalized world order.

Realists agree that states play power politics to claim territorial sovereignty and protect their national interests. The stability of the international system arises from the material balance of powers. Realists understand that the world is conflictual because countries play zero-sum games. However, Jervis (1999) argues that defensive realists, who would include maintaining international order among state goals, do not discard the possibility of cooperation among self-interested actors to correct the losses from not cooperating, typically in a prisoners' dilemma case.

Marxism, in which we include the dependency theory, stylizes the international order by assuming an uneven distribution of powers among nations leading to the North–South international structure hierarchy, where the material and financial inequality is always present and self-reinforcing. This structural rigidity, in many cases, has a historical origin in colonialism. In this fixture, North–South cooperation only locks in the uneven structure. The South demands non-intervention and calls for South–South cooperation to do away with capitalist expansion (imperialist exploitation). Earlier discourses of the Third World were a manifestation of this type of thought.

Liberalists pay attention to not only military competition for power but also countries' competition for wealth through trading. They argue that deepening interdependence through trade creates interests in cooperation (Keohane 1984, p. 8). Countries are willing to cooperate to build institutions for constructing positive-sum games as an international order in cases where countries can expect reciprocal gains and enhanced reputation among states of different international strategic settings (Keohane 1984, Chapter 3). While classical idealism trusted international organizations to provide a forum for nations to resolve disputes and set a body for global governance, liberalists view institutions more broadly as "recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge" (Keohane 1984, p. 8). This view contrasts with the realists' perspective that hegemonic countries provide institutions.

While all the above theories consider that a state is a homogeneous unit of decision and power uniquely identified by inherent national interests, the constructivism IR model see it as a social construction. This perception implies that the identities and interests of nations in international relations are socially constructed through interactions of heterogeneous ordinary people in a structural setting. Those identities and interests are not taken for granted, but they are changeable in response to a structural transformation. Constructivists echo the idealism and liberalism of the existence of plus-sum cooperation through which a country can gain without harming others. According to constructivism, international interactions construct common values even in an anarchic international system. In other words, an anarchic international system does not necessarily result in a zero-sum power struggle, but plus-sum cooperation is possible. In this line of arguments, constructivism influenced the recent debate on the Global South. More developing countries are being recognized as "makers" and "shapers" of global norms for being capable of charting their courses in international relations without placing too much weight on transforming the rigid North–South structure (Grant 2018).

Finally, for Critical Theory, with globalization, social ties that define national borders were weakened and led to the fragmentation of national cultures, which ended up being diluted in a cosmopolitan global culture. The international society imagined by critical theorists is a pluralistic society of states in which principles of coexistence function as the key to preserving freedom and equality among independent political communities, in which states agree on substantive moral principles.

1.3 International Relations of Brazil

According to Lessa (2010), Brazil maintains with the US a "fundamental partnership" on whose basis the intensity of ties with other countries may be measured. He also classifies the relations with the US as "a structuring relationship" to measure the intensity and organization of the entire system of Brazil's international relations. Further, because of the dominant area and population size in South America and its geographical location of sharing borders with ten countries except Chile and Ecuador, Brazil seeks leadership in South America, projecting parallels to the US' undisputed hegemony over North America. In this regard, Lessa (2010, p. 122) classifies the relationship with Argentina as another "structuring relationship," which became a vector of South America's stabilization. As Weyland (2016, p. 162) asserts, "while Brazil has pursued its self-interest even at the risk of displeasing the regional hegemon, it has always avoided confrontation." Brazilian foreign policy takes a nuanced approach to balancing the alignment with the US and political autonomy as a regional power.

If the US imposes crucial constraints on autonomy, Brazil pursues hard-nosed realist goals to defend the national interest. According to Weyland (2016), the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), established in 1991 with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, played a crucial role in sustaining Brazil's defensive posture and passive resistance to the US' push for the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) under Bill Clinton's and George W. Bush's presidency (p. 166). In his assessment, Brazil's international behavior is not governed by liberalist values in economic collaboration. Unlike constructivism's highlight, Brazil's adherence to international principles (free trade, in this case) is notoriously selective (p. 146). The reaction to FTAA was not just occasional, but "national power and global clout are the priorities that have driven Brazilian foreign policy for more than a century" (p. 157).

Brazil has used tactics to distance itself from the US hegemony since the 1970s. It has expanded less explored partnerships to reinforce autonomous international actions. Lessa (2010, p. 118) characterizes them as "strategic partnerships." Such partnerships are vital for technology transfers and international trade. Earlier examples of this category include the nuclear agreement with Germany (West Germany) and the the Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Program for Cerrados Development (PRODECER) with Japan. Both were under Ernesto Geisel's presidency (1974–1979) during the military regime. Moreover, under the Geisel administration, Brazil recognized the People's Republic of China (Becard and Lessa 2021). Later, more progress was made with the earth image satellite project (CBERS) with China (since 1988) and EU–Mercosur free trade negotiation (1999–2019).

Under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's (2003–2010) and Dilma Rousseff's (2011–2016) presidencies, the strategic partnerships have been instrumental in diversifying international relations and demonstrating Brazil's ambition to play a global protagonist role as a responsible regional power and a strong emerging economy. Lula's administration shifted Brazilian foreign policy toward the Global South engagement. The support to the World Social Forum, the establishment of the India, Brazil, South Africa Forum (IBSA), and inauguration of the BRICS summit in 2009, which also led to the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2014, were manifestations of this orientation.

The relationship with China was positioned as a strategic partnership in 1993 during Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's visit to Brazil,[1] but it remained symbolic until the turn of the century. Brazil's economic relations with China have evolved satisfactorily in the last two decades. China's approximation to Latin America is motivated by the need to compensate for its critical natural resource deficit, feed the world's largest domestic population, and fuel the soon-to-be largest economy in the world (Wise and Chonn Ching 2018). China is also investing in infrastructure for energy and transportation because production and trade would not work without adequate infrastructure. The accelerated depreciation of the Brazilian Real and the Brazilian government's desperate search for investors amid the economic downturn favored Chinese expansion (Becard et al. 2020).

The rapid approximation induced the creation of mechanisms of coordination. The most notable was the establishment of China–Brazil Commission of High Level of Agreement and Cooperation (COSBAN) in 2004[2] with twelve sub-commissions:

(1) political; (2) economy/trade; (3) economy/finance; (4) phytosanitary and quarantine inspection; (5) agriculture; (6) science, technology, and innovation; (7) industry and information technology; (8) spatial cooperation; (9) energy and mining; (10) education; (11) culture; and (12) health. The Brazil–China relations were elevated to a Global Strategic Partnership in 2012, and the Global Strategic Dialogue and the Ten–Years Plan of Cooperation were launched in the same year. Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management and Sino–Latin American Production Capacity Cooperation Investment Fund (Claifund) jointly founded the Brazil–China Fund for Production Capacity Expansion (Brazil–China Fund) in 2017. The initial contribution to the fund was US$20 billion with US$15 billion from the Claifund and US$5 billion from the Brazilian Development Bank and Caixa Econômica Federal. The fund focuses on infrastructure development.

The rise of Chinese presence triggered a pros-and-cons debate.[3] Arguments of "China dependence" come mainly from dependency theory, as Stallings (2020) raises the concern that the predominance of China would lead to the dependency structure that disables Latin America's autonomous development. From the realist's paradigm, Busilli and Jaime (2021) wrote, "priority sectors such as power generation and distribution represent sensitive areas for the host country's security. In this vein, the logics of economic statecraft are strengthened because these same incentives can eventually become 'sticks' since Chinese companies can use them to control, limit, interrupt or impose conditions on the provision of critical infrastructure goods and services for Brazil." Liberalists may reply that the intensification of economic relations induced the institutionalization, which avoided "relative-gain concerns" and allowed to maintain the target of long-term mutual benefits (Zhang and Chen 2021). Constructivist insights show the growing diversified presence of the Chinese is the product of the "Going Out" policy to motivate Chinese firms facing the maturing internal demand to capture demand abroad and win the competition in Brazil, which is obsessed to fulfill the need for investment (Becard and Lessa 2021; Becard et al. 2020). This unsettled debate awaits further scholarly research.

1.4 International Relations of Japan

The Japanese economy significantly benefits from globalization, but the country faces complex threats and challenges in international relations. North Korean missile development and China's alarming strengthening of military forces and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo are imminent in the regional realm. The Japanese government is also concerned about the necessity of adequate international institutions for international trade and supply chain management, climate change and natural disasters relief, and health promotion to address the resiliency of globalization.

Against this background, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan advances diplomacy under the "Proactive Contribution to Peace" guideline. It sets Seven Priority Areas of Japan's Foreign Policy: (1) strengthening the Japan–US alliance; (2) promoting the vision of the Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP); (3) building stable relations with neighboring China, South Korea, and Russia; (4) concerns regarding North Korea; (5) coping with the situation in the Middle East (concerning energy security); (6) leading international efforts to create new rules (trade and data flow, among other things): (7) contributing to global challenges under the concept of human security (e.g., peace building, terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, the rule of law, human rights, women's empowerment and gender equality, disaster risk reduction, global health, and the environment and climate change) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2021).

Priorities from (1) to (5) are linked to national security. In this regard, no other bilateral relationship is more important than with the US based on the US military presence under the Security Treaty. The US also places importance on the US–Japan alliance as the cornerstone of the security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity.[4] Recently, Japan made a "proactive contribution to peace" national policy and emerged as a strategic actor in regional and international politics. Koga (2018) notes that after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Japan responded to reduce security dependence on the US and hedge against the risk of US commitment reduction in East Asia. Japan and the US strengthened their security partnership through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with Australia and India.[5]

Another diplomatic maneuver of Japan is the creation of ASEAN+3 as an ASEAN-centric institution in East Asian cooperation. Japan engages in "value-based diplomacy" as a responsible stakeholder aligned with the US to embed open regionalism and the principles of democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and human rights (Koga 2018, p. 654). The recent agreement of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which states that it aims to broaden and deepen ASEAN's engagement with Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand, ratifies the ASEAN centrality and Asia–Pacific multilateralism. A recent study by Singh (2022) points out that Japan pursues a combination of hard and soft balancing strategies to address threats.

Foreign policy priorities (6) and (7) are linked to contributions to international rule-making and the development of forums of discussion on critical global challenges. A remarkable success in the economic realm is the launch of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known as TPP-11. It includes provisions for the high-standard liberalization of goods and service trade. It also defined dispute settlement rules for investments, introduced a new intellectual property standard, and established the transparency of state-owned enterprises. Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union and the United Kingdom (UK) set equally high-standard rules for trade and investment.

Japan also took the initiative to lead global efforts on data governance at the G20 Osaka Summit in 2019 to inaugurate the process of establishing the international rule of e-commerce with the concept of "the Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT)." According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,[6] 86 countries have confirmed participation in the negotiation, including China and the US.

Regarding climate change, Japan ratified the Paris Agreement and vowed to become carbon neutral by 2050. Kameyama (2021) points out that Japan had been inactive in global climate issues because the decision mechanism was dominated by the "iron triangle" of traditional business leaders from energy-intensive industries, bureaucrats, and conservative politicians. The recent position change was brought about by pressures from new business leaders and subnational governments influenced by the unfolding at the international level.

Japan has provided international cooperation in disaster risk reduction with its knowledge and expertise acquired through experiences of various natural disasters. It played a central role in the UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction in defining the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005–2015 (2005) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (2015). The empirical study by Taghizadeh-Hesary et al. (2021) found that quality infrastructure, which is more durable, environmentally friendly, and disaster-resilient than standard infrastructure, significantly reduces natural disaster damage in the long term. Japan's Partnership for Quality Infrastructure for infrastructure development investment with the Asian Development Bank is Japan's reply to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In the health area, according to Nomura et al. (2022), Japan has disbursed a total of 2.3 billion dollars toward addressing the health-related effects of COVID-19 in low- and middle-income countries, which is the largest among all donor countries and international development agencies. Development assistance for health (DAH) from Japan is increasing, which is channeled through international organizations and multilateral development banks. The Basic Design for Peace and Health (BDPH), which was formulated in 2015, outlines three basic DAH policies: establishing resilient global health governance that can respond to public health emergencies and disasters; promoting seamless utilization of essential health and medical services and universal health coverage (UHC) throughout the lifecycle; and leveraging Japanese expertise, experience, and medical products and technology.

1.5 Japan Viewed from Brazil

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts the Poll on Japan annually in the US and selected countries. The 2017 and 2020 surveys include Latin America, including Brazil. Figure 1.1 is created from the answers to which countries are important partners to their country currently and in the future in Brazil.

The US appears as the most important country in both years, and its share grew remarkably. The rise of the US[7] reflects the political change during this period. President Jair Bolsonaro came into power in 2019. He showed personal admiration to former US President Donald Trump and vowed alignment to the US foreign policy. He also raised the tone of antagonism against China, to which Brazil engaged in approximation during the preceding presidency of the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores). However, the survey also shows that the US' importance will decline in the future. Argentina is the second most important partner in the Americas, and its significance is also predicted to decrease.

2020 poll (400 respondents, multiple answers)



2017 poll (708 respondents, multiple answers)



Fig. 1.1 Current and future important partner countries for Brazil (*Source* Authors' creation based on Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Opinion Poll on Japan https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/pr/index.html)

In both years, China and Japan have been considered more important than even the traditional trans-Atlantic allies such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy. The growth of Chinese share is more remarkable than that of Japan between the two years. China surpassed the US in total export and import value with Brazil in 2010, and the gap has widened further since 2018. China also invested considerably in Brazil, mainly in key sectors such as energy and infrastructure (Becard and Lessa 2021). However, the 2020 survey result predicts that China's importance will decline. This result may be influenced by the current political debate in Brazil over the China-dependence risks and President Bolsonaro's Chinophobic discourses (Becard and Lessa 2021).

Brazilians view Japan as an important partner because of three factors. First, Brazil and Japan have enjoyed a long-term friendship (Chap. 2) through migration (Chap. 6), investment in resource development (Chap. 4), and manufacturing technology transfer (Chap. 7). Brazil is home to 1.9 million[8] Japanese descendants (nikkei), the largest Japanese-origin population outside Japan. Their cultural and economic success created a positive image of Japan among Brazilians. Second, Brazil and Japan are major global economic powers and highly regarded as soft-power countries. The two countries join forces in a strategic partnership and exert influence to lead global challenges (Chaps. 3, 4, and 5). Third, Brazil and Japan do not directly interfere with each other's security and geopolitical autonomy interests. However, the partnership can be instrumental in handling the balance of powers involved, such as their relations with the US and China. This aspect should be critical as the struggle between the two countries intensifies.

Interestingly, Figure 1.1 shows Japan's importance for Brazil to rise in the future. This result can be interpreted that Brazilians view Japanese engagement with Brazil as less than what it should be; it needs to increase in the future.

1.6 Brazil–Japan Relation

Brazil and Japan indulge in deepened dialogues in several domains. Remarkably, the private sectors of both countries took a fundamental initiative. In 1972, a group of Japanese business leaders representing the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) was invited by the Brazilian government to exchange views with the Brazilian business persons and government officials. This trip resulted in creating the Joint Meeting of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committees Brazil–Japan, whose first meeting was held in 1974 in Rio de Janeiro. For the Brazilian part, the Brazilian National Confederation of Industries (CNI) has become Keidanren's counterpart. The meeting was held in conjunction with important events such as visits of heads of state and critical policy changes. Since 2010, it has been held alternately in Brazil and Japan every year (Horisaka 2016).

Japan's strategic partnership diplomacy started under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's administration (April 2001–September 2006) (Shiraishi 2014). In September 2004, President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and Prime Minister Koizumi met in New York with the representatives of Germany and India. They announced a joint statement that advocated the reform of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and cooperation for the candidature of the four countries. In May 2005, when President Lula visited Japan, the two leaders agreed to establish the Japan–Brazil Council for the twenty-first century; this proposal led to the creation of the Strategic Economic Partnership Wise-men Group in 2006. During the Lula administration, Brazil adopted the Japanese standard of digital television broadcasting system in 2006. After adaptations in Brazil, the Japanese–Brazilian Digital TV system (ISDB-Tb) was adopted by eighteen other countries, including eight in South America, five in Central America, three in Asia, and two in Africa.

After a short period of stagnation,[9] Brazil–Japan relations were reinvigorated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Brazil in 2014. Abe announced the three guiding principles of Japan's policy toward Latin America: progress together, lead together, and inspire together. Chapter 2 of this volume elaborates the nature of strategic partnership between Brazil and Japan in great detail.

As leading democracies and economies in their respective regions that share common values such as democracy and fundamental liberties, Brazil, Japan, and the US announced Japan–US–Brazil Exchange (JUSBE) in November 2020. This alliance aims to develop trilateral cooperation in strengthening business environments, expanding foreign investments, promoting regional connectivity, supporting sustainable development and economic growth, and enhancing cybersecurity to promote vibrant digital economies based on an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet. They also agree to strengthen dialogue and cooperation that fortifies democratic governance in their countries and internationally. Although not explicit in any part of the statements, it should be clear that this alliance is aware of the growing presence of China in Brazil, primarily because of the global competition in the fifth-generation (5G) mobile communication system.

1.7 Areas of Interest in Brazil–Japan Cooperation

As an upper-middle-income country, Brazil is regarded as "graduated" from the official development assistance (ODA) in the development cooperation sphere. Hence, ODA provision to Brazil is limited to three priority areas defined in the development cooperation policy for Brazil (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018):

1. Urbanization and environmental problems and disaster prevention.
2. Improvement of investment climate (human capital development).
3. Support for Brazil's development assistance to third countries (triangular cooperation).

It is expected that Japan will expand the triangular cooperation with Brazil under the Japan–Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP) to form a partnership in development projects implemented in Latin America and the Lusophone African countries. Uehara (2016) points out that triangular cooperation, where Japan finances projects and Brazil contributes with the knowledge from own development experiences, also taking advantage of cultural proximity and the use of common language, is cost-effective in aiding less developed countries. Chapter 5 of this book will address this issue.

It is crucial to guide ODA and private investment progress coherently. Regarding the urbanization and environmental problems, participants of the 2020 Joint Meeting of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committee from the Japanese private sector showed interest in the prospects of adopting low carbon mobility technology in Brazil and its related investment opportunities in such areas as transport equipment, transport services, urban development, disaster prevention, environmental control, and energy supply. Regarding the investment climate, the Committee focused on emerging activities in Brazil in the field of digital technology: promotion of startup firms aiming at innovative solutions to social problems, training of digital talent, and supporting research and development (Iijima 2020). Chapter 7 will discuss the transfer of the Japanese-style quality control method to improve Brazil's investment climate.

Vargas (2019) observes that the new guiding principles of Japan's policy toward Latin America (the three "togethers") and Brazil–Japan strategic global partnership represent that the bilateral relation is repositioned to strengthen the ability of both countries to play leading roles in global issues. From such perspectives, the annual reports of the Strategic Economic Partnership Wise-men Group[10] identify areas of common interest of Brazil and Japan in global challenges. For example, the 2021 report proposes cooperation in bioenergy and other renewable energy sources to achieve the goal of a carbon neutral society by 2050, which both countries have promised. It also suggests that the challenge of increasing global food demand opens an avenue for Brazil–Japan cooperation in innovative logistics, digital automation, improved production management skills, and the transfer of experiences and knowledge in sustainable tropical agriculture and biofuel production to other developing countries. It also notes intensifying global competition for competent people and proposed more human-to-human exchanges, especially involving leaders from Japanese–Brazilian (Nikkei) communities. In this regard, Chap. 6 of this book discusses the education of children of working Nikkei families in Japan.

Vargas (2019) argues that Brazil and Japan are interested in promoting international peace and security as a shared global agenda. Above all, the two countries have the common goal to occupy permanent seats in the UN Security Council. The two countries prioritize non-military resources for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding based on pacifism. Vargas mentions that the collaboration of military engineers' activities in UN peacekeeping operations for the reconstruction after conflicts and severe disasters is an example of their common interest. Brazil and Japan will contribute creatively to the Security Council, where power politics has been present throughout its history.

In the business realm, the Joint Meeting of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committees Brazil–Japan mentioned above earnestly recommends to the governments of the two countries to start negotiation for Japan–Mercosur Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). This request was initially motivated by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Mercosur–EU Free Trade Agreement negotiations, which could place Japan in an inferior position in terms of competition with the US and European firms in the South American market (Horisaka 2016). Japanese business sector's demand for Japan–Mercosur EPA is also partly triggered by the increasing presence of Chinese firms in Brazil and the signing of the South Korea–Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

Amorim and Ferreira-Pereira (2021) identify that the strategic global partnerships with China and Japan signaled Brazil to explore more autonomy in its traditional "double standard" foreign policy to simultaneously pursue the alignment with the US-standard international principles and autonomous self-interest. They argue that the partnership with China, on the one hand, opens more room for maneuver economically and politically in projecting national autonomy from the US dependency. On the other hand, the partnership with Japan provided Brazil with an instrument for soft balancing Chinese presence in Brazil and Latin America. According to the authors' assessment, the partnership with China has exacerbated the dependency on primary resources subjecting the country to volatile growth, thus negatively affecting the Brazilian autonomist goals. The partnership with Japan has engendered much fewer concrete gains than those expected as a counterbalance to China. They conclude that Bolsonaro's presidency, because of not only his ideological orientation but also the unsatisfactory results from the partnership with China and Japan, pushed Brazilian foreign policy toward aligning with Washington. In this regard, structuring the relationship with Japan has a strategic value for Brazil's pursuit of diplomatic autonomy.

1.8 Outline of This Book

This book consists of three parts, and the final chapter is a conclusion. Part I includes two more chapters concerning generic issues in Brazil–Japan relations.

In Chap. 2, Lessa and Oliveira point out that the Brazil–Japan relationship developed while both countries jointly explored common interests. Those interests are signaled by reducing the dependence on the US and financial and economic complementarity between the two countries. Japanese investments were complementary to Brazil's industrial structure. Brazil was a major supplier of raw materials and agricultural products, while Japan met Brazil's need for basic industrial products and capital goods for its industrialization process. They contributed to each other's national development projects, including emblematic projects such as Usiminas steel mill, Ishibrás shipyards, and other large energy- and natural resource-intensive projects, such as Cenibra (cellulose), Tubarão (steel industry), Albrás (aluminum), and PRODECER (agricultural development of the semi-arid land). However, economic complementarity began to decrease in the early 1980s, partly due to Brazil's severe economic crisis and the diminished importance of ensuring the supply of raw materials for Japan. In the first years of the twenty-first century, neither Brazil nor Japan prioritized each other's foreign policy. However, President Lula's visit to Japan in 2005 broke the ground for a renewed partnership. In particular, Brazil's adaptation of the Japanese ISDB-T standard of digital television broadcasting created an opportunity for the Japanese–Brazilian Digital TV system (ISDB-Tb) to be implemented in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua,), Asia (Philippines, Maldives, and Sri Lanka), and Africa (Angola and Botswana). Brazil and Japan also agreed on the constitution of the G4 in 2004 to cooperate in the UN Security Council reform. In 2014, during Prime Minister Abe's visit, the Brazil–Japan relationship was elevated to the level of Global Strategic Partnership. Japan also shows constant interest in forming closer ties by signing an EPA. The need to avoid a very ubiquitous presence of China was responsible for the rapprochement of Japan to Brazil. The bilateral relationship between Brazil and Japan is tied with a unique "human bond" created by the Japanese who migrated to Brazil.

In Chap. 3, Campos de Pires and Kawai identify the overall trends in Japan's ODA policies for the health sector in developing countries from 1990 to 2020 and its future post-COVID-19 prospects. Since the end of the Cold War, watershed events have constantly changed the landscape of international cooperation in the healthcare sector. Like other international aid donors, Japan has devised priorities and strategies for ODA based on a set of international and domestic factors in a constantly changing world. Numerous studies on Japan's ODA have examined international and domestic factors that impact the country's aid policy formulation. The authors aim to add to those studies by combining recent debates on international cooperation and foreign aid, the right to health, and world health system reforms to explore and analyze Japan's ODA for health in developing countries. The guiding research questions were as follows: What were the major trends in Japan's ODA policies in the health sector from 1990 to 2020? Which international health debates and international cooperation factors exerted influence on those trends? What are the prospects of Japan's ODA, given the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts? Their preliminary findings revealed that Japan's ODA in the health sector from 1990 to 2020 centered on two main axes: infectious diseases and maternal and child health care, both of which are oriented toward strengthening the healthcare system. Given this goal, it seems relevant to consider that Japan's health system assumes the need to provide UHC, a concept currently supported by the World Health Organization (WHO) in contrast to the universal health system. However, the implications of this choice on Japan's ODA and developing countries' health policies are yet to be fully understood. The COVID-19 pandemic has put substantial pressure on healthcare systems globally and on international cooperation for health; thus, it can affect and even change Japan's ODA for the healthcare sector in developing countries.

Part II is about the Brazil–Japan cooperation in global challenges.

In Chap. 4, Masukata, Inoue, and Sant'Anna discuss global environmental governance. Both Brazil and Japan have been active in global environmental governance, have signed important multilateral environmental agreements, and have committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The two countries have been historical partners in development cooperation/assistance since 1959. Starting with a broad concept of development cooperation, this chapter aims to assess the contributions and impacts of this specific type of cooperative relation between the two countries. The research uses a global environmental governance analytical framework to evaluate the Japanese ODA. It interrogates its contribution to and impacts on environmental protection and sustainable development in Brazil. Through literature review, document analysis, and interviews, the authors identify development cooperation programs and projects implemented from 1981 to 2020 and present two cases, one in the Cerrado (PRODECER) and the other in the Amazon (SAF–Tomé-Açu), to analyze how global environmental commitments guide (or not) the provision of ODA. Such analysis is relevant to understand the global trends of environmental governance at the subnational and local levels. According to international commitments, the environmental dimension has been incorporated into ODA projects. However, more must be achieved to meet global environmental challenges.

In Chap. 5, Koyasu and Ramos discuss the triangular cooperation in international development with particular attention to Africa. Japan has engaged in African development through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) mechanism. Africa gains more importance for Japan as Japan develops a geopolitical project of the Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP), which entails Africa at the western end. Brazil maintains historically and strategically essential relations with Africa, especially Portuguese-speaking countries. To think about the future of Japan–Brazil relations, it is a mutual benefit if Africa develops economically without being constrained by the political interventions of international superpowers. This shared value motivates cooperation. Koyasu and Ramos inquire about the possibility of strengthening the cooperation of Japan and Brazil while looking back at the history and achievements of triangular cooperation between Japan–Brazil, and African countries. Mozambique is a particularly relevant case as a Portuguese-speaking country facing the Indian Ocean.

Part III is about the Brazil–Japan cooperation in bilateral issues.

In Chap. 6, Bugarin and Yamazaki seek to find an efficient way to improve the educational environment for the children of Brazilian residents in Japan. The secondary objective is to identify a better way to improve these residents' social and economic positions through further integration into the Japanese society. The authors believe that their potential to become a vital bridge between the two countries is significant. However, that potential is still not tapped sufficiently. Therefore, the goal of this analysis is more than simply improving the working and living conditions in Japanese society. It aims to promote career development. Educational background is essential to that end; education and acquisition of the Japanese language beginning in primary school are especially of utmost importance.

For this reason, our study focuses on the basic education (especially Japanese language education) of Brazilian children in Japan. We conclude that the style of "afterschool" is most efficient and socially equitable. We propose a public policy adopted by the Japanese government to induce Brazilian families to adopt the hybrid afterschool education system.

In Chap. 7, Hamaguchi and Miyazaki argue that Brazil faces fundamental challenges in social inequality, and in this regard, increasing higher quality jobs with human capacity development is the key. In this respect, Japan's experience during the industrialization in the post-Second World War period is valuable. Until the 1980s, Brazilian industrialization was oriented toward the domestic market. Although competitive pressure was weak, exporting companies and local subsidiaries of multinationals deployed the Japanese quality control model, which was considered the hallmark of the Japanese industry's competitiveness. Individual companies and local business associations were the leading promoters of quality control, with the collaboration of JUSE. The first boom fell short of expectations because of the lack of understanding of corporate managers and some intercultural problems faced by workers in introducing Total Quality Control. The market liberalization since the 1990s set a new ground for competitiveness-seeking quality control, supported by the government. The second boom did not materialize because of the industrial paradigm change for machine-based productivity gains, while Japanese-style quality control is human-based. However, we find that Japanese-style quality control has been effectively used in non-industrial sectors such as public administration and healthcare. We argue that Japanese technical cooperation capitalizing on quality control methods will enhance Brazil's labor productivity and social well-being.

To conclude, Chap. 8 summarizes our arguments and discusses proposals for policy in detail.

Notes

1. According to Feng and Huang (2014), it was the first strategic partnership for China. Since then, building strategic partnerships has become one of the most notable dimensions of Chinese diplomacy.
2. The first meeting was held in 2006.
3. The debate in U.S. on whether the Chinese rise in Latin America would interfere the U.S. interest is also divided. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission invited specialists for the Hearing on "China in Latin America and the Caribbean" on May 20, 2021. In this occasion, US Army War College professor R. Evan Ellis describes "China as an incubator for anti-US leftist populism" and "it has been leftist populist regimes which have hosted China's building of the first national surveillance system in the region," which "creates a dangerous reinforcing cycle of exporting of "digital authoritarianism" (Ellis 2021). Boston University professor Rebecca Ray contests to the "debt trap" and "environmental degradation" argument related to Chinese investment, arguing that the outcomes depend on institutional capacity of recipient countries. She proposes that rather than forcing Latin American countries to turn away from Chinese investment, a closer engagement with China, while helping the government for institutional capacity building, will serve U.S. interest (Ray 2021).
4. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-japan/ (access data March 7, 2022) and https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/en_html/chapter1/c010002.html (access data March 7, 2022).
5. Japan insisted on the participation of India in RCEP. But India pulled out of the pact in the last stage of negotiation.
6. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100167362.pdf (access data March 7, 2022).
7. The Brazil–US relation was deteriorated after it was revealed in 2013 that the U.S. National Security Agency bugged phone calls of the former President Dilma Rousseff, which provoked the cancellation of President Rousseff's visit to the U.S.
8. This estimate is provided by the Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad (http://www.jadesas.or.jp/en/) (access data March 7, 2022).
9. President Dilma Rousseff, who faced internal political crises, canceled visit to Japan in 2013 and 2015.
10. Reports are available from https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/brazil/jb_kaigi_0703.html (in Japanese).

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Chapter 2
Brazil–Japan Relationship: A Partnership?

Henrique Altemani de Oliveira and Antonio Carlos Lessa

2.1 Introduction

East Asia[1] is currently one of the most dynamic centers in the global economy, which, according to many, confirms the rise of the Pacific Century (Tellis 2010; Kurlantzick 2011; Haass 2013). However, Asia was not as attractive in the 1960s and 1970s. It was instead a region marked by conflict, liberation wars, ideological conflicts, and economic underdevelopment, with the notable exception of Japan.

Also notable was the presence of the United States, engaged in a policy of containment of the Soviet Union (USSR). This policy allowed for consensus in political and academic circles that the US was, and still is, a regional player due to its role in maintaining regional security as well as its political, strategic, economic, and financial interests in the region.

In this setting, two facts marked the Brazil–Japan relationship through time. First, Southeast Asia is the most natural region for Japan to access basic products and to begin and maintain its process of economic recovery. The region would also be a space for "regional leadership," i.e., "a leader directing its followers' behavior toward collective goals set by the leader" (Terada 2001, p. 197).

Second, the US's presence in Asia constrained in part Japan's ability to reestablish a political power that was compatible to its economic power. Subsequently, Japan witnessed the emergence of a new player in the region competing for influence and power: China.

Furthermore, Southeast Asia only achieved stability after it contained conflicts stemming from border disputes and ideological issues. This happened with the creation of ASEAN[2] (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in 1967, initially

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with five members, due to the continuing instability in Indochina. Therefore, we must consider the hypothesis that the commercial relationship between Brazil and Japan, which started in the mid-1950s, was induced by Japan's difficult relations with Southeast Asia.

The series of embarrassments in Eastern Asia, the border conflicts in Southeast Asia, historic resentments in the region due to Japan's imperialist past, as well as the climate of insecurity caused by the presence of Communist China and its later competitive, economic, and political rise can explain the rationale behind the rapprochement and the deepening ties with Brazil. This rapprochement was strengthened by economic complementarity, mutual benefits, and the presence and resourcefulness of the Japanese community in the country.

Despite having at times assumed more independent stances in its foreign policy, Japan never rejected its alliance with the US, even when pursuing its economic interests (Horisaka 2006, p. 150). In this respect, Japan's economic cooperation with Brazil was always endorsed by the US, as it was interested in Japan's economic recovery to counter the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the Korean War.

It can therefore be observed that, given the changing roles of the US and China through time, Japan began to see the need to broaden its economic, political, and strategic ties with countries outside the Eastern Asian region.

Brazil had in turn been under the influence of the US since the end of World War II, a situation that was militarily institutionalized by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947), and legally and politically institutionalized with the creation of the Organization of American States (1948). Since there was no economic consensus, due to conflicting interests, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), linked to the United Nations system, was implemented in 1948.

Brazil's goal to continue its (automatic) strategic alliance with the United States in the post-war period clashed with the US's foreign policy turn, when it took responsibility for international security, opposing the USSR and denying Latin America financial resources to boost economic development. Brazil thus aimed to diversify and universalize its foreign partnerships. This strategy became economically viable after the mid-1950s, when the recovery of Japan and Germany began to bear fruits, allowing for commercial relations and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows; it became even more significant after Japan became an economic superpower.

This chapter aims to reassess the Brazil–Japan relationship, with emphasis on the post-Cold War era, although briefly commenting on previous relations. To better comprehend its meaning and the mutual expectations, this reinterpretation focuses on strategies, characteristics and means of cooperation in the political, economic, commercial, and technological dimensions. While analyzing a possible strategic partnership, one must highlight the landmark moments as well as the circumstances that resulted in either broader or more limited bilateral ties.

At the beginning of this chapter, we will discuss the notion of strategic partnership and its application to the history of relations between Brazil and Japan during the Cold War. Then we will examine the first attempts to boost bilateral ties from the 1990s, focusing on the role of the Asian financial crisis in the rapprochement of the early 2000s, with milestones such as the formation of the G4 in 2004, the adoption of the Japanese system of Digital Television in 2006 and the commemoration of one hundred years of Japanese immigration to Brazil in 2008. Finally, we will discuss the efforts of the then Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe to strengthen the alliance after the global crisis of 2008, as well as the consequences of the growing Chinese influence in Latin America.

2.2 From an Economic Standpoint to a Political Perspective: Basis for a Strategic Partnership?

Japan, under the Yoshida Doctrine and with the US military alliance as a foreign policy cornerstone, aimed to maximize its economic presence abroad. While emphasizing the need for economic recovery, Japan was always careful not to mix politics and economy, which allowed it to establish economic ties with Cuba even after the 1959 revolution and with China well before the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972.

For better understanding, Matsushita (1994, 1998) divides Japanese diplomacy toward Latin America during the Cold War into three distinct periods, based on Japan's international position.[3] His division assumes that there are three types of countries, organized by their level of influence on relevant international issues. One extreme is the influential countries which can impose their values on others, formulate international economic policies, and are called "makers." The other extreme is countries who must accept international decisions without taking part on the decision-making process, the "takers." The middle space is occupied by countries that are not powerful or fragile; they are called "shakers."

From Japan's surrender until 1960, it remained tightly bound to the US's sphere of influence, functioning as a taker. In the 1960s, due to the economic recovery, it improved its international stance. It gained limited capacity to exert influence, making it a shaker, but not a maker. The shift from shaker to economic maker happened when it was included as a member of the G7 (1975).

Hence, Japan initially functioned as a taker while it was suffering the consequences of its defeat in the Pacific Front and the demographic problems caused by the return of citizens from the Manchuria region and the Korean Peninsula. Japan therefore turned to Latin America to reopen migration flows. Subsequently, already a shaker benefiting from economic recovery, interest in migration was abandoned, but the interests in Latin America as a consumer market for industrial products and a source of natural resources grew.

Finally, backed by its economic and technological capabilities, during the 1980s, Nakasone aimed to transform Japan into an international player with a political role that was compatible to its economic power, and was able to employ its military capabilities as a legitimate instrument of state power (Hook 1996, p. 70).

Therefore, by the end of the Cold War, Japan was a highly sophisticated manufacturer of technologically advanced arms with an arsenal similar to the main global powers that included nuclear technology (Oliveira 2019). It was also involved in a scientific and technological cooperation with the United States and its military resources and innovative technology meant that it played a meaningful role in international security. Its constraints were determined by technology, not politics (Vogel 1992, pp. 56–57).

Matsushita (1998, pp. 148–149) claims that this quest for political influence suggests that Japan abandoned the political separation between politics and economy in diplomacy, recognizing that international economic issues are intrinsic to politics.

In this regard, the Brazil–Japan bilateral relationship can also be interpreted as part of Japan's strategy to reduce dependence on the American market, especially since the 1960s (Matsushita 1998; Tsunekawa 1998). Brazil took a similar stance by launching an "Independent Foreign Policy" under President Jânio Quadros's government (1961), in a quest for autonomy and diversified multilateral policy, motivated by the country's concrete interests.

We must also point out that Brazilian Foreign Policy was formulating a concept of dual foreign policy. One stemmed from its historical and traditional ties to the West; the other, from the set of deficiencies that united it to other countries in an unfavorable position in the International System. However, the dual policy approach did not entail the need to choose between different alternatives. On the contrary, they were complimentary motions that pointed to an attempt to diminish dependence on the US.

It must also be pointed out that the first period of Brazilian Foreign Policy's universalization coincides with the moment when new economic powers, especially Germany and Japan, were searching for ways to redefine their foreign policy, also aiming to diminish their dependence on the US. In this regard, we can assume that Brazil's position benefited from the fiercer competition between developed countries.

It is interesting that these economic superpowers (Germany and Japan) supported the Third World's demands for a New International Economic Order, sponsoring conferences in the North–South Dialog. Germany regarded Brazil as a moderate ally in these negotiations. In this regard, in March 1978, it claimed that "Brazil should serve as a bridge in the creation of a new world order." In 1976, Ernesto Geisel rejected the Japanese Prime Minister's suggestion to function as a mediator between North and South, arguing that "in reality, Brazil is in the group of underdeveloped countries … it cannot become a mediator simply because it is so much a part of that group" (Hurrell 2013, pp. 287–297).

It is based on these premises that the present work aims to question whether the strategic partnership between Brazil and Japan is real or an illusion.

Abreu (2008) dismisses the concept of strategic partnership by arguing that "few terms have been used in such imprecise, incorrect or abusive manner as strategic partnership, especially when it comes to establishing priorities." By naming Brazil specifically, the author argues that "the proliferation of priorities means the absence of priorities. When all partners are strategic, none of them are."

We differ from this understanding, arguing that Brazil has a vast array of interests, combined with severely limited resources, which force the country to maintain political guidelines when diversifying partnerships, creating interdependences, or universalizing foreign policy. In this conflict between interests and available resources, selective universalism becomes more preeminent. Although contradictory, Brazil aimed to uphold a universalist perspective while, at the same time, establishing different pragmatic, non-exclusionary alliances, and partnerships, to promote its interests. According to Lessa (1998, p. 37), "the idea of a strategic partnership is investigated in order to clarify interactions that allow for substantial gains in an international scenario marked by narrowing margins for decision-making."

It must be highlighted that what is crucial are the interests at stake, as Minister Azeredo da Silveira observed during a conference at the Brazilian National War College:

> In a world of constant change there are no permanent agreements nor everlasting divergences. Under such conditions, there can be no automatic alignments, since the object of diplomatic action are not countries, but situations. What we must do in each moment is explore the spectrum of coincidence we have with other countries, aiming at the same time to reduce the areas of divergence or confrontation. This pragmatic attitude is the very essence of the diplomatic activity. (Fonseca 1998, p. 321)

The concept of partnership suggests prioritizing a certain bilateral relationship with political and economic relevance. The term "strategic" aims to distinguish those bilateral relationships as "more important" and define them as priority among multiple relationships.

Therefore, in the present case, both concepts apply. The first is due to historic experience, which conveys the relationship's great political and economic relevance for the development strategy. This is because the relationship "demanded political support, political coordination, increase in capital flow, consumer markets, as well as scientific and technological cooperation." The idea of strategic partnership derived from the universalist project, which is "the realization of efforts to diversify foreign partnerships, which gain relevance as instruments to attain larger margins for autonomous international action, essential for the implementation of the modernization strategy" (Lessa and Oliveira 2013, 9–10).

2.3 Phases of the Bilateral Relationship During the Cold War

The history of the Brazil–Japan relationship during the Cold War can be divided into three different periods with different emphases (Torres Filho 1996).

The first begins in the late 1950s, when a partnership based on economic complementarity is established. The second, during the 1970s, when the economic complementarity is resumed, but based on a political rapprochement with the common goal of reducing dependence on the international system. The third, a distancing phase, starts during the 1980s and occurred due to the debt crisis and the deepening of bilateral litigation as well as the loss of Brazil's attractiveness, given Japan's new status in the world as the main international creditor.

During the first phase, Japanese investments were clearly complementary to Brazil's industrial structure. Brazil was a major supplier of raw materials and agricultural products, while Japan met Brazil's need for basic industrial products and capital goods for its industrialization process. Japan's goal was to ensure safe sources of raw materials and to secure its status as an exporter of manufactured goods.

During this period, we can list some economic cooperation initiatives such as Japan's association to the construction project of a steel plant in the State of Minas Gerais, the transfer of textile industries, the construction of Ishibrás shipyards in Rio de Janeiro, and the Toyota factory in São Paulo. For Brazil, both Japanese and European investments, were crucial to resume the development project, given the difficulty obtaining resources from the US.

The second phase, during the 1970s, coincides with the golden years of the so-called *Brazilian economic miracle*, when Japan became an economic powerhouse and there was a sharp appreciation of the Yen, as a result of the Smithsonian Agreement and the suspension of convertibility of US dollars to gold.

During this period, Japan resumed, and then increased, its investments in Brazil, particularly toward the development of large energy- and natural resource-intensive projects, such as *Cenibra* (cellulose), *Tubarão* (steel industry), *Albrás* and *Alunorte* (aluminum). These all occurred in partnership with *Companhia Vale do Rio Doce*.

The most relevant project was PRODECER (Cerrado Development Program),[4] aimed at developing soy production. For Japan, soy production in Brazil had a strategic purpose, as the country sought to defend itself from the US's withholding of soy to Japan as a means of political and economic pressure. The speedy success of soy plantations turned Brazil, in a decade, into the second largest producer of soy worldwide.

For Hosono (2016), PRODECER is one of the main examples of international cooperation provided by Japan through Official Development Assistance (ODA). It works as a catalyst for the economic transformation of developing countries, supporting inclusive growth by making investments in infrastructure, technological innovation, human resources, and institution building. In Brazil, these actions resulted in the transformation of the Cerrado biome and, gradually, of Brazilian agriculture itself.

Hollerman (1988, pp. 17, 21) interprets this partnership as a strategy to reduce Japan's dependence on the US, which, according to him, was conspiratorial and defiant in nature. "The Brazilian case is thus a model of Japanese strategy in challenging the United States through the aspirations of others. Japan's policy of promoting a 'horizontal division' in the world economy is a euphemism for this strategy." When the US decided in 1973 to use the soy market as a weapon against Japan, the foundations were laid for the investments on PRODECER. "According to a Japanese official who participated in his government's decision to provide funds for the soybean Project, its purpose was to 'keep the United States honest.'"

However, economic complementary began to decrease in the early 1980s, due in part to the diminished importance of ensuring the supply of raw materials. This happened because of an increase in supply and decrease in prices, as well as the acceleration of the Latin American economic crisis. As pointed out by Hamaguchi (2020), "Japan was unprepared to face debt defaults, interruption of joint projects and the downturn of local markets."

Furthermore, the diminished importance of Latin America was reinforced by Japan's economic reorientation toward China and Southeast Asia, especially after the sharp appreciation of the Yen against the dollar due to the 1985 Plaza Accord and subsequent reallocation of capital by Japanese companies (Schwartz 1991; Oliveira 1994; Uehara 2003; Fraga and Strachman 2013).

It must be pointed out that, despite the relative economic and commercial distancing, scientific cooperation between the countries, which was already a reality in the 1960s, not only continued but also allowed for the creation of a new modality, called triangular cooperation, which is especially present in Africa.

2.4 First Attempts to Resume the Relationship and the Importance of the Asian Crisis

Since the early 1990s, there has been a slight revival of Brazil's relationship with Asia, albeit with considerable differences regarding previous periods. While Japan remained the main commercial partner and largest investor, it gradually lost ground to other competitors, and Japanese investments decreased considerably. Relations with China, South Korea, and ASEAN expanded significantly.

Japan remained either indifferent or distant from the process of privatization that took place in the Brazilian economy. As the US secured its position as Brazil's main partner, Europe expanded its presence in key sectors, especially in the banking system and telecommunications. Spain became the fifth largest investor in the country, surpassing Japan.

Japan's apathy toward Brazil stemmed first from a negative view of the country, which was coming from a period marked by high inflation rates and accumulated debt—despite its recovery in the 1990s—as well as the reduced activities of Japanese companies in Brazil. At the same time, Japanese companies had not yet recovered from the collapse of the bubble economy and were simply not prepared to expand their presence in the Brazilian market (Nishibayashi 2003, p. 210).

A crucial turning point for the rapprochement between Japan and Latin America was the Asian crisis of 1997–1998. This led to changes in Asia's foreign policy strategy, as well as its perception of Latin America (Mols 2005).

