Darryl S. L. Jarvis
Ka Ho Mok *Editors*

Transformations in Higher Education Governance in Asia

Policy, Politics and Progress

Springer

Higher Education in Asia: Quality, Excellence and Governance

Series Editors

Angela Yung Chi Hou, Fu Jen Catholic University, Taipei, Taiwan
Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
Sheng-Ju Chan, Graduate Institute of Education, National Chung Cheng University, Chiayi, Taiwan
Ka Ho Mok, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China

This book series presents the most important quality issues and the current developments of higher education in Asian nations from multi-perspectives—academics, university managers, QA bodies, governments and students. It makes comparisons on these matters among Asian higher education systems, institutions, and QA agencies, drawing on available data-sets with special emphasis on Quality, Excellence and Governance.

The series attempts to incorporate the most important quality issues and the current developments in Asian nations from multi-perspectives—academics, university managers, QA bodies, governments and students into three major dimensions- quality, excellence and governance. The scope of Asian region includes four areas: East Asia, South Asia, Middle East Asia and the island Pacific nations.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11872

Darryl S. L. Jarvis · Ka Ho Mok
Editors

Transformations in Higher Education Governance in Asia

Policy, Politics and Progress

Springer

Editors
Darryl S. L. Jarvis
The Education University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong, China

Ka Ho Mok
Lingnan University
Hong Kong, China

For Oscar and Flannan
Darryl S. L. Jarvis

To Jasmine, Esther and Lucinda
Ka Ho Mok

Preface

As the fastest-growing region in the world, Asia represents a complex assortment of states collectively experiencing rapid social and political transformation. Not surprisingly, Asia's recent history is often cast in tombs that announce the 'rise of Asia' or the 'new Asian century', reflecting the region's economic dynamism in industrial production, manufacturing, assembly and the increasing proportion of global economic activity that it generates. But while Asia's most recent history has been written largely in relation to its increasing importance in global supply chains and as 'factory to the world', the region's immediate future resides in higher-order economic activities, in science, technology and through leadership in research and innovation. Rapid growth in Asia's economies has thus equally been reflected in rapidly expanding higher education systems, rising participation in tertiary-level education, the development of high-performing tertiary education systems and world-class universities.

These trends, however, have not been uniform. Highly disparate national systems of governance, institutional capacities and levels of political and economic development continue to define the region. The challenges each country face may thus be contiguous insofar as similar sets of aspirations often define policy debates about desired sector outcomes, but set against wide-ranging political, economic and institutional realities.

As the contributors to this volume acknowledge, despite the prevalence of a common set of aspirations, the policy pathways to realizing internationally leading higher education systems remain opaque and often vexed. Higher education systems are not simply compilations of knowledge factories that can be set in place by edict or resource allocation. The academic enterprise remains peculiar, if not idiosyncratic, with knowledge production, discovery, scientific breakthroughs and innovation often non-responsive to linear technocratic planning or systems design. System, institutional and programme quality, for example, are not typically 'fixed' by adding resources alone, or high-quality academic labour 'produced' by simply allocating quota in the hope of achieving short-term knowledge/innovation outcomes. Were it so simple, higher education systems would be much less diverse,

performance more equal and competitive knowledge attainment more equitably distributed.

Often to the distress of policy-makers, developing high-performing higher education systems rests on much less quantifiable or tangible policy levers: soft-institutional and governance technologies able to support the development of academic labour; informal network configurations between government, universities and industry that leverage research capacity; didactic feedback systems able to calibrate training, curriculum and university teaching with the skill attributes of graduates and national development agendas; and mentoring cultures that nurture knowledge development and research collaboration—in other words, the mushy ethereal stuff to which simple policy prescriptions or metrics of analysis are not well suited.

Variation in policy and governance approaches to higher education thus witnesses profound structural differences in the composition and organization of Asia's higher education systems, along with diversity in the mix of public versus private provision, equity and access, institutional and programme quality, and the development and treatment of academic labour.

Governing higher education in Asia thus continues to be a complex, multifaceted and challenging set of policy problems, set amid fast-changing regional and international dynamics and deepening competition for global leadership in research and innovation. We hope this collection of papers contributes to a broader understanding of Asia's rapidly changing higher education landscapes and of their emerging and potential trajectories.

Hong Kong, China   Darryl S. L. Jarvis
                                                                                                            Ka Ho Mok

Contents

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Darryl S. L. Jarvis is Professor and Head, Department of Asian and Policy Studies, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the Education University of Hong Kong (formally the Hong Kong Institute of Education). He has published widely in the areas of comparative political economy, the political economy of development in Asia and comparative public policy. His recent publications include *Convergence and Diversity in the Governance of Higher Education: Comparative Perspectives*, Cambridge University Press (with Giliberto Capano); *Institutional Entrepreneurship and Policy Change: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations*, Palgrave Macmillan (with Caner Bakir); *Asia After the Developmental State: Disembedding Autonomy*, Cambridge University Press (with Toby Carroll); *Markets and Development: Civil Society, Citizens and the Politics of Neoliberalism*, Routledge (with Toby Carroll); *Financialization and Development in Asia*, Routledge (with Toby Carroll); *The Politics of Marketizing Asia*, Palgrave Macmillan (with Toby Carroll); *ASEAN Industries and the Challenge from China*, Palgrave Macmillan (with Anthony Welch); *Infrastructure Regulation: What Works, Why, and How do we Know? Lessons from Asia and Beyond*, World Scientific (with Ed Araral, M. Ramesh & Wu Xun); *Handbook of International Business Risk: The Asia Pacific*, Cambridge University Press; *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline*, University of South Carolina Press; *International Relations. Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought*, State University of New York Press (with R. M. Crawford); and *Post-modernism and its Critics: International Relations and the Third Debate*, Praeger.

Ka Ho Mok is Vice-President and concurrently Lam Man Tsan Chair Professor of Comparative Policy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. Before joining Lingnan University, he was Vice-President (Research and Development) and Chair Professor of Comparative Policy at the Hong Kong Institute of Education (now the

Education University of Hong Kong), and Associate Dean and Professor of Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong. Prior to this, Prof. Mok was appointed as Founding Chair Professor in East Asian Studies and established the Centre for East Asian Studies at the University of Bristol, UK, and also as Founding editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Asian Public Policy* (Routledge), editor of the series *Asian Education and Development Studies* published (Emerald) and editor of the series published by Routledge and Springer.

Contributors

Will Brehm Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

Sheng-Ju Chan National Chung Cheng University, Chiayi County, Taiwan

Kimberly Goyette Temple University, Philadelphia, USA

Darryl S. L. Jarvis The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Jin Jiang Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China

Yu-Ching Kuo National Cheng Kung University, Tainan City, Taiwan

Rattana Lao Asia Foundation, Bangkok, Thailand

Ka Ho Mok Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China

Deane E. Neubauer East West Center, Honolulu, HI, USA

Thanh Nghi Pham Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam

Andrew Rosser University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

Lorraine Pe Symaco Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

Jason Eng Thye Tan National Institute of Education, Singapore, Singapore

Meng Yew Tee University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Siew Yean Tham ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, Singapore; Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Malaysia

Chapter 1
The Political Economy of Higher Education Governance in Asia: Challenges, Trends and Trajectories

Darryl S. L. Jarvis and Ka Ho Mok

Introduction

At a conference on 'University Cooperation and Asian Development' (UCAD) sponsored by the Asia Foundation at the University of Hong Kong in 1966, some twenty-nine university delegates from around Asia, Australia and the USA, and representatives from leading organisations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the Ford Foundation, pondered the merits and practicalities of inter-university cooperation, with the links between regionalisation, internationalisation and the development of Asia's higher education sector an implicit rationale of the conference (Nelson 2013, p. 242). As Nelson noted, the conference was telling on a number of fronts. Of the twenty-nine academic participants, for example, twenty-three held advanced degrees from American universities while the other six held advanced degrees from either Cambridge or Oxford; only one delegate held a doctoral degree from an Asian university (University of Tokyo), underscoring the continuing dominance of Anglo-American leadership in the sector (ibid). On another front, several delegates noted the strange paradox of economic modernisation in some Asian states but the absence of more robust growth in the academic scope of universities. One of the delegates from Japan, for example, lamented the narrow 'focus on technology in Japanese universities' to the detriment of growth in the social sciences and humanities, creating sectoral and institutional imbalances *a*typical of their Western counterparts (cited in ibid., pp. 244–245). Some noted the need for more material assistance not just in terms of resources but in developing the institutional and governance contexts that would

D. S. L. Jarvis (✉)
The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
e-mail: djarvis@eduhk.hk

K. H. Mok
Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China

enable the rapid evolution of Asian universities and their competitive international positioning, while still others identified the need for indigenisation—that is, rather than studying abroad, programmes should be provided by Western institutions for students *in Asia* so that they received more 'pertinent and applicable' training relevant to the local conditions they would encounter upon graduation. Above all, the overriding theme for delegates to the conference was how to harness cooperative regional and international arrangements in order to leverage resources, know-how, institutional knowledge and capacities that would allow Asian universities to catch up with their Western counterparts.

As this chapter will argue, the context, themes and purpose of the 1966 UCAD conference retain contemporary significance. Despite the emergence of several leading, highly ranked Asian universities, Asia continues to be a region largely comprised of what we term 'failed education states'; that is, despite narratives that celebrate Asia's economic transformation and modernisation, or which point to Asia's increasing centrality in the global economic system, this is not necessarily reflected in its higher education systems. In this chapter, we adopt a contrarian perspective, not to rebuke the economic realities of a fast-transitioning region so much as to question the assumed causality between economic growth and Asia's impending leadership in higher education. We thus situate our analysis in a Polanyian theoretical framework to counter what we argue are superficial and analytically ill-informed assumptions about the developmental trajectories of Asia's higher education systems, highlighting instead the sociopolitical and institutional contexts that variously constrain and shape outcomes in Asia's higher education sectors. Successful higher education systems, we argue, are rarely if ever the outcome of singular policy instruments, and still less of top-down resource strategies (add resources and stir). Rather, they represent a myriad of governance systems, policy instruments, institutional endowments and sector-specific academic cultures situated amid complex state–society relations. Indeed, insofar as issues of governance, state–society relations and the relationship between the state and university determine outcomes for sector performance, the institutional autonomy of universities, academic freedom and thus the prospects for research innovation and leadership, our analysis highlights continuing and substantial hurdles for the successful development of higher education systems in Asia. In particular, we draw attention to a preponderance of governance deficits—albeit unevenly experienced in the region—which manifest as various forms of illiberalism and often combined with patrimonial social relations and centralised administrative traditions. Taken together with non-secular state practices, censorship, political intervention and persistent practices of non-merit-based promotion, these diminish the prospects for systemic or institutional innovation and pose serious barriers to sector development, irrespective of the trajectory of economic growth and potential increases in resource availability.

Further, we argue, a broad survey of Asia's evolving higher education landscape reveals not only great unevenness, as might naturally be expected, but also sectoral bifurcation, particularly in terms of developmental trends in STEM (science, technology, engineering and math) compared to the social sciences and humanities. This bifurcation is most obvious in terms of quality, highlighting the importance of

Fig. 1 Higher education governance typologies

political, social and institutional contexts as important determinants impacting the evolution and trajectories of Asia's higher education systems and institutions.

To demonstrate our argument we survey several higher education systems across Asia, grouped by region (Southeast and Northeast Asia) and analysed in relation to a series of qualitative institutional, political and social contexts: firstly, what we term higher education governance indicators such as merit-based recruitment, promotion and remuneration, censorship, institutional and academic autonomy (among others); and secondly, quantitative performance-based indicators such as bibliometric and research performance, reputational and esteem rankings. We draw upon the comparative conceptual framework developed by Dobbins et al. (2011) that sees governance of higher education (HE) as interrelated processes of control, coordination and the allocation of autonomy between three levels—the state, professoriate and university management—and broadly reflected in three typologies of governance: (a) state-centred; (b) market-oriented; and (c) academic self-governance (Dobbins et al. 2011). We use these as a broad analytical rubric through which to understand patterns of HE governance in Asia (see Fig. 1 and Table 1).

While our analysis is far from comprehensive, given its geographic scope and the limitations of space, our primary concern is to highlight a more complex and arguably more compelling set of contextual circumstances that shed light on those forces shaping the performance of higher education systems and institutions in Asia in order to offer a more nuanced analysis of HE developmental trajectories.

Table 1 Higher education governance typologies

	State-centred model	Market-oriented model	Academic self-governance model
Institutional structures of the university			
Dominant decision-making actors	State	State/university management	Community of Scholars/Professional chairs
Organisational structure	State agency	Enterprise	(Corporatist) state–university partnership
Dominant management approach	Bureaucratic	Entrepreneurial	Collegial, federation of chairs
Primary mission of the university	Satisfying state socio-economic objectives	Provision of services to 'academic consumers' and satisfying market demands	Academic freedom and long-term commitment to the production of knowledge
Patterns of control and quality evaluation			
Who controls/evaluates?	Ministry	(State or quasi-governmental) accreditation/evaluation bodies	Self-evaluation by university. Academic peer review (within broad regulatory framework set by the state)
What is controlled?	Academic processes	Quality of academic products	Quality of research output, publications
When does evaluation take place?	*Ex ante*	*Ex post*	Not systematised; university dependent
Focus of quality evaluation	National/state objectives	Local, regional, global economic demands; efficiency, flexibility	Meeting scientific/research objectives
Relations to the state and society			

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

	State-centred model	Market-oriented model	Academic self-governance model
State control instruments	Manpower planning system design	Incentives for competition, quality improvements	Financial, legal framework
Orientation and utility of teaching and research	State defined	Market demands	Scientific/intellectual advancement
Economic and employer stakeholders			
Function	Control	Marketing	Limited (potentially: external defenders of the institution)
Appointed by	State	University management	Academia
Funding			
Main funding base	State budget (university budget integral part of state budget)	Competitive and diversified (tuition, donations, research grants, private entities, state)	State budget (with own university budget)
State funding approach	Itemised (low budgetary discretion for universities)	Lump sum (high budgetary discretion for university management)	Mixed-type (high budgetary discretion for university)
Allocation within university	Input-based → Output-based (objectives defined by the state)	Output-based (objectives defined by university)	Input-based (objectives negotiated by the state and universities)
Strategic investments	State defined	Multifaceted (undertaken by university management, faculties, via spin-off companies, technologies, centres)	Occasional, chair-based (occasionally undertaken by chairs and departments, university managers)
Personnel autonomy			
Recruitment of high-level academic staff	Appointed by state	Elected by faculty/ university management	Elected by professoriate

Table 1 (continued)

	State-centred model	Market-oriented model	Academic self-governance model
Recruitment of high-ranking administrative staff	Appointed by state	Elected by university management	Elected by professoriate
University autonomy to dismiss high-ranking academics	No. State competence; frequent tenure (dismissal for ideological non-compliance in authoritarian/ non-democratic or patrimonial sociopolitical contexts)	Yes (for lack of productivity, poor outcomes; limited tenure privileges)	No. Frequent tenure (dismissal only for severe misconduct)
Professional background of rectors/ deans	Public administration	Management	Scholar/ chair holder
Participation of academic staff in administrative management	Limited	Moderate	High
Substantive autonomy			
Setting academic profiles/curriculum design	State/academia	University management/academia	Academia
Setting strategic goals	State	University management/academia	Academia
Determining the research profile	State/academia	University management/academia	Academia
Setting accession conditions, size of institution and core specialisations	State	University management/academia	Academia

Source Adapted from Dobbins et al. (2011)

The False Logic of Economism: Economic Growth and Higher Education

At the time of the UCAD conference in 1966, Asia's lagging higher education systems reflected several intertwining historical legacies: the North–South (centre–periphery) divide and the international division of labour which had advantaged the West as the hub of scientific knowledge and academic standing; the Cold War politics of the era and Western aid which often 'migrated' Asian talent to study (and work) in the West through philanthropic and soft-power scholarships; Asia's uneven economic development and under-investment in the sector which depressed sector expansion, participation, career and research options; and Asia's traditionally bureaucratised, hierarchical and seniority-based governance cultures which tended to obfuscate innovation or sector reform.

Fifty years hence and the world has changed—and, apparently, dramatically so. The ills that beset Asia's higher education sector would appear to have dissipated—if not absolutely then significantly. The international division of academic labour that accompanied the Cold War and which saw Asian powers such as China and Vietnam (among others) locked within the Soviet sphere of influence and linguistically insulated from English-language scientific communication has largely abated (Altbach 2016b, pp. 3, 8–9). More broadly, the centre–periphery relationship that defined Anglo-American and Asian academic spaces has frayed, with the emergence of successful universities and research centres and with educational attainment in various Asian states deepening in terms of rates of participation and quality measures. The predominantly insular nature of Asian HE systems has also been impacted (albeit unevenly) by international trends associated with competitive global and regional rankings, an increasing emphasis on teaching quality, research productivity and graduate learning outcomes. Indeed, to the extent that research on HE in Asia has a common undergirding rationale, this is overwhelmingly themed around issues associated with expansion, massification, growing investment and excellence in research—and even the emerging possibility of global research leadership (Kim 2016; Kitamura et al. 2014; Neubauer 2012).

The reasons for such optimism are not hard to discern. Asia's new-found wealth has transformed the region. In 1980, roughly 20% of global economic activity was accounted for by Asia, compared to 32% by Europe. By 2012–13, these positions had been inverted (Swanson 2015). And while the USA remains the single largest economy in the world, accounting for approximately 24% of global GDP, by 2029 China is expected to surpass the USA to become the world's largest economy—although its GDP per capita is expected to remain at approximately 35% of that of the USA (Willige 2016). Asia's economic dynamism, in other words, is likely to be structurally transformative, not just to the constellation and distribution of global economic power, the locus of production, manufacturing and assembly, but also to knowledge production and research, potentially displacing the West's leadership in higher education or at least posing significant competition to it. Popular narratives thus hold that the rise of Asia has reached the 'scales of global knowledge' (Lehmann

2017), with many of Asia's universities, if not already at 'the top of the class', then destined to be so (Levin 2010). Forecasts suggest that Asia will be the 'next higher education superpower' (Bhandari and Lefebure 2015; Cummings 2010; Marginson 2011b) with countries such as China poised to dominate global research leadership with as many as forty-two world-class universities by 2050 (Asian Correspondent 2017; Grove 2017).

Ashley, Polanyi and the Dangers of Linear Forecasting

The optimism inherent in such prognostications is clearly informed by what we might term an *economic essentialism* in which economic growth is implicitly correlated with various forms of institutional modernisation and deepening institutional capacities, but also with a techno-scientific rationality in which the interests of the economy discipline or at least supplant politics and discrete institutional types to form more or less similar systems of sociopolitical management and functional institutional outcomes. The logic of economism, in other words, tends to set aside politics, political context, the specificity of social relations or of discrete institutional forms. As Richard Ashley observes, the logic of economism exaggerates 'the economic sphere's importance in the determination of social and political relations' and correspondingly underestimates 'the autonomy and integrity of the political sphere' (Ashley 1983, p. 463). For Ashley, there are three implicit modes of economism:

> variable economism, where political outcomes are said to be attributable wholly or predominantly to economic causes, logical economism, where … political life is interpretable only insofar as it can be comprehended within the framework of economic logic, and historical economism, involving a double limiting of state practice … [in the] … reproduction of an economistic social order. (ibid.)

Ashley explored the fallacy of the logic of economism in the case of international relations and US triumphalism in the post-Cold War period, when various liberal theorists argued that the establishment of a free market multilateral world order would act as a fulcrum disciplining more economies to rule-based governance—dominated by the USA—and captured in Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis in which the economic rationality of globalisation was sublimating politics and nation states (Fukuyama 1992; see also Keohane 2002; Keohane and Nye 1977).

Ashley's analysis, of course, is a novel restatement of Karl Polanyi's rejection of economic determinism. In his study of the origins of free market capitalism and its seemingly insurmountable domination of the European order, Polanyi eloquently highlights the contingent nature of what he termed the 'great transformation' and the historically specific series of sociopolitical processes which had embedded market-based orders within certain political contexts (Polanyi 1957). There was, in other words, no determination of social and/or political relations by the market, but only ever of exchange relations by political and social accommodations—the stuff of history and political contestation.

Both Ashley's and Polanyi's insights bear repeating, especially since so many of the social 'sciences' embrace the logic of economism as the main epistemological lens by which to understand the forces propelling change, probable historical destinations and the character and composition of social and institutional orders that will 'naturally' follow. The popular embrace by social, political and economic commentators of linear economic forecasting, for example, in which contemporary economic growth data are extrapolated to project the future ranking of economies or the structural composition of the global economy, misses entirely the central place of politics, social orders and institutional contexts in mediating historical outcomes. The World Bank's infamous forecast in 1961, for example, that Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and the Philippines were the 'most likely candidates in Asia to follow Japan into sustained economic growth', in part reflecting their economic performance, consistently superior GDP per capita income compared to other Asian states and robust export sectors, bore no relation to subsequent trajectories. Rather than 'taking off' in the Rostowian sense, each of these states became 'developmental disasters', descending to the brink of failed states and into dire poverty—where they remain to this day (Coclanis 2013; Rostow 1971). Similarly, Jim O'Neill's celebrated forecast in 2001, based on ten years of economic growth data, that Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS) would dominate and transform the global order by 2050, seems likely to be proven wrong (O'Neill 2001). By 2015, for example, O'Neill was forced to revise the idiom to the 'IC' (India and China) economies, noting that Russia, Brazil and South Africa had faulted as emerging economic powerhouses due to various political factors (O'Neill 2015).[1]

The point, of course, is that the logic of economism provides scant evidence of any natural causality between economic growth and institutional or systemic outcomes, while linear economic forecasting highlights the dangers of assuming that historical, political or social outcomes are 'attributable wholly or predominantly to economic causes' (Ashley 1983, p. 463). Put another way, it is not economic growth which kick-starts forms of institutional modernisation or innovation, but transformations within sociopolitical institutional contexts that facilitate the emergence of specific modes of productive economic activity. There is thus ample precedence to reject, or at least be sceptical of, analytical frameworks that posit a natural causality between economic growth and Asia's projected performance in higher education and research. Indeed, we suggest this is a less than useful prism by which to understand the political, social and institutional forces mediating change in higher education in Asia and the substantial barriers to reform and innovation that persist.

---

[1]The BRICS formed into a loose international coalition (initially without South Africa) in a summit in 2008; it collaborated to create the BRICS Development Bank in 2014, driven and substantially resourced by China, and now referred to as the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai. Much like its namesake idiom, however, with domestic political and economic disruptions in Russia, Brazil and South Africa, the international significance of the forum relative to other multilateral groups has diminished (see Abdenur and Folly 2015).

The Political Economy of Higher Education Governance: Southeast Asia

Popular depictions of a 'rising Asia' or an 'Asian century' are replete with what Lee calls 'conceptual ambiguity' since they give 'the illusion of political and perhaps even ideological cohesion' (Lee 2016, p. 9). As a geographic and economic moniker, 'rising Asia' thus requires serious and sustained contextualisation in order for the vast diversities of wealth, development, politics and state–society relations to be fully understood. Indeed, outside of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the city state of Singapore and Hong Kong SAR (China), few other geographic entities in Asia have transitioned into a high-income economy—defined by the World Bank as economies with a GNI per capita greater than US$12,475 (World Bank 2016).[2] In economic terms, the 'Asian Century' has thus been geographically discrete, mostly confined to Northeast Asia and most recently to wealth creation in China (predominantly Eastern China). Southeast Asia, by contrast, has remained mired in widespread poverty and underdevelopment, especially in Indochina (Cambodia, US$1140; Laos, US$2150; Vietnam US$2060; and Myanmar US$1190), with countries such as Indonesia (US$3400) and the Philippines (US$3580) performing somewhat better but clearly outpaced by levels of economic development in Malaysia (US$9860) and Singapore (US$51,880).[3]

Indonesia: Systemic Failures and Enduring Obstacles

Perhaps not surprisingly, apart from Singapore and Malaysia, higher education systems in Southeast Asia thus continue to suffer resource challenges, are not competitive in terms of attracting international talent due to low levels of remuneration, and generally struggle in terms of quality (Heyward and Sopantini 2013). In Indonesia, Southeast Asia's largest economy and the world's fourth most populous nation, for example, the sector has consistently performed poorly despite repeated policy attempts since the mid-1990s to increase 'quality, responsiveness, and accountability of its universities' and efforts to have several Indonesian universities ranked within the top 500 globally within a decade (Negara and Benveniste 2014; Rakhmani 2018; see also Rosser, this volume). The establishment of a national-level task force, political announcements supporting sector reform and changes to the constitution in 2002 requiring the government to commit 20% of its total budget to education have generally failed to produce net positive outcomes (Logli 2016; World Bank 2013). Currently, not a single university in Indonesia is ranked in the top 500 World University Rankings, with the country's three most esteemed universities (University of Indonesia, Bandung Institute of Technology and Universitas Gadjah Mada) ranked

---

[2]The only other examples are Brunei Darussalam (US$32,860) whose wealth is singularly attributable to resource extraction (oil) and Macau, SAR, China (US$65,130) which derives 88% of its entire GDP from 'gambling services'.

[3]GNI per capita, Atlas method, current US$; see World Bank (2017).

Table 2 The world university rankings: Southeast Asia 2018

Country	Number of HEIs in top 801–1000	Number of HEIs in top 601–800	Number of HEIs in top 401–600	Number of HEIs in top 201–400	Number of HEIs in top 101–200	Number of HEIs in top 51–100	Number of HEIs in top 1–50
Cambodia							
Indonesia	3						
Laos							
Malaysia	1	5	1	1			
Myanmar							
Philippines		1					
Singapore						1	1
Thailand	5	3	1				
Vietnam							
Total	9	9	2	1		1	1

Source Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2018. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2018/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/scores_citations/sort_order/asc/cols/scores

between 801 and 1000 (see Table 2) (OECD/ADB 2015; Times Higher Education 2018, p. 205).[4] Despite legal requirements, spending on higher education remains low by regional and international standards (0.3% of GDP as of 2009), adversely impacting investment in research and development (0.09% of GDP as of 2012) (Logli 2016). While spending on higher education as a proportion of the central government budget has increased from 0.92% in 2007 to 2.76% as of 2011, compared to neighbouring Malaysia or Singapore the sector continues to be under-resourced (OECD/ADB 2015, pp. 197–198, 207).

With low levels of investment, Indonesia struggles to produce sufficient academic labour to populate the sector or allow for rapid expansion. The number of domestically trained PhDs in 2013, for example, was a mere 1765 from a population base of 261 million. As the World Bank notes, this contrasts poorly with countries such as Brazil which, with a much smaller population, annually train some 10,000 new PhDs. (Negara and Benveniste 2014, p. 35). As a consequence, only 10% of academic labour in Indonesia's public universities hold a Ph.D., a third have a Bachelor's degree, with

---

[4]We recognise that university rankings are not the ultimate measure of excellence or achievements in teaching and research. Rather, they capture a broad cross section of performance metrics in research, teaching, internationalisation and other related esteem measures. We use only the Times Higher Education World Universities Rankings (THE WUR) data; we believe this is the most objective of all the available university rankings indices insofar as it does not use surveys based predominantly on reputational perceptions but metrics drawn from five areas weighted as follows: teaching (30% of the total score), research (30%), citations (30%), international outlook (7.5%) and industry income (2.5%). See https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/methodology-world-university-rankings-2018. (See also Hazelkorn 2017; Marope et al. 2013; Pratt 2013; Pusser and Marginson 2013).

the remaining holding diplomas or other post-secondary qualifications (Negara and Benveniste 2014, p. 35; OECD/ADB 2015, p. 214). Such low rates of advanced doctoral training have obvious implications for research quality and productivity, with the country producing on average just 1000 papers a year between 1996 and 2011, increasing to 11,765 articles in 2016 (see Table 3)[5] (Yasih and Mudhoffir 2017). But while there is evidence of an upward trend in the overall number of research outputs, research productivity continues to lag substantially behind neighbouring countries. According to the Global Innovation Index, for instance, Indonesia is 'grouped between "under performers" (Venezuela and Algeria) and "learners" (Malaysia and Thailand)' (Global Innovation Index as quoted in Moeliodihardjo 2014, p. 3; see also OECD/ADB 2015). Relatedly, the level of international research collaboration has also been declining, with the percentage of papers that are internationally co-authored falling from approximately 81% in 2003 to 57% in 2011 (UNESCO 2014, p. 84).[6] Perhaps more importantly, the impact of the research produced is one of the lowest in Southeast Asia. According to bibliometric measures produced by SCImago, for example, the 11,765 published articles received just 4604 citations, lower than the absolute number of citations for published outputs in Vietnam (4970) and Thailand (11,331) (Pelupessy 2017). This is also confirmed by the OECD, which notes that a large proportion of the scientific research produced in Indonesia falls below the world average in terms of relative citation impact (OECD 2013a, p. 166).[7]

These realities contrast sharply with Indonesia's otherwise robust recent economic performance, with increasing domestic private consumption and annual GDP growth rates hovering above 5% since 2004 (World Bank 2018). Indeed, the economic narratives surrounding Indonesia are invariably of ever-deepening success; 'the largest economy in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)', one of the 'best economies in the G20' and 'predicted to become the world's fourth-largest economy by 2050' (de Haan 2017, p. 2; Legowo-Zipperer 2017; Oberman et al. 2012). Clearly, the causes of underperformance in Indonesia's higher education system are not related to declining national economic capacity. Rather, they relate to the political, institutional and social contexts that govern the sector. Several of these are readily apparent; in particular, the governance legacies set in place as a result of Suharto's New Order, political contestation vis-à-vis public and private interests, as well as interventions by multilateral organisations to encourage private sector participation in higher education provision (Robison 1986; Robison et al. 2005).

---

[5]The World Bank estimates that research productivity per academic staff is roughly around 0.4 research outputs per year, well below international standards (Negara and Benveniste 2014, p. 36).

[6]The extremely low base of research output is also noted by the OECD in the organisation's country background report, which highlighted that 'an increase in research output and research papers in recognised international journals written by Indonesian researchers', in part reflected 'co-operation with foreign researchers', and grew 'from 578 research papers in 2000 to 1142 papers in 2008'— significant growth to be sure but still lagging behind equivalent-sized economies (OECD/ADB 2015, p. 202).

[7]Indonesia performs least well relative to other countries in Asia in terms of citations per document. In 2016, for example, citations per document were 1.26 (Pelupesssy, 2017).

Table 3 Research output rankings, Asia 2016

Rank	Country	Documents	Citable documents
1	China	483595	472441
2	India	148832	137824
3	Japan	126294	116692
4	South Korea	81099	77727
5	Taiwan	36902	35003
6	Malaysia	29739	28585
7	Singapore	20985	19167
8	Hong Kong	17632	16183
9	Thailand	14608	13678
10	Indonesia	12185	11765
11	Vietnam	5768	5508
12	Philippines	3021	2790
13	Macao	1268	1199
14	Brunei Darussalam	519	456
15	Cambodia	387	368
16	Myanmar	306	286
17	Laos	267	253
18	North Korea	40	40
19	Timor-Leste	28	25

Source SCImago Journal & Country Rank (Scopus, Elsevier B.V): https://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php?year=2016&region=Asiatic%20Region

Indonesia's Governance Legacies

One of the obvious barriers to sector reform insofar as public universities are concerned remains the stifling level of centralised control over all facets of university activities exercised by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) and the Director General of Higher Education (DGHE). The MoEC, for example, determines the budget allocations to each public university and issues budgets which are based on permitted line-item expenditures and overseen by the DGHE and the state auditor. As Negara and Benveniste note, public higher education institutions (HEIs) have 'very little financial autonomy' with government funding for public and private HEIs 'rigidly pre-allocated into an annual line-item budget' with HEIs 'not permitted to make adjustments to these budgets', which, because of their short-term nature, 'makes funding long-term programmes much more difficult (regardless of the programmes' performance)' (Negara and Benveniste 2014, p. 45). This allows the MoEC to stipulate university activities and performance indicators and thereby align specific institutional goals and objectives with those of the MoEC. Further, the MoEC regulates the programme offerings of HEIs, their duration and degree requirements,

with HEIs required to seek MoEC approval for the development, implementation and discontinuation of all degree programmes (ibid., p. 44; see also Nizam and Nurdin 2014). The only academic autonomy HEIs enjoy relates to the determination of student admissions/rejections, although even here there are limitations: the MoEC stipulates admission requirements and standards and, under more recent policies, has mandated student admissions on the basis of locality and socio-economic under-privilege, with at least 50% of students required to be admitted via the 'National Admissions Scheme' (also centrally administered) (Negara and Benveniste 2014, p. 44; OECD/ADB 2015, pp. 191–194).

Similar rigidities can also be observed in relation to staffing at public HEIs. Both administrative and teaching staff are considered civil servants, such that hiring and firing is handled by the State Civil Service Agency (BKN). This provides for little institutional say in hiring processes, targeting specialist niche areas for development, or developing research/expert clusters subject to merit-based recruitment practices. Rather, as Negara and Benveniste note, 'newly recruited teachers are granted lifetime tenure after a maximum of two years … and face long, bureaucratic processes if they wish to move' from one institution to another, while promotions 'generally occur automatically after employees have fulfilled specific administrative requirements', with university administrators lacking authority 'to adjust salaries and incentives in response to employees' performance' (Negara and Benveniste 2014, p. 43). Promotion is exclusively on the basis of attaining administrative appointments (with no doctorate required), with advancement all the way up to full professor resting in the hands of the Minister of Education and Culture and often attained on the basis of patrimonialism or seniority (Rakhmani and Siregar 2016, p. 22).

In 2009, a new law (Law 9) establishing greater HEI autonomy was proclaimed, with the Director General of Human Resources (DGHR) establishing what were termed 'Public Service Agencies' (Badan Layanan Umum, or BLU) which granted to twenty-one institutions increased levels of financial autonomy and greater discretion in budget management. In reality, however, these institutions were still required to comply 'with the regulations of all governmental officers, including on financial management under the MoF and on personnel management under the State Civil Service Agency' (BKN) (Moeliodihardjo 2014; OECD/ADB 2015, p. 212). As Logli notes, national regulations were not adapted to BH guidelines and input from the government was still necessary on numerous matters which, in essence, did not translate into any practical increase in institutional autonomy (Logli 2016, p. 565).

The 2009 law was subsequently challenged on constitutional grounds and repealed, with a new law passed in 2012 which again sought to confer greater levels of institutional autonomy as well as enhance sector development. The 2012 law established three categories of public universities:

1. Autonomous public universities (PTN-BH)
2. Public universities with a large degree of financial management flexibility (PTN-BLU)
3. Public universities operating as government implementing units (PTN).

To date, only seven public HEIs qualify as autonomous public universities (PTN-BH) with the vast majority falling into the second and third categories.[8] While PTN-BH universities notionally have autonomous self-governance, operationalised through a Board of Trustees (or Senate) with the Rector appointing Deans and other senior university officers who are subject to the usual institutional reporting, transparency and accountability requirements, in practice such governance mechanisms are impaired. As Rakhmani and Siregar (2016) observe, 'attempts to push for professionalisation of the work environment under state universities are ultimately impeded by the very status of academics as civil servants or government employees'; a classification which prevents the legacies of a highly centralised bureaucratic system being easily disposed of (Rakhmani 2018; Rakhmani and Siregar 2016, pp. 22–23; see also Rosser, this volume). Rather, despite announcements and DGHR directives, the reforms promised by the 2012 law are not being experienced within universities, where 'autonomy' has mainly translated into the enrolment of a greater number of self-financed students in order to bolster the financial position of PTN-BH institutions but with little material impact on research cultures, research productivity or systems of recruitment, promotion and performance management.

Added to these realities are persistent practices of patrimonialism and corruption. Under the New Order regime, public HEIs:

> were part of the larger 'franchise' structure that characterised the regime, the key feature of which was the purchase of government positions in exchange for access to the rents they could generate. The government's strict control over senior HEI appointments, restrictions on academic freedom, and widespread corruption within the civil service combined to create a context in which senior management positions at public HEIs were sold to the highest bidder … [with academic staff] … compelled to show loyalty towards the state and be subservient to HEI management. (Rosser, this volume)

Promotion thus came through administrative appointments, access to rents and salary supplementation through servicing the needs of the state or gaining lucrative government contracts. More generally, the 'New Order bureaucracy prioritised the production of technocratic forms of knowledge that could contribute to or legitimise its developmentalist policies', in essence disciplining academic inquiry especially on issues considered sensitive (Yasih and Mudhoffir 2017). In the post-New Order era, these practices did not simply stop. They remain, albeit fractured in the context of the new political environment. Even for PTN-BH institutions, for example, the Minister of Education retains significant influence over senior university appointments (with a 35% vote); systems of patronage persist, in part reflecting ingrained social norms in Indonesia and which continue to manifest in university contexts. As Rakhmani and Siregar note, 'research contracts in universities have tended to be "controlled by research godfathers" within a research patronage system'—what they describe as a

---

[8]The universities classified as Autonomous Public Universities (PTN-BH) include: University of Indonesia, Bogor Agricultural University, Institute of Technology Bandung, Gadjah Mada University, University of North Sumatra, Indonesia Educational University and Airlangga University. Four other public universities are also in the process of acquiring autonomous public university status: Padjadjaran University, Diponegoro University, Nopember Institute of Technology and Hasanuddin University (Moeliodihardjo 2014, p. 4).

societal structure of 'embedded clientelism'. Similarly, the dominance of 'applied approaches in social research' reflects legacies of formal and informal censorship often at the university level, where a 'culture of critical thinking is practically non-existent' and where a culture of critical peer review 'has yet to take hold post-*Reformasi* after a three-decade long period of being deprived of a role in influencing [government] policies' (Rakhmani and Siregar 2016, pp. 26, 58; see also McCarthy and Ibrahim 2010; Welch 2017).

