Complex Ties: Nuclear Governance and Governance for Supporting Evacuees

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Abstract

Many people were forced to evacuate as a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake that struck on March 11, 2011, and the ensuing Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident. In this chapter, I analyze the process by which governance related to the institutional responses, including support for evacuees of the NPP accident in Saitama Prefecture, has developed, taking into consideration the framework and discussion points in research on the sociology of disasters and in the theory of adaptive governance. I did not only carry out interview and questionnaire surveys of governmental entities, support organizations, and evacuee groups, but also carried out the participant observation and action research.

First, analysis of governmental institutional responses in terms of evacuee support yielded the similar results as the conventional discussion of institutional responses in disaster sociology. That said that adaptive governance was found to be possible in cases in which mayors of local governments were able to exercise their leadership, cases in which local governments adopted counterpart aid schemes, or cases in which general affair-type sections within local governments having wide-ranging authority carried out the support activities. In contrast, nongovernmental support organizations were able to engage in more flexible support activities than their governmental entities. The analysis revealed that, by sharing information on problematic aspects of evacuee support, learning from each other, and applying know-how accumulated prior to the disaster, nongovernmental support organizations were able to provide "spontaneous" support and, as contracted parties, to deliver support services tailored to the evacuees' circumstances.

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Second, the analysis revealed the difficulties of implementing adaptive governance for evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture. This is due to the fact that Saitama Prefecture, despite being the local government hosting evacuees from disaster-affected areas, was not involved in the governance of evacuee support, and the fact that nongovernmental support organizations, which took the lead in directing evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture, were unable to play the role of "mediators" and facilitators responsible for managing logistics, protocols and procedures, and goals, which are central to effective adaptive governance. Although adaptive governance theory recognizes important factors for the management of adaptive governance, it does not discuss the capacities required of agents to exercise such factors or the social structures needed to bring forth such agents. Comparison of evacuee support governance in different regions is needed to identify the structural conditions required for the establishment of adaptive governance of evacuee support.

8.1 Characterization of and My Interest in the Problem

8.1.1 Current Status of NPP Evacuees and Purpose of this Chapter

The Great East Japan Earthquake that struck on March 11, 2011, and the ensuing Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident created a large number and demographically diverse mix of evacuees. The number of evacuees from Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures affected by the tsunami was estimated to be 170,000 (as of November 2011), while the number of evacuees from the NPP accident was estimated to be 150,000 (as of September 2011). The number of evacuees in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima as of March 2012—a year after the earthquake and accident—was approximately 270,000, while the number of evacuees in all other prefectures combined was approximately 76,000 (Harada 2019a: 12–21). As of April 2019, an estimated 48,000 evacuees still existed around the country.

Following the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident, the Japanese government has engaged in the "remediation" of regions contaminated by radiation, reconstruction, and infrastructure improvement, and the rehabilitation of daily life through payment of damage compensation by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). It has also implemented a "Return Policy" involving the reorganization of evacuation zones within Fukushima to encourage evacuees to return to Fukushima. The Japanese government has equated the "return of evacuees to their homes" with "recovery" and has tied the "restoration of communities" in evacuation zones to "prompt cancellation of evacuation orders" (Yamashita et al. 2013). This policy is driven by the Japanese government's desire to complete restoration before the start of the 2020

Table 8.1 The rate of residence in the former areas to which evacuation orders (April 2019)

	The period of rearranged the areas to which evacuation orders	Number of residents of areas to be evacuated	Number of residents	Rate of residents (%)
Tamura City, Miyakoji District East area	April 2014	273	222	81.3
Kawauchi Village, East area	October 2014 & June 2016	287	87	30.3
Naraha Town	September 2015	6946	3657	52.6
Katsurao Village	June 2016	1301	375	28.8
Minami Soma City, Odaka District etc.	July 2016	8677	3665	42.2
Namie Town	March 2017	14,535	910	6.2
Iidate Village	March 2017	5415	905	16.7
Kawamata Town, Yamakoya District	March 2017	843	334	39.6
Tomioka Town	Apirl 2017	9269	877	9.4
Total		47,546	11,032	23.2

Tokyo Olympics and the fact that restoration of the resident population, by calling back evacuees, is critical for political rehabilitation of the Fukushima prefectural government and municipalities near the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP.

Despite such efforts, the actual return of evacuees has not progressed as hoped. Table 8.1 shows the resident populations of former evacuation zones as of April 2019 (Kahoku Shimpo April 12, 2019). While residency rate (return rate) is higher for towns whose evacuation orders were canceled early, the average residency rate is 23.2%. The residency rate for towns located near the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP that were severely affected by radiation remains very low at 6.2% for Namie Town, 9.4% for Tomioka Town, and 16.7% for Iitate Village.

Why, then, have those who evacuated outside of Fukushima Prefecture not tried to return? There is a wide range of reasons. For example, since there were areas where radioactive contamination increased again even after decontamination, some evacuees are concerned that the radioactive contamination in their hometowns is still high. Despite assurances by the Japanese government that the "nuclear accident has been resolved," there is latent fear of Dai-ichi NPP. Others explain the fact that, even if they were to return home, everyday life would be inconvenient because the infrastructure necessary for daily life has not yet been re-established. Furthermore, due to the prolonged evacuation period, a fair number of individuals have already taken up residence in their evacuation destinations. In some cases, evacuees with

school-aged children refuse to return to their hometowns because their children have become accustomed to life in their evacuation destinations.[1] However, it is not the case that these individuals are thinking, "We don't want to return to Fukushima." The current state of mind of many of the evacuees is that "Eventually, we want to go back to Fukushima. But, at the moment, even if we wanted to go back, we couldn't." Even in the abovementioned cases where families have set down roots in their evacuation destinations, it is not as if the individuals have been willing to choose to settle there. They had no choice but to do so.

The evacuees' financial circumstances have greatly influenced their lives as evacuees. Evacuees who had assets to begin with or who were able to receive compensation from TEPCO have not struggled to get by. That said, many elderly evacuees lament that they feel isolated and lonely living in a place where they have no acquaintances or friends. Meanwhile, other evacuees have struggled financially and found themselves in circumstances that are both mentally and physically taxing. In terms of their current state, evacuees can be broadly categorized into those who feel lonely (former group discussed above) and those who find themselves struggling emotionally and physically as well as financially (latter group). Japan is now facing the challenge of how to support those evacuees scattered around the country who "want to return but can't."

The objective of this chapter was to examine the institutional response with respect to evacuee support and the formation of support-related governance by analyzing how evacuee support schemes have changed over time in Saitama Prefecture, which is located 200 km from Fukushima, from the standpoint of local governance theory and adaptive governance theory, as well as an analytical framework from disaster sociology. Saitama Prefecture, which is located just north of Tokyo, was the destination for as many as 7000 evacuees at its peak. In particular, the Saitama Super Arena, Japan's largest multiple-purpose arena, became a center of attention immediately following the NPP accident when it became the evacuation site for 1200 evacuees from Futaba Town in Fukushima Prefecture. Because Saitama Prefecture had not suffered many large-scale disasters in the past, the prefectural government had not anticipated having to take in evacuees and had little accumulated institutional experience with how to support evacuees. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter was to elucidate the evacuee support governance logistics and practices that were ultimately developed and to identify the challenges encountered in these dimensions of governance by clarifying how the prefectural government, local municipalities, and their residents responded to such unanticipated circumstances and the processes by which evacuee support solutions were developed over time.

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[1] However, there are many children who have been unable to adjust to evacuee life and are unable to attend school or who are bullied because they are evacuees (Harada, 2019c).

8.1.2 Evacuation Process Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accident[2]

Following the earthquake and tsunami that occurred on March 11, 2011, many people in disaster-affected areas evacuated to schools and other emergency shelters or to the homes of friends and relatives. After the subsequent NPP accident, evacuation and shelter-in-place orders were issued for people living within 3 and 10-kilometer radius of the NPP, respectively. On March 12, as the severity of the accident began to become clear, the Japanese government expanded the scope of the evacuation order to a 10-kilometer radius and then to a 20-kilometer radius. On March 15, a shelter-in-place order was issued for people living between 20 and 30 kilometers from the NPP. On March 15, a request was disseminated through the National Governors' Association for prefectures around the country to host evacuees from Fukushima. As a result, municipalities throughout Japan opened up gymnasiums, community centers, and other facilities as emergency shelters. Saitama Prefecture opened the Saitama Super Arena as an emergency shelter.

Construction of emergency temporary housing (prefab and wooden temporary housing) under the Disaster Relief Act began in April 2011. A temporary (rental) housing program was established wherein the prefectures secured private rental housing and the national government paid for rents, security deposits, key money, and handling commissions. Permission was granted across the board for evacuees from the three disaster-affected prefectures to move into this temporary housing, marking the start of evacuation life in public and private rental housing throughout the country. By the summer of 2011, the vast majority of evacuees had moved into temporary housing, and all but a few emergency shelters were closed.

However, the situation for evacuees from Fukushima Prefecture remained in flux as a result of radioactive contamination from the NPP accident and the national government's changing evacuation orders. With each new revelation of the scale of the contamination, the government was forced to expand the scope of its evacuation order. On April 22, the Japanese government designated the area within a 20-kilometer radius of the accident site as a restricted area and prohibited entry into the area. In addition, the government designated a deliberate evacuation area whose residents were directed to evacuate within a month and an evacuation-prepared area in case of emergency whose residents were instructed to prepare to evacuate. Under these evacuation orders, Namie Town, Futaba Town, Okuma Town, Tomioka Town, Naraha Town, Hirono Town, Katsurao Village, Kawauchi Village, and Iitate Village were subject to complete evacuation. Accordingly, all residents of these municipalities, including their entire governments, evacuated en masse. Parts of Tamura City, Minami Soma City, and Kawamata Town also became subject to evacuation. As of September 2011, there were approximately 100,000 evacuees from designated evacuation zones who were considered to be "enforced evacuees" (Fig. 8.1).


[2]This section was prepared based on Harada (2019a).

Fig. 8.1 Restricted area, deliberate evacuation area, and regions including specific spots recommended for evacuations (as of November 25, 2011)
Source: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/evacuation_map_111125.pdf

   The areas affected by radioactive contamination were not limited to the evacuation zones, and a number of "hot spots" with high contamination occurred throughout the region. On June 16, the government designated Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuations outside of the evacuation zones; however, these

図 Pattern of Evacuees

	Evacuation Zone	Fukushima Prefecture outside Evacuation Zone	Tohoku area and Kanto area	Western Japan and Hokkaido
（1）Enforced Evacuees	→	→	→	
（2）Voluntary Evacuees living in Fukushima Prefecture		→	→	→
（3）Voluntary Evacuees living in other area			→	

Source: Harada（2019: 17）

Fig. 8.2 Pattern of Evacuees

areas affected only 282 households. This caused many residents outside of the designated evacuation areas, especially those with young children, to worry about their health due to potential radioactive contamination and led some to relocate, if only temporarily, to low-radiation areas for the sake of "health preservation." A subset of these individuals ended up living as evacuees for an extended period. Such evacuees from areas that were not designated as evacuation zones were considered to be "voluntary evacuees."