It became an accepted notion that the crisis had broken out due to the commercial conflict between Japan and the US, regardless of financial issues. Since the crisis directly affected the Asian economy, countries were more aware of the need to organize in some type of regional mechanism that could act consistently in defense of regional interests on the international level. The creation of ASEAN+3 (ASEAN + Japan, China, and South Korea), without the participation of any members from outside the region, meant the recognition of East Asia as a region, a fact that Bergsten (2000) interpreted as the world being divided into three different blocs.

Furthermore, despite the increasing number of initiatives for Latin America, there remained a certain distrust regarding the region, which was considered unstable, as shown by the Mexican financial crisis in early 1995. However, the Asian crisis led the continent to reassess its views on Latin America and realize the need for closer relations between them. This, combined with the fear that a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would make it more difficult for Asia to access the American market, allowed for the creation of the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC).[5] Japan played a crucial role in the development of FEALAC by promoting the first meetings, with funds from the Japan Special Fund at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Thus, the response to the crisis not only addressed specific issues for Asia, but it also introduced a third bloc in the redefinition of the International Order and System. A third bloc that thus far had one major competitor (Japan) but would soon boast a second claimant to regional and international power: China.

The effects of the crisis on commerce and the economy were not as positive for the Brazil–Japan relationship as they were on the political realm. Trade flows, which had begun to increase in the first half of the decade, were affected by the downturn of imports as well as the halt of FDI. Only in the early years of the twenty-first century, after China's accession to the WTO, was there a significant increase in trade flows between the two regions.

Japan's renewed interest in regionalism forced it to adopt a soft balancing strategy aiming to contain China's growing influence. A more aggressive strategy, based on an alliance with the US, would be impossible since China's economy was already crucial for Japan's prosperity. Besides, China's growth strategy is based on soft power (Sohn 2010). Okamoto (2009, p. 34) argues that "improving the relationship between Japan and Asia cannot be at the expense of the close ties between Japan and the US. They are perfectly compatible with one another."

Asia and the US are, thus, the main and most important priorities for Japan's foreign policy. Although Latin America is not a priority for Japan, there is growing interest in the region because of the changes in East Asia, especially the economic and political rise of China.

For Tsunekawa (2010), Japan drastically changed its view on Latin America in the past 10–15 years. After dealing with political and economic instabilities, hyperinflation, military rule, and autocratic regimes, and under strong influence from the US, the region became much more independent and politically democratic, with a much more stable and prosperous economy. But Latin America was not the only region going through changes. East Asia also changed, especially in terms of the economy, with China and other countries expanding their capacities and reducing Japan's predominance. In a nutshell, according to Tsunekawa (2010) "Japan was compelled to reassess its relationship with Latin America".

An alternative view is that, since after the 1980s crisis, Asia and South America remained distant and China filled the gap, forcing Japan to take a more proactive stance in its relationship with Brazil and South America (Hamaguchi 2020).

Economic relations between Asia and Latin America, previously dominated by Japan, became more diversified, forcing Japan to adjust its relationship with the region. Therefore, Japan's renewed interest in Brazil can be ascribed, on the one hand, to changes in the Asian economy, due to its growing dependence on the Chinese market, and, on the other, to the fact that (emerging) countries from the South gained more political and economic relevance.

2.4.1 Perspectives of Reapprochement of Brazil and Japan in the Twenty-First Century

Keindanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) and CNI (Brazilian National Confederation of Industry), coordinators of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committee, intending to revitalize the bilateral economic relationship, launched in 2000 a document called *Brazil–Japan: Alliance for the 21st Century*, pointing out bottlenecks and strategies to bring the countries closer.

At that time Brazil and Japan had decided to strengthen the partnership via triangular cooperation, with the signature of the Japan–Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP), which became an intergovernmental legal framework. It must be noted that, for both Brazil and Japan, fomenting international cooperation is a foreign policy tool (Uehara 2010; Aragusuku 2011).

Declarations by Japanese public figures made clear that there were high hopes for rekindling the Brazil–Japan relationship. "During the 80s and 90s, due to economic circumstances in both countries, the relationship stagnated, but we can feel it revive nowadays." He added that the 100th Anniversary of Japanese Immigration in Brazil (2008) would be an opportunity "to reflect upon the construction of a new Japan–Brazil relationship, looking at the next hundred years, and not just as an occasion to remember the past" (Ishida 2005). Or the fact that "major Japanese colonies in Brazil serve as a basis for an economic rapprochement between these two countries [...] and the recovery of the Japanese economy [shows that] the time has come for a new phase of economic rapprochement between the two countries" (Suzuki 2005).

In the first years of the twenty-first century, neither Brazil nor Japan were priorities for each other's foreign policy. Brazil was too involved in the political, strategic and economic consolidation of South America, as well as its deeper ties with emerging powers (IBSA, BRICS) while Japan aimed to strengthen ties with the US and the European Union, and to reorganize East Asia as a means to diminish China's regional influence (the proposal of the East Asia Community, reintroducing external players like India, Australia and New Zealand).

In line with the change of Brazil's image abroad, after a meeting in March 2003, right after the inauguration of President Lula, the Japanese section of the Brazil–Japan

Economic Cooperation Committee stated that "the new government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has solid economic and trade policies, regarded as positive both in Brazil and abroad, besides valuing efforts to attract foreign investments" (Horisaka 2016a, pp. 85–86).

Horisaka points out that, in this 2003 meeting, due to the advance in the FTAA negotiations, and the MERCOSUR–EU Free Trade Agreement, the possibility of a trade agreement between Brazil and Japan was suggested.

In the 2005 meeting, on Lula's visit to Japan, a study group on the EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) was created, prompted by a myriad of factors, such as the mutual visits, Digital TV, and the acquisition of Embraer[6] aircraft by Japan Airlines in 2007 (Horisaka 2016a, p. 88).

It is not possible to pinpoint which individual factor was responsible for the rapprochement between Japan and Brazil. In actuality, many factors are responsible for the event, besides the need to avoid a very ubiquitous presence of China that might thwart Japan's freedom of action. However, as acts of good will from both parts on the intent to improve the bilateral relationship, three initiatives, in three different dimensions, can be highlighted: (i) the constitution of the G4 in 2004; (ii) the adoption of the Japanese Digital TV system in 2006; and (iii) the celebration of one hundred years of Japanese immigration in Brazil in 2008 (Cavalcante 2015).

Even though the intention to form a new and renewed United Nations Security Council had been on the diplomatic agenda since the early 1990s, the G4 acquired a formal political dimension, more assertive and official "with the proposal by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi" (Amorim 2005). The proposal, which included Germany, Japan–Brazil, and India, was highly symbolic, as it encompassed two developed and two developing (or emerging) countries, representing different regions of the world (Europe, East Asia–Latin America, and South Asia).[7]

The initiative was important because it proved that the bilateral relationship between Brazil and Japan was no longer limited to economic, commercial, and financial interests, or simply international cooperation, but also encompassed the political dimension, i.e., a joint venture in the quest to redefine the International System and Order. Japan's recognition of Brazil's role in future international negotiations on the restructuring of the commercial and financial orders, as well as the participation on coalitions of developing countries (UNASUR, IBSA, BRICS) was implied.

The process to digitalize the terrestrial television signal started during the Collor Government, but peaked during the Lula Government, with the launch of SBDTV (Brazilian Digital Television System), and the option (2006) to use the Japanese technology ISDB-T (Integrated Services Digital Broadcasting Terrestrial) instead of the European or North American standards (Ogasavara and Masiero 2010, pp. 185–186; Carvalho and Carvalho 2012).

Besides the undeniable technological quality of the Japanese standard, other factors influenced Brazil's decision, such as the possibility to (i) take part in the technological adjustments necessary for the reality of undeveloped countries; (ii) the installation of a semiconductor fabrication plant in the country; and (iii) the possibility of increasing its presence in other countries, especially in South America.

Therefore, Brazil's adoption of the Japanese standard for Digital TV, besides being "a symbol of this new bilateral relationship we can call *the partnership of the twenty-first century*" (Otta 2007), also became a symbol of technological cooperation between Brazil and Japan as it was reshaped with resources developed in Brazilian research centers and universities which were provided in the agreement signed with the Japanese government. Therefore, with technological innovations developed in Brazil, the Japanese standard became a Japanese–Brazilian standard, and was a clear example of technological collaboration (Oliveira 2009; Cavalcante 2015).

The Japanese–Brazilian standard was developed by integrating the technical basis of the Japanese system with Brazilian standards of digital compression of audio and video. Technologies developed by the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and Federal University of Paraíba were used, with emphasis on Ginga, the open-source national middleware platform (a software that translates what the user wants into the system and exchanges information between the application, the operating system and the device's electronic component) (IPEA 2018, p. 159; Vieira 2018).

Hitherto only available in Japanese–Brazilian and Japanese representatives became committed to promoting a standard that was adequate to the reality in Latin America, as Ginga was "internationally recognized as one of four digital television standards worldwide by the ITU (International Telecommunication Union)" (Carvalho and Carvalho 2012, p. 3).

After the Japanese–Brazilian system had been implemented in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), Japanese–Brazilian delegations endeavored to implement them in Central America (Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras), Asia (Philippines, Maldives, and Sri Lanka), and Botswana in Africa (IPEA 2018, p. 159). The Brazilian and Japanese governments provided technical cooperation to the countries that adopted the standard. In March 2019, Angola also adopted the Japanese–Brazilian standard (Cufuna 2020). As pointed out by Ken Shimanouchi, when developing digital TV technology based on the Japanese system, Brazil was triggering "another important aspect of this cooperation: collaboration with third countries" (Otta 2007).

Another expectation attached to the definition of the Digital TV standard was the condition that a semiconductor fabrication plant be built in the country. When this was suggested, the North American delegation withdrew from the negotiations, especially because the investment proposal (US$ 150 million in total) was much lower than that of other competitors (US$ 400 million from the Europeans and US$ 500 million from the Japanese), although none of them ensured the installation of a plant.

Even after Decree 558 (September 2006) earmarked resources from the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects for research and development in the field of semiconductors,[8] the government did not receive any concrete proposal on the installation of a semiconductor fabrication plant in Brazil. The terms of installation signed by the Brazilian and Japanese governments (June 2006) did not ensure a semiconductor fabrication plant, but only hinted at a possible cooperation on the electronic industry: "the Japanese Government will cooperate for the development of the semiconductor industry […] to attract investments from semiconductor manufacturers in Brazil" (Cruz 2008).

During the celebration of one hundred years of Japanese immigration in Brazil (2008), Itamaraty mentioned the installation of the semiconductor fabrication plant, but the response was clear that the Japanese government "cannot do anything about these investments, as they depend on the decisions of private companies" (Marin 2008).

The Brazilian government's emphasis on the celebration of one hundred years of Japanese immigration, as well as the visit of Crown Prince Naruhito to Brazil in June, taking part in the official ceremonies, was proof of both parts' unequivocal interest to use the commemorations as an opportunity to resume and expand the bilateral relationship. The term used by ambassador Ken Shimanouchi (2009) conveyed the mutual interest by saying: "to put it in other words, this is the 'rediscovery' of Brazil." In this regard, the Centennial celebrations were a valuable opportunity to "remodel the traditional relationship between Japan and Brazil, with new characteristics in terms of diversity and quality."

Shimanouchi also mentioned the role of "the largest Nikkei community outside Japan," or the "special bond" built through national projects such as Usiminas, Albrás, the development of the Cerrado biome, between the 1960s and 80s.

Although not emblematic, the bilateral rapprochement in the energy sector was also significant during this period. This comprised both biofuels and petroleum. Mitsui, although not intending to produce ethanol, showed interest in its logistics, transportation and distribution in Brazilian and Japanese territories; Mitsubishi looked for opportunities to buy private plants to produce ethanol in the country; Marubeni inquired about the possibility to develop a project to produce irrigated sugarcane in the State of Maranhão; Itochu announced that it was interested in the production, commercialization, and logistics of ethanol fuel. The government signed agreements with Japan for cooperation in this field, and it advanced talks to invest US$ 1.2 billion in research, production, and distribution of ethanol fuel. The preliminary project to use funds from Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) provided for R$ 680 million in projects for the manufacturing of sugarcane into ethanol and biofuels, R$ 520 million in direct investments to manufacturers, and R$ 86 million in research.[9]

In its strategic plan, Petrobras included the goal of surpassing the US as the world leader in biofuels sales by 2011, with national production of ethanol and biodiesel. To reach this goal, it started the Japanese company Nipaku, in partnership with the state company Nippon Alcohol Hanbai, to commercialize Brazilian ethanol in Japan and Asia (Caldas 2007).

For US$ 50 million, Petrobras bought 87.5% of the shares of the Japanese refinery Nansei Sekiyu, which belonged to the North American group ExxonMobil, while the other 12.5% belonged to Sumitomo. Petrobras also planned to invest US$ 885 million to modernize the refinery and sell oil derivatives in Japan and other Asian countries and to use the refinery's storage capacity to sell fuels, including ethanol, to neighboring countries, such as Korea and China (Agência Estado 2007).

The signing of JBPP (March 2000) was a big incentive to expand triangular cooperation provided by the two countries in Africa, allowing Brazil to play the role of a partner with similar responsibilities to those of Japan instead of just acting as a recipient. Thus, the "Brazil–Angola–Japan project: Building Capabilities at the Josina Machel Hospital" was one of the program's first projects. Seen as a test case of triangular cooperation, and presenting satisfactory results, it made the ProForsa, or HSPSP (Angola Health System Performance Strengthening Project) possible; this project was considered more ambitious (Sakaguchi and Veiga 2010; Cavalcante 2015, p. 81).

The most emblematic cooperation project was the Prosavana (Triangular Cooperation Program for agricultural development of Mozambique's tropical savannah), signed in 2009, with the participation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), the JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) and the Mozambique Agrarian investigation Institute, among others.

ProSavana was inspired and tried to reproduce the success of PRODECER. The main goal was to improve the research capacity and technology transfer to develop and implement productive projects in the field of commercial and family agriculture. However, critics pointed out that the project favored Vale (coal exports through the port of Nacala-a-Velha) and Odebrecht (construction works to turn the air base of Nacala into an international airport). But the main criticism regarded the lack of transparency, as they excluded peasant organizations and civil society representatives in Mozambique (Cavalcante 2015, pp. 94–96). This is the primary concern with projects based on the PRODECER model, which had been implemented in an uninhabited area with exceptionally large land properties; it was incompatible with the Mozambican territory, which featured small farms with high demographic density.[10]

2.4.2 *Difficulties Caused by Crises and Abe's Efforts to Strengthen the Partnership "Together"*

There were two major obstacles to creating closer ties between the two countries at the end of the 2000s. First, the global financial crisis of 2008, which hit developed countries especially hard and affected both imports and investments, causing a negative impact on Japan's relationship with Brazil.

The other major obstacle, also caused by the crisis, directly affected the political and strategic dimension. It forced Japan to focus on regional issues in East Asia, but also created incentives for a rapprochement with Brazil both economically and politically.

As the environment in East Asia became more unstable and China's power and influence grew more assertive, Japan sought to play a more hegemonic role in the region and, in view of its nuclear vulnerability, strengthened its military alliance with the US and expanded defense and military security cooperation with some ASEAN members (Emmers 2018, p. 362).

However, with difficulty trusting the US's commitment to safeguarding security in the region and considering the growing certainty of China's rise not only economically, but also politically and strategically, Japan was forced to expand partnerships outside the region. Reelected in December 2012, Shinzo Abe stated that he had come back to rejuvenate[11] Japan, to overcome the long period of economic stagnation after the global financial crisis of 2008, and to restore national pride and power (Inoguchi 2014, p. 102).

With the prestige he obtained after the initial success of the economic project, Abe introduced the doctrine of "proactive pacifism," a clear demonstration of the changes he would affect during his mandate. One particularly meaningful change was the substitution of the economic model controlled by the bureaucracy, who made the decisions, for a stronger political leadership (Horisaka 2016a, p. 83).

Therefore, in 2014, during Abe's visit, the Brazil–Japan relationship was elevated to the level of Global Strategic Partnership. There was the establishment of an annual Brazil–Japan Dialog between Foreign Ministers, to discuss political, strategic, and economic issues. President Dilma highlighted that Japan was Brazil's most traditional partner in Asia and recognized the key role it played in international economic and political issues (Brasil 2014).

It is obvious that Abe's intention, two weeks after Xi Jinping's visit to Brazil, was to redefine relations with Brazil (and Latin America) after China had become Brazil's largest commercial partner in 2009 and had been increasing investments in the country. By recalling Japan's historic presence and the partnership between the two countries, he proposed to "expand relations further, to grow together, to contribute together and inspire together." For Saccomandi (2014), Abe's declaration referred to the fact that Japan proposed common development, while China prioritized its own.

In practice, Japan was proposing new guidelines to strengthen the relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, based on "Together", namely "Progress together" (strengthen economic connections through global chains of value and quality infrastructure); "Lead together" (strengthen value connections through common ground and political dialog); and "Inspire together" (strengthen knowledge connections to face challenges through innovation) (Japan 2014).

Even if the brief time frame between the visits was a coincidence, they had the same motivations and were attracted by Brazil's economic, commercial, and political assets. The strategies were, however, different. Both were interested in energy investment deals, while Japan was also seeking support for its candidacy to a non-permanent member seat at the Security Council in 2015. While China could offer its consumer market and an abundance of resources for investment, Japan was betting on the untapped potential of the ethnically Japanese population in Brazil, as well as political values such as democracy (Ford 2014).

As a highly symbolic gesture that expressed Japan's interest in Brazil, Abe launched the global cultural center "Japan House," aiming to value Japan in the international community, mixing soft power with commercial interests (Farnsworth 2017). It must be noted that the first Japan House was inaugurated in São Paulo, in May 2017, followed by London in June 2018, and Los Angeles in August 2018.

Aware of the difficulty, or even the impossibility, of competing with China and its ambitious Belt and Roads Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Acharya 2017, pp. 277–278), Japan began emphasizing the quality of its investments over their quantity, implicitly contrasting its standards of engagement in the Latin American economy with China's (Farnsworth 2017).

As was pointed out before, the debt crisis of the 1980s had a negative effect on the economic and trade relationship, but not on technical cooperation, which even allowed for the emergence of triangular cooperation. In this regard, Japan's new guidelines ("Together") reinforced the principles of triangular cooperation as an instrument for the development of recipient countries, but also as an instrument to strengthen strategic partnerships and increase its presence on the world stage. Objectively, they reinforce the Brazil–Japan partnership and improve both countries' international image.

Triangular cooperation with Brazil is a priority for Japan, since "it views Brazil as a major emerging country that can transfer know-how to other developing countries, and a major emerging country with which it shares similar political characteristics." Furthermore, Japan does not even consider the possibility of a similar cooperation with China, as they are competing for international influence (Inoue and Vaz 2012, p. 523).

Hamaguchi and Murakami (2014, p. 165) claim that Japan's slow population decline jeopardizes the future of the industry and economic growth in the country, which forces them to transfer production abroad. However, the globalization of Japan's industry is highly concentrated in East Asia, and it does not successfully advance in other promising markets. The authors argue that "with its high level of manufacturing technology, the Japanese industry still keeps high potential to grow if it innovates strategy for globalization" and that "Latin America presents fertile unexplored opportunities in this direction."

Horisaka (2016b, p. 170) also highlights the tendency of population decline and argues that "looking for opportunities in the foreign market is inevitable for Japanese companies"; he adds that "Brazil is a strong candidate for this purpose."

The lack of integration in Latin America, without much trade of intermediate goods, is an obstacle for designing a strategy in the region. For example, Mexico's production is still dependent on the supply of parts from East Asia, which makes it more profitable to export directly to the US instead of assembling items in Mexico, as it is cheaper to acquire parts (Hamaguchi and Murakami 2014, p. 174).

Even so, the population with medium income has been growing, and with it the consumption of high-tech products, which stimulate innovations that help meet the demand. "The recent adaptation of the Japanese Digital TV system by most LACs based on Japan–Brazil technological cooperation is a good example" (Hamaguchi and Murakami 2014, pp. 175–176).

It is interesting that, during the 1970s, when Japanese investments in Brazil peaked, criticisms were the same. Horisaka (1990) pointed out the following hindrances to the larger flow of Japanese capital into Brazil during the 1980s: (i) the fact that the market had stagnated and needed to be made more dynamic by increasing the population's purchasing power (social, land, education and tax reforms); (ii) the need for more industrial linkages in the regional market; and (iii) closer economic ties with the US. In general, Horisaka pointed out the need to expand markets, which meant that along with the Brazilian market, the Latin American and North American markets were of interest.

Given that Japan's diagnosis in the 1970s was real, as rated by Horisaka, but it did not become a reality for the lack of a broader and more stable market, we can argue with a certain level of confidence that Asia's current tendency to allocate FDI in Brazil's manufacturing sector is a result of a broader market assessment, as well as the existence of a specialized workforce and a stable political and economic environment. That is why, in the early years of the 2010s, there was a clear investment tendency, not only from China, but also Japan and Korea, in the country's manufacturing and service industries.[12]

Besides the tendency to transfer production to Brazil–Japan also shows constant interest in forming closer ties by signing an EPA. According to Horisaka (2016a, pp. 87–93), after the EPA study group of 2005, the High-Level Group Brazil–Japan was created in 2007. After five meetings, in 2015, it presented the report *Brazil–Japan: Roadmap for an Economic Partnership Agreement*, with a large array of subjects to be debated that could build broader economic ties than a free trade area. Recognizing the difficulties of such a task, especially when considering the embarrassments caused by MERCOSUR's customs union, Horisaka pointed out that the report "is an achievement of Keindanren and CNI's business diplomacy".[13]

While Japan resumed its economic growth and left the deflation period behind, thanks to a series of economic policies Shinzo Abe implemented after coming to power in 2012 (Abenomics), growing tensions in Brazil, together with the serious recession that began in 2015, brought the negotiations to a halt. Nevertheless, the opposition of the industrial sectors in Brazil and Argentina, fearful of the Japanese competition, cannot be omitted (Olmos 2007).

2.5 Conclusion

The history and motivations for the bilateral relationship between Brazil and Japan show the reality of a shared mutual interest, which can be called a partnership, albeit prone to crises led by circumstances.

First, although neither Brazil nor Japan was each other's first option to establish a migration flow, random factors created the conditions for Brazil to become the country with the largest Japanese population outside Japan.[14] This was not a decisive factor, but it provided a "symbolic tie between the two countries" (Uehara 2013, p. 145). Ninomiya (2016, pp. 159–161), for example, argues that the bilateral relationship is founded on the "human bond" created by the Japanese who migrated to Brazil, as well as the presence of dekasegi Brazilian citizens.

Second, the economic and financial complementarity enabled them to contribute to each other's national development projects. This complementarity suffered setbacks during the 1980s due in part to the acceleration of the economic crisis in Latin

America, but also to Japan's economic reorientation toward China and Southeast Asia. This was especially true after the appreciation of the Yen against the dollar, with the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the subsequent reallocation of capital from Japanese companies.

Third, and despite the growing conflict between the US and Japan in the 1990s, in the so-called dispute between the Asian and Western economies, Japan was interested in a rapprochement with Latin America, and Brazil in particular. An emblematic example of this interest is the ongoing partnership in providing triangular cooperation; a concrete example of such partnership was the role Japan played in financing the first meetings of the recently institutionalized FEALAC.

Fourth, the will for closer ties between Asia and Latin America is evident. The starting point for this is the initiatives aiming at institutionalizing a high-level political rapprochement and implementing programs and plans to create closer economic, political, and cultural ties between the two regions. Koizumi's visit in 2004, and Abe's in 2014 convey these favorable circumstances to elevate the bilateral relationship to the level of a Global Strategic Partnership.

Besides Brazil's traditional attractiveness, for Japan the partnership also conveys ongoing changes in East Asia, or even in the International System. On the one hand, it prevented the American continent from closing in on itself as a free trade area; on the other, it minimized embarrassments or dependence because of the roles China increasingly played as both a regional and global power.

Notes

1. The concept of East Asia has been used since the end of the Cold War, more specifically after the Asian crisis, indicating the tendency to combine countries from Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula) with those of Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam).
2. Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are the original members of the ASEAN, created in 1967. Brunei was admitted in 1984; Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1996, and Cambodia in 1999.
3. Matsushita used the model developed by Krasner (1978) and modified by Pempel (1983).
4. PRODECER I began in 1979 and received US$ 60 million. PRODECER II began in 1985 and received US$ 375 million in investments. PRODECER III received investments of US$ 138 million from 1995 to 2002, 60% of which came from the Japanese government. For more detailed accounts, see Dantas (2019) and Hosono et al. (2019).
5. As a basic proposal, this initiative was aimed at institutionalizing a high-level political rapprochement and implementing programs and plans to deepen economic, political, and cultural ties between the two regions. The inaugural meeting took place in September 1999, in Singapore (Meeting of High Officials).
6. "Embraer sells US$ 3,1 bi to Lufthansa and JAL," *Folha de São Paulo*, June 19, 2007.
7. Its negative result will not be analyzed here, as it goes beyond the scope of the article.
8. The entirety of the decree can be accessed at: http://www.convergenciadigital.com.br/inf/portaria_558.pdf.

9. "Ethanol attracts a wave of Japanese investments." *Valor Econômico*, July 3, 2006. Available at https://jornalcana.com.br/etanol-atrai-onda-de-aportes-japoneses/; "Ethanol: the world wants it. Brazil has it." *Exame*, June 15, 2006. Available at https://doczz.com.br/doc/754613/etanol-o-mundo-quer.-o-brasil-tem.
10. Informal conversation with Nobuaki Hamaguchi in September 2018.
11. A response to the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the Triple Disaster of March 11, 2011 (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster) which deeply affected the population and the government.
12. These were ideas partly discussed by Oliveira (2014).
13. This series of negotiations around the EPA is based on Horisaka (2016a, pp. 87–93).
14. Two factors were crucial. The first, as a result of immigration, and as demanded by the Brazilian government, was that families, and no single individuals, migrated into the country; second, the fact that there was not a strong anti-Japanese sentiment in the country.

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Chapter 3
Japan's ODA to Developing Countries in the Health Sector: Overall Trend and Future Prospects

Rodrigo Pires de Campos and Saori Kawai

3.1 Introduction

This chapter identifies the overall trends of Japan's official development assistance (ODA) policies for the health sector in developing countries from 1990 to 2020 and their prospects, given the COVID-19 pandemic.

The history of Japan's ODA is directly related to the post-Second World War era when Great Britain was engaged in continued efforts to maintain its influence in the former colonies of the Asia–Pacific region, including Australia, Canada, Ceylon (presently Sri Lanka), India, New Zealand, and Pakistan. In January 1950, a Commonwealth Conference on Foreign Affairs was held in Colombo, Ceylon,[1] during which the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific was conceived. The Colombo Plan, which evolved from the original group of seven Commonwealth nations into an intergovernmental organization composed of 27 members, including non-Commonwealth countries, was officially launched in July 1951 (The Colombo Plan 2021).

Japan was affiliated with the Colombo Plan in October 1954, launching, at the time, its first international technical cooperation projects. Similar to other countries' initiatives to institutionalize their foreign aid activities, in March 1961, Japan established the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) as the implementing agency for loan aid, which assumed management over the Southeast Asia Development Cooperation Fund from the Export–Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM). In June 1962, Japan launched the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) to administer Japan's technical assistance. In August 1974, the Japan International Cooperation Agency

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(JICA) was founded to replace the OTCA. In the meantime, several other organizations were established, such as the Japan Emigration Service (JEMIS) and Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), which expanded and strengthened Japan's Official Development Aid (ODA) institutional framework. In October 1999, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) was established by merging JEXIM and OECF. Finally, in October 2008, the "new JICA" was established, merging the former JICA—specialized in technical cooperation—and the JBIC. Today, JICA is responsible for Japan's technical and financial aid (JICA 2021a).

It is worth noting that, since April 1964, Japan has been a fully-fledged member of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). The organization was founded in December 1960 during the first half of the Cold War under the leadership of the United States and less than two years after the Cuban Revolution with the explicit purpose of focusing on the twofold objective of achieving sustainable economic growth that could contribute to the development of the world economy and contributing to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral basis (OECD 1960). The OECD plays a major role in guiding and overseeing members' ODA figures and policies through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), currently supported by the Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD).

Japan's ODA scheme can be divided into bilateral and multilateral aid, which is provided through international organizations. JICA, the ODA implementing agency, oversees the former, which includes bilateral technical cooperation, grant aid, and loans. Multilateral aid in the health sector involves contributions to the WHO through government agencies such as the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, and the Cabinet Office.

Nowadays, JICA's motto is "leading the world with trust," meaning that the agency "values the relationship of mutual trust with developing countries and is working with them to rise to the challenges" (JICA 2021b). JICA's mission is aimed at two basic international development goals: human security, which means "aiming for a society where all people can protect themselves from various threats and live their daily lives in security and with dignity," and quality growth, which seeks to promote "sustainable growth with less disparity and without harming the environment" (JICA 2021b). The agency's work worldwide is organized into four main themes or topics: people, peace, prosperity, and planet (commonly referred to as the 4Ps). Under each topic, the agency targets development sectors or areas (see Table 3.1 for a full list). It is important to clarify that the motto and main international cooperation topics and sectors, like any other international aid agency, reveal the agency's prime concerns and agendas and that they vary or change over time, as we shall see in this chapter, due to several domestic and external factors. Generally speaking, JICA's main international development themes and sectors/areas are as follows.

Since the end of the Cold War, watershed events have constantly changed the landscape of international cooperation and foreign aid in the health sector. Similar to other international aid donors, Japan has devised priorities and strategies for its health projects based on a set of internal and external factors in a perpetually changing

Table 3.1 JICA's main international development themes and sectors/areas

People: A society where all can live healthy, safe lives
• Education • Health • Social security
Peace: A peaceful, just society without fear or violence
• State-Building to Prevent the Outbreak and Recurrence of Conflicts • Governance Support • Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls
Prosperity: A prosperous, sustainable economy at harmony with nature and prepared for promoting social development
• Agricultural and Rural Development • Private Sector Development • Urban and Regional Development • Ensure Access to Affordable and Clean Energy • Development of Transport Infrastructure
Planet: Care for the Planet
• Environmental Conservation and Management • Water Resources Management • Disaster Risk Reduction • Climate Change

Source JICA (2021b)

world. This chapter explores and analyzes the process to identify overall trends from a perspective that combines conceptual and theoretical notes and debates on international cooperation and foreign aid for health.

The guiding research questions are as follows: What were the major trends in Japan's ODA policies in the health sector from 1990 to 2020? Which international health debates and international cooperation factors have exerted influence on these trends? What are the prospects for the future of Japan's ODA, given the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts?

This study relied on primary and secondary sources. In terms of primary sources, we obtained the Japanese versions of the annual reports on the implementation of Japan's ODA Annual Reports (1997–1999), Japan's ODA White Papers (2001–2014), and the White Papers on Development Cooperation (2015–2020), which are available on the Internet as of November 2021.[2] Based on these documents, we compiled the relevant information and the overall structure of each report, organized it by chronological order, and then comprehensively tabulated the descriptions of the health sector in each piece. From this, we created a matrix that facilitated the identification and analysis of the overall structure and dynamics of the country's ODA policies in the health sector over the years. Another primary source that we used to explore Japan's ODA commitments and disbursements for the health sector from 1990 to 2020 was the online database provided by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In addition, secondary sources—academic literature on international cooperation and foreign aid for health—helped devised a preliminary and tentative analytical framework.

This chapter is organized into two sections. Section 3.2 briefly introduces historical, conceptual, and theoretical notes and debates on international cooperation and foreign aid, specifically concerning international cooperation and foreign aid to promote health. Section 3.3 explores and analyzes Japan's ODA in the health sector from 1990 to 2020. Finally, we present final considerations of overall trends and prospects, with a special emphasis on the potential impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on international cooperation and Japan's ODA.

3.2 Toward an Initial and Provisional Analytical Framework of International Cooperation and Foreign Aid for Health

This first section explores current conceptual and theoretical notes and debates on international cooperation and foreign aid for health to devise an initial and provisional analytical framework that can help identify Japan's overall ODA trends for the health sector and reflect on its prospects. In an attempt to contribute to the joint effort of brainstorming effective partnerships for the future to create a framework of Brazil–Japan cooperation, we purposefully explored specialized Brazilian and Latin American literature on international cooperation aimed at promoting health that raises the current issues of contention and debate.

3.2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Notes and Debates on International Cooperation and Foreign Aid

The practice of international cooperation dates back to Thucydides' classic book "The history of the Peloponnesian War," which was written more than 2,000 years ago. However, in the academic field of international relations, the expansion of the theory of international cooperation is relatively recent. International relations was first established as an academic field around the 1920s in Europe. Until the mid-to-late-1980s, the initial theory of international cooperation relied primarily on the hegemonic stability theory (HST) hypothesis to explain the occurrence of international cooperation among nations in an anarchic international system. One advocate of this line of thinking stated that "for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (Kindleberger 1973, p. 305). The prevalence of HST as an undisputable international cooperation hypothesis for more than 60 years can be partly attributed to the lack of academic interest and effort toward theorizing the phenomenon under the unfavorable historical context of crises, wars, and conflicts that marked the twentieth century. Indeed, this context helped maintain HST, which remained uncontested during that period (Pires de Campos et al. 2010).

However, inspired by the development of neorealists' structural analyses of the international system during the 1970s, from the mid-to-late-1980s, a new generation of international cooperation theorists began to flourish (Keohane 1984; Grieco 1990; Haas 1990; among several others). By incorporating a systemic analytical framework for international cooperation among nations, combined with game theory, a new set of hypotheses beyond HST emerged that explained the phenomenon of reciprocity and reputation among states, different international strategic settings, relative gains among states, number of actors, domestic politics, and international institutions (Milner 1992; Dai et al. 2010).

Regardless of the progress made by the new generation of theorists, HST has retained its explanatory power for international cooperation. In essence, the theory explains the occurrence of international cooperation among sovereign states in an anarchic international system as the result of the action of a hegemony whose outstanding military, political, and economic power under a respective zone of influence guarantees intergovernmental cooperative arrangements in various areas and issues of the hegemon's interest (Pires de Campos et al. 2010, p. 9). The reemergence of such analytical considerations makes it evident that since recent theoretical efforts indicate that the occurrence of international cooperation among nations in the international system can be directly influenced by several factors other than hegemony, hegemony continues to hold a critical, although not exclusive, explanatory capacity.

Within this context, the practice of international cooperation—defined among academia since the mid-1980s as "mutual adjustment of state policies to one another" (Keohane 1984, p. 31)—can be explained either by the unilateral imposition of policies by hegemonies or by more democratic and multilateral processes supported by other influential, but not hegemonic, states in the international system.

Recently, a number of analysts worldwide have returned to hegemony to explain the current failures in international cooperation to face global issues and challenges. The devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, coupled with the nations' considerable difficulties promoting effective international cooperation to tackle the crisis equitably have led analysts to become more interested and critical of the history of the establishment of the Liberal International Order (LIO) after the Second World War and the history and evolution of Western international institutions in that order (see, for example, Lake et al. 2021; Almeida and Pires de Campos 2020).

In fact, Lake et al. (2021, p. 234) argued that "the LIO has been challenged from the very beginning, from forces both within and without, and by feedback between internal and external dynamics." According to the authors, four lessons can be drawn immediately: (i) "*orders are clubs that include as well as exclude*"; (ii) "*international orders are not neutral but embody a set of material, ideational, and normative interests congealed into institutions and practices*"; (iii) "*institutions are social constructs that rest on social foundations*"; and (iv) "*domestic politics matter for the LIO*" (pp. 246–250).

In a multidisciplinary analysis focused on current issues and future challenges for the WHO regarding multilateralism, world order, and COVID-19, Almeida and Pires de Campos (2020, p. 32) recognized the intensification of disturbing and disruptive events in times of hegemonic transition or inflection. As a sociopolitical space of continuous negotiations, confrontations, and clashes, the WHO is affected in different ways and at different levels during these times by several forces. These include a proliferation of new actors and financing mechanisms, neoliberalism, the erosion of public services provided by states, the ascendancy of the health security agenda and its exclusive emphasis on specific geopolitical "health threats," among others. These findings indicate that:

> […] the [present-day] fragility of WHO originates from a twofold dynamic: by assuming and incorporating the precepts of the new neoliberal world order, in order to guarantee its survival, [WHO] gradually distances itself from more holistic approaches to collective health, with a public good focus, compromising its performance in the face of contemporary health challenges, internalizing the problems arising from this option and becoming hostage to powerful actors focused on their own interests. (pp. 35–36) (translated by the authors)

Inspired by Ruggie's (1992) argument that the definition of multilateralism by a number of actors hides the fact that multilateral arrangements can be, in practice, controlled by one or a few members and by Ikenberry's (2001) argument that institutions freeze the stratification of power resulting from systemic disputes, thus establishing an ordering of norms and decision-making structures favorable to great powers, Lima and Albuquerque (2021) recognized that the COVID-19 pandemic brought to light a critical issue in multilateralism and highlighted the need to deepen the mechanisms of collective action (Lima and Albuquerque 2021, pp. 8–11).

The authors analyze the United Nations (UN) as a universal, governmental, and, above all, political organization that has struggled to ensure a truly inclusive and diverse multilateral system since its creation. Despite some advances achieved by developing countries within the UN General Assembly over the years, the dominance of US interests in the organization before, during, and after the Cold War is paramount. This situation contributed to the current crisis of multilateralism, especially within the context of emerging hegemonic tensions between the two great powers at present: the United States and China. Against this backdrop, Lima and Albuquerque (2021, p. 17) pointed out that:

> The diagnosis of a crisis that characterizes the current period is complex since it includes changes of a systemic and structural nature, deficiencies in the functioning of the UN, and a crisis of legitimacy, to cite the most obvious reasons. In this context, the COVID-19 pandemic can be understood as a critical juncture that maximized the effects of pre-existing problems [...]. The paradox is that when collective multilateral regulation is most needed to deal with public evil, institutions such as the UN and WHO are weaker than in the past. (translated by the authors)

International cooperation for development, also known generally as foreign aid, and more strictly as ODA, is defined as necessary "to promote economic development through a transfer of resources and knowledge from industrialized to developing countries" (Feinberg 1993, p. 309). Thus, it bears a close relation to international cooperation among nations, as defined above. In 1984, Robert O. Keohane, an influential theorist of international cooperation among nations, showed that foreign aid is commonly nested within international arrangements derived from international cooperation among nations. According to Keohane (1984), the international trade regime

> […] is nested within a set of other arrangements, including those for monetary relations, energy, foreign investment, aid to developing countries, and other issues, which together constitute a complex and interlinked pattern of relations among the advanced market-economy countries. These, in turn, are related to military-security relations among the major states. (pp. 90–91)

Thus, in defiance of the apparently neutral or positive meaning commonly associated with the term "international cooperation among nations" and foreign aid, it is imperative to consider the phenomenon in historical, cultural, social, economic, and political contexts as complex expressions of domestic and global idiosyncrasies, forces, and movements revolving around several factors, among which hegemony seems to be the gravitational center.

Lastly, a closer look at the theoretical developments in the last 40 years helps us identify the prevalence of international and domestic factors as prevailing hypotheses in international cooperation theory to the detriment of hypotheses based on individual factors. Recently, the individual dimension of international cooperation has become an emerging issue in Japan's ODA. Sato (2021) indicated that, although changes in the Japanese government's international cooperation philosophy over time had led to consideration of the individual dimension in foreign aid, the issue suffered from a lack of concern regarding the "Development Cooperation Charter," approved by the cabinet of ministers, in which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs still defines "development cooperation as "international cooperation activities that the government and its affiliated agencies conduct for the main purpose of development in developing regions." According to the author, with regard to policy discussion, "the people" are absent or hidden behind Japan's philosophy of development cooperation. Even though former JICA president Ms. Sadako Ogata tried to adopt "human security" in the implementation of international cooperation for development, it remains difficult to determine whether ODA was carried out with an awareness of individuals (Sato 2021, p. 190).

Therefore, the current international context demands a closer examination of the interconnections between international cooperation and foreign aid, with special attention given to the role of hegemony and international cooperation. Inspired by Almeida and Pires de Campos (2020, p. 16), who consider the WHO "not as a mere formal and static organization, composed by member-states organized around a set of norms, rules and decision procedures, but rather as a socio-political arena where negotiations and confrontations take place, reflecting the broader dynamics of multilateralism and the world order," we assume JICA to be more than a formal and static governmental organization but rather a sort of socio-political arena in which academicians and professionals, interest groups, organizations, and institutions' views are confronted, negotiated, and advanced in constant, dynamic, and complex ways reflecting domestic, foreign, international, and global policies, and, more widely, the world order itself.

This first section clarified some interconnections between international cooperation and foreign aid. In addition, the chapter introduced a wide range of contending theoretical hypotheses that explain the phenomenon of international cooperation and the recent return of hegemony. This leads us to consider Japan's ODA as predominantly, although not exclusively, aligned with a hegemonic Western effort to maintain its influence and agendas in Asia. In this sense, Japan's ODA for health does not necessarily reflect developing countries' needs and demands but rather the prevailing interests and agendas that are more broadly expressed in international and multilateral health cooperation initiatives. The following subsection explores some notes and debates on foreign aid and international cooperation for health.

3.2.2 Conceptual and Theoretical Notes and Debates on Foreign Aid and International Cooperation for Health

The ongoing debate on international health has led to the emergence of policies that eventually became diffused across countries through international cooperation by "mutual" adjustments[3] or associated foreign aid. Almeida (1996, 2017) aptly summarized the historical process and the importance of hegemony in its progression. Health had become a central international cooperation issue, especially from the mid-to the end of the nineteenth century, when countries first established common protocols to fight diseases that were affecting international trade, in particular cholera, plague, and yellow fever. The creation of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), an important reference for health cooperation on the American continent, dates back to 1902. Later in the twentieth century between the two world wars, health aid prioritized scientific and technological advances as a result of a clear and direct influence of the United States, an emerging hegemony.

During the 1960s and the 1970s, the decolonization of former African and Asian colonies, international health cooperation focused on community care, prioritization of public health, and health systems based on primary health care (PHC) were inspired by the influence of the post-great war welfare state. From the mid-1970s to the 1980s, a combination of economic, political, and social factors, including national and international debt and financial crises, unequal economic globalization, implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) by UN financial institutions, aggravation of world poverty, the worldwide spread of HIV/AIDS, civil and political turmoil in the fight for democracy in Latin American countries, and independence movements in African and Asian former colonies led to strong criticism of the key foundations of health service systems, primarily medical assistance, and, eventually, to underfinancing and weakening of health service systems and the introduction of a post-welfare agenda for health through health system reforms. The relationship between health and human rights and health and the public good was strongly questioned and challenged and health conditions and indicators worldwide deteriorated rapidly.

During the 1980s and the 1990s, the negative impacts of neoliberal policies on social equity led to the definition of social development as a renewed foreign aid priority. Under this context, social development received greater attention in foreign aid expenditure worldwide (Pires de Campos 1998). Simultaneously, health aid moved away from strengthening healthcare systems.

From the 2000s until the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, so-called "public–private partnerships" increased exponentially, questioning the sufficiency of the state as the sole actor, and were interpreted as "a concerted response to address the worrisome increase in the burden of disease in the world." According to Almeida (2017, pp. 63–67):

> This oscillation became the rule over time, and the bilateral or multilateral allocation of foreign aid or international cooperation resources to countries and regions around the world took place in complex political and economic processes permeated by strategic, national, and international considerations. Further, the conditionalities and priorities, always present, have changed over the decades, according to the different conjunctures and tastes of the dominant powers.

The unexpected terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 eventually led to a new shift in the paradigms of international cooperation and foreign aid for health, increasing concerns about national and global health risks and health security. Almeida (2013, pp. 240–241) asserted that at the turn of the century, the world experienced an unprecedented intense proliferation and dissemination of several health-related risks, such as the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases, the emergence of drug-resistant pathogens, the spread of non-communicable chronic diseases, a generalization of the effects of pollution and environmental changes, and an increase in violence. Combined with geopolitical interests, the author argues that these events have led to the emergence of the health paradigm as a national security issue. Despite the relevance of several actors, the United States played a leading role in this shift, motivated by the country's responses to the 2001 terrorist attacks to influence other countries and international organizations.

Inspired by Franklin D. Roosevelt's four freedoms that guided the creation of the UN, human security has been broadly defined as "freedom from want and freedom from fear." The terms "human security" and "health security" gradually became the prevailing paradigms and were included in international reports, declarations, and agreements. The 2003 report entitled "Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People," for example, was written by the Independent Commission on Human Security established at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, held in New York and was a Japanese governmental initiative[4] supported by the Swedish government, World Bank, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Japan Center for International Exchange. Similarly, the Global Health Security Initiative was established in 2004 a high-level group of experts from the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the WHO joined forces to define activities that could strengthen the capacity of surveillance and promote a rapid response to pandemics. Along with several other initiatives, these movements led to what specialists in global health consider to be the establishment of robust links between health, foreign policy, globalization, security, and development (Almeida 2013, pp. 242–245).

> However, the link between health, foreign policy and security, as a promoter of development, is problematic for several reasons, among which the following stand out: a) the close link between health and very specific and linked political-ideological, economic, and security agendas to certain interests and values and b) the fact of being at the service of the strategy of hegemony and domination of great powers. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence to support the arguments that defend this association and some studies show fragile correlations between health, economic development, and national security variables, which are devoid, however, of the respective historical, social, and geographical contexts (Ingram, 2005: 537). In addition, many of the justifications used to declare that certain diseases are a threat to national security — the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the African military, as a sign of destabilization of the new States, and the spread of the disease around the world from the US military in missions (or wars) in Africa, among others — were also not accurate (Feldbaum et al., 2010). (Almeida 2013, p. 245)

The devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide have created an opportunity to reflect on what kinds of international cooperation for health have been promoted in the world since the establishment of the international liberal order in the second half of the twentieth century. In fact, international cooperation for health has been the topic of intense academic discussion for the last three decades, which the COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced and deepened.