The embedded patrimonialism at the heart of Indonesia's political system represents the most deep-seated obstacle to the future success of its higher education sector. The ninety-eight public HEIs (of which fifty-five are universities),[9] while carrying a level of domestic prestige and academic authority in terms of their reputation, are dwarfed by the preponderance of private HEIs, which total 3353 (not including fifty-two private Islamic universities) (Moeliodihardjo 2014, p. 1; OECD/ADB 2015, p. 187). Marketisation agendas championed by multilateral agencies like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank since the 1990s have sought to establish a regulatory environment conducive to the expansion and operation of private HEIs, seen in part as a means of catering to the rising demand for higher education which cannot be met by the state due to fiscal constraints (ADB 2012a). While this policy approach has encouraged an enormous expansion in private HEIs, it has also fostered the emergence of a sizable and politically influential set of corporate actors, many of whom are associated with elite families and able to exert political pressure to protect their interests. Sector reforms or restructuring that may disadvantage the interests of private HEIs or bolster the autonomy and reputation of public HEIs are thus politically difficult to engineer and often met with outright resistance.

Challenges and Trends in Higher Education in Southeast Asia

In highlighting the structural challenges Indonesia faces in terms of reforming and developing its HE sector, we are not suggesting it is an outlier or fundamentally backward relative to regional neighbours. Indeed, Indonesia exemplifies the types of challenges and conflicting sectional interests that are equally endemic in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and the Philippines. Rather, it is Singapore who is the outlier (see measures of Singapore's research performance and impact in OECD 2013c). As Table 2 makes clear, in terms of university rankings there is no equivalent in Southeast Asia to Singapore's performance—an achievement even more remarkable given its size compared to neighbouring states. Equally, there is also an enormous gulf in the research performance between Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries, where research outputs are disproportionally low relative to their population base despite robust and sustained levels of economic growth (especially in Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines).

---

[9]HEIs consist of universities, institutes of technical education, colleges, polytechnics and academies.

In the Philippines, for example, while the HE sector has expanded significantly in terms of participation, increasing from 27.5% in 2005 to 35.7% in 2014, with the number of students in the sector almost doubling from 2.2 million to 4.1 million between 1999 and 2015/16, academic and institutional quality continues to be poor. As the Philippine National Development Plan notes, while the HE sector is larger than many of its ASEAN neighbours and while the Philippines has ten times as many HEIs as Indonesia, its performance has been lacklustre. It produces fewer researchers (81 per million of the population) compared to Indonesia (205) and Vietnam (115), with knowledge production and research quality performing poorly with only twenty-eight out of the 777 journals in which Philippine academics were published (3.6%) being listed under Thomson Reuters, Scopus or both (Macha et al. 2018). Similar to many of its neighbours, the insufficient production of qualified academic labour has severe implications for university research capacity and research-led teaching, with only 12.62% of university instructors holding a doctoral degree (see Table 3) (see Quimbo and Sulabo 2013). Indeed, despite the size of the HE sector, only one institution (University of the Philippines) ranks in the THE WUR (ranking in the 601–800 bracket in 2018; see Table 2).

These outcomes largely reflect the composition of the HE sector which is dominated by 1170 private HEIs compared to 233 public universities and colleges, with academic labour in private HEIs incentivised to concentrate on student recruitment and teaching and address the for-profit dynamics of their institutional environments to the detriment of academic research. Indeed, the dominance of private HEIs, mostly owned by politically influential elite families and corporate interests, means that reform is fraught with political difficulties, rendering the sector largely unresponsive to issues of quality enhancement or the needs of the economy (British Council 2018; Macha et al. 2018; McCoy 2009, p. xxvi).

The disconnect between economic growth and performance in HE is also demonstrated in Vietnam and Malaysia, both of which have enjoyed remarkable economic transformations. The introduction of Đổi Mới in Vietnam in 1986, for example, marked the start of a period of rapid economic growth, with the country's economy expanding by 3303% between 1990 and 2016—the second fastest in the world, behind China (Trines 2017). The impact on the HE sector has been obvious, with the gross enrolment rate rising from 10.59 to 28.84% between 1999 and 2017, while the number of HEIs has mushroomed to 445 accompanied by improvements in the qualifications profile of academic labour and research productivity (especially in the natural and applied sciences). Yet, despite these achievements the sector performs poorly by international standards and continues to suffer from what Anh and Hayden label the seven impediments to progress: (1) governance, in which public universities do not enjoy autonomy in relation to strategic, financial, programmatic, curricular, enrolment and operational decisions; (2) an inefficient and ineffective government funding design for HEIs; (3) poor research performance compared to neighbouring states such as Thailand and Malaysia, with the gap continuing to widen between 2001 and 2017; (4) poor-quality postgraduate education with knock-on implications for the future quality of academic labour and the labour needs of the economy; (5) uneven quality standards with relatively ineffectual policy mechanisms to address

this; (6) the persistence of seniority over merit-based promotion systems for academic labour; and (7) often obtuse and confusing policy governance of the sector (Anh and Hayden 2017, pp. 79–84). In relative terms, Vietnam is ranked behind Thailand, itself a poor performer in HE, research, citations and impact. SCImago, for example, judges just four institutions in Vietnam to be producing 'new knowledge that has a technological impact, compared to 14 universities in Thailand'—in part a reflection of the fact that only 20% of university instructors hold a Ph.D. (Anh and Hayden 2017, p. 81; Sheridan 2010, p. 19). The OECD also notes the relatively poor performance of much of the research produced in Vietnam in terms of its impact ranking, with only three areas (clinical medicine, earth and environmental sciences and biomedical sciences) performing above the world average—an outcome largely reflecting the rise in co-authorship and international research collaboration especially with researchers from Japan, the USA and France (OECD 2013d, p. 291).

While Vietnam has attempted to leapfrog institutional and academic labour quality issues by allowing foreign private HEIs[10] to operate in the country and act as informal standard setters, in reality Vietnam suffers from an uncoordinated, fractured higher education system split between public universities (of varying size and quality), senior colleges, technical and military academies and private domestic and foreign universities, overlaid by a complex series of laws and regulations governing the sector. Indeed, the rapid growth of HE has led to what Trines (2017) describes as the 'mushrooming of low quality private providers' with Vietnam suffering 'a lack of high-quality universities, inadequate foreign language training, bureaucratic obstacles, and curricula that do not prepare students for entry into the labour force' (Hoàng Minh Đỗ 2014, p. 60).

Equally, Malaysia, Southeast Asia's second most developed economy after Singapore, continues to punch below its weight in terms of its performance in higher education. As recently as 2008–9, for example, Malaysia produced fewer than 4000 PhDs, with only 36% of academic labour at public universities holding Ph.D. qualifications (Zhengqi 2016, p. 127). Not surprisingly, the country's HEIs generally rank poorly by international standards, with only one of the country's twenty public universities (University of Malaya) placed in the top 400 (THE WUR 2018; see Table 2), and with the OECD observing as recently as 2016 that 'Malaysian institutions have yet to achieve a competitive position internationally' (OECD 2016a, p. 196). This is also reflected in terms of research quality and impact (see Table 3). As the OECD further notes, 'publications in all scientific disciplines in Malaysia are ranked below the World average in terms of relative citation impact', with research in clinical medicine and information communication technologies in particular scoring badly (OECD 2013b, p. 197). Indeed, for many students the fifty-three private universities or six foreign university branch campuses that operate in the country are perceived as providing better options in terms of quality and employment outcomes—a point underscored by the fact that Malaysia exports nearly as many students (approximately 90,000) who pursue foreign degree programmes as it attracts international students

---

[10]Most notably RMIT University Vietnam (the Vietnamese branch of the Australian research university the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology) and the British University, Vietnam.

(130,000), predominantly from China, Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria and Yemen (Jusoh 2017; StudyMalaysia 2015). Hampered by pervasive centralised government intervention over appointments and promotions, informal censorship particularly of academic criticism of the government, and by discriminatory race policies which favour the Bumiputera (especially in university leadership roles), the quality of Malaysia's public HEIs has tended to remain impaired (Jarvis 2017; OECD 2016a, pp. 195–197).

HE Governance and Academic Labour in Southeast Asia

An obvious commonality among most of Southeast Asia's HE systems is the persistence of state-centred governance models (Dobbins et al. 2011). Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar clearly fall into this category, while Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia remain predominantly state-centred but with some hybridity in terms of limited institutional autonomy usually associated with market orientation—the latter used as a policy instrument to increase university responsiveness to labour market/national economic needs, curriculum innovation and better graduate training. Singapore remains an obvious outlier, with elements of all models present but more obviously situated in a market-oriented model of governance with strong government oversight. Outside of Singapore, the dominance of the state over the professoriate and university management continues to be a hallmark of the region, with little latitude for institutions to set specific goals, decide on academic specialisms or commit to the long-term development of specialised research capacities.

While Dobbins et al.'s (2011) typology does much to capture the systems of public administration and management that continue to dominate in Southeast Asia's HE systems, what it cannot do, of course, is explain why this state-centred form persists in the face of international norms that tend towards more sector independence and state oversight from a distance, i.e. models in which the relative discretion of university management has come to play a greater role over time. Part of this may be explained by historical path dependencies and colonial administrative legacies that morphed into the apparatus of newly independent states. An emphasis on state-building, modernisation and economic development was coterminous with the development of deeper administrative capacities, more extensive state coordination of key areas of the economy, centralised national planning and thus the use of 'command and control' public administrative practices (Altbach 1998, Chaps. 2 and 3; Carroll and Jarvis 2017b). These legacies implicitly distorted the power of the state over university management and the professoriate, creating longer-term tensions and inefficiencies within HE systems which were typically managed through ad hoc but largely ineffectual policy responses. These included accommodating demands for greater participation by allowing the expansion of private HEIs (Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam) but without addressing access and equity issues, and in some instances by granting greater nominal resource autonomy to public HEIs by expanding self-financed student enrolments (Indonesia, Thailand, among others) to offset inadequate state fiscal transfers.

However, another part of the explanation resides in the politics of state capture and domestic contestation over interests and the control of resources. The political legitimacy of various ruling coalitions and elites in Southeast Asia has historically been problematic, creating natural synergies between centralised systems of administrative/state control and their utility to ruling coalitions in terms of the management of dissent. Indeed, if anything, such synergies have only strengthened over time, especially in a context of deepening political illiberalism. In Laos and Vietnam the long dominance of single-party socialist rule, in Cambodia the continuous rule of Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's party since 1985, in Thailand the reinstatement of military rule in May 2014 and in the Philippines the rise to power of Rodrigo Duterte in June 2016, all mark a deepening pattern of illiberalism, creating politically vexed environments in which academic labour and universities are forced to operate. The suspension of the constitution in Thailand, in particular, has witnessed the ongoing curbing of open academic discourse, the shutdown of various academic proceedings, the detention of students and academics and the introduction of approval requirements from the military junta in order to hold research seminars and conferences (Lamubol 2015). In Indonesia too, the rise of religious groups, political criticism of university activities and the sizable corporate power represented by private universities have played a part in the censorship or banning by the authorities of various academic gatherings, the screening of controversial documentary films or seminars on sensitive topics. In the Philippines, the use of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances has been accompanied by a crackdown on human rights advocates, political critics and press freedom, with many academics self-censoring in order to avoid being targeted by the authorities (Human Rights Watch 2018; Wiratraman 2016).

The development of academic labour in the region is thus often constrained both directly when it is at odds with prevailing political orthodoxies and indirectly in terms of the pressures to self-censor, particularly since meagre academic salaries are often supplemented through accessing lucrative government research contracts predominantly derived through patronage and clientelism. Similar constraints operate at the institutional level in the majority of states in Southeast Asia, where universities are typically not autonomous entities that coexist with the state but rather function as extensions of the state, carrying out state-directed research agendas that create strong institutional pressures to monitor heterodox academic practices.

Insofar as Western models of the university invoke notions of academic independence from the state as essential to critical intellectual inquiry, knowledge production and the emergence of successful HE systems, the political realities that operate in the majority of states in Southeast Asia underscore the continued state dominance of the sector and the sublimation of university management and academic labour to the interests of ruling coalitions (Carroll and Jarvis 2017a). Assumptions that higher education in Southeast Asia will thus naturally progress in line with deepening economic growth are thus misplaced. Rather, the majority of states in Southeast Asia continue to suffer from governance deficits that adversely affect the potential for HEIs to emerge as regionally or internationally competitive (see Table 4).

Table 4 Higher education governance indicators Southeast Asia: public universities

Country	Merit-based recruitment and promotion	Formal or informal censorship: curriculum, content, research, academic expression	Institutional autonomy: programme offerings, accreditation, programme management, student admissions, graduation requirements	Institutional autonomy: budget, professorial remuneration	Institutional autonomy: academic recruitment, promotion and retention	Research productivity requirements as condition of employ-ment/promotion	Professorial autonomy: research and teaching	Earned PhD required for appointment to academic posts (ranks of assistant professor and above or equivalent)	Employment designation of the professoriate in practice
Singapore	☑	⊕	☑	☑	☑	☑	☑	☑	University employee
Malaysia	⊕	⊕	⊕	✦	✦	⊕	☑	☑	Government/civil servant
Indonesia	✦	⊕	⊕✦ Varies between classification of public HEIs by government	⊕✦ Varies between classification of public HEIs by government	✦	✦	✦⊕	✦	Government/civil servant
Philippines	☑	✦⊕	⊕	⊕	☑	☑⊕	☑	☑	University employee
Thailand	⊕	⊕	⊕	⊕	☑⊕	☑⊕	☑	☑	University employee but with government oversight
Cambodia	⊕	⊕	✦	✦	✦	✦	✦	✦	Government/civil servant
Laos	⊕	⊕	✦	✦	✦	✦	✦	✦	Government/civil servant
Myanmar	⊕	⊕	✦	✦	✦	✦	✦	✦	Government/civil servant
Vietnam	⊕	⊕	✦	✦	✦⊕	✦⊕	✦⊕	⊕	Government/civil servant/⊕

Key: ☑ = Yes; ✦ = No; ⊕ = mixture

Source Interviews conducted by the authors; ADB (2012b)

The Political Economy of Higher Education Governance: Northeast Asia

Relative to its Southeast Asian neighbour, Northeast Asia has enjoyed greater depths of economic progress, hosting the region's first 'miracle economy' (Japan, GNI per capita US$38,000) and three of the four 'Asian Tiger' economies (Hong Kong, GNI US$42,940; South Korea, US$27,600; and Taiwan, US$26,212), along with the now second-largest economy in the world, China (US$8250) (Carrol and Jarvis 2017c; Statistical Bureau 2018; World Bank 2017). Apart from China, the region's economic development commenced earlier than that of Southeast Asia, with several economies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) achieving high-income status by the 1970s–1980s. These achievements are clearly identifiable in terms of the emergence of quality HEIs as measured by the THE WUR (see Table 5), especially in the case of Hong Kong relative to its size, but also Japan and South Korea. China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan now collectively dominate the research landscape in Asia as measured in terms of the number of published research outputs, occupying four of the top five spots (see Table 3).

No doubt these achievements are significant, especially given the late development of China and the low base from which its HEIs are emerging. However, these rankings also reveal levels of performance in HE that are not commensurate with the magnitude of economic transformation the region has enjoyed. South Korea, the ninth-largest economy in the world, for example, manages to place only two of its universities in the top 100 (Seoul National University, ranked 74, and Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, ranked 95; THE WUR 2018) while at the same time holding the distinction of having the highest ratio of 24–34-year-olds with tertiary education of any of the thirty-six OECD member states (Hultberg and Calonge 2017; Hultberg 2017). As Parry notes:

> Korea occupies rather extreme positions in relation to OECD averages: it has the highest education costs borne by households and one of the lowest government spending rates in the sector; it has the third-highest tuition fees and the second-lowest level of government investment in scholarships, loans and grants; it has the highest transition rates from secondary to tertiary education and the lowest happiness rates for students. (Parry 2013)

Much of this is attributable to the obsessive emphasis placed on higher education in terms of status and social mobility but often expressed in terms of credentialism as opposed to actual achievements in skills attainment, graduate quality and employability, creating a disconnect between rates of participation, graduate placement and the labour needs of the economy. It has also contributed to a mushrooming of private HEIs (approximately 180 compared to forty-three publicly funded universities), with a disproportionate focus on teaching as opposed to research producing 'too many institutions of uneven quality' (Fischer 2016; Sharma 2014). Perhaps most obviously, however, it has also created a disconnect between domestic perceptions of quality and the achievements of various Korean HEIs internationally. Korea's 'SKY institutions' (Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei University), for example, enjoy absolute domestic esteem and are popularly held as tickets to successful grad-

Table 5 THE world university rankings: Northeast Asia 2018

Country	Number of HEIs 801–1000	Number of HEIs 601–800	Number of HEIs 501–600	Number of HEIs 401–500	Number of HEIs 301–400	Number of HEIs 201–300	Number of HEIs 101–200	Number of HEIs 51–100	Number of HEIs 1–50
China	16	22	10	4	1		5		2
Hong Kong SAR				1			2	1	2
Japan	42	18	2	3	2	3			1
Macau SAR					1				
South Korea	4	7	4	2	2	3	2	2	
Taiwan	12	7	3	2	1		1		
Total	74	54	19	12	7	6	10	4	5

uate placement in the country's premier private and public institutions while ranking only modestly internationally (Korea University and Yonsei University rank in the 201–250 bracket; THE WUR 2018).

Japan displays similar patterns of variation between domestic perceptions of esteem versus international rankings of its HEIs. With approximately 775 universities, of which almost 80% are private, Japan has only two universities in the top 100 (University of Tokyo, ranked 46, and Kyoto University, ranked 74; THE WUR 2018), with HIEs like Osaka, Tohoku (both ranked 201–250) and Nagoya (301–350) celebrated domestically but ranked only modestly internationally (THE WUR 2018). Indeed, Waseda University, a top-ranked private institution domestically and highly sought after in terms of perceived graduate prestige and employment opportunities, ranks only 601–800 on the THE WUR, 2018. As the OECD observes, the number of Japanese universities of 'global stature, the level of publications in top journals and the international mobility of researchers rank low compared to the OECD median' (OECD 2016b, p. 2).

The declining fortunes of Japanese universities in international league tables coupled with continuing low rates of internationalisation were the main drivers prompting Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to establish the 'council on resuscitation of education' and the 'Top University Programme' (TUP) in 2014. While primarily designed to place 'at least 10 universities among the global top 100 within a decade', TUP also set a series of performance goals to increase the number of (a) foreign and Japanese faculty with PhDs earned from overseas universities; (b) linkages between Japanese and international researchers; (c) Japanese students studying abroad; and (d) the ratio of international students in the domestic student population (MEXT 2017; Sawa 2017). The programme, however, is limited to thirteen 'Type A' universities ('universities that are conducting world-level education and research and have the potential to be ranked among the world's top 100 universities') and twenty-four 'Type B' universities (universities with the potential to foster 'innovative educational partnerships with foreign universities') of the eighty-seven national universities in Japan (MEXT 2017; Sawa 2017). Indeed, given the stalling international performance of Japan's HE sector the ambitions of TUP are modest and underscore the deep structural rigidities within the sector.[11] Several of the stated objectives, for example, target the seniority system of promotion and lifetime employment practices that continue to prevail, with the proposed introduction of a tenure track system and performance- and merit-based remuneration, as well as introducing a course numbering system (to allow students to differentiate been course levels) and increasing the number of courses subject to student evaluation—targets that are now standard across various HE systems elsewhere (MEXT 2017; Sawa 2017; see also Yamamoto and Futao 2014).

TUP thus needs to be seen in the context of reforms introduced in 2004 that were meant to be pivotal to the future of Japan's national universities. These involved the

---

[11] Jean-Pierre Lehmann blames the declining fortunes of Japanese universities in international league tables a consequence of poor and declining levels of internationalisation, noting that 'Japan, a very open country during the 1960s and 1970s, has become inward-looking' and that Japanese 'universities share an important part of the blame' (Lehmann 2017).

corporatisation of the eighty-seven national universities with the intention of providing greater university autonomy, de-classifying academics as civil servants and ending lifetime employment practices, transferring accountability to university presidents and governing boards, and providing the governing space for universities to identify areas of excellence in order to compete internationally (OECD 2009, p. 17). The fact that TUP reiterates many of the same policy goals as the 2004 reforms highlights not only continuing structural rigidities but also continuing policy failures. The 2004 reforms, for example, allowed the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to retain significant control over HEIs in terms of caps on student enrolments, tuition fees and academic reorganisation at the programme or departmental level, leading the OECD to note that the reforms 'represent a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the Japanese tertiary system to become internationally competitive' and that in international terms 'Japanese national institutions continue to exercise less strategic initiative with respect to hiring and setting wages, reallocating recourses, and exploiting investment opportunities than do comparable universities in the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands' (OECD 2009, p. 19). State-centred approaches, in other words, continue to dominate the governance of HE in Japan, despite various reform efforts.

Historically, state-centred governance approaches have also predominated in Taiwan, especially under the Kuomintang (KMT) which, prior to the suspension of martial law in 1987 and the commencement of political reforms in the mid-1990s, maintained highly centralised state control over the sector and over academic labour (Mok 2014). Prior to democratisation, the HE sector was governed by a political fiat of 'divide and conquer' with resources distributed highly unevenly as a means of preventing the formation of political constituencies that might threaten the KMT, and rewarding those who supported it (Wang 2014, pp. 33–34). The number of universities, admissions and student quotas, the appointment of university presidents, the hiring and dismissal of faculty, curriculum design, departmental size, along with the affairs of faculty and students on campus were all controlled by the central authorities (Chou 2012; Lo 2014, p. 21).

Reform of the HE sector commenced in the mid-1990s, driven in part by the need to enhance sector performance in the face of growing regional and international competition; in part by a wish to remodel the sector after the end of authoritarian rule; and in part by the need to manage massification and issues of institutional quality. Between 1986 and 2000, for example, an increasingly influential middle class and demands for greater participation in HE saw the number of public and private colleges and universities expand from 28 to 127. In the post-2000 period, expansion of the sector continued, driven predominantly by the establishment of additional private HEIs, with the total number of HEIs expanding by 77% to 163 (approximately a third of which are public) in the last decade alone (Lo 2014, p. 22; Mok 2014). At the same time, amendments to the Universities Laws in 1994 and 2005 began the transformation of Taiwanese universities into more autonomous actors in terms of admissions, staffing, tuition policies, self-regulation in respect of cross-institutional collaborative arrangements including inter-institutional qualifications, financial management, faculty remuneration and organisational structure—including

removing nationality restrictions for senior university appointments, albeit with the Ministry of Education (MoE) retaining representation on the selection panels for senior appointments (Chou 2012, p. 4; Mok 2014, p. 5).

Since the mid-1990s Taiwan's higher education sector has thus witnessed substantial reform, liberalisation, massification and corporatisation, setting in place more decentralised systems of governance and sector oversight. At the same time, the MoE also attempted to enhance institutional quality and international competitiveness. In 2006, for example, the government established key performance targets, which included having at least one university in the top 100 universities globally within a decade, as well as seeing fifteen departments/cross-university research centres reach the top of their field in Asia within five years (Chou 2014; Hou et al. 2012, p. 27). As demonstrated in Table 5, however, Taiwan's ambition regarding the global top 100 has not been realised: National Taiwan University is ranked 198 while the majority of Taiwan's HEIs fall into the 500–1000 bracket (Times Higher Education 2018). Indeed, rapid expansion of the sector has often come at the cost of institutional and programme quality or developing appropriate graduate skills able to meet the rapidly changing needs of Taiwan's economy (Kuo 2016). As a result, despite a strong performance in terms of participation rates with 70% of the population aged 18–22 enrolled in a HEI (the second-highest rate in the world behind South Korea), almost half of all youth end up working in blue-collar jobs unrelated to their programmes of study while unemployment rates for university graduates are 'higher than all other levels of education, including those without college degrees' (Chou 2014; see also Mok and Neubauer 2016).

Research Universities in Northeast Asia: Legacies, Hierarchies and Future Trajectories

Higher education in Northeast Asia, excluding China, represents a complex mixture of successes and ongoing challenges. Not revealed in any international league table, for example, is the long-standing and highly successful integration of the research and development (R&D) activities of universities into national economic planning under centralised, state-led development strategies. In early developmental phases this involved state–industry relationships, with universities treated primarily as extensions of the state, working for the state and with industry to develop technologies, human capital and the graduate skill sets necessary to help drive economic growth. An emphasis on early phase developmental needs thus manifested in a core focus on research areas such as engineering (chemical, electrical, mechanical) and basic science and technology, with these shaping the composition of universities in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) and forging strategic state–university relationships that were both functional and economically productive.

Insofar as these motifs account for the research focus of Northeast Asian universities and for traditions of state-centred governance, they also underscore the con-

Table 6 Number of universities by range of active research areas, 2008–2011		Range			Total
		Wide	Medium	Narrow	
	China	13	22	155	190
	Hong Kong SAR	2	3	2	7
	Japan	7	10	85	102
	ROK, South Korea	4	11	27	42
	Malaysia	0	3	4	7
	Singapore	1	1	1	3
	Taiwan	2	7	25	34
	Thailand	0	2	7	9
	Total	29	59	306	394

Source UNESCO (2014, p. 73)

temporary challenges the region's HEIs face. As Table 6 highlights, the majority of HEIs in Northeast Asia continue to be narrow in terms of their range of research areas when compared to broadly based, comprehensive institutions offering a wide range of science, social science and humanities subjects. This has implications not only for their performance in international league tables, where the best-performing HEIs are overwhelmingly 'full blown' comprehensive institutions (Altbach and Salmi 2011; Marginson 2011a), but also their ability to contribute to the rapidly changing needs of the economy. Comprehensive research universities have become 'the central institutions' of the twenty-first-century knowledge economy—key institutional drivers of 'knowledge for competitive advantage and performance', productivity growth, the capture of high-end global value chains (GVC) and the training of creative talent that positions nation states competitively in the global economy (Altbach and Salmi 2011, p. 2; Hazelkorn 2011, p. 6; see also Mok and Hallinger 2013). More than simply responding to globalisation, leading research universities are the 'primary drivers of global flows in knowledge, communications, and people movement' and 'among the most internationalized and cosmopolitan of all human organizations' (Marginson 2011a, pp. 37–38). What historically might have been the comparative advantage of Northeast Asia's universities in terms of their specialist focus on a narrow range of research areas functional to the immediate needs of rapidly transitioning economies and state-led development agendas in the contemporary global economy appears increasingly to be a comparative disadvantage. The majority of Northeast Asian universities continue to be 'lop-sided', with the social sciences and the humanities underdeveloped; even in science, they tend to be comparatively narrow in subject range. Coupled with low rates of internationalisation, a professoriate composed predominantly of domestically trained PhDs and low rates of academic mobility, fostering institutional cultures of creativity, exploration and innovation conducive to global research leadership remains a key challenge.

Governments in the region are, of course, keenly aware of these challenges and responding with reform efforts to foster the innovation and creativity necessary for

their HEIs to become high-performing, world-class institutions (Shin 2018). The potential effectiveness of these policy agendas, however, have to be contextualised amid the academic cultures, social relations and institutional legacies that operate in the region. As Yang argues, an 'academic culture that is based on meritocratic values, free inquiry, and competition is largely absent in East Asia' (Yang 2016, p. 15). Seniority systems still operate widely in the region, with social hierarchies and deference to authority dominant social practices. Attempting to instil critical models of inquiry or construct institutional environments that celebrate heterodox academic practices and contrarian thought remains problematic; a characteristic that Yang suggests 'explains why achievements in science and technology are so much greater than in the social sciences and humanities' (Yang 2017, p. 29; see also Marginson 2015, p. 70; Tjeldvoll 2011, p. 225). Rather, academic cultures tend to be riven with traditions of rote learning and text-based exposition designed to impart knowledge as opposed to encouraging critique or creating new knowledge—traditions reinforced by low levels of academic mobility and internationalisation in terms of faculty composition. Further, as the OECD and World Bank observe, attempts to impart greater autonomy, flexibility and entrepreneurialism are often hampered by the persistence of centralised, hierarchical administrative practices with insufficient pools of administrative expertise able to exploit greater levels of official university autonomy and nurture more entrepreneurial activity (OECD 2009; World Bank 2012, Chap. 5).

While these obstacles are not insurmountable they highlight continuing impediments to international leadership in research and the performance of Northeast Asia's HEIs in global competitive rankings. Recent analysis by Hallinger (2014) of the performance of the region's scholars in terms of 'publication in internationally refereed journals', for example, 'failed to reveal competitive levels of [research] productivity', with Hallinger noting the continuing dominance relative to its size of Hong Kong, compared to immediate competitor states (Taiwan, Korea and Japan) (ibid.; see also Altbach and Postiglione 2012). Similarly, analyses by UNESCO of research performance in science and applied science subject areas in 438 Asian universities (see Table 7) show a relatively narrow spectrum of subjects (chemistry, environmental sciences and materials sciences) in which research performance is defined as 'world class' or 'internationally excellent', with UNESCO observing that 'overall, most research conducted in broad subject areas in Asian universities is in the "below average" performance bands' (UNESCO 2014, p. 72). If, as Mok argues, competition for world-class standing among HEIs in Northeast Asia is intensifying, then clearly it will take concerted and ongoing governance reforms, greater levels of investment and internationalisation, along with transformations in academic (research) cultures for these ambitions to be realised (Mok and Cheung 2011; Mok and Hallinger 2013; see also Altbach 2011; Postiglione and Arimoto 2015).

It may also be the case, however, that the locus of research in the region is increasingly shifting to non-university environments, thereby skewing the type of analyses presented above. Research by Zhengqi (2016) focusing on the 'triple helix paradigm' and the complex trilateral state–business–university relationships that operate in Northeast Asia (often the result of state-led development initiatives to help cap-

Table 7 Distribution of universities by research performance in board subject areas: selected Asian countries 2008–2011

Country / Territory	Subject Area
China	Agriculture and Biological Sciences
Hong Kong, SAR	Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
India	Chemistry
Japan	Computer Science
Republic of Korea (South Korea)	Earth and Planetary Sciences
Malaysia	Economics and Business Sciences
Singapore	Engineering
Taiwan	Environmental Sciences
Thailand	Health Professions and Nursing
	Materials Sciences
	Mathematics
	Medicine
	Multidisciplinary Other Life Science
	Physics and Astronomy

Band	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Performance	World class	Excellent		Above Average		Below Average				

Country	World class	Excellent	Above Average	Below Average
China		11	65	190
Hong Kong, SAR		4	6	7
India			8	44
Japan	1	5	30	108
ROK (South Korea	1	4	24	42
Malaysia		1	3	8
Singapore	1	2	3	3
Taiwan		4	29	35
Thailand			6	9
Total	**3**	**31**	**174**	**446**

Source UNESCO (2014, pp. 70–73)

ture higher-order technologies within GVCs) reveals sites of research dynamism not necessarily reflected in conventional university rankings or assessments of the research capacities of universities. In South Korea and Taiwan, government-sponsored research institutes and the location of high-tech industry within specialist clusters in science parks have enabled both countries to sustain their leadership and product innovation in electronic component manufacturing, computers and memory chips, among others (Chu 2016; Etzkowitz and Zhou 2009; Zhengqi 2016). South Korea, for example, invests a higher proportion of its GDP in R&D than does Germany, indicative of research-intensive activities being conducted in diverse institutional contexts (Jump 2013). That said, the sense in which a predominant focus on applied as opposed to pure research can sustain technological innovation in the longer term or translate into global research leadership is challenging. Universities still play a central role in training the skilled labour necessary to support R&D efforts whether configured through state (i.e. government research laboratories)–business relationships or other modalities, and in pure research and major scientific breakthroughs and economic innovations. The importance of pure research in capturing higher-

order value-adding knowledge activities within GVCs, in other words, is only likely to deepen the importance of universities to the region's future (Carroll and Jarvis 2017b; Gereffi 2014, p. 20).

China: The Next Higher Education Superpower?

More than any other country in the region, China has attracted the lion's share of analysis about its potential global leadership in research. The reasons for this are obvious. Since 1996, China has tripled its spending on R&D as a proportion of GDP from 0.7% in 1998 to 2.2% in 2015 (Wilhelm 2013). At the same time, the overall size of China's economy has expanded rapidly, magnifying the material impact of resources available for R&D activities and reflected in the enormous growth in research outputs (Jump 2013; Postiglione 2015, p. 238). In 1990, for example, slightly more than 1% of research papers globally had Chinese authors. Between 2007 and 2011 this increased to 11% and in some fields such as materials science and chemistry to 20%, with China becoming the world's largest producer of science publications in 2016—producing 426,000 studies compared to 409,000 in the USA (Marginson 2015, p. 69; Tollefson 2018; Zha 2016; Zhang et al. 2016, p. 870). Top Chinese institutions such as Tsinghua and Shanghai Jiaotong now have higher rates of research outputs than the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, with the number of Clarivate-indexed journals doubling at all top Chinese universities between the four year periods 2006–09 and 2012–15 (Usher 2018). Similarly, citation rates for China's top universities are now higher than for equivalent universities in Japan, although they lag behind those of the National University of Singapore (Usher 2018, p. 26).

No less impressive has been the staggering growth in the sector. Just a few decades ago, participation in higher education was an elite privilege with only 5% of Chinese aged 18–20 enrolling in tertiary education. By 2000, the participation rate had increased to 10%, by 2002 to 15%, by 2009 to 22.4% and as of 2016 to 48.44%, with China graduating a record 8 million tertiary students in 2017 (or nearly ten times more than in 1997) and operating the world's largest HE system with enrolments of 37 million students spread across 2880 HEIs (Rhoads et al. 2014, p. 17; Stapleton 2017; UNESCO 2018; Xinying 2017).

Purely in terms of numbers, China's rise in higher education is impressive, not least because of the low base from which it has grown and the rapidity of that growth. The emphasis on massification, however, has not been without cost. Institutional and programme quality remains uneven with vast diversity across the HE sector. Curricular and pedagogical reforms have been slow, raising social concerns about graduate preparation for employment and forcing the central government to closely monitor the employment success rates of several million new graduates who enter the workforce each year (Altbach 2009, p. 208; Shi et al. 2016, p. 221). Chinese business leaders, in particular, lament the lack of creativity and innovating thinking displayed by graduates, concerned that the sector produces 'fewer independent thinkers than its competitors' and fails to train graduates able to support China's economic trans-

formation from a manufacturing hub to a 'designed in China' high-tech economy (Postiglione 2015, pp. 240–241; see also Feng 2017b).

Rapid expansion has also placed inordinate pressures on the sector, especially for academics who have experienced large increases in teaching loads, graduate supervision and advisory requirements along with a greater emphasis on research, but often without sufficient resources or administrative support (Rhoads et al. 2014, p. 17). Facilities too have been stretched, with overcrowding in classrooms and dormitories a common feature. And while the gross enrolment rate has expanded dramatically since the late 1990s, participation in HE remains geographically skewed, with higher rates of participation in Eastern compared to Western regions—a pattern also reflected in the distribution of the country's HEIs, intensifying social pressures around, equity and access (Shi et al. 2016).

Higher Education Policy in China: The Pursuit of World-Class Standing

To some degree, these issues have been exacerbated by the bifurcation of HE policy reform efforts, split between elite institutions on the one hand and the mass university sector on the other. A belief among the Chinese leadership in the early 1990s that the country lacked the type of universities typically identified as 'world-class' prompted a series of ongoing reform efforts that have segmented policy approaches to the sector. Project '211', for example, initiated by the Ministry of Education (MoE) in 1995, aimed to improve the research standards of existing high-level universities, enhance doctoral training and better position these universities relative to international competitors. By 2017, 116 universities met the criteria for designation as a Project 211 university, qualifying them for additional funding and special treatment within the Chinese HE system. This was soon followed in 1998 with the 'Project 985' initiative, designed to promote the reputation and research performance of Chinese higher education and focused on founding world-class universities by the twenty-first century. Originally focused on nine universities (known as the C9 League) including Fudan, Nanjing, Peking and Tsinghua, the number of Project 985 universities expanded to thirty-nine, providing substantial funding from national and local governments to support new infrastructure and internationalisation efforts, the appointment of leading international faculty and hold international conferences, among other activities (Mohrman 2008; Rhoads et al. 2014, pp. 24–25; THE WUR 2017).[12]

Both Project 211 and 985 policy initiatives were subsumed by the Double First Class Project (DFCP) announced in 2015 and designed to develop a group of elite Chinese universities into world-class institutions by 2050. However, it took until September 2017 for Chinese authorities to announce the list of forty-three universities

---

[12]By one estimate, Project 985 universities enjoy 10 per cent of total national research expenditure while accounting for only 3 per cent of the nation's researchers, bestowing on them an extraordinary level of resources compared to a typical Chinese university (THE WUR 2017).

(which include the C9 and many of the universities previously listed under Projects 211 and 985) to be included in the programme, which grants further resources to support university activities along with more intensive oversight to monitor progress (Grove 2017). For DFCP-nominated universities, the resource windfalls have been significant. China's thirty richest elite universities, for example, each record annual expenditures in excess of US$1 billion—a figure only surpassed by the USA and indicative of the massive ramping up of resources since 2009, when only five Chinese universities enjoyed annual expenditures of US$1 billion or more (Zha 2016, p. 10).

Impressive as these numbers may be, however, they also conceal unique challenges. Central authorities have mandated that the country's elite universities must 'pursue world-class standing' while 'developing Chinese characteristics' (Zha 2016, p. 11). As Postiglione notes, while 'top-tier universities are coming to resemble their OECD counterparts', they find themselves caught between 'the goals of internationalisation and safeguarding national sovereignty', with the government encouraging 'Sino–foreign cooperation along with stern warnings of its dangers' (Postiglione 2015, p. 239). Jointly announced by the Central Party Committee and the State Council, the DFCP was broadly defined as a 'reform-based performance-related attempt to help universities optimise their disciplinary structures by strengthening the recruitment of talented scholars and scientists both within China and abroad', with an emphasis on building an 'innovation excellence culture' to 'enhance the level of scientific research and to create a new type of university think tank with socialist core values' (Peters and Besley 2018, p. 1). China's elite universities thus find themselves caught in a resource–performance trap: the party-state mandating a specific role for elite universities in the economic transformation of the country and supported by top-down resource policies, but at the same time providing them with a relatively narrow and increasingly rigid domestic political envelop in which they must operate and all the while being assessed against international performance criteria.