Hotspots were discovered not only in Fukushima Prefecture but also in the Tohoku and Kanto regions. Some residents of such hotspots, primarily those from the greater Tokyo area, evacuated voluntarily to the western part of Japan and to Okinawa and Hokkaido. Figure 8.2 shows the pattern of evacuation from the NPP accident. It is in the manner described above that the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident caused the dispersal of evacuees to all parts of the Japan (Fig. 8.3).

Half a year after the NPP accident, the Japanese government began preparations to rescind the evacuation order in Fukushima Prefecture. First, the order designating the Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of Emergency was lifted on September 30, 2011. On December 16, 2011, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda declared that the NPP had reached a "cold shutdown" and that the accident was over. Soon thereafter, on December 26, the Japanese government announced that the Restricted Area and Deliberate Evacuation Area would be reorganized into the three following zones: a zone in preparation for the lifting of the evacuation order (annual radiation dose of less than 20 mSv) whose residents would be allowed to return in the near future (Area 1), a restricted residence area (20–50 mSv) whose residents would be allowed to return after several years (Area 2), and a difficult-to-return zone (50 mSv or higher) whose residents would not be able to return for five or more years (Area

Fig. 8.3 The number of evacuees from Fukushima Prefecture to other prefectures as of July 5, 2012

(Source: http://fukushimaontheglobe.com/wp-content/uploads/fukushima_hinansya_en.pdf)

3). The reorganization of zones began in March 2012 and was completed in August 2013 (Fig. 8.4).

The Japanese national government subsequently began making preparations to rescind the two areas (Area 1 and Area 2). Evacuation orders were lifted for Tamura City in April 2014, Kawauchi Village in October 2014, Naraha Town in September 2015, Katsurao and Kawauchi Villages in June 2016, and Minami Soma City in July 2016. This was followed by the lifting of evacuation orders for Kawamata Town, Namie Town, Iitate Village, and Tomioka Town in March and April 2017. The main justification given for lifting these evacuation orders was the lowering of radiation levels through decontamination. Evacuation orders were thus lifted for 70% of the area designated as evacuation zones following the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident. Those who continued to live as evacuees after the lifting of these evacuation orders were no longer considered "forced evacuees" but rather "voluntary evacuees."

In March 2017, the Japanese government ended the temporary housing program that had been providing housing for voluntary evacuees. In other words, evacuees were forced to make a decision to either settle permanently in their evacuation destinations or return to Fukushima. As discussed in Sect. 8.1, the majority of evacuees, while struggling with the decision of continuing to live as evacuees or returning home, have, in the end, chosen to continue living as evacuees.

Fig. 8.4 Areas to which evacuation orders have been issued (August 7, 2013)
Source: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/roadmap/pdf/20130807_01.pdf

8.1.3 Characteristics of the Evacuees in Saitama Prefecture

Next, let us examine the change over time in evacuee numbers in Saitama Prefecture, which is the focus of this chapter. Figure 8.5 shows the change over time in evacuee numbers for six prefectures besides the three disaster-affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima) that hosted the greatest number of evacuees. One year after the disaster, the three prefectures with the highest numbers of evacuees in order from highest to lowest were Yamagata, Tokyo, and Niigata. Both Yamagata and Niigata prefectures share borders with Fukushima Prefecture and, thus, were readily accessible to evacuees. More than 90% of evacuees in Yamagata and Niigata prefectures were from Fukushima Prefecture. A large portion of evacuees in Yamagata were voluntary evacuees, particularly mothers and children, from areas other than the officially designated evacuation zones who lived "dual lives," moving back and forth between their evacuation destinations and their hometowns. This is likely due to the proximity of Yamagata and Fukushima prefectures, which made travel between the two easy. The evacuees in Niigata Prefecture represented a mix of evacuees from designated evacuation zones and voluntary evacuees (Harada 2019a: 21–24).

Five years after the earthquake, Tokyo, Ibaraki, and Saitama were among the top five prefectures hosting evacuees. This may have had something to do with the fact that these prefectures are located a little farther away from Fukushima Prefecture and a certain number of evacuees decided, at least for a little while, to stay in their evacuation destinations. The number of evacuees in Saitama apparently increased between 2013 and 2014. This increase was due to the discovery in 2013 that the method used by Saitama Prefecture to count evacuees only included those living in housing created through the Disaster Relief Act and not those who had procured private rental housing on their own and those were living with friends and relatives,

Transition of the number of Refugees by Prefecture(March 2012-Sep.2019)

(Source) Reconstruction Agency Web site (http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-1/hinanshasuu.html)

Fig. 8.5 Change over time in number of evacuees hosted by prefectures (March 2012–September 2019)

which led to a revision of the counting method in 2014 (Harada 2019b: 167–169). Accordingly, considering the situation in Tokyo and the downward trend of evacuee numbers over time, it can be estimated that there were 7000–8000 evacuees in Saitama Prefecture immediately after the earthquake. That is to say, Saitama Prefecture, which is the focus of this chapter, hosted high numbers of evacuees.

8.1.4   The Research Question and Structure of This Chapter

Up to this point, we have presented a historical context and examined trends related to evacuees generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident. It is clear from this historical framing that even eight years after the earthquake disaster, many evacuees still exist. Such evacuees are frequently compared to refugees who have been forced to flee from their home countries. One commonality between refugees and evacuees is the fact that their fates tend to be decided based on the reasoning of the hosts rather than on the thoughts and wishes of the refugees and evacuees themselves. In the case of refugees, there are generally said to be three durable solutions. Among these, the most desirable is voluntary repatriation. The second is local integration. The third is resettlement, in cases where refugees are unable to receive long-term protection in the initial host country and are resettled in a third country (Watado et al. 2016: 9–10). However, such solutions are not applicable to evacuees from the NPP accident. This is because, although the NPP evacuees are being encouraged by the national government and Fukushima Prefecture to return home, circumstances are such that not all of the evacuees can return even if they want to; as such, "repatriation" is not a viable solution. Furthermore, integration into evacuation destinations is not really what most evacuees want. The question is how can support be provided to evacuees who find themselves struggling with the hard choice of returning home or resettling in their evacuation destinations. This is the practical reason for analyzing the support solutions available in evacuation destinations to evacuees and the evolution thereof.

Therefore, the objective of this chapter was to elucidate what kinds of support schemes were established in Saitama Prefecture, which was the host to a large number of evacuees. In Sect. 8.2, I examine frameworks for analyzing social processes related to disasters that are being discussed in disaster sociology. Next, I examine relevant connections among disaster sociology, local governance theory, and adaptable governance theory, and present this study's research question. In Sect. 8.3, I analyze the responses of disaster relief organizations and the evolution of support schemes targeting evacuees in Saitama Prefecture. In Sect. 8.4, I identify the current state of evacuee support governance provided by Saitama Prefecture and the challenges therein.

8.2   Theory and Methods

8.2.1   Vantage Point (1) for Analyzing Social Processes Related to Disasters: Time Periodization

Time periodization and the selection of social units have been discussed in the field of disaster sociology as important considerations when describing social processes related to disasters. This is because disaster sociology, as a scholarly discipline, has sought to elucidate the response mechanisms of communities affected by disaster—i.e., investigated what kinds of problems occur over time and how different social units have responded to these problems (Yoshikawa 2007).

First, let us examine the disaster process along the time axis. Barton (1969) suggested a periodization of disasters comprising the following five stages: (1) the pre-disaster period, (2) the period of detection and communication of threat, (3) the period of relatively unorganized response, (4) the organized response period, and (4) long-run, post-disaster equilibrium. Building on research in disaster sociology conducted in the USA, Yoshikawa (2007) pointed out that disaster processes follow a cycle consisting of the following stages: disaster (contributing causes), acute stage (direct damage, extended damage, firefighting, lifesaving, etc.), emergency stage (evacuation, securing of temporary housing, debris cleanup, etc.), recovery and restoration (re-establishment of daily life, community (cities), industry, etc.), and prevention (creation of disaster-resistant communities, disaster risk reduction planning, etc.).

The following are examples of actual disaster processes in Japan examined along the time axis. The social processes following the Great Hanshin Earthquake that occurred in 1995 unfolded as follows: emergency first response period (less than 1 week post-disaster), evacuation and relief period (ranging from a 1-week to a 2-month period, post-disaster), and restoration of daily life period (starting 3 months post-disaster). The majority of evacuation shelters established during the evacuation and relief period were closed during the restoration of daily life period as the disaster survivors moved to temporary housing and began rebuilding their lives (Yamashita and Suga 2002: 7–11). In contrast, survivors of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident have experienced a much more prolonged evacuation period under circumstances that have made the rebuilding of lives difficult. Furthermore, efforts to rebuild evacuees' lives do not always match with the goals of community recovery and restoration; as such, recovery cannot simply be equated with the return of evacuees to their cities/towns of origin. Thus, to understand the disaster processes of this earthquake, we need to use a different time periodization from that of the typical disaster.

As discussed in Sect. 8.1.2, the factors determining the disaster responses related to the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident include the evacuation orders issued by the Japanese government and the timing

of the lifting of these orders, as well as policies related to housing provided to evacuees. In this chapter, I employ the following 4-stage periodization for analyzing the movement of evacuees and evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture.

1. Emergency evacuation period (March 11–31, 2011): Immediately after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident, the Saitama Super Arena along with gymnasiums and other facilities was opened up by different municipalities to take in evacuees. The main challenge during this period included the identification of appropriate facilities and types of support needed to ensure the survival of evacuees.
2. Early period of evacuee life (April 2011–March 2012): In April 2011, officials established designated zones including restricted areas near the NPP; in Saitama Prefecture, evacuees began moving from evacuation shelters to public and other temporary housing. The temporary (rental) housing program was officially launched in August, marking the start of the extended period of evacuee life. The residents of Futaba Town who evacuated en masse to the Saitama Super Arena were moved to the former Kisai High School (which was not being used at the time) in Kazo City in northern Saitama, where some evacuees remained living until December of 2013. The main challenge during this period was how to provide support for daily life and to ensure continued interaction between evacuees after they each found places to live (see Fig. 8.8).
3. Extended evacuation period (April 2012–March 2017): April 2012 saw the reorganization of evacuation zones and the extension of the temporary (rental) housing program; as it became clearer that the evacuation period would be prolonged, a number of groups began support activities. Some supporters, for example, began providing relevant information to evacuees, while others and the evacuees themselves began hosting gatherings for evacuees to interact. In Saitama, meetings (Fukutama Meetings) were convened to bring together support organizations and evacuee groups in Saitama Prefecture. In addition, the local governments of evacuees' hometowns in Fukushima began working with support organizations to create groups whose goal was to prevent the isolation of evacuees by conducting home visits and related support work.
4. Period of exploration of evacuee support through public–private cooperation (April 2017 onward): While in the fifth year after the disaster the temporary housing program ended for voluntary evacuees and evacuees of the tsunami as well as a curtailing of evacuee support by host municipalities, the Reconstruction Agency and Fukushima Prefecture began working with support organizations to explore ways to continue providing evacuee support through, for example, the establishment of support hubs to help evacuees rebuild their lives. In parallel with efforts by the Reconstruction Agency and Fukushima Prefecture to implement new support programs designed by experts for targeted evacuation destinations, new forms of support governance based on public–private cooperation are being explored.