As previously indicated, the COVID-19 pandemic put to the test more than just international cooperation capacity. Indeed, scholars have stressed that it has revealed numerous weaknesses and contradictions that undermine the very foundations of the international (liberal) order. Within this context, Almeida et al. (2013) emphasized the adequacy of adopting a view of health that incorporates the (geo)political dimension of power relations in the contemporary world system, an arena with extensive inequalities and structural violence demanding collective struggles in which there is no place for naivety:

> What these authors describe is a way to address health problems that extends worldwide, across borders and bodies, by going beyond the biological and medical focus to address health concerns also as political issues and political options (Fassin, 2010; Lézé & Fassin, 2013). This means considering Global Health with an "attitude." It also consists of looking at, questioning, and acting with (and sometimes against) some of the unprecedented constellations of international and transnational actors involved in the political field of health. This is so permeated by inequalities and structural violence (Fassin, 1996; Farmer, 2001) that it now demands a collective struggle in both scientific research and political action on health. Accordingly, this struggle is no place for naivety; rather one should be mindful that it is also a locus of power relations and for building political force in order to achieve changes in health priorities. (Almeida et al. 2013, p. 2)

Almeida (2020, p. 22) endorsed a critical understanding of international cooperation in health, especially when one considers that "the definition of global health is variable, both descriptively and prescriptively, and in both cases, its uses are embedded in 'particular normative frameworks' that depend on whomever is formulating the problem and its solution […]" for it "constitutes a scientific and political field disputed by different actors, disciplines, and paradigms" (Almeida et al. 2013, p. 1). In short, "[…] health interventions are not neutral, nor based [always] on scientific evidence […]" (Almeida 2017, p. 52). Therefore, in general terms, there appear to be two main approaches to international cooperation for health: "health treated as a disease, in the strict sense and centered on a certain few epidemic or endemic diseases, and the need to control health problems globally, which not uncommonly is bound up with geopolitical objectives" (Almeida et al. 2013, p. 2).

Almeida (2017, p. 55) approaches international cooperation for development from the assumption that

> […] foreign aid and international cooperation for development are historically marked by the social, political, and economic relations and practices of each particular society and by the position that society occupies in the world system. However, the political-ideological projects that guide this aid or cooperation assume particular meanings in specific historical conjunctures permeated by permanent tensions and disputes.

A reflection of this assumption is the continuously changing relevance of health throughout history (Almeida 2017, pp. 44–45). Until Second World War, the US bilateral aid to the world articulated military and research interests in public health and medicine. Immediately after Second World War, the establishment of the UN system under US leadership expanded the country's aid agenda to world reconstruction and development. A few years later, during the Cold War, health aid was marginalized by security concerns and became a mere instrument for pursuing national interests. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, health aid gradually returned to the forefront of the international development agenda. The end of bipolarity pushed health onto the agendas of the UN Security Council and the G8 as a key issue in the debate on globalization and health security. Regarding the latter point, Almeida (2017, p. 46) argued that "In reality, it is disease, not health that becomes a geopolitical issue." It is important to note that these variations all favored the prevailing hegemony.

In contrast, Garay et al. (2013, p. 8), in reference to the etymology of the term "global," articulated three basic principles that should guide true global health: (i) "health for all" (for all people worldwide), (ii) "health by all" (by a representative range of stakeholders and actors), and (iii) "health in all" (multi-sectorial efforts to increase health, with special attention to social determinants of health). These three basic principles rest on several international legal frameworks: the WHO's constitutional objective refers to "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health" (i.e., health for all). The 1978 Declaration of Alma-Ata highlights the central role of community participation in improved health (i.e., health by all), as does the Ottawa Charter for health promotion, which recognizes that "the health of individuals and populations is dependent on a host of environmental, economic, social and political factors" (health in all).[5]

Notwithstanding their relevance, "these principles are not consistently included in discussions about global health, let alone fulfilled" (Garay et al. 2013, p. 8). Health for all has been negatively affected by global inequity and the overall de-funding of the WHO by nation states in the last few decades, which led the organization to focus on private actors' agendas and priorities. Meanwhile, health by all has been affected by the lack of democratic national and global governance frameworks, which are commonly influenced by market and communication factors and private actors. Last but not least, health in all has been negatively impacted by the lack of assessments on "health actions and relations with other international and trans-territorial policies, agreements, and dynamics." For example, limitations on access to medicine through trade or migration agreements may hinder health aid activities.

Regarding the ontological dimensions of the term global health, Garay et al. (2013, p. 6) highlighted three types of actors: private and public–private initiatives, international organizations, and national and regional organizations. As for private and public–private initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization, and the Global Strategy on Women and Children's Health, there has been a focus on "only some health problems, some interventions, or some population groups," which clearly falls short from the "health for all" principle or dimension. As for international organizations, the term global health "remains undefined, and simply related to some of the factors influencing/improving it." Finally, for national and regional organizations, it has been verified that the European Union (EU), Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland "have developed policies on global health" and that "they [do] discuss the globalized and multi-sectorial influence on health and are aimed at improving both the health of their citizens and of those in the wider world."

As a result, it is argued that "the traditional international health paradigm of a rich country helping a poor country does not adequately address the complex determinants of health in the world today" (Garay et al. 2013, p. 8). Given increasing national health inequities, some propose that foreign aid should concentrate on decreasing disparities by adopting a "wider-than-health approach that targets social determinants [of health]".[6]

> While the global health agenda aims at a "health-in-all" approach, the democratic governance ("by all") of this agenda in action is challenged by the current aid architecture and the bias of economic influences. Likewise, the combination of national interest-based foreign policy links to development aid and the agendas of the progressively more influential philanthropic groups result in biased support for some specific diseases or countries, undermining the "for all" principle. (Garay et al. 2013, p. 6)

Garay et al.'s (2013) analysis concerning national and regional organizations working toward global health, summarized in Table 3.2 (white boxes mean the absence of any explicit discussion on the issue), shows that Japan's global health policy focused on mother and child health and primarily worked toward the "health for all" principle. Due to the country's support during global public health emergencies, Japan has contributed to the "health in all" dimension of global health.

In conclusion, Garay et al. (2013) insisted on the need for a collective approach to global health, without which current efforts will continue to impose a great burden on a large part of the world's population.

> While each global actor on its own cannot – and should not – aspire to ameliorate all three global dimensions of health, collective action under strong leadership and governance should progress towards them. […] At present, […] collective action is not clearly progressing on the three global health principles. (Garay et al. 2013, p. 8)

Table 3.2 Key features of national and regional policies on global health

	HEALTH FOR ALL	HEALTH BY ALL	HEALTH IN ALL			
	GH equity	GH governance	GH knowledge	GH and trade	GH in foreign policy and security	Other coherence
Swiss health Foreign Policy, 2006	Efficiency of development and humanitarian aid Health systems AMT and NCDs	WHO role Geneva as world's health capital	GH research agenda	Swiss pharma's role in global health IPR protection	Pertinent bilateral and international agreements. Mention of migration. Swiss citizens' health	
UK, Health is Global, 2008	Health systems IHP, A2M, HRH	UN reform EU role in GH	GH research agenda UK strength in research for health	IPR/A2M UK strength in health services		Poverty reduction, climate change, pandemics, migration, and conflicts
US Global Health Initiative, 2009 (63 Bn USD 2009–2014)	AMT, MNCH, NTDs Family planning, nutrition Health systems Focus on GHI+ countries. Each area has specific budgets and attributable results		New efficient and sustainable approaches to service delivery			
EU role in Global health, 2010	Health equity (priory countries), strengthening healthcare systems IHP, multi- sectorial (nutrition, education, gender, water, and sanitation)	WHO increased core funding and inclusive leadership	Pertinence and access to knowledge/ tools and capacity building	Coherence in BTAs, respect and promotion of TRIPS provisions in public health	Reference to IHRs	Coherence in migration policies, food security/agriculture, and climate change

(continued)

Table 3.2 (continued)

	HEALTH FOR ALL	HEALTH BY ALL	HEALTH IN ALL			
	GH equity	GH governance	GH knowledge	GH and trade	GH in foreign policy and security	Other coherence
Japan's Global Health policy, 2011 (5 Bn USD 2011–2015)	Focus on mother and child health: EMBRACE—Ensure Mothers and Babies Regular Access to Care				Support global public health emergencies	

Source Garay et al. (2013, p. 7)

A2M: Access to Medicines, AMT: AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, Bn USD: Billion US Dollars, BTA: Bilateral Trade Agreements, GH: Global Health, GFATM: Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, HRH: Human Resources for Health, IHP: International Health Partnership, IHRs: International Health Regulations, IPR: Intellectual Property Rights, MNCH: Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, NCD: Non-communicable Diseases, NTDs: Neglected Tropical Diseases

Yuasa et al. (2013) conducted a study on the contributions of JICA health-related projects aimed at strengthening the global health system. They justified their research by indicating that JICA projects "have seldom been evaluated systematically from a health systems perspective" (p. 2). By analyzing more than 105 projects implemented between January 2005 and December 2009, the authors revealed that JICA "has focused its attention on appraising health development assistance projects and redirecting efforts towards strengthening health systems." Their conclusion is that, aimed at strengthening health systems, "the majority of JICA projects had prioritized workforce development and improvements in governance and service delivery." In addition, the authors highlighted that "nevertheless, our findings suggest that JICA assistance could be used to support financial aspects of health systems, which is an area of increasing concern."

According to Labonté (2008), there are five ways in which "governments and multilateral institutions are responding to the increasing asymmetries and health risks posed by globalization" to frame global health to determine which arguments are most likely to promote health for the greatest number: (i) health as security, (ii) health as development, (iii) health as a global public good, (iv) health as a commodity, and (v) health as a human right.

Labonté (2008) explained that despite being the dominant discourse, health as security is the most reductionist approach, directing attention to specific diseases considered threats to national security or simply inconvenient to global trade, finance, and tourism. Besides being reductionist, this discourse opens ways to violate basic human rights and "can slip slowly towards fascism" (p. 469). Nevertheless, human security, as an alternative discourse that expresses concerns with a person's physical safety, economic, and social well-being, as well as respect for people's dignity and worth as human beings, is more in line with the "idealized principles of health promotion" (p. 469).

Health as development, in turn, is the second most prominent discourse in global health debates. Under this paradigm, health becomes a "desired outcome of development" (p. 469) and, as such, is commonly associated with foreign aid flows and market performance rather than solidarity-building mechanisms of global redistributive obligations and human potential.

Health as a global public good, emerges as a response to the limitations found in the health for development discourse. Despite having a rather vague and weak definition of the public good in terms of policy advocacy and a utilitarian approach to international cooperation assuming shared interests as a key rationale for collective action, as in the health security discourse, it undoubtedly places collective benefits above individual gains.

Health as a commodity, as the expression itself suggests, reduces health to goods or services whose main *raison d'être* is to maximize profit. Irrespective of its relevance in terms of revealing direct relations between health and trade such as TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) and GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), "health can be commodified, but it is not a commodity" (p. 475).

Finally, health as a human right is a strong discourse that directly clashes with health as a commodity, generating several international obligations derived from international declarations, covenants (treaties), and plans of action. Notwithstanding their broad range, such initiatives lack enforcement power and depend on strong, popular mobilizations derived from social awareness efforts. Recent developments, however, indicate that "efforts to advance human rights as the normative guiding frame for twenty-first century global governance are growing […], representing the most widely shared language of opposition to the devaluation of health that results from the globalization-driven spread of markets" (p. 477).

Farmer et al. (2013, p. 10) however, defend collective and holistic approaches to global health toward social changes:

> Global health delivery begins with the question "how can a health system efficiently provide health services to all who need them?" More efficient and equitable delivery of existing health interventions could save tens of millions of lives each year. But even the best models of global health delivery cannot alone raise the standard of health care available to people worldwide. The health of individuals and populations is influenced by complex social and structural forces; addressing the roots of ill health — including poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation — requires a broad-based agenda of social change.

Within this context, Almeida et al. (2013, p. 2) noticed that the debate over global health has undervalued wider approaches to health:

> Currently, the international debate over global health undervalues the perspective centered on the variables that determine improvements in the health of populations, groups, and individuals, considering the political, economic, social and cultural dimensions in which societies are embedded. This outlook calls for multidisciplinary thinking and action by the health actors who provide the input for scientific endeavors and determine the quality of the knowledge needed for innovation and technological development in health care worldwide.

It is necessary to point out that since the 1990s, within the context of voracious neoliberalism, one of the main international debates around international cooperation and foreign aid for health, particularly for low- and middle-income countries, has revolved around health system reform. The debate has also centered on the topics covered so far in this chapter: geopolitical, hegemonic, neoliberal, social, and cultural issues, thus requiring further critical thinking to analyze its recent impacts on international cooperation and foreign aid for health worldwide.

One should bear in mind that the "right to health" is a widely recognized right in international treaties, conventions, and agreements around the world. This right has been widely recognized in several declarations and resolutions adopted by international organizations since the end of the Second World War. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 recognized the "right to health" as one of a set of basic human rights. Later in the same year, the Constitution of the WHO also recognized health as a fundamental right of every human being, irrespective of race, religion, political belief, and economic or social condition. In 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted and opened for signature the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which mentions the right to health (Article 12). In 2005, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and

Cultural Organization (UNESCO) mentioned the same right in its Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. These legal foundations impose obligations on sovereign states[7] but are not entirely effective. As Kingston et al. (2010, p. 1) stated, "The scope and meaning of this right have been the subject of debate within the international community, however, the means for achieving it remain similarly contested."

Although there are innumerable national and international groups worldwide promoting the right to health, each one specific and unique, international cooperation and foreign aid practices in the last 70 years or so have demonstrated the power a nation can exert in the international system by having some of its own experiences labeled as "best practices" or the like. Brazil and Japan have already enjoyed this status at different times in the last 30–40 years in different development policy areas. For decades, Japan has been recognized as a "high technology" country, and that status strengthened and expanded not only Japan's foreign aid but also foreign trade, foreign investments, etc. (see, for example, Orr 1990). Brazil likewise enjoyed the status of a "social technology" country in the first 15 years of the twenty-first century (see, for example, IPEA 2014, 2017). During that time, Brazilian "best practice" experiences were diffused worldwide, opening avenues for the foreign trade, foreign investments, etc. with the country.

Health systems are a major issue for international cooperation in general. Contending models of health systems were developed and promoted in the initial years of the Cold War reflecting the world's capitalist–socialist divide. Since then, different health systems and health system reforms have been developed and implemented in different parts of the planet. According to several studies (Reibling et al. 2019; Heredia et al. 2015; O'Connell et al. 2014; Noronha 2013; Kingston et al. 2010; Kutzin et al. 2009), the evolution of these health systems has created two main "models" of health systems around the world: the universal health coverage (UHC) and the universal health system (UHS).[8]

According to Noronha (2013), the first explicit reference to "universal coverage" in the international cooperation system was made in one of the reports for the 58th World Health Assembly in 2005, entitled "Sustainable health financing, universal coverage, and health social insurance." The author argues that this sparked the "semiotic transformation" of the right to health and universal and equitable access to "universal coverage," which is convergent with the (neoliberal) idea of protecting states against financial risks and seeking alternative mechanisms of sectoral financing. The international debate over whether the UHC or the UHS model is more appropriate for health system reforms thus commenced, greatly fueled by Margaret Chan's, former Director-General of the WHO, proposal of UHC as the "best model to assure the right to health" in 2008.

In 2010, the title of the World Health Report, "Health systems financing: The path to universal coverage," inverted the logic of the terms, adopting sectorial financing as the key strategy toward achieving universal coverage. Since then, the topic has garnered strong interest among certain circles of conservative thought on health worldwide. In one of many articles published in The Lancet, a prestigious scientific review of the field of health, the author refers to UHC as the "third global sanitary transition." According to the WHO Director-General at the time, Dr. Margaret Chan:

> […] a response to a need, expressed by rich and poor countries alike, for practical guidance on ways to finance health care. The objective was to transform the evidence, gathered from studies in a diversity of settings, into a menu of options for raising sufficient resources and removing financial barriers to access, especially for the poor. As indicated by the subtitle, the emphasis is firmly placed on moving towards universal coverage, a goal currently at the center of debates about health service provision. […] At a time when money is tight, my advice to countries is this: before looking for places to cut spending on health care, look first for opportunities to improve efficiency. (The World Health Report 2010)

Later in 2012, during the opening session of the 65th World Health Assembly, Dr. Chan claimed that "universal health coverage is the single most powerful concept that public health has to offer" (Noronha 2013). Since then, many researchers and policymakers have jumped into the debate, intent on revealing the strengths and weaknesses of both models and reasons not to employ a one-size-fits-all solution, especially considering the constraints of the UHC in terms of promoting equity, a central concern of the right to health and a principal issue in developing countries (Kutzin et al. 2009; Sachs 2012; Noronha 2013; O'Connell et al. 2014; Heredia et al. 2015; among others).

Although the debate is complex, it is easier to introduce the perspectives in terms of opposites, that is, those who defend the UHC model and those who defend the UHS model. For those who defend the UHC model, social health insurance (SHI)[9] (also referred to as the "Bismarck model" after the German chancellor of the same name enacted social legislation destined to protect workers in the nineteenth century) is the right political choice in health financing, particularly for low- and middle-income countries hoping to realize universal coverage. For those who defend the UHS, a general or universal, tax-funded system (often called the "Beveridge model" after the designer of the British National Health Service, NHS) would be the best option:

> Advocates of SHI have suggested that in low-income countries, insurance coverage can expand from the formal sector in the entire population, as it has done in many countries that followed the Bismarck model, such as in Western Europe, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Critics of this view have argued that introducing SHI in economies in which most of the population is in the informal sector runs the great risk of widening existing disparities in access to care and financial protection. (Kutzin et al. 2009, p. 549)

Kutzin et al. (2009) regarded the dichotomic debate between UHC and UHS as reductionist. For the authors, Kyrgyzstan's experience of successfully introducing an adapted SHI after facing "extreme fiscal contraction in the first half of the 1990s" after the collapse of the former Soviet Union is worth sharing. They argue that the country's experience reveals a more complex rather than dichotomic reality, calling attention to the need to consider "health financing policy in functional terms, rather than in terms of historical models imported from Western Europe" (Kutzin et al. 2009, p. 549). According to the authors,

> […] it is possible to create a universal health financing system by transforming the role of budget funding from directly subsidizing provision to subsidizing the purchase of services on behalf of the entire population. In other words, universality was designed into the system from the beginning rather than hoping that insurance coverage would simply expand over time. […] By approaching health financing policy from a functional perspective, the Kyrgyz health reformers have demonstrated that it is not necessary to choose between Beveridge and Bismarck: well-defined policy can enable their complementary co-existence in a unified, universal health system. (Kutzin et al. 2009, p. 552)

Although an enthusiast of the UHC model, Sachs (2012, p. 944) recognized that "despite the commitment to universal coverage, in practice, effective access to health care and outcomes depends strongly on economic and social conditions" and that "health outcomes are the result of many complex factors inside and outside the health system." In this sense, according to the author, analysts and policymakers tend to ignore two issues that constrain people from low-income settings from benefitting from such a model: (1) many households' lack of means to afford any health care services and (2) inadequate budget for low-income countries' governments to ensure universal access to health care (pp. 944–945).

Sachs (2012) noted that people usually think that private sector health provision with public financing would offer "the best combination to ensure efficient, high-quality, low-cost primary health care" (p. 945). In response, the author presented three considerations that "point to the importance of public sector provision more akin to the [British] NHS [National Health System]: greater transparency, fewer incentives and pressure to raise costs, and a greater possibility of systematically applying and monitoring best-practice technologies at population scale (pp. 945–946). According to Sachs, "These limitations imply that efficiency, as well as equity, calls for highly systematic and broad coverage of key intervention strategies" (p. 946).

Heredia et al. (2015) argued that "interest in universal health care has recently risen thanks to the question of Universal Health Coverage as the basis for post-2015 agreements. […] Everybody seems to agree with this objective" (pp. E34–E35). Nonetheless, before adopting the hegemonic UHC model of reform that is unlike European healthcare models, which has been intensely advocated for recently emerging new world development goals, the authors defended a careful and critical examination of both terms, especially in the context of Latin America as "[…] they acquire different connotations according to different social, political, and financial interests" (p. E34). For Latin America, for example, the experience of health reforms must be analyzed in view of the broader picture of the strong influence of structural adjustment reforms imposed by international financial institutions in several countries on the subcontinent during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as their consequences in terms of a dearth of financial resources, which has gradually weakened health ministries and social security institutions.

In their efforts to propose an analytical framework for comparing both models, the authors supported the establishment of a set of uniform criteria to compare each model's achievements in terms of the right to health in Latin America and around the world. These include population and medical coverage in their categories of universal or segmented access and use of service and possible barriers; health expenditures (both public and private); distribution of costs and amount of out-of-pocket expenditures; impact on public health actions and health conditions; and equity, popular participation, and transparency (p. E35).

One of the assumptions regarding universal health coverage is that "health is primarily a responsibility of the people, with medical care financed by individuals and employers, but not by the state, or at least not as central financial responsibility. For the state, funding could only be extended to groups in extreme poverty or at risk." According to the authors, this model "is built on principles of the market (internal or external), commodification, managed competition, and pluralism." Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, three Latin American countries that have adopted this model in their health reform processes, have increased out-of-pocket expenditures yet failed to guarantee the use of health services, provide high population coverage, and avoid increases in health expenditures, leaving millions of people far from their basic right to health. Moreover, and most concerning, "the person-centered insurance model tends to have a negative impact on public health because its pluralist focus weakens epidemiological surveillance and collective interventions" (Heredia et al. 2015, pp. E35–E36).

Some claim that UHC experiences in Latin American countries "have not made substantial improvements because of their commercial orientation and welfare costs" (Heredia et al. 2015, p. E35). In opposition to that model, the authors, on behalf of the Latin American Association of Social Medicine (Alames), defended a universal health system, which they believed "argues for the right to health for all citizens, without distinction, with the state as the guarantor of finance and administration," as seen in the cases of Cuba and Brazil, where health reforms and emerging policies that expanded the right to health with greater equity were based on state-funded laws and finance. In contrast with the universal health insurance model, "the problems of the single public health system (SPHS) are operational or concern implementation: they are "de-commodified, integrated, and publicly funded health systems, granted by the State", "[…] the much-discussed pooling of risks and funds is complete since they have a single health fund," they "offer integrated care [with] better conditions to promote and implement public health actions, such as health education, promotion, prevention, and early detection of disease," have been the result of extensive institutionalized social participation in some Latin American countries and, for those reasons, "have shown advances in population health and in life security" (Heredia et al. 2015, pp. E35–E36).

In a nutshell,

> Intercultural relations are important in the debate over universal health insurance and SHPS because the basic focus on the health insurance model is on the individual and the biomedical, while SPHS is constructed on the basis of the universal well-being of the person, the family, and the community where people live and develop their potential. In the community, ancient and popular cultures and knowledge allow the health sector to build respectful relationships with the population in which promotion and prevention form part of everyday life. (Heredia et al. 2015, p. E37)

O'Connell et al. (2014) considered that the high-level political support to UHC—also referred to as universal health care, universal healthcare coverage, or simply universal coverage—contrasts with the diversity of meanings, lack of clarity, and absence of a consistent framework of the term that can lead, in practical terms, to the inability to promote "equity of access and use of services to achieve more equitable health outcomes." Taken together, these constraints "can lead to unintended policy consequences" (O'Connell et al. 2014, p. 277).

In a detailed empirical analysis of each term of the expression universal health coverage aimed at establishing "practical boundaries on what policies can achieve, thus creating a normative and operational means by which to gauge national strategies and progress," the authors asserted that "universal" refers to the noble "legal obligation of the state to care to all its citizens" in an inclusive way. For the authors, the word itself cannot tackle decisions or policies that cause exclusion, diverting health policies from universality (O'Connell et al. 2014, p. 277).

The second term, "health," is another problematic issue in UHC debates. Although the United Nations General Assembly's broad definition of health implies the delivery of equitable opportunities "in most countries, the move towards UHC gradually expands access starting from a narrow set of essential health services that are accessible to the public and private sector wage earners," health inequality increases when a comprehensive social health platform is not established at the very beginning of the reform (O'Connell et al. 2014, p. 277).

Lastly, the authors argued that the term "coverage" is also problematic when it comes to "financial hardships associated with payment" that could guarantee access to essential services (O'Connell et al., p. 277). Here, coverage should be defined beyond "mere accessibility of services to incorporate an assessment of effective utilization" (p. 278). In other words, "two aspects should be made explicit if UHC policies are effective: the appropriateness, and the quality, of coverage" (p. 278). In short,

> The term universal necessitates a focus on equity, with the path to UHC explicitly being a gap-narrowing one that prioritizes the attainment of greatly improved health outcomes for those who are currently left behind. Similarly, the term health must consider social determinants, including beliefs, values, and expressed needs of various subpopulations, as well as how actions beyond the health sector can be implemented. For the term coverage, its results must be considered, moving from the measurement of access to the assessment of utilization, appropriateness, and quality. Finally, consistent participation of civil society and the private sector, along with government and development partners, is essential to forge a true consensus about what UHC means within each country so that the relevant causal pathways and mechanisms hindering and enabling UHC can be fully diagnosed. (O'Connell et al., 2014, p. 278)

Noronha (2013) presented a thought-provoking semiotic criticism of the emergence of universal health coverage as the main internationally supported and recommended model for health reforms worldwide. In lines of thinking similar to other authors, the author developed three arguments against the claim that universal health coverage is the "best model for health system reform around the world." First, he criticized the argument that a specific policy requires a specific finance-pooling mechanism. According to the author, investments and other common services are financed by taxes, contributions, and interests, thereby integrating governments at different levels. The final destination of funds from this fiscal resource pool is detailed in national budgets and investment plans (p. 848).

Second, the term “coverage” does not necessarily mean that individuals are utilizing health services; indeed, the term differs from the actual access and use of health services. In addition, there are several other supply and demand barriers to universal access beyond financial barriers, and which vary according to the service required to address the population’s specific needs (Noronha 2013, p. 848).

Finally, the author wondered why the equity issue is presented in UHC global policies as dependent on the idea of “financial protection” of the poor. This comprehension ignores the major problem of supply segmentation according to social classes and the different kinds of protection guaranteed by different modalities of public or private insurance (p. 849).

Before moving more specifically onto Japan’s ODA for the health sector in developing countries, it is important to know that, as part of the OECD, Japan has a singular health system. Reibling et al. (2019) presented an extended typology of healthcare systems among selected OECD countries by integrating two theoretical frameworks: a comparative-institutional perspective of existing classifications and ideas from the current international health policy research debate. The authors argued that combining these two perspectives “provides a more comprehensive picture of modern healthcare systems and takes the past decade’s dynamic of reforms into account. (…) The results from a series of cluster analyses indicate that at least five distinct types of healthcare systems can be identified” (p. 611).

Based on a theoretical framework that integrates ideas from a comparative-institutional welfare state and comparative health policy research, the authors deduced “five crucial theoretical dimensions for comparing the healthcare systems of OECD countries, including Japan, which are supply, public–private mix, access regulations, primary care orientation, and performance” (Reibling et al. 2019, p. 618). The authors asserted that “instead of assuming the existence of “frozen” regimes that are built on long path-dependent historical trajectories, system types are in fact the result of institutional stabilities and ongoing policy change” (p. 618).

They further recognized the increasing complexity of healthcare systems worldwide over the past three decades and the evolution of healthcare typologies stemming from the scientific community. Hence, for the authors, higher supply and greater access to healthcare do not necessarily lead to good care and improved outcomes (p. 611).

To synthesize the frameworks of both the OECD and the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies perspectives, the authors developed “an extended typology of OECD healthcare systems.” Utilizing a cluster analysis, the authors identified five distinct types of healthcare systems while suggesting the weakening of dichotomic distinctions between the UHC (Bismarckian model) and the UHS (Beveridgean model) (pp. 611–612).

At the same time, Reibling et al. (2019) recognized that the debate on the “extent to which healthcare is linked to population health outcomes has been central to the health policy community. Prevention—while relatively insignificant in terms of the healthcare budget—is an area with vast potential to improve health outcomes.”

Hence, comparisons need to move toward including prevention efforts as significant research variables. Finally, the authors recognized the existence of a "vast difference in quality […] both within and across countries" that needs to be further addressed (pp. 612–613).

The authors' integrated perspective for healthcare system comparison considers five indicators: 1. supply, 2. public–private mix, 3. access regulation, 4. primary care orientation, and 5. performance. Through a cluster analysis, the authors identified six clusters of countries. Their analysis indicates that Japan and South Korea "have no strong ties with any other country but are both partial members of Cluster Four (Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), with Japan being more consistently clustered with this group of countries than South Korea" (p. 616). From these clusters, the authors proposed the following types of healthcare systems among OECD selected countries[10]:

a. The supply- and choice-oriented public system
b. The performance- and primary-care-oriented public system
c. The regulation-oriented public system
d. The low-supply and low-performance mixed system
e. The supply- and performance-oriented private system

In an overview of cluster characteristics, Japan (along with Finland, South Korea, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, and Sweden) is included in the second type of healthcare system (the performance—and primary-care-oriented public system), as shown in the second column of Table 3.3.

Reibling et al. (2019) emphasized that "the low-supply and low-performance mixed system suggests that not all OECD countries currently have sufficient resources for a high-performing healthcare system" and that, among several study limitations, one is the conscious "exclusion of important aspects of healthcare system comparison from the cluster analyses" with several indicators working only as proxies (p. 618).

From the specialized literature on international cooperation and foreign aid for health, it is clear that, at least since the nineteenth century, with a few exceptions, world health has been influenced by emerging issues and debates, from which the most influential countries or a hegemony may have greater opportunities to stake their visions and interests either through regional, such as the OECD, or multilateral institutions, e.g., the WHO. Thus, as part of the so-called "international aid community," Japan's ODA for the health sector is an expression of the prevailing domestic and global health visions and interests. In this context, Japan's UHC, aligned with the WHO's support for that model, represents a strong force *en route* for adjusting developing countries' policies and approaches in the sector.

Concerning health systems, it is clear that the WHO's decision to advocate exclusively for the UHC model, reinforcing a rather conservative, privatized view of health, fails to promote equity, especially when simply reproduced by foreign aid in developing countries. Here it is worth mentioning that the COVID-19 pandemic has offered a unique opportunity to reflect on hegemonic global health system models and their long-term effects. Within this context, more than ever, critical thinking is crucial to

Table 3.3 Overview of cluster labels and characteristics

		Supply-and choice-oriented public systems	Performance- and primary-care-oriented public systems	Regulation-oriented public systems	Low-supply and low performance mixed systems	Supply- and performance-oriented private systems
		AU, AT, BE, CZ, DE, FR, IE, IS, LU, SI	FI, JA, KO, NO, NZ, PT, SE	CA, DK, ES, IT, NL, UK	EE, HU, PL, SK	CH, US
Supply	Expenditures	Medhigh	Medium	Medium	Low	High
	Doctors	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium
Public–private mix	Public financing	High	High	High	Medium	Low
	Private financing	Medium	Medhigh	Medium	High	Medhigh
	Fee-for-service	FFS	Salary	Salary	FFS	FFS
Access regulations	Access	Low	Medium	Maximum	Maximum	None
	Cost sharing	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
	Choice	No	Yes	Yes	Some	Yes
Primary care orientation	Expenditures	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	High
	Doctors	High	High	Medium	Low	Medium
Performance	Tobacco consumption	Medium	Low	Medium	High	Medium
	Alcohol consumption	High	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
	System quality	Medlow	High	Medhigh	Low	High

Source Reibling et al. (2019, p. 617)
Notes AT (Austria), AU (Australia), BE (Belgium), CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), CZ (Czech Republic), DE (Germany), DK (Denmark), EE (Estonia), ES (Spain), FI (Finland), FR (France), HU (Hungary), IE (Ireland), IS (Iceland), IT (Italy), JA (Japan), KO (Korea), LU (Luxembourg), NL (Netherlands), NO (Norway), NZ (New Zealand), PL (Poland), PT (Portugal), SE (Sweden), SI (Slovenia), SK (Slovakia), UK (United Kingdom), US (United States)

foster debates on health system reform toward the achievement of the universal right to health with equity for all mankind.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, there may be an increased focus on international cooperation limited to specific diseases, thus contradicting previous discussions about the need to strengthen health systems. Eventually, strengthening health systems, not specific disease control, might become the priority and the basic policy for international cooperation in the health sector would not yield political pressure with short-term results. This is in line with criticism made by Labonté (2008), who explains that despite being the dominant discourse, health as security is the most reductionist approach, directing attention to specific diseases that are considered threats to national security or merely inconvenient to global trade, finance, and tourism.

In an effort to understand what combination of historical factors has brought the world to such crossroads and what future lies ahead, scholars from various fields have provided some relevant insights. To date, findings point to some consensus around international (or systemic) and domestic (or national) factors. These include the intensification of Western liberalism, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, and the voracious Western neoliberal capitalism that has marked the world order since then. This has resulted in an overall reduction and weakening of the role of the state at both the domestic and international levels, the rise of China and some countries of the geopolitical South as threats to the American hegemony and their non-Western values and principles (Weiss and Wallace 2021), the securitization of the international development agenda since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of America, and the deterioration of world social and economic indicators (Goodman and Pepinsky 2021). Moreover, the rise of nationalist movements in different countries that are now strong enough to elect right and far right politicians (in accordance with Lake, Martin and Risse 2021, p. 235) in powerful nations who, in turn, undermine collective action initiatives, cause fear and mistrust that results in tension and rigidifies the international system further, threatening the status quo (Nye and Welch 2014, p. 48).

In brief, the concept of global health that has been promoted in the last few decades has hindered nations from tackling the current COVID-19 pandemic in a collective and equitable way, reflecting that international cooperation for global health is a result of complex political, economic, social, environmental, historical, and cultural factors and contexts that extend far beyond the predominant biomedical approach to health. States and global institutions alone, weakened by decades of neoliberal policies and the rise of nationalistic movements, have failed to guarantee effective international cooperation at a crucial time for humankind. Private and public–private initiatives, in turn, did not contribute much to tackle such a global challenge.

3.3 Japan's ODA for the Health Sector from 1990 to 2020

ODA in Japan and other countries is governed by various factors, including world affairs, international events, bilateral and regional international relations, domestic political and economic conditions, the country's experience in each sector, and individual knowledge and expertise. Japan's 2014 ODA White Paper, which reflects on the trajectory of 60 years of Japanese ODA, categorizes the period from the 1950s to the 1960s as "Beginnings," the period from the 1960s to the 1980s as "Expansion and Diversification," and the period from the 1990s as "Initiatives as a Top Donor." Finally, the period from the 2000s onward is classified as "Responding to New Development Challenges of the 21st Century" (MOFA 2014).

Health has been treated as one of the principal sectors since the very beginning when Japan agreed to be involved in international cooperation in the 1950s. The early projects in the 1950s and 1960s were implemented as a series of one-off cases without formulating consistent and transparent policies on international health cooperation. From a broad, historical perspective, the establishment of the OECF in 1961, the Economic Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1962, and the inauguration of Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOVC) served as domestic preparation for system building in ODA to developing countries. At the same time, a series of international events, such as Japan's entry into the United Nations in 1956, the foundation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1960, the establishment and Japan's admission onto the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961, and the foundation of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1966 helped boost Japanese involvement in international affairs.

The establishment of the JICA in August 1974 enabled the Japanese government to implement its desire to be involved in international cooperation in the health sector through grant-aid and technical cooperation. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, international cooperation in the health sector was focused on public works such as hospital building and equipment provision. Technical assistance and training to combat diarrhea and infectious diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis was also implemented. However, the lack of alignment between grant-aid and technical cooperation resulted in poor continuity of projects or even abandoned cases in developing countries. Reflecting on these bitter lessons, the government discussed the importance of coordination and effective evaluation of international cooperation projects in the latter half of the 1980s. In 1984, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the first version of Japan's ODA plan, known as the *ODA White Paper*.

Around the same period, PHC needs in developing countries had begun to receive significant attention in international health cooperation. PHC was officially mentioned by then Director-general of the WHO, Dr. Halfdan T. Mahler, at a meeting of the executive board in 1975. PHC emphasizes the importance of comprehensive health care at the community level, which must be embedded in the national health system (Fujiya 2013). In September 1978, the *Declaration of Alma-Ata* was adopted at the First International Conference on Primary Health Care. Article I states that health is a fundamental human right. Article III indicates that economic and social development are of primary importance to attain health for all and reduce the gap between the health status of developing and developed countries.

Japan's ODA expanded steadily from the 1960s to the 1980s. However, after becoming the top donor in the field of development assistance in the 1990s, it showed a downward trend in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Figure 3.1 shows the trend of Japan's ODA expenditures by sector based on the information provided in the OECD DAC database. Looking at the breakdown by sector, the economic infrastructure and services sector has been on an upward trend in terms of the absolute amount and share. This trend was particularly pronounced in the 1990s and 2010s. ODA in the social infrastructure and services sector, which includes education, health, and water and sanitation, hovered around 20 percent since the 1990s but fell below 20 percent in the 2010s, indicating a decline in the presence of this sector in Japan's ODA (MOFA 1997, 1998, 1999). The share of health expenditures out of total ODA has remained less than 4 percent since the 1990s, when Japan was the top donor, and has been relatively modest in terms of quantity in the process of addressing new challenges in the international community against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War and the progress of globalization.

Figure 3.2 shows the amount of bilateral aid in the fields of health, population policy, reproductive health, and water and sanitation. Notably, the scale of aid for water and sanitation, which involves large-scale facilities, is greater than that for health, which includes basic health and medical services.



Fig. 3.1 Japan's ODA by sector, commitments, constant-US dollars in millions, 2019 (left y-axis), sector share percent (right y-axis) (*Source* Authors' elaboration based on the OECD DAC database)



Fig. 3.2 Bilateral assistance in the fields of health, population policy and reproductive health, and water and sanitation, Commitments [C] and Disbursements [D], US dollars in millions, 2019 (*Source* Authors' elaboration based on the OECD DAC database)

In developing countries with poverty problems, there is a wide range of issues related to health care. Population, AIDS, child health, and parasite control are representative areas that have been continuously addressed by Japan's ODA in the field of social development. In many developing countries, the level of and access to health services are insufficient, and preventive and curative disease control measures are lacking. In addition, the economic crises and neoliberal policies experienced in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and Asia, have caused long-term, grave consequences for social development, especially in the area of health care. According to Japan's ODA White Papers, the importance of development cooperation for the health sector needs to be constantly emphasized in developing countries, which are more vulnerable to internal and external shocks (MOFA 1997, 1998).

The need to address global issues in the context of globalization has been discussed since the 1990s. In the ODA Charter , which was first adopted in 1992 to clarify the principles of Japan's ODA, addressing global issues is listed as a priority. Consequently, health issues covered in Japan's ODA White Papers have been divided into two categories: health and medical care, which are considered sectoral assistance, and infectious diseases, population, and AIDS, which are considered global issues (MOFA 2001). In the area of sectoral assistance, the perspective of PHC, which aims to provide basic health care services to as many people as possible, has been positioned as important, and both hardware and software support have been provided to facilities that form the core of health and medical systems in developing countries (MOFA 1999, 2001). To address global-scale issues, Japan announced the "Global

Issues Initiative on Population and AIDS (GII)" in 1994 and helped develop an international effort to combat AIDS, supporting the leading role of the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (MOFA 1999, 2002, 2003).

Infectious diseases have long been considered a global issue. As globalization has facilitated the greater movement of people, infectious diseases have become recognized not only as a health problem that threatens the health and lives of people in developing countries but also as a threat that can spread across national borders to developed countries. At the G8 Kyushu–Okinawa Summit in 2000, for the first time in history, infectious diseases were considered a major issue among developed nations as part of the agenda among developed nations (MOFA 2001, 2002, 2003). On that occasion, the "Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative (IDI)" was announced to strengthen support for Japan's infectious disease control measures and to stimulate international interest in infectious diseases. This trend led to the establishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) in 2002, which is expected to continue to play a central role in the global fight against infectious diseases (MOFA 2002).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),[11] adopted in 2000, also set three health-related goals: Goal 4: reduce infant mortality, Goal 5: improve maternal health, and Goal 6: prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. These MDGs, together with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), agreed with agendas established at the 1999 World Bank/International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings and provided the impetus for the search for results-oriented development assistance (MOFA 2001, 2003). In 2005, the Japanese government announced the Health and Development Initiative (HDI), which aims to contribute to the achievement of MDGs related to the health sector, such as combatting infectious diseases and improving maternal and child health and health care systems, and supporting gender equality, education, water and sanitation, and other areas related to health care (MOFA 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010).

Japan's ODA since the 2000s has been characterized by the key concept of "human security," which emerged in the mid-1990s as an alternative to "national security," i.e., the traditional concept of the state protecting its borders and citizens (MOFA 2001, 2002). Human security is a concept that seeks to protect people from various threats to their survival, livelihood, and dignity and to integrate and strengthen efforts to realize people's potential based on the perspective of each individual. The ODA Charter , revised in 2003, incorporates the perspective of human security into its basic policy (MOFA 2003, 2005, 2007; among others).

Based on the concept of human security, the new ODA Charter emphasizes the need to address cross-cutting issues in four priority areas: poverty reduction, sustainable growth, addressing global challenges, and building peace. The ODA Charter was revised to reflect changes in international trends surrounding ODA and Japan's specific circumstances. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, developed countries stepped up their ODA efforts with the realization that poverty can be a breeding ground for terrorism (MOFA 2002, 2003, 2007). However, Japan's ODA budget peaked in FY1997 and has been reduced by more than 30 percent in the seven years since then (MOFA 2003), partly due to public criticism of ODA amid a severe financial situation caused by domestic economic stagnation known as the "Lost Decade." In 2004, on the 50th anniversary of Japan's ODA, the role of economic growth and infrastructure in poverty reduction was emphasized and the revival of the economic dimension of ODA was confirmed, including the strategy of securing development funds via private investment through foreign direct investment and linking trade and development.

In 2006, the International Cooperation Bureau was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to strengthen cooperation between the government and implementing agencies. In 2008, when the new JICA was established, it became one of the world's leading aid implementing agencies in terms of funding. JICA's aid reforms in the 2000s clearly reflected its policy of implementing results-oriented ODA, including the strengthening of its strategic focus on "selection and concentration" and the establishment of the Plan–Do–Check–Act (PDCA) cycle for quality improvement (MOFA 2007, 2011).

According to Japan's official publications on ODA, with the rapid progress of globalization, development issues in the health sector are recognized as issues to be tackled on a global scale. Governments of developed countries that are members of the OECD–DAC, as well as emerging donor countries and private organizations, actively participate in development cooperation (MOFA 2006, 2011). The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI Alliance) and the International AIDS and Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), established at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in 2000, as well as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM), established in January 2002, have increased the number of foundations and funds that provide global assistance to specific development issues (MOFA 2002, 2004, 2007, 2012; among others). However, as will be discussed later in this section, it is necessary to carefully examine whether the system of international cooperation in the health field involving various actors, e.g., governments of developed countries and emerging countries, international organizations, and private organizations, as well as global efforts such as the GAVI Alliance, functioned effectively during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Discussions at the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit in 2008 led to the concept of international health in Japan's development cooperation in the fields of health and medical care, which emphasizes the need for comprehensive efforts to strengthen health systems, improve maternal and child health, and combat infectious diseases (MOFA 2008, 2009). In 2010, the government formulated the New International Health Assistance Policy for the period 2011–2015, with 2015 being the deadline for achieving the MDGs (MOFA 2010, 2011, 2012). The three pillars of the policy are maternal and child health, control of the three major infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria), and efficient response to public health emergencies. The response to public health emergencies became relevant after the outbreak of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002 and swine flu (H1N1) in 2009. Accordingly, countermeasures against these emergencies need to be implemented via international cooperation and coordination with international organizations such as the WHO and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Figure 3.3 shows the trend of the Japanese government's contribution



Fig. 3.3 Japanese government contributions to the WHO (JPY thousand) (*Source* Authors' elaboration based on the documents released by MOFA)

to the WHO. The amount contributed by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Cabinet Office (Cabinet Office) shows a marked increase in the latter half of the 2010s, a reversal of the downward trend that began in 2000. As globalization increases the complexity of human mobility and supply chains as well as the interdependence of economic relationships, strengthening countermeasures against the threat of infectious diseases has become an international issue.

In 2012, the Global Health Innovative Technology (GHIT) Fund was established to address infectious diseases in developing countries. It is an international public–private partnership fund originating in Japan that brings together the Japanese government, domestic and foreign pharmaceutical companies, and others to promote the development of new drugs for infectious diseases and to make essential medicines affordable and accessible to people in developing countries. This initiative, which aims to control infectious diseases in developing countries through research and development of low-cost and highly effective therapeutic drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics, may be based on encouraging private companies to become more involved in the field of development cooperation and promoting the diffusion of Japanese companies' technologies through development cooperation in the field of health care (MOFA 2013).

The "International Health Diplomacy Strategy," formulated in 2013, sets the promotion of universal health coverage (UHC) as an important policy goal, namely to grant all people access basic health services when they need them throughout their lives at a cost they can afford (MOFA 2014). In promoting human-centered development through ODA, Japan has traditionally emphasized efforts in the field of health care linked to human security and has been focused on strengthening health systems. To meet the health challenges outlined in the 17 SDGs, which were newly formulated as successors to the MDGs, a policy to strengthen efforts toward UHC has been proposed, along with the importance of a cross-sectoral approach and global partnership (MOFA 2015). The possibility of utilizing Japan's experience and technological capabilities to cope with an aging society and realize the world's longest healthy life expectancy through the universal health insurance system is also being explored in development cooperation policies (MOFA 2013).