The results of this approach have thus far been mixed; they might even be labelled unsuccessful if measured in terms of the performance of elite Chinese universities on international league tables and by research impact/ citations. As Altbach (2016a) argues, investment in the sector has been on a grand scale, creating 'significant research capacity and world-class infrastructure' at the top universities which may yield impressive results in the decades to come. Currently, however, only two institutions rank in the top 50 (Peking University and Tsinghua University) while five rank in the top 101–200, but with the majority of China's elite HEIs in the 501–1000 bracket (Times Higher Education 2018; see also Table 5). Further, measured by normalised citations and impact, the forty-two universities that comprise the DFCP collectively have lower citations compared to 'most universities in Europe and North America' with Tsinghua and Shanghai Jiaotong standing above the pack (Marginson 2015, p. 69; Usher 2018, p. 26). That is, while growth in resources has clearly boosted research volume it has not, as yet, led to a commensurate increase in research impact and citations across the DFCP universities. Resources alone, in other words, have not been sufficient to achieve the outcomes that senior Chinese policymakers had hoped for. More poignantly, the sense in which an 'add (still more) resources

and stir' strategy can be sustained or achieve the types of future performance outcomes desired is questionable. Recent analysis by Usher (2018) suggests that, since 2012, resources going into the elite universities have plateaued, with per student expenditures at Tsinghua falling by 3% between 2012 and 2016 and at Zhejiang University by 5% as a result of increasing student numbers and inflation. Similarly, further funding initiatives supporting China's elite universities, such as the one-off RMB480 million tranche of funds given to Sun Yat-sen University as part of the DFCP, while nominally impressive in fact represent only 8% of the institution's current annual budget—at best a 'one or two-year bump in funding' with no accrued resource impact going forward (Usher 2018, p. 25).

The top-down resource strategies applied to China's elite universities might thus be facing 'Liebig's Law' where any future growth in research quality, impact and performance only occurs at the rate permitted by the most limiting factor (Gorban et al. 2011). Clearly this is not resources but rather factors associated with sector and institutional governance, institutional and academic autonomy and the treatment of academic labour. Despite various reforms, there is little institutional autonomy at elite Chinese universities compared to their international counterparts. Even in areas of academic and subject organisation, for example, the Ministry of Education retains control. In order to gain funding and legitimacy, areas of study have to be defined in relation to established disciplines typically prescribed by central authorities, obviating interdisciplinary experimentation otherwise central to creative and innovative scholarship common in leading international universities. Tenure practices too are subject to central rule-bound procedures which mandate that only departments teaching undergraduate programmes are able to offer tenured appointments, with applicants vetted for their academic abilities but also their political suitability by party cadres who are embedded within each university department and within the senior leadership team of each university (Altbach 2016a, p. 12). Programme design and approvals are overseen by the Ministry of Education, while university-level administration remains, in essence, the preserve of the government and is interwoven by dense administrative practices along with central reporting requirements (Rhoads et al. 2014, p. 38). It is not uncommon, for example, for Chinese scholars to complain of reams of paperwork and layers of approvals necessary to carry out basic academic pursuits, commence a new research agenda or present a paper at an international conference. Even the submission of academic papers to international journals outside of China requires approval, vetting and consent before they can be dispatched, as does attending an international conference.

While the 1998 Law of Higher Education along with subsequent promulgations by the State Council and Ministry of Education (including the Outline of China's National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development 2010–2020) was meant to usher in greater levels of institutional and academic autonomy—in part to provide space for an 'innovation excellence culture' to emerge—in reality such objectives have always been at odds with the party-state whose administrative structures, modes of governance and interests have rested in command-and-control political authority (Rhoads et al. 2014, p. 39; Shi et al. 2016, p. 218). Since the elevation of Xi Jinping to the presidency in 2013, this has become even

more evident, with the reassertion of party ideology and a crackdown on dissent and ideological impurity. As Altbach and de Wit observe, when 'considered together, recent developments show significant change in the Chinese academic landscape of the past half century', with communist party supervision of universities, which has 'traditionally been a central part of academic governance', significantly strengthened in recent years (Altbach and de Wit 2018, p. 24). From the closing of virtual networks limiting the access of Chinese scholars to international information sources, through a hardening of the 'Great Wall of China' censorship system and a crackdown on academic criticism or contrarian thought, to the reassertion of required ideological education in universities, Beijing has sent a cold wind through the academic establishment—one that has hit the social sciences and humanities particularly hard (ibid., p. 25). Overt and passive monitoring of classroom activities, lectures, seminars and other academic work is routinely reported by Chinese academics, with a student party cadre at Peking University celebrating the fact that 'we have been continuously strengthening and increasing our ideological work'—phenomena also reported on campuses internationally where 'political discipline' of Chinese student comments has attracted recent attention (Corr 2017; Feng 2017a).[13]

The reassertion of party ideology has also led various universities, including Renmin University, an elite DFCP university known for its social science and humanities programmes, to establish research institutes dedicated to 'Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era' and with Renmin announcing that it 'aims to ensure the theory enters class materials, classrooms and brains' (Hancock 2017b). Even the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the largest single funding body of social science and humanities research, now features Xi Jinping thought at the top of its list of approved topics and gives funding priority to those research agendas that propagate Xi Jinping's ideology (Hancock 2017b). Indeed, the encroachment of the party-state and its networks into research funding dynamics is highlighted by academics in elite universities who complain that 'too much of the research enterprise is controlled by administrators and governmental officials, who are sometimes one and the same, given that Chinese universities are run to a great extent by the government' (Rhoads et al. 2014, p. 38). The recent study by Rhoads et al. (2014), based on interviews with academics in Tsinghua, Peking and Renmin universities, reveals a combination of increasing pressures on academic labour for greater research productivity and demonstrated impact, set amid grievances that range from low academic salaries compared to international counterparts, a lack of transparency in research funding, an inability to pursue a full range of research and publishing options in terms of academic freedom, low rates of internationalisation, poor levels of funding to support international conference attendance, concerns about academic integrity and plagiarism, entrenched hierarchies typically based on seniority, party connections or Guanxi as opposed to academic merit, and low levels of collegiate participation in decision-making related to academic matters (see also Altbach and Postiglione 2012; Postigliones 2015, p. 237).

---

[13]Information also ascertained through interviews with Chinese scholars at elite universities (i.e. DFCP-designated universities).

Bifurcation and Tensions in China's Higher Education Sector

Beyond the elite university sector, China's higher education system suffers from a malaise of quality and capacity issues. Teaching and research quality operate at a much lower order than might be observed in elite universities, with the recurrent problem of graduate preparation for employment failing to meet the needs of the economy.[14] Resources are also in shorter supply, with overcrowded classrooms, dormitories and poor-quality student learning and library facilities frequently reported. Academic staff are generally less qualified and less well compensated compared to their counterparts in elite institutions; have fewer options in terms of research funding and support and display generally much lower levels of research productivity and international publications. Research and teaching quality assessments, while standard at elite institutions, are lax or often absent allowing 'mediocrity to flourish in the rest of the system' (Altbach 2016a, p. 12). And while elite institutions now typically experiment with innovative teaching pedagogies, non-elite institutions tend towards more traditional rote-based 'chalk and talk' pedagogies with implications for student learning outcomes (Postiglione 2015, p. 241). Compared to the elite sector, levels of internationalisation tend to be low with few if any international faculty; academic staff have usually obtained their postgraduate qualifications domestically, whereas the profiles of junior staff at elite institutions frequently reveal international qualifications.

Unlike many of its international counterparts, China's HE system is clearly bifurcated; elite institutions ride high at the top, resource rich and actively pursuing higher-order research with substantial levels of international publication placement, while in the rest of the system quality and standards vary widely and receive much 'less attention from the central government' (Altbach 2009, p. 208; see also Postiglione 2015, p. 241). Higher education in China thus reflects what Altbach describes as an unbalanced system; significant improvement at certain institutions 'but not necessarily for the system as a whole' with those at the bottom of the academic hierarchy creating 'serious problems' for the systemic quality transformation of the sector (Altbach 2016a, p. 12; Zha 2016, p. 11). Zha adds to the point, noting that the achievements of a few elite institutions are not a game-changer and do not produce a higher education sector with uniform quality standards able to support the types of economic transformation that China's policymakers desire (Zha 2016, p. 11).

China's dilemma is not unique to the region. Outside of Singapore and Hong Kong, there is little evidence that Asian states have been able to ensure quality across the entire HE system (Postiglione and Arimoto 2015, p. 152). What does distinguish China, however, is the huge range of institutional quality and the failure to even out overall standards—in part a consequence of Chinese policymakers' preoccupation with chasing world-class standing for the country's elite institutions. But even here, questions remain about research quality and integrity. For example,

---

[14] Average salaries for fresh graduates from non-elite universities in 2017, for example, were reported at 4000 yuan (US$588) a month which is insufficient to meet living needs in most urban environments in China (Zuo, 2017).

in 2017, the Journal of Tumor Biology (Springer) retracted 107 Chinese-authored papers due to the review process having been 'deliberately compromised by fabricated peer review reports'. According to Retraction Watch, an NGO that tracks academic paper and patent retractions, 'China leads the world for articles retracted due to fake peer review', highlighting an escalation in recent years of academic scandals in medicine and biology in particular and culminating in 2016 when 81% of Chinese drug approvals were withdrawn after 'pharmaceutical companies were asked to check their clinical data'—a result attributed to the extreme pressure on academics in elite universities to 'publish or perish' (Hancock 2017a; Yang and Zhang 2017). When coupled with the reassertion of party ideology since 2013, the outlook for China's higher education sector is thus less positive than might be popularly imagined (Altbach 2016a). As Altbach and de Wit observe, 'China's investment of billions of dollars in the upgrading of its top universities to create "world-class" institutions may be, at least in part, put at risk', along with China's internationalisation efforts and its attempts to build joint-collaborative ventures with leading international universities through the establishment of branch campuses (Altbach and de Wit 2018, p. 25; Feng 2017a). Until impediments to academic freedom are addressed, academic salaries are boosted and an academic culture free of plagiarism emerges, China's much heralded 'climb to the top' is not likely to be realised (Altbach 2016a, p. 13).[15]

Conclusion

As we noted at the outset of this chapter, Asia's economic development is not disputed. There is ample evidence to map the growth of rapidly transforming economies, especially in Northeast Asia where China's economic modernisation over the last four decades has been spectacular. But as we also noted, the assumed positive correlation between economic modernisation and emerging leadership in higher education and global research is not automatic. Resources are obviously important but of themselves not sufficient to produce globally leading higher education systems. Zha's argument is instructive here, noting that the success of Western systems of higher education in global comparisons rests not on the performance of individual universities but most importantly on 'the strength of a normative model'. Indeed, it is the adoption of this model in an ever-larger number of countries in Asia and elsewhere that speaks to its utility, economically but also in terms of its contribution to social development and human betterment (Altbach 1998; Zha 2016). As Altbach observes: 'Every academic institution in contemporary Asia has its roots in one or more of the Western academic models. Patterns of institutional governance, the ethos of the academic profession, the rhythm of academic life, ideas about science, procedures for examination and

---

[15]These issues likely account for the fact that of all overseas-trained Chinese scholars, between 70 and 80% do not return home—a figure that Altbach and de Wit indicate has been holding steady (Altbach and de Wit 2018, p. 25).

assessment, in some cases the language of instruction, and a myriad of other elements are Western in origin' (Altbach 1998, p. 40). This gives rise to two overwhelming realities shaping Asian higher education: 'the foreign origin of the academic model and the challenges of indigenization' or, more poignantly, the degree to which processes of indigenisation in the context of social, political and institutional norms ultimately detract from this model and thus render its performance less than optimal (ibid., p. 37).

In much of Asia, such questions have not been posed explicitly or used as a means to explore critically the role of the university in society, or of the relationship between the university, the state and political authority. Indeed, such questions have mostly been brushed aside, reflecting the subsumption of the higher education system and academic labour (and of any notion of the Western normative model) within systems of political power—a feature particularly dominant in Southeast Asia with Singapore the obvious exception.[16] While, as Zha and Altbach argue, the Western normative model has informed the idea of the university in Southeast Asia, it is clearly the case that 'indigenisation' has largely denuded the model of functional and performative utility, with universities ensconced as extensions of the state or as semi-autonomous state entities operating under the weight of 'command-and-control' administrative systems with negative implications for academic labour, institutional autonomy or decentralised academic decision-making. State-centred governance models thus continue to dominate, operating both as a means of governing (administering) the sector but also as a means of political incorporation in which any semblance of political heterodoxy that might challenge the state is controlled.

While these observations are less true of Northeast Asia, in part because of more diffuse traditions of academic organisation, they still fall largely under state-centred systems of governance, with Hong Kong and, more recently, Taiwan the obvious exceptions. Historically, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have seen their HE systems incorporated as extensions of state policy and as semi-autonomous elements within the developmental state, while their recent histories have witnessed attempts (albeit uneven) to adopt models that provide greater levels of university autonomy as part of broader reform efforts to replicate the Western normative model and, concomitantly, to improve national performance in international university league tables. The outcomes of such reforms, as we have demonstrated in this chapter, however, remain problematic at this point in time. This is particularly true of Japan, where government efforts to encourage greater levels of institutional experimentation are often resisted at the institutional level, encapsulated within seniority systems and hierarchical social relations.

This leaves China as the obvious outlier, publicly embracing the Western normative model (at least for its elite HEIs) but with periodic reminders that this has to be indigenised with 'Chinese characteristics' in order to protect China's national sovereignty and the political power of the party-state. In this sense, China's experi-

---

[16]Although historically, of course, Singapore was notorious for disciplining academic labour and for controls on free speech, including deportation (through revoking employment visas) of foreign academic labour.

ment in seeking world-class standing for its elite institutions remains just that—an experiment—but a singularly unique one. For example, it represents a continuation of state-centred traditions of governance typical in Asia, but with the state playing a much larger role than just about any other jurisdiction in the region. As Marginson observes, this has advantages for driving world-class standing insofar as helps direct resources, sets targets and policy agendas; but, 'on the other hand the state may limit what can be achieved, in that it often inhibits peer judgements in research, or retards the flow of knowledge through society and the innovation spaces in the economy' (Marginson 2013, p. 28). It is also an experiment of limited proportions and non-systemic in nature, bifurcated between elite and non-elite institutions—the latter represented by some 2838 of the 2880 HEI currently in existence, which, by and large, remain untouched by this experimentation. At the same time, it is also an experiment to develop world-class institutions that are *a*typical of their Western counterparts, focused predominantly on science (STEM), without commensurate developments in the social sciences and humanities (which remain largely underdeveloped in China even among elite universities) and thus without the organic creativity of interdisciplinarity. Finally, it is an experiment predicated on top-down, directed research in STEM disciplines and aimed at harvesting science and technology for economic transformation—an instrumentalist project of the highest order.

All of this, of course, is at odds with the attributes of the Western normative model which broadly adjures to systems of knowledge inquiry that are generally researcher driven, typically uncoordinated, personalistic and even idiosyncratic—bottom-up systems of intellectual endeavour that rely on open, critical, often heterodox modalities of knowledge production. To be sure, such systems are guided, sometimes cajoled by governments and regulations designed to channel research into commercialisable pursuits or particular subject areas that address the labour needs of the economy, and sometimes disciplined by punitive measures designed to deter specific forms of academic endeavour. Ultimately, however, the enterprise of academic inquiry under the Western normative model remains largely uncoordinated, vicarious and typically subject to its own collegiate system of review and development beyond the pure instrumentalist interests of the state. Asia's experimentation with this model has proven uneven, especially in Southeast Asia—an unevenness that might well be repeated in China given recent political developments.

References

Abdenur, A. E., & Folly, M. (2015). The New Development Bank and the institutionalization of the BRICS. *R/Evolutions: Global Trends & Regional Issues, 3*(1), 66–92.

ADB. (2012a). *Private higher education across Asia: Expanding access, searching for quality*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

ADB. (2012b). *Administration and governance of higher education in Asia: Patterns and implications*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

Altbach, P. G. (1998). *Comparative higher education: Knowledge, the university and development*. Greenwich, CT; London, UK: Ablex & JAI Press.

Altbach, P. (2009). China and India: A steep climb to world-class universities. In J. A. Douglass, C. J. King, & I. Feller (Eds.), *Globalisation's muse: Universities and higher education systems in a changing world* (pp. 205–226). Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Public Policy Press.

Altbach, P. G. (2011). The past, present, and future of the research university. In P. G. Altbach & J. Salmi (Eds.), *The road to academic excellence: The making of world-class research universities* (pp. 11–32). Washington, DC: World Bank.

Altbach, P. G. (2016a). Chinese higher education: 'Glass ceiling' and 'feet of clay'. *International Higher Education, Summer* (86), 11–13.

Altbach, P. G. (2016b). *Global perspectives on higher education*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Altbach, P. G., & de Wit, H. (2018). The closing of China? Possible implications for universities worldwide. *International Higher Education, Spring, 93,* 24–25.

Altbach, P. G., & Postiglione, G. A. (2012). Hong Kong's academic advantage. *International Higher Education, 66,* 22–27.

Altbach, P. G., & Salmi, J. (Eds.). (2011). *The road to academic excellence: The making of world-class research universities*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Anh, L. T. K., & Hayden, M. (2017). The road ahead for the higher education sector in Vietnam. *Journal of International and Comparative Education, 6*(2), 77–89. https://doi.org/10.14425/jice.2017.6.2.77.

Ashley, R. K. (1983). Three modes of economism. *International Studies Quarterly, 27*(4), 463–496. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600557.

Asian Correspondent (2017, September 25). China aims to dominate higher education via 42 world class universities. *Asian Correspondent.* Retrieved from https://asiancorrespondent.com/2017/09/china-aims-dominate-global-higher-education-sector-via-42-world-class-universities/#8kY5ZOxM1UcXgGFS.97.

Bhandari, R., & Lefebure, A. (2015). *Asia, the next higher education superpower?*. New York: Institute of International Education.

British Council. (2018). *Philippine higher education*. British Council. Retrieved from https://www.britishcouncil.ph/tne/facts-figures/philippines.

Carroll, T., & Jarvis, D. S. L. (2017a). Developmental states in Asia: Change and transformation. In T.-K. Chang & A. Chang (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of Asia in world politics* (pp. 48–60). London & New York: Routledge.

Carroll, T., & Jarvis, D. S. L. (2017b). Disembedding autonomy: Asia after the developmental state. In T. Carroll & D. S. L. Jarvis (Eds.), *Asia after the developmental state: Disembedding autonomy* (pp. 3–50). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carroll, T., & Jarvis, D. S. L. (2017c). Preface. In T. Carroll & D. S. L. Jarvis (Eds.), *Asia after the developmental state: Disembedding autonomy* (pp. xvii–xxxviii). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chou, C. P. (2012). Who benefits from the massification of Taiwan's higher education? Guest editor's introduction. *Chinese Education & Society, 45*(5–6), 3–7. https://doi.org/10.2753/CED1061-1932450500.

Chou, C. P. (2014, November 12). Education in Taiwan: Taiwan's colleges and universities. *Taiwanese–US Quarterly Analysis*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/education-in-taiwan-taiwans-colleges-and-universities/.

Chu, Y.-W. (2016). Democratization, emergence of the knowledge-based economy, and the changing developmental alliances in South Korea and Taiwan. In Y.-W. Chu (Ed.), *The Asian developmental state: Reexaminations and new departures* (pp. 117–138). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Coclanis, P. A. (2013). Asia's next tigers? Burma, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. *World Affairs* March/April. Retrieved from http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/asia%E2%80%99s-next-tigers-burma-philippines-and-sri-lanka.

Corr, A. (2017, June 28). Chinese informants in the classroom: Pedagogical strategies. *Forbes*. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/06/28/chinese-informants-in-the-classroom-pedagogical-strategies/#31c8fd6412da.

Cummings, W. K. (2010). Is the academic center shifting to Asia? In D. W. Chapman, W. K. Cummings, & G. A. Postiglione (Eds.), *Crossing borders in East Asian higher education* (pp. 47–76). Hong Kong: Springer.

de Haan, J. (2017, April 27). Indonesia: Economic developments and future prospects. *Future Directions International*. Retrieved from http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/indonesia-economic-developments-future-prospects/.

Đỗ, H. M. (2014). Towards more flexible organization. In L. Tr`ân, S. Marginson, H. Đỗ, Q. Đỗ, T. Lê, N. Nguyễn, T. Vũ, T. Phạm, & H. Nguyễn (Eds.), *Higher education in Vietnam* (pp. 54–85). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dobbins, M., Knill, C., & Vögtle, E. M. (2011). An analytical framework for the cross-country comparison of higher education governance. *Higher Education, 62*(5), 665–683. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-011-9412-4.

Etzkowitz, H., & Zhou, C. (2009). Evolution of the university's role in innovation and the new Asian model. In J. A. Douglas, C. J. King, & I. Fekker (Eds.), *Globalization's muse: Universities and higher education systems in a changing world* (pp. 229–247). Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Public Policy Press.

Feng, E. (2017a, April 25). Ideological purge hits China universities with western ties. *The Financial Times*. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/8a7552d8-1f68-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9.

Feng, E. (2017b, September 20). 'What China needs right now is more Steve Jobs': Government pressure threatens an experiment in western style education. *The Financial Times*. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/b4e68f66-76d7-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71.

Fischer, K. (2016, May 1). When everyone goes to college: A lesson from South Korea. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. Retrieved from https://www.chronicle.com/article/When-Everyone-Goes-to-College-/236313.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. London: Penguin.

Gereffi, G. (2014). Global value chains in a post-Washington consensus world. *Review of International Political Economy, 21*(1), 9–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2012.756414.

Gorban, A., Pokidysheva, L., Smirnova, E., & Tyukina, T. (2011). Law of the minimum paradoxes. *Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 73*(9), 2013–2044. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-010-9597-1.

Grove, J. (2017). China targets 'world-class' status for 42 universities. *Times Higher Education World University Rankings*. Retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/china-targets-world-class-status-42-universities.

Hallinger, P. (2014). Riding the tiger of world university rankings in East Asia: Where are we heading? *International Journal of Educational Management, 28*(2), 230–245. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJEM-11-2012-0126.

Hancock, T. (2017a, September 28). China's EMBA programmes: Under government scrutiny. *The Financial Times*. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/2fed43c8-5da9-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220.

Hancock, T. (2017b, October 30). Chinese universities race to embrace Xi Jinping's theories. *The Financial Times*. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/7002d916-bd47-11e7-b8a3-38a6e068f464.

Hazelkorn, E. (2011). *Rankings and the reshaping of higher education: The battle for world-class excellence*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hazelkorn, E. (2017). *Global rankings and the geopolitics of higher education: Understanding the influence and impact of rankings on higher education, policy and society*. London & New York: Routledge.

Heyward, M., & Sopantini, E. D. (2013). Indonesia: The challenge of quality and equity in education. In L. P. Symaco (Ed.), *Education in Southeast Asia* (pp. 71–94). London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Hou, A. Y.-C., Ince, M., & Chiang, C.-L. (2012). A reassessment of Asian Pacific excellence programs in higher education: The Taiwan experience. *Scientometrics, 92*(1), 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-012-0727-4.

Hultberg, P. T., & Calonge, D. S. (2017). Is South Korea in a higher education access trap? *University World News*, 468. Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20170711111525929.

Hultberg, P., Calonge, D. S., & Kim, S.-H. (2017). Education policy in South Korea: A contemporary model of human capital accumulation? *Cogent Economics & Finance, 5*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2017.1389804.

Human Rights Watch. (2018). *Philippines: Duterte's 'drug war' claims 12,000 + Lives*. New York: Human Rights Watch.. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/philippines-dutertes-drug-war-claims-12000-lives.

Jarvis, D. S. L. (2017). The state and development in Malaysia: Race, class and markets. In T. Carroll & D. S. L. Jarvis (Eds.), *Asia after the developmental state: Disembedding autonomy* (pp. 201–236). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jump, P. (2013, February 28). Strong but uneven patterns as bricks build on research. *Times Higher Education Supplement.*

Jusoh, D. S. I. (2017, May 7). Turning the world towards Malaysian education. *New Straits Times*. Retrieved from https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2017/05/237032/turning-world-towards-malaysian-education.

Keohane, R. O. (2002). *Power and governance in a partially globalized world*. London: Routlege.

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). *Power and interdependence: World politics in transition*. New York: Little Brown.

Kim, T. (2016). Internationalisation and development in East Asian higher education: An introduction. *Comparative Education, 52*(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2016.1144309.

Kitamura, Y., Kuroda, K., Meerman, A., & Yonezawa, A. (2014). *Emerging international dimensions in East Asian higher education*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Kuo, Y.-Y. (2016). Taiwan universities: Where to go? *Humanities, 15*(1). https://doi.org/10.3390/h5010012.

Lamubol, S. (2015). Continued curbs on academic freedom under military rule. *University World News,* 370. Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20150605102104963.

Lee, C. M. (2016). *Fault lines in a rising Asia*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Legowo-Zipperer, V. (2017, July 7). Indonesia among the best economies in the G20. *Deutsche Welle*. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/indonesia-among-the-best-economies-in-the-g20/a-39598526.

Lehmann, J.-P. (2017, September 12). University challenge: Asia in the scales of global knowledge. *The StraitsTimes*. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/university-challenge-asia-in-the-scales-of-global-knowledge.

Levin, R. C. (2010). Top of the class: The rise of Asia's universities. *Foreign Affairs, 89*(3), 63–75.

Lo, Y. W. (2014). *University rankings: Implications for higher education in Taiwan*. Singapore & Heidelberg: Springer Science + Business Media.

Logli, C. (2016). Higher education in Indonesia: Contemporary challenges in governance, access, and quality. In C. Collins, M. Lee, J. Hawkins, & D. Neubauer (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of Asia Pacific higher education* (pp. 561–581). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.

Macha, W., Mackie, C., & Magaziner, J. (2018, March 6). Education in the Philippines. *World Education News + Reviews*. Retrieved from https://wenr.wes.org/2018/03/education-in-the-philippines.

Marginson, S. (2011a). Asia-Pacific universities in the global space: Visions of university presidents. In S. Marginson, S. Kaur, & E. Sawir (Eds.), *Higher education in the Asia-Pacific: Strategic responses to globalization* (pp. 37–52). Dordrecht: Springer.

Marginson, S. (2011b). Higher education in East Asia and Singapore: Rise of the Confucian model. *Higher Education, 61*(5), 587–611. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-010-9384-9.

Marginson, S. (2013). Different roads to a shared goal: Political and cultural variation in world-class universities. In Q. Wang, Y. Cheng, & N. C. Liu (Eds.), *Building world-class universities: Different approaches to a shared goal* (pp. 13–34). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Marginson, S. (2015). Systemic challenges to educational quality and global competitivness. In R. Bhandari & A. Lefébure (Eds.), *Asia, the next higher education superpower?* (pp. 57–75). New York: Institute of International Education.

Marope, P. T. M., Wells, P. J., & Hazelkorn, E. (Eds.). (2013). *Rankings and accountability in higher education: Uses and misuses*. Paris: UNESCO.

McCarthy, J., & Ibrahim, R. (2010). *Review of social science capacity building support to Indonesia's knowledge sector*. Retrieved from https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/indo-ks9-socialscience.pdf.

McCoy, A. W. (2009). Preface: The Philippine oligarchy at the turn of the twenty-first century. In A. W. McCoy (Ed.), *An anarchy of families: State and family in the Philippines* (pp. xi–xxxii). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

MEXT. (2017). Top global university project. Tokyo: MEXT. Retrieved from https://tgu.mext.go.jp/en/about/index.html.

Moeliodihardjo, B. Y. (2014). *Higher education sector in Indonesia. Massification of higher education in large academic systems.* British Council. Retrieved from https://www.britishcouncil.in/sites/default/files/indonesian_higher_education_system.pdf.

Mohrman, K. (2008). The emerging global model with Chinese characteristics. *Higher Education Policy, 21,* 29–48.

Mok, K. H. (2014). Promoting the global university in Taiwan: University governance reforms and academic reflections. In C. P. Chou (Ed.), *The SSCI syndrome in higher education: A local or global phenomenon* (pp. 1–24). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Mok, K. H., & Cheung, A. B. L. (2011). Global aspirations and strategising for world-class status: New form of politics in higher education governance in Hong Kong. *Journal of Higher Education Policy & Management, 33*(3), 231–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360080X.2011.564998.

Mok, K. H., & Hallinger, P. (2013). The quest for world class status and university responses in Asia's world cities: An introduction by the guest editors. *Journal for Higher Education Policy and Management, 35*(3), 230–237.

Mok, K. H., & Neubauer, D. (2016). Higher education governance in crisis: A critical reflection on the massification of higher education, graduate employment and social mobility. *Journal of Education and Work, 29*(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639080.2015.1049023.

Negara, S., & Benveniste, L. (2014). *Tertiary education in Indonesia: Directions for polic*y. Working paper no.89301. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/105061468044074141/Tertiary-education-in-Indonesia-directions-for-policy.

Nelson, A. R. (2013). Regionalisation and internationalisation in higher education and development: A historical perspective, c. 1950–1970. *Journal of Higher Education Policy & Management, 35*(3), 238–248. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360080x.2013.786858.

Neubauer, D. E. (2012). *The emergent knowledge society and the future of higher education: Asian perspectives*. New York: Routledge.

Nizam, N., & Nurdin, M. (2014). Governance reforms in higher education: A study of institutional autonomy in Indonesia. In N. V. Varghese & M. Martin (Eds.), *Governance reforms in higher education: A study of institutional autonomy in Asian countries* (pp. 85–106). Paris: UNESCO & International Institute for Educational Planning.

Oberman, R., Dobbs, R., Budiman, A., Thompson, F., & Rosse, M. (2012). *The archipelago economy: Unleashing Indonesia's potential*. McKinsey Global Institute. Retrieved from https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Asia%20Pacific/The%20archipelago%20economy/MGI_Unleashing_Indonesia_potential_Full_report.ashx.

OECD. (2009). *OECD reviews of tertiary education: Japan 2009*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2013a). Indonesia: Innovation profile. In OECD, *Innovation in Southeast Asia* (pp. 153–180). Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2013b). Malaysia: Innovation profile. In OECD, *Innovation in Southeast Asia* (pp. 181–211). Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2013c). Singapore: Innovation profile. In OECD, *Innovation in Southeast Asia* (pp. 223–254). Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2013d). Viet nam: Innovation profile. In OECD, *Innovation in Southeast Asia* (pp. 281–305). Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2016a). *OECD reviews of innovation policy: Malaysia 2016*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. (2016b). *OECD science, technology and innovation outlook 2016: Japan*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD/ADB. (2015). *Education in Indonesia: Rising to the challenge*. Reviews of National Policies for Education. Paris: OECD Publishing.

O'Neil, J. (2001). Building better global eeconomic BRICs: Global Economic Paper, No: 66. New York: Goldman Sachs. Retrieved from http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf.

O'Neill, J. (2015, January 8). BRIC in danger of becoming 'IC,' says acronym coiner O'Neill. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/.../bric-in-danger-of-becoming-ic-says-acronym-co.

Parry, Z. (2013). The higher education sector in Korea: What you see is not always what you get. *The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education*, October. Retrieved from http://www.obhe.ac.uk/newsletters/borderless_report_october_2011/higher_education_in_south_korea.

Pelupessy, D. (2017, September 14). Indonesia wants to be no. 1 in ASEAN, but in the world of science collaboration is more important. *The Conversation*. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/indonesia-ingin-jadi-no-1-di-asean-tapi-dalam-dunia-ilmu-pengetahuan-kolaborasi-lebih-penting-83984.

Peters, M. A., & Besley, T. (2018). China's double first-class university strategy: 双一流. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2018.1438822.

Polanyi, K. (1957). *The great transformation* (1st Beacon paperback ed.). Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Postiglione, G. A. (2015). Research universities for national rejuvenation and global influence: China's search for a balanced model. *Higher Education, 70*(2), 235–250. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-014-9838-6.

Postiglione, G. A., & Arimoto, A. (2015). Building research universities in East Asia. *Higher Education, 70*(2), 151–153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-015-9873-y.

Pratt, S. M. (2013). The global institutional profiles project: A new approach to evaluating academic institutions. In Q. Wang, Y. Cheng, & B. C. Lui (Eds.), *Building world class universities: Different approaches to a shared goal* (pp. 181–196). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Pusser, B., & Marginson, S. (2013). University rankings in critical perspective. *The Journal of Higher Education, 84*(4), 544–568.

Quimbo, A. M. T., & Sulabo, E. C. (2013). Research productivity and its policy implications in higher education institutions. *Studies in Higher Education, 39*(10), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2013.818639.

Rakhmani, I. (2018). Reproducing academic insularity in a time of neo-liberal markets: The case of social science research in Indonesian state universities. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, (forthcoming).

Rakhmani, I., & Siregar, F. (2016). *Reforming research in Indonesia: Policies and practice*. Working paper no. 92. New Delhi: Global Development Network. Retrieved from http://www.gdn.int/sites/default/files/Doing%20Research%20in%20Indonesia%20-%20Working%20Paper.pdf.

Rhoads, R. A., Wang, X., Shi, X., & Chang, Y. (2014). *China's rising research universities: A new era of global ambition*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Robison, R. (1986). *Indonesia: The rise of capital*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Robison, R., Rodan, G., & Hewison, K. (2005). Transplanting the neoliberal state in Southeast Asia. In R. Boyd & T.-W. Ngo (Eds.), *Asian states: Beyond the developmental perspective* (pp. 172–198). London & New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Rostow, W. W. (1971). *The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sawa, T. (2017, December 24). Why Japan's universities continue to fall in global rankings. *The Japan Times.* Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/12/24/commentary/japan-commentary/japans-universities-continue-fall-global-rankings/#.WzRh_xLpckI.

Sharma, Y. (2014). Rising unemployment: Are there too many graduates? *University World News*, 307. Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20140213153927383.

Sheridan, G. (2010). *Viet Nam: Preparing the higher education sector development project (HESDP)*. Technical assistance consultant's report. Asian Development Bank. Retrieved from https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/63093/42079-01-vie-tacr-04.pdf.

Shi, J., Jo, L., & Li, J. (2016). Prospects of higher education in the Asian region with specific reference to China. In C. S. Collins, M. N. N. Lee, J. N. Kawkins, & D. E. Neubauer (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of Asia Pacific higher education* (pp. 211–226). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.

Shin, J. C. (Ed.). (2018). *Higher education governance in Asia: Transformations under Neoliberalism*. Singapore: Springer.

Stapleton, K. (2017, April). Inside the world's largest higher education boom. *The Conversation*. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/inside-the-worlds-largest-higher-education-boom-74789.

Statistical Bureau. (2018). National statistics: Per capita GNI (US dollars). Statistical Bureau, Republic of China (Taiwan). Retrieved from https://eng.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=1.

StudyMalaysia. (2015, March 14). The Malaysian higher education system: An overview. *StudyMalaysia.* Retrieved from https://www.studymalaysia.com/international/the-national-education-system/the-malaysian-higher-education-system-an-overview.

Swanson, A. (2015, October 5). Why Asia is the new Europe. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/05/why-asia-is-the-new-europe/?utm_term=.3211ad6485eb.

Times Higher Education. (2017). Best universities in China 2018. *Times Higher Education World University Rankings*. Retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/student/best-universities/best-universities-china.

Times Higher Education. (2018). *Times Higher Education: World Universities Rankings 2018*. Retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2018/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats.

Tjeldvoll, A. (2011). Change leadership in universities: The Confucian dimension. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 33*(3), 219–230. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360080X.2011.564997.

Tollefson, J. (2018). China declared world's largest producer of scientific articles. *Nature*, *553*(390). https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-018-00927-4.

Trines, S. (2017, November 8). Education in Vietnam. *World Education News and Reviews*. Retrieved from https://wenr.wes.org/2017/11/education-in-vietnam.

UNESCO. (2014). *Higher education in Asia: Expanding out, expanding up. The rise of graduate education and university research*. Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

UNESCO. (2018). *China: Education and literacy*. UNESCO. Retrieved from: http://uis.unesco.org/country/CN.

Usher, A. (2018). Have Chinese universities hit a plateau? *International Higher Education* (93), 25–26.

Wang, H. H. (2014). The political economy of quantitative indexes for measuring academic performance. In C. P. Chou (Ed.), *The SSCI syndrome in higher education: A local or global phenomenon* (pp. 25–38). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Welch, A. (2017). Higher education and the developmental state: The view from East and South East Asia. In T. Carroll & D. S. L. Jarvis (Eds.), *Asia after the developmental state: Disembedding autonomy* (pp. 359–387). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilhelm, I. (2013, March 11). China crowds into scholarly research and new patents. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. Retrieved from https://www.chronicle.com/article/China-Crowds-Into-Scholarly/137815.

Willige, A. (2016). The world's top economy: The US versus China in five charts. *World Economic Forum, 2017*. Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/.

Wiratraman, H. P. (2016, February 15). Academic freedom post-Soeharto: Not much better. *The Jakarta Post*. Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/15/academic-freedom-post-soeharto-not-much-better.html.

World Bank. (2012). *Putting higher education to work: Skills and research for growth in East Asia*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. (2013). *Spending more or spending better: Improving education financing in Indonesia*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. (2016). New country classifications by income level. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from: https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-2016.

World Bank. (2017). *GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$): World Bank national accounts data and OECD national accounts data files*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD.

World Bank. (2018). *World Bank data: Indonesia*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ID.

Xinying, Z. (2017, September 28). China has world's largest education system. *China Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-09/28/content_32606890.htm.

Yamamoto, S., & Futao, H. (2014). Governance reforms in higher education: A study of institutional autonomy in Japan. In N. V. Varghese & M. Martin (Eds.), *Governance reforms in higher education: A study of institutional autonomy in Asian countries* (pp. 107–124). Paris: UNESCO & International Institute for Educational Planning.

Yang, R. (2016). Toxic academic culture in East Asia. *International Higher Education, 84,* 15–16.

Yang, R. (2017). The cultural mission of premier universities in East Asia. *International Higher Education, 91,* 29–30.

Yang, Y., & Zhang, A. (2017, June 18). China launches crackdown on academic fraud. *The Financial Times*. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/680ea354-5251-11e7-bfb8-997009366969.

Yasih, D. W. P., & Mudhoffir, A. M. (2017, November 28). *How autonomous are Indonesian universities?* Indonesia at Melbourne. Retrieved from http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/how-autonomous-are-indonesian-universities/.

Zha, Q. (2016). China calls for smarter standards for its world-class universities. *International Higher Education, 86,* 10–11.

Zhang, L., Bao, W., & Sun, L. (2016). Resources and research production in higher education: A longitudinal analysis of Chinese universities, 2000–2010. *Research in Higher Education, 57*(7), 869–891. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-016-9410-6.