8.2.2 Vantage Point (2) for Analyzing Social Processes Related to Disasters: Social Units

The second critical viewpoint when analyzing social processes related to disasters has to do with which social units to use. For example, Barton (1969) proposed a segmentation of four social units consisting of (1) individuals, (2) small groups (families and neighborhood organizations), (3) formal organizations, and (4) states/regions/nation. He then constructed a matrix with these four social units against five time periods to comprehensively analyze the social process underlying disasters. Dynes and Quarantelli (1968) presented a classification of four organizational types based on whether the structure and function (task) of the organizations changed before and after the disaster (Table 8.2). Noda (1977) reviewed the knowledge assembled by the Ohio State University Disaster Research Center (currently the University of Delaware Disaster Research Center), which was the central hub of disaster sociology in the United States, including research by Dynes and Quarantelli.

Using the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 as a case study, Noda proposed the following classification of organizational responses to the changing task environment that can be described as one of increasing uncertainty, urgency, and interdependency (Noda 1997: 33–64). Type I organizations are established organizations, which are organizations whose structure, mission, and tasks do not change substantially during the emergency period from normal operations. In other words, during the disaster, such organizations continued to perform the roles that are expected of them during normal times. The police, firefighters, hospitals, local governments, utility companies, and other lifeline organizations fall into this category. This type of organization has a bureaucratic structure with a clearly defined organizational mission, power structure, and chain of command. As uncertainty increases during a disaster, established organizations seek to maximize efforts within the scope of their original activities by collecting information and shifting administrative staff to operations departments and other relevant positions. That said, because their tasks involve a certain level of expertise, such organizations tend to exclude outsiders and to limit efforts to what they are currently able to handle. Because normal decision-making processes are too slow to respond to the increased urgency that arises during a disaster, in some cases, decision-making functions in established organizations are delegated to entities that are in the affected area. However, there are many cases in which decision-making is delayed because it is not clear which department/section should take initiative and because the organizations are not equipped to coordinate efforts with other organizations. Furthermore, although the interdependence of these many kinds of organizations increases during a disaster, established organizations

Table 8.2 Four types of organizational response

		Task	
		Regular	Non-regular
Structure	Old	Type I Established	Type III Extending
	New	Type II Expanding	Type IV Emergent

Source: Dynes and Quarantelli (1968)

are hesitant to take on activities that are not directly related to their core tasks, especially after the emergency phase has passed. They thus try to maintain their organizational boundaries even when doing so goes against the wishes of other institutions and organizations.

Type II organizations, expanding organizations, are those that develop plans for how the organization will act *ex ante* and carry out those action plans when a disaster occurs. In addition, while such organizations have only a few staff members during normal times who are involved in management, they recruit large numbers of volunteers during disasters and carry out specific tasks while restructuring and expanding their organizations. The Red Cross is a perfect example of such an organization.

Expanding organizations are more subject to increasing uncertainty during disasters than established organizations (type I). This is not only because the routes for information collection are not as firmly fixed as in the case of established organizations but also because expanding organizations grow in size as they take on volunteers, which makes the control of information difficult. Furthermore, because the knowledge and skill level of disaster support volunteers varies and because the tasks expected of volunteers are not clear, in many cases, the volunteers are unsure of what to do. That said, under such circumstances, cooperation between organizations sometimes emerges as a consequence of the overlap of different organizations' boundaries. For example, the "Nishinomiya-style"[3] of coordination between the local government and volunteers that emerged after the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 has subsequently served as a lesson on the importance of coordinating volunteers during a disaster.

It has also been pointed out that, in such organizations, problems related to decision-making responsibility and authority can occur in the context of increasing urgency. Specifically, individuals who do not have organizational responsibility are often called on to make decisions, despite not having the necessary information or without understanding normal decision-making patterns, resulting in a scattering of decision-making processes that complicates subsequent coordination efforts. In addition, even if new organizations with appropriate authority and functions may be needed during a disaster, in the context of increasing urgency, existing organizations sometimes slide in to fill those voids using their social status before the disaster as a basis for their authority.

Type III organizations, extending organizations, are those that do not have action plans for disasters but whose tasks change during a disaster, although their structure does not change. This category includes existing organizations and groups that carry out their usual functions to fulfill tasks that are needed during a disaster. This describes the role of construction companies during reconstruction and the role of department stores that provide shelter and food immediately after a disaster.

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[3]The human resources department of the Nishinomiya City government was tasked with keeping track of the number of volunteers needed by each section and for communicating with volunteer organizations about where volunteers should be deployed.

According to Noda (1977: 38–39), in previous research on disaster-related organizations, extending organizations were considered to be outside the scope of research because they did not clearly fall into any of the other organizational categories and because the activities of individuals belonging to extending organizations (e.g., the deployment of Boy Scouts as messengers), while undeniably important during a disaster, did not represent activities carried out by organizations, and therefore were not the target of research.

Extending organizations have nothing to do with disasters during normal times. In the context of increasing uncertainty during a disaster, such organizations often suspend their normal operations and activities. However, depending on the level of urgency during a disaster, the members of an extending organization may, in some cases, be driven by a concern for others to provide disaster support. In other cases, extending organizations may carry out activities at the request of established organizations (type I).

Type IV organizations, emergent organizations, are those that are established after a disaster occurs and carry out support and supplemental activities in areas affected by the disaster. These organizations do not exist before a disaster, and many are temporary organizations that disband after the emergency phase has passed. However, such organizations have a substantial impact on the circumstances of a disaster and are important. Examples of emergent organizations include search and rescue teams that work in disaster-affected areas and committee-type organizations comprising the representatives of the main support organizations that are formed in the early stages of a disaster to conduct coordination, etc. Evacuee support organizations and neighborhood councils formed by evacuees also fall into this category.

Such emergent organizations tend to appear when there is insufficient coordination between organizations after a disaster, when the power structures of existing organizations do not allow them to function effectively, or when existing social systems do not work for responding to the disaster. As discussed above, the main responders to disasters, established organizations (type I), seek to maintain their ability to carry out their own activities with self-consistency; they avoid taking on responsibilities that are beyond their existing capabilities, and they avoid the risk of taking on too much responsibility. In other words, emergent organizations play a supplementary role to established organizations.

The majority of emergent organizations disappear after the state of emergency has passed. This is because, by that time, existing organizations have become able to carry out disaster response and many of the members of such emergent organizations have returned to their original workplaces. However, some emergent organizations continue to exist even after the initial disaster; this happens in cases where there is an ongoing need for the work carried out by the emergent organization and in cases where the organization is able to secure personnel and other necessary resources, is recognized for carrying out suitable activities, and is able to establish a pattern of mutually beneficial interaction with other organizations.

I will use the four organizational types described above as social units in the case studies of disaster processes presented in this chapter.

8.2.3 New Developments in Disaster Sociology and Adaptive Governance Theory

According to a review of research trends in the USA from the 1960s to 2018 by Daimon and Atsumi (2019), new developments in disaster sociology emerged from research on the disaster responses to the coordinated terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center that occurred on September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In this section, I will describe these new developments and their relevance to this chapter.

First, research on the disaster response to Hurricane Katrina led to an expansion of focus from just the period immediately after a disaster to the mid- and long-term issues arising from the disaster. More than 70,000 people were forced to evacuate as a result of Hurricane Katrina. As many of the individuals who lost their homes were from the lowest economic classes, relevant socioeconomic issues related to the "resettlement" of evacuees have been discussed. On this point, there is much overlap with the issues facing evacuees from the NPP accident. I would like to point out here that, although there is a tendency for disaster research to focus on the period just before and just after a disaster, efforts to find concrete solutions to issues related to recovery from a medium- to long-term perspectives represent a new theoretical and empirical tide in disaster sociology and that the present study is a part of that tide.

Next, one of the central points of discussion related to the coordinated terrorist attacks[4] is the role of improvisation in disaster response. It is suggested that disaster response should not be carried out according to a playbook created before the fact but, rather, should be viewed as an "art" in the broad sense of the word in which emphasis should be placed on the senses and skills of those on the ground. It has been proposed that different types of improvisation exist: These include "reproductive improvisation," wherein responses are reproduced based on existing visions and action policies of organizations but using different methods, "creative improvisation," wherein responses are related to but not exactly the same as existing responses, and "adaptive improvisation," which lies somewhere between "reproductive" and "creative" improvisation (Wachtendorf and Kendra 2012).

Table 8.3 represents organizational models for disaster response based on improvisation (Daimon and Atsumi 2019: 31). Daimon and Atsumi point out that the organizational theory based on the "improvisational-autonomous model" has been highlighted in disaster sociology in the USA and represents the ideal form of disaster response.

Organizational theory based on the improvisational–autonomous model should address questions such as an "under what circumstances" and "by which

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[4]One more point that has received much attention in discussions on the disaster response to the coordinated terrorist attacks is the relationship between communities and organizational resilience after the attacks. For example, it has been demonstrated that even though organizations involved in disaster response were devastated by the attacks, the ability to respond to crises remained intact thanks to the cooperation between communities and organizations that had been cultivated up to that point.

Table 8.3 Organizational models for disaster response

	A: Management-control model	B: Improvisational-autonomous model
Predicted behavior	Disorder and chaos	Cooperation and coordination
Chain of command	Management and control	Improvisation and autonomy
Organizations that should respond	New response organizations	Enhancement and coordination of existing organizations
Organizational structure	Authoritarian or military-style/tree-style	Decentralized, autonomous decision-making/rhizome-type
Policy during emergencies	Avoidance of chaos	Problem resolution
Organizational creation	According to manual	Issue-dependent
Organizational transformation	Change to achieve fixed state	Change dynamically

Source: Daimon and Atsumi (2019: 31)

organizations" improvisational and autonomous disaster response has been carried out. The circumstances of evacuees from the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident who are scattered across the country, which is the subject of this research, are such that the response has required repeated reconfiguration of support solutions through trial and error and the creation of adaptive support mechanisms. It has been necessary to provide a wide range of types of evacuee support and to respond adaptively to all evacuees, who differ in terms of place of origin, gender, generation, occupation, economic power, family structure, and social relations while also keeping pace with changes over time in the evacuees' circumstances and evacuee support policies.

In this next, I attempt to analyze the social processes related to disaster, focusing on processes regarding evacuee support by examining the relationships among the four types of organizations involved in disaster response as social units in each of the time periods discussed above from the perspectives of local governance and adaptive governance.