Since the 2016 version of the White Paper on Development Cooperation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has emphasized that, in addition to the promotion of UHC, Japan has led discussions in international fora such as the G7 and TICAD on the establishment of a framework of the international community for responding to these health crises, so-called "the global health architecture" (MOFA 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). The WHO Health Emergencies Program, the Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), and the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (EF), established by the World Bank with the support of Japan at the G7 Ise–Shima Summit in 2016, are the principal frameworks mentioned in this context. Through these schemes, the government highlights Japan's contributions in response to the Ebola virus disease (EDV) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 2010s (MOFA 2018, 2019).

In 2020, the spread of the new coronavirus disease (COVID-19) severely affected the lives and livelihoods of all people on the planet. The response to the global pandemic will be a turning point that will change the direction of development cooperation among countries in the field of health care. MOFA (2020) briefly mentions in its annual report that, in addition to the EDV outbreak, Japanese financial aid to the CFE and the EFE is to be used to respond to the COVID-19 crisis and contribute to addressing the health crisis. Based on past experiences, weak health systems are factors behind the epidemic or pandemic, and "building a sustainable and resilient health system is crucial to control infectious diseases" (MOFA 2016). It is important to not only pursue a direct response to end the COVID-19 pandemic but also to promote existing frameworks to strengthen the health system and prepare for future emergencies.

Not only in the field of health but also in the field of international cooperation under Japan's ODA, applications are officially submitted based on the request of the developing country's government, and the Japanese government decides whether to implement the project. In practice, it is not uncommon for Japanese agents, such as JICA experts, to assist officials from the host government and related organizations in drafting the application form. Looking back at the trajectory of the projects implemented in Brazil,[12] it is possible to say that the personal attributes of the experts involved, such as their disciplines and academic backgrounds, work histories, and previous experiences, as well as their personal relationships with their counterparts, the selection of the participants and their awareness and problem consciousness are strongly reflected in the projects. These factors may influence not only the implementation of each project but also the entire series of international cooperation activities through case formation and follow-ups. In the evaluation of international cooperation projects, research that focuses on the people involved in the project and comprehensive analysis of the impact on local communities and stakeholders over a longer period of time that extends beyond one-off project evaluations may reveal contributions that have been overlooked in the past.

JICA aims to implement international cooperation in the field of health in line with the policies proposed by international organizations such as the WHO. Since the development of UHC based on Japanese experience has a high affinity with international discussions, the implementation of international cooperation projects that target achieving health in a broad sense with health promotion as the core has been promoted.

The connection between international cooperation and foreign aid was clarified in our empirical longitudinal analysis of Japan's ODA in the health sector from 1990 to 2020 within the overall picture of world affairs. Japan's ODA in the health sector has been influenced by and has itself influenced international cooperation in health. According to the most recent international cooperation theories, influence may be exerted by not only interest groups, organizations, and institutions at domestic and international and global levels but also by individuals.

In the field of international cooperation, where actors are becoming increasingly diverse, the role and contribution of the Japanese government must be reconsidered. The lessons learned from the spread of COVID-19 go beyond verifying the effectiveness of global health architecture and its underlying frameworks, such as CFE and EF, which focus on responding to health crises. In the pursuit of global health, as recently defined by JICA, it has become necessary to rethink how international cooperation in health should be developed to contribute to strengthening national health systems and what should be considered when implementing such international cooperation.

Data and information extracted from official reports and databases on Japan's ODA for the health sector from 1990 to 2020 illustrate Japan's overall ODA trends in the health sector. Japan's ODA has been strengthening its health systems to address both infectious diseases and the need for maternal and child healthcare. On the one hand, this double priority may lead Japan's ODA to be criticized for being too specific and hampering the country from truly contributing to global health. On the other hand, Japan's ODA is concerned with the health system strengthening signals in a different direction, perhaps more in line with equity concerns expressed in much of the extant literature. Nonetheless, the issue, including the assessment of Japan's UHC at the domestic level, remains to be explored and deserves further research.

3.4 Final Considerations

This chapter aimed to identify the overall trend of Japan's ODA policies for health in developing countries from 1990 to 2020 and their prospects given the current COVID-19 pandemic context. The research was guided by the following questions: What were the major trends in Japan's ODA policies in the health sector from 1990 to 2020? Which international health forces, debates, and cooperation factors have influenced these trends? What are the prospects of Japan's ODA, given the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts?

Japan's official ODA documents indicate that health has been treated as a principal sector since Japan first elected to engage in international cooperation in the 1950s. As the history of foreign aid in the world suggests, Japan's ODA has also gone through different health paradigms over the decades, during which it has dealt with various health challenges and paradigms. Comparatively, the economic infrastructure and services sector indicated an upward trend in absolute amounts and shares from 1990 to 2020. Simultaneously, the social infrastructure and services sector—which includes education, health, and water and sanitation—has declined steadily. Within this context, in addition to the country's recognized role and expertise in public health emergencies, Japan's ODA has focused on two main global issues: health and medical care (mainly maternal and child care, with an emphasis on PHC) and infectious diseases.

Overall, Japan's ODA has been connected to international cooperation paradigms and movements such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the human security paradigm, WHO official support to UHC, and WHO and World Bank funds for health emergencies. Connections with international cooperation paradigms in health care must be critically assessed in light of hegemonic interests and the strong neoliberal agenda that has dominated the world since the early 1990s. They also need to be critically evaluated considering Japan's views and interpretations of emerging health paradigms. In short, if it is true that Japanese ODA cannot be fully understood without considering hegemonies and geopolitics, it is likewise true that it cannot be fully understood without more profound comprehension of the country's unique views and approaches to international cooperation in health, which sometimes clash with prevailing international paradigms. These considerations highlight the need for further research on Japan's ODA views and approaches to recent global health issues, such as UHC, infectious diseases, maternal and child healthcare, human security, and an aging society.

In short, Japan's ODA is part of the domestic and global debates on health policies and systems. As part of these ongoing and dynamic debates, there is evidence that Japan's ODA has already incorporated the fight against COVID-19 into its global health policies. By October 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic had already surpassed the death toll of the twentieth century Spanish flu. After the outbreak, neither international cooperation nor global health materialized as mandated by international legal agreements, goals, and frameworks (health for all, health by all, and health in all).

In contrast, competition, denialism, nationalism, and border politics have prevailed, causing disunity and inequity across the globe.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been teaching us, in the cruelest way possible, the lesson that values, mechanisms, and policies of international cooperation for global health devised with the participation of multiple local, national, regional, and global actors in the international arena in the last decades have not been sufficient to tackle a global pandemic in an equitable way that honors the universal right to health.

At countless moments in history, we, the human species, a collection of peoples, nations, societies, and communities, have come to crossroads. Wars, natural disasters, pandemics, and other events have changed the course of history. In times like these, it is common for humanity to rethink past choices, reflect on the paths taken thus far, and devise new plans for the future. Perhaps it is time for those in charge of organizing Japan's ODA to think and rethink about past health aid choices and future prospects.

From the discussion above, the simple inclusion of COVID-19 in Japan's foreign aid agenda does not seem sufficient to promote international cooperation on the issue. On the contrary, it may just reinforce the agency's trend to focus on infectious disease without contributing, in the longer run, to an actual world collective effort to tackle the current and future pandemics and/or similar challenges. Moreover, maternal and child healthcare, while undoubtedly relevant, may reinforce Japan's trend of adopting a specific agenda to the detriment of broader and more relevant agendas for health equity around the world. Whether both directions have effectively contributed to strengthening health systems around the world is yet to be analyzed. Moreover, both trends—infectious diseases and maternal and child healthcare—must reflect Japan's UHC assumptions, unique experiences, and approaches that are yet to be explored in future research.

Recent demonstrations of hesitation on the part of the US government during the Trump administration regarding whether to continue supporting the LIO conceived and implemented by Western powers after the Second World War calls for increased attention to the future of international cooperation and foreign aid for health. Through its UHS model, China has demonstrated an outstanding ability to deal with the pandemic at both the domestic and international levels. Despite a few limitations, Japan has demonstrated the ability to tackle the pandemic at the domestic level. More than ever, it is time to assess strengths and weaknesses carefully and pragmatically based on the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic and all forces and circumstances that have significantly impacted people's lives worldwide. From there, perhaps it will be possible, like Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four Freedoms after the Second World War, to have states or their leaders propose and negotiate a new set of ethical consensuses on health that might open new ways of international cooperation for greater health equity in the future.

Finally, this chapter elucidates that international cooperation in general, and more specifically international cooperation for health, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, cannot be restricted to establishing formal agreements, budgets or fundraising, official reports, approved projects, and other necessary daily bureaucratic actions. If failures in international cooperation can cost lives, the realization of international cooperation requires mutual awareness of the forces at play in the process. In the field of health, more than ever, international cooperation requires the notion of gains and losses caused by past choices, knowledge of global geopolitical forces and prevailing health paradigms, awareness of ongoing international health debates and models, recognition of domestic experiences' singularities, consciousness of organizations and individuals' experiences and views.

Brazil and Japan have accumulated enriching experiences of international cooperation and foreign aid in health. Such experiences deserve further studies and analyses based on a broader analytical framework if a true partnership for change is to be devised in the future to deal with the tremendous global health challenges that lie ahead. Simple economic-oriented assessments and evaluations restricted to project effectiveness may not suffice to thoroughly evaluate these initiatives, their complex ramifications, and their implications.

Although it is a simple first research step, the preliminary and tentative analytical framework developed for this study may have elucidated a few aspects that reveal the complexity of thinking about international cooperation and foreign aid for health in the past, present, and future. Admittedly, international cooperation is not an easy task, but it is a collective one that holds the potential to change people's lives for the better or for the worse.

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Notes

1. Currently Sri Lanka.
2. The latest version, White Paper on Development Cooperation (2020), was only available in Japanese in February 2022.
3. At times, "mutual" may reflect the dominant will of a hegemony explicitly or implicitly imposed on other states.
4. The Independent Commission was presided over by Ms. Sadako Ogata, a former member of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Ford Foundation's fellow at the time and Amartya Sen from Trinity College, Cambridge.
5. Ferreira et al. (2013, p. 2) endorsed the idea that "human health is undoubtedly the result of complex biological and socio-historical process."
6. As reported by Labontè (2008, p. 467), "One of health promotion's major contributions has been its discursive challenge to biomedical and even behavioral models of health and illness. The concept of social determinants of health is now widely accepted by health authorities in many parts of the world. When health promoters focus on these determinants; however, it is often at local or national scales. Contemporary globalization demands a more critical appraisal of how many health problems have become inherently global in cause and consequence."

7. See Kingston et al. (2010) for an interesting analysis on the scope of nation states' obligations concerning the right to health for people who are no longer citizens of any sovereign state or have no legal nationality, also referred to as "stateless people."
8. There are many expressions to refer to these two health systems, as we shall see in the continuation of the discussion in this chapter.
9. SHI, as explicated below, refers to UHC, according to Kutzin et al. (2009).
10. The authors' typology is arguably based on distinctions between healthcare systems "according to their institutional characteristics and patterns of financing and service provision," thus moving away from "the tradition of typologies that have centered on the mode of governance, on the degree of doctor's autonomy, or— more generally—on the actor in order to distinguish healthcare systems" (p. 617).
11. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are 8 goals that UN Member States have agreed to try to achieve by the year 2015. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, signed in September 2000, commits world leaders to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against women. The MDGs are derived from this Declaration. Each MDG has targets set for 2015 and indicators to monitor progress from 1990 levels. Several of these relate directly to health. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/millennium-development-goals-(mdgs).
12. Authors had opportunities to visit, work, and conduct research on several international cooperation projects implemented in Brazil, including three pioneering international technical cooperation projects between Brazil and Japan in public health: the Public Health and Social Development Center (NUSP) in the Federal University of Pernambuco, developed between 1995 and 2000, the Maternal and Child Health Improvement, Humanization of Childbirth (LUZ) in Ceará State, conducted from 1996 to 2001, and the Healthy Municipality Project in Northeast Brazil, carried out from 2003 to 2008.

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Part II
Brazil–Japan Cooperation from Global Perspectives

Chapter 4
Global Environmental Governance and ODA from Japan to Brazil

Shuichiro Masukata, Cristina Yumie Aoki Inoue, and Nanahira de Rabelo e Sant'Anna

4.1 Introduction

Japan and Brazil have been historical partners in development cooperation/assistance and share important political diplomatic ties. In the field of International Relations (IR), cooperation is defined as the mutual adjustment of government policies through a process of policy coordination (Martin 1993, p. 434). In this work, we look specifically at international cooperation and consider it as joint projects and programs that are carried out within the framework of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan to Brazil. Even though ODA refers primarily to relations between countries, non-state and subnational actors have actively participated either as beneficiaries or as agents in projects and programs.

Global environmental governance is understood as a multi-layered and multi-dimensional process in which diverse actors participate. These actors can be state and non-state and involve institutional arrangements from the global to the local level; they include individuals, organizations, or networks that respond to global environmental challenges by trying to set agendas, establish norms and rules, implement action programs or policies at the local, national or international levels (Rosenau 1992; Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009; Gonçalves and Inoue 2017). The multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are essential parameters for global governance that specify principles, norms, rules, and procedures which have been widely

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agreed upon. Brazil and Japan have been actors in multilateral negotiations and diplomacy, both have signed important MEAs dealing with climate change, biodiversity, desertification, persistent organic pollution, etc., and both have committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). State and non-state actors, international organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations refer to MEAs when setting their policy directions, such as ODA projects and programs.

However, previous studies on development cooperation/assistance have not fully explored the dimension of "environmental sustainability" and how multilateral environmental commitments guide development cooperation or are implemented through it. This is an important dimension of global environmental governance that is often overlooked, and its real impact on environmental sustainability is yet to be identified and assessed. There has also not been much attention paid to the relationship between global level MEA commitments and what has been actually implemented through ODA programs and projects on the ground. Previous studies already described the purpose and significance of the Japanese government's assistance to Brazil both on agriculture and space technology programs (Dantas 2019), and the specific programs and results of JICA's assistance to Brazil on sustainable agriculture (Hosono et al. 2016, 2019). In this sense, we aim at analyzing ODA programs and projects between Japan and Brazil by using this encompassing notion of global environmental governance.

More specifically, we will identify Japan's ODA program and projects in Brazil to examine whether they can be considered a response to global environmental commitments. We will also scrutinize two cases at the local level: PRODECER (The Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Program for Cerrados Development) in Paracatu, Minas Gerais, and SAF (Agroforestry Systems) in Tomé-Açu, in Pará. We will identify the actors and processes to analyze to what extent development cooperation between Japan and Brazil can be related to global environmental and sustainable development commitments. Our goal is to understand the challenges to boosting international cooperation that promotes sustainable development and what policies are needed to do so.

Through literature review, document analysis, and interviews, we identify development cooperation programs and projects implemented until 2020 to create a broad overview of the trends and how environmental sustainability is discussed relative to other areas. Then, we analyze the cases at the local level (PRODECER in Paracatu and SAF in Tomé-Açu) to examine whether they can be related to global environmental governance processes, and more specifically, to what extent these respond to MEA commitments by both countries.

The chapter has three sections after this introduction. The first section focuses on the Inter-state/bilateral level of governance processes. The second section identifies Brazil's and Japan's main foreign policy positions related to environmental issues and MEAs. Then, it outlines the historical background of the cooperation in environmental sustainability between Brazil and Japan and discusses the guidelines (policy directions/orientation/goals) of Japanese ODA and the cooperation framework agreed between both countries (what is negotiated/agreed upon during the Comistas—Bilateral Cooperation Commissions). This section also systematizes the available data about ODA. In other words, it sheds light on the changes in Japan–Brazil relations that occurred after the transformation of Japan's ODA budget to Latin American countries. The third section deals with the subnational-local level to analyze two cases of bilateral programs and projects: PRODECER (Paracatu, MG) and Agroforestry Systems (Tomé-Açu, PA) using the global environmental governance analytical framework. Finally, the conclusion section provides lessons learned from cooperation in environmental sustainability between Brazil and Japan.

4.2 Multilateral-Global Dimension/Level

Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are a set of conventions, accords, agreements among nation-states to promote environmental sustainability and sustainable development. Examples ranged from the well-known United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and related Paris Agreement to those less known, such as the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. Instruments like the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 2030 Agenda on the Sustainable Development Goals are also included. This set of legal documents expresses different types of commitments, both binding and non-binding, resulting from global mobilizations that have included a broad diversity of actors at the global level.

The global level is more comprehensive than national state actors, encompassing state and non-state, subnational, and local actors from the public, private, and civil society sectors. MEAs are important because they establish global collective principles, norms, rules, procedures, and action programs.

4.2.1 Conceptual Lenses—Global Sustainability Governance

Our analytical framework considers governance as a global–local process composed of multiple actors, governmental and nongovernmental (state, civil society, and market) from global to local (global, international, national, subnational, local) which can be multilevel or polycentric (Ribeiro 2022, forthcoming). From an IR perspective, our framework blurs the distinction between external and internal, or the domestic and international levels, established by neorealism (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Governance processes include the establishment of agendas, making, implementing, and adjudicating rules, and setting goals and programs of action (Young 2000; Biermann et al. 2009; Avant et al. 2010) to deal with global collective issues.

Therefore, global environmental governance is understood as a multi-layered and multi-dimensional process in which diverse actors take part. Using it as an analytical framework, we aim to shed light on multiple levels of analysis, diverse actors, power relations, and the three sustainability dimensions (ecological-environmental, social, and economic) to assess ODA between Japan and Brazil. More specifically, we consider global commitments established on MEAs as the goals or parameters for global governance processes. By doing so, we analyze Japanese ODA programs and projects in Brazil, asking to what extent they contribute to realizing these global commitments and goals.

4.2.2 Brazil's and Japan's Positions in the Global Environmental Arena

The Brundtland's Commission final report, "Our common future," influenced various global actions related to the environment and development, including the creation of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 (WCED 1987). The Rio 1992 Conference was considered a landmark for global environmental governance when major international environmental agreements were signed. In this conference, the Rio Declaration, the Agenda 21, Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were signed by 156 countries, including Brazil and Japan. By this time, the concept of sustainable development was beginning to take root, and this too was to have significant impacts on Brazil and Japan's foreign environmental policy.

In the mid-1980s, Brazil gradually changed its views on environmental issues. It initially rejected these issues in multilateral conferences, like the 1972 Stockholm United Nations Convention on Human Environment, considering it a problem for Northern rich countries. However, in 1989 Brazil offered to host the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and was then active in negotiating and signing climate and biodiversity conventions; it also blocked the establishment of a legally binding document on forests.

Since the Rio 1992 Conference, Brazil has had a mixed profile in the global environmental arena (Viola and Gonçalves 2019), moving from veto to proposition in sensitive issues like forest management (Carvalho 2012); playing a leadership role in other areas, such as biodiversity (Lovejoy and Inoue 2013); and being actively involved in climate negotiations through coalitions like BASIC either by blocking or forwarding resolutions (Hochstetler and Viola 2012). Brazil has therefore been a relevant actor in the construction of the global environmental government architecture by actively participating in negotiations of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), but its roles and types of participation have been highly variable (Hochstetler and Inoue 2019; Viola and Gonçalves 2019).

On the other hand, Japan was heavily criticized by the international community as "an economic animal" or "environmental outlaw" in the mid-1980s. However, the end of the Cold War fundamentally changed global politics and opened the window for global cooperation (Sakaguchi et al. 2021). Japan has also become an increasingly active supporter of global environmental agreements and a major funder of bilateral environmental initiatives (Schreurs 2018). One of Japan's first attempts to engage in multilateral action toward addressing global environmental problems was with the establishment of the Brundtland Commission in 1984 under the UN General Assembly. The Japanese government proposed the establishment of the commission and made a substantial financial contribution toward it (Schreurs 2018, pp. 76–77). In 1989, Japan pledged to provide a considerable amount of environmental official development assistance (ODA) at the G7 Arch summit and the 1992 Rio Summit. The conference had major impacts on Japan's foreign and domestic environmental policies. It seemed that Japan would evolve from a reactive to proactive state (Calder 2003); it took a leadership role in building an agreement on the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.

The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from June 20, 2012 to June 22, 2012. Following the adoption of the outcome document "The future we want" at Rio+20, the United Nations General Assembly adopted "the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" in 2015. This agenda consists of 17 global goals and 169 targets that should be achieved as SDGs by 2030; their development was the first time that the international community discussed environmental, social, and economic development in an integrated way. Prior to that, environmental and developmental goals were handled separately. The outcome document "The Future We Want" confirmed the importance of integrating the three elements of the environment, society, and economy (Dodds et al. 2017).

Meanwhile, Japan has struggled to find the Post-Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The Japanese government manifested its potential to the fullest and participated in building a better society to achieve sustainable development worldwide. In Rio+20, Japan presented three specific initiatives toward creating a "Green Future": (1) Future City, (2) Green Cooperation Volunteers, and (3) cooperation to reduce risk from catastrophic natural disasters (MOFA 2012a), based on the understanding of "human security."[1]

4.3 Japan's Cooperation Trajectory and "Green" ODA to Brazil

4.3.1 Historical Overview

Japan's recovery from the Second War was steady and relatively fast, with the country becoming an economic power and an important international player in several arenas, including development cooperation. After significant international criticism in the 1970s and 1980s, Japan increased its ODA contributions and became a large financial supporter of major international organizations. During the 1970s, both Japan's status as a developed country and the accompanying responsibilities were recognized by both Japan and other members of the developed world. JICA (the Japan International Cooperation Agency) was established in 1974.

An issue of burden-sharing and the US wanted Japan to do more in economic cooperation. To comply, Japan decided to double its ODA budget in 1977 (Kato 2016).[2] Japan's ODA continued to expand in volume and develop in its range of activities during the 1980s. In 1989, it became the world's top ODA donor, surpassing the United States. However, since the economic downturn of 1991, the Japanese government has faced a more difficult budgetary environment, and further expansion of financial contributions was limited (Funabashi and Ikenberry 2020).

In 1992, after the end of the Cold War, Japan formulated the ODA Charter and charged the ODA with the area of social development in developing countries. The Japanese government was conscious of contributing to international interests in Brazil in particular through urban poverty and medical measures. The continued decline of Japan's ODA during the post-Cold War was largely because of the prolonged recession and the alarmingly high level of public debt (Kato 2016). The ODA Charter was revised for the first time in 11 years by a Cabinet decision on August 29, 2003; at that time, the environment was considered to be a global issue. The balance between the environment and development continues to be the first of the principles of development cooperation of ODA.

During the 2000s, JICA became an independent administrative institution and was merged with the ODA loan department of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) (Kato 2016). JICA emphasized support for African countries, which have the greatest need for economic development, and stated that ODA toward Asian countries would place greater emphasis on national interests from a geopolitical perspective and the strength of historical and economic ties.

Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of total ODA from Japan between 1967 to 2019 (OECD 2021a).[3]



Fig. 4.1 Total cooperation for international development, 1967–2019 (Millions of dollars) (*Source* OECD 2021a)



Fig. 4.2 ODA from Japan by selected sectors: Agriculture, forestry and general environmental protection, 1995–2019 (Millions of dollars) (*Source* OECD 2021a)

Figure 4.2 demonstrates the evolution of total ODA from Japan between 1995 and 2019 in three sectors related to the purposes of this study, namely agriculture, forestry, and general environmental protection.[4] In most of those years, the ODA spent in the sectors of forestry and general environment protection was lower in relation to the amount directed to the agricultural sector, except in 2000, 2003, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. The referred disparity is also verified in the highest amounts spent in each sector: USD 409 million for the sector of forestry in 2003; USD 723 million for general environment protection in 2011; USD 1.7 billion for agriculture in 2017 (OECD 2021a).

ODA has also been identified as an instrument for the implementation of the Liberal Democratic Parties (LDP) government whose economic policy was called "Abenomics" (MOFA 2012b). With these policy orientations, the government revised the ODA Charter for the second time in 2015. The new document, now titled Document Cooperation Charter, emphasizes the role of ODA as a meditation for other actors that engage in development cooperation (Kato 2016).[5]

4.3.2 *Japan–Brazil Development Cooperation*

Brazil and Japan have been historical partners in development cooperation/assistance. Since the start of ODA to Brazil–Japan has closely engaged with issues faced by Brazil through the provision of support for sustainable growth in Brazil in a variety of fields (MOFA 2020). For example, in 1973, the US embargo on soybeans led Japan to pursue diversification of countries from which they could import food. Japanese ODA, therefore, combined the Brazilian government's goal of economic development of inland areas in the country and the Japanese goal of food security by increasing the production of grains. Projects initially included not only the agricultural field such as the development of Brazil's Cerrado, but also an investment for the Usiminas steel plant project and technical cooperation in environmental conservation. Since the 2000s, the Japanese government has also provided support to improve the abilities of relevant government agencies, such as improving the technology of satellite images, and have helped to control and prevent environmental crimes such as deforestation.

Since 2010, ODA policy toward Latin American countries has become a low priority because most Latin American countries already achieved a certain degree of economic development. ODA projects in Brazil also covered social development: urban issues and environmental and disaster prevention measures, South–South cooperation, third-country cooperation with Latin America and African countries with Brazil as a partner.

In 2019, JICA's development cooperation in Brazil celebrated its 60th anniversary. These figures shed light on the changes in Japan–Brazil relations that occurred after the transformation of Japan's ODA budget to Latin American countries.

Figure 4.3 demonstrates the evolution of ODA disbursements from Japan to Brazil in the period between 1998 and 2019 (OECD 2021b).[6]

With an average amount of USD 64.8 million dollars between 2018 and 2019, Japan was positioned as the third largest donor of gross ODA for Brazil, after Germany and France (OECD 2021c). Figure 4.4 shows the number of projects carried



Fig. 4.3 ODA disbursements from Japan to Brazil, 1998–2019 (Millions of dollars) (*Source* OECD 2021b)



Fig. 4.4 Projects between Japan and Brazil by sector, 1981–2020 (number of projects) (*Source* JICA 2021a, b, c)

out in Brazil with ODA from Japan in the period from 1981 and 2020 by sector (JICA 2021a, b, c).[7]

Brazil considers itself a dualist country; this means that it provides cooperation for international development including technical cooperation, humanitarian assistance scholarships, and contributes to international organizations (Hochstetler and Inoue 2019; Purushothaman 2021), while still receiving ODA. The Brazilian government has also worked towards the SDGs 2030. According to the 2019 Sustainable Development Report, Brazil has reached Goal 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), but Goal 3 (Good Health and Well-Being), Goal 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), Goal 10 (Reduced Inequalities), and Goal 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) have not been achieved. JICA believes that it is necessary to support the achievement of Goal 14 through sewerage projects in Brazil.[8] Therefore, the ODA budget tends to expand to accommodate cooperation with Japanese companies planning to promote their relationships with Brazilian government agencies and Nikkei society.

4.3.3 The Environmental Dimension in Japan–Brazil's Development Cooperation

The Paris Agreement was created at the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in 2015. It recommends the implementation and support of Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)+, which is the most important framework for efforts in



Fig. 4.5 Paracatu, Minas Gerais (*Source* IBGE 2017)

Fig. 4.6 Tomé-Açu in Pará (*Source* IBGE 2017)

the field of forests and natural environments in the international community. Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries promised to fund climate change mitigation and adaptation measures in developing countries.

The environmental dimension in Japan–Brazil's development cooperation is relevant to the conservation of the Amazon rainforest which is closely related to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions (GGE). In recent years, peatland management and blue carbon conservation (carbon absorbed and stored in coastal ecosystems such as mangroves and seaweed beds) have also attracted attention. JICA implemented a project to utilize Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS) images to help protect the Brazilian Amazon rainforest and combat illegal deforestation (cooperation period 2009–2012).

The Japanese government has also provided support to improve the capabilities of relevant government agencies, such as better technology for satellite images, and has achieved results in the control and prevention of environmental crimes, such as deforestation. Furthermore, cooperation with third world countries and a partnership with Nikkei communities have been proposed. An Amazon field museum project that JICA supported also began in 2019. This project aims to contribute to the sustainable development of local communities by conducting research, conservation, and dissemination activities.

Projects carried out in Brazil with ODA from Japan have become increasingly related to the environment and sustainability since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which occurred in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro.

According to JICA's data (2021a, b, c), no activities related to the environment took place between 1981 and 1991, but projects in parallel fields were identified. A total of eight projects were carried out in that time; four in transportation, three in agriculture and agricultural civil engineering,[9] and one in electricity.

Between 1992 and 2011, marked by changes in Brazilian environmental legislation, before the signing of the new Brazilian Forest Code—Law nr. 12.651/2012, 10 projects out of a total of 42 were carried out in the areas of environment, forestry, and forest conservation, representing approximately 23.80% of all projects. Half of these projects (5) were expressly related to the Amazon biome. Between 2012 to 2020, six projects were underway or under discussion, two of which were related to environment preservation, specifically the Amazon. The two initiatives analyzed in the next section, PRODECER, and SAF, are not included in the data presented in Fig. 4.4 and subsequent paragraphs since both started prior to the time interval with available data.

4.4 Subnational–Local: PRODECER in Paracatu and Agroforestry Systems in Tomé-Açu

This section analyzes two cases of bilateral cooperation, namely the Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Program for Cerrados Development—PRODECER (Paracatu, MG) and Agroforestry Systems—SAF (Tomé-Açu, PA), which were carried out in two different Brazilian biomes, the Cerrado and the Amazon rainforest. It focuses on the subnational–local levels using the global environmental analytical framework.

As we mentioned, global environmental governance is understood as a multi-layered and multi-dimensional process with diverse actors. These two sample cases are significant both because they demonstrate how the environmental agenda has been incorporated into cooperation practice and because they illustrate how MEAs and GEGs are implemented in bilateral cooperation projects.

4.4.1 PRODECER: Report on Environmental Sustainability

PRODECER, created by a joint statement signed in 1974 and implemented in three stages from 1979 to 2001, aimed to stimulate an increase in the global food supply and contribute to development in the Cerrados region, a biome that occupies approximately 25% of the Brazilian territory.

According to a report jointly published by Brazil's Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) and JICA, the main features of PRODECER included the participation of the Brazilian and Japanese public and private sectors; the development of colonization poles with the settlement of medium-sized farmers that were supported by cooperatives; creation of a binational company—Agricultural Promotion Company (Campo)—for the implementation of the Program; and strict attention paid to the environment, with innovation on issues such as "mandatory forest reserves in condominiums" and "encouraging modern soil conservation methods" (BRAZIL and JICA 2002, R-8).

The numerous studies on PRODECER characteristics and impacts can be separated into two groups. The first group is comprised of studies that focus on the positive repercussions of the program for the relations between Brazil and Japan, for food supply in the world and for economic development and agricultural modernization in the country, including socioeconomic improvements in inland regions. The second group, which is supported by the official history of the program,[10] includes research that criticizes the repercussions of PRODECER in the form of land concentration, rural exodus, social conflicts, environmental degradation, indebtedness, bankruptcies, and cultural changes in rural communities, among others.[11]

In official report, PRODECER was positively evaluated in terms of efficiency, achievement of its objective, impact, and adequacy of the initial planning and sustainability. Regarding sustainability, the report highlights the "multiple effects of PRODECER's direct impact on local communities and the indirect impact on regional and national economies and agriculture and, finally, on the global food supply." To sustain these multiple effects, it recognized the need for "sustainable use of incorporated agricultural areas" and "maintenance of their spreading effects" (Brazil and JICA 2002, R-12).

However, the report also refers to the negative impacts of the Program, especially regarding deficiency in energy and transport infrastructure, indebtedness of farmers, and environmental problems, such as the reduction of the area's native vegetation and depletion of water resources. The section on prospects for the development of the Cerrados includes challenges related to environmental preservation, ecosystem protection, and sustainable agricultural development. It is recommended that the preservation of biodiversity be focused on by a combination of ecological corridors,[12] protection of the indigenous population and their land, and the awareness of producers about the importance of environmental preservation. This should include compliance with Brazilian environmental legislation related to agricultural production activities, such as rules on the protection of native and riparian forests, installation of irrigation equipment, and handling of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.

4.4.1.1 PRODECER in Paracatu, Minas Gerais

PRODECER started in the municipality of Paracatu, located in the Northwest region of the state of Minas Gerais, which has native vegetation typical of the Cerrado. The municipality's soil has been exploited for mining since the eighteenth century, while more technology and machinery became common in agriculture. It was implemented on a large scale in the second half of the twentieth century, stimulated by government plans and programs such as PRODECER. The location hosted the majority of projects carried out under the Program, five out of a total of 21 projects, and received the largest number of producers settled, 147 out of a total of 717 producers. In 2002, 97 out of a total of 466 producers settled in all locations remaining residing in the areas of the municipality where the projects were held (Brazil and JICA 2002; Sant'Anna 2018).

The first PRODECER project in Paracatu—the pilot project of the program—was called *Novo Mundo*. Started in 1980 and structured through a partnership between Campo and Cotia Agricultural Cooperative (CAC), it was carried out in a total area of 23 thousand hectares (ha). The selection of areas for the project was based on analysis of aerial photographs and local research on topography, vegetation, hydrography, and roads, with the intention of identifying and confirming suitable conditions for mechanized agriculture. The areas which were close to rivers, with abundant vegetation, were designated as common natural reserves to be preserved (Hosono and Hongo 2016).

The main products cultivated within the *Novo Mundo* project were soybeans, corn, coffee, and beans. Other cultivated products included watermelon and cotton. The average area of the lots was between 800 and 1000 hectares (ha), with planted areas between 800 and 900 ha; the natural reserve area of 200 ha. The project was characterized by direct planting[13] by more than 50% of farmers, rotation between soybean and corn crops, and implantation of irrigation equipment—central pivot—for coffee cultivation (BRAZIL and JICA 2002).

The next PRODECER project in Paracatu, still within the first phase of the program,[14] was *Entre Ribeiros I*. The project started in 1983, was developed through a partnership between Campo and the Agricultural Cooperative of Paracatu Valley (Coopervap) and included a total area of 10,315 ha.

The main products cultivated were soy, corn, pumpkin, tomato, pepper, beans, and garlic. Other products included pineapple, banana, carrot, and potato. The average area of the lots was 300 ha, with a planted area of 120 ha and a natural reserve area of 60 ha. Similar to the previous project, *Entre Ribeiros I* was characterized by rotation between corn and soybean crops and the implantation of central pivot in 3,000 ha of the planted area (Brazil and JICA 2002; Santos 2007).

Between 1985 and 1993, during the second phase of PRODECER, three projects were initiated in Paracatu, all of them supported by Coopervap, namely *Entre Ribeiros II*, in a total area of 10,843 ha; *Entre Ribeiros III*, area of 5,953 ha; and *Entre Ribeiros IV*, area of 3,984 ha. The projects were carried out without irrigation equipment in places where agricultural production was difficult due to conditions of low water availability (Brazil and JICA 2002).[15] According to the official report, the introduction of irrigation equipment contributed to reducing the damage caused by short mini droughts in the rainy season, known as *veranicos,* as well as facilitated "the consolidation of the crop rotation system, resulting in diversification" (Brazil and JICA 2002, pp. 3–29). Studies on PRODECER projects in Paracatu mention the establishment of crop irrigation systems by central pivots in the face of adverse climatic conditions, especially drought periods that hampered agricultural production (Pimentel and Botelho 2007; Santos 2007; Inocêncio 2010; Sant'Anna 2018). Agricultural producers who participated in PRODECER in Paracatu reported that the irrigated area led to higher productivity, making it possible to obtain two harvests per year. However, their debt accrued as the financing of pivots was affected by the high interest rates and inflation of the so-called lost decade (Sant'Anna 2018).

Furthermore, in a study on the impact of irrigation in the region of the *Entre Ribeiros* hydrographic basin, whose agriculture usage was stimulated by the *Entre Ribeiros* project, Santos (2007, p. 1) clarifies that agricultural production in this area occurred "dissociated from proper management, both with regard to land use and to water catchment in order to supply irrigation systems." Abstractions without proper technical care caused the process to produce scarcity in the area, which led to an intervention by the Public Prosecution Service (*Ministério Público*) demanding the readjustment of irrigation practices. During interviews with producers, they revealed, to a large extent, awareness of the water issue, given the evidence of the risk of compromising their activities and productivity levels. They recognized the existence of environmental problems and their responsibility in the process and indicated "distance between what irrigators do and the role of environmental bodies" (Santos 2007, p. 77).

This study draws attention to the associativism among producers which facilitated the organization of initiatives to structure the readjustment of irrigating practices and reduce excessive abstraction and water losses. The role of the Association to the Support to Entre Ribeiros Producers (AAPER) is highlighted in its efforts to encourage farmers to optimize the use of water and to mediate possible conflicts (Santos 2007).[16] The associativism among producers and their families is also highlighted in the studies by Pimentel and Botelho (2007)[17] and Sant'Anna (2018), which focus on the perspectives of people of Japanese origin (Nikkei).

Returning to the environmental issue, in the research conducted by Pessôa (1988, p. 9), "environmental degradation of proportions not yet dimensioned" was already mentioned among the effects of PRODECER. Santos (2007) indicates that research on the relationship between environmental preservation and sustainable agricultural practices was secondary compared to occupation, deforestation, and production, which is confirmed by the official report of the Program (Brazil and JICA 2002).

In the period from 1974 to 1999, studies were carried out within the scope of technical-scientific cooperation projects aimed at agricultural development in the Cerrados. Until 1992, research focused on techniques for rational use of the soil–plant-water system and grain cultivation. With the recognition of environmental impacts,[18] because of the accelerated process of agricultural occupation, the need to "evaluate natural resources and increase research that aimed at the balance between agricultural development and environmental preservation, promoting the practice of sustainable agriculture" was indicated (Brazil and JICA 2002, pp. 4–2). After 1994, studies were carried out in the areas of plant protection, soil fertilization, remote sensing, production systems, water quality, agricultural machinery, disease, and pest control. In addition, sustainable agricultural technologies were developed with an emphasis on environmental conservation. While cooperation in research was promoted, the project was called "Cerrados environmental monitoring" was carried out from 1992 to 2000, with the goal of assessing the environmental impact of the agricultural development process in the areas where the program was implemented. Indicators related to soil erosion, volume, and quality of water, vegetation, and insects were monitored.

The Rio 1992 Conference contributed to the improvement of environmental legislation in Brazil. PRODECER followed the changes in this legislation in the third and last phase of the program, carried out in the states of Tocantins and Maranhão, from 1995 to 2001. At that time, each area was 1,000 ha and the projects had a nature reserve area expanded to 50% of the properties, mostly preserved as collective and grouped areas. In this phase, the introduction of irrigation equipment was programmed, based on the experience obtained in previous projects, and direct planting was performed intensively (Gonçalves 2018).[19]

Although PRODECER has officially demonstrated compliance with Brazilian environmental legislation and incorporated its changes in the third phase, especially in relation to the establishment of natural reserve areas, the program's sustainability was harmed in its environmental dimension by its negative environmental impacts, such as reduction and depletion of water resources, climate change, soil degradation and erosion, and the reduction of native fauna and flora. However, it was possible to verify that the program achieved sustainability in its social dimension, in the form of associativism between producers who participated in the program and their families, including people of Japanese origin (Nikkei).

4.4.2 Agroforestry Systems: Report on Environmental Sustainability

During the 1980s, Agroforestry Systems (SAF) was founded in the municipality of Tomé-Açu, located in the North Region of the State of Pará, which has a wide range of Amazon and Cerrado biomes. SAF is a system that cultivates a combination of crops on a single land, contains at least one large tree, and uses both vertical and horizontal land production, also known as "agriculture in which people and forests live together." In Tomé-Açu, Pará, SAF is considered a practical example of technology transfer even for small non-Japanese farmers. JICA, the government of Pará, and the Agricultural Cooperative of Tomé-Açu (CAMTA) have collaborated to conduct training in Japan and abroad on SAF for Brazilian agronomists. Policy effects were confirmed through similar activities in other communities, both in Brazil and in other countries, such as Peru.

4.4.2.1 Agroforestry Systems in Tomé-Açu, Pará

The activities in Tomé-Açu have attracted the attention of international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which operates in agriculture and social development, as a good example of sustainable development.[20] We can evaluate the character of SAF in Tomé-açu by using the global environmental governance analytical framework at a subnational–local level. Firstly, SAF contributes to global sustainable development by changing agricultural practices on the local level. SAF as Nikkei agriculture in the Amazon makes highly productive planted forests, complements the income of small farmers, and contributes to their rural settlement. It has attracted international attention in the field of environment and sustainability as a measure to boost sustainable development. The lessons from SAF-based trading also provide a wake-up call to an international trade that generates uneven resource distribution between developed and developing countries. Therefore, the SAF project-initiative in Tomé-Açu, with support from JICA, has promoted environmental, social, and economic sustainability and thus can be considered in tune with global goals and MEAs, although it still needs more time to know how it will persist over time and what the positive (or negative) impacts are for climate, biodiversity, and forest.

Secondly, the virtues of the Nikkei community with ethics, solidarity, and resilience were crucial to the successful development of SAF in Tomé-Açu. Japanese immigrants in Amazon have always been fraught with difficulties, but that is why they were able to unite and develop their community (Saes et al. 2014). In general, we tend to think of human activities as destroying forests, but the ability of local communities to choose rich and proactive activities is a benchmark for maintaining a balance between economic development and forest conservation and creating a sustainable society where people and forests coexist in harmony from the perspective of global environmental governance. However, it cannot be denied that the success of the agroforestry activities in Tomé-Açú was coincidental in the history of community development by Japanese immigrants. If consumers try to demand an increase in primary product production through agroforestry farming, it will be difficult to maintain the current farming method, which was created by motivated people who had a narrowly intended result from the perspective of land use and labor costs.

In these senses, sustainable development risks promoting disorderly development without the creation, dissemination, and proper management of scientific knowledge. A simple binary conflict of environmental conservation or economic development has created problems because of short-term interests, lack of knowledge, and ideological conflict. For example, in the debate over forest conservation in the Amazon, the existence of poverty has long led to the claim of sustainable development along with environmental conservation, but this claim risks justifying widespread development (Nishizawa et al. 2005). On the other hand, if we pay attention only to protecting the forest, it will not be accompanied by benefits for the producers. In general, SAF, which attracts attention only from being considered "environmentally friendly," must be balanced by which social development of the region can be carried out at the same time in addition to the aspect of economic development in order to maintain sustainability (Masukata 2021).

4.5 Conclusion Lessons Learned from Cooperation in Environmental Sustainability

This chapter tried to shed light on the environmental dimension of Japanese ODA to Brazil–Japan's development assistance to Brazil is limited by the government's pursuit of both the national interest and international public goods. Quantitative data and the two cases demonstrate the incorporation of environmental norms into the practice of ODA. For instance, Cerrado agricultural development and cooperation in the Amazon area have been implemented in face of two global norms: food security and environmental conservation. This has been done through financial and technical cooperation. The former did not have any environmental provision in its original formulation, but as time went by, regulations about water, for instance, had to be considered. In the Amazon, most projects had an environmental dimension.

This chapter shows that Japanese cooperation with Brazil has changed over time and that both countries can maintain and consolidate cooperative relations even if there are crucial transformations in the international arena. Global environmental governance norms have cascaded to ODA projects more slowly than we wished, but data and the evidence from case studies show that global commitments have a role in the direction of development assistance from Japan to Brazil. This is important and necessary to respond to global environmental challenges like climate change or biodiversity loss, though that may not be sufficient given the pace of global environmental change.

Along with incorporating global guidelines on the environment and sustainability in their policies and legislation, Brazil and Japan regarded these issues as priorities in their bilateral relations agenda. Environment and sustainability gained prominence in Japan's technical and financial cooperation with Brazil in the 1990s, following global consensus on the importance of policies and actions aimed at environmental preservation and responsibility. It is worth highlighting the pioneering efforts of Nikkei communities in the two cases analyzed at the subnational–local level, and the role of cultural values such as ethics, solidarity, resilience and associativism in conducting the initiatives.

The cooperation in environmental sustainability between Brazil and Japan is at a crossroads in the COVID-19 era. In March 2021, Brazil and Japan entered into the Tomé-Açu Memorandum of Cooperation Regarding Sustainable Use of the Amazon Region's Biodiversity (MOFA 2021b). The objective of this Memorandum of Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as "this MoC") is to further bilateral cooperation between the Participants for the promotion of agroforestry systems in the Amazon. Through the Memorandum, it is expected that cooperation on the sustainable use of agroforestry systems and biodiversity in the Amazon region will be further promoted. It also aims to promote science, technology, and innovation for joint research and encourage the exchange of experiences about sustainable use and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits that arise from the economic utilization of the Amazonian biodiversity (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federative Republic of Brazil 2021).[21]

The inclusion of the 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development in the development cooperation between Brazil and Japan can also promote more comprehensive cooperation between the two countries in the near future. Bilateral cooperation aims to contribute not only to mutual benefits but also to international interests. Cooperative relationships with sustainable development goals will be the driving force for promoting international cooperation by addressing cross-border issues while maximizing each other's national interests.

However, our global environmental governance framework indicates that one should always take a global–local perspective and that promoting sustainable policies (including the SDGs) might also have the negative effect of damaging the local environment. Development cooperation between two countries should always evaluate whether we are achieving agreement with citizens and social inclusion at the local level whilst contributing to global goals and commitments. Governments and corporations have strong desires to promote decarbonization and environmental protection, but it often seems that they are putting their own and their country's interests first, and not paying attention to things that do not benefit them. We need to think about how we can achieve sustainable development in the true sense of the word, not just superficial and short-term "environmental protection" and "stable economic development."