Zhengqi, P. (2016). State-led innovation partnerships: Asian developmental states within the triple helix paradigm. *European Journal of East Asian Studies, 15*(1), 108–143. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01501005.

Zuo, M. (2017, June 14). China's new graduates earn US$588 a month … less than the cost of an iPhone. *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2098225/chinas-new-graduates-earn-us588-month-less-cost-iphone.

Darryl S. L. Jarvis is Professor and Head, Department of Asian and Policy Studies, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the Education University of Hong Kong (formally the Hong Kong Institute of Education). He has published widely in the areas of comparative political economy, the political economy of development in Asia and comparative public policy. His recent publications include *Convergence and Diversity in the Governance of Higher Education:*

Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge University Press (with Giliberto Capano); *Institutional Entrepreneurship and Policy Change: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations*, Palgrave Macmillan (with Caner Bakir); *Asia After the Developmental State: Disembedding Autonomy,* Cambridge University Press (with Toby Carroll); *Markets and Development: Civil Society, Citizens and the Politics of Neoliberalism,* Routledge (with Toby Carroll); *Financialisation and Development in Asia,* Routledge (with Toby Carroll); *The Politics of Marketizing Asia.* Palgrave Macmillan (with Toby Carroll); *ASEAN Industries and the Challenge from China,* Palgrave Macmillan (with Anthony Welch); *Infrastructure Regulation: What Works, Why, and How do we Know? Lessons from Asia and Beyond*, World Scientific (with Ed Araral, M. Ramesh and Wu Xun); *Handbook of International Business Risk: The Asia Pacific.* Cambridge University Press; *International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline,* University of South Carolina Press; *International Relations. Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought,* State University of New York Press (with R. M. Crawford); and *Post-modernism and its Critics: International Relations and the Third Debate,* Praeger.

Ka Ho Mok is the Vice-President and concurrently Lam Man Tsan Chair Professor of Comparative Policy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. Before joining Lingnan University, he was the Vice-President (Research and Development) and Chair Professor of Comparative Policy at the Hong Kong Institute of Education (now the Education University of Hong Kong), and Associate Dean and Professor of Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong. Prior to this, Prof. Mok was appointed as the Founding Chair Professor in East Asian Studies and established the Centre for East Asian Studies at the University of Bristol, UK. Professor Mok is the founding Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Asian Public Policy* (Routledge), editor of the series *Asian Education and Development Studies* published (Emerald) and editors for series published by Routledge and Springer.

Chapter 2
Changing Patterns in the Governance of Higher Education in Asia

Deane E. Neubauer

Introduction

When seeking to identify and analyze changes in governance patterns in Asia, it is mindful to have an appreciation of the enormity of change which has taken place within the higher education sector of the region. In what has become an important typology of higher education change developed decades ago, Martin Trow argued that with higher education driven by a continuing need to provide access to larger sections of national populations, change would proceed along a continuum from its historically familiar position of engaging 15% or less of a national population (the elite stage) to a period of massification, ranging up to 50% of a population as the need and desirability of higher education qualifications spread throughout society, and onto an even more inclusive stage of universalization in which the whole of an eligible national population would have access to higher education if desired (Trow 2005). Trow's categorization and de facto prediction of the course of higher education throughout the world has, perhaps, been realized more quickly and generally throughout Asia than anywhere else in the world. (For two interesting approaches to the processes of massification in Asian higher education, see Hawkins and Mok 2015; Calderon 2012).

Massification, quite expectedly, has followed similar but different courses as it has developed throughout Asia, reflecting the historical complexities of the region itself (Cf. Hawkins et al. 2012). However, in every society in which it has occurred, some version of a process has taken place in which the effort to provide greater access has been inexorably tied to issues associated with producing corresponding levels of capacity. Common to this process, but much influenced by the relative scale of such capacity increases, a multitude of issues arises focused (in general terms) on questions of the quality of the education product being created in such

D. E. Neubauer (✉)
East West Center, Honolulu, HI, USA
e-mail: deanen@hawaii.edu

expanding systems. In ways that have been replicated in one form of another, this wave of change has operated to literally engulf existing patterns of higher education governance. Systems of governance, primarily state-centric and hierarchical, that had been in existence for decades, were simply overwhelmed by the scale and extent of the demands placed on them to administer to such a rapidly and radically expanded structure and culture of higher education institutions.

It is useful to take note of the social, political, and cultural forces that provoked this radical higher education expansion especially over the last four decades of the twentieth century which would come to be accepted as the phenomenon of contemporary globalization, in all its complexities and blends of forces acting on nation-states to produce both creative and destructive outcomes. (For a marvelous recounting of these processes see the early, but significant review by Barnet and Muller 1974). As the massification of higher education took shape across the Asia-Pacific region in response to and indeed, as an integral part, of contemporary globalization, processes of governance across societies, most commonly perceived as being shaped and driven by some form of adopted neoliberalism, governance structures in general were subject to extensive change, within which those focused on higher education were no exception (Steger and Roy 2010).

Within this transformative environment nation-states developed an array of governance responses to the varied forces of globalization driven in part by the need to "accommodate" in some way the "intrusions" of global forces within the nation-state, e.g., the development of new industries that would become part of global commodity chains requiring the creation and organization of local labor forces capable of supporting them. Perforce, the rapidity and extent of globalization brought new sources of wealth into such societies, displacing in some instances the role that historical elites (especially traditional landowning elites) had played in traditional governance structures and processes and empowering those more closely linked to the new sources of capital associated with and in many instances derived directly from the complex dynamics of global capital. Overall, the effect in countries across the region was to decentralize traditional governance structures both in the sense of devolving power (social, economic, and political) to more "local" areas and note that globalization was accompanied in many parts of the region by the rapid emergence of megacities, huge urban aggregates which came to be rivals in many ways to traditional national capitals where political power and historical government centrality had been located (Douglass 2008).

As the varied chapters of this collection make clear, the form and substance of such governance changes have contained both similarities across the Asia region—largely reflecting the steady growth of neoliberalism as a "covering ideology" for increasing globalization—and persistent differences in both tone and substance, reflecting the enduring nature of the particularistic national histories and experiences of countries within the region. Although the detail of these governance changes differs by country and across the region, in some way or other, the following elements have been involved: (a) a devolution of autonomy from the central state to either subordinate political units at the regional or local level, or both (as in China); (b) within

these movements, a formal shifting of authority from central government ministries to existing higher education institutions, often with a redefinition of and placement of authority in a centralized local agent, e.g., the office of the president in Japan HEIs; (c) a formal differentiation of type of institution based on a presumptive mission with some granted formal autonomy, again with increased authority framed within the office of the president, e.g., as is the case in Thailand; (d) in like fashion, selecting a small group of institutions to be recipients of additional governmental funds to enable them to compete internationally, especially within global rankings and with specified research missions, as has been the case in China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Japan; and (e) arraying higher education administrative processes across formal mechanisms of performance evaluation based on explicit norms developed by centralized authority, as has been the case with the development of key performance indicators within Malaysian higher education.

Extending beyond these endeavors has been the rapid expansion of formal quality assurance activities across the region which has had the effect of exposing individual institutions to broader norms of performance and accountability within a "shared property space" that stands outside the formal reach of governmental power and authority while simultaneously creating patterns of performance and assessment within individual higher education institutions that perforce mandate that internal behaviors and activities necessarily are references to external standards of quality. (For an extended review of the activities alluded to within these two paragraphs, see: Collins et al. 2016).

In proceeding to examine various patters of higher education governance change over the past several decades, I encourage an examination of the notion of change within given national or regional contexts as variable and contextual. To this end, I suggest a framework for differentiating change within varying patterns of governance. Second, I seek to employ this notion within a framework of categorizing governance activities by their presumptive spatial reach in what I take to be an instance of the framework suggested by Christaller (1996).

On Change

In his late twentieth-century review of postmodernity, David Harvey remarks to the effect that one of the most remarkable changes to appear in the framework of an increasingly globalized world is "change in the nature of change itself." The remark in this context is apt and arresting as we are asked to contemplate how late twentieth-century technology was leading to the destruction of time and place as understood by previous generations (Harvey 1990). Within this frame, Harvey was asking us to contemplate how much of human landscape and human "timescape" were being radically transformed by the ability of a steadily advancing technology that increasingly erased boundaries established in previous technological regimes. This, he argued, was the essential condition of postmodernity, one in which many

human frames of reference established and operated through the previous regime would be transformed. Now, almost 40 years later, as we live in a continuously changing cyber-world that we have come in many ways to take for granted, we seem to have made an overall accommodation with the initial radicalism of the notion that the nature of change itself may have changed. For the purpose of this chapter, however, I wish to propose that we re-examine some aspects of this assertion as it addresses the question of changing patterns of governance in higher education in Asia.

Beyond the obvious stunning implications of a social world organized around simultaneity, accepting this assertion suggests that we may attempt a further inquiry of other elements of "change" as well. Recently, attempting to examine the range of events and outcomes that might be encompassed within the notion of "innovation" within comparative higher education contexts (Neubauer 2016), I proposed a tentative framework for examining change within a higher education context based on the simple but compelling notion that *change* obviously and importantly, can and does have multiple "dimensions" and effects or outcomes. Here I propose the examination of change along a continuum defined at one end by what I term "genuine novelty" and at the other by what I term "extinction." The proposal suggests that within the ever-present welter of change in all dimensions of social life, instances that are "fundamentally new" come into existence and these in turn begin to operate to transform other elements of the social spaces in which they are operating. Christensen and his colleagues, for example, in their review of US higher education, termed these events "disruptions" (2011), a signification that quickly achieved commonplace within the literature on higher education and which has yielded quickly to significant levels of differentiation. At the other end of the continuum, we can posit the notion of "extinction," suggesting that for most purposes, the practices identified within this category have ceased to exist, at least in any meaningful way. The purpose of the exercise, however, lies within that which is to be gained by examining social practices, in this instance within the contextual pattern of higher education governance.

In short, I am asking if we are to examine changes in higher education governance can we usefully do so without having some sense of differentiation of the *kinds* of changes we are examining? Were we to imagine a continuum of change on which to place governance modalities, one end of it could be defined in terms of what we might term *genuine novelty*…a change of such magnitude that it requires us to often invent new ways of experiencing the world, at least within the frame of reference for a given instance. In this regard, Castells (2009), in his effort to frame and characterize aspects of the information society, sees the Internet as constituting genuine novelty in that it profoundly transforms how we communicate, create, and retrieve information globally within an instance of near simultaneity (and to return to Harvey, experience the meaningful time frames of change itself). From other points of view we can see instances such as this as inventing new paradigms of knowledge and engagement.

By the most stark contrast, *extinction* occurs when previously existing practices,

values, and patterns of social engagement disappear in the face to replacement practices and/or come to have the status of legacy institutions and practices, kept in existence as social tropes and exemplars, but not perceived as viable social practices.[1]

Most change, however, I suggest lies in places between these extreme ends of the continuum and involve *combinations* of existing mechanisms and structures often consisting of practices drawn from one social endeavor and applied to another. Much of online education is of this order wherein the traditional elements of existing pedagogy have been combined with either synchronist or synchronous and asynchronous technologies to create the "virtual" classroom.

Such a framework, I am suggesting may be useful in attempting to assess the degree to which changing patterns of governance are occurring within the Asian context. Some of these changes most observers might conclude constitute instances of genuine change…what we may commonly refer to as "major" changes or "significant changes." Others may be of less significance and can gain from being noted as such. Further, should such a framework prove useful, it can also be employed as a kind of metric to suggest how different countries within the region "score" in relation to this dimension of change.

In examining patterns of change, I am proposing a hierarchy of transformations operating at four levels of generality. At the most general are patterns of governance change, and mean by this the identification of forces—social, economic, political—that are fundamentally and genuinely transformative. Including in this level of greatest generality are patterns of governance change which lead to a repurposing of higher education in the society; the relocation of higher education institutions within external knowledge economies; the repositioning of higher education institutions within broader, formal governmental authority; and the redefinition of governance roles within higher education institutions themselves.

Patterns of Governance Change: The Repurposing of the HEI

Governance activities can be differentiated in any number of ways, e.g., by their legal and putative reach; by the range of activities covered by their specifications; by the numbers of individuals, groups and structures affected, etc. I am proposing a four-level categorization that in large part embodies a trajectory from the general to the specific. The first set of activities are differentiated by their efforts to in some important way "repurpose" higher education within the society. In a long-accepted notion of the fundamental "functions" of higher education (over decades and in many

---

[1]This is what in effect Richard DeMillo predicts for much of the existing higher education structure as it currently exists, as he perceives the underlying financial model of higher education to be unsustainable within the coming years and decades of technological innovation and progress. See: Neubauer 2016.

cases over centuries), HEIs were charged specifically with creating knowledge (the research function), disseminating knowledge (historically to provision society with elites to perpetuate its governance activities…the teaching function), conserving knowledge (the library or archive function), and contributing to the public good.

With the advent of and spread of globalization one can suggest that these historical functions have been impacted by an additional or related set of activities that amount to a fundamental repurposing of the HEI in society and that the "governance energy" and impulse framing HEIs derive from elements such as contemporary globalization dynamics. In large part, they derive from the transformative "economization" restructuring of society that is perhaps the primary effect of contemporary globalization and which has resulted in a global transformation of wealth structures and capital flows. (The literature on this is vast, but for a focused view, see Harvey 2011). Another way to express this shift is to suggest that within accepted governance modalities across a wide variety of nation-states, higher education has been repurposed to the primary end of emphasizing its desired and putative contributions to the economic well-being of the societies within which it is situated. [2]

Such a repurposing in response to an economic imperative has been consistent with the spread of neoliberalism throughout the world and its particular effects on the organization and reorganization of higher education in a fundamentally reductionist manner (Mok 2010a). In the very nature of how I mean to employ the notion of "repurposing" higher education affected by these globalization elements, their effects extend throughout all levels of analysis as we shall see below. [See, for example, the effects on faculty roles (Poole 2009.)] An inseparable element of the repurposing for economic primacy has been the framing and reframing of higher education within marketing structures, which as we will observe below, reach well into the redefinition and characterization of students and other higher education participants as consumers along with a full range of implications that flow from this redefining (Olssen and Peters 2007).

Repurposing in this manner also has the effect, whether intentional or derivative, of shifting the role of the individual with respect to the society of which he/she is a part. The social construction of "student" within the accepted historical functions of higher education enumerated above carries with it the implied linkage of the student as learner on some form of progression to a later stage of social integration that presumes a normative exchange relationship with the broader society. Reconstructing the student as a consumer, especially within the context of the neoliberal construction of student, has the effect of dismissing the student as a future participant in a society of obligations that were necessarily a part of the broader normative construction of

[2]A recent publication seeks to locate contemporary higher education institutions within Asia in the context of what it posits are four conflicting hypotheses, which briefly are (a) the Western HEI emulation hypothesis so identified with Philip Altbach, (b) the economic primacy hypothesis, (c) a related hypothesis that directly situates HEIs with globalization, and (d) one which suggests that for at least many HEIs in Asia they continue to embody elements of the Confucian tradition. The concluding essay of that volume, (to which I am a contributor) argues for the notion of viewing contemporary HEIs in Asia as "hybrids" with some identifiable characteristics. See: Shin et al.

the higher education process, e.g., as a moral agent acting in some way on behalf of a greater social good, etc. (McArdle-Clinton 2011).

Relocating Higher Education Within External Knowledge Economies

A significant portion of governance-related activity focused on HEIs has been to *relocate* them in fundamental ways from the society within which they have been created and formed into a range of activities external to those societies. In a sense these activities have worked to *shift* the significant frame (s) of reference from a given society and its inhabitants and purposes into some formation of what has become regional or global. Within this pattern of relocation, I identify eight elements: (1) quality assurance/evaluation, which in turn has been linked to; (2) external forms of quality assurance and evaluation; (3) ranking; (4) income generation, including the commercialization of research; (5) marketization of higher education; (6) franchising of education programs; (7) knowledge production management; and (8) access. Each of these processes, I suggest, have shifted, moved, or relocated HEIs from their historical location within host societies into a broader (global) context. In making such shifts, perforce, the modalities of governance within broader social frames (e.g., those that previously may have existed between ministries of education and HEIs within a nation-state) have also shifted to accommodate the demands, standards, qualities, and rewards proffered by operating within supranational contexts, which for this purpose I choose to call "external knowledge economies."

Quality Assurance/Evaluation

In general (with some exceptions), the call for quality assurance at the national level in the region was largely an accompaniment of the massification within Asian higher education: As access to higher education expanded rapidly, the effects on quality (all too often) were manifest, motivating the creation of national schemes for quality assurance, usually modeled after USA or European experiences. [The two primary exceptions were the Philippines in which US-derived forms of accreditation were developed for four separate classifications of universities (De Jesus 2016), and Japan where formal review of higher education dates from the 1970s (National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Evaluations, 2nd edition 2012)]. In a recent review of quality assurance activities in the region over the past four decades, Molly Lee has identified six factors that collectively have established what has now come to be the common setting for engaging quality assurance: the decline of academic standards as a result of increased massification; the loss of public confidence in HEIs; budget cuts and pressures to increase efficiency within HEIs especially in regard to

public expenditures; demands for greater public accountability; the changing higher education context linking it to employment; and side effects of the HEI ranking phenomenon (Lee 2013).

By the end of the twentieth century, all major countries in Asia had adopted some form of state-authorized, mandated, or operated higher education quality assurance mechanism, which as a whole has amounted to a major shift in governance relationships between HEIs and their surrounding political structures, and however, much they may differ in their particulars. For the purpose of this review, we can see that they range in "reach" from strong state systems (e.g., Malaysia and Taiwan) with review structures that one would regard as being of high specification of process and structure, to those admitting of greater variation, such as the four complementary review structures of the Philippines. In a secondary effect of the spread of quality assurance, one can point to the rapid growth of international efforts to link national systems with the expressed intention of moving in the direction of common international standards for quality assessment and the ability for nation-states to provide mutual recognition for HE degrees (Hou 2012).

However, such systems are established and operated they constitute in the end a "displacement" of governing authority and practice to whatever the quality assurance entity operating within a given national frame.

Rankings

The search for comparability is the major force driving all quality endeavors in higher education wherever located, and the practice leads inevitably toward focused comparison on designated criteria. The nature of this process leads with equal inevitability (apparently) toward notions of radical simplification, and summation which within QA systems give HEIs a "score" or category assignment (e.g., pass, fail, pass with distinctions, etc.) and which, in its more contemporary form has resulted in the global ranking phenomena. As the ranking of higher education institutions proceeded from national to international settings, the result was a de facto displacement of governance from the national to global settings. Marginson and Sawir have made the important argument that as higher education entered into global markets as a purchasable commodity (with degrees and research products gaining discrete market values), the higher education market, as any other market within which commodities and values are traded, requires some notion of comparative pricing. Utilizing the notion of global flows, Marginson and Sawir view global competitive rankings (no matter that there are several competing sources) as serving, however, imperfectly, this critical purpose (Marginson and Sawir 2005).

For our purposes, we can view this complex of activity as directly relocating HEIs within external knowledge economies, over which as individual actors, they have very little leverage. Further, we can see that as national governments make use

of globally competitive rankings as decision-focused data which drive elements of government funding (as do policies in Korea, China, Japan, and Taiwan, for instance), they legitimize this displacement of critical elements of the decision process, no matter how such policies are situated within given ministries of national governance.

Income Generation

The contemporary HEI is viewed as a source of income generation from a variety of sources. In an increasing number of countries, the recruitment of cross-border students is a major income source, especially for the UK, USA, and Australia which lead in the provisioning of incoming cross-border education (Knight 2008).[3] Current estimates suggest that the number of cross-border students may reach 7 million by 2020. The concentration on the recruitment of students and their accommodation within existing education programs can result in a host of governance-related issues, including the full range of administrative decisions affecting how such students are recruited, housed, accommodated in courses, and programs, especially given language issues, etc. It is increasingly common for governments to delegate much of the administrative engagement of such students directly to HEIs and for those institutions most successful in gaining such students to become dependent on them in overall budgetary terms, which creates a form of de facto budgetary positioning.

A major form of income generation, that which is garnered from grant-based and supported research and that which is distributed within markets (e.g., through universities holding sometimes solely, sometimes jointly, intellectual property rights and patents) is an increasing source of the combined funding on which mainly research-oriented universities rely. Within the largest research/technical universities, these "components" of the institution often come to operate within their own designated administrative structures, for example (as is the case in the USA), through semi-autonomous research entities attached to universities and dedicated to the effective administration of research. Increasingly, technologically focused universities may contract directly with private sector entities in a variety of ways, up to and including structures that are authentically joint ventures. (For a comprehensive view of "university-business" cooperation as an exemplar of this pattern in Europe, see Healy et al. 2014).

Various other forms of income generation exist through the provision of courses to "external" constituencies, either as online or face-to-face endeavors. Within the USA, such "extension" aspects of universities are of long-standing duration, tend to employ both on-staff and off-staff instructional personnel at adjunct salaries (thereby reduc-

---

[3]The government share of higher education support in Australia has declined from 1994 to a low point in 2002 from which it has made a recovery primarily focused on increased student enrollment which since 2004 has relied significantly on income from cross-border students, which increased by almost 75% in 2014 to 4.7 billion Australian dollars, currently constituting about 17 of total university revenue (Universities Australia 2015, p. 14).

ing the institutional costs), often exist administratively as quasi-independent units, and have historically been a source of "bailout" financing for the parent institution during periods of financial exigency.

As a pattern of governance, it is clear that as public sector funding for higher education continues to decline, and as private higher education moves more widely to occupy new instructional and research "spaces" within the globally articulated higher education market, traditional sources of governance control both between the state (at all levels) and within HEI's have become increasingly permeable to permit novel and expanded ventures in income generation, and such a trend is likely to continue.

Marketization of Higher Education

The marketization of higher education by its nature positions at least a significant portion of the sector within a framework of market signals and exchanges that are external to given institutions and within discrete aggregations. Historically, over the past several decades across many different societies, marketization has led to increase in the degree of privatization of such sectors and subject to the cost dynamics that exist within them. Roger Brown has emphasized that efforts to marketize higher education in Europe and outside it have been accompanied by other efforts toward reform by moving the sector in corporate directions, including the transformation of governance bodies "on corporate lines" and the imposition of varieties of performance indicators, tendencies that are identifiable in Asia as well. These efforts have been accompanied in many places by the increasing portions of higher education costs being borne privately, citing steep increases in the UK (up from 23.2% in 2006 and 11.3% in 2000 to 69.9% in 2011) which were topped only by Chile and Korea in terms of the private sector share of higher education (Brown 2015).

As with other elements in this "relocation of HE within external knowledge economies," marketization by its nature positions institutions within ever-broader decision making frameworks, at the cost of diminished local control.

Franchising of Higher Education Management

The franchising of higher education, viewed as the distribution of part or the whole of a HEI's educational curriculum to be delivered and operated by those external to the originating institution, constitutes one of the most rapidly growing segments of international education. In 2015, Lane and Kinser had identified universities in 32 countries having "exported" 235 branch campuses across 73 nations (2015). The resulting relationships range from institutions whose entire mission is to extend across a wide global path, such as Laureate University with 75 campuses on six

continents and the US conglomerate Apollo Group Phoenix University,[4] to smaller and often failed attempts by single universities to establish franchises in one country such as those recently experienced by US HEIs George Mason, Michigan State, and the University of La Verne.

From a governance perspective, distinct modalities are required for both the sending institutions and countries and receiving countries. Working these out in practice can be complex and require entirely new methods of cooperation depending in large part on the kinds of governance structures in operation in receiving countries. Such was the case at the end of the last century when numerous HEIs from developed countries rushed into the newly opening China market only to discover they lacked the capacity to create and sustain an effective institutional presence. Subsequently, however, it is estimated that (in 2012) as many as 1000 HEI's have some form of collaborative relationship in China, albeit that the China regulatory framework requires that most of these be viewed as independent universities rather than as branch campuses of external universities (Wilkins and Huisman 2012).

It seems to follow as a matter of course that governance relationships for international franchising will vary directly and considerably given the exigencies of the countries engaged in the exchange, and can involve decision making from the most micro-level of structure (the nature of the course, its content, its provider, modalities of assessment, grading and certification, etc.) to macro-decisions on structure and the contractual relationship of the franchise partners.

Knowledge Production Management

Throughout global economic regions, the common press for competitive advantage has eroded the historical boundaries between the higher education sector and the economies within which given institutions exist. Albach, Reisber, and Rumbley in their survey of global education at the end of the first decade of this century viewed this transformed role as a paradigm shift. They cite three distinct roles into which HEIs are emerging. One is the engagement within knowledge production well beyond an earlier role of participating in intellectual property licensing or start-ups into a role in which universities work directly with industry in economic development. Second, universities, especially in the economically developing countries, are directly engaged, performing different functions central to their ability to provide support for industry in innovation and economic development. And third, universities are no longer expected to operate in isolation from the major economic institutions of a society. In what has increasingly become a commonplace within national policy agendas, universities are viewed as "a critical component of evolving triple helix in

---

[4]The Apollo group advertises over 100 US locations and with the creation of its Global Education Network, also now offers programs in the UK, India, Germany, Chile, South Africa, Australia, and Mexico. (Apollo Global 2016).

which universities, government and industry change their roles through interaction"
(Albach et al. 2009, 185).

Even as the processes by which this engagement of higher education within the
broader economy (ies) display particularities of local and historical emphasis, as a
governance modality some institutionalization of this commonality of governance
shift necessarily exists as institutional patterns of decision making including bud-
get formation and allocation are drawn into this orbit of external signal generation
and response. What HEIs gain in terms of their deepening engagement in external
knowledge production benefits necessarily comes in part at the expense of traditional
decision making and governance patterns and relationships.

Access

As has been well documented in numerous accounts, massification of higher educa-
tion wherever it has occurred, has largely been driven by the need to supply access
to higher education for diverse groups and populations. We can view this force as
a major element of the relocation of higher education within external knowledge
economies in many of the dimensions discussed immediately above. The movement
toward transnational education, significant expansion of the private higher education
sector, the commitments to obtaining and working through triple helix arrangements,
franchising and the other mechanisms touched upon in this section in some important
sense are driven by a desire and need to occasion a form of access currently absent
from whatever existing higher education framework is in place. And short of the uni-
versalization of higher education provision (a condition which Taiwan, Korea, and
Japan have already reached) access in some form will continue to be a determinant
in shifting existing frameworks of higher education toward the presumed benefits of
attaching in some way to external global economies.

However, it needs to be acknowledged that some of the political movements
embedded in the current nationalist/anti-globalization sentiment in various portions
of the world may construct an effective "counter-narrative" to the dominance of what
I have characterized as the overwhelming force of the governance shift toward greater
inclusion in external knowledge economies.

Repositioning Higher Education Institutions Within
Broader Formal Governmental Authority

Several of the governance shifts discussed in the context of relocating the HEI within
external knowledge economies have an attendant effect of repositioning the HEI
within formal governmental authority within the national state and its traditional
sub-units. Such is the case with the introduction and role of quality assurance that

is external to the institution itself and evaluation modalities that result from external QA. So too, has been the shift in many countries from direct control of institutions by a governmental ministry and their engagements (mandated in most cases) to a revision of local governing structures through newly authorized and constituted boards of directors/trustees/governors, cast in most policy situations as a decentralization of authority from the central state to focused institutional control. As we observed in the preceding section, much of the political force behind such putative decentralization was driven either by a perceived need on the part of the state to reduce its direct financial support of institutions in exchange for such local authority, or in many cases equally driven by national commitments to neoliberal principles and an expressed concern to have HEIs moved across the governance spectrum toward practices most conveniently viewed as more business-like.

Inseparable from this discourse of governance has been that of greater accountability at all levels of the institution, with the invention and provision of accounting schemes what can contribute more directly to what are viewed as "externally validated norms" of institutional conduct. This package of mechanisms for accountability and control is in turn framed by the processes of external quality assurance and the mechanisms of evaluation that are implemented as a necessary component. In some cases, the national policy for evaluation and autonomy has been joined, as in those instances (Taiwan and Malaysia for example) in which superior performance on quality assurance reviews can lead to institutions gaining the right to "self-accreditation" following the norms of the external agency.

To some extent this process has had its varied implementations in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia, with variations on the theme of trade-offs being made for promoting greater local autonomy in exchange for overall reduced financial support from the central state, or by being subject to national policy that differentiates support to HEIs in terms of their presumed contribution to larger national goals (such as the 985 and 211 policies of China and the various "excellence in research" oriented policies of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan). (See Mok 2010b for an extensive review of such mechanisms throughout Asia).

In other instances, this devolution of authority from higher to local levels has resulted in greater freedom for institutions to engage their local communities in a variety of ways, including engaging various businesses for activities that directly engage students in internships or other occupational-related endeavors (Neubauer and Collins 2015).

Within this hierarchy of governance realignment, it is difficult to know just where to situate the significant issue of student debt. While it is clear that overall various "autonomy" policies have operated to shift costs from central governments to HEIs and in many cases their local/surrounding communities, it is the case throughout most of higher education that massive cost shifting has resulted (as noted above) in increased tuition costs, which in turn has promoted significant student debt. Overall,

it would seem that accounting at some macro-level for the overall "costing out" of higher education throughout the region and for the full measure of contemporary massification, a continuously evolving complex funding structure has emerged of retained government funding. This can be differentiated by the type, nature, location, and the history of individual institutions, the variety of income generation schemes that HEIs are capable of given their diverse missions and capabilities, and increased tuition support. Even as some governments are pursuing novel policies for accommodating student debt (such as Australia's policy of tying the level of payment schedules to annual earned income), the structural direction of this massive cost shifting over the past two to three decades is unlikely to be reversed. (For the Australian policy see Hare 2015).

Redefining Governance Roles Within HEIs

The most direct and immediate governance effects are experienced at the institutional level, and here, the kinds of impacts have been substantial from changes in the nature of formal governance authority, e.g., who appoints and oversees the chief executive officer of the institution, through the imposition of budget and curriculum planning, to processes of accountability, etc. Overall, it is useful to characterize these changes in governance modalities and practices as the creation of a formal *performativity culture,* modeled in many different specific ways after notions of how business should and in many ways does operate within the private sector.

Again, variations of quality assurance have been essential features of this governance shift, starting from the legitimation at the national level of standards and practices deemed to be determining markers of quality and with the normative presumption that such standards and practices as externally mandated have the intended effect at the institutional level.[5] Such a presumption is required to in turn legitimate the many transformations that have been imposed through the varied reconstructions of bureaucracy that have been employed to bring "effective accountability" to all institutional activities from the classroom to departments, schools, colleges, and ultimately to the institution viewed as a whole through such performance measures.

---

[5]The reality of what educational practices and behaviors constitute quality, and acceptable quality, in differentiated situations is the subject of continued debate at national, regional, and international levels. A valuable summary of these complexities is contained in the publication of the Global University Network for Innovation in 2007 devoted to a global review of higher education quality practices. Although almost a decade old, the basic conceptual essays featured in this volume continue to be relevant. See especially the contribution by Sanyal and Martin on the various core meanings of quality, which remains critically relevant throughout higher education practice.

In one way or other such transformations, especially when formalized through the adoption of detailed accounting systems such as key performance indicators (KPIs), and the establishment of quality assurance entities within HEIs themselves, have the effect of "restructuring the institutional placement" of actors within the institution. The overall effect has been on balance an increase in bureaucratic routine and a diminution of the authority lodged within departments and schools and ultimately within faculty practices themselves (Sirat 2009). In this context, a familiar comment is that formal quality assurance activities rarely fully value either the role or the sentiments of students within such practices *and* take critical faculty time away from the classroom (Ghaffar and Abrizah 2017).

It may also be the case that across the range of difference represented by Asian higher education that what have appeared to be devolutions of authority by central governmental authorities may be highly contingent on "local" (meaning in this instance "national") conditions of political stability and change. Thailand is a case in point in which over the past several decades existing regimes have directly interfered with university activities deemed to be politically unacceptable, most recently in the context of the military-focused regime. Notably, several instances reported in the press have involved institutions with formal "autonomy" within the Thai higher education system, including the 2015 dismissal of a notable faculty member at Thammasat University. (See Suwanwela 1996; New Mandala 2015).

In summary, in one way or another the litany of "changes, transformations, or innovations" that are redefining governance roles at the institutional level include notions of accountability, reframing of academic freedom, the imposition of external quality assurance and the imposition of cycles of evaluation and institutional audits, often with a reconstituting of the reach and nature of boards of governance at the institutional level. These in total constitute a shift in manifest culture from a collegial basis to one modeled after corporate norms, reframing the responsibilities for curriculum and staff that exist at the faculty/department or school level and overall an increase in the norms and reach of bureaucratization.

Conclusion: Dimensions of Change

Returning to the framework introduced earlier in this chapter, a further exercise remains to develop mechanisms to determine the magnitude and enduring nature of the changes described within these four dimensions of change.

Conceptually, we can propose such an exercise in which one can disaggregate each of the changes detailed along one of the four dimensions with respect to its relative impact and potential endurance as institutional practice. Such an exercise would have the following configuration (Table 2.1):

Table 2.1 Categorizing HEIs

Dimension of change	Genuine novelty	Combination—major change	Combination—minor change	Elements extinguished by the change
Repurposing the HEI in society: e.g., neoliberalism, economic benefit, marketization, shifting role of individuals in society				
Relocating the HEI within external knowledge economies: e.g., QA/evaluation; external forms of quality assurance and evaluation; ranking; income generation and the commercialization of research; marketization of higher education; franchising education programs; knowledge production management; and access				
Repositioning the HEI within broader formal governmental authority: institutional autonomy; reduced public funding; accountability; external QA; decentralization; corporatization of public institutions, distribution of costs and calculation of benefits; mass student debt; and distribution of costs and calculation of benefits				
Redefining governance roles within the HEI: e.g., accountability, academic freedom, direct QA and evaluation; performativity culture; key performance indicators; and realignment of faculty/department/school responsibilities and prerogatives				

Further, such a summative exercise could be conducted first by developing relative empirically based measures for each of the items above, and then, generating some suggestive indicators to support the degree of change represented within the suggested categories. Conducting the exercise in this manner would allow one to deal with the caveat identified in the first portion of this chapter, namely that the very diversity of the Asian higher education experience virtually ensures that exceptions of some form will be identifiable for whatever empirical measures are proffered for comparative purposes.

References

Albach, P. G., Reisberg, L., & Rumbley, L. E. (2009). *Trends in global higher education: Tracking an academic revolution.* United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Conference on Higher Education. Accessible at http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30910755/Altbach__Reisberg__Rumbley_Tracking_an_Academic_Revolution__UNESCO_2009.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1481072436&Signature=F71uXG%2B%2BknqIjEaIFb9Pc%2BqQqJE%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DTrends_in_global_higher_education_Tracki.pdf. Accessed December 2, 2016.

Apollo Global. (2016). *Learning Platforms*. Available at https://www.apollo.edu/learning-platforms/apollo-global.html. Accessed December 5, 2016.

Barnet, R. J., & Muller, Ronald E. (1974). *Global reach: The power of the multinational corporation*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Brown, R. (2015). The marketisation of higher education: Issues and ironies. *New Vistas, 1*(1), 1–8.

Calderon, A. (2012). Massification continues to transform higher education. *University World News*, 2 September. Available at http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120831155341147. Accessed December 14, 2016.

Castells, M. (2009). *Communication power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Christensen, C. M., & Eyring, H. J. (2011).*The innovative university: Changing the DNA of higher education, inside and out*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Collins, C., Lee, M., Hawkins, J. H., & Neubauer, D. E. (Eds.). (2016). *Handbook of Asian higher education*. New York: Springer Nature.

De Jesus, E. (2016). Cross-currents in Asian higher education. In C. Collins, J. Hawkins, M. Lee, & D. Neubauer (Eds.), *Handbook of Asian higher education.* New York: Springer Nature.

Douglass, M. (2008). *The rise of mega-urban regions in Pacific Asia—Urban dynamics in a global era*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

Ghaffar, F. A., & Abrizah, A. (2017). Quality assurance and quality culture at a public higher education: A view from within. In D. Neubauer & C. Gomes (Eds.), *Quality issues at the university level: Implementing massification in Asian higher education*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hou, A. Y.-C. (2012). Mutual recognition of quality assurance decisions on higher education institutions in three regions: A lesson for Asia. *Higher Education, 64*(6), 911–926.

Hare, J. (2015). Runaway loans: Student set to owe $70 bn. *The Australian: April 15.* Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/runaway-loans-students-set-to-owe-70bn/news-story/c3038c23a94. Accessed December 6, 2016.

Harvey, D. (1990). *The condition of post modernity: An inquiry into the origins of cultural change*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Harvey, D. (2011). *The enigma of capital and the crises of capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hawkins, J. N., Mok, K. H., & Neubauer, D. (Eds.). (2012). *Higher education regionalization in Asia Pacific: Implications for governance, citizenship and university transformation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hawkins, J. N., & Mok, K. H. (Eds.). (2015). *Research, development, and innovation in Asia Pacific higher education*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Healy, A., Perkmann, M., Goddard, J. & Kempton, L. (2014). *Measuring the impact of university-business cooperation: Final report.* Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Knight, J. (2008). *Higher education in turmoil: The changing world of internationalization*. Rotterdam/Taipei: Sense Publications.

Lane, J., & Kisner K. (2015). How universities turned themselves into global franchises. *New Republic.* June 5.

Lee, M. (2013). Globalizing practices in Asian Pacific Universities. In D. E. Neubauer, J. C. Shin, & J. N. Hawkins (Eds.), *The dynamics of higher education development in East Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mcardle-Clinton, D. (2011). *The consumer experience of higher education: The rise of capsule education*. London: A.C. Black.

Marginson, S., & Sawir E. (2005, November). Interrogating global flows in higher education. *Globalisation, Societies and Education, 3*(3), 281–309.

Mok, K. H. (2010a). When neoliberalism colonizes higher education in Asia: Bringing the "public" back to the contemporary university. In D. Rhoten & C. Calhoun (Eds.), *Knowledge matters: The public mission of the research university* (pp. 195–230). New York: Columbia University Press.

Mok, K. H. (Ed.). (2010b). *the search for new governance of higher education in Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Evaluation. (2012). *Overview: Quality assurance system in higher education*. Tokyo: Japan.