First, let us define local governance as "the aggregate of the diverse and interconnected systems, institutions, practices, missions, ties and relations implemented by local governments, business entities, NGOs, and NPOs for socially relevant strategic purposes—i.e., the multitiered composite of schemes comprising conflict, compromise, and coordination" (Yoshihara 2002: 96). Society is becoming increasingly complex, and people's needs for governmental administration are becoming increasingly diverse and sophisticated. At the same time, governments are finding it increasingly difficult to provide administrative services at the levels required due to deteriorating fiscal circumstances. In this context, political scientists and sociologists have pointed out the importance of "governance" wherein diverse stakeholders play appropriate roles in governing as opposed to "government" wherein the administrative state alone is responsible. It is especially important to understand forms of governance involving diverse stakeholders in the case of

support for evacuees from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident because the national government, in the form of the Reconstruction Agency, and Fukushima Prefecture have implemented relevant support initiatives in collaboration with non-governmental support organizations. I attempt to analyze how diverse stakeholders (disaster response organizations) have provided support to evacuees from the NPP accident while cooperating, clashing, negotiating, and compromising. In terms of organizational theory based on the improvisational–autonomous model, what I am endeavoring to do is to analyze the process by which rhizome-type organizational structures—grassroots, contextual, and situationally spontaneous structures that meet demand in appropriate stages of the disaster—are formed and issue-based organizations are created through the enhancement and coordination of existing organizations. That said, it has been pointed out that governance involving diverse stakeholders ends up complementing existing power structures and can create ambiguity in terms of the respective boundaries and responsibilities of public and private sectors (Yoshihara 2002: 102). When discussing local governance of evacuee support, such dilemmas are also included in analysis.

Furthermore, because the evacuees come from all sociological walks of life, it is necessary to adjust the content and methods of evacuee support through trial and error and to take an adaptive approach to evacuee support governance. In this regard, the discourse on adaptive governance, which is an approach that has been taken in environmental protection whereby methods are flexibly adjusted through a process of trial and error while respecting the pluralistic values of local communities, has proven informative. Miyauchi (2013) identified three conditions for ensuring adaptive governance: (1) guarantee of trial and error and dynamism, (2) setting of pluralistic values and multiple goals, and (3) recontextualization in local communities through investigative activities and learning by a wide range of local residents. Furthermore, Miyauchi (2017) explained that the three following points were important for "adaptive process management," which entails ensuring that processes remain adaptive in the face of uncertainty and continue to move. The first is to guarantee "multiplicity" in terms of setting multiple "common goals" that the parties involved can agree on as they come up, utilizing multiple methods in parallel, and creating multiple schemes. When doing so, it is also important to allow some wiggle room—some adaptiveness—to deviate from plans (Miyauchi 2017: 20–22). The second is "evaluation," which is needed to "continuously monitor what impacts one's activities and projects are having and what one has achieved in order to assess whether process is generally on track or not and to determine where efforts should be concentrated next" (Miyauchi 2017: 23–24). The third is "learning." According to Miyauchi (2017: 24–25), "Learning generates various social values. Because learning is usually carried out in groups, it promotes mutual understanding and trust among participants. It also facilitates the building of consensus within communities. Learning also promotes connections with outsiders (experts, local governments, other organizations, other communities, etc.) and encourages the creation of networks, which, in turn, facilitate the occurrence of "chain reactions" among communities and stakeholders."

That said that it is not expected that adaptive process management in terms of the setting of common goals, evaluation, and learning can be carried out by a single organization. In a context where the composition of stakeholders, methods used, and the values driving activities are context-sensitive and changing in real time, the process cannot be managed by a single organization with fixed methods and goals. Instead, what is important in the context of rapidly changing sets of stakeholders, social units, methods, and values is the role of connecting these core social components. In other words, some entity is needed to connect stakeholders, methods, and evaluations. A "mediator" is needed to, for example, connect values with other values, people with other people, to mutually translate external and internal values, and to pick up the diverse views of different stakeholders (Miyauchi 2017: 26).

The mediator in adaptive governance theory could be likened to the conductor of an orchestra.[5] The role of a conductor is to coordinate the members of a professional orchestra and to direct the music in an appropriate direction while taking into consideration the audience's reaction and each section of the orchestra—each stakeholder group. The conductor, after presenting his or her vision of the "ideal performance," leads the orchestra in an effort to jointly create the "ideal performance" while at times being criticized by orchestra members, with the goal of receiving applause from the audience for a good performance. If we apply this metaphor to the adaptive governance in the context of evacuee support, the orchestra members are the nongovernmental support organizations. The audience is the evacuees. The conductor might be a governmental entity in some instances or a nongovernmental organization in others. The role of the conductor is to envision an "ideal support system" while taking the state of evacuee support at the time into consideration and to lead the effort to implement that vision.

If we consider the discussion of adaptive governance, above, in conjunction with that related to disaster-focused organizations in conventional disaster sociology, the challenge of this chapter is to examine learning and knowledge accumulation by disaster-related organizations and evacuee support organizations regarding evacuees and methods for supporting them, how this knowledge has impacted adaptive support activities, and what entities have carried out adaptive process management related to evacuee support.

8.2.4 Methodology

In addition to conducting interviews and written questionnaire surveys of governmental entities, support organizations, and evacuee groups, I have also carried out collaborative research that combines participant observation and action research. My use of various research methods is the result of changing relationships between myself, research subjects, and the field.

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[5]The idea for an orchestra as a metaphor for organizational theory was inspired by Hirata (2010).

After the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident, I began conducting interviews of evacuees in Saitama Prefecture, support organizations, and local governments in Saitama. Later, in March 2013, I became involved with the editing and publishing of an information magazine known as *Fukutama Tayori* for evacuees living in Saitama Prefecture. While conducting questionnaire surveys of evacuees and local governments and publishing the results of these surveys in *Fukutama Tayori*, I also engaged in participant observation while helping to manage Fukutama Meetings that brought together evacuee groups and support organizations. Further, in March 2016, I set up an NPO called the Saitama Wide-area Evacuee Support Center and began developing proposals for submission to the national government, Fukushima Prefecture, and Saitama Prefecture while being contracted by the Recovery Agency and Fukushima Prefecture to provide evacuee support. My efforts, outlined above, are what Yamori (2010) terms action research, which he defines as "collaborative social practice carried out by researchers and subjects of research who share a vision for society" and pointed out the importance of researchers "intervening" in their "field sites" to promote changes aimed at the realization of a more ideal society (Yamori 2010: 11). By this definition, the evacuee support research that I am currently engaged in is action research.

In sociological research, it is often said that researchers need to maintain a certain distance from their subjects to avoid the problem of "over-rapport," referring to the difficulty in obtaining objective data when one becomes too close to one's subjects. However, I chose to engage in action research for this study because I made the judgment that, if I want to understand the state of support for evacuees on a deeper level, I need to be on the frontlines of evacuee support. In addition, although many studies related to evacuees and support for evacuees have been conducted for scholarly purposes, on numerous occasions, I have heard evacuees and supporters criticize such studies as "not serving any practical purpose." Putting it the other way around, I chose to proactively engage in support activities because I asked myself "what can I do as a sociologist?" Since then, I have been searching for ways of conducting research that will contribute to the evacuees and support activities. It is through this process that I came to ask how support schemes for evacuees generated by the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident have evolved over time in Saitama Prefecture, which did not have experience with major disasters or with the governance of support based on public–private cooperation, and what the challenges of such collaborations and efforts are.

In the sections that follow, I divide the time since the occurrence of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident into four periods and analyze the relationships between disaster-related organizations (the national government, Fukushima Prefecture and municipalities within Fukushima, Saitama Prefecture and municipalities within Saitama, support organizations, evacuee groups) and the types of evacuee support they have provided during each period.

8.3   Case Studies—Evolution of Governance Related to Evacuee Support in Saitama Prefecture[6]

8.3.1   Emergency Evacuation Period (March 11–31, 2011)

8.3.1.1 Evacuee Response by Municipalities in Saitama Prefecture

On March 15, 2011, four days after the Great East Japan Earthquake, Fukushima Prefecture put out a request to all prefectural governments asking them to take in evacuees. Saitama Prefecture instructed municipalities under its jurisdiction to take in evacuees, resulting in the establishment of evacuation shelters around the prefecture. Coordination of local residents who gathered at such evacuation shelters to volunteer was carried out by the Saitama Prefecture Social Welfare Council, which is an expanding organization (type II). However, the majority of municipalities in Saitama had not considered the possibility of taking in evacuees from prefectures other than Saitama. That said, after the NPP accident, a number of municipalities in Saitama were able to provide comprehensive and detailed support to evacuees who arrived with nothing but the clothes on their backs. What enabled government entities, which are the epitome of established organizations (type I), to respond to these unanticipated circumstances?

First, it can be said that mutual-aid interventions had been agreed on between some municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture and municipalities in Saitama Prefecture. Mutual aid is an approach to disaster support that was utilized after the Great Sichuan Earthquake of 2008 wherein municipalities that have established sister-city agreements or friendly relations as a result of some connection agree to support each other's administrative functions if one of the municipalities suffers a disaster. For example, Sugito Town in Saitama and Tomioka Town in Fukushima began sports exchanges of elementary students in 1996 and entered into a friendship-city agreement in 2010. Although there was no official mutual-aid agreement between the towns, it was understood that, if one of the towns experienced a disaster, the other would provide assistance. Misato City in Saitama and Hirono Town in Fukushima had entered into a mutual-aid agreement in the event of a disaster in 2008. That said, as revealed by city workers of Misato City who explained, "although we thought that there might be a chance that Misato residents would evacuate to Hirono, we didn't imagine the opposite occurring," Misato City had not considered the possibility of taking in evacuees from Hirono Town.

Such mutual-aid arrangements made it possible for relief supplies to be sent to Fukushima immediately after the NPP accident and for Fukushima residents to evacuate *en masse* to Saitama Prefecture. At the evacuation shelters, immediate and comprehensive support related to food, clothing, shelter, and health care was able to be provided thanks to cooperation between the public employees of the host municipalities and local volunteers. Little by little, evacuation shelters began to close in April 2011 as the evacuees moved into rental housing. Sugito Town and Misato

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[6]This section was based on Chaps. 2–5 in Nishikido and Harada (2019).

City continued to operate evacuation shelters for a relatively long period until all of the evacuees had found alternative housing and did not take any steps to forcibly move evacuees out of the shelters. Even after the evacuees left the shelters, these municipalities continued to provide livelihood support, employment support, and to check in on evacuees.