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Notes

1. According to Key ODA policies at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, human security is defined as the concept that advances the nation and community building through empowerment and protection of individuals to live happily and in dignity, free from fear and want. See MOFA (2021a).
2. The Japanese government acknowledged the country's food and natural resource insecurities, and hence the need to develop comprehensive security policies. Japan's ODA policy was modified. The shock occurred when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka made a visit to Southeast Asia in 1974 and was both political and diplomatic (Kato 2016).
3. The period selection was based on availability of data published in the statistics website of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD.Stat.
4. The data source, OECD.Stat, provides figures of ODA from Japan by the three sectors separately from 1995 onwards. Until 1994, there is no data regarding general environment protection and the sectors of agriculture and forestry sectors are aggregated into "Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing."
5. The second Abe administration, which came to power in late 2012, embarked on a process of introducing a whole range of new policies, including, most importantly, national security and economic revitalization. The administration created a new National Security Strategy in December 2013, in which ODA was referred to as an important means of ensuring the security of the country (Kato 2016).
6. The period selection was based on availability of data published in OECD.Stat.
7. The majority of projects were held in the sectors of Agriculture (13), Forestry and Environment (12) and Water Resources (12), which accounted for approximately 66% of the total of 56 projects. "Forestry" and "Environment" were merged because projects in both areas focus on environmental and forest conservation.
8. Shinji Sato, Senior Representative of JICA, generally shared the undated information for use in our research and his associates conducted this interview at Brasília on 19th August 2019.
9. One of the projects in the area of agricultural civil engineering was the Program of Irrigation Equipment Financing (PROFIR), carried out from 1985 to 1992. This project's objective was to offer support to agricultural development through partial financing of the resources necessary to acquire irrigation equipment, such as central pivots, conventional sprinklers, and propelled sprinkler, for producers in the Cerrado region (BRAZIL and JICA 2002).
10. In general, this first group has its analysis based on written sources produced by Brazilian and Japanese governmental and business institutions, such as agreements, reports, speeches and other official documents about PRODECER (Brazil and JICA 2002; Harada 2013; Hosono et al. 2016).

11. The studies in this second group, in addition to considering written sources, incorporate oral reports from government authorities and producers and rural workers both participating and not participating in the program, as well as photographs and other unwritten sources (Pessôa 1988; Pires 1996, 2000; Duarte 1998; Osada 1999; Duarte and Theodoro 2002; Mendonça 2004; Pessôa and Inocêncio 2014).
12. Environmental protection areas where the displacement of plant and animal species is possible, in order to reduce the effects of fragmentation of ecosystems, separated by human interference (Brazil 2000).
13. According to the official report, the growth in the adoption of the technique contributed to reducing the production cost, protecting the soil from erosion, and favoring the development of microbiological activity, increase in the organic matter content, and water retention on the ground (Brazil and JICA 2002).
14. Paracatu held two out of four projects from the first phase of PRODECER, and all of them were developed in municipalities of the State of Minas Gerais.
15. According to the official PRODECER report published by the Brazilian government and JICA, three out of 15 projects from the second phase of the Program were developed in Paracatu. The other 12 projects were carried out in municipalities of the state of Minas Gerais, Goias, Bahia, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul (Brasil/JICA 2002). In a publication on Coopervap's 50th anniversary, it was registered that Entire Ribeiros IV was aborted after its inception "because the money for its implementation was blocked by the F. Collor government" despite farmers' struggles (COOPERVAP 2013, p. 51).
16. AAPER was created in 1984, at the initiative of the agricultural settlers themselves, so that they could organize the production and commercialization of agricultural products when faced with differences with Coopervap. The experience of creating their own associations, carried out for *Entre Ribeiros I* project, was followed by the settlers of the projects *Entre Ribeiros II, III and IV*.
17. Pimentel and Botelho (2007, p. 2) discussed the relationship between the history of PRODECER and the life trajectory of farmers, who left other regions to develop an agriculture project in the associativism stemmed from their participation in the projects.
18. The appearance of pests and diseases, damage arising from the continuous succession of the same crop, climate change, soil degradation and erosion, reduction of native fauna and flora in the region, and destruction of the natural ecosystem are all mentioned as effects (BRAZIL and JICA 2002).
19. PRODECER's official report mentions that "significant advances were observed in the elaboration and establishment of legal norms aimed at environmental preservation in the development process" (Brazil and JICA 2002, pp. 5–34). At the time of the first and second phases of the program, the Brazilian Forestry Code of 1965 was in force, which had established the creation of legal reserves—the amount of native forest to be preserved—of 50% in the Amazon region and 20% in the rest of the country. After 1996, provisional measures increased the legal reserve in the Amazon region to 80%, while the legal reserve in the Cerrado within the Amazon was reduced to 35% and it was maintained 20% for the other biomes (Gonçalves 2018).
20. Alberto Oppata, president of CAMTA and his associates conducted several interviews at Tomé-Açú on 10th–11th March, 2020.
21. Japan launched a joint statement during the Japan–U.S. and Brazil Exchange (JUSBE) on November 10, 2020. Under this trilateral cooperation, Japan will seek to strengthen involvement in Brazil towards achievement of Sustainable Development Goals, without setting out a strong sense of opposition to China.

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Chapter 5
Japan's Relationship with Portuguese-Speaking Africa: Considering the Future of Brazil–Japan Cooperation

Akiko Koyasu and Danielly Ramos

5.1 Introduction

"Brazil is an important partner of Japan" is a phrase that Japan often uses about its relationship with Brazil. The Cerrado project in the 1970s, the ProSavana project (agricultural development cooperation by Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique), and the United Nations Security Council Reform proposed by Japan, Brazil, India, and Germany (G4) are examples, respectively, of bilateral cooperation, triangular cooperation, and multilateral cooperation (or cooperation about the global agenda) involving both countries. Japan has partnered with Brazil at various levels for a long time.

Currently, Japan puts the Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP) concept at the center of diplomacy. The FOIP aims to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity by regarding the Indian and Pacific Oceans as essential for the stability and prosperity of the international community and the two continents facing them, Asia and Africa, as "free and open" as international public goods. Japan is looking to expand cooperation with countries worldwide, including Brazil, to support Japan's vision.

Countries on the African continent facing the Indian Ocean are also covered by the FOIP initiative, especially Mozambique, where Japan and Brazil cooperated in triangular cooperation to date. Portuguese-speaking Africa (PALOP, in Portuguese, African Countries of Portuguese Official Language)—Mozambique, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau e São Tomé and Príncipe—is Brazil's partner in South–South cooperation. According to the Brazilian International Cooperation Agency (ABC, in Portuguese, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação), from 1989 to 2019, the total number of Brazilian technical cooperation projects to PALOP (and Timor-Leste)

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was 571 cases, totaling $52.8 million. The most significant projects and amount invested are in Mozambique, with 146 cases and $12.7 million[1] (Ministério das Relações Exeriores 2021 p. 34).

In early January 2021, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi (at that time) visited Latin America and Africa, including Brazil. During his visit to Brazil, he wrote an article for the local Japanese community's newspaper *Nikkey Shimbun*, where he stated:

> As changes in the balance of power in the international society, including Latin America, are accelerating and becoming more complex, maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law is becoming increasingly important. For that reason, international cooperation is necessary. Many Latin American countries share the basic values of the rule of law, freedom, democracy, human rights, etc., with Japan. (Motegi 2021)

Although the terms "FOIP" and "the geographical concept of Indo–Pacific" was not used in this article, it should be noted that the words "free and open" have been incorporated.

Although Brazil does not border the Indian Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, Japan's idea of FOIP is relevant to Brazil if it considers a relationship with a country like Mozambique. Given future Japan–Brazil relations, it is first necessary to consider Japan's African diplomacy in the FOIP concept era to compare it with Brazil's African diplomacy.

To this end, first in this article, Japan's diplomacy in Africa will be explained, emphasizing Lusophone Africa, including Mozambique. Special attention will be given to the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), an international conference initiated by the Japanese in 1993. Next, Brazil's diplomacy in Africa will be presented to understand the convergence of agendas and perspectives of Japan and Brazil interacting with each other in Portuguese-speaking Africa. It will be asked, for example, what are the possibilities for Japan to propose innovative dynamics and techniques through triangular cooperation with Brazil in Africa. These factors will be used to understand Japan and Brazil's success and relative difficulties, in occupying spaces in Africa, particularly through triangular cooperation. The conclusions will summarize the most impressive results of Japan–Africa and Brazil–Africa relations in the last decade, which will help take stock and consider the future of Japan–Brazil triangular cooperation in Africa.

5.2 Japan's African Diplomacy[2]

5.2.1 The African Development Conference (TICAD): A Turning Point

Adem (2018) had divided the history of Japan's African diplomacy into five periods since 1961, when the Division of Africa was founded at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, namely: 1961–1972 (Cold War), 1973–1992 (oil crisis), 1993–2006 (TICAD), 2007–2013 (expansion of China's presence), and after 2014 (the second Abe administration).[3] In 1974, under the second Cabinet of Kakuei Tanaka, Japan's foreign minister entered the African continent for the first time. At that time, foreign minister Toshio Kimura visited four African countries, including Nigeria. The first visit to Africa as Prime Minister of Japan was in 2001 by Yoshiro Mori. He visited Kenya and Nigeria. After that, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Ghana and Ethiopia in 2006, but since then, no Japanese leader has visited Africa at the prime minister's level until 2013.[4]

TICAD is an international conference led by Japan and jointly held by the United Nations, UNDP, the World Bank, and the African Union Commission. TICAD VII was held in Yokohama in 2019. The eighth conference will be held in Tunisia in 2022. The first was held in Japan once every five years until the second (1998), the third (2003), and the fourth (2008). Since then, the fifth (2013), sixth (2016), and seventh (2019) have been held once every three years, hosted by Japan and Africa in turn. The sixth (2016) was TICAD's first event in Africa (Nairobi, Kenya).

France held an international conference on African development, such as TICAD, in 1990, earlier than Japan. Following France, Japan's TICAD was held in 1993, followed by China, the EU in 2000, India and Turkey in 2008, Arab countries in 2010, the United States in 2014, and Russia in 2019 (Devermont 2019, p. 2).[5] Regarding why Japan started TICAD in the early 1990s, Luhari and his colleagues emphasized that Japan's African diplomacy has changed significantly after the end of the Cold War (Luhari and Kumumba-Kasongo 2016, p. 208).

In the roundtable prior to TICAD VI held by the journal of the Foreign Ministry *Gaikou* (July 2016), three experts on African studies[6] agreed that, as the international community's interest in Africa has declined rapidly since the end of the Cold War, it was significant that Japan had led initiatives like TICAD to regain the international community's interest in Africa, which had suffered from civil war and refugee problems. In addition, Japanese companies' interest in Africa was still low until around the third TICAD (2003). After that, the private sectors gradually started to show their desire to do business and trade with African nations around the fourth and fifth times, and so on (Endo et al. 2016, p. 34). Table 5.1 shows the characteristics of TICAD from the first to the fifth (1993–2013). The number of participating countries and individual participants are increasing with each round. The sixth and seventh sessions will be described later in this chapter.

5.2.2 *Relationship Between Portuguese-Speaking Africa and Japan*

5.2.2.1 Prime Minister Abe's Visit to Mozambique in 2014

As mentioned above, Japan's Diplomacy in Africa was considered a watershed in 1993. Also, for Portuguese-speaking African countries, Japan's diplomacy has

Table 5.1 Transition of TICAD Conference (1st to 5th)

TICAD I October 1993 (Tokyo)
• A total of about 1000 people participated, including 48 African countries, 12 donor countries, EC, 8 international organizations, and many observers • Tokyo Declaration (four issues related to sub-Saharan Africa development) was adopted • Contribution to the re-arousal of interest in African development as the international community's interest fades after the end of the Cold War • At the same time, African countries were encouraged to employ self-help (democratization, good governance)
TICAD II October 1999 (Tokyo)
• Co-hosted by Japan, the United Nations, and the Global Union for Africa (GCA) • A total of 22 organizations from 80 countries, 40 international organizations, and NGOs participated • The basic theme was "Poverty Reduction in Africa and Integration into the Global Economy" • The Tokyo Action Declaration (Tokyo Agenda for Action) (which clearly states priority policies and actions, including numerical targets, in three areas: social development, economic development, and development foundations) was adopted • As a basic principle, Japan advocated the importance of "self-help efforts (ownership)" of African countries and "partnerships" of development partners in the international community
TICAD III September–October 2003 (Tokyo)
• More than 1000 people participated, including Heads of state and leaders from 89 countries, 47 institutions, 24 African Heads of state, and about 20 international organizations • The TICAD 10th Anniversary Declaration was adopted, which showed the future direction and priority approach of TICAD
TICAD IV May 2008 (Yokohama)
• More than 3,000 people participated, including representatives from 51 African countries (41 heads of state and leaders), 34 development partners and Asian countries, 77 regional and international representatives, the private sector, and civil society • The main theme was "Aiming for a Healthy Africa: A Continent of Hope and Opportunity" • Japan presented the plan to double ODA to Africa and help double investment in Africa within the five years to 2012 • Yokohama Declaration, Yokohama Action Plan and TICAD Follow-up Mechanism were adopted
TICAD V June 2013 (Yokohama)
• 39 heads of state and leaders from 51 African countries, 31 development partners and Asian countries, representatives of 72 regions and international organizations, and representatives of the private sector and civil society participated • The main theme was "Working hand in hand with a dynamic Africa" • 3 principal agenda "Strong and Sustainable Economy", "Inclusive and Resilient Society", and "Peace and Stability" were presented • A direct dialogue session between African leaders and representatives of Japanese private companies was conducted to encourage private-sector-led growth • Government and private investments up to 3.2 trillion yen ($32 billion), including 1.4 trillion yen ($14 billion) of ODA over the next five years to support African growth • The Industrial Human Resource Development Initiative (ABE Initiative) for African youth was presented • Yokohama Declaration 2013 and Yokohama Action Plan 2013–2017 were adopted

Source Elaboration by authors based on the information in *Gaikou* Vol. 38 (July 2016), page 25 begun virtually around TICAD after a diplomatic vacuum that has continued for a while since establishing diplomatic relations. Particularly, based on TICAD's three pillars highlighted in TICAD III (2003), "human-centered development," "poverty reduction through economic growth," and "peacebuilding," Japanese relations with Mozambique and Angola were activated, followed by relations with the other three Portuguese-speaking African countries—Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe (Carvalho 2015, p. 57).

The history of diplomatic relations between Japan and Portuguese-speaking African countries backed to the 1970s, when each country became independent from Portugal, beginning in 1974 with Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe in 1975, Angola in 1976, and Mozambique in 1977. The Embassy of Japan was established in the 2000s, first in Mozambique in 2000, Angola in 2005, and the other three countries under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Embassies in Senegal and Gabon (Guinea-Bissau has been under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Embassy in China since 2003). The Office of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), one of the key actors in the economic cooperation of Japan, was established in Mozambique in 2003 and Angola in 2007. As for TICAD, Cabo Verde, Angola, and Mozambique have participated since the first TICAD in 1993 (Guinea-Bissau was suspended from TICADV).

Considering the relationship between Japan and Portuguese-speaking Africa, we should not underestimate the approval of Japan as an observer country in the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Nations (CPLP) in July 2014. The CPLP is a regional forum for cooperation between Portugal, Brazil, five Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, Equatorial Guinea, and East Timor. It was primarily designed to solidify the position of Portuguese-speaking countries in the international community through political and diplomatic solidarity, incorporating various fields such as politics, economy, society, culture, and interpersonal exchanges, and spreading the Portuguese language around the world. Due to its inauguration in 1996, 2021 marked the 25th anniversary of the founding of the CPLP.

Prime Minister Abe, who made his first visit to Portugal as Japan's incumbent prime minister in May 2014, announced Japan's motivation to participate in the CPLP, and the observer status was unanimously approved at the CPLP Summit in July 2014. In July 2015 Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Timor-Leste to attend the CPLP Ministerial Meeting, and, on that occasion, he had the opportunity to meet with the Foreign Minister of Mozambique. The Secretary-General of CPLP, Maria Silveira at that time, visited Japan in March 2017. Japan is said to regard the CPLP as "unique with a global influence."

Prime Minister Abe visited Mozambique in January 2014 (he visited Oman, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ethiopia besides Mozambique). This was the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Africa since 2008 and the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Portuguese-speaking Africa, Mozambique.[7] In a joint statement after the summit meeting, the two leaders confirmed that Japan and Mozambique would cooperate in four areas: (1) TICAD and bilateral relations in general, (2) economic fields, (3) economic cooperation, and (4) international fields, to build "win–win" relations under the "Friendship / AMIZADE" partnership.[8] Specifically, over the following five years, they planned regular high-level policy dialogues (1), and the development of human resources of 300 people by the "Japan-Mozambique Natural Gas and Coal Development Initiative," which was announced to develop natural resources and improve the business environment (2). Furthermore, in the subsequent five years, in addition to infrastructure development such as roads, ports, and energy and support for education and health, 70 billion yen of Official Development Assistance (ODA) would be provided for the development of the Nacala Corridor area (3).

Prime Minister Abe gave an opening speech at the Japan–Mozambique Investment Forum (attended by the two countries' leaders and business community members). The following explains what Japan aims for in terms of relations with Mozambique (underlined by the author).

> Mozambique is home to one of the largest natural gas fields in the world and one of the largest coking coal fields in Africa. I am firmly convinced that cooperation between Mozambique, blessed with an abundance of resources, and Japan, with its highly advanced technological capabilities, will, without any doubt, result in <u>greater wealth for both nations.</u> Bountiful resources and the wealth acquired through their use are Mozambique's very own treasures. The benefits must be shared by the Mozambican people and mobilized to engender sustained growth and <u>improvements in the people's daily lives.</u> If we combine Mozambique's own efforts, including further improvements to the investment climate, with the <u>support of Japan's public and private sectors</u>, we will be certain to build a relationship as partners that contribute to growth in both countries.[9]

In other words, the relationship between Japan and Mozambique would be mutually profitable. As a resource-rich country, Mozambique's resources should be utilized to benefit the people, and Japanese private companies would be expected to be an actor in promoting relations between the two countries. This idea would generally be common to Japan's attitude toward African diplomacy.

As of August 2021, four Portuguese-speaking African countries (Angola, Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe) other than Mozambique have not yet been visited by the Prime Minister of Japan. Although in May 2019, Foreign Minister Taro Kono (at that time) visited Angola, and the Foreign Minister's visit was also featured in local newspapers. In August 2019, when TICAD VII was held, prime ministers or presidents from all four countries visited Japan, and 11 ministers, especially from Angola, visited Japan. There were also visit channels such as Japanese parliamentarians belonging to the Japan–AU Parliamentary Friendship League. After Prime Minister Abe's visit in 2014, the foreign minister, deputy foreign minister, parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, and others have visited Mozambique, and Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi (at that time) visited Mozambique in December 2020. Following the joint statement on Prime Minister Abe's visit in 2014, a high-level policy dialogue took place[10] (see Table 5.2).

5.2.2.2 Economic Cooperation

The Country Assistance Policy of Japan's ODA is explained clearly in the National Development Cooperation Policy (formerly National Assistance Policy), formulated

Table 5.2 Visits to Mozambique by ministers and government dignitaries since 2014

2014	January	Prime Minister Abe's Visit to Four African Countries (including Mozambique) (Joint Statement)
	July	Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs visits Mozambique, Guinea, and Burkina Faso State Minister visits Mozambique, South Africa, and Namibia
2015	January	Dispatch of Special Envoy to Mozambique's Inauguration Ceremony
	June	Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs attends a reception commemorating the 40th anniversary of Mozambique's independence
2016	August	Visit to Africa by Assistant to the Prime Minister (August 4th) Japan-Mozambique Summit Meeting (Working Lunch) (August 26th)
2017	March	Foreign Ministers' Meeting of Mozambique Japan-Mozambique Summit Meeting (Joint Statement)
	June	Visit to Mozambique by State Minister for Foreign Affairs
	August	Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs visits Mozambique Foreign Minister Taro Kono Visits Mozambique and Ethiopia
2018	February	Courtesy call on Prime Minister Abe by The Speaker of Mozambique's National Assembly
	October	Japan-Mozambique Foreign Ministers' Meeting
2019	August	Meeting between Foreign Minister Kono and Minister of Economy and Finance of Mozambique
		Prime Minister Abe's Meeting with Former Mozambique President Sisano at TICADVII
2020	January	Visit to Mozambique by Special Envoy to the House of Representatives
	December	Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi visits Tunisia, Mozambique, South Africa, and Mauritius

Source Elaboration by authors referring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan's website

after analyzing the donor countries' development plans and development issues. Regarding The Country Assistance Policy of each Portuguese-speaking Africa, Mozambique was formulated in 2013, Cabo Verde in 2014, Angola in 2017, and São Tomé e Príncipe in 2019.

Table 5.3 summarizes the basic goals (major targets) and priority areas (medium targets) of the four countries' National Development Cooperation Policies and major Rolling Plan. In terms of infrastructure, Mozambique's geopolitical importance (having foreign ports for land-based countries such as neighboring Zambia and Malawi) has allowed developing the economic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, ports, and electricity. Under the so-called "Nacala Corridor Development and Maintenance Program," various forms of assistance, including grant aid, technical cooperation, and ODA loans, were implemented, including the Agriculture Development project (ProSAVANA) by Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique[11]

To support Angola's economic development and poverty reduction, economic and social infrastructure such as electricity, water and sewerage systems, and port facilities have been developed. For example, a power sector reform support program

Table 5.3 Japan's ODA countries assistance policy and main rolling plan

	Angola (July 2017)	Cabo Verde (May 2014)	São Tome and Príncipe (April 2019)	Mozambique (March 2013)
Basic Goals (major targets)	Sustainable economic development and human security	Sustainable and stable growth, inequality reduction and poverty reduction	Sustainable and stable growth, poverty reduction, improvement of food security and basic social services	Sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction
Priority Areas (Medium Targets)	1. Diversification of industries. Financial and technical cooperation for industrial policy and economic and social infrastructure development	1. Economic infrastructure development: Electricity and water fields	1. Food security through food aid from Japan. Development of agriculture and fisheries using schemes such as technical cooperation and grassroots/human security grant aid	1. Regional economic revitalization including corridor development. Comprehensive corridor development support through agricultural development support through the "Tropical Savannah Agricultural Development Program (ProSAVANA-JBN)" with triangular cooperation between Japan and Mozambique
	2. Human resource development for the growth of the non-oil sector. Capacity building and vocational training in sectors such as mineral resources, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, industry	2. Social infrastructure development: Support for poverty reduction and vulnerability to climate change	2. Improvement of basic social services	2. Improving access to health services and basic education. Expanding access to safe water through the development of water supply facilities
	3. Assistance in areas related to people's safety (a large number of land mines remain buried due to the effects of the civil war that lasted for about 30 years). Support for improving medical services and public health awareness. Support for natural disaster policy			3. Construction of meteorological observation systems, the management capacity of forest resources. Support for environmental measures including improvement of waste treatment capacity in urban areas

(continued)

Table 5.3 (continued)

	Angola (July 2017)	Cabo Verde (May 2014)	São Tome and Príncipe (April 2019)	Mozambique (March 2013)
Main Rolling Plans	Basic infrastructure (electric power, water and sewage, port facilities, etc.)	Infrastructure development in the energy and water	Training of medical staff and improvement of medical infrastructure	Social infrastructure development in the Nacala Corridor and surrounding areas (maintenance and repair of roads and bridges, etc.)

Source Authors' elaboration referring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website

Table 5.4 Japan's ODA to PALOP countries (2012–2016, million yen)

	São Tomé and Príncipe	Guinea-Bissau	Cabo Verde	Angola	Mozambique
ODA loan	0	0	259.46	236	704.26
ODA grant	68.67	166.69	165.44	419.03	1061.96
Technical cooperation	8.55	9.07	27.46	63.82	276.89

Source Elaboration by authors referring to the information of each country in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017)

was formulated in 2015 through an ODA loan (23.64 billion yen). For projects related to economic infrastructure development for Cabo Verde (also ODA loan), plans for a transmission line system (6.186 billion yen until 2018), and the Santiago Island water supply system (15.292 billion yen while continuing as of 2021), were included. In Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, there are projects in food security, education, and health care. Guinea-Bissau, one of the world's poorest countries, is involved in projects related to poverty reduction and improving people's lives through the ODA grant.[12]

Regarding the amount of support, Table 5.4 summarizes each type of financial assistance from 2012 to 2016. Regarding São Tomé and Príncipe and Guinea-Bissau, ODA loan (yen loans) has not been provided due to the economic scale, and these two countries are mainly eligible for grant aid. ODA loans are in Cabo Verde, Angola, and Mozambique. It can be understood that the ODA loan is mainly provided for Mozambique, looking at recent data from 2010 to 2019 (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Japan's ODA to Portuguese-speaking African Countries (2010–2019)

		Angola	São Tome and Príncipe	Mozambique	Guinea-Bissau	Cabo Verde	Total of 5 countries	Total of Sub-Saharan Africa	% of 5 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa	% of Sub-Saharan Africa in total ODA
		Million USD								
2010	ODA grant	34.30	2.85	48.95	15.87	7.35	109.32	1129.86	9.68	32.6
	Technical Cooperation	3.32	0.75	13.52	0.24	3.32	21.15	384.86	5.50	11.1
	ODA loan	0	0	0.38	0	6.73	7.11	251.44	2.83	3.1
2011	ODA grant	7.65	3.44	14.55	8.71	4.74	39.09	2470.19	1.58	49.1
	Technical Cooperation	3.77	0.10	24.18	1.07	1.17	30.29	445.48	6.80	11.8
	ODA loan	0	0	31.57	0	20.63	52.2	134.89	38.70	1.8
2012	ODA grant	7.30	3.60	93.92	5.71	4.12	114.65	1080.67	10.61	34.7
	Technical Cooperation	6.50	0.10	35.37	0.41	0.42	42.8	576.39	7.43	15.8
	ODA loan	0	0	−30.92	0	8.11	−22.81	142.17	−16.04	1.8
2013	ODA grant	10.50	2.68	25.79	5.64	0.96	45.57	1969.89	2.31	28.5
	Technical Cooperation	4.67	0.04	25.37	0.01	0.30	30.39	427.39	7.11	15.2
	ODA loan	0	0	34.11	0	14.30	48.41	352.48	13.73	3.6
2014	ODA grant	2.93	2.42	34.98	8.03	0.49	48.85	699.90	6.98	27.3
	Technical Cooperation	5.07	0.04	22.24	0	0.13	27.48	376.97	7.29	14.3

(continued)

Table 5.5 (continued)

		Angola	São Tome and Príncipe	Mozambique	Guinea-Bissau	Cabo Verde	Total of 5 countries	Total of Sub-Saharan Africa	% of 5 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa	% of Sub-Saharan Africa in total ODA
		Million USD								
	ODA loan	0	0	5.44	0	10.39	15.83	208.01	7.61	2.8
2015	ODA grant	0.31	1.46	34.06	3.31	4.05	43.19	650.90	6.64	24.6
	Technical Cooperation	1.63	0.07	25.41	0.18	0.15	27.44	324.47	8.46	13.7
	ODA loan	195.37	0	30.01	0	13.99	239.37	521.51	45.90	7.5
2016	ODA grant	0.39	2.25	34.06	1.19	0.11	38	550.67	6.90	19.5
	Technical Cooperation	4.15	0.13	25.41	0.09	0.43	30.21	383.72	7.87	13.8
	ODA loan	0	0	30.1	0	9.59	39.69	404.32	9.82	3.5
2017	ODA grant	0.79	2.31	2.31	2.41	1.94	9.76	549.50	1.78	21
	Technical Cooperation	2.92	0.23	0.23	0.41	0.54	4.33	362.29	1.20	12.6
	ODA loan	0	0	0	0	5.64	5.64	379.22	1.49	4
2018	ODA grant	12.07	2.63	40.02	0.18	3.94	58.84	542.30	10.85	20.6
	Technical Cooperation	1.09	0	18.96	0.23	0.08	20.36	296.81	6.86	11.2
	ODA loan	0	0	84.89	0	9.81	94.7	430.59	21.99	5.1
2019	ODA grant	5.90	1.93	19.51	4.95	6.25	38.54	675.71	5.70	26
	Technical Cooperation	2.81	0.17	18.47	0.19	0.10	21.74	310.50	7.00	11.3
	ODA loan	0	0	54.74	0	3.42	58.16	567.24	10.25	6

Source Authors' elaboration referring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website

5.2.3 *Japan's Foreign Policy and Infrastructure Overseas Expansion Strategy and Africa*

5.2.3.1 Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP) Initiative and TICAD

Let us return to Japan's African diplomacy in general focused on TICAD. The last two TICADs were held in 2016 (sixth) and 2019 (seventh). According to Endo et al. (2016), TICAD was initially held "for Africa," but with each round, it strengthened its character as a "conference for Japan." In other words, "the region of Africa has begun to have a clear meaning in Japan's foreign policy" (Endo et al. 2016, p. 34). This is reflected in Prime Minister Abe's inclusion of the FOIP initiative in his 2016 TICAD VI keynote speech, quoted below.

> When you cross the seas of Asia and the Indian Ocean and come to Nairobi, you then understand very well that what connects Asia and Africa are the sea lanes. What will give stability and prosperity to the world is none other than the enormous liveliness brought forth through the union of two free and open oceans and two continents. Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous. Japan wants to work together with you in Africa in order to make the seas that connect the two continents into peaceful seas that are governed by the rule of law. That is what we wish to do with you. The winds that traverse the ocean turn our eyes to the future. The supply chain is already building something quite like an enormous bridge between Asia and Africa, providing industrial wisdom. The population in Asia living in democracies is more numerous than that of any other region on earth. Asia has enjoyed growth on the basis of democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy that has taken root there. It is my wish that the self-confidence and sense of responsibility spawned there, as a result, come to envelop the entirety of Africa together with the gentle winds that blow here. Let us make this stretch that is from Asia to Africa a main artery for growth and prosperity. Let us advance together, Africa and Japan, sharing a common vision. The future abounds with blazes of bright colors. We are poised to hear the intense yet refreshing beat of the drums. My African friends, let us continue to walk forward together, believing in the potential that the future holds.[13]

In recent years, the term FOIP has been often used in international politics. According to Hiroshi Nakanishi, a professor at Kyoto University who specializes in international politics, it is now a "cliché of international politics" (Nakanishi 2018, p. 13).

Although it has been widely covered by the US Trump administration, Japan was the first to come up with the idea of a FOIP at the government level, and it was used in the keynote speech of TICAD VI of 2016. Also, according to Nakanishi, it can be said that the keynote speech quoted above expresses well the substance of the FOIP strategy in terms of the geographical concept of Indo–Pacific, the normative of free and open, and the economic vision of affluence and growth (Nakanishi 2018, p. 13).

The idea's origin that led to FOIP dates back to the 1990s when the Cold War ended. This was the time when Japan rebuilt its relations with Asia and Africa. However, it is not unique to Japan but "resulted from the accumulation of policy executions of countries," including Japan and the United States. These contents are briefly summarized as follows: (1) the formation of a wide-area economic regional zone that combines economic cooperation such as aid, investment, and technology transfer, based on a free-market economy, (2) maintaining and strengthening regional order or framework based on universal values led by the West such as the rule of law, liberal democracy, and human rights, and (3) preserving maritime security based on freedom of navigation covering the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean (Nakanishi 2018, p. 18).

In the Yokohama Declaration of TICAD VII three years later, the FOIP vision set out in the keynote speech of TICAD VI of 2016 was clearly stated: "We (that is, all countries, regions, institutions, etc. that participated in TICAD VII, including the African countries) will pay attention favorably." While we cannot discuss the relationship between TICAD and FOIP further, it can be said that at least the meaning of Africa in Japan's diplomatic strategy is more explicit than before. To embody the FOIP vision, Japan indicates "physical connectivity" through the development of high-quality infrastructures such as ports, railroads, roads, energy, and ICT, and "human connectivity" through human resource development, "institutional connectivity" by facilitating customs clearance.[14] It should be noted that this connectivity concept includes the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique, where economic cooperation has been more common in the past (Table 5.6).

5.2.3.2 Promoting "Quality Infrastructure Investment" at TICAD

The term "quality infrastructure" is also a word Japan has frequently used in recent years, along with FOIP. The first time "quality infrastructure investment" was used was during TICAD VI. TICAD VI emphasized promoting high-quality infrastructure investment centered on three priority regions (East Africa Northern Corridor, Nacala Corridor, and West African Growth Circle) to implement "the G7 Ise–Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment" in Africa, and this was also the case at TICAD VII.

How does Japan use the idea of "quality" in diplomacy and development cooperation? First, "high-quality growth" should be explained. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2020), developing countries must achieve economic growth for self-sustaining development by achieving "high-quality growth." The term "high-quality" involves two main aspects: "inclusiveness" and "resilience." "Inclusiveness" stresses the importance that no one is left behind while being sustainable. Therefore, harmonization between society and the environment is required. "Resilience" through "high quality" means it can withstand the shocks of economic crises and natural disasters that developing countries often experience.

Infrastructure (economic and social) must be developed by being inclusive, resilient, and sustainable[15] to achieve high-quality growth. In other words, it is necessary for developing countries to "develop quality infrastructure" that truly contributes to "high-quality growth" and supporting such infrastructure development is understood as one of the strength for Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2020, p. 28).

Table 5.6 Characteristics of the TICAD Conference (6th to 7th)

TICAD VI 2016 (Nairobi, Mozambique)
• More than 11,000 people participated, including representatives of civil society, representatives from 53 African countries, development partner countries and Asian countries, international organizations and regional organizations, and private sector and NGOs • First conference held in Africa • Based on issues in African nations[a] since the last TICAD (TICAD V), the three priority areas to be tackled for the future are (1) economic diversity and industrialization (investment in quality infrastructure, human resource development, promotion of private sector activities), (2) promotion of resilient health systems (including universal health coverage UHC in Africa) and (3) promotion of social stabilization (promotion of food security, climate change and overcoming vulnerability to natural disasters) • Launch of the Japan-Africa Public–Private Economic Forum • Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Implementation Plan were adopted
TICAD VII 2019
• More than 10,000 people participated, including representatives from 53 African countries, 52 development partners, 108 international and regional organizations, including 42 leaders, and civil society representatives from the private sector and NGOs • TICAD VII's three pillars are (1) economy (development of industrial human resources, high-quality infrastructure for strengthening connectivity, etc.), (2) society (further promotion of UHC expansion, disaster-resistant society creation, high-quality education, etc.) and (3) peace and stability (institutional design for elections and administrative systems, system building for the sustainability of peace, human resource development support, refugees, support for displaced persons, etc.) • For the first time in TICAD's history, private companies have been positioned as official partners and direct dialogue between Japan, the African public and private sectors was held at this meeting • Yokohama Declaration 2019 and Yokohama Action Plan 2019 were adopted

[a]The decline of global commodity prices, infectious diseases (Ebola, terrorism, violence and climate change

Source Elaboration by authors

This Japanese idea of "quality" was shared at the 2016 Ise–Shima G7 Summit and approved as the G7 Ise–Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment[16] The five-point quality infrastructure principles at the Ise–Shima G7 Summit were subsequently confirmed at another international conference and approved as the G20 Principles on Quality Infrastructure Investment at the G20 Osaka Summit in June 2019.[17] Besides, in June 2021, at the G7 meeting held in Cornwall, England, an agreement was reached to establish a framework to support infrastructure construction for developing countries (Nihon Keizai Shimbun June 13, 2021). It is to say that infrastructure support and infrastructure development in developing countries are keywords not only in Japan but also in the international community.

5.3 Brazil's African Diplomacy

Due to the Japan-Brazil relations in Africa, it is also necessary to consider Brazil's African diplomacy. Throughout the 1950s, Brazil still maintained special ties with colonialist nations, such as Portugal, and showed itself to be distant from the process of liberation of African nations, having, however: (i) recognized the importance acquired by African and Asian nations on the international stage, (ii) created missions and established diplomatic relations with their governments and; (iii) supported ideas related to developmentalism in international forums.[18]

At that time, Brazilian foreign policy was clearly focused on Latin American regional interests, an option that led Brazil to play a secondary role in the decolonization process, limiting its support for the creation of diplomatic missions in Afro–Asian nations. The Brazilian departure from universal issues, combined with Brazil's feeling of solidarity with Portugal, emphasized Brazilian action against colonialism being based, ultimately, on the principle of non-aggression and non-intervention, the latter affirmed in article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter—which deals with the right of each people to dispose of themselves, the non-interference of third parties in the internal life of each State—when considering that Portugal did not have colonies, but overseas provinces, belonging to their own territory, with the right to defend them against new colonialisms.[19]

During the 1960s, and especially from the 1970s onwards, Brazil began to seek regionalization and the globalization of its international relations, especially given the difficulty obtaining public resources from developed countries, such as the United States, to finance industrial projects bilaterally. As a result of this new dynamic, Brazil began to position itself in favor of the self-determination of African peoples and sought to achieve a necessary reconciliation of anti-colonialism with the historical ties that linked it to Portugal. Between 1961 and 1964, with the solidification of the so-called independent foreign policy, the Brazilian alignment with the principle of non-intervention, the self-determination of peoples, the emancipation of peoples, and anti-colonialism was reinforced. It was also defended as the stimulus to the institutionalization of relations and collaboration between nations to overcome problems of raising the standard of living, promoting the population's culture, and preserving the internal order of nations. In the case of Angola, the Brazilian government stated that it "was waiting for Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination and urged it to assume the leadership of the movement for Angola's freedom and its transformation into an independent country friendly both to Portugal and Brazil".[20]

In the same period, on the one hand, Brazil's relations with Asia became mostly multilateral, intending to build a common political agenda for developing countries in favor of a new international economic order. Brazilian relations in Asia were limited almost exclusively to relations with Japan in the commercial area. On the other hand, South–South cooperation was more deeply focused on Africa than Asia. According to Altemani de Oliveira, the so-called African policy was encouraged, which best "represented, as an emblem, the Brazilian involvement with the prospects of generating a new international economic order and with its Third World policy."[21]

Brazil expanded the scope of its foreign policy and defended and supported the principle of self-determination. Economic development and peaceful international coexistence were intertwined to serve as a basis for the defense not only of Brazilian interests but of peoples who were at a disadvantage in North–South relations. This option allowed Brazil to participate more actively in the decolonization processes, especially during the debates held at the UN General Assembly. Objectives linked to the promotion of an increase in the market for Brazilian production also led to privileging the anti-colonialist discourse for Africa.

During Ernesto Geisel's government (1974–1979), the strategy of diversifying partnerships made it possible to choose new ways of external relations, allowing Brazil to increase its presence in scenarios that had been little explored until then. In response to the demands of national development with Africa and the Far East, the Middle East, the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America were reviewed and expanded, and later with Japan, China, and other countries in the South American continent.

Thus, in the 1970s, Brazil inaugurated systematic cooperation with West Africa and reinforced the importance of using the external sector to boost economic growth, with the State as the articulator of the production process.

In the 1980s, the Brazilian international presence deepened, mainly due to the international framework that led to the replacement of the Cold War by peaceful coexistence and the division of the world between developed and underdeveloped countries. The increase in the Brazilian presence in Africa (as well as in Asia) was perceived as linked to Brazil's growing need to obtain new markets for its exports.

In this process of internationalization, Brazil abandoned the automatic alignment with Portugal and launched a policy with interest in (i) increasing South–South cooperation; (ii) ensuring that the principles of sovereignty and self-determination of States were respected; (iii) encouraging the economic independence of companies; and (iv) condemn colonialism and racial discrimination. Brazil, however, lacked the resources to expand South–South relations and conditioned its choices to the possibility of defending specific bilateral interests.

The difficulties faced by Brazilians and Africans, particularly generated by the external debt crises, imposed setbacks in projects previously developed by Brazil, although the inflection toward Africa was maintained, continuing to follow the general lines of previous conduct.

Political-diplomatic relations with Africa were also enhanced during the administration of President João Figueiredo (1979–1985). The visit of the Brazilian president to Africa had two values: the first, material and objective, which translated into the reciprocal recognition of the Brazilian commercial strategy for the continent. The second, symbolic, went back to the idea of the Atlantic identity that united the two "riverside" regions, with the political gesture of the visit of the first South American president.

Aside from the presence of President Figueiredo in Africa, the most important fact in Brazil's African policy at that time was the ability shown by Brazilian foreign policy to articulate African diplomacy in order to face North American pressures for the construction of the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (OTAS)—collective security pact for the region along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—and to propose, in its place, the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.

If under the Figueiredo government, Brazil–Africa trade reached the highest level in their shared history until then—with exports representing 9.3% of total Brazilian exports in 1984—under the Sarney government, this share dropped to approximately 4%. Despite the limits imposed by the negotiation of the external debt and the internal economic instability, the Sarney government continued to maintain an interest in Brazilian foreign policy in Africa.

Despite the establishment of democracy in Brazil in 1985 and the opening of new diplomatic fronts with the international and regional community, the worsening of the foreign debt issue, the resurgence of strong inflationary pressures, the moratorium decreed in 1987, and the beginning of the reduction of large projects from the Geisel era made it difficult to obtain positive balances in Brazil's international relations.

Throughout the 1990s, Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa was marked by a gradual decrease in its strategic importance. Thus, Afro–Brazilian relations presented two main characteristics: (i) accelerated decline of exchanges, persisting, however, selective contacts aimed at meeting precise priorities and limited to a few countries, regions, and themes; (ii) gradual deconstruction of the culturalist discourse that had fueled commercial contact between Brazil and Africa; and (iii) emergence of more critical perceptions about the place of Africa in the formation of Brazilian nationality and the country's international reintegration.[22]

As a practical consequence of the change in the direction of Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa, there was a decreasing number of diplomats serving on the African continent (contrary to what had been happening with Europe and North and South America) and a decline in Brazilian trade with Africa. On the one hand, the transformation in Afro–Brazilian relations was attributed to African difficulties in facing deep economic, political, and social problems, with no trade options being created between the parties that would allow adaptations to the crisis context. On the other hand, from 1992 onward, Brazilian foreign policy favored the *platino* exchange, to the detriment of the hitherto priority partnership with Africa.[23]

At the beginning of the Itamar Franco government (1993–1995), Chancellor Fernando Henrique Cardoso announced where to look for Brazil's new priority partners: Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The reasons for not only Latin America, but also Asia, being defined as a priority for Brazilian diplomacy, to the detriment of relations with the African continent, were related to the cooperative potential of the region in the field of science and technology and the growing market for exports and imports. The Brazilian interest in Asia was motivated by two reasons in particular: the first, of an economic nature, opened the prospect of association with an increasingly attractive region, thanks to the success of the economic and scientific-technological development model adopted by it; the second, of a political nature, met the Brazilian guidelines for autonomy and diversification of partnerships with countries that, many times, adopted positions similar to those of Brazil in multilateral forums.

During the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), relations with Africa were adapted to the political strategies present in Brazilian foreign policy, which made partnerships with the African continent selective. The institutionalization of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 1996 and the rapprochement with post-apartheid South Africa were part of these selective formats of the partnership with Africa. However, the commercial area was the one that showed greater pragmatism in Brazilian foreign policy and boosted relations with the African continent in specific areas of trade and investment. Trade with Nigeria and Angola, concentrated in crude oil, stood out at that time (Mendonça and Faria 2015).

The selectivity in the relationship with Africa led to the closing of several Brazilian embassies in African countries, the reduction of the Brazilian government's participation in prospecting investments in the continent, especially in civil construction, and a general retraction of the trade flow with Africa.

At the same time, the Brazilian government supported UN peacekeeping missions in Angola and Mozambique during the 1990s, reflecting the selectivity policy that incorporated Portuguese-speaking countries into Brazil's international strategy.

The two terms of President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) brought changes in Brazilian policy toward Africa, especially through the inclusion of regions with no traditional link with Brazilian diplomacy. There was an apparent effort to expand the scope of action of Brazilian diplomacy on the African continent, even though most diplomatic and technical cooperation efforts continue to focus on Portuguese-speaking countries (PALOP) (Mendonça and Faria 2015).

The expansion and deepening of relations with Africa reflected the desire to diversify partnerships and expand Brazil's bargaining power in the international system. In this context, both the pragmatic exercise of foreign policy in the face of the exhaustion of the vertical model of international insertion—which led to the reactivation of 19 new embassies in Africa—and the ideological aspect of solidary diplomacy helped to expand the Brazilian presence on the African continent. If, on the one hand, ethnic, historical, and cultural ties were no longer seen as sufficient to strengthen relations with Africa, on the other hand, the possibilities of trade, investment, and technical cooperation with African nations proved to be additional factors for attracting Brazilian attention and interest to the African continent. Lula made 32 trips to Africa during his two terms, visiting 21 African countries (Mendonça and Faria 2015).

With the government of Dilma Rousseff, which began in 2011, the space occupied by the African continent in Brazilian foreign policy was maintained. However, some adjustments were made due to several national and international challenges. Even though presidential diplomacy was less intense, cooperation, political, diplomatic, and commercial ties were strengthened (Oliveira and Mallmann 2020, p. 1).

During her term, President Dilma Rousseff attended the IBSA (forum which brings together India, Brazil, and South Africa) meeting in South Africa, visited Angola and Mozambique and designated Lula da Silva as Brazil's official representative at the 17th African Union (AU) Summit, held in Equatorial Guinea (World Bank and IPEA 2011). Rousseff also promoted the creation of the "Africa Group" to link Brazilian investments and sales to local development programs and coordinate the activities of Brazilian companies.

A smaller number of cooperation projects with Africa during the Rousseff administration reflected both a context of international crisis and technical adjustments aimed at a better organization, planning, structuring of the programs developed, and the consolidation of initiatives launched previously. Despite internal and external difficulties, Rousseff continued with 61 cooperation projects with African countries initiated during the Lula government and started 156 others. In his second term (2015–2016), 16 new projects were created via ABC (Oliveira and Mallmann 2020).