Neubauer, D., & Collins, C. (Eds.). (2015). *Redefining Asia Pacific higher education in contexts of globalization: Private markets and the public good*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Neubauer, D. (2016). Are we ready for the coming HE revolution? *Higher Education Evaluation and Development*, *10*(1).

New Mandala. (2015). Academic Freedom in Thailand. Feb. 7. Available at http://www.newmandala.org/academic-freedom-in-thailand/. Accessed December 7, 2016.

Olssen, M., & Peters, M. A. (2007). Neoliberalism, higher education and the knowledge economy: From the free market to knowledge capitalism. *Journal of Education Policy, 20.*

Poole, G. S. (2009). *Higher education in East Asia: Neoliberalism and the professoriate*. Boston: Sense Publishers.

Sirat, M. B. (2009). *Strategic planning directions of Malaysia's higher education: University autonomy in the midst of political uncertainties*. Springer Science+Media, B. V. published on line 19 July. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Morshidi_Sirat/publication/226490267_Strategic_planning_directions_of_Malaysia's_higher_education_University_autonomy_in_the_midst_of_political_uncertainties/links/556491df08ae89e758fd91e2.pdf. Accessed December 6, 2016.

Steger, M. B., & Roy, R. K. (2010). *Neoliberalism: A very short introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Suwanwela, C. (1996). academic freedom and university autonomy in Thailand. *Higher Education Policy, 9*(4), 277–279.

Trow, M. (2005). Reflections on the transition from elite to mass to universal access in modern societies since WWII. *International Handbook of Higher Education* (RSS).

Universities Australia. (2015). *Higher education and research: Facts and figures, November 1015.* Canberra: Government of Australia.

Wilkins, S., & Huisman, J. (2012). The international branch campus as transnational strategy in higher education. *Higher Education, 64*(5), 627–645.

Deane E. Neubauer is Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, Manoa (UHM), USA. He holds a B.A. from the University of California Riverside and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Yale University. He has long been interested in the conduct of policy within and between democratic nation-states, an interest that has over time focused on comparative democratic institutions, policy processes, health care, food security, education and more recently the development, and conduct of globalization. He has taught at the University of California, Irvine (1965–1970), prior to taking a position at UHM.

Chapter 3
Engaging Forms of ASEAN Higher Education: Regionalism and Governance

Lorraine Pe Symaco and Meng Yew Tee

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional bloc formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, is now host to ten member states (with the addition of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) and two observers (Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste). Considered to be one of the most compact regions in the world, South East Asia is home to more than 600 million people and straddles countries that exhibit a variety of contrasts, where political, economic and cultural diversity result in a very eclectic mix. If ASEAN were fully integrated, its combined gross domestic product would make it the seventh-largest economy in the world and its economic growth in the last two decades would come second only to China (Asian Development Bank 2015).

Higher education (HE) integration initiatives in the region predate ASEAN's formation, with the founding of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization—Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (SEAMEO-RIHED) in 1965. This was followed by the establishment of the ASEAN Universities Network (AUN) in 1995 and the ASEAN+3 University Network in 2007. These are the main organizations facilitating HE integration initiatives in the region.

However, the developments in and discourse on ASEAN HE regionalism must be situated within the broader historical and political dynamics of the region (Chao 2016; Schreurs 2010). Before the establishment of ASEAN, a number of attempts at regionalization had been made. Those attempts include the Asian Relations Conferences in the 1940s and 1950s, and the founding of the Southeast Asia Treaty

L. P. Symaco (✉)
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
e-mail: lorraine@symaco.org

M. Y. Tee
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Organization (SEATO) in 1954, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 and MAPHILINDO, a group comprising Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, in 1963. It was a contentious period as the colonial powers in the region began to break down. French rule came to an end in Vietnam (1945), Cambodia (1953) and Laos (1953). British colonial rule in Myanmar ended in 1948, followed by Malaysia (1957), Singapore (in 1963 to become part of Malaysia, only to become an independent state in 1965) and Brunei Darussalam a couple of decades later in 1984. The long Dutch rule and a brief Japanese occupation during the Second World War gave way to Indonesian independence in 1945. The Philippines gained its independence from the USA (1946), having previously won its independence from Spain (1898). Thailand is the only ASEAN country that has never been ruled by a western colonial power, though it too was greatly affected by the domination of western influence in the region. Colonial interests began as far back as the sixteenth century with the Portuguese wresting control of Malacca (today part of Malaysia), but China and India were also influential forces in the region during and prior to the arrival of the Europeans.

Interest in the region derives from it being one of the busiest and most important strategic waterways in the world, combined with the richness of local resources. Today, about half of global trade and one-third of the world's oil supply pass through the Straits of Malacca alone (Nair and Onn 2008, World Economic Forum 2014). In this regard, the geopolitical interests in the region have also witnessed a renewed rise in tensions, with China making claims to a number of islands in the South China Sea. Other claimants and allies include a number of ASEAN countries (i.e. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) as well as Japan, Taiwan and the USA. Most recently, in 2016, the Philippines won an arbitration case filed against China over disputed territorial claims with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The founding of ASEAN must be viewed through the historical ebb and flow of foreign influence, as well as the inevitable political negotiations within and between its young member countries just coming into their own. This has given root to the "ASEAN way", whose tenets are constructive engagement, consensus-building and non-interference in other member countries' internal affairs—values central to ASEAN policy deliberations (Chao 2016; Schreurs 2010).

Higher Education and the ASEAN

The significant role of HE in the ASEAN has been emphasized through the theme of broader education for development. The vital function of education for greater advancement among ASEAN member countries, and the region in general, has been highlighted in policy declarations and joint meetings established by the organization. Education continues to be an important focus, as evidenced by the mandate of "education cooperation [covering the] ASEAN Declaration, the ASEAN Vision 2020 and the ASEAN Charter which call for an onward looking region, living in

Fig. 3.1 WPE within the Pillars of the ASEAN Community (AEC = ASEAN Economic Community; APSC = ASEAN Political-Security Community; ASCC = ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community; WPE = ASEAN Five-Year Work Plan on Education. *Source* ASEAN (2012: 4–5)

prosperity, peace and stability, bonded together in partnership and dynamic development" (ASEAN 2012: 3). Clearly, the education sector also retains its central place in the development of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration adopted in 2009 also references an education sector envisioned to "contribute to the establishment of a socially responsible ASEAN Community" (ASEAN 2012: 3). To this end, the ASEAN framed a Five-Year Work Plan on Education (WPE) for 2011–2015 and, more recently, for 2016–2020. Among the main themes of the WPE (2011–2015) are the need to: (a) support ASEAN programmes that raise awareness of regional identity; (b) promote access to and improve the quality of (tertiary) education; (c) support regional mobility programmes for students, teachers and faculty, and strategies for internationalization; and (d) support other ASEAN sectoral bodies with an interest in education (ASEAN 2012: vii).

The intersection of the WPE with the broader ASEAN Community also demonstrates the evolutionary governance of the ASEAN in terms of the regionalization of (higher) education. The figure below demonstrates how specific policy issuances (e.g. the pillars of the ASEAN Community) play out within a more complex and fluid backdrop featuring adaptable influences within sectors. For instance, the WPE may fall more directly under the pillar of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), but intersections with the other pillars are also evident (Fig. 3.1).

More specific regional cooperation in HE in the region can be seen through the AUN, the ASEAN+3 and the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization—Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (SEAMEO-RIHED). The "ASEAN way" of HE regionalism may reflect a rudimentary form of what Hooghe and Marks (2004) refer to as Type II multilevel governance, also reflected in the

development of the WPE above. Type II multilevel governance involves task-specific, intersecting memberships, and flexible, problem-solving jurisdictions. While Type I multilevel governance resembles federalism, Type II is more focused on specific policy sectors and issues within a more complex and more fluid landscape consisting of innumerable jurisdictions (Bache 2010). It is within this framing that we will discuss the governance and initiatives of ASEAN HE regionalism, with particular focus on its task-specific orientation.

Task-Specific Actors and Intersecting Functions

ASEAN+3

An informal summit meeting in December 1997 among the leaders of ASEAN members, China, Korea and Japan resulted in the creation of the ASEAN+3 in Manila in 1999. The Joint Statements on East Asia Cooperation which followed the Manila summit highlighted the need for greater cooperation within and among countries and has since "helped increase opportunities for cooperation and collaboration with each other, thereby strengthening the elements essential, for the promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in the region" (ASEAN 1999). The joint statement similarly highlighted essential cooperation in economic, social and political fields, among others. The need to engage in the development of social and human resources for sustained growth was emphasized further through the implementation of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Initiative by "establishing a human resource development funds, and the ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets" (ASEAN 1999). A number of initiatives have followed since the 1999 Manila summit, among them the ASEAN+3 Cooperation Work Plan (AWP) 2007–2017 and the ASEAN+3 Plan of Action on Education (2010–2017).

One of the main initiatives of the AWP is to encourage greater collaboration in HE among member countries. The AWP specifically aims to "promote higher education cooperation, increase linkages between universities […] and to encourage credit transfers between universities in ASEAN+3 countries by establishing a working group on mobility and quality assurance in higher education" (ASEAN: 18). In addition, the AWP plans to support research activities and exchanges of ASEAN+3 scholars. The Plan of Action on Education emphasized the need to develop quality and greater mobility in HE among member countries. This has since resulted in the formation of the ASEAN+3 Working Group on Mobility of Higher Education and Ensuring Quality Assurance of Higher Education among ASEAN+3 Countries (Sirat et al. 2014).

Similarly, a number of meetings focusing on HE have been convened, including the ASEAN+3 Higher Education Policy Dialogue and a series of ASEAN+3 Heads of International Relations Meetings. These meetings led to the creation of the ASEAN+3 University Network and the facilitation of discussion of student

mobility through increased scholarships, training and exchange, and the utilization of the ASEAN Credit Transfer System, among others [AUN n.d. (c)]. Moreover, the ASEAN+3 Higher Education Policy Dialogue (2009) purposely aimed, among other things, to: (a) enhance HE networking, facilitate student and staff exchanges among ASEAN+3 Universities; (b) initiate the ASEAN+3 Collaborative Academic Programme in various fields of common interest; (c) create a voluntary, non-intrusive credit transfer system to accelerate student mobility among ASEAN+3 Universities; and (d) expand the AUN Distinguished Scholars Programme into the ASEAN+3 Distinguished Scholars Programme in order to widen opportunities for staff mobility.

Seameo-Rihed

The Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO), an intergovernmental organization formed in 1965 by the governments of Southeast Asian countries, aims to "promote cooperation in education, science and culture" in the region. The organization also targets to "provide an intellectual forum for policymakers and experts and to promote sustainable development of human resources" (ASEAN 2012: vii). The SEAMEO is composed of the ten ASEAN member states and Timor-Leste. The SEAMEO currently has 21 specialist institutions that promote research, training and development in the areas of education, science and culture. Besides establishing the specialist institution SEAMEO-RIHED in 1985, the focus on HE is espoused as one of the SEAMEO's priority areas (2015–2035) and the organization advocates for the harmonization in HE and research in the region. This agenda aims to promote institutional-level harmonization within member countries, which are "investing in strengthening [their] higher education institutions [HEIs] with each institution determining their most important needs, supported by research, in order to be able to coordinate and set quality standards with other institutions" (SEAMEO n.d.).

The SEAMEO-RIHED, which is based in Thailand, plays a crucial role in the regionalization of tertiary education through the implementation of its five objectives: (a) empowering HE institutions; (b) developing harmonization mechanisms; (c) advancing knowledge frontiers in HE system management; (d) cultivating globalized human resources; and (e) promoting university social responsibility (USR) and sustainable development (SEAMEO-RIHED 2012a). To help realize the objectives in these five areas, a number of initiatives to support each priority are considered. Table 3.1 lists some of these initiatives.

In addition to the schemes listed above, the SEAMEO-RIHED has a vital task in supporting the development of HE in the region through study visits, the student mobility programme (AIMS) and the internationalization award. Credit transfer and quality assurance (QA) systems are also observed.

Table 3.1 Five objective areas of SEAMEO-RIHED

Objective areas	Initiatives
Empowering HEIs	i. Education programmes on university governance and management; university research management; quality assurance; harmonization of higher education; management of internationalization (e.g. study visits to the US, UK, Australia) ii. Workshops on management of higher education (e.g. UNESCO IIEP–RIHED) iii. Programmes on relevant areas for countries of the Greater Mekong Subregion
Developing harmonization mechanisms	i. Southeast Asian Quality Assurance Framework and Asian Credit Transfer System ii. ASEAN curriculum content, research clusters and citation indexes
Advancing knowledge frontiers in HE system management	i. Research in areas such as university governance and management; harmonization of HE and change management and; impacts of regional integration and globalization
Cultivating globalized human resources	i. Student and research mobility programmes i. Regional internship programmes
Promoting university social responsibility (USR) and sustainable development	i. Bridging universities' social and corporate social responsibilities ii. Initiating and facilitating the development of curricula that focus on emerging cross-border and regional issues

Source SEAMEO-RIHED (2012a)

ASEAN University Network

The AUN was established in 1995 initially with the participation of 11 universities from six ASEAN member countries. Today, the AUN's membership represents 30 universities from all the ten ASEAN member states. As a key player in regional HE cooperation, the AUN is tasked to: (a) strengthen the existing network of cooperation among universities in ASEAN and beyond; (b) promote collaborative study, research and educational programmes in the priority areas identified by ASEAN; (c) promote cooperation and solidarity among scholars, academics and researchers in the ASEAN member states; and (d) to serve as the policy-oriented body in HE in the ASEAN region [AUN n.d. (b)]. In addition to this, the strategic focus of the AUN in establishing South East Asia-related studies in HE is demonstrated through the promotion of ASEAN-related research initiatives and studies and the ASEAN visiting professors programme.

The AUN is also one of the key agencies implementing the ASEAN Socio-Cultural (ASC) portfolio with a number of activities. The five main AUN programmes that support the ASC portfolio are: (a) youth mobility; (b) academic collaboration; (c) standards, mechanisms, systems and policies of higher education collaboration; (d) courses and programmes development; and (e) regional and global policy platforms. These initiatives also promote greater regional cooperation among the various AUN

member universities. On the one hand, harmonization of HEIs within the region is evident through the AUN Quality Assurance Network (AUN-QA), which deals with programme- and institutional-level assessments. The AUN-QA system has been applied in more than 40 assessments throughout the region and actively collaborates with the SEAMEO-RIHED and the AQAN. A three-way partnership among the organizations was established to further strengthen QA cooperation in HE in South East Asia [AUN n.d. (a)]. This highlights the overlap and flexibility of governance (e.g. in QA) in HE between organizations within the ASEAN, where the "ASEAN way" of consensus building limits policy initiatives to special problem-solving.

The following sections will discuss in detail the functional and task-specific orientations of these organizations in responding to HE governance and development concerns in the region.

Higher Education Task Specificity in the ASEAN

Quality Assurance in Higher Education

Aspiring to strengthen its regional alliance, the ASEAN simultaneously established the AEC in 2015 and launched the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, which aims to "Create a deeply integrated and highly cohesive ASEAN economy […] [and to] widen ASEAN people-to-people, institutional, and infrastructure connectivity through ASEAN and sub-regional cooperation projects that facilitate movement of capital as well as skilled labour and talents" (ASEAN 2015a: 2). To this end, the AEC Blueprint has emphasized the need to: (a) enhance cooperation among AUN member universities to increase the regional mobility of students and faculty; (b) develop core competencies and qualifications for job/occupational and training skills in priority and other service sectors; and (c) to strengthen the research capabilities of each member state by promoting skills, job placements and information on networks among member states (ASEAN 2012: 6). However, such proposed movements of skilled labour and talent naturally call for comparable qualifications in HE in an open market, which is what is envisioned by the ASEAN. This also highlights the increasing role of the regionalization of institutions in the HE sector, not just in South East Asia but broadly, as evidenced for instance through the Bologna Process, which was established as part of European integration. However, much has yet to be realized in terms of a regulated and uniform qualifications framework among ASEAN member states.

As harmonization does not necessarily mean uniformity, the task of creating any regional QA framework remains a challenge in terms of ensuring that the region's HEIs conform to a verified and quantifiable QA framework, while also respecting individual QA systems in place in each country. The multifaceted socio-economic, political and cultural make-up of the ASEAN makes this task doubly complex. QA frameworks within the ASEAN exhibit different governance styles, with more

centralized government agencies (e.g. Brunei, Lao PDR and Vietnam), independent authorities (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand) and mixed systems (e.g. Philippines and Singapore) (SEAMEO-RIHED 2012b). Given the impetus for a more sustained and compact ASEAN, as underlined in the AEC, harmonization in HE plays a key role in the region's pursuit of greater development and alliance. This further underlines the significance of a regional qualifications framework that will help achieve this goal. Nevertheless, there are a number of QA frameworks and networks, among them the ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework (AQRF), the AQAN and the AUN-QA. The overlapping function of the different organizations in the ASEAN in terms of QA is also exhibited in QA tasks, for instance, that of the SEAMEO-RIHED, which also published a QA model framework for the ASEAN in 2012 (SEAMEO-RIHED 2012b).

The AQRF, implemented from 2016, has pushed ASEAN member states to establish or better integrate their respective national qualifications framework. These are, again, all in line with the creation of a free flow of skilled labour envisioned in the AEC. The AQRF requires that each member state links its national qualifications framework to that of the AQRF: "[the] link between the national qualifications levels and the AQRF levels is [the] outcome of the referencing process and enables further linkage, through the AQRF, to the qualifications levels in other AMS [ASEAN member states]" (Bateman n.d.: 14). On the one hand, three interconnected areas are seen to promote an ASEAN QA Framework: (a) QA principles, through developing the infrastructure required to support regional QA; (b) capacity-building through cooperation and strengthening of internal and external QA; and (c) promoting the benefits of quality assurance through better engagement with regional organization and other stakeholders (SEAMEO-RIHED 2012b: 114).

While the QA mechanisms employed in the ASEAN, such as the AUN-QA, may not necessarily represent a comprehensive regional framework, given the limited enactment by member universities, the framework nonetheless serves as an important outline of best practices that can be copied by the rest of the region. Similarly, the AQAN established in 2008 in Kuala Lumpur envisions the promotion of good practice in HE in South East Asia. It also intends to "share information on higher education and facilitate mutual recognition of qualifications throughout the region" (ASEAN 2014). The AQAN regularly holds dialogues, training sessions and meetings related to QA practices.

Promoting a regional QA system requires the Type II multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks 2004) mentioned earlier, in which there are fluidity and consensus building in issues relating to the broader HE sector. In this regard, agencies such as the SEAMEO-RIHED, the AUN, national governments and individual HEIs, among others, serve to promote actions and recommendations for a more robust regional qualifications framework (SEAMEO-RIHED 2012a). This consensus building among organizations, described above in broad strokes, can be viewed as a form of epistemic governance which addresses an underlying "epistemic structure/base" in the different organizations/sectors. As Vadrot highlights, this epistemic governance "aims to address the power relations in the modes of creating, structuring, and coordinating knowledge on socio-ecological issues […] the production

and use of knowledge is seen to be linked to questions of relational, structural, and soft power, and to the relationship between science and policy. This relationship is not linear, but full of complex references and co-constituting" (as cited in Campbell and Carayannis 2013: 26). This elaborate "epistemic governance" can be seen in the various intersecting and consensus-building functions of the different groups in the ASEAN member states regarding issues affecting HE governance in the region, in this case, QA.

The next section will discuss mobility in HE and the push for greater capacity-building within the region.

Higher Education, Labour Mobility and Capacity-Building

The issue of QA resonates with the increasing internationalization of services in education, whereby HE, in particular, continues to remain at the forefront of government policies worldwide (Symaco 2013). This is especially relevant to the ASEAN member states, whose relatively young populations (more than half are under 30) conceivably participate and contribute to their respective HEIs and to boosting mobility in the HE sector. HE will continue to be a crucial influence in the region's socio-economic development as exhibited in various government policies (e.g. Malaysia's *Vision 2020* and Brunei Darussalam's *Wawasan (National Vision) 2035*). Along this line, there is a need to ensure that HE in the ASEAN member states is standardized to enable more fluid cross-border labour mobility. It is envisioned that the strengthening of the alliance among ASEAN country states will influence the delivery and governance of HE in the region.

Mobility in HE is a strong feature of the ASEAN networks, which push for greater knowledge sharing and capacity-building through various visit and exchange programmes. One way to augment development in the region is to increase cooperation that will enable "movement of capital as well as skilled labour and talents" (ASEAN 2015a: 2). Given this, organizations within the region, such as the AUN, ASEAN+3 and the SEAMEO-RIHED, have formulated different programmes for cross-border mobility in the sector. For instance, the ASEAN International Mobility for Students (AIMS), a study mobility project piloted in 2009 in HEIs in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, recorded that over 100 students took part in this mobility programme in 2010. AIMS has now branched out further to include other ASEAN member states (SEAMEO-RIHED 2012c). The Internationalization Award was created to better enhance the sustainability of AIMS. International Relations Offices of HEIs that actively promote the AIMS programme are awarded this distinction. Similarly, exchange programmes are organized within the AUN and ASEAN+3 to encourage knowledge exchange, such as the AUN-Kyoto Cooperation, which has a summer school, joint supervision and double-degree programmes.

The push for greater labour mobility is also seen in various arrangements in the region. For instance, in line with providing better services for overall socio-economic development, the ASEAN initiated the Mutual Recognition Agreement

(MRA), which can also be seen to promote the overall well-being of ASEAN professionals through collaborative exchange and capacity-building. There are eight recognized ASEAN MRAs (i.e. engineering, nursing, architectural, medical, dental, and accounting and tourism professional services, and a framework for surveying qualifications). The MRAs aim, among other things, to "facilitate the free movement of professional and skilled labour" in the region (ASEAN 2015b: 33). Various approaches are adopted by each ASEAN MRA. For instance, those for engineering and architecture recognize the qualifications of those registered as ASEAN professionals. The Medical and Dental MRAs focus on "exchange of information and best practices on the licensing and registration of healthcare practitioners, as well as capacity building" (ASEAN 2015b: 34). Currently, there are 284 architects listed on the ASEAN Architect Register while some 1252 engineers are recognized on the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineers Register (ASEAN 2015b).

Capacity-building among communities is also advocated by regional organizations; the role of universities in promoting social responsibility has been gaining traction in the areas of community engagement and sustainable development. The push for universities to take on greater social responsibility in ASEAN member states can be seen in the development of the ASEAN University Network—University's Social Responsibility and Sustainability (AUN USR&R) in 2010. This is much in line with the Association's Socio-Cultural Community, which is devoted to "lift[ing] the quality of life of its peoples through cooperative activities that are people-oriented, people-centred, environmentally friendly, and geared towards the promotion of sustainable development" (ASEAN 2009: 1). The ASCC Blueprint, implemented in 2009–2015, was successful in "developing and strengthening the coherence of policy frameworks and institutions" to improve environmental sustainability, social justice and rights, social protection and welfare (ASEAN 2009: 1).

The ASEAN's push for university social responsibility (USR) has also resulted in collaborative meetings and initiatives among various ASEAN HEIs (e.g. the Burapha workshop in 2010 and the Asia Engage platform of the National University of Malaysia). This USR focus is coupled with the ASEAN Environmental Education Action Plan (EEAP) 2014–2018, which aims to help realize a "clean and green ASEAN with citizens who are environmentally literate, imbued with environmental ethics, willing and capable to ensure the sustainable development of the region through environmental education and public participation efforts" (ASEAN EEAP: 3). One of the aims of the plan is to integrate environmental education and education for sustainable development at all levels of the formal sector in each ASEAN member state. However, although ideas, delivery and governance in line with the principle of USR are shown by individual HEIs, some of which take a more active role, USR has yet to become a major feature of the higher education sector of the region? Technical training for development remains the main focus of HEIs (Symaco 2013). This is not surprising given that most ASEAN member states are in the low to low-middle income status range.

For mobility and capacity-building concerns, governance issues in HE in the ASEAN member states show what was earlier described as a "fluid, consensus

building and decision-making form." Clearly, "sustainable and effective" governance relies on institutions' ability to address an underlying "epistemic base" that defines the type of governance—where epistemic governance also underlines the different "knowledge paradigms" inherent in HE (Campbell and Carayannis 2013). For this, the HE mobility initiatives of the AUN, ASEAN+3 and the SEAMEO-RIHED all point to the *common notion* of mutual cooperation and exchange for *development*, while the MRAs pushed for by the ASEAN Community complement and highlight the mobility of HE and quality standardization concerns regarding qualifications. Perhaps the thrust for a more integrated regional alliance and an equally complex socio-economic and political make-up can only start to drive for a cooperation that can be considered mutually beneficial to all. Thus, forging a HE system within ASEAN that brings about improved mobility and, ultimately, better development and capacity-building of communities, is reckoned to create greater regional advancement that has "one vision, one identity, one community".

Closing Remarks

The integration of the ASEAN regional HE landscape is heavily complicated by the sheer diversity of cultures, histories, political structures, HE systems and levels of economic progress. To wade through these complexities, intraregional events within ASEAN and Asia more broadly have concentrated largely on minimally depoliticized tasks to meet functional goals of international education by focusing on initiatives such as QA and standardization, harmonization, sustainability, student and labour mobility, and international partnerships and exchange.

The "ASEAN way" of constructive engagement, consensus-building and non-interference in member states' internal affairs—values central to ASEAN policy deliberations—have given rise to a form of Type II multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks 2004). Task-specific and problem-solving orientations are facilitated by organizations such as ASEAN+3, the SEAMEO-RIHED and the AUN, each unit represented by different levels of government (i.e. from national ministerial levels and professional associations to senior officials of member universities).

The initiatives championed by these organizations form emerging epistemic structures (Vadrot 2011) with which to negotiate the complex socio-economic and political power relations between countries. These intersections, where work plans, exchange programmes and QA frameworks are negotiated and developed, become ideal spaces to maintain the non-confrontational ASEAN approach while making headway in co-constituting the emerging governance of ASEAN HE regionalism. The speed and effectiveness of this process may be significantly coupled with broader political and economic forces (Chao 2016), especially China's increasingly hegemonic presence in the region. It is not clear if the ASEAN HE sector will become as centralized, ordered and transparent as its European counterpart, for instance. For the time being, the focus seems to be on using capacity-building initiatives as a means to work towards conditions where mutual benefits and aspirations are aligned.

References

Asian Development Bank. (2015). *ASEAN economic community: 12 things to know*. Retrieved from https://www.adb.org/news/features/series/12-things-know.

ASEAN Quality Assurance Network (AQAN). (2014). *Mission*. Retrieved from http://aqan.org.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). (1999). *Joint statement on East Asia cooperation*. Retrieved from http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-statement-on-east-asia-cooperation-28-november-1999.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2009). *ASEAN socio-cultural community blueprint*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2012). *ASEAN 5-year work plan on education (2011–2015)*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2015a). *ASEAN economic community blueprint 2025*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2015b). *ASEAN integration report*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

ASEAN+3 Higher Education Policy Dialogue. (2009). *Intellectual contribution to enhancing the future of higher education in the East Asian community*. Phuket, Thailand, 21–22 March.

ASEAN Universities Network (AUN). [n.d (a).]. *AUN-QA assessment*. Retrieved from http://aunsec.org/institutionallevel.php.

ASEAN Universities Network (AUN). [n.d. (b)]. *History and background*. Retrieved from http://aunsec.org/ourhistory.php.

ASEAN Universities Network (AUN). [n.d. (c)]. *Information paper APT*. Retrieved from http://www.aunsec.org/pdf/introduction.pdf.

Bache, I. (2010). Europeanization and multi-level governance: EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid in Southeast Europe. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10*(1), 1–12.

Bateman, A. (n.d.). ASEAN guiding principles for quality assurance and recognition of competency certification systems. Retrieved from http://asean.org/storage/2012/05/ASEAN-Guiding-Principles-for-Quality-Assurance-and-Recognition-of-Competency-Certification-Systems1.pdf.

Campbell, D. F. J., & Carayannis, E. G. (2013). *Epistemic governance in higher education*. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.

Chao, R. Y., Jr. (2016). Changing higher education discourse in the making of the ASEAN region. In S. L. Robertson, K. Olds, R. Dale, & Q. A. Dang (Eds.), *Global regionalisms and higher education: Projects, processes, politics* (pp. 124–142). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2004). Contrasting visions of multi-level governance. In I. Bache & M. Flinders (Eds.), *Multi-level governance* (pp. 15–30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nair, D., & Onn, L. P. (Eds.). (2008). *Regional outlook: Southeast Asia 2008–2009*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Schreurs, M. (2010). Multi-level governance the ASEAN way. In S. L. Robertson, K. Olds, R. Dale, & Q. A. Dang (Eds.), *Global regionalisms and higher education: Projects, processes, politics* (pp. 308–320). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

South-East Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO). (n.d.). *What is SEAMEO?* Retrieved from http://www.seameo.org/SEAMEOWeb2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90&Itemid=518.

South-East Asian Ministers of Education Organization—Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (SEAMEO-RIHED). (2012a). *Objective areas*. Retrieved from http://www.rihed.seameo.org/about-us/objective-areas/.

South-East Asian Ministers of Education Organization—Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (SEAMEO-RIHED). (2012b). *A study on quality assurance models in South East Asia countries: Towards a Southeast Asian quality assurance framework*. Bangkok: SEAMEO-RIHED.

South-East Asian Ministers of Education Organization—Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (SEAMEO-RIHED). (2012c). *Student mobility AIMS*. Retrieved from http://www.rihed.seameo.org/programmes/aims/.

Sirat, M., Azman, N., & Abu Bakar, A. (2014). *Towards harmonization of higher education in Southeast Asia: Malaysia's perspective.* Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/globalhighered/towards-harmonization-higher-education-southeast-asia.

Symaco, L. P. (2013). *Education in South East Asia*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Vadrot, A. (2011). Reflections on mode 3, the co-evolution of knowledge and innovation systems and how it relates to sustainable development. Conceptual framework for "epistemic governance". *International Journal of Social Ecology and Sustainable Development, 2*(1), 44–52.

World Economic Forum. (2014). *The world's most important trade route?* Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/05/world-most-important-trade-route/.

Lorraine Pe Symaco is Professor under the zju 100 programme of Zhejiang University, China. She was the founding director of the Centre for Research in International and Comparative Education (CRICE) at the University of Malaya, Malaysia and UNESCO Chair on International and Comparative Educational Research with Special Reference to South East Asia.

Meng Yew Tee is Member of the Faculty of Education, University of Malaya, Malaysia. He researches teaching and learning practices in and across systems, knowledge construction, learning communities as well as technology-supported learning. Among his publications is *Education in Malaysia: Developments and Challenges* (co-edited with Moses Samuel and Lorraine Pe Symaco, 2017).

Chapter 4
Big Ambitions, Mediocre Results: Politics, Power and the Quest for World-Class Universities in Indonesia

Andrew Rosser

Introduction

For more than a decade, the Indonesian government has sought to transform the country's higher education institutions (HEIs), particularly its leading ones, into 'world-class universities'. In 2006, the Education Ministry (hereafter MoEC)[1] established a special task force to elevate ten local HEIs to world-class status (Haryanti 2010). A year later, the Education Minister, Bambang Sudibyo, announced that it had expanded the list to 50 HEIs, including 27 state and 23 private universities (Antara 2007). Recent Education Ministry five-year plans have accordingly set targets for the number of Indonesian HEIs to be ranked among the world's top universities in global university league tables such as the Times Higher Education World University Rankings, Shanghai Jiao Tong's Academic Ranking of World Universities, and the QS World University Rankings. MoEC's strategic plan for 2005–2009, for instance, aimed to have four Indonesian HEIs in either the world's top 500 universities or Asia's top 100 (Department of National Education 2005: 52). Its strategic plan for 2010–2014 aimed to increase this to 11 HEIs in the world's top 500 (Ministry of Education and Culture 2010: 43).

However, outcomes have fallen well short of these ambitious objectives. The quality of research and teaching in Indonesia's higher education system—even at the country's best institutions—is generally regarded as poor relative to both global

---

[1]The name of the Education Ministry has changed a number of times in recent years. Sometimes, it has had carriage of the culture portfolio, sometimes not. For a period it was a Department rather than a Ministry. For the sake of simplicity, I use the acronym MoEC (short for Ministry of Education and Culture) to refer to all its incarnations rather than chop and change between its official titles. Likewise, I refer to the relevant minister as the Minister of Education/Education Minister regardless of his precise title.

A. Rosser (✉)
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
e-mail: andrew.rosser@unimelb.edu.au

standards and those of neighbouring countries in Asia (Hill and Thee 2013: 161, 169; OECD/ADB 2015: 213; World Bank 2014). For instance, according to the World Bank (2014: 36), Indonesian researchers published 16,139 scientific papers between 1996 and 2011, an average of 1000 papers per year, placing the country in 63rd position globally and 11th place within the region. At the same time, as the Education Sector Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP) (2012: 81) has noted, 'few researchers based at Indonesian HEIs produce research papers without international cooperation, which suggests limited research capacity'. It is more difficult to judge the quality of teaching at Indonesian HEIs, but MoEC accreditation results provide some insight. In 2012, only 23% of state university undergraduate degree (S1) programs and 4.5% of private university undergraduate degree programs received the maximum grade of A (ACDP 2012: 80).

These difficulties have in turn translated into low rankings for Indonesian HEIs in the major global university league tables. No Indonesian universities were ranked in the top 500 in the world in the Times Higher Education World University Rankings in 2014/15. Nor were any ranked in the top 500 in the world in Shanghai Jiao Tong's Academic Ranking of World Universities in 2014/15. The country has fared better in the QS World University Rankings but even there its performance has been lacklustre: four Indonesian universities were ranked in the world's top 500 in 2010 but this fell to two in 2014. At the same time, the University of Indonesia, long regarded as the country's top university and one of the two Indonesian institutions remaining in QS's top 500 in 2014, actually fell in the rankings. In 2009, its global ranking peaked at 201 but by 2014, it had fallen to 310. Reflecting this situation, the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education (2015: 34)—which took over responsibility for the management of the higher education system from MoEC in 2014—has set a more modest target of five Indonesian universities in the world's top 500 in its strategic plan for 2015–2019.

What explains Indonesia's lack of success in transforming HEIs into world-class institutions over the past decade? Conventional accounts have pointed to funding problems, human resource deficits, poor institutional management and excessive government control (Welch 2007; Wicaksono and Friawan 2011; Hill and Thee 2012, Hill and Thee 2013; World Bank 2014; and OECD/ADB 2015). This paper, by contrast, argues that this lack of success has been fundamentally a matter of politics and power. Specifically, it has reflected: (1) the continued political dominance of politico-bureaucratic and corporate elements that were nurtured under the 'New Order' (the authoritarian regime that ruled the country from 1965–1998); and (2) the increased ability of popular forces such as NGO, parent and student groups to participate in policy-making since the fall of the New Order and the country's successful transition to democracy. The first of these factors, it is argued, has meant that Indonesian HEIs have been primarily oriented towards the reproduction of predatory politico-bureaucratic and corporate elites rather than the production of knowledge, technology and skills consistent with notions of a world class university. In particular, they have done so by providing a mechanism through which these elites accumulate resources, distribute patronage, mobilise political support and exercise political control. The problems of funding, human resources and administration emphasised in conven-

tional accounts have been part and parcel of this orientation. The second factor has meant that efforts by government technocrats, foreign donors and university managers to reorient HEIs towards the production of knowledge, technology and skills, especially through neoliberal policy and management reforms, have encountered fierce resistance, not only from predatory forces but also from popular forces.

In presenting this argument, I begin by outlining an approach to understanding HEI performance in developing countries that emphasises the role of politics and power. I then move through a series of sections that seek to explain HEI performance in Indonesia, focusing on the role of power and politics. The final section of the paper speculates on how Indonesian HEIs are likely to evolve in the future given the political dynamics underlying their operation and the way these dynamics will themselves evolve.

Understanding HEI Performance in Developing Countries

Most analyses of HEI performance in developing countries suggest that HEI quality—and, in particular, HEIs' ability to evolve into world-class universities—is predominantly a function of their funding, human resources and the way in which they are governed at both the institutional and policy levels. In a series of works, Jamil Salmi and his collaborators, for instance, have argued that the success of the world's best universities is largely attributable to three factors: '(a) a high concentration of talent (faculty members and students); (b) abundant resources to offer a rich learning environment and to conduct advanced research; and (c) favourable governance features that encourage leadership, strategic vision, innovation and flexibility and that enable institutions to make decisions and manage resources without being encumbered by bureaucracy' (Altbach and Salmi 2011: 3; Salmi 2009; Salmi and Liu 2011). Viewing HEIs as similar to private corporations but recognising that governments play a crucial role in shaping the nature of the environment in which HEIs operate, Salmi and Liu (2011: xi) further argue that HEI trajectories depend on decisions taken at both the institutional and government or policy levels. It is unlikely, they suggest, that world class institutions 'can be rapidly created without a favourable policy environment and direct public initiative and support'. But, at the same time, HEIs require 'strong leadership, a bold vision of the institution's mission and goals, and a clearly articulated strategic plan to translate the vision into concrete targets and programmes' (2011: xii) if they are to succeed.

This paper, by contrast, takes a different view, one more grounded in critical perspectives on higher education—especially those that emphasise the role of politics and power (see, for instance, Pusser 2008; Pusser and Marginson 2012; Martinez-Alemán et al. 2015; Pusser 2015). Such perspectives have a central concern with the way in which power relationships and political and social contests shape higher education at both the policy or institutional levels: 'in general, an explicit focus on power is……a central feature of the critical political approach' (Pusser and Marginson 2012: 90). Accordingly, this approach locates HEIs as 'politically constituted institutions

of the state' (Pusser 2015: 51)—that is, as sites for the exercise of power and contestation between competing political and social forces. As Pusser and Marginson (2012: 92) have explained: 'Colleges and universities—both public and private—are chartered by state action as sites for the production of key public and private benefits, outcomes central to broader state goals. The form of these benefits and the allocation of the costs that attend them are determined by political and social contest.' Such perspectives are thus concerned with identifying the political and social forces that shape higher education, assessing the relationships of power between these forces and exploring how contestation between them shapes what HEIs do and how they do it through decisions at both the governmental/policy and HEI levels.