However, there is a problem with such mutual aid: namely, that although aid is likely to reach residents in municipalities having such agreements, there is a possibility that aid will not reach residents of municipalities that do not have such agreements. For example, while the satisfaction of Tomioka Town evacuees who were able to receive counterpart aid is extremely high, Misato City prioritized the intake of evacuees from Tomioka Town and, in some cases, refused to take in evacuees from other regions. As explained by a Sugito City employee who dealt with evacuees firsthand, "They are all evacuees. I don't understand why they should be treated differently. I had to make extremely tough decisions." A widespread, large-scale disaster, especially if it is a composite disaster, may generate an unexpectedly large number of evacuees. Given the uneven geographic distribution of aid, it is necessary to reexamine the appropriateness of mutual-aid relationships as an administrative response mechanism in times of emergency.

Second, the initiative of the mayors of municipalities that took in evacuees enabled aid to be provided flexibly during the emergency period. For example, in addition to the abovementioned Sugito Town and Misato City, the mayor of Sayama City announced that the city would take in 100 evacuee households and adopted a policy whereby Sayama City assumed payment of 50,000 JPY worth of monthly rent for six months and the security deposit and key money.

Third, the smoothness with which evacuee aid was provided during this period depend on the administrative department within the local government that was responsible for carrying out the aid. The main role of disaster response departments in local governments is crisis management. As such, dealing with evacuees from other places falls outside their responsibility. For example, when nongovernmental support groups asked disaster response departments—whose duty is crisis management—to hand out flyers announcing events or aid for evacuees, the fliers often never made into the hands of the evacuees. This is a problem of compartmentalized administration, the narrow specialization of disaster response departments not being useful in terms of providing aid to evacuees from other places. This problem has also been pointed out in discussions on institutional responses in the field of disaster sociology.

To begin with, not all local governments have designated departments responsible for evacuee support. As such, in the case of a disaster, it is necessary to assign a department or section to manage the implementation of aid or to respond via supplemental or alternate mechanisms outside of normal operations. In the case of the municipalities in Saitama that I investigated, departments were able to provide evacuee support flexibly if they were able to coordinate the activities of multiple departments within the government, either because they were already engaged in general affair-type work or were under the direct control of the mayor.

For example, in Koshigaya City, the crisis management department dealt with evacuees immediately after the earthquake. However, the lodging of numerous demands and complaints by citizens' groups regarding aid led the Mayor's Office and the Public Information Section to take over, which made it possible for the government to implement measures that cut across different sections. In another example, although crisis management departments tend to be separated from departments responsible for human services, in Misato City crisis management is dealt by the Security Promotion Section, which is an office in the Planning and Administration Division in the Resident Services Department. This enabled the government to develop an overall plan for evacuee aid and to implement flexible support that was not compartmentalized within a disaster management section.

In addition, the ability of governments to identify what they can and cannot do and to then establish schemes for cooperating with nongovernmental entities was the key to being able to implement flexible support for evacuees. When municipal governments were responsible for providing relevant support services related to the hosting of evacuees, flexible support was observed when the department providing the support was not one that is normally engaged in planning and management but, rather, one that is responsible for human services or one that has similar capacities and experience. This facilitated the taking up of disaster survivors' and supporters' views and cooperation with nongovernment volunteers. In April 2011, Sugito Town changed the section responsible for evacuee support from the Policy Section to the Resident Participation Promotion Section. By putting the Mayor's Office and the Public Information Section in charge, Koshigaya City was able to hear the voices of the supporters and evacuees and to provide comprehensive aid. In Higashimatsuyama City, the Community Development Section in the Community Life Department, which serves as a contact point for nongovernmental organizations, divvied up tasks with the Social Welfare Council and other entities and implemented public–private joint evacuee support. In other words, a condition for administrative departments to be able to create innovative and adaptive support schemes is that they have already established relations with diverse stakeholders including citizens' groups as a part of everyday operations.

8.3.1.2 Activities by Nongovernmental Support Organizations for Evacuees Who Evacuated *En Masse*

Upon receiving the request from the Fukushima prefectural government to host evacuees, the Saitama prefectural government found itself having to respond to the residents of Futaba Town, Fukushima, who had evacuated to the Saitama Super Arena along with the town's government. The Saitama Super Arena was opened as an evacuation shelter for 16 days from March 16 to 31, 2011, at its peak hosting approximately 2500 individuals including the entire population of Futaba Town and its government. Thanks in part to its easy accessibility, and the Saitama Super Arena was swamped by crowds, which on some days exceeded 1000 individuals, offering to volunteer.

Next, let us examine what kinds of support activities were carried out by expanding organizations (type II) and extending organizations (type III), and how

emergent organizations (type IV) formed. In addition, using specific examples, I will discuss what kinds of relationships these organizations had with Saitama Prefecture, which is an established organization (type I).

At the point that it opened up the evacuation shelter on March 16, Saitama Prefecture's policy was limited to providing shelter and blankets to evacuees and the prefecture was hesitant about providing food and recruiting volunteers. What breathed new life into this policy was the volunteers. On March 17, members of the Antipoverty Network Saitama, a group that provides support to individuals who have lost their jobs and homes as a result of being laid off, visited the Saitama Super Arena and set up the Shinsei Shein [Earthquake Disaster Support] Network Saitama (SSN) together with a lawyers' committee, a judicial clerks committee, a suicide prevention hotline called Inochi No Denwa, and an NPO called Hot Pot, which provides livelihood assistance to those living in poverty. The SSN was an emergent organization (type IV) whose members included a wide range of extending organizations (type III).

On March 18, discussions between SSN members, various volunteer groups, and the Saitama Social Welfare Council, an expanding organization (type II), which had been asked by Saitama Prefecture to provide assistance, resulted in the establishment of the Volunteer Station that consisted of individuals with experience running disaster volunteer centers. The division of roles related to evacuee support was also discussed, which resulted in the formation of the following subgroups. The "meal preparation group" included the Junior Chamber Saitama, Chamber of Commerce, and consumer cooperatives; the "goods and allocation group" included the Saitama Social Welfare Council and the Saitama Worker's Welfare Council; the "information group" included Hands On! Saitama, an NPO that carries out community development and intermediate support activities in Saitama Prefecture, along with the high school and university students who assembled in support of this NPO; the "childcare group" included the Sainoko Children's Network, an NPO that supports childrearing and their volunteer members; and the "consultation group," which included the SNN, lawyers, judicial clerks, and a range of professionals such as licensed social workers and clinical psychologists. General volunteers who did not belong to a specific group carried out support activities including the delivery of relief supplies. The Saitama Social Welfare Council was responsible for organizing the volunteers.

Problems related to evacuee support and solutions were discussed on a daily basis by the Volunteer Station, and groups with new roles were formed as needed. For example, with the arrival of the residents of Futaba Town on March 19, it soon became evident that care for the elderly was needed. A new "welfare group" was formed that included members with care-providing qualification from the "childcare group." In another example, on March 19, after receiving notice that the residents of Futaba Town would be evacuating *en masse*, Saitama Prefecture announced that it would provide meals to the evacuees and asked for volunteers. In this process, the Volunteer Station was joined by the Johokankyo, a general incorporated association that carried out activities that differed from those of other organizations associated with the Volunteer Station. This organization carried out support tasks that included

handing out information to evacuees from Iwaki City taken from the Iwaki City Disaster Response Headquarters website and, at the request of the Futaba Town government, creating a list of evacuees from Futaba Town. In other words, this group carried out activities using the Internet that supplemented the efforts of the Futaba Town government, which had evacuated to the Saitama Super Arena, and the Iwaki City government, which had remained in Fukushima Prefecture. On March 21, the Minna No Gakko [School for Everyone] aimed at providing educational instruction and recreational activities for K-12 students was set up under the leadership of an NPO group, the Supporting Union for Practical Use of Educational Resources. Many retired teachers, university students, and high school students participated in the program as volunteers.

As can be seen from the above, support activities at the Saitama Super Arena were carried out by groups that differed in terms of their normal activities and organizational characteristics. The groups discussed the problems related to evacuee support and ways to solve these problems on a daily basis and used their respective know-how accumulated through past activities in order to provide "improvisational" support. The organization of the meal preparation group had a network for procuring foodstuffs and restaurants to use these ingredients to begin providing meals immediately. The SNN, which provided a wide range of support as part of the consultation group, was able to adapt support activities carried out by the Antipoverty Network Saitama before the disaster that targeted low-income individuals who had lost their jobs and homes. The SNN utilized its existing network of lawyers and clinical psychologists to provide support to evacuees. These support activities can be classified as "reproductive improvisation" in which activities that are generally in line with the original missions and action policies of the organization are carried out in a different manner. In contrast, the support activities of groups such as Hands On! Saitama in the information group and Johokankyo were completely new and could be classified as "creative improvisation." They provided information services to address a support need that is unique to evacuee shelters by adapting the organization's normal community development activities, mobilizing large numbers of student volunteers, and providing/sharing information with evacuees. With the help of volunteers with experience caring for the elderly, the Sainoko Children's Network, which played a central role in the childcare and welfare groups, engaged in nursing care activities with which they had no previous experience. This is an example of adaptive improvisation, which lies somewhere between reproductive and creative improvisation. It is in the manner described above that wide-ranging and rapid support activities came to be provided by nongovernmental support organizations.

Meanwhile, what was the relationship between the support provided primarily by nongovernmental support organizations associated with Volunteer Station and the support activities carried out by Saitama Prefecture on March 19 and subsequently? The two provided support independently, and this duplication of efforts remained until the end. For example, individuals responsible for evacuee support from the Saitama prefectural government did not participate in meetings of the Volunteer Station groups, and organizations associated with the Volunteer Station were not

permitted to participate in meetings of the Saitama Disaster Response Headquarters despite requesting to do so. As such, the two entities were unable to share information, which led to redundancies in food and relief supplies, confusion regarding information, and inadequate management of the many volunteers who came to Saitama Super Arena to help. Harada (Harada 2019a, b, c: 86) points out that this occurred because Saitama Prefecture approached support activities at the Saitama Super Arena as an extension of its normal duties. The sections within the Saitama prefectural government that was put in charge of support activities at the Saitama Super Arena were not sections related to disaster prevention and disaster management but, rather, the urban development section, which managed the Saitama Super Arena, and the social welfare section. These two sections responded as best they could while trying to figure out what to do. As pointed out by Dynes and Quarantelli (1968), decision-making is delayed in situations where it is not clear which section of governmental entities is supposed to take initiative. In the case of the Saitama Super Arena, although the Saitama prefectural government tacitly consented to Volunteer Station's support activities, nongovernmental organizations were not allowed to participate in decision-making related to evacuee support. This was a consequence of the sections in question of the Saitama Prefecture acting as an established organization (type I) and attempting to maintain the boundaries of their own organizations and was one of the main factors that prevented resolution of the duplication of efforts.

With the closing of the evacuation shelter on March 31, the Volunteer Station and the Saitama Prefecture Disaster Response Headquarters were dissolved and evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture was left for a short time without a headquarters. Support activities were subsequently continued by organizations that had been involved in the Saitama Super Arena.