In the Rousseff government's trade relations with the African continent, the trade volume initially remained stable. However, in the second term of President Rousseff (2014–2016), Brazilian imports to Africa declined, reaching the worst result since 2009 (US$ 8 billion). The volume of bilateral trade was US$ 12.4 billion, the worst since 2005 (Oliveira and Mallmann 2020).

Michel Temer's government brought about radical changes in Brazilian foreign policy for Africa, starting with emphasizing the "commercialist" discourse to the detriment of support for the political-developmental debate practiced until then. Presidential diplomacy and diplomatic ties were greatly diminished.

With Michel Temer in the presidency, the more commercial approach in relations with Africa contributed to the resumption of growth in Brazilian imports and the total volume of trade. However, the trade profile remained the same, with Brazil mainly exporting low value-added manufactures and importing mainly oil (which accounted for more than 80% of Brazilian imports from Africa from the Lula government to Temer).

The change in Brazilian policy toward Africa took place to the detriment of initiatives to bring together and strengthen the political and cultural ties of previous governments. Michel Temer has only been to Africa twice (in Cape Verde and South Africa in 2018). There were also few new projects and partnerships in technical cooperation (Oliveira and Mallmann 2020).

Under Jair Bolsonaro's presidency, which began in 2019, relations with Africa have become even more distant due to the choice to realign alliances with developed countries, decrease strategic cooperation in the Global South, and reduce participation in multilateral forums. The disarticulation of Brazilian technical cooperation agendas, based on health, education, and poverty alleviation programs, has deepened even further under the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Francisco et al. 2020).

In May 2020, in a decree signed by President Bolsonaro, the closing of seven diplomatic representations in Africa and the Caribbean was announced, including the African ones in Freetown (Sierra Leone) and Monrovia (Liberia), which came to be exercised cumulatively by the Embassy in Accra, Ghana (Freire 2020).

Trade relations between Brazil and African countries also suffered huge setbacks since the beginning of the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. In 2019, exports to Africa were $7.5 billion, the lowest in ten years. In these circumstances, whether due to the shrinkage of trade flows or the reduction in international technical cooperation agendas with African countries, some analysts pondered that Brazil is ceasing to be a reference of excellence in public policies for developing countries and is losing prominence in the Global South (Francisco et al. 2020).

5.4 Triangular Cooperation Between Japan and Brazil in Africa: Possibilities for Future Dynamics and Innovative Techniques

When relations between Brazil and Africa are experiencing great difficulties and an apparent retraction, we inquire about the possibilities for Japan and Brazil to increase relations with Africa in this last part of the chapter. We propose innovative dynamics and techniques through triangular cooperation with African countries based on their previous bilateral and multilateral experiences on the continent. Before that, we analyzed some of the joint actions between Brazil and Japan in Africa that marked their common history of past and present.

One of the most important aspects of bilateral relations between Brazil and Japan is development cooperation. Japan experienced remarkable economic development in the second half of the twentieth century and achieved the rank of the largest provider of ODA throughout the 1990s (Aragusuku 2014).

In the 1960s, Brazil received Japanese assistance in the form of loans to carry out several projects, such as the projects aimed at steel production in Minas Gerais, which gave rise to the company Usiminas; iron ore exploration in Carajás; pulp and paper production in Minas Gerais; and aluminum production in Pará. The Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Project for the Development of the Cerrado (PRODECER) is considered a great success story in Brazil's cooperation with Japan. PRODECER aimed both at making food production viable in the Brazilian Cerrado, such as soybeans, and at the socio-economic development of the local population. Thanks to this project initiated through a partnership with Japan, Brazil is now, according to Embrapa, the largest soybean producer globally, with a 2020/2021 crop of 135.409 million tons (Embrapa 2022).

Inspired by PRODECER, the Tripartite Program for the Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savanna in Mozambique (ProSavana) was announced in 2007, and the Memorandum between Brazil–Japan, and Mozambique was signed in 2009. The Complementary Agreement to the Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2010. The objective of ProSavana was to transform Mozambique's savannas into fertile and food-producing lands and improve the living conditions of the population in the Nacala Corridor through sustainable and inclusive regional agricultural development. The modernization of agriculture was therefore seen as a way to increase productivity and diversify agricultural production and generate jobs through agricultural investments and the establishment of value chains (DW 2020). Even in the presence of many positive results from ProSavana, there was much criticism from members of civil society, who believed that the project would favor monocultures and exports rather than focusing on family farming. The end of ProSavana was announced in July 2020 by the government of Mozambique. Despite the closure of the project, Japan continues to invest in the Nacala Corridor, indicating that the region is a priority objective for Japan, including for the realization of trilateral projects (DW 2020).

Reflections on the results of joint projects, mainly PRODECER and ProSavana, have helped Brazil and Japan think about new ways of cooperation that could increase the social, economic, and environmental results of their joint projects and advance and deepen triangular cooperation with African countries. In this sense, it is worth noting that JICA is constantly creating working groups and promoting debates on triangular cooperation to identify opportunities for using Brazil and Japan's resources and know-how, which could be applied in assisting other developing countries, including Africans.

In 2000 the two governments signed an agreement called the "Brazil–Japan Partnership Program (JBPP)" to further promote triangular cooperation. As partners on global issues, focusing on Latin America and Portuguese-speaking African countries, Brazil and Japan promoted cooperation in different areas, such as agriculture, health, and medical services, environment, and professional training. Since then, Technical Cooperation Projects in Third Countries have taken advantage of the fields of excellence in Japan and Brazil and combined investments and resources from the two countries (including experts and training).

In 2019, the Japanese government invited Brazilian representatives to participate in TICAD VII, which took place in Yokohama in August 2019, to create dialogue and cooperation with Africa and enhance and deepen the trilateral cooperation. As seen earlier in this chapter, TICAD is the main Japanese foreign policy initiative for Africa and seeks to emphasize economic cooperation, social development, and the promotion of security and peace. Brazilian representatives participated in thematic sessions on cooperation and agriculture; disaster risk reduction; education and human resource development; science, technology and innovation, and blue economy (Caçador 2019).

More recently, since the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020, the implementation of the technical cooperation agenda between Brazil and Japan in Africa has become more complex. In general, the technical cooperation offered by Brazil in Angola has privileged the development of local capacities and the sharing of knowledge and experiences for the formulation and implementation of public policies and specific professional training actions. The trilateral projects maintained between Brazil, Angola, and Japan would normally include areas such as humanized childbirth care, training of professional training managers, water distribution systems, in collaboration with the Japanese cooperation agency (JICA), as well as the areas of sport and rights of people with disabilities, in collaboration with the CPLP (Embassy of Brazil in Luanda 2020).

The trilateral projects maintained between Brazil, Angola, and Japan are now suffering setbacks not only by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic but also by the general distancing from Africa imposed by the political choices made by the Bolsonaro government.

5.5 Conclusions

As of 2019, few Japanese companies have expanded into five Portuguese-speaking Africa. There are 563 companies in Africa, of which ten are in Angola, twelve in Mozambique, one in Guinea-Bissau, one in São Tomé and Príncipe, and none in Cabo Verde.[24] It can be said that the relationship between Japan and Portuguese-speaking Africa other than Angola and Mozambique is still based on ODA. Mozambique is subject to the idea of "connectivity" under the FOIP initiative, and Japan's commitment will be expected to increase.

As shown in TICAD II, Japan's African diplomacy emphasizes the idea of partnership and self-help efforts (ownership). Japan's relations with Portuguese-speaking Africa will be continued while taking great care of its links with Portuguese-speaking regional organizations such as CPLP, in which Brazil and Portugal are participating.

As presented previously, Japan's cooperation with Africa has been marked by enormous success in recent decades, despite the difficulties and challenges faced. Thus, when major setbacks in Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa became all too visible in its most diverse aspects, triangular cooperation with Japan revealed itself as a fundamental way out for the maintenance of agendas considered historically relevant to all African countries involved. This is especially true for Portuguese-speaking African countries and for the expansion and innovation of joint activities in areas considered fundamental in post-pandemic future.

Only concerted policies between African countries and better governance within countries can eliminate opportunistic attitudes, avoid exploitation of weaker states, and attract policies from cooperating countries with greater consideration for African values and needs.

Notes

1. Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2021).
2. Hideo Oda, a leading expert in African studies in Japan, pointed out the "physical and psychological distance" in the relationship between Japan and Africa.
3. The word inside the parenthesis is a keyword described by the author to understand Japan's African diplomacy in each era.
4. Prime Minister Taro Aso (then), who had spent two years in Sierra Leone during his childhood, did not visit any African nations during his administration (Adem 2018, p. 9).
5. Devermont (2019).
6. Mitsugu Endo (Professor, The University of Tokyo), Junzo Fujita (Ambassador for TICAD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Keiichi Shirato (Senior Researcher, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Strategic Research Institute).
7. In the summer of 2014, Prime Minister Abe visited five Latin American countries, including Brazil and Mexico, and gave a "joint speech."
8. It is a Portuguese word for friendship, but it is a combination of the underlined parts of Japão–Mozambique Iniciativa para Dinamizar e Acelerar o Desenvolvimento.
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014).
10. Besides TICAD, the president of Mozambique also visited Japan in 2017. Government officials continued to come and go between the two countries.

11. According to JETRO, financial support from major donor countries such as the IMF was frozen due to the discovery of the "non-disclosure debt problem" of the Mozambique government in 2016, and JICA's new loan aid project was suspended (Matsunaga and Takahashi 2020).
12. When writing this paper, a Country Assistance Policy for Guinea-Bissau has not been formulated, but a Rolling Plan has been issued. After the 2003 coup d'etat, Japan did not approve of the government, and economic cooperation was suspended except for some aid through international organizations. Normalization of relations between the two countries was restored in 2006, economic cooperation was resumed in 2007, and after the resumption, poverty reduction is a priority field, and support is provided mainly in basic living needs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011).
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016a).
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (n.d.).
15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2020, p. 28).
16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016b).
17. Ministry of Finance of Japan (2019).
18. See Cervo and Bueno (2002, pp. 300–301).
19. See Cervo and Magalhães (2000, p. 293).
20. See Cervo and Bueno (2002, p. 309).
21. Oliveira (2004, p. 11).
22. Saraiva (1996, p. 217).
23. Saraiva (1996, p. 217).
24. African Business Partners (2019). The top five destinations of Japanese companies are South Africa (141 companies), Kenya (64 companies), Egypt (52 companies), Morocco (49 companies), and Nigeria (34 companies).

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Part III
Brazil–Japan Cooperation from Bilateral Perspectives

Chapter 6
Brazilian Workers in Japan and Public Policies for Promoting Their Social Integration with a Focus on Basic Education for Children

Keiichi Yamazaki and Mauricio Bugarin

6.1 Recent Trends for Brazilian Workers and Their Families in Japan

6.1.1 Short History of Brazilian Immigrants to Japan

The population of Nikkei Brazilian residents[1] in Japan started to increase dramatically in 1990, but there were already Brazilian residents living and working in Japan at that time. Most of them were first generation Nikkei people, which meant that all of them were Japanese citizens. As Japanese nationals, there was no legal barrier to enable them to enter Japan. Some came to Japan for a short stay to deal with the economic difficulty they faced in Brazil.

In 1990, the Immigration/Emigration Control Act was revised to create a new visa category: "Teijusha." Its literal meaning is "long stay resident," but it does not carry a specific period of time that the individual may stay in Japan. This category refers to the "status" of the applicant; Teijusha refers to third generation Nikkei persons in Brazil, Peru, the US, and other parts of the world. The revised law gave these individuals the qualification to freely enter Japan regardless of their skill and occupation, although they did need to renew their visa every three years. This resulted in a rapid increase of Nikkei Brazilian immigrants to Japan as shown in Fig. 6.1. Many second-generation Nikkei in Brazil still held Japanese nationality without any legal barriers to enter Japan. At the same time, the number of people with other nationalities living and working in Japan also increased, as indicated in Fig. 6.2.

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

Fig. 6.1 The number of Brazilian residents in Japan from 1998 to 2021 (*Source* Data for the years between 1988 and 1991 are from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/latinamerica/kaigi/brazil/data.html]. Data for the years between 1992 and 2008 are from Table 1 in Yamazaki [2015]. Data after 2009 are from the website of Immigration Services Agency of Japan [URL: https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/publications/press/13_00017.html])

As Fig. 6.1 shows, in the 2000s, the number of the Brazilian Nikkei population in Japan was constantly increasing; researchers questioned if they were long stay or short stay types but were not able to determine the point because of lack of data and information at that time. After the global financial crisis of 2008 triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the number of the Brazilian residents in Japan dramatically decreased from 300,000 yearly to 200,000 as many returned to Brazil in the aftermath of the crisis. This sudden reduction of migrant workers is rare, compared to other host countries. Those who did not return to Brazil in 2008/2009 started to acquire Permanent Resident visas; as of 2020, more than half of the Brazilian residents in Japan are in this category.

Why did so many Brazilians decide to return to Brazil after 2008? In fact, few researchers have made large-scale, detailed investigations on the behavior (stay or go home) of Brazilian residents in Japan. But the following characteristics can be pointed out:

1. Many Brazilians regarded their stay in Japan as a short-term stay to increase their savings. Therefore, there was a very limited level of incentive for them to acquire the Japanese language. When the financial crisis hit Japan in 2008, they thought that their stay in Japan was no longer effective for increasing their savings.



Fig. 6.2 The number of foreign residents in Japan according to the origin country/region after 2011 (*Source* Website of Immigration Services Agency of Japan. URL: https://www.moj.go.jp/isa/publications/press/13_00017.html [last access: March 14, 2022])

2. Many of the Brazilians who decided to stay in Japan after 2008 chose to change their visa category to permanent resident. Some of them may harbor a clear vision of their life and career development in the Japanese society.
3. Therefore, the typical characteristics of the residents before 2008 and after 2009 may be different. A greater share of the Brazilian residents in Japan today can be considered oriented towards a long stay.

This created a potential demand for language education. The importance of acquiring the Japanese language became more important both for adults and their children, with public and private schools playing crucial rolls. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 offer basic statistics on school enrollment of children of foreign[2] nationalities, excluding higher education such as universities. Table 6.2 clearly demonstrates that public (municipal) elementary, junior high, and high schools are where the research on education should be focused.

How many children should be targeted for the support programs[3] of Japanese language education at primary and secondary schools in Japan? As Table 6.3 shows, the total number of children of all nationalities was about 30,000 in 2014, with about 19,000 elementary school students. It should also be noted that the number of children in this group increased between 2004 and 2014.

One recent challenge at schools is that both foreign children and Japanese children who were born and raised in other countries and have returned to Japan now face the same challenge in learning the Japanese language. Table 6.4 shows a rather significant number of children in this situation. This is why the children of our focus are often referred to as "Children with connections to other countries" instead of "foreign children" by those who work in this field, such as civil servants of local governments, NPO staff, volunteers, and so forth. Some of such Japanese children spent their early childhood in foreign countries. We will study this issue in greater details later in Sect. 6.2. Before delving into this aspect, let us study a few more basic points related to Nikkei Brazilians' immigration to Japan.

6.1.2 Difference Between Brazilian Workers and Other Nationalities

Generally speaking, there is a problem of de facto low wage work which often pays between JPY 300 and JPY 400 per hours, less than half the minimum wage. This poses a problem of basic human right violations as widely reported by the Japanese mass media. Minimum wage varies from prefecture to prefecture in Japan. In 2020, the lowest wage was JPY 792 in Oita Prefecture and the highest was JPY 1,013 in Tokyo. This low wage employment is possible and legally accepted under the system of skill training (*gino jisshu*); because the participants in these training programs are regarded as trainees, not workers, payment is not regarded as wage and labor laws are therefore not applied. Most low wage workers are from Asian countries. It may be safe to assume that very few Brazilians are involved in this type of human right

Table 6.1 The number of foreign students enrolled in public schools in Japan

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Elementary School	41,809	42,110	43,129	44,595	45,491	45,073	42,748	41,166	40,263	40,796	42,721
Junior High School	19,911	19,266	19,311	20,119	21,253	22,123	22,218	21,806	21,405	21,310	21,143
High School	8,131	8,092	7,909	7,433	7,284	7,461	8,189	8,725	8,948	8,984	8,584
Special Assistance School	462	311	508	520	906	651	947	705	824	580	630
Middle Education School	32	38	79	84	109	109	112	110	105	111	211
Total	70,345	69,817	70,936	72,751	75,043	75,417	74,214	72,512	71,545	71,781	73,289

Source Prepared from the data in the Figure in MEXT (2016, 3)

Table 6.2 The number of foreign students according to the levels and types of schools as of 2014

Education levels		National government	Public (Municipal)	Private	Total
Elementary School		40	**42,721**	451	43,212
Junior High School		40	**21,143**	884	22,067
High School		20	**8,584**	3,854	12,458
Middle Level Education School	First Level	9	105	9	123
	Second Level	10	106	8	124
Special Assistance School	Elementary School	1	268	0	269
	Junior High School	2	124	0	126
	High School	11	238	2	251
Total		133	73,289	5,208	78,630

Source Rearranged from the table in MEXT (2016, 3)

Table 6.3 The number of foreign students enrolled in public schools who need instructions on the Japanese language learning

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2010	2012	2014
Elementary School	13,307	14,281	15,946	18,142	19,504	18,365	17,154	18,884
Junior High School	5,097	5,076	5,246	5,978	7,576	8,012	7,558	7,809
High School	1,204	1,242	1,128	1,182	1,365	1,980	2,137	2,272
Special Assistance School	55	70	72	84	98	132	140	177
Middle Education School	15	23	21	25	32	22	24	56
Total	19,678	20,692	22,413	25,411	28,575	28,511	27,013	29,198

Source Prepared from the data in the first figure in MEXT (2016, 4)

Table 6.4 The number of Japanese students enrolled in public schools who need instructions on the Japanese language learning

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2010	2012	2014
Elementary School	2,277	2,388	2,860	3,318	3,593	3,956	4,609	5,899
Junior High School	663	646	797	888	1,072	1,257	1,240	1,586
High School	186	163	193	167	197	244	273	332
Special Assistance School	6	12	13	10	17	26	32	49
Middle Education School	5	5	5	0	16	13	17	31
Total	3,137	3,214	3,868	4,383	4,895	5,496	6,171	7,897

Source Prepared from the data in the second figure in MEXT (2016, 4) violation because there is no need for the Nikkei Brazilians to apply to this visa category (skill training) as the Teijusha category is applicable to them.

One labor problem which the Brazilian workers do face in Japan is the issue of being laid off during an economic crisis. Generally speaking, many Brazilians are employed by factories which manufacture industrial products in high price brackets such as automobiles, automobile parts, electronic appliances, and so on. These are expensive commodities whose income elasticity of demand is rather high; in other words, during a recession when income of the customers goes down, demand for their products shrinks substantially and sensitively. This is exactly what happened during the 2008 financial crisis. Then, the one-year (or short-term) employment contracts of many Brazilian temporary workers were terminated. After this crisis, the total number of Brazilian residents in Japan decreased from 300,000 down to 200,000 individuals, as mentioned before. Some Brazilians work in factories which produce cheaper commodities with less income elasticity of demand such as foods, lunch boxes and food products that are shipped to family restaurants and convenience stores.

6.1.3 Labor Market Analysis

Researchers from the areas of labor market and migration analyses are interested in the following issues:

1. What are the characteristics of workers who returned to Brazil after the 2008/2009 crisis and of those who decided to stay in Japan? Which variables (age, sex, occupation, educational background, skill level, etc.) best explain their behavior?
2. After April 2009 to March 2010, the Japanese government offered a subsidy to those who decided to return to Brazil on the condition that they would not seek re-employment in the Japanese labor market with the same *Teijusha* visa. The amount was JPY 300,000 per worker and JPY 200,000 for his/her family member.[4] What type of people applied to this subsidy and used it to go back to Brazil? No impact study of this subsidy program has been conducted so far.
3. Many international studies on the return of the immigrants to their home country show that: (i) there is a wage premium from their overseas stay; (ii) education and skill level affect their behavior (stay or return) significantly; (iii) a high rate of unemployment in the host country promotes the decision to return to their mother countries; (iv) in the case of a country with a large population of immigrants, 20–50 percent of the immigrants return to their mother countries within 10 years.
4. We can assume that the average attributes of the Brazilian residents in Japan changed around 2008 but studying this empirically is difficult as no data is available about detailed attributes of the Brazilian residents in Japan.

Hashimoto Yuki's recent work is one of the attempts to tackle these research questions. She matched the Japanese national census data of Brazilian residents who stayed in Japan after 2008 and the database of NIATRE, São Paulo. NIATRE is a center to provide for information and consultation services to those Brazilians who returned to Brazil from Japan. Some of the basic questions her study covers are: (i) what is the difference between the group who returned to Brazil in 2009 and the group who returned after 2011? Does the "early return group" include those who are younger and less fluent in the Japanese language? (ii) What are the characteristics of the people who used the "return subsidy"? What are the reasons for using this subsidy program? (iii) Do the workers who returned from Japan to Brazil seek the same jobs in Brazil that they had during their stay in Japan? How do their experiences of working in Japan help them find a new job back in Brazil?

Hashimoto hypothesizes that the experiences Brazilians gained while working in Japan's production processes are not useful in Brazil and that their stay in Japan does not lead to good evaluation of their career in Brazil. Therefore, she concludes that the wage premium from their stay in Japan may not materialize.

6.2 Challenges Faced by the Children

6.2.1 Ten Thousand Children to Target

Many children face difficulty in learning and acquiring the Japanese language as well as the Portuguese language both at school and at home. Children who struggle to learn both languages (mother tongue and foreign language) are called "double limited". Among these children, how many are Brazilians? Table 6.5 shows that almost 10,000 children in elementary and junior high schools speak Portuguese as their mother tongue. The primary focus of this research, therefore, are these students. But we also need to pay attention to the Japanese children who returned from Brazil. How many are there? Table 6.6 shows 564 children are identified as students (elementary and junior high schools) who are Japanese nationals and who regularly speak Portuguese in their daily life. They also need assistance in learning the Japanese language even if it is their mother tongue. This double limited issue seems to make the work of the helping volunteers and NPO staff harder according to what we learned during the interviews (see the interview list at the end of this chapter).

6.2.2 Difficulty in Entering High School

Due to the limited level of learning, the rate of successful entry to high school and to universities remain low. One hurdle is the selection process to advance to high school from junior high school. In Hamamatsu City,[5] according to a recent study (Hamamatsu City Education Committee 2021), 88.8 percent of the foreign students in junior high school advance to high school (see Fig. 6.3), but Hamamatsu Foundation for International Communications and Exchanges (HICE), a half public,

Table 6.5 Mother tongues of the foreign students in public elementary and junior high schools who need instructions on the Japanese language learning as of 2018

Mother tongue	The number of foreign students
Portuguese	9,851
Chinese	8,427
Filipino	6,755
Spanish	3,507
Vietnamese	1,744
English	1,032
Korean	537
Other languages	4,723
Total	36,576

Source Calculated from the data in Table 3 in MEXT (2019, 9)

Table 6.6 The daily languages of the Japanese students enrolled in public elementary and junior high schools who need instructions on the Japanese language learning as of 2018

The daily languages of the Japanese students	The number of Japanese students
Filipino	3,179
Japanese	1,093
Chinese	2,028
English	1,113
Portuguese	564
Spanish	443
Korean	217
Vietnamese	189
Other languages	914
Total	9,740

Source Calculated from the data in Table 4 in MEXT (2019, 9)

half private administrative entity (see Sect. 3.5 of this article for details), estimates that about 40 percent of them choose nighttime schools, as their learning level is not high enough to pass the entrance examination to enter daytime schools. A HICE staff whom we interviewed estimates that about 50 percent[6] of the students in nighttime schools in Hamamatsu are foreigners.

Another hurdle is a qualification rule regarding *Gaikokujin Gakko* ('foreign schools' or international schools) located in Japan. According to School Education Law of Japan, the basic rule is that only those students who have graduated from Japanese junior high schools qualify as participants in entrance examinations to high schools in Japan while the students from foreign/international schools located in Japan do not qualify (see Fig. 6.4). One way to overcome this institutional hurdle is for the junior high school student enrolled in a foreign school to take and pass the "Test of Lower Secondary School Graduation Certificate". Those students who have passed this Test qualify as participants in entrance examinations to Japanese



Fig. 6.3 Growth of the percentage of foreign students in junior high schools who advance to high schools in Hamamatsu City (*Source* Hamamatsu City Education Committee [2021], p. 8)

high schools.[7] As to entrance examinations to universities, 41 'foreign (international) high schools' (or high school divisions of foreign schools) located in Japan are designated as high schools which correspond to regular Japanese high school.[8] The students enrolled in these 41 foreign (international) high schools in Japan qualify as participants in entrance examinations to universities in Japan.

< Good case >

Grades 1-3 Enrolled in a Brazilian school
Grades 3-6 Enrolled in a Japanese school
Junior High 1-3 Enrolled in a Japanese school
→ Qualify as a participant in the entrance examination to a high school

< Unlucky case>

Grades 1-3 Enrolled in a Japanese school
Grades 3-6 Shifted to a Brazilian school (for reasons such as being bullied by the classmates)
Junior High 1-3 Enrolled in a Brazilian school
→ Do not qualify as a participant in the entrance examination to a high school

Fig. 6.4 An institutional trap regarding an entrance examination to a high school

The HICE staff whom we interviewed stated that foreign students are often livelier and more energetic at nighttime schools than Japanese students and that the president of students' self-governing association (which exists in all schools in Japan) at a nighttime school is often a foreign student. Foreign students are highly communicative although their academic performance is insufficient to enter day-time schools. This signifies that these foreign students have high potential and that more assistance programs can effectively and efficiently enhance their capabilities.

One challenge for the high school students is that after entering a high school, the official support for studies that was offered by junior high school is no longer available because high school education is not compulsory. This may be a specific issue for foreign students who enter high school. Without these supports, academic success becomes difficult. HICE staff speculates that Brazilian students' drop-out rate might be rather high, but there is no data about the issue currently available. One policy challenge for HICE is how to offer educational support to the foreign students who successfully entered high schools but face academic hardship there. HICE also faces the challenge of collecting information and developing a database regarding the reality of foreign students' learning and educational needs in high schools in Hamamatsu City.

6.2.3 The Problem of Truancy ("evasão escolar")

One important challenge that many cities face is the problem of "evasão", the habit of children's not going to school or the problem of staying home without receiving school education. A possible cause of "evasão" is a necessity for a student to quit a foreign school, such as a Brazilian school, due to his or her parents' economic troubles. Foreign schools often have a higher tuition fee than Japanese public (municipal) schools, but changing to a less expensive Japanese public school can still be difficult due to the language barrier or other academic and cultural barriers (see Fig. 6.4). This was a common problem during the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, but there seem to be fewer cases of this type during the current crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Hamamatsu City launched an "Evasão Zero" project in 2010 to reduce the number of students connected with foreign countries who refuse to go to school. In September 2013, the city achieved the target of "zero truancy" through various support activities including consultation service to the children and their families with this problem.

6.2.4 The Problem of Family Communication

Living in a foreign country creates additional potential conflict due to a possible loss of communication between parents and their children. For example, if the parents work long shifts in jobs that do not require them to learn Japanese, they do not develop local language skills. If their children go to Japanese school exclusively, they tend to lose their Portuguese language skills, especially if the long daily shifts of their parents reduce the time they spend together. In that case, it may become increasingly hard for the children to communicate with their parents in Portuguese.

This problem is known in the literature as the "emotional rupture" problem: since the child cannot communicate well with the parents, they cannot be helped in their academic studies, which may increase the probability of failure in a Japanese school. According to Connexion. Tokyo (2015a), "It is a not uncommon situation where children cannot enter and finish high school (Koko) and cannot keep a dialog with their parents due to the language barrier" (free translation).

Our interviews (see the List of Online Interviews at the end of this chapter) suggest that emotional rupture increases truancy and makes parents highly hesitant about sending their kids to the Japanese school. This problem of communication loss has been debated in the literature, but has not been formally modelled, as discussed in Sect. 6.4.

6.3 Public Intervention

6.3.1 National Level: A New Law

Faced with many new issues arising from the rapidly increasing Brazilian population in many communities across the country, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan organized symposiums by inviting Brazil's Ambassador to Japan, academics, lawyers, officials of local governments, businesspersons, NPO staff, and others to speak. The first meeting was held on February 1, 2001, about ten years after the start of a rapid increase in Nikkei Brazilians' arrival. The top researchers on Brazil, including Prof. Kotaro Horisaka and Prof. Chiyoko Mita of Sophia University and Prof. Masato Ninomiya of USP, Brazil (law professor, lawyer) were among the speakers invited from the academic community. The second meeting was held on March 10, 2004, this time with a focus on children's basic education. Various problems related to school education and Japanese language learning were covered in this second meeting.

Along the way, the Agency for Cultural Affairs (Bunka-cho, hereafter referred to as ACA) of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (hereafter referred to as MEXT) was indicated as an organization responsible for the public policies and subsidies related to programs designed to help Brazilian and other foreign residents in Japan. In addition to the regular responsibilities of ACA, including promotion of cultural events and activities such as theatrical performances and music concerts, they organized the extension of assistance to foreign residents after the number of foreign residents started to increase in the 1990s. It is not clearly known why and how ACA was chosen as a responsible governmental entity to take care of this policy area, which does not seem related to their main duty of promoting culture, music, and art. At any rate, ACA offered a variety of subsidies to promote activities of teaching the Japanese language to foreign residents, especially adults.

In 2014, ACA called for comprehensive research on the problems faced by many communities across the country regarding language education. In March 2015, Learn-S Co. Ltd, who won this project, published a detailed report (Learn-S. Co. Ltd. 2015) on the results of their large-scale research. As many as 38 organizations including NPOs, local governments and international exchange associations in many parts of Japan were covered by this study and the needs and challenges faced by all concerned entities were summarized.

One important, recent action by the central government was the enactment of a new law, i.e., the Law to Promote the Japanese Language Education (hereafter referred to as LPJLE). This law is intended to enhance the programs that help foreign residents in Japan. Its purpose is not necessarily limited to language education; it covers a broad area of public policies to ease the life and work of foreign residents in Japan as well as to promote social integration of foreign residents in Japanese society. The Law is under the jurisdiction of ACA/MEXT of Japan. It is important to note that this Law does not target school children; therefore, the ACA's responsibility does not include school education of foreign residents. School education is undertaken directly by the main body of MEXT and by the local Education Committee (hereafter referred to as EDUCOM) which is attached to both city and prefectural governments.

In Japan, the EDUCOM at the municipal level is fully responsible for important policies for primary and junior high schools in the municipality (including choice of textbooks) while the EDUCOM at the prefectural (provincial) level is responsible for management of public high schools in the prefecture (province).

One positive impact of enacting LPJLE is that cities and prefectures started to prepare a strategic plan to develop policies for foreign residents living and working in their locality because the law made this a requirement and precondition for receiving subsidies from ACA. These subsidies were then used to help local governments promote programs that could help foreign residents. This is regarded as a new trend which was not recognized over the past 30 years.[9] One future challenge regarding this law is how business corporations that employ many foreign workers can make a social contribution to the community in the future as LPJLE does not make these responsibilities clear. We can see Japanese firms "free-riding" on many public services offered by local governments towards foreign residents because the firms employing foreign workers do not shoulder the administrative costs of the programs.[10]

LPJLE is necessary because the need for assistance to foreign residents are starting to exceed the capacity of volunteers and local NPOs. Their needs are also increasingly diversified in terms of volume, quality, and nature. One example is a need for assistance to foreign residents who are looking for affordable houses to purchase for a longer or a permanent stay in Japan. In order to provide for these diverse needs, co-production projects are gaining importance.

Regarding school education, subsidies to NGOs/NPOs who work in this policy field from the central and local governments remain limited as of today. The number of assistants in classrooms remain limited too. We can assume that LPJLE is unrelated to the task of increasing the quality of educational service to foreign students in school as it does not focus on school education.

6.3.2 Nation-Wide Reaction of Municipal Governments

Faced with the challenge of meeting the needs of the increasing foreign residents in the municipal territories for the first time in Japan's modern history, many local governments set up a division within their municipal government to deal with the task of "multicultural co-living" (*tabunka kyosei*). This may roughly correspond to the concept of social integration of foreign residents in the community.

Some municipalities have formed a national consortium to exchange information and ideas about how to deal with the challenge of internationalization at the local level called the Conference of Cities with Concentration of Foreign Residents (CCCFR). The first national meeting was held on May 7, 2001 in Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture.

The member cities of CCCFR as of 2021 are: Ota, Oizumi (Gunma Ken), Ueda, Iida (Nagano Ken), Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Ken), Toyohashi, Toyota, Komaki (Aichi Ken), Tsu, Yokkaichi, Suzuka, Kameyama (Mie Ken), Soja (Okayama Ken) (Total: 13 cities).

During the national meeting held in Ueda City, Nagano Ken (Prefecture), the Ueda Declaration was adopted (see the column). This statement emphasizes the importance of offering assistance to foreign residents in Japan in the area of the Japanese language education.

Column 6.1 Ueda Declaration (Adopted in 2019 at the National Meeting of 2019 of Conference of Cities with Concentration of Foreign Residents)
Conference of Cities with Concentration of Foreigners have promoted various efforts including the task of finding solutions to the various problems that have surfaced in our local communities to realize a convivial society with foreign residents. Regarding the issues related to the development of laws and institutional arrangement, we have made and forwarded recommendations to the national Ministries and related organs of the central government.

Currently, the number of foreigners residing in Japan exceeds 2.8 million, the highest number ever, and in recent years, the number of immigrants from Asian countries has been increasing. The number of the residents of a long stay type is on the increase too. This year (2019) will be a turning point in which the country will take a major step in accepting foreign human resources who are instantly ready to contribute to our productive activities. One example of such a step is the creation of a new status of residence called "Specific Skills" from April in order to cope with a serious labor shortage in Japan. The central government formulated a policy package of "comprehensive measures for acceptance of and co-living with foreign residents" to contribute to the realization of a society in which Japanese and foreigners can live in peace and safety. The central government announced that they will now strongly promote the measures.

One of these measures is "enhancement of Japanese language education". Under these circumstances, the "Law to Promote Japanese Language Education" came into effect in June this year (2019). It is an undeniable fact that strengthening the environment for Japanese language education is important for foreign children to develop their own career in the Japanese society in the future. Both local governments and the national government must jointly take the responsibility for the education of children and must work together with educational institutions and their parents. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* also states that all children must receive mandatory primary education free of charge. It is our duty to guarantee all children the right to education, regardless of nationality or age. It should also be remembered that for many foreign children, the right to education can be fairly guaranteed only when we provide them with the support for learning Japanese and their mother tongue. The importance of supporting Japanese language learning and of taking into consideration their mother tongue is specified in this law.

In addition, regarding instructors in charge of Japanese language education, the qualities and abilities required for teaching children in the development stage of acquiring a language are completely different from those required for teaching adults. The central government should take this into consideration when they put effort into the training of instructors of the Japanese language education. The government should develop a system that will lead to improvement of the working environment and the salary/wage of such instructors so that they can live a stable life.

So that we can step forward with this Law as our foothold, we request that the central government design a system and offer support to us to help local governments strengthen the Japanese language education and improve the working conditions of the language teachers.

For the national government to fulfill its responsibility for developing and implementing the policy measures for the promotion of multicultural co-living, they should collaborate with other Ministries, local governments, business firms, educational institutions and other institutions, should learn effective methods adopted by many communities so far, and should develop policy measures of multicultural co-living targeting all generations which are wanted by the local governments.

The Conference of Cities with Concentration of Foreigners aims to build a society where each person can consolidate his/her own life while utilizing the individuality and ability regardless of nationality or age. It will undertake one project after another at a steady pace while enriching the policy measures for multicultural co-living.

December 26, 2019

The Conference of Cities with Concentration of Foreign Residents
Translated by Keiichi Yamazaki.

6.3.3 Policies of Individual Local Governments in Shizuoka Prefecture

Hamamatsui City offers a subsidy to the parents for buying school textbooks for their children. The city is credited with having achieved "Evasão Zero" (Zero Truancy) for more than ten years consecutively and ranks first or second among the Government Ordinance Designated Cities (GODCs)[11] in Japan for having a low rate of evasão.

In Sanarudai Elementary School of the City, the instructions to the pupils about the measures to prevent COVID-19 infection are offered in five languages on their official website including Japanese, Tagalog, Portuguese, Chinese, and English.[12] The first official motto of the school is to help children to become "persons who will live in a better way and promote a society of multicultural co-living."

Hamamatsu Foreign Resident Study Support Center was established in 2010 to offer general educational supports to foreign residents, especially in the city. Their official website lists three objectives on its front page[13]: [citation] "As a city with the most Brazilian residents in Japan, the Center strives to be a place that offers general educational support for foreign residents of all ages. […] Acting as a base, the Center dispatches Japanese language teachers to international schools in Hamamatsu, and with the cooperation of the foreign community, conducts a number of Japanese classes throughout the area. […] In cooperation with the Hamamatsu Multicultural Center that opened in 2008 (10 min' walk from the Hamamatsu Station's north exit), the Center works to promote Hamamatsu as a multicultural city making it its unique feature".

The EDUCOM of Hamamatsu City cares for children who regularly attend school by offering additional tutoring at school or by providing private lessons through local NPOs on Saturdays to students who are struggling. Regarding assistance in Japanese language education, Hamamatsu City secured a budget to cover the cost of offering tutoring and instructions to the children in 2019. The program is named as "*Gaikokujin Kodomo Kouiku Suishin Jigyo* (Program to promote education of foreign children)" with the budget of JPY 122 million, out of which about 26 million is the subsidies from the central and prefectural governments to the City.[14] We can consider it as an important first step forward.

Iwata City of Shizuoka Prefecture is another city with many Brazilian residents. As of March 2016, about 3.6 percent (6,169) of the population were foreign residents, making it the city with the third most foreign residents in the prefecture, after Hamamatsu City and Shizuoka City. At a peak year before 2008, about 80 percent of the foreign residents were Brazilians, while Philippine residents have been increasing in recent years. In accordance with the "Plan to Promote Multicultural Co-living in Communities" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Somu-sho), Iwata City prepared "Iwata City Plan to Promote Multicultural Co-living" in March 2007. In 2017, the city launched the "3rd Iwata City Plan to Promote Multicultural Co-living" to cover the years until 2021. It is noteworthy that not only big cities such as Hamamatsu but small cities such as Iwata are faced with the challenge of promoting multicultural co-living.

6.3.4 Kanagawa Prefecture and Yokohama City

Kanagawa Prefecture, part of the greater Tokyo metropolitan area, is another region with many foreign residents, with 226,766 people (2.45% of the total population) as of January 1, 2021.[15] The biggest city in the Prefecture is Yokohama City with 99,646 foreign residents (2.64% of the total population) as of October, 2021.[16] Table 6.7 shows the numbers of residents by nationality in both Kanagawa and Yokohama.

In Kanagawa Prefecture, we assume that the foreign residents are generally more integrated into the local communities than in other prefectures in Japan due to the historical background. There is a long history of co-living with so-called "old comers" (mainly Chinese and Koreans) there. Therefore, both the foreign residents and the Japanese residents are more prepared to live in a harmonious way than in other regions. Another feature of Kanagawa is the high correlation between the concentration of Brazilians, Peruvian, and Vietnamese in terms of chosen residential districts as shown in Table 6.8. In other words, in cities and towns with many Peruvian and Vietnamese residents, we can find many Brazilian residents. This could mean that there might be social networking to help each other not only between Japanese and foreign residents but also among foreign residents of different nationalities.

Figure 6.5a–d indicate that there is no correlation between the number of foreign residents and the liveability score (deviation value of the index from a private housing information firm called *Iiheya Netto* [good apartment network] of Daito Trust Construction Co., Ltd. of the district, city, and town in Kanagawa Prefecture. This can be interpreted as a reflection of a significant level of integration of the foreign residents in the communities in the Prefecture. In other words, a great number of foreign residents regardless of the nationality seems to have no impact on the livability. "Many foreign residents" does not mean a low quality or high quality of the living environment of the district and there may be no prejudice or discrimination against foreign residents. This is an important element and precondition for promoting 'after school' for the children, as it depends on the support from the community.

Table 6.7 The number of foreign residents in Kanagawa prefecture and Yokohama City as of January 1st of 2021

Country of origin	China	South Korea	Vietnam	Philippines	Brazil	Nepal	Peru	India	US	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Sri Lanka
Kanagawa Prefecture	71,386	27,138	26,191	22,825	8,749	7,581	6,227	5,828	5,600	5,214	4,176	4,036	3,971
Yokohama City	40,479	12,582	9,262	8,265	2,664	4,183	1,267	2,948	2,523	2,737	1,645	1,534	942

Source Shiryo *1* [Material 1] available at the website of Kanagawa Prefecture. URL: https://www.pref.kanagawa.jp/docs/k2w/prs/r3998085.html (last access: March 14, 2022)

Table 6.8 Correlations between nationalities, two by two (Kanagawa prefecture)

Country of origin	China	South Korea	Vietnam	Philippines	Brazil	Nepal	Peru	India	US	Taiwan	Thailand	Indonesia	Sri Lanka
China	1.000	0.894	0.543	0.660	0.306	0.649	0.137	0.463	0.617	0.914	0.789	0.394	0.053
South Korea	0.894	1.000	0.660	0.796	0.352	0.684	0.207	0.521	0.610	0.809	0.773	0.567	0.093
Vietnam	0.543	0.660	1.000	0.773	0.677	0.496	0.614	0.426	0.228	0.401	0.736	0.636	0.498
Philippines	1.000	0.796	0.773	1.000	0.540	0.587	0.457	0.437	0.487	0.550	0.730	0.648	0.142
Brazil	0.306	0.352	0.677	0.540	1.000	0.384	0.708	0.221	0.055	0.154	0.488	0.547	0.462
Nepal	0.649	0.684	0.496	0.587	0.384	1.000	0.157	0.306	0.387	0.542	0.428	0.419	0.006
Peru	0.137	0.207	0.614	0.457	0.708	0.157	1.000	0.131	0.053	0.080	0.567	0.458	0.530

Source Prepared by the authors. The source for the numbers of foreign residents is the same as Table 6.7

Fig. 6.5 Number of foreign residents in districts in Kanagawa prefecture and 'liveability' (deviation value of the 'liveability' scores) **a** Correlation between the number of residents and liveability index (deviation value) [All foreign residents], **b** Correlation between the number of residents and liveability index (deviation value) [Brazilians], **c** Correlation between the number of residents and liveability index (deviation value) [Chinese], **d** Correlation between the number of residents and liveability index (deviation value) [Americans]

6.3.5 Co-Production and NPOs

Some of the big prefectures and cities with concentrations of foreign residents have instituted half public, half private associations to promote inter-exchange and cultural interaction between Japanese and foreign residents in the local community. This





Fig. 6.5 (continued)

entity is another example of co-production between the local civil society and the local public administration in the field of promoting multicultural co-living, a major public policy in the age of globalization at the community level. This association of Shizuoka Prefecture is called SIR (The Shizuoka Association for International Relations). There are currently four full time staff in SIR.

Hamamatsu City's association similar to SIR is called HICE (Hamamatsu Foundation for International Communication and Exchange). About twenty people work for HICE including part-time staff. In the headquarters, two individuals work for the municipal government while five are directly employed by HICE on a full-time basis. In addition to these staff, there are several counselors who work for HICE on a less regular basis. Ninety percent of the revenue comes from the budget of commissioned works. This means that HICE regularly applies for public funds proposed by the municipal government. At the moment, there are no rival organizations with the same level of expertise to help foreign residents in Hamamatsu; therefore, the selection process is based on single participant bidding, which is a legally accepted form of public bidding when rival firms are non-existent due to the nature of the business.

YOKE, the Yokohama Association for International Communication and Exchanges, is "an extra-departmental body of Yokohama City to promote creating multi-cultural communities with both Japanese and foreign residents" (citation from their website). It is an association similar to SIR and HICE. YOKE functions as the secretariat of 11 international exchange lounges in the City of Yokohama; one of them is in Tsurumi-ku (administrative district) with the lounge conveniently located in the building attached to JR Tsurumi Station.

ABC Japan[17] is a nation-widely known local NPO in Yokohama City. Its office is located in Tsurumi, one of the liveliest districts out of the 18 in the City of Yokohama in terms of multicultural co-living. One very important activity of ABC Japan is to help children enter a high school. Entering a high school (at the age of 15 or 16) is a significant challenge for Japanese students as well as foreign students, with some considering it to be the biggest event of an individual's life before the age of 20. Many foreign children fail in this selection process and give up the plan of advancing to a high school and university. One's future career becomes very limited if their educational background stops at the junior high school level.

Japan's high school selection process is complex; the scores of entrance examinations as well as evaluations from teachers of students' day-to-day behavior are taken into consideration. The frequency of submitting reports and homework to the teachers as well as the clothes are important. As to the latter, school children should not look so fashionable at school to gain good evaluation from their teachers, but there may be a cultural conflict element involved in this fashion regulation. What looks regular or low-key appears too fashionable in the eyes of the Japanese people and teachers. ABC Japan alerts the parents and children about these issues of cultural conflict to prevent unnecessary friction at school. It holds a guidance meeting for the parents and children to remind them of this peculiar reality of Japanese society.

Tsuruminho is an activity to help primary school children do their homework together with their friends in the library of their school after all classes of the day are finished. It is run by ABC Japan (NGO) in collaboration with Irifune Elementary School, a municipal school of Yokohama City. The volunteer participants help them learn Japanese and basic mathematics. It is held two or three times a month on Tuesday afternoons.[18]

6.3.6 Private Business Sector Initiative

1. Brazilian schools: There used to be 7 Brazilian schools in Hamamatsu City, but there are currently 3. They are not officially authorized by the MEXT as "schools"

in the Japanese education system. Due to these institutional constraints, graduates from the Brazilian junior high schools do not qualify as participants in the entrance selection process towards high school in Japan.[19] If they are authorized and categorized as "miscellaneous schools," they are entitled to subsidies from Hamamatsu City as well as from Shizuoka Prefecture.