From this perspective, then, HEI performance can be seen as the outcome of struggles between competing political and social forces over policy (especially higher education policy) and institution-level decisions. The point here is not that HEI funding, human resources and governance do not matter. Rather, it is that such variables are *proximate* in nature: they reflect an underlying politics and set of power relationships. HEI funding levels, for instance, are the product of political decisions at the policy level about the extent of government taxation, the allocation of public spending between competing budget items, and the extent to which tuition and other fees are determined by market forces—issues in which a range of competing political and social forces have a stake and seek to influence outcomes with differing capacities to exercise leverage over outcomes. Likewise, the regulatory and management frameworks that determine incentives for academic staff with regards to research and teaching reflect political decisions at the policy and institutional levels about how staff spend their time in the service of institutional objectives. Again, these are issues in which a range of political and social forces have a stake and seek to influence outcomes with differing capacities to exercise leverage over outcomes. Politics and power also shape other crucial governance-related variables such as the legal status of HEIs—for instance, whether such institutions are part of the state bureaucracy or independent entities—and, at the institutional level, the nature of institutional and faculty strategies and investment priorities.

Much recent analysis from a critical perspective on higher education in developing countries has emphasised the role of international organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in shaping the evolution of higher education in those countries (see especially Arnove 2009; Robertson 2009; and Naidoo 2011). Economic globalisation and the development of the knowledge economy, it has argued, have created pressure for developing countries to improve access to and the quality of their higher education systems in order to enhance national economic competitiveness. This has included by transforming leading HEIs into 'world class' institutions. This pressure has emerged to a large extent because international organisations have used their intellectual, financial and political resources to pressure developing country governments into adopting neoliberal policies and programs aimed at enhancing the quality of their HEIs such as institutional autonomy, accreditation systems and opening up of the higher education sector to foreign competition. Such perspectives have often been informed by an understanding of politics that emanates from dependency theory and world

systems theory and centres on notions such as neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. In this view, the key contests in higher education are ones *between* 'core' countries in wealthy industrialised countries Europe, North America, Australasia and (increasingly) Northeast Asia, on the one hand, and 'peripheral' countries in the developing world, on the other. International organisations enter the analysis as agents of core states and their capitalist classes.

This paper, by contrast, emphasises the role of power relationships and political and social contests *at the national and institutional levels*. Pressures emanating from global/structural factors—including via the intervention of international organisations in developing countries—are mediated by distinctive national political and social systems. As Carlos and Schugurensky (2002: 429) have put it, 'global trends [in higher education] are promoted, resisted and negotiated differently in each national context'. The result is different outcomes across countries. For instance, while some developing countries have adopted, implemented and had success with ambitious plans to transform elite national HEIs into world-class universities (for instance, China), others have found it difficult to do so (for instance, India) (Sharma 2015; Morgan 2016). Similarly, developing countries have taken quite different approaches to the establishment of branch campuses of foreign universities—an alternative way of creating world-class universities (compare, for instance, Malaysia's experience with that of Indonesia) (Khong 2013). The important point is that countries' 'choices' in these respects are shaped by national political processes involving contestation between competing domestic political and social actors.

At the same time, the trajectory of particular HEIs is shaped by power relationships and political and social contests at the institutional level. The point here is that: (i) HEIs have some control over their own direction and, specifically, whether they evolve into world class universities, albeit more so in decentralised systems where HEIs have significant autonomy than in highly centralised systems where they do not; (ii) decisions to pursue world-class status may yield changes at the HEI level that redistribute control over and the allocation of university resources and reallocate decision-making authority to the benefit of some elements within or external to the university and the harm of others; and (iii) decisions to pursue world-class status are thus potentially subject to challenge by these various elements.

To capture the role of these national and institution-level contests, we thus need an analytical framework that focuses on the nature of the political and social forces that shape higher education within specific national and institutional contexts, the relationships of power between them, and their respective roles in shaping what HEIs do and how they do it via national-level policy-making and institutional decision-making. In this respect, this paper draws on the 'social conflict' framework that has been applied in studies of the political economy of Southeast Asia by scholars such as Rodan et al. (2006), Hameiri (2007) and Rodan and Jayasuriya (2012). Like critical perspectives on higher education, social conflict analysis focuses on identifying the actors engaged in political and social struggles; understanding their interests, agendas and forms of leverage over the policy-making and implementation process; and illustrating how contests between these actors have shaped shifts in policy and its implementation over time. In short, it shares with critical perspectives on higher

education a concern with the 'different but competing interests that structure the development, spread and enforcement of capitalist markets' and the way in which 'policy and institutional transformation take place within broader patterns of social and political power' (Rodan et al. 2006: 7).

It defines the relevant actors in structural and collective terms—for instance, as classes, class fractions, politico-bureaucratic strata, and/or popular forces—rather than in individual and organisational terms. Individuals and organisations are viewed as expressions of broader structural/collective interests and relationships of power or, in the case of organisations, as sites for contestation between these interests. It further locates these actors and the contests between them in terms of countries' particular historical trajectories and respective locations within the global political economy. Primarily for these two reasons, the social conflict approach can be distinguished from alternative frameworks in the political economy such as public choice theory, pluralism, rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism as well as dependency/world systems theory (see Rodan et al. 2006 for a review of the relevant literature).

Social conflict analysis accordingly implies that HEI performance is determined by the outcome of contests between (structurally-defined) domestic political and social actors (each having distinctive interests, agendas and forms of leverage over policy and its implementation) operating within distinctive historical and geo-political and geo-economic contexts at both the policy and HEI levels. HEI performance is not a simple, automatic response to global/structural forces for change nor a straightforward reflection of institutions' respective endowments of funding, human resources and governance arrangements. Rather it reflects the balance of power between competing actors at the policy and institution levels.

In the following three sections, I provide an overview of the proximate causes of poor HEI performance in Indonesia as analysed in conventional accounts. I then draw on the social conflict framework to examine how HEIs' performance—and its proximate causes—have reflected the continued political dominance of predatory political, bureaucratic and corporate elements that were nurtured under the 'New Order' and the growing influence of NGO activists, student groups and other actors in Indonesian civil society as a result of the country's successful transition to democracy. I focus initially on the realm of national higher education policy-making and then on institution-level decision-making.

The Proximate Causes of Poor HEI Performance in Indonesia

Conventional accounts have suggested that four main factors have inhibited the performance of Indonesian HEIs and, in particular, prevented the country from transforming its HEIs into world-class institutions:

First, public spending on higher education in Indonesia has been low by international and regional standards. According to the OECD/ADB (2015: 207) public spending on higher education in Indonesia was 0.3% of GDP in 2009, much lower than several other developing countries including Chile (0.5), Uruguay (0.6), Thailand (0.9), India (1.1), and Malaysia (2.1) (figures for the latter being for 2004–5). High private spending has made up for the low level of public spending to some extent but not completely—overall, Indonesia spent only 1.2% of GDP on higher education in 2009 compared to 3.2% in Chile, 1.3% in Thailand, 2.7% in India, and 2.1% in Malaysia. The low level of public spending on higher education is notwithstanding the fact that there has been increasing demand in Indonesia for higher education in recent decades and significant increases in total government education spending since the introduction in 2002 of a new Constitutional requirement for the central government to spend at least 20% of its budget on education.

One result of low public spending on higher education has been to limit the ability of Indonesian HEIs to support research. According to the OECD/ADB (2015: 197–198), research and development spending in Indonesia was just 0.09% of GDP in 2012, a level that 'is extremely low compared with other countries in the region like Singapore and Malaysia'. Another consequence has been a dramatic privatisation of the higher education system that has served to undermine educational quality. Public HEIs have been unable to absorb growing demand for higher education, leading to a growth in the role of private HEIs, the vast majority of which are of lower quality than public HEIs—in 2012, private HEIs accounted for 97% of the total number of HEIs in Indonesia and around two-thirds of student enrolments.[2] At the same time, many public universities have introduced so-called 'extension', 'special entry' and/or 'international' programs for which they charge much higher tuition fees than 'regular' programs. As Welch (2007: 679) has pointed out, these programs have typically entailed lower entry requirements and less demanding academic standards.

Second, Indonesia has lacked sufficient numbers of qualified academic staff. According to the World Bank (2014: 35), more than one-third of the academic labour force in Indonesia has a Bachelor's degree or less; only about 10% have Ph.Ds. This imbalance is more pronounced in private HEIs than public ones but is a feature even of the country's top universities (Wicaksono and Friawan 2011:171). Domestic production of Masters and Ph.D. graduates has 'grown steadily' in recent years but has been 'too small to provide the amounts of human capital needed for an increased critical mass of qualified instructors and professors' (World Bank 2014: 35). In this respect, the country has failed to emulate the model set by countries such as the US and Brazil, both of which successfully increased domestic production of Ph.Ds at previous points in their respective histories, helping them 'move from efficiency-driven economic production to innovation-driven production' (World Bank 2014: 35).

Third, Indonesian academics have faced reward/incentive systems that have discouraged them from producing high-quality research and teaching. Academic appointments have tended to be made on the basis of seniority and loyalty rather than

---

[2]Data is from the Directorate-General for Higher Education (DIKTI).

merit, promotions have tended to occur automatically after staff have met particular administrative requirements rather than on the basis of a track record in delivering high-quality research and teaching, and terminations have been rare even when staff performance is poor (World Bank 2014: 43). At the same time, low salaries at both public and private HEIs have encouraged academics to take on extra work, sometimes of a non-academic nature, including consulting jobs for government departments and agencies, positions in NGOs and management and teaching roles at other universities. The result, as Buchori and Malik (2004: 261) have noted, is that 'faculty members often come to campus to teach their classes and then leave immediately afterward, which deprives students of sufficient interaction with their instructors outside of class.'

Fourth, government management of HEIs has been highly centralised, top-down and restrictive in nature. Public and private HEIs have been closely monitored by the central government, in particular, the Directorate-General for Higher Education (DIKTI) in MoEC and, since DIKTI's absorption into the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education in 2014, various directorates-general within the latter Ministry. Under the New Order, public HEIs were formally units within the bureaucracy rather than separate legal entities and their staff were classified as civil servants. They had virtually no managerial or financial autonomy as a result. In recent years, government technocrats and donors have endeavoured to provide public HEIs with greater financial and managerial autonomy but, for reasons that are analysed below, they have largely failed in this endeavour. According to the OECD/ADB (2015: 211), there have consequently been 'too many restrictions and binding rules for [HEIs] to develop at a reasonable pace and in keeping with changing local needs and circumstances.'

The Political Economy of HEI Performance in Indonesia: The Policy Level[3]

The poor performance of Indonesian HEIs—and the proximate causes of this as outlined above—have stemmed in large part from the political dominance of predatory political, bureaucratic and corporate elements that were nurtured under the 'New Order'. Indonesia's New Order reflected an effective alliance between 'politico-bureaucratic' officials and the dominant sections of domestic and foreign capital (Robison 1986). Following a military coup in 1965, the leaders of the Indonesian military emasculated the political parties, reduced the national parliament to a rubber stamp, secured control over the bureaucracy and subordinated the judiciary to political and bureaucratic authority. In so doing, they concentrated power in the hands of a strata of politico-bureaucrats, a group so-named because they occupied the state apparatus and fused political and bureaucratic authority (Robison 1986: 107). Unconstrained by any effective rule of law, these 'politico-bureaucrats' were able to sell

---

[3]This section draws heavily on Rosser (2016).

access to government concessions, licenses and facilities and in the process enrich themselves and their families.

Facing economic crises in the late 1960s and mid-1980s, the politico-bureaucrats accepted foreign aid and policy advice from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the country's main bilateral donors, and sought to attract mobile capital—which had fled under the previous regime. In so doing, they effectively widened the governing coalition to include controllers of mobile capital. In this context, they granted broad authority over macroeconomic and fiscal policy to a group of liberal technocrats—known widely as the 'Berkeley Mafia'—whose policy advice broadly corresponded with the interests of mobile capital. Over subsequent decades, this coalition expanded further to include major domestic business conglomerates which emerged, in most cases, due to close political ties and consequent privileged access to state credit, facilities and licenses. By contrast, popular forces—such as university students, labour and NGO activists—played little role in policy-making and implementation, reflecting the New Order's strategy of 'disorganising' civil society (Robison and Hadiz 2004).

The onset of economic crisis in 1997 and subsequent collapse of the New Order in 1998 undermined the economic base of the politico-bureaucrats and their corporate clients by precipitating widespread corporate bankruptcy, increasing the country's public debt, undermining sources of government revenue and forcing the government to negotiate a rescue package with the IMF (Robison and Rosser 1998). At the same time, transition to democratic rule increased the scope for popular forces to influence government policy by removing key obstacles to political organisation, opening up new entry points into the policy-making process and creating an incentive for politicians and their political parties to promote redistributive policies because of their electoral popularity (Mietzner 2010; Rosser 2015). The economic crisis and collapse of the New Order did not, however, eliminate the politico-bureaucrats and their corporate clients. As Hadiz (2003: 593) has argued, these elements were 'able to reinvent themselves through new alliances and vehicles' such as political parties with the result that they have maintained instrumental control over the state apparatus notwithstanding the shift to a more democratic and decentralised political system (see also Robison and Hadiz 2004).

Within this context, there has been strong political opposition to significant spending on education and higher education in particular. Predatory politico-bureaucratic and corporate elements have had a vested interest in low spending on education because it has freed up resources for spending on projects in infrastructure, mining and energy, transport and communications that provide greater rent-seeking opportunities. At the same time, technocratic officials and donor organisations have stressed the need for fiscal rectitude and for government education funding to be concentrated on the school sector (Prawiro 1998; Robison 1986: 373–399). During the oil boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s, when the government had substantial discretionary investment funds at its disposal, it accordingly invested in expanding the size and geographic reach of the public school system but did little to establish new public HEIs or invest in the training of future generations of academics. As noted above, it accommodated growing demand for higher education at this time by

expanding privately-provided higher education to the detriment of higher education quality. In the post-New Order period, technocratic and predatory elements opposed efforts by the Indonesian teachers union (PGRI) and NGOs in the late 2000s to force the government to comply with the new Constitutional requirement for at least 20% of government budgets to be spent on education (Rosser and Joshi 2013: 183).

At the same time, public HEIs have become primarily oriented towards the reproduction of predatory politico-bureaucratic and corporate elites rather than the production of knowledge, technology and skills required for improved national economic competitiveness or fulfilment of citizens' rights to education. In particular, they have acted as mechanisms through which these elites accumulate resources, distribute patronage, mobilise political support and exercise political control. Under the New Order, these institutions were part of the larger 'franchise' structure that characterised that regime, the key feature of which was the purchase of government positions in exchange for access to the rents they could generate (McLeod 2000). The government's strict control over senior HEI appointments, restrictions on academic freedom and widespread corruption within the civil service combined to create a context in which senior management positions at public HEIs were sold to the highest bidder, there was widespread corruption in HEI management, and academic staff were compelled to show loyalty towards the state and be subservient to HEI management. Ambitious academics accordingly focused on securing senior administrative positions that provided opportunities for income supplementation through perks of office and corruption or engaging in outside paid consulting and teaching work rather than upgrading their qualifications, improving the quality of their teaching, or producing traditional research outputs (Cummings 1981: 39–40; Idrus 1999: 136; Nugroho 2005: 155).

The political shifts precipitated by the Asian economic crisis and the collapse of the New Order did little to change this situation. At the height of the crisis, the technocrats and their donor supporters pushed for the government to grant public HEIs greater autonomy so that they could re-focus around traditional academic activities such as the production of knowledge, technology and skills. This lead to the enactment of a series of regulations and laws enabling public HEIs to change their legal status to one or other form that gave them greater autonomy (the name and nature of the form varied depending on the regulation or law). But this push encountered serious resistance. Seven leading public universities—the University of Indonesia, Gadjah Mada University, Bogor Agricultural Institute, Bandung Institute of Technology, North Sumatra University, Indonesia University of Education, and Airlangga University—were granted a change in legal status in between 2000 and 2006. But by May 2014 no further institutions had been granted the same although it appeared likely that a small number of others would follow.

Similar outcomes prevailed in relation to autonomy in the appointment of senior managers and financial management. Under the New Order, rectors of public universities were appointed by the President and the Education Minister based on a shortlist of three names nominated by academic senates. Following the fall of the New Order, rector appointment processes were 'democratised' so that they were appointed through an electoral process in which staff and students usually partici-

pated. However, the Minister of Education was granted 35% of the vote, allowing him to retain enormous influence over the outcome. With regards to financial autonomy, the government backtracked on moves to grant public HEIs greater control over their own finances. On the one hand, it retained pre-allocated line-by-line budgeting for HEIs, despite committing to increased use of block grants in its 2003–2010 Higher Education Long Term Strategy (World Bank 2013: 48; 2014; 45). On the other hand, it introduced 'complex, detailed rules about tuition rates and collection' at public HEIs that restrict their ability to set their own fees (World Bank 2014: 46). The latter decision appears to have been a response to popular concern about the commercialisation of higher education. But, besides this, the changes have been broadly consistent with the logic of predation in so far as they reinforced decision-making processes susceptible to corruption.

A second reason for the poor performance of Indonesian HEIs—and the proximate causes of this as outlined above—has been the increased ability of popular forces to participate in policy-making in the post-New Order period. While some of the resistance to HEI autonomy came from predatory forces—particularly the corporate owners of private HEIs who feared that greater autonomy would mean they had less control over their HEIs—much also came from progressive NGO activists, nationalist intellectuals and university student organisations. In their case, the principal concern was that autonomy entailed higher fees at public HEIs (Irawan 2007; Darmaningtyas, Edi Subkhan and Ismail Fahmi-Panimbang 2009; Tilaar 2012). Champions of democracy, they were supportive of greater intellectual autonomy for Indonesian HEIs (i.e. academic freedom) but feared that financial and managerial autonomy would worsen inequality by increasing the cost of higher education. In 2010, these groups—working in alliance with the corporate owners of private HEIs—secured a Constitutional Court decision that cancelled Law 9/2009 on Education Legal Entities, then the legal basis for HEI autonomy (Mahkamah Konstitusi 2010: 371–404). As noted above, seven public HEIs have since been granted a change in legal status. But the Constitutional Court decision nevertheless dramatically slowed the shift towards autonomy.

The Political Economy of HEI Performance in Indonesia: The Institutional Level

The political dominance of predatory political, bureaucratic and corporate elements and the increased ability of popular forces to participate in policy-making in the post-New Order period have also shaped how individual HEIs have responded to the challenge of achieving world-class status. Especially important in this respect have been the seven public HEIs that were granted a change in legal status in 1999 because they have had the autonomy to carve out their own strategic direction and, given their relatively high standing compared to other Indonesian HEIs, the greatest prospect for achieving world-class status. At these institutions, the quest for world-class status has implied changes in internal decision-making, budgeting and workforce man-

agement—in the direction of a more corporate style of HEI management—that have had the potential to upset traditional hierarchies and power relationships within these institutions. It has also implied an effort to create world-class facilities through investment in new infrastructure that has had the potential to exacerbate corruption—or, at least, raise suspicions of corruption. As such, it has presented a political challenge to those trying to transform these institutions into ones focused on the production of knowledge, technology and skills in accordance with notions of a world-class university. In most cases, the result appears to have been inertia; university managers have generally baulked at pushing through radical change.

The political difficulties in this respect are well illustrated by the University of Indonesia's (UI) experience between 2007 and 2012. As noted above, although UI has long been regarded as the country's preeminent HEI, it has rated poorly in the main global university league tables. After becoming rector in 2007, Gumilar Rusliwa Somantri, the youngest rector in the university's history and the first to originate from the university's Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (Kuswandini 2010), set about trying to rectify this situation through an ambitious program of internal reform that had three main components.

First, he invested heavily in university infrastructure to support research and enhance the student experience, in particular, a massive library complex, IT facilities and campus transport facilities (Somantri 2012: 2–3; Rulistia 2009). Second, he appointed a number of staff members with strong research track records to research-focused positions, also granting them big pay rises (Somantri 2012: 6). Third, he introduced changes in internal management and budgeting that aimed to produce, as he put it, 'a modern corporate management approach that focuses on efficiency and effectiveness' (as quoted in Maulia 2008). Key in this respect were the centralisation of management authority over university finances, infrastructure and information systems; a reduction in the number of university bank accounts from over 700 to 70; and a reduction in the number of university tax file numbers from 70 to two (Somantri 2012: 5). These changes served to relocate much decision-making authority and financial control from the faculties—which had previously had a high degree of autonomy within the university management structure (Somantri 2012: 4)—to the central administration. He also planned to reduce the number of faculties from ten to three (Maulia 2008), a move that would have further centralised authority, but he did not in the end proceed with this change.

Initially, this plan appeared to pay dividends for both UI and Gumilar personally. The university's research productivity improved: between 2007 and 2012, it went from producing less than 15 articles in international journals per year to over 200 (Somantri 2012: 6). At the same time, UI's position in the QS rankings went up from 420 in 2005 to 201 in 2009 and 217 in 2011. In this context, Gumilar was hailed in the Indonesian media as a 'great' reformer (Kuswandini 2010), awarded honorary doctorates by British and Korean universities and given a number of international awards (Somantri nd).

Emboldened by these successes, Gumilar sought to secure even greater control over university management following the Constitutional Court's decision to annul Law 9/2009 on Education Legal Entities and the issuance of a new government regu-

lation on education management and implementation in 2010.[4] The new regulation, which was aimed at bringing government policy in line with the court's decision, proposed a model of university of governance that was different to that previously provided for in government regulations, particularly for institutions such as UI that had been granted autonomy. Specifically, it did not recognise the existence of the Board of Trustees (MWA), a body equivalent to a university council and reduced checks and balances on the rector. Invoking this new regulation, Gumilar moved to unilaterally appoint a new university senate. Without the knowledge of the latter, he also negotiated a key funding and performance agreement with DIKTI (Salim 2012: 226–227).

By mid-2011, these various changes had alienated large sections of UI's staff and student populations, including many faculty deans and members of its MWA. Things eventually came to a head in August 2011 when it was announced that the university had awarded an honorary degree to the King of Saudi Arabia. Coming shortly after a series of reports in the media about abuse of Indonesian migrant workers in that country and the execution by beheading of an Indonesian maid for murdering her employer after allegedly suffering repeated torture, this announcement prompted several NGOs and a group of prominent university academics to visit the national parliament to demand that it summon the university's senior management (Jakarta Post 2011a). This protest quickly morphed into one about the nature of the university's governance more generally and Gumilar's leadership in particular. Claims of authoritarianism, mismanagement, a lack of transparency and corruption soon became the focus of the debate with questions being raised especially about the university's investments in the library and IT infrastructure.

In early September, an informal discussion took place at the residence of Emil Salim, a former Minister for the Environment, a member of the MWA and a professor of economics at the university, involving Emil, the MWA secretary, and Thamrin Amal Tamagola, a professor at the university. Speaking to the media after the event, Thamrin said: 'We have to stop [Gumilar] because he tends to accumulate all power in his own hands. He decides all things' (Jakarta Post 2011b). A few days later, Emil gave a well-attended speech at the university's Faculty of Economics in which he criticised Gumilar's management and called for reform of the university's governance (Reza et al. 2011). Within a matter of days, staff opposed to Gumilar had formed 'Save UI', a group that, according to a leading member, Armando (2012: 5), sought to 'save UI from mismanagement by its leadership that had not only caused losses to the state amounting to billions of rupiah but also destroyed the foundations of truth, honesty, justice that should be held high by a higher education institution such as UI'. The rest of 2011 saw an announcement by these staff that they had found irregularities in the university's financial accounts; these staff report Gumilar to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for alleged corruption; complaints from faculty deans about administrative problems caused by centralisation of financial management; prominent members of UI's alumni condemn Gumilar's management

---

[4]Government Regulation 66/2010 on an Amendment to Government Regulation 17/2010 on Education Management and Implementation.

style; student representatives from the Faculty of Economics call for a lecture strike; the MWA decide to dismiss Gumilar as rector; and Gumilar ignore this decision. In the end, the Education Minister of Education, Muhammad Nuh, intervened to broker a peace deal (Jakarta Post 2011c, 2001d, 2011e, 2011f, 2011g; Tempo 2011).

In early 2012, however, open warfare erupted again following a report by the State Audit Agency (BPK) that it had found irregularities in UI's budget management resulting in state losses of nearly US$5 million (Widhiarto 2012). In March 2012, staff opposed to Gumilar's leadership formed an anti-corruption group called 'Clean UI' aimed at 'struggl[ing] for the values of honesty, truth and justice as the basic values to be followed at UI' (Armando 2012: 13). Led by Ratna Sitompul, the dean of the Faculty of Medicine, one of the university's most powerful faculties and historically the principal source of its rectors, this organisation soon became the main vehicle for opposition to Gumilar's continued tenure as rector as new elections for the position approached. Gumilar—who appeared to be seeking re-election—responded by sacking Sitompul and, a few weeks later, seven other deans, sparking howls of protest from staff, students and alumni (Kompas 2012a, b). The Minister was forced to intervene again, appointing the director-general of DIKTI, Djoko Santoso, as acting rector upon conclusion of Gumilar's term in August 2012 until elections could be held (Antara 2012). For his part, Gumilar initially registered for the elections but his candidature did not survive past the initial stages.

For Gumilar's detractors, this episode was essentially about a power-hungry, corrupt and authoritarian leader being brought down by popular forces advocating for democracy, transparency and accountability (Toha-Sarumpaet et al. 2012). But it can also be interpreted as a contest between forces seeking to transform UI into a world-class university through the introduction of neoliberal managerial changes and forces supporting the status quo. The point here is twofold. First, whatever else motivated Gumilar, he clearly had an ambitious vision of UI as a world-class university complete with modern corporate management systems, high-quality infrastructure and world-class researchers. Second, much opposition to Gumilar and his reforms emanated from powerful interests within the university whose authority and access to patronage resources were undermined by his reforms, most notably the faculty deans and senior professors. Gumilar may have had all the personality traits attributed to him by his opponents.[5] And opposition to his leadership was clearly framed in terms of notions of democracy, transparency and accountability. But it doubtless also reflected the fact that his more corporate form of university governance redistributed power and resources within the institution away from powerful vested interests.

In this respect, then, UI's experience illustrates the political limits to transforming Indonesian HEIs into world-class universities, even at the country's most prestigious HEIs. Just as efforts to create world-class HEIs through policy changes providing for increased institutional autonomy were largely defeated at the hands of predatory and popular forces, so managerial reforms at the institution level have encountered a similar fate.

---

[5]At the time of writing (August 2016), Gumilar had not been formally accused of or put on trial for corruption, although he had appeared as a witness in the corruption trial of a former Vice-Rector.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that Indonesia's lack of success in transforming HEIs into world-class universities over the past decade has been primarily a matter of power and politics rather than simply inadequate funding, human resource deficits, poor institutional management and excessive government control as emphasised in conventional accounts. In particular, this lack of success has reflected the continued political dominance of predatory politico-bureaucratic and corporate elements and the increased ability of popular forces to participate in policy-making since the country's transition to democracy. Combined together, these factors have ensured (i) that Indonesian HEIs have served to reproduce predatory politico-bureaucratic and corporate elites rather than promoting the production of knowledge, technology and skills; and (ii) that efforts by government technocrats, foreign donors and university managers to reorient them in the latter direction have encountered fierce political resistance. Such resistance has served to stymie the emergence of an enabling policy framework for change and the introduction of the required managerial and infrastructural reforms at the institutional level.

In terms of future trajectories, the implication is that there is little prospect for Indonesia to transform its HEIs into world-class universities in the foreseeable future. The country has not yet established the political and social preconditions for the emergence of such universities and it is not obvious how they will emerge in the short to medium term. Some commentators have argued that Indonesia should focus its attention on developing 'locally relevant' HEIs—that is, ones that meet local market needs—rather than creating HEIs capable of competing with the world's top universities in the research stakes. This is because the former are more feasible given the country's financial and human resources and administrative capacity (Royono and Rahwidiati 2013; Oktafiga 2016). The analysis here suggests that such institutions may be all that are politically feasible as well.

The best hope that Indonesia will develop world-class universities in the future probably rests with progress in international trade negotiations. It is possible that the Indonesian government will decide at some point in the future to permit foreign universities to set up branch campuses as a part of a bilateral or multilateral trade deal—and that the country will get a set of world-class universities through that route. Following a recent meeting with his Australian counterpart, Trade Minister Enggartiasto Lukita reportedly indicated that he supported Australian university campuses operating in special economic zones in Indonesia (Hawley 2016). And a legal basis for foreign branch campuses is provided in the 2012 Higher Education Law. But even here there are serious political obstacles. As of late 2016, the Indonesian government has so far baulked at issuing the implementing regulations that would make branch campuses legally possible in the face of vocal opposition from domestic state and private universities, NGOs and student groups (Rosser 2016: 18–19). Looking forward, the question is whether international pressure for change becomes strong enough to out-trump this domestic opposition.

References

Altbach, P., & Salmi, J. (2011). Introduction. In P. Altbach & J. Salmi (Eds.), *The road to academic excellence: The making of world-class research universities* (pp. 1–10). Washington DC: World Bank.

Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership. (2012). *Overview of the education sector in Indonesia 2012: Achievements and challenges*. Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture.

Antara. (2007, April 14). Minister Hopes four RI universities to rank among Asia's Best 100.

Antara. (2012, August 16). Djoko Santoso becomes acting rector of University of Indonesia.

Armando, A. (2012). Bagaimana Perlawanan Terhadap Kezaliman Rektor Berkembang. In R. K. Toha-Sarumpaet, M. Budiman, & A. Armando (Eds.), *Membangun di Atas Puing Integritas: Belajar Dari Universitas Indonesia* (pp. 3–12). Gerakan UI Bersih and Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia: Jakarta.

Arnove, R. (2009). World systems analysis and comparative education in the age of globalization. In R. Cowen & A. Kazamias (Eds.), *International handbook of comparative education* (pp. 101–119). Dordrecht: Springer.

Buchori, M., & Malik, A. (2004). The evolution of higher education in Indonesia. In P. Altbach & T. Umakoshi (Eds.), *Asian universities: Historical perspectives and contemporary challenges* (pp. 249–278). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Cummings, W. (1981, February). Pendidikan Tinggi dan Masyarakat Indonesia. *Prisma*, 34–49.

Darmaningtyas, Edi Subkhan and Ismail Fahmi-Panimbang (2009). *Tirani Kapital Dalam Pendidikan: Menolak UU BHP (Badan Hukum Pendidikan)*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Yashiba and Damar Press.

Department of National Education. (2005). *Rencana Strategis Departmen Pendidikan Nasional 2005-2009*. Jakarta: Department of National Education.

Hadiz, V. (2003). Reorganizing political power in Indonesia: A reconsideration of so-called "democratic transitions". *Pacific Review, 16*(4), 591–611.

Hameiri, S. (2007). Failed states or a failed paradigm? State capacity and the limits of institutionalism. *Journal of International Relations and Development, 10*(2), 122–149.

Haryanti, E. (2010*). Strategi Pengembangan Kelembagaan PT Menuju World Class University*. Available at http://www.knowledge-leader.net/2010/07/768/. Aaccessed July 22, 2016.

Hawley, S. (2016). Indonesia trade deal Steve Ciobo's top priority after bilateral meeting with Enggartiasto Lukita. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-02/indonesia-trade-deal-steve-ciobo's-top-priority/7683506. Accessed August 21, 2016.

Hill, H., & Thee, K. W. (2012). Indonesian universities in transition: Catching up and opening up. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 48*(2), 229–251.

Hill, H., & Wie, K. W. (2013). Indonesian universities: Rapid growth, major challenges. In D. Suryadarma & G. Jones (Eds.), *Education in Indonesia* (pp. 160–179). ISEAS: Singapore.

Idrus, N. (1999). Towards quality higher education in Indonesia. *Quality Assurance in Education, 7*(3), 134–141.

Irawan, A. (2007, September 18). Ancaman RUU Badan Hukum Pendidikan. *Seputar Indonesia*. Available at http://www.antikorupsi.org/antikorupsi/?q=node/11316. Last accessed January 28, 2013.

Jakarta Post. (2011a, August 27). Honorary degree for Saudi King Draws Fury (p. 1).

Jakarta Post. (2011b, September 2). Pressure mounts on UI rector over award (p. 1).

Jakarta Post. (2011c, September 15). Comments: UI student group calls for lecture-strike (p. 8).

Jakarta Post. (2011d, November 29). Greater Jakarta: UI activists report rector to KPK (p. 9).

Jakarta Post. (2011e, September 13). Academics find suspect transactions in UI budget (p. 4).

Jakarta Post. (2011f, December 22). Business as usual for UI rector despite demand to 'step down' (p. 3).

Jakarta Post. (2011g, December 24). Gumilar remains UI rector: Minister (p. 3).

Khong, K. H. (2013). The transformation and internationalization of higher education: The Malaysian experience. In D. Suryadarma & G. Jones (Eds.), *Education in Indonesia* (pp. 216–235). ISEAS: Singapore.

Kompas. (2012a, August 2). Gumilar Berhentikan Tujuh Dekan di UI. Available at: https://ekonomi.kompas.com/read/2012/08/02/11342371/gumilar.berhentikan.tujuh.dekan.di.ui. Accessed 12 June 2019.

Kompas. (2012b, August 3). BEM UI Desak Mendikbud Berhentikan Gumilar. Available at: https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2012/08/03/11574869/bem.ui.desak.mendikbud.berhentikan.gumilar. Accessed 12 June 2019.

Kuswandini, D. (2010, May 26). Gumilar Rusliwa Somantri: From good to great. *The Jakarta Post* (p. 28).

Konstitusi, M. (2010). *Putusan Nomor 11-14-21-126 dan 136/PUU-VII/2009*. Jakarta: Mahkamah Konstitusi.

Martinez-Alemán, A., Pusser, B., & Bensimon, E. M. (Eds.). (2015). *Critical approaches to the study of higher education: A practical introduction*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Maulia, E. (2008, May 12). End of universities nigh: 'If no reform is taken'. *The Jakarta Post* (p. 2).

McLeod, R. (2000). Soeharto's Indonesia: A better class of corruption. *Agenda, 7*(2), 99–112.

Mietzner, M. (2010). Political conflict resolution and democratic consolidation in Indonesia: The role of the constitutional court. *Journal of East Asian Studies, 10*(3), 397–424.

Ministry of Education and Culture. (2010). *Rencana Strategis Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 2010–2014*. Jakarta: Ministry of Education and Culture.

Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education. (2015). *Rencana Strategis Kementerian Riset, Teknologi, dan Pendidikan Tinggi Tahun 2015–2019*. Jakarta: Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education.

Mok, K. H. (2011). When neoliberalism colonizes higher education in Asia: Bringing the "public" back to the contemporary university. In D. Rhoten & C. Calhoun (Eds.), *Knowledge matters: The public mission of the research university* (pp. 195–230). New York: Columbia University Press.

Morgan, J. (2016). India plans to create 20 'world-class' universities. *Times Higher Education*. Available at https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/india-plans-to-create-twenty-world-class-universities. Accessed August 4, 2016.

Naidoo, R. (2011). Rethinking development: Higher education and the new imperialism. In R. King, S. Marginson, & R. Naidoo (Eds.), *Handbook on globalization and higher education* (pp. 40–58). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Nugroho, H. (2005). The political economy of higher education: The university as an arena for the struggle for power. In V. Hadiz & D. Dhakidae (Eds.), *Social science and power in Indonesia* (pp. 143–165). Singapore and Jakarta: ISEAS and Equinox.

OECD/Asian Development Bank. (2015). *Education in Indonesia: Rising to the challenge*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Oktafiga, D. (2016, July 15). Locally relevant rather than world-class universities. *University World News*. Available at http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20160714093651272. Accessed August 21, 2016.

Prawiro, R. (1998). *Indonesia's struggle for economic development: Pragmatism in action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pusser, B. (2008). The state, the market and the institutional estate: Revisiting contemporary authority relations in higher education. In J. Smart (Ed.), *Higher education: Handbook of theory and research* (pp. 105–139). New York: Agathon Press.

Pusser, B. (2015). A critical approach to power in higher education'. In A. M. Martinez-Aleman, B. Pusser, & E. M. Bensimon (Eds.), *Critical approaches to the study of higher education: A practical introduction* (pp. 49–69). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Pusser, B., & Marginson, S. (2012). The elephants in the room: Power and politics in higher education. In M. Bastedo (Ed.), *The organization of higher education: Managing colleges for a new era* (pp. 86–117). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Reza, M., Agustia, R., Febriyan, M. S., & Sari, D. (2011, September 18). Lunturnya Demokrasi di Kampus Kuning. *Tempo*, 49–51.

Robertson, S. (2009). Market Multilateralism, the World Bank Group and the asymmetries of globalising higher education: Toward a critical political economy analysis. In R. M. Bassett & A. Maldonado-Maldonado (Eds.), *International organizations and higher education policy: Thinking globally, acting locally* (pp. 113–131). London and New York: Routledge.

Robison, R. (1986). *Indonesia: The rise of capital*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Robison, R., & Rosser, A. (1998, August) Contesting reform: Indonesia's new order and the IMF. *World Development*, 1593–1609.

Robison, R., & Hadiz, V. (2004). *Reorganising power in Indonesia: The politics of oligarchy in an age of markets*. London: Routledge.

Rodan, G., & Jayasuriya, K. (2012). Hybrid regimes: A social foundations approach. In J. Haynes (Ed.), *Routledge handbook on democratization* (pp. 175–189). Abingdon: Routledge.

Rodan, G., Hewison, K., & Robison, R. (2006). Theorizing markets in South-East Asia: Power and contestation. In G. Rodan, K. Hewison, & R. Robison (Eds.), *The political economy of South-East Asia: Markets, Power and Contestation* (pp. 1–38). Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Rosser, A. (2015). Law and the realisation of human rights: Insights from Indonesia's education sector. *Asian Studies Review, 39*(2), 194–212.

Rosser, A. (2016). Neoliberalism and the political economy of higher education policy in Indonesia. *Comparative Education, 52*(2), 109–135.

Rosser, A., & Joshi, A. (2013). From user fees to fee-free: The politics of realising universal free basic education in Indonesia. *Journal of Development Studies, 49*(2), 175–189.