8.3.2 Early Period of Evacuee Life (April 2011 to March 2012)

8.3.2.1 Uneven Distribution of Governmental Evacuee Support

As evidenced by the closing of the evacuee shelter set up in the Saitama Super Arena on March 31, shelters set up to house evacuees from the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident tended to be short-lived. This is because of the experience after the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 where public facilities could not be used for a prolonged period due to their continued use as evacuee shelters. That said, in Saitama Prefecture, the municipalities that had mutual-aid arrangements discussed in Sect. 8.1 (Sugito Town, Misato City) operated evacuee shelters for a relatively long time. The 1200 residents of Futaba Town who had evacuated to the Saitama Super Arena were relocated *en masse* to a former high school building in Kazo City located in the north of Saitama Prefecture. This evacuation shelter was operated continuously until December 2013. Kazo City provided mutual aid to Futaba Town.

The Japanese government took steps to partially or completely exempt the medical and educational expenses of evacuees, while the Japanese Red Cross

Society provided six types of household appliances: washing machines, refrigerators, televisions, rice cookers, microwave ovens, and electric water boilers. Local governments provided housing and basic livelihood support in accordance with the Disaster Relief Act. However, more detailed support was needed to be able to carry out everyday tasks, in some cases, differences could be seen in the support provided by different municipalities. For example, Saitama Prefecture is warmer than Fukushima Prefecture, and air conditioners are essential in the summer. However, air conditioners were not included in the six appliances provided by the Japanese Red Cross Society. In addition, voluntary evacuees who were staying with relatives were not eligible to receive appliances from the Red Cross Society. That said that local governments were prohibited from directly providing household appliances such as air conditioners to individual evacuees because doing so would constitute the government contributing to a private individual's assets. As such, some municipal governments reached out to local social welfare councils, asking them to provide support to help evacuees obtain air conditioners or to collect donations from city residents to purchase air conditioners and deliver them to the evacuees (e.g., Koshigaya City). This is an example of the local government (type I organization) supplementing the work of the Red Cross Society, which is an expanding organization (type II) through a third expanding organization (type II).

As another example of public support provided to evacuees, some host municipalities adopted policies to exempt evacuees from having to pay water and sewage fees. In Tokyo, for a certain period, exemption from paying water and sewage fees was implemented across the board, in all special wards and municipalities. However, in Saitama Prefecture, some municipalities implemented similar exemptions, while others did not. Similarly, other types of livelihood support, including the distribution of donated money and everyday supplies or the provision of help in finding employment, were provided by some municipalities but not others. In other words, the types of livelihood support an evacuee could receive depended on the municipality to which they had been evacuated.

Furthermore, there was a concern that if the evacuees leaving the evacuee shelter all moved in together in temporary (rental) housing, and the evacuees would find themselves isolated if they had fewer opportunities to interact both with other evacuees and the local residents. Along with Sugito Town, Misato City, and Kazo City, which had counterpart aid arrangements, Fujimino City and Koshigaya City carried out home visits to individual evacuees in order to confirm that they were okay. In particular, Koshigaya City established a system in which the evacuees themselves would keep an eye on evacuees. The system was set up because the city had received requests from evacuee groups and questionnaire surveys to create employment for evacuees. As discussed in Sect. 8.3.1.1, this example illustrates how municipalities with mechanisms in place to hear the requests of evacuees were able to provide adaptive support.

8.3.2.2 Remobilization of Nongovernmental Support Organizations and Establishment of Evacuee Groups

The nongovernmental support groups that had provided support at the Saitama Super Arena held meetings to try to continue providing support cooperatively after the evacuees from Futaba Town had relocated to the former high school building in Kazo City. In the end, however, each group ended up making separate arrangements with the Futaba Town government to provide support. That is, the consultation group ended up providing legal and livelihood consultations, while the welfare group provided volunteers to listen to the evacuees, the information group created an evacuee information database, the meal preparation group provided one meal a week, and the supplies group provided supplies, all based on their experience at the Saitama Super Arena.

The SSN, which had been responsible for providing consultations at the Saitama Super Arena, presented recommendations to the Governor of Saitama Prefecture on April 4, 2011, regarding mechanisms for evacuee support that should be put into place. The recommendations consisted of the establishment of a public–private joint task force and the creation of a prefecture-wide public–private joint consultation system to enable continuous response to the evacuees' diverse needs. In response to the proposal, Saitama Prefecture called to establish Disaster Response Coordination Council. The SNN, together with the Saitama Bar Association, assumed the task of assembling such a council. Members of the Disaster Response Coordination Council included Saitama Prefecture along with eight municipalities in Saitama; 11 nongovernmental support organizations, many of which had provided support at the Saitama Super Arena; and nine professional associations including the Saitama Bar Association, the Saitama Judicial Scrivener Society, the Saitama Society of Certified Clinical Psychologists, and the Saitama Society of Certified Social Workers. This council, which was convened 13 times between July 2011 and June 2013, enabled governments, nongovernmental organizations, and professional associations to share information on the current state of evacuee support. Although the (1) establishment of a clearinghouse for information on the support available to individual evacuees, (2) creation of a comprehensive consultation system to enable response to requests for consultation in all areas, and (3) the regular convening of a public–private joint task force were proposed as a framework for the provision of support, no such platform for coordination with practical ability was ever created.

At the same time, numerous evacuee organizations have formed throughout Saitama Prefecture. These evacuee organizations can be divided into six types depending on whether their members live together in a single housing complex or are dispersed and whether the organization was formed under the guidance of the government, support volunteers, or the evacuees themselves (Harada 2019a, b, c). Eleven evacuee organizations existed in Saitama Prefecture during the period from March 2011 to March 2012 (Table 8.4, Fig. 8.6).

It can be seen that, in regions where evacuees lived together in clusters, although some evacuee organizations were formed by governments (A1), many were formed by the evacuees themselves (E1 to E4). In all of the evacuee organizations, an

Given the vulnerability of evacuees to becoming isolated, it was important in this period for local governments hosting the evacuees to keep track of where the evacuees were living in order to help create evacuee networks. That said, in reality, it was the nongovernmental support groups and the evacuees themselves that carried out the role that local governments should have performed. It should also be noted that some organizations (A1, D2, and E3), which made requests to local governments to improve living conditions for evacuees, also played a role as advocates.

8.3.3   Extended Evacuation Period (April 2012 to March 2017)

8.3.3.1 Decline of Governmental Livelihood Support with Prolongation of Evacuation Life

After the earthquake disaster, local governments in Saitama Prefecture provided a wide range of livelihood support. However, this livelihood support declined with the protraction of the evacuation period. Figure 8.7 shows the change over time in livelihood support provided by local governments in Saitama to evacuees from 2014 up to 2018. It can be seen that, although local governments continued to provide livelihood support for five years after the earthquake, the number of such support programs has declined since 2016.

Municipalities in Saitama were struggling with the question of "how long and what types of special treatment should be given to evacuees?" Whether or not to provide special support to evacuees is left up to the discretion of each municipality. For example, in 2016, the Saitama prefectural government implemented a policy that gave preferential treatment to voluntary evacuees applying to live in housing under prefectural management. That said, Saitama Prefecture's governance of evacuee support overall has been unclear, and the question of what kind of support municipalities should provide to evacuees has been completely delegated to local governments. Under such circumstances, nongovernmental organizations gradually assumed a central role in providing evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture.

8.3.3.2 Expansion of Nongovernmental Support Organizations and Evacuee Groups

The support organizations that continued to carry out support activities even as the evacuation became protracted were the various organizations that provided support at the Saitama Super Arena. For example, the SSN, which was part of the consultation group at Saitama Super Arena, continued to provide phone consultations and professional referrals. The Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare, which was a part of the goods and allocation group, continued to distribute goods received from companies and other donors to the evacuees and to host events and social gatherings for evacuees. The Saitama Coop, which was a part of the meal preparation group, hosted cookouts and gatherings for evacuees. In addition, amid the prolonging evacuation period, these organizations supported the activities of the various evacuee groups that formed in Saitama Prefecture.

Distribution of public relations
Distribution of information magazines and event information
Health Checkups and Vaccinations
Exemption from water charges
Exemption from sewerage charges
Individual visits and telephone calls
Distribution of free tickets and discount tickets for buses
Financial support for kindergartens and nursery schools
Distribution of gift certificates, rice vouchers, free citizen pool tickets, etc.
Holding of exchange meetings
Distribution of donations and household goods

0   5   10   15   20   25   30   35

■ Jan 2014 ■ Jan 2015 ■ Jan 2016 ■ Jan 2017 ■ Jan 2018 ■ Jan 2019

Fig. 8.7 Changes in life support by local governments in Saitama Prefecture

Since April 2012, 18 evacuee groups have formed in Saitama Prefecture (Table 8.5, Fig. 8.8). This is because, during the protracting of the evacuation period, activities to prevent the isolation of evacuees, particularly those living apart from other evacuees, were carried out separately under the leadership of governments, support volunteers, and the evacuees themselves. For example, some evacuee groups were formed in several locations (C1, D5, D6, F5, etc.) after being inspired by an evacuee gathering hosted by a nongovernmental organization; in other cases, evacuees who were active in evacuee gatherings formed new evacuee groups after moving to a different location (F7, F8). Some groups formed whose members consisted of individuals from the same hometown who ended up in different evacuation destinations throughout Saitama Prefecture (F4, F9, F10), while other evacuee groups that were formed by volunteers in the early evacuation period have continued to carry out activities while the leadership has been taken over by the evacuees themselves (D1 → F2, D2 → F3). Finally, there is an example of an organization, which began as a volunteer cookout group, which has become an NPO that rents facilities to provide meals to evacuees (D7). If we included organizations that were formed prior to April 2012, at its peak, there were approximately 30 evacuee groups carrying out activities in Saitama Prefecture. Although the majority of these were emergent organizations (type IV), with growing expectations of a protracted evacuation period, some support organizations have emerged that are pursuing longer-term organizational management.