2. Driving school: There is a driving school which employs a bilingual instructor who speaks both Japanese and Portuguese. A driving school is a training center where almost all Japanese people go to acquire their driver's license. On paper, it is possible to study traffic rules and to learn the driving skill alone and take the exam to acquire the license, but the pass rate is extremely small. Most people spend a few months at a driving school, taking classes and lessons after work, to acquire a driver's license. Acquiring a driver's license is another big hurdle for foreign residents to be integrated into the Japanese society. Therefore, introduction of bilingual instructors is a very important step forward to promote multicultural co-living.
3. Businessperson's initiatives: One notable case is a social contribution activity by Mr. Walter Saito, a second generation Brazilian (Nisei) of Japanese–Brazilians who was born in 1967 in the State of Parana. After graduating from the State University of Londrina, he became a physical education teacher (educação física) in Brazil. He came to Japan in the early 1990s to work as a dekasegi worker. After achieving saving of about 6 million yen (about USD 50,000), he established a staffing firm (temporary staff service) in 1995. When the firm faced a severe crisis after the economic shock of 2008, Saito turned to agriculture and started to produce green onions (called negi in Japanese). Now he is known nationwide as the "King of Green Onions" (Rei da Cebolinha, in Portuguese), selling a high-quality fresh produce whose value is double the standard market price of regular quality green onions in Japan. The brand name is the same; Negi Oh (King of Green Onions). As the demand for his green onions is larger than the amount which he can produce in his farms (totaling 50 hectares), he allocates almost no efforts for sales. His firm TS Farm has no sales department. In addition to his highly successful agricultural business, Saito devotes a great deal of his resources, both time and money, to his social contribution activities, helping the Brazilian and non-Japanese children living in Japan. First, he established one of the first Brazilian primary and secondary schools in Japan for the Brazilian children in the country. Second, he established a nursery school to take care of smaller children where education is conducted in three languages: Japanese, English, and Portuguese. Third, Mr. SaitoSaito, Walter has recently launched a scholarship to help the Brazilian high school students advance to universities to continue their studies.[20]

Considering all the points discussed in this section, we conclude that enactment of a basic law to promote the society of multicultural co-living is imminent. Laws have been proposed by CCCFR as well as Hamamatsu City with promotion from scholars like Prof. Keizo Yamawaki of Meiji University. As early as in November of 2002, Prof. Yamawaki published his opinion to promote such a basic law in *Asahi*

Shimbun (one of the five biggest national newspapers in Japan) according to his short essay (Yamawaki 2009). In fact, a bill titled "Basic Law for the Society of Multicultural Co-living" with 21 articles was introduced to the Lower House in 2019 for a parliamentary debate.[21] As of today, it is still under discussion. Creating such a basic law will work as a strong drive to many entities involved in the efforts to support foreign residents and their children in Japan.

6.4 Formal Modeling: Schooling Choices and Government Intervention

There is a large body of literature discussing the challenges and hardships faced by Brazilian families (and those of other nationalities as well) living in Japan. That literature focusses either on migration, labor, or sociological instruments for analysis.[22] More limited is the literature that uses incentive theory instruments to analyze foreign families' decisions, especially regarding children's educational choices. To the best of our knowledge, Bugarin (2017, 2018) is the first attempt to build a formal decision-theoretic model to better understand the trade-offs that Brazilian families face when deciding what strategies to use for their children's education.

This section first briefly presents the main findings in Bugarin (2017, 2018). Next, it stresses that the existing literature did not include an important variable that parents take into consideration when deciding their children's educational strategy, namely, the concern with a possible communication loss between parents and children when the children attend Japanese school. Then, it extends the original analysis by building a mechanism design model that includes the "communication loss" variable, aimed at inducing Brazilian parents to send their children to Japanese elementary school and, furthermore, to Brazilian after-schools, at the lowest possible cost for the Japanese government.

6.4.1 The Decision-Theoretic Approach: The Brazilian Families' Schooling Decisions

This subsection briefly describes the findings in Bugarin (2017, 2018). The reader is invited to read the original papers for details on the decision theoretic model underlying the results presented here, as well as the careful motivation of the modelling hypothesis.

The mentioned works suggest five choices Brazilian families have regarding education for their children in Japan.

First, they can decide to keep their children out of school, at home. This strategy avoids all psychological costs associated with going to the Japanese school, which include bullying, the feeling of failure due to lack of achievement, difficulties of communication, etc. That strategy, however, strongly reduces the likelihood of future professional success both in Japan, if the child remains in the country, or even in Brazil, if the child returns.

Second, parents can decide to enroll their children in a regular Japanese (elementary) school. If the children are successful in adjusting to the Japanese school system, in spite of the psychological cost discussed above, the children will more likely have access to better paid, higher status jobs in Japan.

Third, parents may enroll their children in a full-time Brazilian school. In that case there will be no psychological adjustment cost.[23] However, the children will not be able to acquire the language and academic skills necessary to have access to better paid, higher status jobs in Japan. In addition, many Brazilian full-time schools tend to deliver insufficient academic content in Portuguese language, which will make the students unfit to access better jobs in Brazil. This is the phenomenon of the "double limited" child, unable to muster the Japanese or the Brazilian language, which we discussed earlier.

Fourth, parents may enroll their children in a full-time bilingual school, that would teach both the Brazilian and the Japanese academic curricula. This would also reduce the psychological costs of adaptation and better prepare the student for a successful future career in Japan or in Brazil. However, such schools tend to be quite expensive and only the most elite Brazilian families can afford them; they are not available to the majority of Brazilian families living in Japan.

Fifth, the parents may enroll their children in regular Japanese schools, but complement their education with a Brazilian, part-time, afterschool. The Brazilian afterschool would have three main goals. First, to preserve the Portuguese language as a heritage language for the Brazilian students thereby reducing the likelihood of communication loss between Portuguese speaking parents and their children. Second, to help students acquire the academic level required in the Japanese school, as the typical jukku does for Japanese students. Finally, this option maintains the students' psychological stability by offering professional support, to help them cope with the psychological costs of attending Japanese schools. This model highly increases the chances of success in Japanese schools and of acquiring a better paid, higher status job. This model may also be less expensive than attending a full-time traditional Brazilian school.

The original research suggests that the most suitable strategy for the families is to choose this last hybrid model: Japanese school followed by part-time Brazilian afterschool. That model increases the chances of academic success as well as future professional success, while reducing the psychological challenges of adjusting to the Japanese school. Therefore, that model should be stimulated and, one would expect that it would flourish naturally.

As Prof. M. Bugarin presented in the Workshop "Inclusão de alunos brasileiros no sistema educacional japonês", organized by the Brazilian Embassy in Tokyo in February 2017, a survey of 28 (out of 39) Brazilian schools in Japan revealed that 18 of them, i.e., 64% of respondents, either already have afterschool programs, or are interested in implementing such a model.[24]

Therefore, one would expect the hybrid Japanese school + Brazilian afterschool model to become dominant. However, it may take some time for that change to occur for several reasons, as discussed in Bugarin (2017, 2018). Two potential reasons are: (i) risk-aversion, i.e., the fact that many Brazilian schools are used to the full-time model, including the higher fees, and don't feel comfortable with the risk of changing; and (ii) the fact that the only enduring scholarship for Brazilian students, organized by the Mitsui Company, is targeted toward full-time Brazilian schools.

One important reason why Brazilian parents may be concerned with enrolling their children in Japanese schools appeared frequently in our interviews and has not been modeled in the cited literature. Our interviews revealed that parents fear that their children may lose their Brazilian identity and that communication between parents and children may be jeopardized because the children may not retain their Portuguese speaking skills. Combined with the concern about the adaptation cost of attending a Japanese school, this may explain why many Brazilian parents may prefer a fulltime Brazilian school.

The next subsection introduces the mechanism design approach to assess what the Japanese government can do to induce parents to opt for the hybrid educational model.

6.4.2 The Mechanism-Design Approach: The Japanese Government's Intervention

Elementary and middle school attendance in Japan is mandatory for Japanese children. However, the current government interpretation of the Japanese constitution, which states that basic education is mandatory to all "kokumin",[25] excludes foreign children from this mandatory character. In other words, foreign children may attend Japanese schools but are not required to.

This interpretation of the constitution has been a delicate diplomatic issue. The Brazilian embassy in Tokyo, for example, argues that if foreign children were required to attend Japanese public schools, then the problem of truancy would be resolved. However, the Ministry of Education may be concerned with the cost increases associated with such a change in policy.

Thinking in the long-term, demographics are an important, related concern in Japan. As Japanese fertility rates are insufficient for populational stability, many argue that foreign workers and their families may help cope with the aging population problem Japan presently faces (Sakamoto 2014; Bugarin 2017). This is one of the main reasons the Japanese government changed the immigration control act, first in 1990, to allow for third generation Nikkei to work in Japan, and then in 2019, to allow foreign citizens to receive working visas in 14 job categories. The legislation is currently being revised further to allow indeterminate visa renewals and to expand the categories that allow foreigners to bring their families to Japan (see also The Japan Times 2021).

Considering the permanent and increasing need to import labor, from the point of view of Japanese government, it is not only a matter of social welfare, but a long-term strategic choice to ensure that the foreigners and their families are able to integrate properly into Japanese society. In particular, a fundamental tool of integration is making sure that foreign families' children enroll in the local schools. Under that perspective, while the constitutional interpretation remains unchanged, the Japanese government may find it within its best interests to take actions aimed at inducing parents to enroll foreign children in the Japanese educational system.

Suppose, therefore, that the Japanese government wishes to induce parents to keep their children in Japanese schools. However, foreign families might not be willing to enroll their children due to the psychological and the loss of communication costs discussed earlier. To create the right incentives, the government could offer financial support g to the foreign family, as long as a child remains in a public Japanese school. The purpose of this subsidy would be to countervail the negative effects of the psychological cost p of going to a Japanese school and the possible loss of communication cost l.

Note that there are, actually, several possible levels for this communication cost l. If a child goes to a fulltime Brazilian school, then the chances of communication loss is very low because the child speaks Portuguese at school all day long. For simplicity, we set that cost to zero. If the child goes only to a fulltime Japanese school that cost is high, because the child listens to Japanese language all day long and may completely lose his Portuguese language skills. Let $l = \bar{l}$ be the loss of family communication in that case. If the child follows the hybrid system, i.e., goes to a Japanese school and a Brazilian afterschool, then the loss of communication cost exists, but it is lower than in the previous case. Let $l = \underline{l} < \bar{l}$ be the loss of communication cost in that case.

Similarly, there are several psychological costs of adjustment to the Japanese school. If the child goes only to a Japanese school, that is when the psychological cost is at its highest: $p = \overline{p} > 0$. If the child goes to a Japanese school first and then to a Brazilian school, given the psychological support structure in the afterschool, the psychological cost is lower: $p = \underline{p} < \overline{p}$.

Finally, there are no fees for attending the Japanese public school, but there is a (high) fee $c = \overline{c}$ for attending the fulltime private Brazilian school and a (lower) fee $c = \underline{c} < \overline{c}$ for attending the (halftime) afterschool Brazilian school.

Note that, since both the psychological and the communication-loss costs are reduced when a child goes to a Brazilian afterschool, it is potentially cheaper for the government to induce the parents to enroll their children in a Japanese school if they also attend the Brazilian afterschool. Hereafter, we build a mechanism design program to induce parents to enroll their children in the hybrid system.

Suppose the government offers subsidy $g > 0$ to the family that enrolls a child in the hybrid schooling system. For simplicity, we only consider four choices for the families[26]: (i) truancy, i.e., keep the child out of school; (ii) fulltime Japanese school only; (iii) fulltime Brazilian school only; (iv) the hybrid system.

The corresponding utilities are:

i. Truancy: in this case, there are no financial not psychological costs, but the expected future income, $r_0 > 0$, is very reduced. The net utility is:

$$u_0 = r_0$$

ii. Fulltime Japanese school only: in this case, the expected future income $r_j > r_0$ is higher, but there are two costs: the psychological adaptation cost, $\overline{p} > 0$ and the loss of communication cost, $\bar{l}$. The net utility is:

$$u_j = r_j - \overline{p} - \bar{l}$$

iii. Fulltime Brazilian school only: in this case, there is neither a psychological adjustment cost nor a communication loss cost, but there is a financial cost (the private school fees) and the expected income r_b is lower than when going to the Japanese school: $r_0 < r_b < r_j$. The net utility is:

$$u_b = r_b - \overline{c}$$

iv. Hybrid schooling: in this case the psychological adjustment cost, the communication loss cost and the school fees are all lower and the expected future income $r_{jb} > r_j$ is highest. In addition, the family receives the government subsidy g. The net utility is:

$$u_{jb} = r_{jb} - \underline{c} - \underline{p} - \underline{l} + g$$

Considering all these alternatives, the Japanese government problem is to choose the optimal subsidy to solve the following program:

$$\min_{g} g$$

Subject to:

$$\begin{aligned}
u_{jb} &= r_{jb} - \underline{c} - \underline{p} - \underline{l} + g \geq u_0 = r_0 && IR \\
u_{jb} &= r_{jb} - \underline{c} - \underline{p} - \underline{l} + g \geq u_b = r_b - \overline{c} && IC_b \\
u_{jb} &= r_{jb} - \underline{c} - \underline{p} - \underline{l} + g \geq u_j = r_j - \overline{p} - \bar{l} && IC_j
\end{aligned}$$

The objective function is the financial concern and states that the government aims to keep the expenditure as reduced as possible. Condition IR is the individual rationality condition or the participation constraint. It says that the family must prefer to enroll the child in the hybrid system rather than keeping him/her home and out of school. The IR condition could also be called, in this context, the “No-truancy condition”.

Condition IC_b is the incentive compatibility condition for the fulltime Brazilian school. It says that the family must prefer to enroll the child in the hybrid system rather than enrolling him/her in a fulltime Brazilian school.

Finally, condition IC_j is the incentive compatibility condition for the Japanese school. It says that the family must prefer to enroll the child in the hybrid system rather than enrolling him/her only in a fulltime Japanese school.

Rewriting the above conditions yields:

$$\begin{aligned} IR: &\quad g \geq \underline{c} + \underline{p} + \underline{l} - (r_{jb} - r_0) \\ IC_b: &\quad g \geq \underline{p} + \underline{l} - (\overline{c} - \underline{c}) - (r_{jb} - r_b) \\ IC_j: &\quad g \geq \underline{c} - (\overline{l} - \underline{l}) - \left(\overline{p} - \underline{p}\right) - (r_{jb} - r_j) \end{aligned}$$

Let $\Delta c = (\overline{c} - \underline{c})$; $\Delta l = (\overline{l} - \underline{l})$; $\Delta p = \left(\overline{p} - \underline{p}\right)$. Then, the solution to the government minimization problem

$$g = \max\left\{0, \underline{c} + \underline{p} + \underline{l} - (r_{jb} - r_0), \underline{p} + \underline{l} - \Delta c - (r_{jb} - r_b), \underline{c} - \Delta l - \Delta p - (r_{jb} - r_j)\right\}$$

The above expression presents the cheapest way for the government to align the incentives of Brazilian families with the government's goal of stimulating the hybrid schooling system.

Ceteris paribus, the subsidy necessary to award the families that choose the hybrid educational system is lower:

i. The higher the difference in their children's (expected) future wages when they follow the hybrid system, compared to the alternatives.
ii. The higher the difference between the financial cost of the fulltime Brazilian school and the part-time Brazilian afterschool.
iii. The higher the difference between the loss of communication perspectives when the child enrolls at the Japanese school only and when he/she follows the hybrid system.
iv. The higher the difference between the psychological adjustment cost for attending a Japanese school when the child goes only to a Japanese school and when the child adopts the hybrid system.

In sum, the more efficient the Brazilian afterschool, the less expensive it is for the government to induce the adoption of the hybrid system. Higher demands for the afterschool will induce competition for students and higher efficiency; therefore, the cost of the proposed public policy shall reduce in time.

Furthermore, since this policy induces parents to enroll their children in a Japanese school and a Brazilian afterschool, the likelihood that those students will succeed is increased; therefore, in the medium run this policy will yield more productive citizens, who will contribute to increasing Japanese GDP, which in turn will increase government tax revenues. Therefore, in time, this policy will become financially self-sustained.

6.5 Conclusions

The legal framework to promote education of the Japanese language to adults is being developed, but there is still a long way to go for a system that will help school children. The new LPJLE is welcome. It covers a broad area, but we conclude from our field study that, at this time, the law is insufficient to focus on the challenges (drop out, failure in entrance exams, truancy, etc.) of children in school.

From our theoretical study as well as interviews, the best style seems to be the provision of a complementary Brazilian afterschool. Co-production between local governments and local NPOs would be an effective form of strengthening the system to promote an afterschool to consolidate the Japanese language learning of about 10,000 Brazilian children in schools.

As the integration of foreign families into Japanese society is highly desirable in all points of view, including the population deficit in Japan, we find it advisable that the Japanese government takes active policy initiatives to induce Brazilian families to enroll their children in the Japanese public education system as well as in a Brazilian afterschool, which we have called the hybrid educational system. We find that a subsidy to the families that choose to enroll their children in the hybrid system may be the cheapest way for the government to attain the integration goal. A mechanism design calculation shows how to set the minimum subsidy, which will decrease as the afterschool becomes more efficient. We should note that a Basic Law to Promote the Society of Multicultural Co-living is needed to boost support both from local administration and the civil society to the local community faced with the challenge of achieving harmony among all residents. [Part of this work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 18K11810.]

Notes

1. Nikkei refers to the Japanese immigrants and their descendants who live in the countries outside of Japan. The total number of Nikkei people living and working in Brazil today is estimated to be around 1.6 million according to an introductory report available at the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/wakaru/topics/vol115/index.html [last access: February 6, 2022]).
2. The phrase "foreign residents" is employed at many places in this article although our main focus is on the Nikkei Brazilian residents. The issues related to the Brazilian residents are often

inseparable from the issues related to foreign residents in general in Japan; many supporting organizations we interviewed target and support not only Brazilians but also other nationalies living in Japan. To clearly identify some of the distinctive issues related exclusively to the Nikkei Brazilians is to be reserved for our next research in the near future.

3. "Support programs" here mean a variety of activities incluging suppelemantary classes offered by school teachers and collaborative educational activities undertaken jointly by school teachers and local NPOs.
4. See the discussion in Tobace (2009). The official announcement (in the Japanese language) about this return travel subsidy from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare is available at the follwoing website: https://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2009/03/h0331-10.html (last access: February 6, 2022).
5. Hamamatsu is one of the most important cities as a research target of this theme for several reasons. First, there are many Nikkei Brazilian residents living there with a high demand for assistance on multicultural co-living. Second, the city is one of the leading local governments to tackle the challenge of social integration of foreign residents in Japan as a principal member of the CCCFR. Third, the serious situation of Brazilian children in the region is familiar because of the popular documentary film *Lonely Sparrows* or *Kodokuna Tsubametachi* (first shown in 2011 across Japan). Thanks to this publicity, the city is a symbol for the issue of children who dropped out of formal primary and secondary education. Our interviews around this time suggested that the difficult situation faced by the children described in the film can still be observed in Hamamatsu City today.
6. We are not certain if this estimation of 50 percent can be applied to other cities and prefectuers in Japan, but there are other information sources more or less compatible with this figure. A news article published online on January 29 of 2019 at the website of *Asahi Shimbun Digital* entitled "Gaikokujin Kyouiku 'Teijisei Danomi'" (Education to foreign students depends on nighttime schools) written by Yusuke Saito and Nao Hidaka reports that a nigthtime course of Gamagori High School in Aichi Prefecture had 41 foriegn students out of the total 97 students as of Janaury 2019 (URL = https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASM1X6D87M1XOIPE01Q.html [last access: February 6, 2022]).
7. FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) regarding entrance examinations to high schools are available at the following website of MEXT: https://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/kaikaku/sikaku/1311012.htm (last access: March 4th, 2022).
8. The list of these forty one high schools is available at the following webiste of MEXT: https://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/koutou/shikaku/07111314/003.htm (last access: March 4th, 2022).
9. The central government of Japan does offer a variety of earmarked subsidies as well as non-earmaked ones (revenue sharing type) to both prefectural and basic level governments, but as far as the policy area of multi-cultural co-living is concerned, the central govenment has been inactive in assisting local govenments for the last thirty years. One reason for this lack of action on the part of the central goverment might be that there was no national law related to the promotion of multi-cultural co-living.
10. One exception of a private firm's shouldering the cost of multi-cultural co-living is a case of Mitsui & Co. Ltd, known as Mitsui Bussan in Japanese, one of the largest trading houses in Japan. Mitsui Bussan commits itself to the social contribution activity of helping the Brazilian children. The company created a scholarship program for the Brazilian children in Japan in 2009. It has supported 4,266 students by 2021 (see their website at https://www.mitsui.com/jp/ja/sustainability/contribution/community/index.html [last access: February 6, 2022]).
11. In the context of the study of Japan's local administration, GODC and big and important cities are almost synonymous. Technically speaking, a GODC is a city with more than 500,000 residents designated by the central government and given additional administrative authorities as stipulated in Item 19, Article 252 of Local Autonomy Law. There are 13 such special functions and powers which otherwise belong to the upper prefectural government.
12. URL of Sanarudai School is this: https://weblog.city.hamamatsu-szo.ed.jp/sanarudai-e/.
13. URL of the website is here: http://www.hi-hice.jp/u-toc/en/center.html.

14. Suorce: Hamamatsu City's offical website at: https://www.city.hamamatsu.shizuoka.jp/zaisek/budget/budget31/detail/d_157.html (last access: February 6, 2022).
15. Source: Kanagawa Prefecture's official website at: https://www.pref.kanagawa.jp/docs/k2w/prs/r3998085.html (last access: February 6, 2022).
16. Source: Yokohama City's official website at: https://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/city-info/yokohamashi/tokei-chosa/portal/jinko/gaikokujin/r3gaikokujin.html (last access: February 6, 2022).
17. The Chairperson of the board of ABC Japan is Ms. Michie Afuso, who received Ordem do Rio Branco from the Brazilian Government in 2018 for her long-time contribution to help the Nikkei Brazilians in Japan and Gaimu Daijin Sho (Foreign Minister's Commendations) of the Japanese Government in 2019 for her long-time contribution to promote the mutual understanding of the two nations and to realize the society of multicultural co-living.
18. The session starts from 14:30 to 15:00 for Grades 1 to 4 and 15:00 to 15:30 for Grades 5 and 6. About three to seven volunteers participate while two schoolteachers come as responsible persons from the school. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, *Tsuruminho* was suspended for most of the period between 2020 and 2021.
19. This means that Brazilian students enrolled in Brazilian junior high schools face two different problems for entering a Japanese high school: they are limited academic performance (including language barrier) and the institutional barrier discussed in this paragraph.
20. Mr. T. Saito received the Ordem do Rio Branco in 2020 for his contribution to the development of Brazil–Japan relationship in the field of basic education to the Brazilian community in Japan. He also received Gaimu Daijin Sho (Foreign Minister's Commendations) of the Japanese Government in 2018 for his long-time contribution to promote the mutual understanding of the two nations.
21. For the full text of this bill, go to the official website of the Lower House at the following link: https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/honbun/houan/g19805028.htm (last access: December 2, 2021). This bill is a positive and important step forward, but Article 18, which stipulates the central government's duty to promote the education of the Japanese language to school children, still looks incomplete in our view in the sense that it only refers to the children from the age of 6 to the age 15 and does not cover high school education after the age of 16 where the drop-out rate seems to be high according to our research this time.
22. See, for example, Balago (2019), Connexion. Tokyo Team (2015a and 2015b), Cornelius (1995), Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão. (2010), Fuji (2021), Hatano (2010), Hashimoto (2020), Inaba and Higuchi (2010), Ishi (2010), Kanasiro (2011), Learn-S Co. Ltd. (2015), Nakaema (2014), Ohphata (2016), Sakamoto (2014), Sasaki (2006), Yamazaki (2015), Yamazaki and Uchida (2007), among many other references.
23. There may always be some psychological adjustment cost entering school; however, that cost is negligible in Brazilian schools in comparison to Japanese schools and, for simplicity, is normalized to zero in the models.
24. The complete presentation is available upon request.
25. The word *kokumin* can be translated either as "citizens", i.e., all people living in the country, in a wider view, or as "nationals", in a narrower view, which excludes foreigners and is the present interpretation of the Japanese government. The official English version of the Constitution of Japan uses "the Japanese people" for *nihon (=Japanese) kokumin* and "the people" for *kokumin*, leaving room for these two different interpretations. Article 10 of Chapter III (Rights and Duties of the People) stipulates: "The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law".
26. The possible choice of the bilingual school, as discussed in the literature, is reserved for the financial elite and, therefore, is not the concern of the Japanese government.

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List of Online Interviews Conducted by the Authors

July 23 (Thursday), 2020. from 10:00. Ms. Michie Afuso, ABC Japan.
July 23 (Thursday), 2020. from 11:00. Ms. Erica Endo, Assistant manager of a Brazilian bank in Tokyo.
August 4 (Tuesday), 2020, from 0:00. Mr. Norberto Shinji Mogi, Entrepreneur (Construction sector).

August 9 (Tuesday), 2020. from 10:00. Ms. Guida Suzuki, ABT (NPO in the city of Toyohashi City, Aichi Prefecture).

April 15 (Thursday), 2021, from 13:30. Mr. Toshio Saito (visit to his farm in Saitama Prefecture).

May 21 (Friday), 2021, from 9:30. Mr. Hiroki Furuhashi, Department of International Affairs, Hamamatsu City Government.

May 21 (Friday), 2021, from 20:00. Prof. Aparecida Mitsue Mitsuyasu, Hamamatsu Gakuin University.

May 28 (Friday), 2021, from 9:30. Ms. Kanako Furuhashi, SIR, Hamamtsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture.

June 4 (Friday), 2021, from 9:30. Ms. Marie Matsuoka, HICE, Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture.

June 8 (Tuesday), 2021, from 10:00. Ms. Kanako Furuhashi, SIR, Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture.

June 14 (Monday), 2021, from 10:00. Consulado-Geral do Brasil in Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture.

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Chapter 7
Dissemination of Japanese Quality Control in Brazil

Nobuaki Hamaguchi and Silvio Y. M. Miyazaki

7.1 Introduction

The history of economic exchange between Japan and Brazil started with the Japanese migration in 1908.[1] Full-fledged business relationships developed a half-century later during and after the high growth of the "Brazilian Miracle" from 1968 to 1973 under the state-led economic development model. The two countries strengthened economic cooperation and worked together to implement natural resource seeking national-projects[2] which also motivated the boom of Japanese companies' investment into Brazil.

However, in the 1980s, the Brazilian external debt crisis dealt a critical blow to the Brazil–Japan economic relationship. Japanese financial institutions suffered significant losses and a number of firms decided to withdraw investment from the Brazilian market which then entered a long slump. Since then, Japanese investment in Brazil has been stagnated or even in decline.

Japan amended the Immigration Act in 1990 in response to a labor shortage, granting special visa status with a working permit to the Brazilians of Japanese descent up to the third generation. This change triggered a massive migration of Brazilian workers to the Japanese labor market. However, the global financial crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 caused massive layoffs. This was followed by a significant reverse migration.

The above paragraphs give an overview of 100 years of Japan–Brazil economic exchanges. A significant amount of literature exists on the topic. Examining Japanese immigration in Brazil, Saito (1960) pioneered empirical research based on his field

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survey in the 1950s on residential location choice and productive activities. Recently, Maruyama edited a commemorative publication (Maruyama 2010) of the 100th anniversary of immigration, which collects valuable studies by history and sociology experts on the nikkei community. Regarding economic cooperation, Japanese corporate investment, and external debt issues, Masao Kosaka, Yoichi Koike, and Toshiro Kobayashi respectively contributed detailed documents (Nihon-Brazil Kouryushi Henshu Iinkai 1995). Watanabe (1995) and Kajita et al. (2005) discussed the Brazilian migrant workers in Japan. This paper will examine Japan–Brazil economic exchange regarding the transfer of Japanese quality control methods to Brazil, a topic which has been very rarely discussed in previous studies.

"Cheap and poor in quality": Japanese products were previously described this way in industrialized countries.[3] To earn a good reputation, Japanese companies in the post-World War II period established unique quality control methods to eliminate the variation in quality. Their progress in this area enabled them to expand export market shares through mass production with stable product quality. Because of this, Japanese quality control methods attracted international attention as one of the pillars of support for the Japanese economy's rapid growth in the post-war period. The US television network NBC aired an episode of the show *NBC White Paper* which was titled "If Japan Can…Why Can't We?" and aired on June 24, 1980.[4] It attributed Japanese firms' secret of success to the faithful implementation of the statistical quality control proposed by an American statistician Dr. W. E. Deming. In 1989, MIT's research report on American Industrial Competitiveness (Dertouzos et al. 1989) also examined the continuous improvement in Japan. The British *Journal of Management Studies* published a special issue in November 1995 (Vol. 32, Issue 6) on the transfer of Japanese management to alien institutional environments.

Japanese quality control is indeed based on ideas generated outside of Japan. These ideas include American scientific research ideas such as statistical quality control by Walter Andrew Shewhart, statistical process control methods by William Edwards Deming, total quality control discussed by Armand V. Feigenbaum, and quality control management as a management technique proposed by Joseph M. Juran. However, it was a group of Japanese scientists and engineers who gathered in the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) led by Dr. Kaoru Ishikawa (professor of engineering at the University of Tokyo) and crystalized the idea of Japanese quality control. They synthesized the new ideas[5] and organized them as a practical system of Total Quality Control (TQC) consisting of Quality Control Circle (QCC) activity, PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Action) Cycle, Quality Control 7 Tools, and Kaizen (continuous improvement).

These terms became buzz words in international business magazines in the 1980s and 1990s and learning from Japan had become a fashion. While companies in industrialized countries were eager to know what was threatening their competitiveness, businesspersons in developing countries showed keen interest in the Japanese model of rapid catch-up. The quality control method therefore became a prime reason for boosting Japan's presence as a soft power nation.

Brazil was one of the most relevant countries in this regard. Industrialization progressed remarkably during the late 1970s to early 1980s. The first wave of

Japanese management boom in Brazil gave it the necessary momentum to catch up to industrialized countries. Many experts from Japan were invited to give seminars to corporate managers. Quite a few companies in Brazil adopted QCC and TQC. Despite the significance of the exchanging knowledge about corporate management between Japan and Brazil, this topic has been almost ignored in previous studies on the history of the Japan–Brazil bilateral economic relationship. In this article, we document important events based on existing materials. This study will contribute to a better understanding that business values in both countries', i.e., globalization of Japanese business and upgrading Brazilian product quality, did not interface well with each other, ending this phenomenon in a short boom.

In what follows, we will track the transfer of TQC to Brazil and draw lessons from those experiences. Section 7.2 covers stories from the early stages until the 1980s. Section 7.3 deals with the more recent period, beginning in the 1990s. We will see that episodes presented in the two sections have significantly different backgrounds. In the early stage, Brazilian industrial development was under a state-led developmental model in a closed domestic market. In recent years, significant market liberalization has been made, promoting global competition in cost and quality. The period covered in Sect. 7.3 has also seen considerable progress in automation and informatization of the production process, which affected the relevance of TQC. Section 7.4 reports two contemporary and relevant examples of TQC in non-industrial sectors in Brazil. Although TQC was initially born in the industrial sector, this technique is generally a helpful human power development tool for non-industrial sectors. We will portray the case of public sector administration and health care service. Section 7.5 will conclude the discussion.

7.2 Japanese TQC Transfer to Brazil Until the 1980s

According to previous studies in Brazil,[6] QCC was first introduced in Brazil in 1971 by Volkswagen's San Bernardo do Campo plant (State of São Paulo). According to the JUSE mission report to Latin America for quality control research in 1976 headed by Kaoru Ishikawa (Ishikawa and Hiromatsu 1977), the introduction of QCC was a local initiative and not a transfer from Germany. Instead, Volkswagen diffused the know-how on QCC from Brazil back to Germany. According to the same report, Usiminas Steel (the Japan–Brazil joint venture whose Japanese shareholders were Yahata Steel and Fuji Steel—merged as Nippon Steel in 1970 and NKK—now JFE Steel) initiated QCC in 1970. Usiminas had already implemented a joint activity of QCC with Volkswagen and Ishibras (Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industry (IHI)'s shipyard in Rio de Janeiro). Therefore, it might be true that Volkswagen learned Japanese style QCC from Usiminas or Ishibras. After the 1973 visit to Brazil, Kusaba (1974) reported that he witnessed Volkswagen already actively engaged in Japanese-style quality control, and Johnson & Johnson also started QCC in September 1972.

Following these pioneering companies, QCC in Brazil saw the first boom from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. Yuki (1988) reports that there were about 3000 companies implementing QCC in 1979. Ferro and Grande (1997) explained the background of the QCC boom: (1) it was worth imitating Japan's successful experience; (2) QCC seemed costless without investment and organizational change; and (3) there was a positive image of introducing the participatory decision making of QCC in the workplace in the period of political transition from the military authoritarianism to democracy. In other words, QCC was conceived as a managerial method that could bring a good image to the company ((1) and (3)) and enabled productivity gains without further costs (2).

It must be emphasized that the Japanese-style QCC required that workers' participation adapted to the Brazilian labor environment where management exerted strong power over workers. Humphrey (1993) argued that having managers consider workers' proposals through QCC was useful in understanding workers' demand before colliding with the labor union, thus lowering the turnover rate and helping them retain the skilled labor force.[7] Kubo and Farina (2013) mentioned that the attitude of Brazilian managers toward QCC was authoritarian.[8] They found that managers did not fully respect workers' independence to make suggestions for improvement and did not encourage them to participate spontaneously. According to Fleury (1995), Brazilian companies' managers failed to understand that without harnessing corporate strategy changes, the productivity improvements that occurred because of QCC activities' achievements quickly faded.

Because a firm is an organic organization consisting of interrelated sections, changes in one part may require adjustments in other parts. Thus, total company-wide initiative is necessary to adapt workers' suggestions for improvement arising from each section, sometimes requiring corporate structure reforms. In Japanese-style quality control, QCC is not a means to the end; it is a part of total quality control (TQC) to detect problems and maintain the company-wide continuous improvement through the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Action) cycle.

QCC essentially depends on workers' voluntary participation. Each shop floor-level QCC has the role of detecting waste and dysfunctions and proposing improvements. However, if the employees were not informed of the company-wide goal and the way in which these improvements could contribute to their company's growth, they may feel suspicious and believe that the management would exploit frontline workers' knowledge to reduce the labor force. Without employees' trust, the QCC imposed from above would not work well. Workers demand recognition from managers and they need to be motivated by seeing their suggestions influence company strategy and contribute to the company's growth.

The volunteerism is also cultivated by enhanced pleasure at work. According to Kusaba (1984), foreigners tend to appreciate Japanese quality control only on its scientific aspects of using statistical methods, but they overlook the human elements of QCC, considering that the group working on QCC only has the emotional value of a sense of unity. In this regard, Kusaba (1984) emphasizes that workers feel progress in their personal capability from learning the logical thinking and the pleasure of working in a good social relationship obtained from cooperating in solving problems at work. He remarked on the necessity of disseminating an accurate idea of TQC as the "company-wide" movement and its advantage from the combination of scientific and human sides.

Observing the situation in the early stage of the quality management in Brazil, Ishikawa and Hiromatsu (1977) noted that "Brazilian companies consider that QCC is sufficient for quality management," implying the lack of total company-wide initiatives. They further observed that "companies consider quality to be controlled by an inspection at the end of the production line." This attitude differs from the objective of Japanese-style quality control which uses stringent control to eliminate defects and unevenness that exists in the production process. They concluded "Brazilian companies still need to figure out what is quality control." Nishimura (1984) pointed out that Brazilian managers initially had incorrect ideas that QCC would result in quick outcomes in corporate profit. Ferro and Grande (1997) described how Brazilian companies understood that the work floor level quality controls were disconnected from company management.

These views reflect difficulties in transplanting the Japanese-style quality control to the Brazilian environment. Previous studies pointed out that the hostile manager-worker relationship adversely affected the introduction of company-wide quality control, making the QCC boom in the early 1980s short-lived. The participatory decision making reached a deadlock that faced attacks from both trade union's obstructions and dissatisfactions the middle-managers who feared infringement on their authority to make decisions. As Brazil faced a severe macroeconomic crisis in the second half of the 1980s, the labor market condition deteriorated with a massive job cut. The labor relations became even more confrontational, compelling QCC to decline (Humphrey 1993).

It is known that workers at that time had a negative view of QCC participation. From the study on labor relations in the São Paulo State ABC Region (consisting of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, and São Caetano, adjacent to São Paulo City), Carvalho (1987) found that, combined with the electronically controlled automation system promoted in that period, QCC was seen as a labor-saving productivity enhancement tool, meaning an enemy for workers. The pioneering QCC in Volkswagen failed in early 1980. When the company tried to reinvent QCC in 1982, workers harshly boycotted it (Hirata 1983).

Some authors attributed the TQC success in Japan to the Japanese socio-cultural uniqueness. For example, Hirata (1983) found that the development of QCC in Japan is due to specific social conditions, such as the family perception that allows for a work-centered life, the sense of belonging to the company that is formed under the lifetime employment and seniority system, the small wage gap among employees which promotes cooperation, a principle for consensus decision making, and strong collectivism that is intolerant to deviation. She found it difficult to disseminate QCC in Brazil because the social conditions vary.

Japanese parties involved in TQC also expressed skepticism about the transferability of Japanese TQC to foreign companies (Ishikawa Kaoru Sensei Tsuisouroku Henshuu Iinkai 1993). JUSE launched an international diffusion of Japanese-style

TQC in the 1960s. The international activities initially had a publicity purpose for export promotion to show that the high quality of Japanese products is sustained by QCC without giving practical details. In the pioneering comprehensive textbook of Japanese TQC in English,[9] one of JUSE's leading scientists Kaoru Ishikawa considered that Japanese society's peculiarities worked as a pre-condition for the success of Japanese quality control and did not hide a believe that it would be difficult to perform Japanese quality management in different cultures in foreign countries (Ishikawa 1985, pp. 23–36).

Afterwards, as Japanese companies increased overseas production, the purpose of JUSE's international activities shifted to support for overseas production of Japanese companies to increase competitiveness. The chief recipients of dissemination were still limited to Japanese affiliates. One way of thinking at that time was that "a foreigner can see the benefit of Japanese-style TQC only after he experienced by himself receiving a hands-on training of Japanese instructors" (Kusaba 1984).

Japanese businesspeople and researchers often emphasize the role of TQC in Japan's remarkable recovery from the devastating destruction of World War II. However, the thought that "only Japanese can understand" and abandoning further logical explanation hampered international diffusion and understanding of the Japanese-style TQC concept remained obscure overseas. These shortcomings caused dubious perceptions or even misinterpretations. One illustration was the "Japan-bashing" in the late 1980s from the Western world, putting forward the idea that Japanese products' high competitiveness was inexplicable unless Japanese companies conducted unfair competition based on different rules. Harada (1984) argued that the spirit of the service to mankind alone does not go very far and the Japanese government must support disseminating and popularizing the precise know-how of TQC in foreign countries. Understandably, a private institution like JUSE alone could not afford to develop such activities. The government should have taken these recommendations more seriously and taken steps to make Japanese-style TQC known on an international level. For example, the knowledge transfer could have been facilitated by translating practical manuals to foreign languages and the development of teaching materials adapted to the specific context of other cultures.

Japanese companies in Brazil, like in other Japanese overseas affiliates, tended to stop using TQC because they realized that the participatory, bottom-up, and company-wide approach was not possible in their environment. The local affiliates lacked the knowledge to adapt the Japanese-style TQC to local conditions. Because of this, Japanese affiliates in Brazil could not become leaders in diffusing TQC accurately to surrounding companies. To our knowledge, Rohm Indústria Eletrônica Ltda (Rohm I. E. L. at Mogi das Cruzes, State of São Paulo) was an exception. The Brazilian affiliate of Rohm introduced QCC in 1974. It promoted awareness of QCC by establishing the Association of Quality Control in the Paraiba Valley (AVCQ[10] in the Portuguese acronym) with companies in the region such as Johnson & Jonson (Hiraki 1975). Further details of the case of Rohm I. E. L. are provided in Column 7.1.

Column 7.1 QCC in Rohm Indústria Eletrônica Ltda (Rohm I. E. L.) Rohm I. E. L. was a subsidiary of Rohm Co., Ltd., headquartered in Kyoto, established in November 1972 in Mogi das Cruzes, São Paulo State. The plant produced electronic components such as resistors mainly for export to the US market. Production started on August 9, 1973 and continued until June 1997.

Before starting production, the company sent 12 senior production managers to the Rohm headquarters as technical trainees from January to May to learn both production technology and QCC. After returning to Brazil, these trainees became instructors and educated middle managers about QCC to make trained leaders. Production trainers were not Japanese employees.

QCC activities in the company started in July 1973 with eight circle groups, then expanded quickly. In October, the company held the first QCC workshop with 15 groups. The company had the workshop in July 1974, with 31 groups inviting Johnson & Johnson and other neighborhood companies. It became a founding member of the Association of Quality Control in Paraiba Valley (AVCQ).

The human element is critical in improving productivity and reducing defect rates immediately after plant start-up. On-the-job training, including QCC, was very active and showed significant results. However, the number of workers rapidly increased as exports expanded, and QCC became less useful for productivity improvement because the newly added workers did not share the knowledge. Hit by the export disruption during the recession after the first oil shock in 1973, the company had to reduce employment substantially through layoffs. QCC in Rohm I. E. L. stopped for almost one year after May 1975.

As the economies of developed countries recovered, production resumed quickly. However, the sudden increase in employment while employees' awareness of quality remained low partly due to the stagnation of QCC activities caused the defect rate to increase. In May, the company increased automation by investing in state-of-the-art equipment to minimize human errors. At the same time, it resumed QCC activities introducing the remuneration system for excellent suggestions from workers. The combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches led to a dramatic increase in productivity and decreased defective rate. In 1983, the company established the TQC headquarters with the president at the top of the structure to coordinate the company-wide quality control activities.

According to Fujiyoshi Hirata, the original Japanese-style bottom-up approach in quality control based on continuous QCC does not apply to Brazil because the education level, racial and cultural diversity, and labor relations are different from Japan. However, only the top-down labor management would not be able to unleash employees' human potential. Referring to the concept of the five levels of Maslow's "hierarchy of needs," Hirata points out that managers should not ignore the human aspect of work in which people desire to realize their needs. In a society where people are diverse and developing like Brazil, what employees want to accomplish will change according to the company's growth stages and the society's developmental phase. Therefore, management can achieve the best performance in quality by presenting the optimal combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches adapting to the changing circumstances. Through the experience in Rohm I. E. L., Hirata emphasizes the importance of interact with employees and choose the optimal combination at each stage.

This column is based on the online interview with Mr. Fujiyoshi Hirata on May 7, 2020.

Although the first wave of Japanese-style TQC in Brazil ended after the temporary boom, QCC put down roots in Brazilian companies to some degree. Ferro and Grande (1997) identified some interesting adaptations for localization. First, the QCC came to be known by a wide variety of different names such as "quality circle," "creative circle for improvement," or "dynamic quality circle" because people felt top-down administrative nuance from the term "control." Second, factory floor level circles became organized under the company-wide committee or coordinator, thus positioning them in formal company organization. This aspect implies that the company-wide total quality control concept gained recognition and higher-class managers have become more involved. Third, Ferro and Grande found that QCC in Brazil is composed by employees from different sections and mixed job ranks, including supervisory positions, significantly transformed from the original Japanese style QCC composed by workers in the same team and from the same job classification. Fourth, it became more likely that managers give directions to QCC's theme choice, rather than leaving it free to circles. Activities of QCC have more links to companies' actions in quality improvement. Fifth, many companies introduced a monetary reward system reflecting the results of QCC to provide incentives for participation.

Considering the situation in this way, when voluntary participation of shop floor workers and company-wide total involvement are the two pillars of successful implementation of QCC, the adaptation to Brazil required more emphasis on the latter, at the sacrifice of the former to some degree. In the original Japanese model, workers volunteerism and the company wide total involvement went hand-in-hand. Because the post-war period's Japanese labor relation was based on the life-time employment system, workers could consider a long-term optimization, under which continued company growth would increase employees' income and expand future promotion opportunities. In Brazilian labor relations, where managers and workers belong to different classes, workers may be excluded from the profits raised by higher labor productivity. Under a semi-contractual agreement, where managers suggest quality circle themes and workers receive a monetary reward for good suggestions, quality circles may work better than expecting workers to volunteer participation. As Hosono (2009) pointed out, the adaptation of the Japanese-made approach to the local context is essential. We can conclude that the transformation of QCC that is shown by Ferro and Grande (1997) incorporated the Brazilian way of promoting engagement of both workers and managers.

7.3 Japanese-Style TQC in Brazil Since the 1990s

The economic liberalization during the late 1980s and the early 1990s brought about a shift in the competition paradigm in Brazilian industry and its perception on quality as a core strategy (Miyake 1996). The government took an initiative to support this transition, turning the focus of industrial policies from import substitution industrialization for the protected market to the enhancement of competitiveness with higher quality, innovation, and productivity.

Under such circumstances, attention to quality management gained momentum. The Science and Technology Development Support Program (Programa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, PADCT) began in 1984, and the Bureau of Industrial Technology launched the Quality Control Specialist Development Project (Projeto de Especialização em Gestão da Qualidade, PEGQ) in 1988. The establishment of the Brazilian quality assurance system based on the international standardization ISO 9000 in 1990 was part of the project. In September 1990, the Consumer Protection Act (Código de Defesa do Consumidor) was enacted to regulate manufacturers' product liability.