Royono, R., & Rahwidiati, D. (2013). Beating the odds: Locally relevant alternatives to world-class universities. In D. Suryadarma & G. Jones (Eds.), *Education in Indonesia* (pp. 180–202). ISEAS: Singapore.

Rulistia, N. (2009, June 21). University of Indonesia's green, sophisticated library to reach out to all. *The Jakarta Post* (p. 20).

Salim, E. (2012). Pengalaman Pribadi Tentang Tata Kelola UI. In S. Irianto (Ed.), *Otonomi Perguruan Tinggi: Suatu Keniscayaan* (pp. 223–230). Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia: Jakarta.

Salmi, J. (2009). *The challenge of establishing world class universities*. Washington DC: World Bank.

Salmi, J., & Liu, N. C. (2011). Paths to a world-class university. In N. C. Liu, Q. Wang, & Y. Cheng (Eds.), *Paths to a world-class university: Lessons from practices and experiences* (pp. ix–xviii). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Sharma, Y. (2015). Hubs to take elite universities into world-class club. *University World News*. Available at http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20151015211423407. Accessed May 4, 2016.

Somantri, G. R. (2012). *Mewujudkan Mimpi UI: Memajukan Peradaban Berpijak Pada Akar Keindonesiaan*. Available at https://gumilarsomantri.wordpress.com/2014/05/25/mewujudkan-mimpi-ui-memajukan-peradaban-berpijak-pada-akar-keindonesiaan/. Accessed August 19, 2016.

Somantri, G. R. (nd). Curriculum vitae. Available at https://gumilarsomantri.wordpress.com/about/. Accessed August 19, 2016.

Tempo. (2011, October 16). *Gumilar di Simpang Jalan* (p. 74).

Tilaar, H. A. R. (2012). *Kaleidoskop Pendidikan Nasional: Kumpulan Karangan*. Jakarta: Kompas.

Toha-Sarumpaet, R., Budiman, M., & Armando, A. (Eds.). (2012). *Membangun di Atas Puing Integritas: Belajar Dari Universitas Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gerakan UI Bersih and Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.

Torres, C., & Schugurensky, D. (2002). The political economy of higher education in the era of neoliberal globalization: Latin America in comparative perspective. *Higher Education, 43,* 429–455.

Welch, A. (2007). Blurred vision? Public and private higher education in Indonesia. *Higher Education, 54*(5), 665–687.

Wicaksono, T., & Friawan, D. (2011). Recent developments in higher education in Indonesia: Issues and challenges. In S. Armstrong & B. Chapman (Eds.), *Financing higher education and economic development in East Asia* (pp. 159–187). Canberra: ANU E-Press.

Widhiarto, H. (2012, January 20). Alleged corruption spotted in country's top university. *The Jakarta Post*.

World Bank. (2013). *Implementation status and results: Indonesia: Higher education for relevance and efficiency*. Report No. ISR7081.

World Bank. (2014). *Tertiary education in Indonesia: Directions for policy*. Jakarta: World Bank.

Andrew Rosser is Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Melbourne. His main research interests are human rights, the resource curse, the political economy of policy-making, the politics of inclusion, aid governance, rebuilding governance in fragile states and corporate governance/corporate social responsibility, especially in Indonesia and Timor Leste. He has spent the last few years working on a research project focused on law, politics and socio-economic rights in Indonesia courtesy of an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship. He has worked previously at the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex), AusAID, the University of Sydney, the University of Adelaide, and Murdoch University and acted as a consultant to the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Oxfam, UNRISD, UNDP, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His work has been published in journals such as *Third World Quarterly, Critical Asian Studies, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Journal of Development Studies, Asian Studies Review, New Political Economy*, and *World Development*.

Chapter 5
Asserting Global Leadership in Higher Education: Governance with Strong Government in China

Jin Jiang and Ka Ho Mok

Introduction

In the last few decades, China has recorded unprecedented growth in higher education (HE) in terms of enrolment (system capacity) and enrolment rate (enrolment relative to age cohort). In light of Trow's definition of three-stage HE development (Trow 1973), China's HE system has experienced a transformation from an elite to a mass form within a short period. The growing opportunities in HE may improve the employability of the population and life chances. However, the same process has also created challenges for the continued development of HE, particularly when such a rapid expansion outstrips the ability of higher education institutions (HEIs) to maintain the quality of their teaching. Set against the policy context of Chinese HE's experience of the process of massification, this chapter examines critically the strategies adopted by the Chinese government to assert its global leadership in HE. With particular reference to changes in university governance, this chapter focuses on the major measures that the Chinese government has adopted in order to (a) develop a "world-class university" and (b) recruit/attract overseas talent for employment in the country. The discussion begins with the transformation of governance strategies of universities management in the context of intensified global competition, followed by an examination of major schemes for building world-class universities and attracting global talent to assert global leadership in HE. The final part of the chapter discusses the changes in university governance and implications for educational development as well as the strategies/measures recently adopted by the Chinese government to transform its universities.

J. Jiang (✉) · K. H. Mok
Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China
e-mail: jjiang@ln.edu.hk

"Governance without Government" in Public Sector Management

The growing influence of neoliberalism and its subsequent tides of marketization and privatization have shaped how Asian states manage their economic affairs and how public policy is formulated and the public sector is managed (Carroll 2012; Stubbs 2009; Hayashi 2010). To adapt to the challenges of globalization, many Asian states (including China) have adopted a neoliberal approach as they unleash the power of the market to enhance capital formation, promote resource allocation, and sustain economic growth/welfare gains (World Bank 2002; Carroll and Jarvis 2013; Jomo 2001). Embracing market principles to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation, the state has experienced a decentring of its role and replacement by a reliance on subnational government and participation by entities, markets, or even families and individuals. As a reflection of Asia's contemporary economic dynamism being increasingly driven by global market forces, many Asian states have assumed the responsibility of creating an institutional and operational environment to support market-based activities; this condition is characterized by the retreat of the state from direct service provision towards the privatization and corporatization of service delivery as well as the increasing use of regulations and regulatory systems of governance to subject economic and social space to market forces (Cammack 2012; Wong and Flynn 2001; Mok et al. 2010). Carroll and Jarvis (2015) correctly stated that the Asian states joining the wave of neoliberal policy reforms have inevitably circumscribed the role of the state in favour of the markets, which results in "deepening of *financialisation* and *marketisation*, or more fundamentally as *attempts* to construct market societies modelled on liberal capitalism" (page 2; see also Carroll and Jarvis 2014a, b).

In the context of this wide political economy, governments across different parts of the globe have tried to adopt decentralization in governance, delegating the responsibilities of public policy provision and social service delivery to subnational government, to the markets and to entities participating in managing the social and economic needs of citizens at the local level (Jayasuriya 2001; Caroll and Jarvis 2013; Stubbs 2009). HE governance is not immune from the growing influence of diverse interests shared by multiple actors, especially under tremendous pressure to move beyond the ivory tower and to work with different industries, businesses and wider society (Hawkins and Mok 2015). Specifically, the call for entrepreneurial universities has driven institutions to become increasingly proactive in seeking different partners to diversify funding sources and engage in teams with diverse backgrounds and expertise to solve multifaceted problems (Gornitzka and Maassen 2014; Mok 2013). Under this broad social and political background, "collaborative governance" has become increasingly popular, especially when no single institution can formulate integrated policies and comprehensive strategies to manage citizens' heightened expectations for well-coordinated and efficiently delivered public services aimed at addressing rapid social, economic and political changes. Collaboration between the government, business sector and civil society, which is aimed towards co-production

and the coordination of service delivery and public policies to meet changing social needs, has become particularly prominent in public sector management at the international level (Donahue 2004).

In bringing multiple stakeholders together to engage in collaborative governance, the state perceives a reduction of its role as dominant decision-maker; other non-state actors (the market and civil society) advocate significant role-shaping policy agenda and policy implementation, particularly when "collaborative governance" requires the active participation of non-state stakeholders (Ansell and Gash 2007). The growing popularity of "collaborative governance" can be expected to result in a new regulatory state with a silent feature of "governance without the government" in public management (Peters and Pierre 1998; Rhodes 1996). The present chapter sets out to examine how university governance has changed in mainland China in this wide policy background, especially when the central government has tried to encourage non-state actors (including the market) to engage in the provision of higher learning. At the same time, the state proactively helps universities to become globally competitive by engaging in university governance through strategic investment in selected universities. With consideration of the rise of non-state sector involvement in HE provision and the resulting competition to drive universities to perform, the present chapter mainly focuses on the development of the university governance model in China.

From State Control to State-Governed Market Approach in University Governance

During the Mao era (1949–78), the Chinese government utilized education as a political tool to ensure its citizens' loyalty to the ruling regime. HEIs had no autonomy over the administration, syllabi, curricula, textbooks, enrolment or allocation of school/university professorships (Hao 1998; Ngok 2007). Instead, the central government formulated educational policies, distributed educational resources, exerted administrative control, recruited teaching staff and decided on the curricula and textbooks to be used (Ngok 2007; Yang et al. 2007). In sum, the state "monopolized the provision, financing and governance of education" (Ngok 2007: 143). The Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China stated in the 1960s:

> The establishment, change, and cancellation of programs in all these universities must be approved by the MOE … University teaching should be according to the syllabi designed or approved by the Ministry … No programs, syllabi, and textbooks should be changed easily. Any substantial changes must be approved by the Ministry. (Hu 2003: 4)

According to Neave and van Vught (1994), the HE system in China had long been regarded as an example of the state-controlled model because of the strictly centralized control. The rigid regulations and inflexibility in university governance inevitably resulted in insufficient and low-quality tertiary education, which hindered sustainable economic growth, especially when we compare the HE enrolment rate of

1.7% in China with the global average of 12.3% in 1980 (UNESCO 1985). Warned by the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and the importance of HE to economic development and social progress (Ngok 2007), the Chinese government thereafter adopted a series of policies to loosen its rigid control over HE and to protect "the initiatives and enthusiasm of educational institutions" (Mok and Chan 2012: 114; see also Hawkins 2006). The 1980s appear as "a turning point in government-university relationships in China" (Yang et al. 2007: 579). As Minister of Education Zhu Kaixuan stated in the 1990s, "Education is no longer dissociated from the economy … Education is closely linked with the economy, and has become an organic component and key content of the plans for economic and social development" (Rosen 1997: 259). The *Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party of China on the Reform of the Educational System* of 1985 ("the 1985 Decision" hereafter) and the *Education Law of the People's Republic of China* of 1995 were promulgated to emphasize the pivotal role of HE in the process of Chinese modernization. As Zhong (2011) has argued, the central government's evaluation of education changed from "an instrument merely to serve proletarian politics" to "a wider conception" (118).

Although the 1985 Decision introduced the concept of decentralization and the devolution of power to lower levels (Ngok 2007), it also enabled the central government to continue supervising the education sector and provide basic guidelines for future development. The Chinese HE system was indeed not entirely released from strict central control until the promulgation of the *Programme for China's Educational Reform and Development* promulgated by the State Council in 1993 ("the 1993 Programme" hereafter). Containing six parts and 50 articles, the 1993 Programme is intended to "actively encourage and fully support social institutions and citizens to establish schools according to law and to provide correct guidelines and strengthen administration" (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) 1993). Therefore, "democratic parties, social organizations, retired cadres and intellectuals, collective economic organizations, and individuals subject to the Party's and governmental policies" were encouraged to "actively and voluntarily" contribute to "developing education by various forms and methods" (Mok and Wat 1998: 258; see also Wei and Zhang 1995). *Minban* colleges, second-tier colleges and transnational cooperation have become increasingly popular since the establishment of the 1993 Programme.

To create numerous opportunities to meet the pressing demand for HE, the Chinese government has allowed the non-state sector to take up the provider role in offering higher learning opportunities. Figure 5.1 clearly indicates a steady increase in the number of students enrolled in *minban* colleges run by the non-state sector. At the same time, overseas HEIs have been encouraged to either establish offshore campuses in collaboration with local educational institutions or to offer transnational programmes to meet the diverse learning needs of young Chinese people. Figure 5.2 shows the steady increase in the number of students studying overseas. The diversification of China's HE provision has indeed transformed the traditionally elite HE system into a mass system within a relatively short period. The following section discusses how Chinese HE has expanded in the last two decades and prompted the

**Fig. 5.1** Rise of *minban* colleges in China. *Sources* National Bureau of Statistics of China (2002–2015) and MOE (2002–2015)


Fig. 5.2 Number of Chinese students studying and returning from abroad (1978–2015). *Source* China Statistical Yearbook (1997–2015), National Bureau of Statistics

government to adopt different reform measures to improve the quality and consequently assert its global leadership in HE.

Diversified Educational Opportunities and Massification of the Higher Education System

Although mainland China is a latecomer to HE development, the Chinese government has worked hard to increase HE opportunities since the late 1990s. In 1998, the MOE stated in *The Action Plan to Revitalize Education in the Twenty-First Century* (Ministry of Education (MOE) of China 1998) that the government aimed to achieve a gross enrolment rate of 15% by 2010. This goal was later adjusted to reach 15% by 2005.[1] Starting in 1999, China recorded an unprecedented growth in both HE enrolment and gross enrolment rates. Enrolment increased from 1.08 million in 1998 to 1.6 million in 1999. In 2014, the number had reached 7.2 million, eight times the level of 1994 (0.9 million). In addition to the rapid growth in system capacity, the HE enrolment rate, which is measured as HE enrolment relative to the number of students enrolled in primary education in the corresponding year,[2] increased dramatically. The enrolment rate was 5% in 1998 and leaped to 8% in 1999. By 2014, it had surged to 37%, indicating a 12-fold of HE opportunities in the last 20 years (the enrolment rate was 3% in 1994) (Fig. 5.3).

Strategies to Enhance Quality Amid the Massification of Higher Education

The quality of HE is important for its sustainable development as well as for national competitiveness in the globalizing world. In the context of the intensifying competition among world-class universities and the pressing needs of the knowledge economy, East Asian governments have attempted to groom their elite universities to become globally competitive (Mok 2005; Mok and Yu 2011). In the era of massification, the Chinese government has adopted a variety of strategies to develop HE with "a change from quantity-to-quality orientation", that is, changing the focus from quantity flow of enrolment to an emphasis on the quality of service provided in HE (Li, Whalley, Zhang, and Zhao 2011). In this context, the Chinese government has underscored the quality of HE in the guidelines of the country's development since 1996 (Ninth Five-Year (1996–2000) Plan,[3] Item 20). Moreover, the Eleventh Five-Year (2006–2010) Plan stated that the development of HE should emphasize

---

[1]Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China, retrieved 12 September 2016 http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzggz/fzgh/ghwb/gjjh/200709/P020070912638588995806.pdf (in Chinese).

[2]The annual statistics on the size of age cohorts are not publicly available. The number of students enrolled in primary schools is used as a proxy, as China implemented compulsory education in 1986.

[3]Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China, retrieved 12 September 2016 http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzggz/fzgh/ghwb/gjjh/200709/P020070912638573307712.pdf (in Chinese).

Fig. 5.3 National HE enrolment and enrolment rate, 1982–2014. *Source* Educational Statistics Yearbook of China, 1982–2014. *Note* HE enrolment is measured as the number of students enrolled in regular HEIs in mainland China. The HE enrolment rate is measured as HE enrolment relative to the cohort size of the same age and transformed into a percentage. Primary education enrolment is used as the proxy for the corresponding cohort size because no direct measure of cohort size is available

improving quality and optimizing structure (Sect. 3 of Chap. 28).[4] The quality of HEIs is largely tied to the research capacity of their scholars. The talent requirements in China are thus extremely urgent. In the context of brain drain, the quest for global talent has become notable in China. Welch and Zhang (2008) have suggested that Asian countries have all suffered significantly from the effects of brain drain. Numerous scholars from China have travelled abroad to study in the past several decades but less than 30% have returned (Welch and Cai 2011). The following discussion examines the major measures adopted by the Chinese government to groom leading universities and recruit/attract overseas talent to work in the country. Special attention is given to how the Chinese government has engaged in the "war for talent" through the implementation of the "Chang Jiang Scholar Scheme", a programme designed to recruit and attract leading scholars and researchers from overseas. The last part of the chapter reflects the changing university governance model.

(1) *Asserting World-Class University Status for Global Leadership*

The term "world-class university" is not new, but it has only recently become popular among governments and universities worldwide, and the ideology is now "embedded

---

[4]Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China, retrieved 12 September 2016 http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_268766. htm (in Chinese).

in the HE policies and strategies of a range of nations" (Deem et al. 2008: 84). The realization of a "world-class university", a term defined by scholars as being interchangeable with "global research university" or "first-class university" (Li 2012: 320), is the desire of every researcher, HEI and government (Yonezawa 2003). The transformation from an agricultural to an industrial economy, and now to a knowledge economy, has spawned the "transition to more knowledge-based economies, coupled with growing competition from non-OECD countries", and necessitates the capability to explore and disseminate "scientific and technological knowledge, as well as other intellectual assets, as a means of enhancing growth and productivity" (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2004: 11). As a foundation of national competitiveness in economic, social and political arenas, HE is ranked a top priority in the public policy agenda setting (Hazelkorn 2009). Changes in demography and the concomitant decline in the student population have inevitably led to the "scramble for students" (Matsumoto and Ono 2008: 1) or "battle for brainpower" (Wooldridge 2006: 2), attracting attention (or over-attention) to the "rising significance and popularity of rankings which attempt to measure the knowledge-producing and talent-catching capacity of higher education institutions" (Hazelkorn 2009: 3).

The quest for world-class university status has become an unprecedented trend across the globe, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, where scholars have yet to reach a consensus on the definition of "world-class university" or develop strategies and measures appropriate for obtaining the status (Altbach 2004). Niland (2000) proposes nine aspects essential to pursuing or sustaining world leader status for HEIs: high-quality faculty, excellent research reputation, talented undergraduates, international recognition, diversified resources, extensive networks, comprehensive disciplines, technical advancement and efficient/effective administration. Altbach (2004) narrows this down to four major domains: research excellence, academic freedom and an intellectually stimulating environment, internal self-governance system and adequate investments. According to Salmi (2009), a world-class university should be distinguished by its superior output: qualified graduates catering to the needs of the labour market, advanced research publishable by top scientific journals and effective knowledge transfer feeding into technical innovation and industrial progress. Similarly, Douglass (2016) evaluated world-class status on the basis of influential research outcomes, an intrinsic culture of excellence, up-to-date facilities and an internationally renowned brand name, and attention to local engagement. He proposed the notion of the "flagship university" to replace "world-class university", arguing that universities should develop their own strengths in line with their unique visions and missions, and emphasized the importance of role differentiation and being "fit for purpose" when assessing a university's performance.

In the context outlined above, a number of national governments have indeed adopted rankings to "direct or inform initiatives" or as "a quasi-funding mechanism" (Hazelkorn 2009: 19). With the perception of global rankings as a zero-sum competition, a growing trend has emerged in the Asia-Pacific region: strong government intervention in university governance through focused efforts to groom a few selected universities to assert their "world-class status" despite the absence of an

Table 5.1 Different funding schemes of selected countries and regions in East Asia for world-class university status

Country/region	Funding scheme
Mainland China	• Project 985 • Project 211 • "Double World Class" Project
Hong Kong	• Comprehensive Education Reviews • Role Differentiation Exercise • Positioning Hong Kong as an International Key Player in HE • University Merging and Deep Collaboration • Research Assessment Exercises • Teaching and Learning Quality Process Reviews • Management Reviews and University Governance Review
Taiwan	• Programme for Promoting the Academic Excellence of Universities • Five-Year – 50 Billion Excellence Initiative • Development Plan for World-class Universities and Research Centres for Excellence

Japan	• Flagship University Project
	• "Global 30" Scheme
	• Competitive Funding Allocation Method
	  – Twenty-First-Century Centres of Excellence
	  – Global Centres of Excellence
	  – World Premier International Research Centre Initiative

South Korea	• Brain Korea 21 • World-Class University Initiative • Brain Korea 21 Plus Project
Singapore	• "World-Class Universities" Programme

Source Cheng et al. (2014), Mok (2005)

official definition of "world-class university" (Mok and Hallinger 2013; Mok 2016). Table 5.1 presents different schemes adopted to make selected universities competitive in various international ranking exercises. China, like other Asian countries, has made serious efforts to seek "world-class university" status.

Realizing the urgent need to groom a few universities to compete for global rankings, the Chinese government has never shied away from adopting differential treatment policies, concentrating funding support for a few top public universities through different incentive schemes in order to obtain excellence. Projects 211 and 985 could be taken as the most significant attempts to secure world-class positions. In 1983, Kuang Yaming, the president emeritus of Nanjing University, and a number of other distinguished scholars and administrators proposed to build several first-class universities with concentrated national funding.[5] The responses to these requests and after series considerations, Projects 211 and 985, were introduced and implemented

---

[5]For more details, refer to *Xinhua Net*: "Six Decades: The National Strategies for World-class University Initiative" (in Chinese). Retrieved on 1 February 2016, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2009-09-28/content_12121612_1.htm.

in 1993 and 1998, respectively, providing funding support to selected universities (Li et al. 2011).

Projects 211 and 985 aimed to enhance teaching, research and management capacities. Project 211 received 36.83 billion RMB over the period 1995–2005, while the investment in Project 985 reached 90.476 billion RMB (55.4 billion from the central government and 35.076 billion from local authorities) over the period 1998–2012 (Ying 2011; see also Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2012). The trend of stratification is shown by selected universities hosting of over 50% of doctoral candidates, national key disciplines and state key laboratories, although only 39 universities were selected for inclusion in these projects, which represents less than 3% of almost 2000 full-time state universities in China. The Chinese state adopted a new strategic plan, "Double World Class Project" (*shuang yiliu*), to develop world-class universities and disciplines. The project, initiated in 2015 (State Council 2015), stated that the government was targeting the development of a certain number of leading universities and disciplines such that they would be recognized as world-class and included in the international top tier by 2020. In the second phase of the plan, the number of world-class and top-tier universities and disciplines should increase further, and overall HE quality in China should improve significantly by 2030. Moreover, China's world-class universities and disciplines are intended to be international front-runners in terms of both quantity and quality, and China hopes to be recognized as having a strong HE system by the mid-twenty-first century. Central to these new initiatives for facilitating selected universities' quest for excellence is the further concentration of funding support to highly selective groups of universities or disciplines. The development of such universities or disciplines widens the gap between the "haves" and the "have nots".

The performance of Chinese universities is measured through Salmi's criteria; the number of Chinese universities in the Top 300 has increased from two in 2003 (Shanghai Jiaotong University 2003) to 17 in 2016 (Shanghai Jiaotong University 2016).[6] Table 5.2 indicates that a few public universities in China have steadily climbed up the ladder in different university leagues produced by the QS, *The Times Higher Education Supplement* and the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) by Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

(2) *Competing for Global Talent: Chang Jiang Scholars Programme*

The Chinese state strongly believes in addressing the "brain drain" problem through HE development and has been working hard to strengthen strategic planning for talent development. Attracting global talent to HEIs in mainland China is a crucial strategic plan. The Chang Jiang Scholars Programme (*changjiang xuezhe jiangli*

---

[6]We recognized other widely cited league tables, such as the *Times Higher Education* and Quacquerelli Symonds World University Rankings. However, the rising trend of Chinese universities cannot be fully demonstrated in the past few decades given that the open-access information is limited (the *Times Higher Education* ranking is only available for 2011–2016 and QS ranking for 2016).

Table 5.2 Top mainland universities (global rankings)

University	QS		Times		ARWU	
	2012	2016	2011/12	2016/17	2012	2016
Tsinghua	48	24	71	35	151–200	58
Peking	44	39	49	29	151–200	71
UST China	186	104	192	153	201–300	101–50
Fudan	90	43	226–50	155	201–300	101–50
Jiao Tong	125	61	301–50	201–50	151–200	101–50
Zhejiang	170	104	301–50	201–50	151–200	101–50

Source QS World University Rankings were retrieved from http://www.topuniversities.com/qs-world-university-rankings; *The Times* Higher Education World University Rankings (2010–2015), were retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2017/world-ranking; the ARWU data were retrieved from http://www.shanghairanking.com/

jihua)[7] for the recruitment of global eminent scholars is a large and influential national programme that attracts outstanding scholars from around the world. Moreover, it can be regarded as a typical case of the "state-governed market approach" in that the government allowed the non-state sector to engage in the national talent programme while maintaining strong governance.

The programme was established by the MOE and the Li Ka-shing Foundation (LKSF) in 1998 under the coordination of Chen Zhili, the State Councillor and the Education Minister. It aims to attract high-achieving academic scholars to mainland China in order to enhance the development of Chinese universities. The programme allows universities in mainland China to provide preferential measures by offering appointments to international recruits as Chang Jiang Chair Professors or Chang Jiang Distinguished Professors. The programme also awards the Chang Jiang Achievement Award.[8]

Partial Market Approach When Managing Competition

The Chang Jiang Scholars Programme is a national one that attracts international intellectuals to mainland China but involves a market approach in terms of engaging market forces and introducing competition among universities and applicants. The programme is also known as "Cheung Kong" in Cantonese, which shares its name with Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited. The Hong Kong entrepreneur Li Ka-shing is the founder of this company and the LKSF. The LKSF is a Hong Kong-based charitable organization founded in 1980 that provides considerable financial support for the programme: initial funding of HKD60 million (approximately US$7.7 million) was received from the LKSF for the appointments of Chang Jiang Scholar Chair

---

[7]The programme is also known as the Cheung Kong Scholars Programme and the Yangtze River Scholars Programme.

[8]For details, see http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/channel/5.

Professors or Distinguished Professors, and HKD10 million (approximately US$1.3 million) for the Chang Jiang Achievement Award.[9]

The LKSF's press release about the tenth anniversary of the programme[10] mentioned that total investment in the programme over the first ten years amounted to approximately RMB454 million (approximately US$66 million), of which RMB124 million (approximately US$18 million) was provided by Mr Li, and RMB330 million (approximately US$48 million) by the MOE. Therefore, the prestigious national scholar programmes involve large sums of money and engage the LKSF (the market force) to contribute approximately 27%. The contribution of the LKSF was recognized by the government. The foundation was invited to join ceremonies alongside senior government officials. For example, Mr Li was invited to give a speech at the first appointment ceremony of Chang Jiang Scholars in 1999, which was also attended by Vice Premier Li Lanqing and Education Minister Chen Zhili. On the tenth anniversary of the programme, State Councillor Liu Yangdong thanked Mr Li for his continued support and recognized Cheung Kong Scholars as an education "super brand". Moreover, these events were held at Beijing's Great Hall of the People, which is usually reserved for legislative and ceremonial activities by the central government and the ruling Communist Party. The participation of senior government officials and the venue of the ceremonies indicate importance the government placed on the programme and the contribution of the LKSF.

In addition to the introduction of market forces in its funding, the Chang Jiang Scholar Scheme encourages competition among universities and applicants. The latest version of the implementation policy (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2011: Items 13–15) indicated that universities should establish Chang Jiang Scholar posts and open applications to global recruitment. Applicants can apply for the posts through self-nomination or nomination by experts, embassies or consulates abroad. Universities that adopt the programme are responsible for convening an academic committee to evaluate applicants and recommend qualified candidate(s) to the MOE. Since 2005, hosting universities have expanded beyond mainland China to Hong Kong and Macau, and the disciplines involved have been expanded to the humanities and social sciences.[11]

Strong Government Role in Governance

Although the programme involves a partial market approach, it remains under strong state governance. The policy for implementing the programme was issued by the MOE and specifies the recruitment criteria and responsibilities of Chang Jiang Scholars. Moreover, the MOE chooses Chang Jiang Scholars from among the candidates.

---

[9]For more details, see the official website of Chinese talent programme: http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/channel/5 and the website of LKSF http://www.lksf.org/20081205-2/.

[10]See "Mainland's HE reform, academic leaders nurtured as 'Cheung Kong Scholars Programme' Celebrates 10th Anniversary", http://www.lksf.org/20081205-2/.

[11]The Ninth Press Conference of the MOE in 2005, the introduction of the Chang Jiang Scholar Achievement Award. http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_2233/200506/10019.html (in Chinese).

The MOE organizes an expert committee to peer review the candidate(s) after an initial review of applicants recommended by universities. The list of selected Chang Jiang Scholar candidates is publicized. The MOE has the discretionary power to handle disputes regarding candidates. The appointment with the scholars is also issued by the MOE (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2011: Items 16–19). A representative from the LKSF stated in a press conference with the MOE that the planning and implementation of the programme (together with the Chang Jiang Scholar Achievement Award) were mainly conducted by the MOE and the Chinese Academy of Science.[12]

In 2011, a new Chang Jiang Scholars Programme was launched by the MOE in line with the implementation of the National Long-term Development Plan (2010–20) and the National Long-term Talent Development Plan (2010–20). The programme is considered an important part of the national key talent project and supports national development of first-rate intellectuals (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2011: Items 1–2). These statements in the new implementation policy indicate that the programme has been fully integrated into the state's national development plan and imply improved governance from the state.

The new policy specified that the new programme has dedicated funding from the central government (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2011: Item 8). The MOE reviews the performance of the appointed scholars and allocates funding annually (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2011: Item 27). The "visible hand" of the MOE can also be observed in the measures adopted to promote the programme in universities in western China. In 2011, the MOE stated that it would provide preferential policies to support universities in western China in order to attract academicians to them (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2011: Item 23). Moreover, the MOE specifically stated that universities in eastern China are not allowed to recruit Chang Jiang Scholars appointed by universities in western areas (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2014: Item 4).

Discussion

Reflections on Reform Strategies: Achievements and Challenges

More than eighteen years have passed since the Chang Jiang Scholar Programme was initiated in 1998. The programme has made great achievements and gained global acclaim. It has utilized funding from the non-government sector and encouraged competition among universities and applicants, and the state has maintained strong governance over it. This strong governance market approach has attracted numerous world-renowned scholars to Chinese universities and enhanced their competitiveness in both teaching and research. As of September 2016, 3032 scholars have been

---

[12]See the previous footnote for the source.

|	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2011	2012	2013 -14	2015
Young scholar															211
Chair professor	6	10	10	7	10	78	88	99	95	109	99	47	32	91	49
Distinguished professor	65	111	97	131	84	108	101	103	107	135	153	194	163	287	152
Total	71	121	107	138	94	186	189	202	202	244	252	241	195	378	412

Fig. 5.4 Number of Chang Jiang Scholars, 1999–2015. *Source* MOE. *Note* The numbers are collected and summarized based on information extracted from the MOE since the first appointment in 1999. The statistics for 2010 and separated statistics for 2013 and 2014 are not publicly available

appointed Chang Jiang Scholars, of whom 1991 are distinguished professors, 830 are chair professors and 211 are young scholars.[13] Figure 5.4 presents the numbers of scholars appointed in the period 1999–2015.[14] The Chang Jiang Young Scholars is a new scheme which has been running since 2015. More young scholar appointments were awarded (211) that year than chair professors (forty-nine) and distinguished professors (152) combined.

The MOE's report on the achievements of the programme (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2014) and the LKSF's press release[15] indicate that the Chang Jiang scholars have contributed significantly to the research and teaching in their host universities. Several scholars have become chief scientists and headed national projects funded by the National Natural Science Foundation, the National Social Science Foundation, and National Science and Technology Research Projects. Others have become chief directors of key national laboratories and national engineering (technology) research centres. Several scholars have been granted *National Natural Science Awards*, *National Innovation Awards, National Technology Progress Awards*, *Higher Education Humanities and Social Sciences Achievement Awards*. Many scholars have been granted prestigious international awards and held important positions in international academic organizations, leadership positions in universities or have been editors of international key academic journals (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2014). They have also played an important role in cultivating students and young scholars

---

[13]All the statistics for the Chang Jiang Scholars programme (unless otherwise stated) are calculated by the author based on the information extracted from the MOE.

[14]The programme started in 1998 and awarded the first batch of scholars in 1999. The number of scholars in 2013–2014 was a lump sum of the scholars for 2013 and 2014.

[15]See http://www.lksf.org/20081205-2/.

by teaching core curricula and developing interdisciplinary and emerging disciplines (Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China 2014).

However, the programme has produced unequal development across regions, provinces and disciplines (Jiang forthcoming). As of 2016, 65% of the scholars have been appointed to posts in the east (1981 out of 3032 scholars), and less than 15% in the west (421 scholars). Beijing (832 scholars), Shanghai (399 scholars) and Jiangsu Province (266 scholars) in the east each have more than 250 scholars, whereas Hainan and Ningxia Provinces in the west only have one scholar each (Jiang forthcoming). The funding allocation is also unequal across disciplines. The programme expanded the initial coverage of natural sciences and engineering to the humanities and social sciences in 2004, but more than 80% of the scholars who have been appointed are in the fields of natural science and engineering. The Chinese government's strategic provision of funding to groom a few universities to rank highly in global league tables has also intensified the inequality among universities, thereby stratifying universities and the treatment of students throughout the country (Mok and Jiang 2017; Mok and Han 2017).

Governance with Strong Government Presence in Managing Universities

The above discussion demonstrates how the Chinese government has attempted to engage non-state actors by involving both local and overseas providers in creating HE opportunities. The government implemented the above schemes to achieve its strategic goal of development while selectively identifying a few universities for competition at the global level to emphasize China's world-class status. Mok et al. critically examined the different types of HEI, particularly *minban* colleges and transnational HE working in collaboration with overseas institutions, and argued that the HE development in mainland China has gone through marketization, privatization and transnationalization processes (see Mok and Wang 2014; Mok and Chan 2012; Mok and Han 2017). Nonetheless, the emerging education market in China should not be understood as a free marketplace similar to its counterparts in the UK and the USA because the Chinese government has never committed to the free education market philosophy. The rise of the education market through the involvement of more non-state actors (including both local and overseas players) in offering learning opportunities for Chinese citizens should be interpreted as the policy tool Such measures are carefully and tactically employed by the government to increase HE enrolment, diversify learning experiences and meet the changing needs of the market rather than representing the government's commitment to opening the education sector freely to the market. The Chang Jiang Scholars Programme was initiated by the Chinese government to attract eminent scholars and overseas talents, and thus enhance the global competitiveness and status of its universities. A "partial market approach" was adopted and the non-government sector introduced to provide funding and to encourage competition among universities and applicants. In the first ten years of the programme, the LKSF provided approximately US$18 million funding support, a significant contribution. The market approach is "partial" because the government's influence can be observed in the programme's implementation. The government launched a New Chang Jiang Scholars Programme in 2011,

incorporating it into the national strategic plan to develop high-end intellectuals. The funding came entirely from the government, and competition among universities and applicants was encouraged.

Mok conceptualized the rise of non-state actors and the market in education provision in China. He argued that the education market was deliberately created by the state as a tool to fulfil its national development goals by allowing non-state actors or sectors to engage in HE provision (Mok 2005). Mok labelled the Chinese "marketization of education" a form of "institutional transition", which implies "a transition from highly centralized economic planning system to market economy" (Mok 2000: 122) rather than a total withdrawal of state control (Mok 1999). Thus, the emerging education market is a "state-governed market approach" adopted by the ruling regime. The above empirical analysis shows the strong government role in university governance through tactical use of market forces as a policy tool to steer reforms in HE. Other countries have reinvented the management of the public sector by making the market and civil society highly prominent in public policy provision and service delivery through "collaborative governance", whence "governance without the government" emerges in public sector management. However, the Chinese approach to public sector management (including university governance) is state-governed, and non-state stakeholders are only policy tools that perform a supplementary role under strong state control, instead of being active participants in deciding and co-producing policy objectives and outcomes, as in western education sectors (Ansell and Gash 2007; Pierre 2000). The above discussion suggests that the Chinese government maintains a decisive position in directing the development of HE even though the HE sector has gained diversified providers. Despite the introduction of competition to drive universities' performance, public universities in China, especially the select top universities, continue to enjoy "preferential treatment" with special allocations from the government for strategic development. Other universities that do not enjoy such treatment are disadvantaged when competing with top public universities under the funding schemes known as Projects 211 and 985. The university governance model that most public universities in China have experienced is a "state-governed market" model steered by central government, which differs from the "market" or "corporate governance" and the "collaborative governance" of the UK system, and the shared governance model that US universities have adopted.

We conceptualize the Chinese approach to university governance with reference to different models, such as bureaucratic governance, as seen in Russia; corporate governance in Hong Kong, Australia, and the UK; and shared governance in the US. We argue that the university governance model of China can be considered "governance with strong government presence" despite the education market's emergence. The Chinese government takes a prominent role in university governance, orchestrating the quest for world-class university status by grooming a few select universities and attracting/recruiting global talent to achieve high global ranking. Such university governance differs from the models in the UK, Europe and the US, where HE has encountered increasing market influence, leading to "corporate governance", "shared governance" and even "collaborative governance". Instead of moving towards "governing through governance" (Bache 2003: 301) or "meta-governance", where the

state becomes a contractor, performance monitor, bench maker and target-setter engaged in the management of "the complexity, plurality and tangled hierarchies found in prevailing modes of coordination" (Jessop 2004: 70), the discussion of the changes in university governance in China suggests "governance with strong state presence" in public sector management through "bureaucratic governance" in practice. China's developmental state may be devolved because of the growing influences of neoliberalism. However, the "hollowing out" of the nation-state in the globalization context has yet to be proven, especially when many nation states, such as China, have successfully transformed themselves into adaptive states capable of handling rapid socio-economic and significant political changes (Mok 2017).

Conclusion

The university governance model shows how "centralized decentralization" operates in China. The Chinese government has encouraged more non-state actors to participate in HE provision. However, the central government continues to influence HE development through its central coordinating and monitoring role via the MOE. Several HE therefore experts conceptualize the university governance model in China as "bureaucratic governance" with strong state control, and the emerging education market does not operate under free market principles and mechanisms because it is only a "state-governed market" that serves national development goals rather than adopting "corporate governance", as is seen in Hong Kong, the UK, Australia and several European countries. The above case analysis shows the influence of the state in university governance and demonstrates "strong government presence" in Chinese university governance. Allocations of special funding to select universities and special measures adopted to attract global talent strongly indicate the "bureaucratic governance" model adopted by the Chinese government in order to assert global leadership in HE.