As can be seen from the above, a diverse set of support organizations and evacuee groups existed in Saitama Prefecture; that said, there were evacuees who were unable to participate in evacuee gatherings for a range of reasons including the fact that, because the evacuees were scattered across Saitama Prefecture, evacuee groups or support organizations did not necessarily exist near everyone's evacuation destination. This resulted in the publication of *Fukutama Tayori*, an information newsletter targeted at evacuees who were at risk of becoming isolated. In addition to

Table 8.5 Types of evacuee organizations that formed in April 2012 and later

	Government-led	Volunteer-led	Evacuee-led
Clustered Residence		C1（Est. in July 2012）	E5（Est. Oct. 2012）
Scattered Residence	B3（Est. in May 2012） B4（Est. in May 2013） B5（Est. in June 2014）	D1 ⟶ D2 ⟶ D4（Est. in Apr. 2012） D5（Est. in June 2012） D6（Est. in Sept. 2012） D7 （Est. in July 2012）	F2（Est. in June 2016） F3（Est. in Oct. 2014） F4（Est. in May 2012） F5（Est. in Mar. 2013） F6（Est. in Feb. 2014） F7（Est. in Aug. 2014） F8（Est. in Nov. 2015） F9（Est. in Feb. 2014） F10（Est. in June 2014）

D1→F2 (Kumagaya City) D5 (hanyu City)
D7 (Kazo City)
F8 (Moroyama Town)
E5 (Kazo City)
F6 (Kuki City)
F7 (Ina Town)
D6 (Kasukabe City)
D2→F3 (Koshigaya City)
D4 (Kawagoe City)
B4 (Soka City)
F5 (Tokorozawa City)
B5 (Wako City)
C1 (Niiza City)
B3 (Fujimi City)

*F4, F9, F10 (The activity are is the whole area of Saitama Prefecture)

Source: Harada (2019:138) partially revised

Fig. 8.8 Distribution of evacuee organizations formed in April 2012 or later

announcements of gatherings and events for evacuees, *Fukutama Tayori* contained information related to childrearing, health, employment, information about Saitama Prefecture, information about thyroid examinations and reparations, and articles on evacuation life. The results of ongoing surveys on numbers of evacuees and support

provided by local governments in Saitama Prefecture were also published in the newsletter.

The editorial staff of *Fukutama Tayori* centered on members who carried out support activities at the Saitama Super Arena; distribution of the newsletter and management of the readership list were carried out by Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare, which was a part of the goods and allocation group at Saitama Super Arena. The Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare is an extending organization (type III) that normally promotes the welfare activities of workers and carries out activities to improve the stability, security, and social status of workers in Saitama Prefecture. Because the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare had a relatively strong organizational foundation and greater financial resilience compared to other nongovernmental support organizations, it was able to monitor the circumstances of evacuees and to respond rapidly and flexibly to the changing needs of evacuees from the very start of carrying out support activities. As evacuation life entered the protracted period, the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare became a central figure in evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture. In the following section, let us examine the specific activities of this organization.

8.3.3.3 New Developments in Nongovernmental Support (1): Outsourcing of Support Activities by Governments

In July 2012, the Japanese government implemented a recovery supporter system for dispatching individuals from inside and outside disaster-affected areas based on recovery plans or general plans based on recovery plans established by local governments in disaster-affected areas with the goal of "rebuilding communities through 'recovery-related cooperative local activities' that included home visits and care of survivors and support of community revitalization efforts." Saitama Prefecture was the only local government to which recovery supporters were dispatched from Fukushima Prefecture as well as Namie Town, Tomioka Town, Futaba Town, and Okuma Town, which were designated as part of the evacuation zone following the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident.[7]

Recovery supporter initiatives were overseen by local governments and carried out by organizations contracted by the local government in question. In the case of Saitama Prefecture, the organization contracted to carry out recovery supporter initiatives for Namie Town, Tomioka Town, and Fukushima Prefecture was the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare, which had continued to carry out evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture. Meanwhile, RCF, a general incorporated association that had carried out recovery activities in Iwate Prefecture and other areas affected by the tsunami, was contracted to carry out recovery supporter initiatives for Futaba Town and Okuma Town.

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[7]Recovery supporter initiatives targeting evacuees in Saitama Prefecture were carried out from 2013 to 2018 for Namie Town, from 2014 to March of 2018 for Futaba Town, and from 2014 to March 2015 for Okuma Town. As of the publication of this study, initiatives launched in January 2015 for Tomioka Town and in 2014 for Fukushima Prefecture are still ongoing.

The recovery supporter initiative undertaken by the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare involved home visits to individuals who had evacuated outside of Fukushima Prefecture. The Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare, which had had many interactions with evacuees from Fukushima Prefecture through its evacuee support activities, determined that personnel capable of speaking the Fukushima dialect would be essential when visiting evacuees. This is because the organization had learned through its experience with evacuee support that, if an evacuee who is feeling isolated is suddenly visited by a stranger, even if the visitor is an expert, the evacuee will, in many cases, not feel comfortable speaking openly and will shut down. In fact, upon being visited by someone who could speak the Fukushima dialect, many evacuees expressed relief, saying things like "that was the first time I've spoken Fukushima dialect since evacuating," and ended up speaking with the recovery supporter for many hours. By having recovery supporters from Fukushima Prefecture carry out home visits, the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare was able to not only provide employment to evacuees but, also, to get a handle on the material and well-being needs of evacuees. This was in contrast to other regions where evacuee home visits were not very successful because they were carried out by nonlocal social workers. In addition, the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare hosted regular gatherings for evacuees and created opportunities for evacuees who were unable to attend such gatherings to meet on an individual basis. In some cases, the home visits led to the discovery of evacuees needing emergency assistance. It can be said that the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare adaptively changed the type of support provided based on its experience with evacuee support in the manner described above.

However, there were substantial problems associated with the home visits of evacuees carried out by evacuees. For example, although the recovery supporters from Fukushima who had no particular expertise were able to listen to the evacuees, they were not able to offer any further professional support. The opposite situation also occurred in some cases where evacuees were unable to speak freely because they were too close to the recovery supporter performing the home visit. In addition, because the recovery supporter initiatives were conducted at the request of the local governments of the evacuees' hometowns, the evacuees sometimes equated recovery supporters with officers from their hometown governments. As such, the recovery supporters, despite being evacuees themselves, became targets of criticism directed at local governments. Thus, a number of challenges remain in terms of evacuee home visits, including how to best conduct home visits and provide professional/expert support to evacuees and how to maintain appropriate distance between the evacuees receiving these visits and the recovery supporters, who are themselves evacuees.

Meanwhile, the goal of the recovery supporter initiative carried out by RCF was to create networks for evacuees from Futaba Town and Okuma Town in their evacuation destinations. Specifically, RCF supported the work of Futaba Town residents' association in Kazo City and helped create evacuee groups for evacuees from Okuma Town. However, the creation of evacuee groups, particularly for individuals who were scattered, proved to be extremely difficult. The recovery

supporter initiative carried out by RCF relied on community development know-how acquired in communities affected by the tsunami disaster. Because community development activities in tsunami-affected areas are primarily carried out by residents who continue to live in the area, supporting group formation is easy. However, in the case of evacuees from the NPP accident who are scattered, it is not clear how long the evacuees will actually live in the area, and individuals able to serve as leaders for evacuee groups are difficult to identify. It is clear that, although the initiative did involve the formation of disaster survivor groups, understanding of the particular circumstances of NPP accident evacuees was indispensable.

8.3.3.4 New Developments in Nongovernmental Support (2): Development of Nongovernmental Organization Networks and the Challenges thereof

As discussed in Sect. 8.3.2.2, the Disaster Response Coordination Council was established by the Saitama Bar Association as an organ for coordinating evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture. However, this council largely served to coordinate existing governmental and professional organizations, and it was difficult for newly established evacuee groups to participate. Meanwhile, after the launch of *Fukutama Tayori*, evacuee groups began to voice their wish to exchange information, which resulted in the start of Fukutama Meetings organized by the Saitama Council of Worker's Welfare in July 2012. Fukutama Meetings were held once every two months until 2015 and a total of 29 times up to December 2019.

Fukutama Meeting participants included not only evacuees in Saitama Prefecture and leaders of support organizations but also staff from the Fukushima Prefecture Evacuee Support Section, recovery supporters involved in evacuee support, and staff from TEPCO. At Fukutama Meetings, participating organizations presented reports on the status of their respective activities; to the support organizations, the meetings were a valuable opportunity to hear the voices of evacuee groups and individual evacuees and to understand "what kind of support is needed." For example, requests from evacuees for gatherings based not only on evacuation destination but also on town of origin and age group led to the hosting of events for women and children evacuees and educational consultation events in evacuation destinations.

However, staff of the Saitama Prefecture Crisis Management and Disaster Prevention Section did not participate in the Fukutama Meetings; as such, coordination between nongovernmental support organizations and Saitama Prefecture, as host to the evacuees, also did not occur in this forum. As the number of organizations participating in the Fukutama Meetings gradually increased, reports from organizations began to take up more and more of the meeting time, making it increasingly difficult to implement activities (such as constructing disaster recovery public housing in Saitama Prefecture) aimed at resolving specific issues brought up by the evacuees. Nongovernmental organizations were able to obtain a variety of information but did not have the time and resources to carry out new activities beyond what they were already doing.

In addition, the lack of a political channel for nongovernmental support organizations that participated in Fukutama Meetings to communicate with the

local governments of evacuee host cities once again emerged as a problem. The requests submitted each year by the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare to Saitama Prefecture were not effective; the fact that the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare was affiliated with labor unions and the former Democratic Party of Japan limited the scope of its political activities. Under these circumstances, the members of the *Fukutama Tayori* editorial staff took the lead in establishing the Fukutama Support Center (NPO) in April of 2016.

8.3.4 Period of Exploration of Evacuee Support through Public–Private Cooperation (April 2017 Onward)

8.3.4.1 Establishment of Resettlement Support Centers and Support from Professionals

Five years after, the Great East Japan Earthquake and the NPP accident saw the ending of programs that provided housing to volunteer evacuees and tsunami evacuees and a reduction in the number of evacuee support measures by municipalities hosting evacuees. At the same time, efforts by the national government and Fukushima Prefecture to work with support organizations and professionals in evacuation destinations to provide public–private joint support began to emerge. First among these efforts was the establishment starting in 2016 of resettlement support centers by the national government (Reconstruction Agency) and the Fukushima Prefecture Evacuee Support Section to provide information and consultations to volunteer evacuees (as of 2019, there are 26 such centers around the country). The main task of resettlement support centers is to provide phone consultations to evacuees. Organizations that operate resettlement support centers can broadly be grouped into support organizations and evacuee groups that began activities after the earthquake disaster (type IV), intermediate support organizations such as regional NPOs (type III), and organizations that were involved in disaster response prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake (type II). This is the first time that implementation of a public–private joint initiative has been attempted at the national scale in Japan. In Saitama Prefecture, a resettlement support center was established in 2015. Although it was initially operated by the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare, this duty was taken over by the Fukutama Support Center starting in 2017.

The second initiative to be launched involved home visits to evacuees with mental disorders, which was outsourced to the Japanese Psychiatric Nurses Association by the Fukushima Prefecture's Disability Welfare Section. The third initiative, implemented independently by Fukushima Prefecture, involved the provision of housing transition support in eight regions with the highest numbers of evacuees by the Fukushima Prefecture Residential Section to evacuees who had not yet secured housing after the close of the emergency temporary housing program. In Saitama Prefecture, the Saitama Association of Certified Social Workers, public interest incorporated association, has been contracted to provide this support.