Also in 1990, the government launched a new industrial policy called the National Plan for Quality and Productivity (Programa Brasileiro da Qualidade e Produtividade, PBQP). As part of PBQP, the National Quality Award (Prêmio Nacional da Qualidade) was established in 1992 and was modeled after the United States Malcolm Baldridge Award.[11] In accord with PBQP, private institutions such as CNI (National Industrial Federation), government-sponsored "S-system," including SENAI (industrial technology), SESC (commercial), SEBRAE (small enterprise support), and the local industrial and commercial chambers offered training courses on statistical techniques and quality management. Companies were able to utilize these services along with the training in-house (Fernandes 2011).

The quality movement provoked the second wave of Japanese-style TQC boom in Brazil. PEGQ designated Minas Gerais Federal University (UFMG) and the University of São Paulo (USP) as the core institutions for the capacity development of quality control specialist training with support from JUSE. The Christiano Ottoni Foundation (FCO) of the Faculty of Engineering of UFMG signed an agreement with JUSE. It started with two professors of the FCO, José Martins de Godoy and Vicente Falconi Campos commissioned by the government to study projects that had increased product quality and productivity of companies since the mid-1980s. They received the advice of W.E. Deming and attended JUSE seminars. Under the agreement, the FCO sent 33 technical groups including 1100 businesspeople to Japan to attend workshops (Godoy 2015). JUSE also sent lecturers to workshops in major cities in Brazil. Because of this, progressively more FCO specialists were trained by

JUSE and could provide consulting services on 5S and QCC to Brazilian companies. FCO collaborated with JUSE to publish textbooks on TQC in Portuguese.

The Carlos Vanzolini Foundation (FCAV)[12] of the Engineering School (Poli) at USP established the education program on quality control in 1995 with the assistance of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). JUSE also supported this program by providing technical seminars to FCAV's instructors in Japan and dispatching an on-site supervisor to USP.

As part of the PBQP, the Brazilian government requested technical cooperation from Japan to establish the Brazilian Institute of Quality and Productivity (Instituto Brasileiro de Qualidade e Produtividade, IBQP-PR), located in Curitiba in Paraná State. The Japan International Cooperation Agency aided the project from 1995 to 2000 with the technical support of the Japan Productivity Center (JPC). During this period, 12 long-term experts and 19 short-term experts were dispatched from Japan. On the Brazilian side, 17 trainees were invited to Japan for capacity development. During the project period, 82 seminars and 26 training courses on quality and productivity were organized with the participation of IBQP-PR. Factory floor level consultation activities were carried out by Japanese and Brazilian experts for more than 20 enterprises (Hosono 2009). Following the establishment of IBQP-PR and the staff capacitation, JICA extended the South–South and triangular cooperation modality fund in 2001–2005 to support IBQP-PR's implementation of the training program for professionals from other Latin American countries and Portuguese-speaking African countries to receive training on quality control from Brazilian instructors. While IBQP-PR is a private non-profit organization, the government granted IBQP a civil organization status for the public interest in 2002, which enabled it to sign partnership agreements with public institutions and develop jointly specific projects.

IBQP-PR proposed the concept of "systemic productivity (produtividade sistêmica)." Hosono (2009, p. 31) explains that systemic productivity defines productivity as a social function because the constant improvement of productivity in each organization must help to create the conditions of sustainable development and better quality of life. In order to assist with decision making in continuous improvement at each organization level under a highly complex Brazilian situation of interwoven intra- and inter-organizational factors affecting productivity, IBQP-PR adopted the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), a quantitative method designed by the Institute for Manufacturing of University of Cambridge (King et al. 2014).

Compared to the private sector centered transfer of Japanese-style TQC until 1980s, the second wave included relevant engagement of public institutions in both Japanese diffusers and Brazilian receptors. Although the systemic support stimulated exchanges, these initiatives had already missed an opportunity to upscale the cooperation in quality control because of a change in the perception of quality assurance.

During the globalization in the 1990s, the quality assurance based on the ISO 9000s accreditation system arose as a new concept of quality management in Europe and quickly gained popularity worldwide. TQC and ISO 9000s have different foci. While TQC aims at improving continuously every facet of an organization through management commitment and employee training and education so that customer requirements are met precisely, ISO 9000s accreditation assures that company's practices are in conformance with its stated quality systems. The implementation of TQC represents the company's policy of considering customer needs and satisfaction as a part of its strategy to gain competitive advantage. The ISO 9000s accreditation signifies the company's consistency in compliance with their stated production method to provide products or services in the quality they have committed to (Zhu 1999). While ISO 9000s accreditation is warranted by an internationally acknowledged certificate, it is hard to prove the successfulness of TQC outside of country specific TQC awards. Because of this, TQC and ISO 9000s are not mutually exclusive (Zhu 1999), but companies competing in the international market pay more attention to TQC as a system of quality assurance.

A recent study by Siltori et al. (2020) found that Brazilian companies expected that ISO 9000s accreditation could increase sales by assuring high quality, consumer satisfaction, and cost justification. However, they recognized that it would not enhance employees' awareness of quality and would not motivate quality improvement. ISO only gives external validation of its established product quality, but it does not show its ability to improve quality. Bernardino et al. (2016) observe that Brazilian companies often refer to the conceptual legacy of TQC to motivate quality improvements, such as a statistical control of the production process and PDCA. Nevertheless, they have already abandoned essential TQC methods, such as QCC seven tools of Ishikawa (1985).

Obtaining the ISO 9000s certificate requires companies to document in great detail the entire quality assurance system process. They also need to provide evidence that workers strictly follow the manuals and reassure customers that information can always be accessed. Once adopted, this system does not allow a company to change the production process and the line layout that had been agreed with customers, leaving no room for the TQC-style continuous improvement with suggestions from workers. These processes need strong leadership from the high-level management. According to Kubo and Farina (2013), the Brazilian production site is deeply rooted in the top-down style Taylorism[13] where elements required for a successful TQC, such as authority delegated to operators, volunteerism, and teamwork are weak. Brazilian companies' culture is therefore more compatible to quality management guided by ISO 9000s.

In addition to the popularity of alternative quality management, Japanese-style TQC was overshadowed by the recent technological developments, where automation technology has substantially reduced human factors in making a product. In the terms of the business community, the "5Ms" represent the man (labor), the materials, the methods (of production), the machinery, and the measurement (and inspection) and are considered the core of quality management. TQC propels continuous improvement in labor and production methods. Brazilian companies often emphasize the acquisition of the latest machinery and materials, incorporating cutting-edge technology that results from overseas research and development to realize leap-frog progress in quality and productivity. This strategy prevails over continuous improvement and accumulation of internal knowledge embodied in labor and methods. In particular, with the introduction of modern equipment incorporating advanced automation and electronic control, high quality is to be preset by the product design and stringently standardized by reducing the interference of human factors, which are prone to errors, to a minimum.

In fact, the QCC activities were already in decline in Japan as well in the 1990s.[14] Dahlgaard-Park (2011) argues that Japanese companies compete more by cost than quality in the long-term recession after the bubble economy burst, causing a decline in quality control. As in Brazil, Japanese manufacturing builds in quality during the product design process, and the workers' contribution to quality improvement has become less relevant. With the decay of the expectation of a life-time employment and increase in temporary and non-permanent (including foreign) workers, volunteerism to participate in QCC after business hours has reduced, and employees' resistance to being required to participate in unpaid QCC has increased. Such structural change diminished the significance of QCC as human resource development.

7.4 Contemporary Cases of TQC in Brazil

So far, we have discussed pathways for the diffusion of Japanese-style TQC in Brazil. We observed that TQC was originally modeled for continuous improvement at the production level of manufacturing industries, and also contributed to employees' empowerment. But many have considered the trend of globalization and automation have greatly diminished the relevance of QCC as a quality management tool in manufacturing.

Nonetheless, TQC still makes strong sense in labor intensive activities, such as services, even in the contemporary scene. In this section, we will demonstrate that Brazil is not an exception. We will shed light on two cases: public administration from the case of the São Paulo State government and health care service and from the case of Santa Cruz Japanese Hospital in Vila Mariana district of São Paulo City.

7.4.1 Public E-Procurement Through Bolsa Eletrônica de Compras (BEC), São Paulo State Government

The Brazilian public sector has initiatives to induce quality in its services. According to Brazil's former Ministry of Federal Administration (Brasil 1997, pp. 12, 14–15), one of the cornerstones to modernize the public sector is implementing a quality program to improve its efficiency and offer better services to citizens. The quality would be shown by performance indicators and third-party certification as a seal of approval. The Ministry of Federal Administration (Brasil 1997, pp. 29–55) provides a step-by-step process to implement quality programs in different public sector secretaries, departments, and agencies and recommends the PDCA cycle as a tool for continuous management improvement.

Concerning Bresser-Pereira (2002), in the late 1990s, the implementation of total quality management "in public administration gained legitimacy and became the official management strategy to implement the [public administrative] reform." In Brazil, national and sub-national public entities have used total quality management to change and improve the public sector.

Quality management continues to be a concern in the Brazilian public sector. Brazil's federal government (Brasil 2018) conducted a survey to the national public entities regarding their process of quality evaluation. Using a federal government-sponsored study, Pedrosa and Menezes (2019) proposed a model to evaluate the management quality in services provided by national public entities to the citizens.

Pereira (2012, pp. 108–109) analyses the relationship between ISO 9001 certification and management models: *hoshin kanri* relates to some of ISO 9001 requirements, while Total Quality Management relates to all ISO 9001 requirements, meaning the Quality Management System. These are examples of quality management models that have been introduced, transferred to Brazil from Japan, and have been used both by the private and public sector.

One case where a quality management system has been implemented in sub-national government is the Bolsa Eletrônica de Compras (BEC), or the public e-procurement system, at the São Paulo State's Secretary of Finance.[15] BEC is a procurement system where public entities buy goods and services and firms sell them by reverse auction (São Paulo, Secretaria da Fazenda e Planejamento, n.d.). Establishing the Quality Management System at BEC started in 2009 and got an ISO 9001 certificate in 2010 (Pereira 2012, pp. 73, 114; Pereira et al. 2010, p. 3).

As an example of the quality benchmarks in the public sector, we detail the BEC case. In the early 2000s, the São Paulo State's Secretary of Finance had a series of projects to modernize structures, processes, infrastructure, internet networks, and the use of information of technology. These projects had viability funded by the Interamerican Bank of Development (Brasil 2003, pp. 1, 45). A modern internet-based government procurement system was built with information technology, and the BEC was established in 2000.

Using BEC the State of São Paulo government had saved up to 20% from the reference price in the early years of operation (Brasil 2003, p. 45). Among the products or services that could be purchased through the internet, about 21% had already bought by BEC in 2003, and the remaining value was purchased through traditional methods (Izaac Filho 2004, p. 57).

The most recent data shows that BEC reverse auction has saved an average of 27% every year since 2000, if allocated budgeted value is compared with the negotiated amount and more than 5 million products and services have already been purchased.

In the beginning, BEC was deployed for just one of the government procurement modalities called *convite*. Negotiations expanded to medical drugs procurement in 2002, then extended to the São Paulo state cities, universities, and public enterprises in 2003. The State of São Paulo government issued a decree obliging the entire direct administration to buy using BEC in 2007 (Pereira 2012, p. 60). Hence, the negotiations through BEC had begun with a limited scope, then gradually expanded.

Finally, all the State of São Paulo public entities have negotiated using this system of reverse auction.

In the BEC, the auctioneers must be public servants who have received training provided by the São Paulo State Government School. Before and after the auction, other public servants prepare tasks that involve paperwork. When the auctions happen, the auctioneer interacts with the suppliers. The auctioneer is anonymous until the auction finishes.

During all processes, there are human interactions, like paperwork preparation, the auction, and writing reports. When people operate the process, continuous quality control would be pivotal to keeping the system trustworthy.

The process to establish the Quality Management System to the BEC started in 2009, when the São Paulo State Secretary of Government selected BEC as the benchmark of quality in the public sector. BEC top officials have decided to implement the ISO 9001, a process-based quality management system. A consulting firm has contracted to revise the processes by a fund from the Interamerican Bank of Development.

Concerning Pereira (2012), ISO 9001 certification to BEC would be a way to get trust from the firms. The certification would attract better suppliers with a fair price; hence, it would show the citizens the optimal use of public resources.

The consulting firm has recommended some changes to BEC to acquire the ISO 9001, which it has received since 2010 (Pereira 2012, p. 114; Pereira et al. 2010, p. 3). The last certification was acquired in 2019, and it expires in September 2022.

In 2011, the São Paulo State government had 85 public entities, among them 25 secretaries that compose the direct administration, 20 public enterprises, 24 public authorities, and 16 foundations. There was an ombudsman or a consumer service in all of them, except in one, and almost one-third of them had a Quality Management System in some department inside the entity. Among the secretaries, just 3 had Quality Management Systems in some departments (Pereira et al. 2010, pp. 65–72).

If the citizen has some complaint and calls the ombudsman, the service offered by the public entity could improve in quality, which would be a reactive action. However, if a department has a formal Quality Management System, this would be a proactive action from the public sector. BEC is an example of a case related to proactive action.

A team to follow and support the quality of the procurement process inside the BEC was first established and operated in 2009 when the Quality Management System began. The Department of Quality and Research was formally established in 2014, after Pereira (2012) analyzed the governance of similar departments at public enterprises and public authorities.

BEC's Quality Management System has 13 processes, eight which relate to BEC users, four for support, and one management process. They all have aims, indexes, and instructions on how to measure them (Pereira 2012, pp. 79, 80, 83, 86, 92), which gives them objective measures for quality management.

Besides the Department of Quality and Research, there is a Committee of Quality. Their members are BEC's process managers, teams' leaders, and top officials to support and provide feedback to the BEC's Management Quality System. This

Committee has a meeting every month, and the Committee has a meeting with top management every semester. This last meeting overlapped the period when an external audit occurs to recertify the ISO 9001. Improvement of BEC's process has emerged after completing the external audit and meeting with top management. The concept of maintaining quality has been part of strategic planning at BEC since 2010 and maintaining the ISO certification has motivated BEC officials and public servants to follow, review, and improve the processes.

There are around 1000 procuring units allowed to buy through BEC, and regular surveys on satisfaction have been sent to them to measure the service's quality. Also, internal feedback surveys have been completed with the officials and public servants related to BEC. Hence, these surveys are also a vital tool for quality maintenance.

7.4.2 Toyota Production System in Santa Cruz Hospital

Next, we turn to the case of quality control applications in healthcare organizations. Reliability of healthcare depends on the systemic capability of each organization to comply with its expected function under pre-determined conditions with reasonable cost-efficiency. The confidence in the healthcare system, in turn, rests on the reliability of each organization. To ensure trust, the government must provide institutional support with appropriate regulation, safety standardization protocols, and funding, etc.

Collins et al. (2015) point out that healthcare organizations face increasingly complex situations consisting of (1) changing healthcare demand due to the aging population; (2) more intense competition among hospitals; (3) challenges of improving patients' safety using advanced technology; (4) eroding profits with rising costs; (5) labor shortage; and (6) necessity of adopting higher quality and safety standards to achieve higher rewards. Quality control in healthcare service is essential for strengthening organizational capacity to consolidate the reliability of each healthcare organization under such conditions. It aims to create routines for procedures through continuous improvement to accomplish higher standards and safety with smaller dispersion in healthcare under highly diverse conditions.

Fillingham (2007) claims that in hospitals, staff usually work in departmental silos. The result is a process that is riddled with errors, duplication, and delay, which frustrates frontline staff and leaves them dispirited. Commonly, waste occurs in transport (movement of patients and equipment); inventory (unneeded stocks and supplies); motion (movement of staff and information); waiting (delays in diagnosis and treatment); over-production (unnecessary tests); over-burden (stressed, overworked staff); and defects (medication errors, infections). Removing as many frustrations as possible can make work a more fulfilling experience.

Beginning in the 2000s, Virginia Mason Medical Center in Seattle, WA, launched the implementation of the Toyota Production System (TPS) for the management of the hospital. Virginia Mason's leaders adopted the TPS method of manufacturing learned from a Japanese consulting company and established the "Virginia Mason

Production System," also known as the "Lean Hospital." The successful records in healthcare outcomes and financial improvements attracted attention, including from Japan.

Because of successful cases in North America, the lean model for healthcare is known of in Brazil but is rarely used in practice; it was pioneered by Hospital Japonês Santa Cruz (HJSC). HJSP was founded in 1939 in São Paulo city with the original mission of supporting the community of Japanese immigrants who had difficulty communicating with Brazilian healthcare organizations. The hospital was founded through donations, including one from the Imperial family of Japan. As of June 2020, it consists of 40 departments and three outpatient clinics, ambulatory, and two surgical centers. There are 170 inpatients beds. It acts as a referral institution in many areas, including ophthalmology, neurology, orthopedic, and cardiology (Hospital Japonês Santa Cruz 2021).

It can be said that this endeavor is unique because it is based on the cooperation between HJSC and Toyota itself. At the 2014 Japan Festival in São Paulo, Toyota Latin America and the Caribbean CEO Mr. Steve St. Angelo informally sought out Mr. Renato Ishikawa, then CEO of HJSC, to learn about his interest in implementing the TPS at the HJSC. According to Mr. Ishikawa, Toyota wanted to contribute to the Japanese-Brazilian community, as it boosts credibility in the Brazilian market for the products with a Japanese brand.

The Toyota group visited the HJSC for initial situation mapping. They found it appropriate to start with the emergency care section because the large volume of entangled back-and-forth flow of more than 2000 patients a month left sufficient room for improvement. Given the similarity to production line optimization, Toyota engineers were able to help remove waste in the process. However, it was a learning experience to implement TPS in a non-manufacturing sector.

Compared to the figures at the start of TPS adoption (in 2015), this project has achieved several positive results by 2020. There were no deaths in emergency care in that year. Moreover, the patient's average stay has been reduced from 240–160 min, with the waiting time reduced from 68 to 30 min (HJSC 2021). By reorganizing medicine and materials stock bins, the time needed for staff to replenish instruments/medicine trays has been reduced from 46 to 36 s. Also, the time spent providing a patient with prescribed medicines declined from 383 to 361 seconds.[16]

Costa et al. (2017) delineated four obstacles when Brazilian healthcare organizations introduce the "lean" concept. The first is human factors originating from employees' distrust, physicians' disinterest, conflicts of interest, and frustrations with previous attempts in organizational changes. The second is the difficulty in extending the lean practices to the outsourced contractors. The third is the necessity for technical support from expert consultants because the lean hospital knowledge is not widespread. The fourth is the relationship between top level hospital management and medical staff to ensure continuity of continuous improvement.

Concerning the obstacles from human factors, Fillingham (2007) reports from experiences at Bolton Hospital (UK) that many of the lean exercises were counter-cultural for the healthcare service workers in the UK. Many initially said that "we are not Japanese and we do not make cars!" when the process was explained to them, which Fillingham identified as inevitable. Many also thought that they had would need to work more to achieve higher quality. However, they learned that sound quality could be achieved with less effort from workers. In the case of HJSC, managers understood that the hospital staff accepted TPS as a work philosophy, not just as a management method for cost reduction. Employees recognized TPS as a factor that helped them avoid rework which reduced their frustration at work.

Concerning the external support, the collaboration with Toyota was essential for HJSC. In the beginning, Toyota provided training to implement TPS at HJSC. Later, the implementation was handed over to HJSC. To ensure continuity, HJSC established a training program to integrate new employees into the TPS. During the training program, the quality supervisor gives a 1.5-h lecture on the concepts of quality and TPS. Currently, HJSC maintains contact with the Toyota TPS crew and receives their occasional visit for technical observances. Having the external input from Toyota is necessary to verify how the implementation is being carried out. With their help, the implementation of TPS in HJSC has expanded to other types of flow amount control such as the surgery centers' patients monitoring, inpatient admission, medication monitoring, nutrition and diet regime, outpatients' appointments, and medical examination process control. There are also visits from other hospitals, such as Hospital do Coração, to HJSC to learn about the TPS.

Other fundamental factors supporting continuity are the inheritance of Japanese culture in HJSC, the strong leadership of Mr. Renato Ishikawa, and the staff's working experiences in Japan through exchange agreements with Osaka University, Tsukuba University, and Kyushu University.

We should note that the adoption of TQC in health care management constitutes a key strategy in JICA's technical assistance in South Asia and Africa. For more information about this, please see Column 7.2. This approach can be extended to Brazil and other Latin American countries.

Column 7.2 JICA's Health Sector Cooperation with the Quality Control Method While healthcare demand and complexity increase, healthcare providers face resource scarcity in staff, materials and equipment, and time. Healthcare workers often blame underinvestment for low efficiency. In trying to deliver higher quality services under such constraints, healthcare institutions in Japan often practice the total quality management method based on the 5S-Kaizen-TQM. The 5S stands for the five Japanese words "Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, and Shitsuke," which can be translated in English as "Sort, Set in order, Shine, Standardize, and Sustain" (Kanamori et al. 2016). The 5S establishes the discipline to create a clean and well-organized workplace. It contributes to reducing the time wasted in searching for objects and reduces the expenses caused by procuring unnecessary materials. It is also intended to enhance healthcare workers' well-being and safety. Kanamori et al. (2016) found that 5S is a foundation or starting point for improving safety, efficiency, or patient-centeredness in healthcare, even among resource-constrained facilities.

Kaizen and TQM refer to the integral problem detection and continuous improvement process, deploying the quality control circle (QCC) activities and the organization-led plan-do-check-action (PDCA) cycle. The 5S-Kaizen-TQM brings together the frontline healthcare workers' experiences, successes and failures, continuous quality improvement, and communication across the vertical management hierarchy and the inter-sectional divisions. It helps prevent human errors by keeping everyone informed of rules and empowering healthcare workers to enact changes.

The 5S in developing countries began at Castle Street Hospital in Sri Lanka in 2000. It was then upscaled to the National Health Master Plan, which was supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Hasegawa and Karandagoda 2013). Building on its success, JICA designed the Better Hospital Service Program in 2007 to transfer the 5S-Kaizen-TQM method in Africa's health sector as a triangular cooperation of Japan, Sri Lanka, and fifteen African countries. This allowed the African countries to learn from Sri Lanka's best practices with Japanese health experts' aid. The program was divided into two phases. The first phase was to understand the concept of 5S and adapt it to each country's local context through experimentations. After human resource formation was complete, the second phase was to learn the Kaizen process and the total quality management methods under the pilot projects in selected hospitals (Honda 2002). JICA has promoted the 5S-Kaizen method application in healthcare in more than 2,000 health facilities in 29 countries (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2018).

JICA (2013) argues that a successful implementation of the 5S-Kaizen-TQM method requires a stepwise approach. Namely, the implementation of a project will pursue the five steps:

First: Introduction to 5S

Second: Implementation of 3S (Sort, Set in Order, and Shine)

Third: Implementation of other 2S (Standardize and Sustain)

Fourth: Introduction to Kaizen (Transition from 5S to Kaizen)

Five: Implementation of Kaizen

JICA (2013) points out several critical factors which help the program implementation succeed. The hospital manager should show strong leadership for the reformation and provide the necessary support. The organization members, including doctors, nurses, and technical and clerk staff, willingly share the importance of team building and information sharing. The Quality Improvement Team (QIT) and the Work Improvement Team (WIT), organized with clearly defined roles, maintain activities regularly, keep activity records, and appraise small successes based on predefined performance indicators.

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, infection prevention control (IPC) within healthcare facilities has become critical. On this urgent issue, JICA recently released the online video titled The Importance of Strengthening IPC with "KAIZEN"—Lessons Learned from Hospital Management in COVID-19 Pandemic. The video points out that "Guidelines for IPC and on-site manuals are not being followed in the workplace. Many factors contribute to this: the shortage of staff, unsanitary environment, and insufficient hygiene facilities. It is reported that even most basic infection control measures in many cases are met with difficulty in practice." It argues that the 5S-Kaizen-TQM method enhances organizational strength by efficiently organizing the healthcare workplace, identifying the root causes of the problems, and enabling management to secure healthcare resources and provide them to the workplace to respond to various issues.

7.5 Final Remarks: TQC in Japan–Brazil Relation in the Next Stage

Until the 1980s, Brazilian industrialization had been oriented toward the domestic market and was protected from international competitions. Although competitive pressures were weak in that setting, the QCC activities drew attention in Brazil because it was considered to be the hallmark of the Japanese industry's competitiveness, which was important to Brazil as it caught up in industrialization. Exporting companies and local subsidiaries of multinationals were the first to deploy QCC. The quality movement was diffused by local business associations, and in some cases JUSE from Japan provided technical assistances as a part of its internationalization aim. The first wave of the QCC boom fell short of expectations because of low volunteerism of workers and weak interest among managers in integrating QCC to the Japanese-style company-wide total quality control (TQC). We noted some inter-cultural issues for such shortcomings, such as the difference in the way of life and corporate administration style and the lack of governmental support. The market liberalization which had begun in the 1990s set the new ground for quality control that was designed to seek competitiveness with relevant involvement of public organizations. The second boom did not materialize because globalization and technological paradigm change which began at that time reduced the relevance of context-specific continuous improvement and interference of human factors in terms of quality.

At present, Brazil uses wider perspectives to capture quality management. By obtaining ISO 9000 s accreditation, firms can show the consistency of their production methods to provide products or services in committed quality. Practice of TQC shows that firms uphold a high standard to meet customer requirements exactly, and to do so they engage in continuous improvement based on statistical evidence in every facet of the organization through management commitment and employee training and education. It has become common sense that these two concepts are not in competition; they are actually complementary and provide external validation of firms' commitment to quality.

We can notice how the past involvement of Japanese private sector and public organizations influenced the transfer of Japanese-style TQC to Brazil. We first noted a significant adaptation of the Japanese-born model to the Brazilian context. For example, the role of leadership of higher-class management in QCC is more emphasized, while monetary reward systems for employees are introduced to induce company-wide involvement. Second, the quality management movement in Brazil gained a social function because the constant improvement of productivity in each organization helped to create the conditions of sustainable development and better quality of life. This definition justifies the public intervention and support to the quality movement because the benefits are not limited to an individual firm's profit but also offers relevant positive externality to the society. Third, quality management expanded to non-manufacturing sectors.

Regarding the third point, we paid special attention to two contemporary cases from the state government administration and health care service. They share commonalities as non-manufacturing activities with a strong presence of human factors, sensitivity to public interests, and the use of information technology. Our case studies show that the basic concept of systemic continuous improvement of Japanese-style TQC continue to be relevant.

Thus, we can conclude that, in view of expected high reward to the public interest from promoting quality improvement, international cooperation in quality management in these fields is highly recommended. Sectoral approaches and human resource development will be the target. Since the trade liberalization in the 1990s, Brazilian firms are compelled to pursue competitiveness. However, Brazilian firms sought machine-based productivity and quality gains, instead of human-based paradigm of the Japanese-style TQC. The higher profit from improved productivity and quality tends to be distributed unequally in favor of capital and skilled labor at the expense of unskilled workers. Given the social divide in Brazil based on large income inequalities, the Brazilian society needs to change a direction for human-centered quality jobs where workers receive not only decent returns from quality and productivity improvement but also a higher satisfaction from working with dignity and sense of human capability improvement. For that end, we consider that the Japanese-style TQC has a potential of transforming the concept of the work.

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Notes

1. Japan and Brazil established diplomatic relations by the Japan–Brazil Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1895). The contract between Japanese private immigration promotion companies and Brazilian state governments defined Japanese immigration to Brazil, the former recruiting immigrants and chartered a ship, and the latter bearing half of the travel expenses. The Japanese government was initially in a position to supervise immigration companies. Still, the rise of unemployment during the inter-war period and the Great Kanto Earthquake (1924) damage encouraged immigration by subsidizing travel expenses.
2. The national project format is a resource development project jointly funded by Japan and Brazil. A state-owned enterprise supported the Brazilian side, and the Japanese side was a joint venture between a private company and a government-affiliated financial institution. Investment in Cerrado development, Carajás mine development, Tubarão steelmaking, Amazon aluminum, Cenibra pulp-and-paper were in such a form.
3. Akio Morita, the co-founder of Sony, remembered that the opinion of anything marked "Made in Japan" was very poor. He confessed that in the early days "we (Sony) printed the line "Made in Japan" as small as possible" (Morita 1986, p. 77).
4. This can be seen on the Deming Institute's YouTube channel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcG_Pmt_Ny4.
5. To distinguish from Feigenbaum's original idea of TQC, Japanese engineers called the Japanese system the company-wide quality control (CWQC). Currently, TQC and CWQC are used interchangeably. We adopt TQC to what originally meant CWQC.
6. For example, see Yuki (1988, p. 24). Ishikawa and Hiromatsu (1977) observed Volkswagen's quality control capabilities in Brazil and said "their efforts lag more than 15 years behind the comprehensive control in Japan".
7. Humphrey (1993) found that after the introduction of QCC, the employment conditions improved due to employment stabilization and wage increase.
8. Oleg Greshner, former quality assurance executive of the Brazilian affiliate of Johnson & Johnson (São José dos Campos, State of São Paulo), explained that a typical reason for QCC not working well was the lack of interest from the top management in the concept of placing QCC as a part of TQC (Greshner 2014). He also pointed out that McGregor's (1960) X-theory type managers who tend to control the company by order and enforcement (typically found in Brazil) understand the concept of TQC less than Y-theory type managers who mobilize employees by showing them exciting goals and responsibilities progressively.
9. French, Chinese, Portugese, Spanish, Slovenian, Dutch, and Italian versions were all published at the same time as the English version (Ishikawa 1985).
10. Embraer (São José dos Campos, São Paulo State, then a state-owned enterprise), which develops and manufactures aircraft, also participated in AVCQ. AVCQ invited the JUSE mission represented by Kaoru Ishikawa and held the Japan–Brazil quality management seminar. In 1978, AVCQ invited Joseph Juran from the United States to a top management seminar on QC. According to Yuki (1988), 500 companies were already implementing QCC by 1984. In addition to AVCQ, eight regional organization for the dissemination of QCC were born between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, including the Santa Catarina State Quality Management Association, the Anhanguera Quality Management Association (Campinas, São Paulo State), and the Minas Gerais State QCC Association (now União Brasileira para a Qualidade, UBQ). Claudius D'Artagnan C. Barros, the Head of Quality Control of Embraer in the early 1980s, led the Brazilian Quality Control Circle Union (União Brasileira de Círculos de Controle da Qualidade, UBCCQ), which was inherited by UBQ in 1990 (Ferro and Grande 1997).
11. The Malcolm Baldridge Award was established in 1987, modeled after the Deming Prize of JUSE started in 1951.
12. According to Academia Brasileira da Qualidade (2019), FCAV later specialized in consulting for ISO certification acquisition.

13. Taylorism is the organization of work based on deconstructing production process into a sequence of simple actions and then coordinating them by means of managerial intervention in order to acheive the highest productivity in the least time (Source: https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199599868.001.0001/acref-9780199599868-e-1849).
14. In 2017, the media reported successive false quality claims, data falsification, and inspection fraud in large Japanese companies. Remaining authority to production sites despite weakening company-wide quality control efforts incentivizes cheating on meeting stringent demands such as cost and delivery.
15. Secretaria da Fazenda e Planejamento do Estado de São Paulo.
16. A similar result of productivity increase was reported by Ng et al. (2010) from the Emergency Department of Hôtel-Dieu Grace Hospital in Ontario, Canada, and from a broader application of TPS in Virginal Mason Medical Centre in Seattle, WA (Weber 2006), the Emergency Treatment Center at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics in Iowa City, IA (Dickson et al. 2008).

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Chapter 8
Conclusion: Structuring Brazil–Japan Cooperation from Complementarity to Shared Value

Nobuaki Hamaguchi and Danielly Ramos

8.1 Chapter Summary

In Chap. 1, we consider the relevance of studying Brazil–Japan relations and cooperation. Any bilateral relationship cannot be understood and explored in isolation without considering interwoven international ties in which each country is involved. We can therefore establish the equation of the reward of Brazil–Japan cooperation as the function of mutual gains based on economic complementarity and shared political values, the global hegemony of the United States, the rise of Chinese influence, and the engagement with neighboring countries, namely, South America for Brazil and East Asia for Japan.

Brazil takes a nuanced approach to balancing its alignment with the United States and its political autonomy as a South American regional power. The approximation of Brazil to Japan in the 1970s through binational joint projects involving natural resources and agricultural development was part of its pursuit of diversified international relations. The recent tightening of economic cooperation with China and the BRICS diplomacy further shifts toward the Global South engagement. However, in the last half decade and since the rise to power of right and extreme right governments, radical changes have been made in Brazilian foreign policy, which has started to emphasize the mercantilist discourse to the detriment of South–South cooperation and the political–developmental approach practiced until then. Brazilian diplomatic ties now face major challenges and may undergo further transformations with the presidential elections at the end of 2022.

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Given complex national security concerns, Japan critically depends on its alliance with the United States. As a leading economy and being partly motivated by the rising Chinese influence, Japan seeks a more prominent role in international politics. It promotes a geopolitical campaign in the form of the "Free and Open Indo–Pacific" (FOIP) to structure an alliance for free trade, freedom of navigation, and the rule of law. It also stands against attempts to unilaterally change the *status quo*. Moreover, Japan actively leads international efforts to create new rules (in international trade and data flow, among other things) and proactively contributes to peacebuilding and other global issues, such as disaster risk reduction, human rights, global health, and environmental protection and climate change.

Given such conditions, Brazil and Japan repositioned their bilateral relations to the level of a global strategic partnership in 2014. Although the Brazil–Japan cooperation has revolved around economic complementarity based on factor endowments (land, labor, capital, and technology), the strategic characteristics in their relation have gained relevance recently as the two countries pursue diplomatic autonomy and prominent positions in the international community.

In Chap. 2, Oliveira and Lessa ask whether the strategic partnership between Brazil and Japan is genuine or an illusion. The authors reaffirm that the economic complementarity between the two countries has decreased since the early 1980s and that there has been financial and commercial distancing because of macroeconomic downturns.

They recall that the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 triggered the interests of Japan in Latin America while the rise of Chinese influence in Latin America reoriented the Japanese strategy in the region. Brazil and Japan engaged in some epoch-making events, such as the 100th anniversary of Japanese immigration in Brazil, the Japan–Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP) for triangular development cooperation with third countries, the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) campaign for United Nations Security Council reform, and Brazil's adoption of the Japanese system of digital television broadcasting. The latter developed into the Japanese–Brazilian Digital TV system (ISDB-Tb), which was adopted by 18 other countries. Japan announced a guiding principle for the Latin American strategy, referring to it as "Together (*Juntos* in Portuguese)," that is, "progress together," "lead together," and "inspire together." Japan also inaugurated the "Japan House" in São Paulo, as well as in Los Angeles and London, as a soft power base to promote Japanese contemporary culture and social values. Chapter 2 concludes that the history and motivations for the bilateral relationship between Brazil and Japan show the reality of a shared mutual interest, which is grounded in a deep "human bond" in economic–financial complementarity, and in bilateral and triangular projects that promote development. It is for all these reasons that this relationship can be called strategic.

In Chap. 3, the trend of official development assistance (ODA) among Japanese diplomatic instruments is analyzed, with a focus on the health sector. Campos and Kawai point out that Japan's ODA is predominantly aligned with a hegemonic Western effort to maintain its influence and agendas in Asia. They also observe that Japan's ODA for health does not necessarily reflect developing countries' needs and demands as it broadly aligns with the agendas of international and multilateral health cooperation initiatives. Japan's ODA steadily expanded until the 1990s, when Japan became the world's top donor. However, it has shown a decline since then. Social infrastructure, including health, education, water, and sanitation, made up around 20% of the total ODA until the 1990s. This proportion declined significantly afterward while the share of economic infrastructure rose, thereby implying health as an outcome of economic development.

Japan's ODA since the 2000s has been characterized by the critical concept of "human security." ODA is focused on human-centered development and is explicitly linked to the health sector. Japan's ODA has evidently been strengthened in the health sector, building expertise in addressing infectious diseases and the need for maternal and child healthcare. The Japanese ODA policy emphasizes improving the global health architecture in international and multilateral institutions to promote universal health coverage in recipient countries. In Chap. 3, Japan's ODA in the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic is predicted to align with the international paradigm of valuing human security and establishing equality in health. The shared recognition of the tremendous global health challenges involved in dealing with emergencies and achieving equity further highlights the importance of Japanese expert contribution to tackling infectious diseases and maternal and child healthcare. Furthermore, the authors suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to further affect and even shift Japan's ODA to the healthcare sector in developing countries. Brazil and Japan, having accumulated rich experiences in international cooperation and foreign aid in the area of health, should be studied more comprehensively to foster their strategic partnership as they deal with the enormous global health challenges that lie ahead.

In Chap. 4, Japan's ODA in global environmental issues is examined. Brazil and Japan are actors in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The Japanese ODA is oriented to support negotiations and diplomacy around MEAs. Brazil, the host of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), moved from veto to proposition on sensitive issues in the global environmental debate. As a part of Japan's ODA to Brazil, The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) implemented a project aimed at utilizing the Advanced Land Observing Satellite images for the surveillance of the Amazonia to protect the rainforest from illegal deforestation. Two cases of agricultural development in Brazil with Japanese cooperation are examined in this chapter: the Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Program for Cerrados Development (PRODECER) in Paracatu (state of Minas Gerais) and the Agroforestry Systems in Tome-Açú (state of Pará). The authors highlight common issues. As projects thrived with expanding production, the local areas faced environmental challenges. Although PRODECER officially demonstrated compliance with Brazilian environmental legislation, the sustainability of the program, particularly its environmental dimension, was jeopardized by its negative environmental impacts. Meanwhile, the project initiative in Tomé-Açu, supported by JICA, was aimed at promoting social, economic, and environmental sustainability; therefore, it can be considered to be in line with global objectives and MEAs. The Nikkei community's virtues of ethics, solidarity, and resilience are considered fundamental to the success of the project in Tomé-Açu. At this stage, the associationism of local producers, which mainly consisted of Nikkei Brazilians, came into play in the two cases to remedy problems and coordinate the direction of social sustainable development. It is critical to understand that global environmental governance must interplay with community-level values, such as ethics, solidarity, and resilience. International cooperation, such as ODA, should support the global–local nexus.

In Chap. 5, Koyasu and Ramos report that Japan's cooperation in African development through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and the westward extension of the FOIP strategy to Eastern Africa merged Brazilian cooperation with Africa, particularly Portuguese-speaking Africa (PALOP in Portuguese abbreviation). The authors consider the possibilities for Brazil and Japan to increase innovative triangular cooperation in Africa. The experience of the Tripartite Program for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savanna in Mozambique is a notable case. The project was inspired by PRODECER and was aimed at transforming Mozambique's savannas into fertile and food-producing lands with the infrastructure development in the Nacala corridor. It is noteworthy that the Japanese government invited Brazilian representatives to participate in TICAD VII in Yokohama in August 2019. More recently, the trilateral projects maintained between Brazil–Japan, and Portuguese-speaking African countries have suffered setbacks because of not only the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic but also the general distance from Africa imposed by the political choices of the current Brazilian government. Thus, the current belief is that only concerted policies and better governance within countries could lead to policies with greater consideration for African values and needs. Under the JBPP, Brazil and Japan are expected to use available resources and the knowledge obtained from past development cooperation experiences to assist other developing countries, including Africa.

As described in Chap. 2, Oliveira and Lessa point out that the existing financial and economic complementarity between Brazil and Japan facilitates their cooperation toward contributing to each other's national development agenda. This direction is the focus of Chaps. 6 and 7.

Japan entered the population-declining phase around 2008. The Japanese population is also aging, which exacerbates labor force decline. Meanwhile, the Japanese legal system has yet to officially provide stipulations for migrant foreign labor. Nevertheless, it has already created some special visa statuses for those who come to Japan to provide work. Thus, the existence of foreign workers and the co-living with people with distinct cultural backgrounds are already a reality. The inflow of Nikkei Brazilians following the amendment of the Immigration Control Act in 1990 represents the main case. In Chap. 6, the magnitude of this process is discussed in detail. Although the boom has passed, about 200,000 Nikkei Brazilians remain in Japan as permanent residents, and the number of those belonging to the second generation continues to increase. Bugarin and Yamazaki focus on the struggles of children accompanying their working parents and those born in Japan. They report that those children are in a "double limited" situation, that is, they have limited linguistic capability in Portuguese (native language of the family) and Japanese (required in a school setting). In particular, the children face enormous difficulty in adapting to primary education in Japan and the transition to secondary education (high schools). Hence, the hurdle for social ascension is considerable. As described in Chap. 6, there are several innovative approaches of local governments and private initiatives, but available resources are scarce. The authors propose that the Japanese society should invest in afterschool programs as a less-expensive supplementary educational institution, which would enable Brazilian families in Japan to exploit economic incentives and thereby maximize their lifetime income. With a hybrid system, psychological costs and communication loss are also reduced. The more efficient Brazilian afterschool programs become, the less expensive it will be for the Japanese government. In the medium term, this policy will produce more productive citizens and become financially self-sustaining.

Finally, Chap. 7 reviews the transfer of the Japanese-style total quality control (TQC) method, also known as Kaizen, to Brazil. The Japanese-style TQC is the total company-wide continuous improvement activity that employs the plan–do–check–act cycle as a workhorse model. A company is an organic system where all constituents continue to learn from the top to the end and adapt to external conditions through the rearrangement of its systemic organization. Thus, the Japanese-style TQC is human-based. Its benefit is not limited to firms' financial gains as it also cultivates enhanced pleasure at work by improving one's sense of progress in terms of personal capabilities. Hamaguchi and Miyazaki describe the challenge of adapting the Japanese-style TQC method to the Brazilian labor environment where the management overpowered workers and labor relations were confrontational. In the 1990s, the international trade liberalization compelled Brazilian firms to be keen on competitiveness. At that time, Brazilian firms sought machine-based productivity and quality gains instead of the human-based paradigm of the Japanese-style TQC approach. The authors argue that given the social divide in Brazil based on significant income inequalities, which exacerbate as firm profits are distributed unequally among workers, the Brazilian society needs to change directions by valuing quality jobs where workers receive not only decent returns from quality and productivity improvement but also a higher satisfaction from working with dignity and a sense of human capability improvement. Hence, Hamaguchi and Miyazaki consider that the human-centered philosophy of the Japanese-style TQC method has the potential to transform the concept of work. They also notice that the original Japanese model is supported by some cultural peculiarities. Therefore, an adaptation to different countries and sectors other than manufacturing requires careful remodeling.

8.2 Concluding Remarks on Structuring Brazil–Japan Cooperation from Complementarity to Shared Value

Brazil and Japan intensified cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s. It was mainly motivated by economic interests. On the one hand, Japan looked for natural resources to sustain its high economic growth and growing foreign market for manufactured products. On the other hand, Brazil needed capital and technology to develop the natural resource potential and upgrade industrialization to produce machinery and industrial input. There was also a politically-motivated interest in both countries to reduce dependence on the United States. Hence, the Brazil–Japan partnership had economic and political relevance based on complementarity.

However, the bilateral complementarity decreased because of transformations of both countries' economic structures and international relations in the past decades. The Japanese economy has matured into a low and stable growth stage. Japan established natural resource sourcing in Asia and Oceania, reducing dependence on long-haul sourcing from Latin America. Trade liberalization transformed Brazil into deindustrialization to some extent, limiting Japanese investment scope. China emerged boldly as a new complementary-based partner for Brazil in a context similar to Japan in the past on a much grander scale.

The analyses presented in this volume showed that the Brazil–Japan relationship could be structured to turn around the doomed outlook. We found a vast array of areas of cooperation for both countries to engage in a deeper strategic partnership. The strategic partnership does not rest on existing complementarities, but it is a forward-looking joint engagement to create mutually rewarding future values. The partnership will require mutual trust. In this regard, as pointed out in Chap. 2, Brazil and Japan can exploit the human bond cultivated based on the largest Nikkei community outside Japan in Brazil. Chapter 4 found that the Nikkei communities' associationism was fundamental for the success of environmentally sustainable agricultural development and played a crucial role in associating the global environmental governance and the local values in ethics and solidarity.

Besides agricultural development, Brazil and Japan also have shared experiences in tackling infectious diseases and promoting maternal and child healthcare in poorer tropical areas, as mentioned in Chap. 3. Thus, the two countries can lead together in critical global challenges studied in this book, such as food security, environmental governance, and healthcare. They can also extend triangular cooperation in third-party countries, as discussed in Chap. 5, targeting countries where two counties' interests overlap, such as FOIP and PALOP.

Brazil–Japan, and the United States launched a new cooperation initiative Japan–US-Brazil Exchange (JUSBE) in November 2020. The areas of interest of this alliance include cooperation in the global governance of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.

The strategic partnership can also be devised to contribute to each country's national development agenda. Chapter 6 sheds light on Japan's challenge to a multicultural co-living society. It has become clear that the existing social system based on a homogeneous society is not adequate for changing reality. In particular, education for children requires an immediate fix. The solution to this problem is essential for the well-being of Brazilian families residing in Japan, and may also contribute to reducing the population deficit in Japan. It is also vital to protect the shared value of the Nikkei community as the cornerstone of the Brazil–Japan partnership.

Brazil is inherently a heterogeneous society. One of its significant challenges is to dissolve the social divide rooted in persisting inequalities. The conclusion of Chap. 7 implied that the adaptation of the Japanese-style TQC may enhance the value of human-centered quality jobs.

Along with global and bilateral agendas studied in this book, Brazil and Japan should continue to cooperate for peacebuilding, including the reform of the United Nations Security Council. Russian military invasion in Ukraine has provoked severe doubt on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council with permanent members' veto power. The G4 will be tested their seriousness on the reform in the next few years.

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