Furthermore, as discussed in Sect. 8.3.3.3, the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare was contracted by the Fukushima Prefecture Evacuee Support Section to

Table 8.6 Overview of public–private joint evacuee support initiatives

Support initiative name	Fukushima prefecture recovery supporters	Consultation, interaction, and explanatory meetings for evacuees outside Fukushima	Home visits to provide mental care to evacuees outside Fukushima	Housing transition support for evacuees
Initiative objective	Evacuee home visits	Phone consultations for evacuees	Home visits to evacuees experiencing mental and physical distress	Support for evacuees when switching residences
Contracted organization	Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare (general incorporated association)	Fukutama Support Center (NPO)	Japanese Psychiatric Nurses Association (general incorporated association)	Saitama Association of Certified Social Workers (public interest incorporated association)
Section of Fukushima prefectural government in charge	Evacuee Support Section	Evacuee Support Section	Disability Welfare Section	Livelihood Assistance Section
Governmental ministry in charge	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications	Reconstruction Agency	Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare	NA
Launch year	2014	2016	2018	2018

conduct home visits as part of a recovery supporter initiative. As of 2019, there are four public–private joint evacuee support initiatives running in parallel (Table 8.6).

8.3.4.2 Current State and Challenges of Public–Private Joint Governance in Saitama Prefecture

These four public–private joint support programs are important support initiatives that target "evacuees who find themselves in economically, mentally, and/or physically distressing circumstances." However, in Saitama Prefecture, the arrangements for coordinating these four programs are inadequate. For example, although both phone consultations by the resettlement support center and home visits by recovery supporters were overseen by the Fukushima Prefecture Evacuee Support Section, coordination between the two programs was not envisioned at first because they were overseen by different ministries of the national government. Similarly, coordination between the other public–private joint initiatives implemented by Fukushima Prefecture was not initially envisioned owing to the fact that different sections within the Fukushima Prefectural government were responsible for each initiative. In other words, the question of evacuee support governance and which organizations should

be responsible for process management was left wholly to those on the ground because of compartmentalized administration within the government.

In light of these structural problems, after repeatedly appealing to Fukushima Prefecture, the Fukutama Support Center, which I represented, finally succeeded in 2019 in getting the government to hold regular coordination meetings attended by the support organizations responsible for implementation and the sections of Fukushima Prefecture responsible for overseeing these four public–private joint initiatives. As a result of these meetings, support organizations have begun to share information and to provide actual support to evacuees who are finding themselves in circumstances that are economically, mentally, and/or physically distressing. At present, staff from the Saitama prefectural government still do not participate in the coordination meetings held by the Fukushima Prefecture Evacuee Support Section. The results contrast starkly with other cases where there is coordination between the municipalities hosting evacuees, Fukushima Prefecture, and support organizations.

8.4   Discussion and Future Challenges

In this chapter, I have analyzed the processes by which the response by organizations to evacuees from the NPP accident and evacuee support governance in Saitama Prefecture have developed over time using an analytical framework and concepts from disaster sociology, while also considering relevant elements from adaptive governance theory. In this final section, I will review the main findings of this analysis and identify future areas of research.

First, in this chapter, I have demonstrated that a large number of evacuees needing a range of types of support still exist despite the fact that nine years have passed since the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident, as well as the fact that the roles and performances of organizations providing support and of governmental entities have changed over time. These facts indicate that there is a need in disaster sociology to not only discuss recovery processes immediately following a disaster but also conduct research with a medium- and long-term view. In this sense, this research is nothing more than an interim report.

Second, I was able to observe, in a case study of evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture, trends in the organizational response of governmental entities representing established organizations (type I), which are the most frequently discussed organization type in disaster sociology, that are largely consistent with those reported previously in the disaster–sociology literature. For example, faced with the unanticipated situation in which governmental entities had to take in evacuees from the NPP accident, the response was delayed in cases where it was unclear which section or department was responsible for taking initiative. In addition, based on the treatment of nongovernmental organizations by the Saitama Prefecture's departments and sections related to disaster prevention and disaster management, I was able to confirm the tendency for governmental departments to maintain their organizational boundaries and thus not coordinate well with other

organizations. In contrast, support was rapidly deployed in situations where the head of the local government exercised leadership with regard to evacuee support and in municipalities where mutual-aid types of support arrangements already existed. Furthermore, there were cases in which evacuee support was carried out by departments or sections within local governments responsible for general affairs, which allowed cross-sectional responses that, in turn, enabled the provision of adaptive support.

In contrast, the response to evacuees of nongovernmental organizations, which largely represent extending organizations (type III) and emergent organizations (type IV), has been more adaptive than those of governmental organizations and were often able to compensate for the deficiencies of governmental responses. For example, creative improvisation and adaptive improvisation were observed in the support provided by nongovernmental organizations at the Saitama Super Arena. That is to say, by sharing and discussing information regarding problematic aspects of evacuee support and ways to resolve these problems and by learning about the actual circumstances of evacuees, support organizations were able to formulate improvisational support by applying know-how acquired through their previous activities. The quality of support provided and the speed of response by nongovernmental support organizations were superior to the support activities developed through the internal trial-and-error efforts of governmental organizations. These support groups that carried on improvisational support activities continue to provide evacuee support in Saitama Prefecture.

In addition, the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare learned about evacuees' circumstances while continuing to carry out support activities. The organization's home visits conducted as part of the recovery supporters initiative went smoothly due to the utilization of evacuees as recovery supporters. These are two examples of "learning" that led to adaptive support. However, as illustrated by the struggles faced by RCF, which had previously supported the community development efforts of tsunami survivors, previous support experience was not always directly applicable to supporting the community development of NPP accident evacuees. To provide support that matches the diverse and changing needs of evacuees, it is necessary to understand the evacuees' circumstances in real time and to have mechanisms to accumulate new knowledge. Conversely, the immobilization of knowledge reduces the flexibility of support activities, which has a detrimental impact on evacuees.

Third, it can be said that evacuee support governance, which is needed to ensure that the diverse needs of evacuees can be met, which still has not been adequately developed in Saitama Prefecture. One reason for this has to do with the fact that governmental organizations (Saitama Prefecture), which is an established organization (type I) that ideally should play a central role in disaster response, have hardly been involved in the overall governance of evacuee support. In disaster sociology, governmental organizations are discussed as being central players in disaster response. This is because their authority and responsibilities are clearer than that of nongovernmental organization, which should make it easier to direct support organizations. If we consider examples of other local governments in Japan that have assumed responsibility for carrying out a portion of support activities for the

evacuees they are hosting (such as Niigata Prefecture), it is highly problematic that the Saitama prefectural government is not playing a leadership role in evacuee support governance.

That said, because support for NPP accident evacuees is needed in the medium and long terms and requires support based on the expertise of essential actors, it is not the responsibility of governmental organizations alone. As discussed above, the development of adaptive governance is essential to being able to meet immediate- and longer-term needs of evacuees. Furthermore, a mediator is needed to undertake process management of evacuee support—i.e., to coordinate the activities of diverse supporters and organizations with diverse experience and expertise and to ensure that adaptive support for evacuees is continuously provided. That is to say, the bigger problem has to do with the fact that, among the various evacuee support organizations in Saitama Prefecture, there is currently no organization that serves as a mediator in process management that can determine the role and function of the missions of multiple support organizations and thus coordinate these in order to meet the shared goal of supporting evacuees.

Recognizing that evacuee support initiatives implemented by Fukushima Prefecture were being planned without consideration for coordination with other support programs owing to compartmentalized administration within government, the Fukutama Support Center mounted efforts that led to the convening of coordination meetings for public–private joint support initiatives. This is one example of successful adaptive process management. The Fukutama Support Center was able to analyze the circumstances of evacuee support from a broad perspective, to identify systemic problems and, thereupon, formulate a proposal to convene a coordination meeting. In this sense, the Fukutama Support Center can be said to be a mediator/conductor in the adaptive governance of evacuee support.

However, while some support organizations contracted by governments are looking at the problems of support schemes while carrying out support activities, others do not feel a need to or believe that they are unable to carry out activities that are beyond the scope of what they have been contracted to do. For example, the reason why the Saitama Council of Worker's Welfare, which conducts evacuee home visits as part of a recovery supporters initiative, does not seek to carry out more targeted evacuee support by coordinating home visits with phone consultations conducted by the Fukutama Support Center has to do with the social welfare orientation of Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare activities, weak motivation toward working with other organizations, and its positioning of contracted support activities as an extension of its everyday activities. Of course, there is nothing wrong with the Saitama Council of Workers' Welfare's policy from the standpoint of work the organizations are contracted to perform. However, such organizations can easily become obstacles to adaptive process management.

Looking at another example, the fact that the Fukutama Meetings, whose participants included numerous support organizations and evacuee groups, were unable to initiate new activities to address the needs of evacuees at the time was not due to the capacities of the organizations alone. Each support organization carries out support activities autonomously; thus, it is difficult for other

organizations to "evaluate" such autonomous actions and to direct an organization to act in a certain way based on these "evaluations." This is because evaluations and the directing of actions based on evaluations create a hierarchical relationship among the parties involved. It is for this reason that nongovernmental support organizations tend to carry out activities that are self-contained and do not often come to the fore as organizations capable of assuming responsibility for managing the processes of support governance. Accordingly, it is difficult for a "mediator" capable of carrying out adaptive governance of support activities and, in particular, adjusting the activities of individual organizations, to emerge from among nongovernmental organizations.

While adaptive governance theory identifies factors that are important for management of adaptive governance (shared goals, evaluation, and learning), it does not discuss the qualities that enable actors to possess these factors or the social structures that give rise to actors with these qualities. In this chapter, I examined changes over time in the characteristics of organizations providing evacuee support and the governance of these organizations in Saitama Prefecture, a region that experiences few natural disasters and has a relatively weak disaster culture. What has become clear is the difficulty of developing adaptive governance of support activities. If we look at areas in Japan where systems for providing public-private joint support have been established, there are examples of regions where governmental organizations, building on their experiences with past major disasters, have taken the lead in establishing sections or departments to provide evacuee support (e.g., Niigata Prefecture) and examples of regions where NPOs and other organizations that, based on the experiences of disaster volunteers, have placed their focus on disaster preparation during normal times and have stepped up to fill the role of mediators in evacuee support governance (e.g., Aichi Prefecture). One of the goals of future research will be to clarify how adaptive governance with respect to support can be developed by comparing a variety of factors, including the governance-related histories of actors engaged in evacuee support, the resources that they do or do not possess, and the state of social resources related to evacuee support.

As of January 2020, a large number of evacuees from the NPP accident remain. There are many issues that need to be considered. For example, how can we best continue to provide support to evacuees who find themselves struggling with options to choose between returning to Fukushima and settling permanently in their evacuation destinations? As nongovernmental support organizations continue to carry out support activities in Saitama Prefecture, how can they develop into actors that can contribute to adaptive governance of support? And, how should governmental organizations and nongovernmental support organizations provide support to disaster survivors and evacuees when the next disaster occurs? For a sociologist, taking part in evacuee support means presenting their vision of evacuee support, which is equivalent to becoming a mediator for adaptive governance of evacuee support. I am planning to continue conducting action research and engaging in support activities through my involvement in the Fukutama Support Center.

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