The "bureaucratic governance model" employed in university governance has inevitably had negative consequences, especially the intensified inequality in educational development. Li (2012) has argued that while most economies in East Asia move to mass HE systems before pursuing world-class status, China embarked on the two tasks simultaneously in the late 1990s (see also Mohrman and Wang 2010). The unintended consequences of rapid HE expansion should not be ignored. Marginson (2016: 1) stated that "the quality of mass higher education is often problematic", as can be seen in the aggravation of education inequality and the lowering of quality in Chinese HEIs (Wu and Zheng 2008; Zheng 2006). The central Chinese government has conducted various projects that combine top-down and bottom-up policy development processes since its decision to expand the HE system by implementing "centralized decentralization" in university governance.

References

Altbach, P. G. (2004). The costs and benefits of world class universities. *Academe, 90*(1), 20. Retrieved from http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/2004/04jf/04jfaltb.htm.

Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18*(4), 543–571.

Bache, I. (2003). Governing through governance: Education policy control under New Labour. *Political Studies, 51*(2), 300–314.

Cammack, P. (2012). Risk, social protection and the world market. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 42*(3), 359–377.

Carroll, T. (2012). Working on, through and around the state: The deep marketisation of development in the Asia-Pacific. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 42*(3), 378–404.

Carroll, T., & Jarvis, D. S. (2013). Market building in Asia: Standards setting, policy diffusion, and the globalization of market norms. *Journal of Asian Public Policy, 6*(2), 117–128.

Carroll, T., & Jarvis, D. S. (2014a). Introduction: Financialisation and development in Asia under late capitalism. *Asian Studies Review, 38*(4), 533–543.

Carroll, T., & Jarvis, D. S. (2014b). Theorising Asia's marketisation under late capitalism: Risk, capital and the new politics of development. In T. Carroll & D. Jarvis (Eds.), *The politics of marketising Asia* (pp. 1–23). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carroll, T., & Jarvis, D. S. (2015). The new politics of development: Citizens, civil society, and the evolution of neoliberal development policy. *Globalizations, 12*(3), 281–304.

Cheng, Y., Wang, Q., & Liu, N. C. (Eds.). (2014). *How world-class universities affect global higher education: Influences and implications*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC). (1993). *The programme for reform and development of China's education*. Retrieved from http://www.edu.cn/zong_he_870/20100719/t20100719_497964.shtml.

Deem, R., Mok, K. H., & Lucas, L. (2008). Transforming higher education in whose image? Exploring the concept of the "world-class" university in Europe and Asia. *Higher Education Policy, 21*(1), 83–97.

Donahue, J. (2004). *On collaborative governance*. Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Douglass, J. (Ed.). (2016). *The new flagship university: Changing the paradigm from global ranking to national relevance*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gornitzka, Å., & Maassen, P. (2014). Dynamics of convergence and divergence: Exploring accounts of higher education policy change. In P. Mattei (Ed.), *University adaptation in difficult economic times* (pp. 13–29). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hao, K. (Ed.). (1998). *Twenty years of educational reform in China (in Chinese)*. Zhengzhou: Zhengzhou Press.

Hawkins, J. N. (2006). Walking on three legs: Centralization, decentralization, and recentralization in Chinese education. In C. Bjork (Ed.), *Educational decentralization: Asian experiences and conceptual contribution* (pp. 27–41). Dordrecht: Springer, Netherlands.

Hawkins, J., & Mok, K. H. (Eds.). (2015). *Research, development, and innovation in Asia Pacific higher education*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hayashi, S. (2010). The developmental state in the era of globalization: Beyond the Northeast Asian Model of political economy. *The Pacific Review, 23*(1), 45–69.

Hazelkorn, E. (2009). Rankings and the battle for world-class excellence. *Higher Education Management and Policy, 21*(1), 1–22.

Hu, J. H. (2003). Shifting from state control to state supervision (in Chinese). *Fudan Education Forum, 1*(6), 3–5.

Jayasuriya, K. (2001). Globalization and the changing architecture of the state: The regulatory state and the politics of negative co-ordination. *Journal of European Public Policy, 8*(1), 101–123.

Jessop, B. (2004). Multi-level governance and multi-level metagovernance. In I. Bache & M. Flinders (Eds.), *Multi-level governance* (pp. 49–74). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jiang, J. (forthcoming). Inequality of the competition for talent amid massification of higher education: Analysis of China's Chang Jiang Scholars Programme. In A. M. Wu, & J. Hawkins (Eds.), *Massification of higher education in Asia: Consequences, policy responses and changing governance*. Singapore: Springer.

Jomo, K. S. (2001). Rethinking the role of government policy in Southeast Asia. In J. E. Stiglitz & S. Yusuf (Eds.), *Rethinking the East Asian miracle* (pp. 461–508). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Li, J. (2012). World-class higher education and the emerging Chinese model of the university. *Prospects, 42*(3), 319–339.

Li, Y. A., Whalley, J., Zhang, S., & Zhao, X. (2011). The higher educational transformation of China and its global implications. *The World Economy, 34*(4), 516–545.

Marginson, S. (2016). The worldwide trend to high participation higher education: Dynamics of social stratification in inclusive systems. *Higher Education, 72*(4), 413–434.

Mok, K. H., & Wat, K. Y. (1998). Merging of the public and private boundary: Education and the market place in China. *International Journal of Educational Development, 18*(3), 255–267.

Matsumoto, A., & Ono, K. (2008). *The scramble for foreign students*. Retrieved from http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20080531TDY01301.htm.

Ministry of Education (MOE) of China. (1998). *The action plan to vitalize education in the 21st century* (in Chinese). Retrieved from http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_177/200407/2487.html.

Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China. (2002–2015). *Educational statistics yearbook of China*. Beijing: People's Education.

Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China. (2011). *The implementation approach of the Chang Jiang Scholars Programme* (in Chinese). Retrieved from http://www.moe.edu.cn/srcsite/A04/s8132/201112/t20111215_169948.html.

Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China. (2012). *Report on the new round of Project "985" Contract* (in Chinese). Retrieved from http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s7045/201212/146215.html.

Ministry of Education (MOE) of the People's Republic of China. (2014). *Achievements of the Chang Jiang Scholars Programme* (in Chinese). Retrieved from http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s8133/201406/169992.html.

Mohrman, K., & Wang, Y. (2010). China's drive for world-class universities. In V. D. Rust, L. M. Portnoi, & S. S. Bagley (Eds.), *Higher education, policy, and the global competition phenomenon* (pp. 161–176). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mok, K. H. (1999). Education and the market place in Hong Kong and Mainland China. *Higher Education, 37*(2), 133158.

Mok, K. H. (2000). Marketizing higher education in post-Mao China. *International Journal of Educational Development, 20*(2), 109–126.

Mok, K. H. (2005). Fostering entrepreneurship: Changing role of government and higher education governance in Hong Kong. *Research Policy, 34*(4), 537–554.

Mok, K. H. (2013). *The quest for entrepreneurial universities in East Asia*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mok, K. H. (2016). Massifying and internationalising higher education, changing labour markets and social mobility: Challenges for education and urban governance. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 38*(3), 233–241.

Mok, K. H. (2017). Withering the developmental state for compressed development? Adaptive state entrepreneurship and social policy expansion in China. In T. Carroll & D. Jarvis (Eds.), *Asia after the developmental state: Disembedding autonomy* (pp. 297–325). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mok, K. H., & Chan, D. K. K. (2012). Challenges of transnational higher education in China. In B. Adamson, J. Nixon, & F. Su (Eds.), *The reorientation of higher education: Challenging the east-west dichotomy* (pp. 113–133). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong.

Mok, K. H., & Hallinger, P. (2013). The quest for world class status and university responses in Asia's world cities: An introduction by the guest editors. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 35*(3), 230–237.

Mok, K. H., & Han, X. (2017). Higher education governance and policy in China: Managing decentralization and transnationalism. *Policy & Society*. Retrieved from http://works.bepress.com/mokkh/244/.

Mok, K. H., & Jiang, J. (2017). Massification of higher education: Challenges for admissions and graduate employment in China. In K. H. Mok (Ed.), *Managing international connectivity, diversity of learning and changing labour markets: East Asian perspectives* (pp. 219–243). Singapore: Springer.

Mok, K. H., Walker, R., Wong, Y. C., & Zhang, X. L. (2010). Embracing the market: Examining the consequences for education, housing and health in Chinese cities. In K. H. Mok & Y. W. Ku (Eds.), *Social cohesion in Greater China: Challenges for social policy and governance* (pp. 187–224). London: Imperial College University Press.

Mok, K. H., & Wang, L. (2014). The impacts of neo-liberalism on higher education in China. In A. Turner & H. Yolcu (Eds.), *Neo-liberal educational reforms: A critical analysis* (pp. 139–163). London: Routledge.

Mok, K. H., & Yu, K. M. (2011). The quest for regional education hub status and transnational higher education: Challenges for managing human capital in Asia. *Asia Pacific Journal of Education, 31*(3), 229–248.

National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2002–2015). *China statistical yearbook*. Beijing: China Statistics Press.

Neave, G., & Van Vught, F. (1994). Government and higher education in developing nations: A conceptual framework. In G. Neave & F. Van Vught (Eds.), *Government and higher education relationships across three continents: The winds of change* (pp. 1–21). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Ngok, K. (2007). Chinese education policy in the context of decentralization and marketization: Evolution and implications. *Asia Pacific Education Review, 8*(1), 142–157.

Niland, J. (2000). *The challenge of building world class universities in the Asian region*. Retrieved from http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=997.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2004). *OECD principles of corporate governance*. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.

Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without government? Rethinking public administration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8*(2), 223–243.

Pierre, J. (Ed.). (2000). *Debating governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). The new governance: Governing without government. *Political Studies, 44*(4), 652–667.

Rosen, S. (1997). Education and economic reform. In C. Hudson (Ed.), *The China handbook* (pp. 250–261). Chicago, IL and London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers.

Salmi, J. (2009). *The challenge of establishing world-class universities*. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.

Shanghai Jiao Tong University. (2003). The Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU). Retrieved from http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2003.html.

Shanghai Jiao Tong University. (2016). The Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU). Retrieved from http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2016.html.

State Council. (2015). *Master plan on developing the world-class universities and disciplines*. Retrieved from http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xxgk/moe_1777/moe_1778/201511/t20151105_217823.htm.

Stubbs, R. (2009). What ever happened to the East Asian developmental state? The unfolding debate. *The Pacific Review, 22*(1), 1–22.

Trow, M. (1973). *Problems in the transition from elite to mass higher education*. Berkeley, CA: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

UNESCO. (1985). *Statistical yearbook*. Paris: UNESCO.

Wei, Y. T., & Zhang, G. C. (1995, November). A historical perspective on non-governmental higher education in China. Paper presented at *International Conference on Private Education in Asia and the Pacific Region*. Xiamen, China.

Welch, A., & Cai, H. X. (2011). *China's overseas talent schemes: A review and appraisal*. Paper Presented at the WUN Ideas and Universities Virtual Seminar Series, The University of Sydney, New South Wales.

Welch, A. R., & Zhang, Z. (2008). Higher education and global talent flows: Brain drain, overseas Chinese intellectuals, and diasporic knowledge networks. *Higher Education Policy, 21*(4), 519–537.

Wong, L., & Flynn, N. (Eds.). (2001). *The market in Chinese social policy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Wooldridge, A. (2006, October 4). The battle for brainpower. *The Economist*. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/7961894.

World Bank. (2002). *World development report 2002, building institutions for markets*. Washington, DC: Oxford University Press.

Wu, B., & Zheng, Y. (2008). *Expansion of higher education in China: Challenges and implications*. The University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute, Briefing Series, 36.

Yang, R., Vidovich, L., & Currie, J. (2007). "Dancing in a cage": Changing autonomy in Chinese higher education. *Higher Education, 54*(4), 575592.

Ying, C. (2011). A reflection on the effects of the 985 Project. *Chinese Education & Society, 44*(5), 19–30.

Yonezawa, A. (2003). Making "world-class universities". *Higher Education Management and Policy, 15*(2), 9–23.

Zheng, R. L. (2006, October). *Chinese college entrance examination: Problems and reforms*. Paper Presented at Teachers College, Columbia University.

Zhong, Y. (2011). Aligning capacity with needs in the process of massification of higher education in China: Northeast Normal University as a case. In D. E. Neubauer (Ed.), *Access, equity, and capacity in Asia-Pacific higher education* (pp. 115–125). New York. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jin Jiang is Research Assistant Professor at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. Her research interests include social stratification, the sociology of education and social policy in Chinese societies. Her research on the development of higher education, educational inequality and educational policy has been published in leading academic journals such as *American Sociological Review*, and *Sociology of Education*, and *Journal of Social Policy*, and by academic publishers such as Oxford University Press, Springer and Routledge. Dr. Jiang's current research focuses on how structural and social changes shape educational opportunities and social inequality in Chinese and other Asian societies.

Ka Ho Mok is the Vice-President and concurrently Lam Man Tsan Chair Professor of Comparative Policy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. Before joining Lingnan University, he was the Vice-President (Research and Development) and Chair Professor of Comparative Policy at the Hong Kong Institute of Education (now the Education University of Hong Kong), and Associate Dean and Professor of Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong. Prior to this, Professor Mok was appointed as the Founding Chair Professor in East Asian Studies and established the Centre for East Asian Studies at the University of Bristol, UK. Professor Mok is the founding Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Asian Public Policy* (Routledge), editor of the series *Asian Education and Development Studies* published (Emerald) and editors for series published by Routledge and Springer.

Chapter 6
Governing Private Higher Education in Malaysia: Change and Evolution

Siew Yean Tham

Introduction

The private sector in Malaysia initiated the provision of private higher education in response to the excess demand for higher education in the 1980s. Since then, private supply has expanded rapidly growing from merely a handful of institutions to more than 450 institutions by 2014/15. The government tacitly supported this growth as it provided social stability by increasing access, especially for the non-Bumiputeras[1] who faced reduced access in public universities due to preferential access to these institutions as part of the affirmative actions of the country.

In an effort to regulate what was initially an unregulated industry, the government has instituted various governance measures that seek to improve the governance of the private higher education service providers. This includes among others the legislation of the Private Higher Education Act (PHEIA or Act 555) to regulate the development of private higher education institutions, as well as accreditation requirements for quality assurance. The aspiration to be a regional hub for higher education as envisioned by the former Prime Minister, Mahathir, prompted further improvements in the governance framework for higher education, especially for private higher education in order to improve quality. Yet, despite these changes that contributed to greater regulatory control, private provision in higher education faces increasing challenges. This includes among others graduate unemployment, a mismatch between the demand and supply of human capital, quality of private provision, as well as the financial vulnerabilities for some of these institutions.

---

[1] This refers to the Malays and indigenous population.

S. Y. Tham (✉)
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: tham.siewyean@gmail.com

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Malaysia

This chapter seeks to explore the evolving character in the governance of private higher education in Malaysia. Specifically, it examines key changes in governance and the reasons for these changes. It also discusses the current challenges in the supply of private higher education and the plausible reasons for these challenges. The chapter closes with some policy suggestions for overcome the existing challenges.

Political Context

At the time of independence in 1957, Malaysia inherited a socioeconomic structure that was divided along racial lines. The Malays, for example, were mainly employed in the less productive agricultural sector while the Chinese were concentrated in the more productive sectors such as mining, manufacturing, and construction, giving rise to an income inequality pattern that was divided along racial lines (Ragayah 2014). Therefore, there was a potential for social instability, although the magnitude of income inequality was comparable to other countries at the same stage of development. While inter-racial income inequality is considered to be a contributory factor to the racial riots that occurred in May 1969, there are others who deemed these riots to be politically incited (Kua 2007).

Critically, the racial riots marked a watershed in Malaysia's public policies as national unity became the overriding objective of the government. This led to a fundamental shift in public policies with the New Economic Policy (NEP) promulgated in 1971 as the tool for attaining national unity. The NEP's two-pronged strategy sought to "eradicate poverty among all Malaysians and to restructure Malaysian society so that the identification of race with economic functions and geographical location is reduced and eventually eliminated, both objectives being realized through the rapid expansion of the economy over time" (Malaysia 1976: 7).

Education became a key instrument for correcting the social imbalances as the Bumiputeras are favored with economic privileges and educational opportunities in the five-year development plans of the country (Singh and Mukherjee 1993). In particular, the medium of instruction in schooling and higher education was switched from English to the national language, and Bumiputeras were provided with preferential access to institutions of higher learning through fixed quotas and financial sponsorship. It is these two changes that set the stage for the emergence of private higher education.

Governance: Evolving Changes Over Time

Before 1996: Non-regulation

Entry quotas for non-Bumiputeras, a growing population and expected economic returns from higher education, led to increasing excess demand for higher education despite an increase in the number of public universities from merely one in 1957 to five by 1975. The extent of excess demand is reflected in the decrease in the percentage of places offered in public universities relative to the number of applicants, which fell from 7% in 1970 to 18% in 1986 (Tham 2013a). Students seeking to pursue higher education had only two options left, study abroad or locally. The former was not affordable for many especially in the wake of the economic recession in 1985 and the imposition of full fees on overseas students by the British and Australian governments (Sato 2007).

Many private colleges emerged to respond to this gap in the market for higher education by offering various types of transnational education such as "twinning" programs that are conducted with partner universities in the UK or Australia. These programs, for example, allowed students to study for one or two years in Malaysia before completing their studies abroad, at the partner university. Transnational education flourished as it benefitted the three main stakeholders involved. The students gained in terms of lower costs while gaining a degree awarded by a foreign university (often perceived to be more marketable in terms of jobs opportunities). Moreover, the programs were conducted in English, the preferred language of private sector-led commercial activities in the country. The local partners of these transnational programs benefit as private institutions are not allowed to confer degrees at that time. Foreign partners of the programs are newer degree awarding institutions that emerged after the abolition of the university-polytechnic divide in the in 1992. These newer universities sought to expand their sources of income through innovative programs that are deemed to be less risky than establishing an off-shore campus (Tham 2013a). By 1996, there were reportedly 354 private colleges in Malaysia, far outnumbering the number of public universities (Tham 2014). They provided a cushion against potential social instability by increasing access, especially for the non-Bumiputeras.

However, the sector was not regulated as there was no legislation to regulate private institutions. The government was therefore unable to maintain a strict control over a burgeoning private sector supply comprising diverse types of institutions and programs (Sato 2007). This was problematic as the economic crisis in 1985/86 also prompted the government to consider private supply as an alternative to reduce the loss in foreign exchange from outflows of students. The government also increasingly viewed this sector as a generator of export revenue from inbound international students, besides offsetting the negative consequences from the discriminatory quotas imposed under the NEP.

The Private Higher Education Institutions Act (PHEIA) was therefore enacted in 1996 for the purpose of overcoming the lack of regulations. Significantly, it allowed these institutions to confer degrees for the first time. The Act further implied the

government's recognition of an economically important sector that had grown independently for over a decade based on market forces and entrepreneurial private sector-led activities.

1996: Onset of Regulation and Ministry-Directed Development

The enactment of the PHEIA was accompanied by two other Acts that were also enacted to ensure the orderly development of private higher education (PHE). These were the National Council of Higher Education Act and the National Accreditation Board (LAN) Act. Private colleges have to register with the Ministry of Education based on the PHEIA while the National Council oversees the policies concerning the development of PHE institutions (PHEIs). LAN accreditation is to ensure that high academic standards, quality and control are maintained. Like its public counterpart, the Department of Private Higher Education was housed in the Ministry of Education, although the administrators appointed are from the public higher education institutions.

The PHEIA itself provides considerable power to the Minister to approve and to determine the types of private universities in Malaysia (Tan 2002). It serves to protect consumers and has mandatory curriculum content in order to preserve national ideology (as in the language [Malay] and compulsory subject requirements). Nevertheless, the pragmatic stance of the government is shown in the flexibility allowed in the Act for PHEIs to conduct their courses in English, subject to the approval of the Minister.

In response to the enactment, the private higher education providers from 17 colleges met up to establish an association (Malaysian Association of Private Colleges) in 1996 to represent their interests by working alongside with the government and to essentially safeguard their investments. Subsequently, the name of the association was changed to the Malaysian Association of Private Colleges and Universities (MAPCU) in 2002 in line with the government's decision to allow the establishment of foreign branch campuses in Malaysia and the upgrading of private colleges to university college and university status. MAPCU's current membership stands at 72 members and includes universities, university colleges as well as branch campuses, making it a significant voice for the larger private providers.

There are considerable differences in the size of the PHEIs. In 2004, it was estimated that about 10% were large, with 2000 or more students, about 20% were medium-sized with 500–2000 students, and the remaining 70% were small with 500 or fewer students (Tham 2014). Therefore, there are two other associations, namely the National Council of Private and Independent Educational Institutions (NAPIEI) that represent the smaller private colleges and Gabungan Institusi Pendidikan Tinggi Swasta Bumiputera (GIPTSB) or the Union of Malay Private Higher Education Institutions, that represent the Malaya colleges delivering franchised courses from the public universities (Sato 2007). Given the large number of private providers as

shown in Table 1, these associations are there to ensure the survival of the smaller institutions in an extremely competitive environment.

Private provision continued to expand rapidly as shown in Table 1. Public provision also expanded from five in 1975 to 20 by the end of 2006. According to Sirat (2006), another major difference between the PHEIs, besides size, lies in their funding sources. Large government-linked commercial/industrial organizations funded the establishment of some of the large private universities, such as Multimedia University (MMU),[2] Universiti Teknologi Petronas (UTP)[3] and Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN).[4] The second group comprises those established by large publicly listed corporations, such as Sunway College of the Sungai Wang Group. The third group were established by political parties of the incumbent Barisan Nasional Government, such as Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR) and Universiti Tun Abdul Razak (UNITAR). The fourth group is the self-funded or independent private colleges, such as Binary University College. Finally, the last group are the Malaysian branch campuses of foreign universities, such as Monash, Curtin, and Nottingham. Funding sources are important since building a campus is expensive, and there are considerable differences in the types of facilities offered among the PHEIs. While some have invested by building campuses, others still operate in shop lots.

The goal of developing world-class tertiary institutions and improving the quality of Malaysia's education system led to the separation of the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) from the Ministry of Education in 2004 so that the two Ministers could "devote more of themselves and concentrate on smaller, but equally crucial areas of focus."[5] However, the Ministry of Higher Education was merged back with the Ministry of Education in 2013, reportedly to facilitate administration under one roof.[6] The two ministries were again separated in 2015 with no public explanation provided for the reestablishment of a separate ministry for higher education.

The Ministry plays a key role in the development of PHE post-1996, as it awards licenses, including the renewal of these licenses every five years, program approvals, and tuition fees. More importantly, it charts the future direction for this sector as it formulates the key policies for this sector, in consultation with stakeholders that are usually represented by academics who are lecturers and associate research fellows with the National Higher Education Research Institute (NAHERI), hosted at Universiti Sains Malaysia; industry associations; international organizations such as World Bank and consultancy agencies. In this regard, the envisioning of Malaysia as an

---

[2]Initially established with funding from Telekom Malaysia (or the privatized national telecommunication company of Malaysia.

[3]Funded by PETRONAS, the national petroleum company of Malaysia.

[4]Initially established with funding from Tenaga Nasional Berhad, which is the utilities company of Malaysia.

[5]As stated by the Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi in his opening address at the Malaysian Education Summit 2004 on 27 April 2004 at the Sunway Lagoon Resort Hotel (page 5 of speech).

[6]The Minister of Education at that time explained that "The merger is a big step taken by the government in striving for progression of national education and should be maintained under one roof to facilitate administration" (page 5 of speech). http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2013/08/21/merging-of-ministries-to-ensure-education-quality/ Accessed 18 October 2016.

Table 1 Number of private higher education institutions, 1996–2015

Type	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2015[a]
U	0	0	5	6	7	11	11	11	11	10	12	18	18	21	23	41
UC	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	10	11	15	15	18	23	21	28
BC	0	0	1	2	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	8
C	354	497	577	632	691	690	518	519	533	532	482	488	491	405	403	414[b]
Total	354	497	583	599	642	706	534	539	559	558	514	525	531	454	452	491

BC branch campus, *C* college, *U* university status, *UC* university–college status

Source Tham (2014); [a]data for 2015 is extracted from FRGS grants for universities in Malaysia; [b]2016 figures taken from http://www.etawau.com/edu/IndexUniversityBranchCampuses.htm (Accessed 18 October 2016)

education hub is maintained over time as evidenced in the five-year plans, the Third Industrial Master Plan (2006–2020) and the Economic Transformation Plan that was launched in 2010. In line with this vision, internationalization of higher education institutions became a clarion call in policy documents such as the National Higher Education Strategic Plan (NHESP), where 100,000 international students were targeted for by 2010. This target indicates the narrow focus on student flows and export generation in the education hub vision, unlike the broader and more holistic understanding of internationalization as articulated in the literature on this issue (Tham 2013b).

PHEIs, however, deemed that they have been internationalizing even before the launch of these policy initiatives, based on a narrow understanding of what constitutes internationalization, such as program and student mobility (Tham 2013a). Their response to internationalize is driven by globalization, and the need to come out with innovative programs that are marketable while intense competition within the country due to the large number of providers has forced them to seek international students to sustain their programs.

Nonetheless, over time the meaning and understanding of internationalization expanded progressively with each policy document. For example, the action plan of the NHESP includes collaborations and networks, while the Global Reach Program includes knowledge exchanges, people exchange beyond students such as exchanges of alumni, government officials, as well as program exchanges and training (Tham 2013b). The latest policy document, the Malaysia Education Blueprint: 2015–2025 for higher education, has continued the emphasis on internationalization by listing global prominence as one of the 10 aspired shifts (MOE 2015).[7] In this shift, the stated goals are for Malaysia to be recognized, referred to, and respected internationally for its academic research expertise besides being among the top ten destination countries for international students. But numerical goals in terms of enrollment of international students continue to be targeted, such as 250,000 international students by 2025 despite being unable to reach the previously targeted 100,000 international students by 2010.

The Ministry also invited foreign universities to establish branch campuses in the country to foster greater internationalization efforts. Strategically, these foreign universities are not the top-ranking elite institutions in the world as Malaysia has a relatively small domestic market and has to position itself carefully to complement its relatively high-cost neighbor, Singapore. Hence, it sought to invite semi-elite foreign institutions that can serve to enhance the existing system and, at the same time, create new demand from the region to boost its educational hub vision (Tham 2014).

MOHE further established a marketing division to focus on promoting Malaysia as a destination for higher education for international students. Four education promotion centers were established in China, Dubai, Vietnam and Indonesia. PHEIs

---

[7]The ten shifts are holistic, entrepreneurial and balanced graduates, talent excellence, nation of lifelong learners, quality technical and vocational education training (TVET) graduates, financial sustainability, empowered governance, innovation ecosystem, globalized online learning, and transformed higher education delivery.

Table 2 Enrollment of international students in public and private higher education institutions, 2002–2014

Year	Higher education institutions	
	Public	Private
2002	5045	22,827
2003	5239	25,158
2004	5735	25,939
2005	6622	33,903
2006	7941	36,449
2007	14,324	33,604
2008	18,486	50,679
2009	22,456	58,294
2010	24,214	62,705
2011	25,855	45,246
2012	26,232	57,306
2013	29,662	53,971
2014	32,842	74,996

Source 2002–2010 from Tham (2013a, b)
2011–2014: updated from MOHE Web site

themselves also market their individual institutions, including the use of recruitment or marketing agents for recruiting international students. As a result of these efforts, Malaysia hosted more than 700,000 international students from 2002 to 2013, contributing approximately RM21 billion to the economy. On average, 70% of international students attended private IHEs annually (Malaysia 2016). In 2014, approximately 75,000 international students attended these private institutions (Table 2).

Table 2 shows the increase in the total number of international students from 27,872 in 2002 to 107,838 in 2014. It should be noted that although international undergraduate students used to study primarily in private institutions due to the cap imposed on these students in public universities based on excess demand and subsidized tuition, public providers have of late, intensified the recruitment for these students for ranking purposes. This has resulted in competition between public and private providers for international undergraduate students as the former no longer concentrate on recruiting these students at the post-graduate level alone, as formerly practiced.

The strong role of the government is augmented with the provision of financial assistance to students who study at PHEIs, even though the institutions themselves are self-financing. Since tuition fees are the main source of income for PHEIs, the provision of financial assistance in the form of subsidized student loans from the National Higher Education Corporation (PTPTN)[8] increased their financial viability by facilitating greater access. According to Loke (2015), for example, the PTPTN has

---

[8]This institution was established in 1997 by the government, and it is under the jurisdiction of MOHE.

a 100% approval rate for loan requests from students and 48% of students of PHEIs benefitted from PTPTN loans. Although these loans are supposed to be contingent on the parents' income, Tham (2011) indicated that this did not appear to be a binding constraint as the verification of this condition was not stringently applied. Although there is a cap on the loan amount for costlier private degree programs, the interest rate of 1% and a repayment period of 5–20 years together with a repayment waiver for students who achieve first class honors make these loans a form of government support for all accredited programs in PHEIs.

The Ministry also provides regulatory oversight over the development of PHEIs, primarily through its ability to award and renew licenses for the establishment of a private provider. Further, it controls quality through the Malaysia Qualifications Agency (MQA) established in 2007 which has responsibility to strengthen the quality assurance systems and to unify quality assurance of both public and private providers under one organization. The main role of MQA is to implement the Malaysian Qualification Framework (MQF) as the basis for quality assurance for higher education and as the reference point for the criteria and standards for national qualifications. The MQA is also responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of quality assurance for higher education.

2007 Onwards: Accreditation and Rating for Sustainability

Assuring quality is a learning process for both regulator and regulated. PHEIs have to devote time and resources to train their staff, establish and maintain quality assurance systems within higher education institutions, while LAN had to train review panels and source experts, many of these were sourced locally. However, forming a review panel can be difficult when local experts are not available. The processing time under LAN used to take between six and twelve months, in part reflecting a steep learning curve regarding quality assurance procedures and processes. This created resentment among the PHEIs with such a lengthy processing time representing high opportunity costs.

Accreditation was based on programs rather than partners (Hill 2012). This meant that branch campuses have to accredit programs that are already accredited at their mother campus in their home countries. Such a duplication of quality assurance created delays, increased costs thereby reducing affordability. In fact, 14 years later, the Economic Transformation Program still identified bottlenecks in the accreditation process as one of the challenges in this sector—even though the processing time has reportedly improved over time (Tham 2014). More importantly, Hill (2012) pointed out that there was a need to balance control with institutional autonomy, balancing a developmental approach with a strictly regulatory approach in order to foster transnational education provided by branch campuses.

Nevertheless, there is increasing transparency in the quality assurance and accreditation processes. The Malaysian Qualification Register (MQR), for example, makes its information publically available through an online portal providing information

on all accredited programs and their validity period. This provides an important information source for parents and students. Accreditation processes have also been refined. In 2010, for example, the four oldest branch campuses in Malaysia were awarded with self-accreditation for non-professional programs, thereby ending the long tussle between these branch campuses and the Ministry over the duplication of accreditation efforts. Meanwhile, the role of professional bodies in Malaysia has been affirmed, with professional programs requiring accreditation and recognition from the relevant professional bodies (University World News, 23 May 2010).

The MQA is also working toward facilitating recognition by joining international and regional accreditation agencies such as the International Network for Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education, the Asia Pacific Quality Network, and the Asia Pacific Qualifications Framework. At the ASEAN level, there are also ongoing efforts to harmonize qualifications under the ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework (AQRF) to facilitate the movement of skilled labor.

The reception of stakeholders' toward accreditation is in general positive as student loans are only available for accredited programs, while only international students can be recruited into these programs. Accreditation is thus used as a marketing tool by various providers to highlight their standing. Further, accreditation is a recurrent requirement for the renewal of licenses every five years, creating synergies between the interests of operators and sector sustainability. Private providers thus typically have dedicated departments or staff in the case of the larger providers to handle the demands of accreditation, though smaller providers can be hard pressed in this matter due to lack of resources. It is, however, important to note that accreditation only standardizes and strengthens processes, especially documentation. It does not necessarily imply that the quality of education, especially the quality of teaching, has improved (Tham 2014).

In response, three assessments were designed by MQA to encourage continuous improvements in quality. These are the Rating System for Malaysian Higher Education Institutions (SETARA), the Malaysia Quality Evaluation System for Private Colleges (MyQuest), and the Malaysia Research Assessment Instrument (MyRA). Malaysia's first rating system, SETARA, was implemented in 2009 to measure the performance of undergraduate teaching and learning in public and private institutions. The SETARA result is measured using a six-tier category with Tier 6 identified as outstanding and Tier 1 as weak. MyQuest is used to evaluate private colleges in Malaysia in terms of the quality of students, programmes, graduates, resources, and governance. My Quest's rating categorized an institution as either excellent, good, or weak. The institutions would also receive a rating based on their level of achievement which ranged from 1 star (poor) to 6 stars (excellent). MyRA, on the other hand, rates the research, development, and commercialization (R & D & C) performance of public and private lowest.

As expected, it is only the bigger and older PHEIs that have the resources in terms of time and staff to participate in these rating exercises. The latest SETARA rating 2013 received a participation from 33 private universities and university colleges while the other 20 that participated are public institutions of higher learning. Out of these 33, eight received a rating of TIER 4 while the others are rated TIER

5. Similarly, a total of 20 public universities and 38 tertiary institutions (27 private universities, five branch campuses of foreign universities, and six university colleges) were assessed for the MyRA ranking for the 2014/2015. However, only 199 out of the 406 private colleges in that year were evaluated and rated in the MyQuest evaluation for 2014/15, leaving a total of 207 private colleges that did not participate (MyQuest was voluntary). Based on MyQuest 2013 results, out of 209 colleges that participated, 105 (or 50%) were rated below 3 stars (Malaysia 2016). The results also indicate size does count as the smaller institutions tend to have a poor rating. In December 2015, MOHE has reportedly made it compulsory for all private colleges to participate in the MyQuest rating. These findings indicate there are some underlying problems with this sector as shown in the challenges in the next section.

Challenges

Despite the efforts taken to govern a rapidly expanding sector and the powers of the Ministry, numerous challenges continue to emerge that indicate inherent weaknesses in its governance.

One key concern is rising graduate unemployment. As the share of tertiary educated in the workforce increased with the rapid expansion of tertiary education, so did unemployment. The proportion of the labor force with pre-university and tertiary education grew from a mere 4.7% in 1985 to 13.9% in 2000, reaching 26.4% in 2014 (Lee and Shyamala 2012; and Department of Statistics, undated). At the same time, the share of tertiary educated unemployed in total unemployment grew from around 9% in the 1990s to 15.3% in 2000 (EPU and the World Bank 2007). This share peaked at 29.8% in 2011 before falling slightly to 28.8% as of 2014.

There is no published data on graduate unemployment by private and public higher education institutions. According to Lim and Williams (2015), in 2013, 27% of private sector graduates were unemployed six months after graduation, compared to 24% from their public sector counterparts. It should be noted that the larger private universities refute these numbers as they keep track of their students' employability as a marketing tool. Moreover, courses offered in the private sector are deemed to be geared to private sector employment since they are conducted in English,[9] and these courses are driven by market demand. However, there is considerable diversity in the private sector as described in the earlier section, and there are also small independent private colleges offering franchised programs from the public universities that are conducted in Malay. Presumably, the share of unemployed graduates in these private colleges will follow the pattern of the public universities. Smaller colleges also perform much more poorly in the rating exercises of MQA as indicated in the earlier sections. Although employability is both a supply and demand issue (EPU and the World Bank 2007), the supply side problem implies that there are quality

---

[9]Proficiency in English is identified as one of the contributing factors to employability in the private sector (see Darmi and Albion 2013).

issues in terms of relevancy of courses and programs since skills mismatch of the skills produced relative to demand is one of the causes of unemployment.

Another problem associated with employability is the possibility that not all PHEIs are offering fully accredited programs as reported in the media. Some private colleges are offering programs with only provisional accreditation, which is not the same as full accreditation.[10] Full accreditation is awarded only after examining and auditing following the completion of studies by the first batch of students. Most programs generally have a duration of less than five years which is the duration of a license to operate. This implies that programs can be run without full accreditation and possibly without being detected until students'/parents' lodge formal complaints or only when the license is due for renewal after five years.

Another challenge is the management of international students. Media reports indicate that unscrupulous private colleges are issuing student visas for students without enforcing attendance or reviewing students' performance.[11] Many of these students use their student visa to work illegally in Malaysia with abuse of student visas continuing to attract media.[12] MOHE's response to this problem was to establish Education Malaysia Global Services (EMGS)[13] in 2011 as a one-stop center for managing all matters pertaining to international students. With this new organization, international students have to pay a processing fee of RM1,000, RM140 international student pass fee, a medical screening fee of RM250 as well as pay upfront medical insurance fees ranging from RM500 to RM850, thereby increasing the upfront costs of coming to study in Malaysia (The Malay Mail, 17 June 2013a, b). The fees are to cover the cost of marketing Malaysia as well as ensuring EMGS is financially self-sustaining (The PIE News undated).

Implementing the new system faced teething problems with complaints from international students and institutions that EMGS was unable to meet its target of 14 days processing time (The Malay Mail, 17 June 2013a, b). Online application was introduced in 2016 in an effort to reduce the processing time of EMGS (New Straits Times, 25 August 2016). Although the Ministry claims that EMGS will be able to monitor international students effectively as each of the accepted international students is issued a card with a star tracking system, the issue of visa abuse remains a concern. The Home Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, for example, recently reported that student visas and the Visas on Arrival (VOA) schemes were misused by individuals who entered the country as students but subsequently were discovered to be working for syndicates (The Malay Mail online, 23 October 2016).

Perhaps most importantly, concerns about the financial sustainability of private providers have been raised in a study conducted by Lim and Williams (2015). In their study, they found that 46% of all private higher education institutions made losses after tax in 2013 after examining the financial statements of 41 private universities,

---

[10]It is reported in the Sun that both public and private sectors prefer to employ graduates with full accreditation (the Sun, 17 December 2012a, b).

[11]See the Sun (17 December 2012b, p. 1).

[12]See the Sun (21 September 2016a, b, p. 4).

[13]This is a privatized company owned by the Ministry.

27 university colleges, and eight foreign branch campuses. Moreover, 46% of these institutions do not have sufficient assets to cover their current liabilities while 64% of them have debts which are mainly short-term but exceed their paid-up capital. With approximately 120,000 students studying in these institutions, these findings raise serious concerns (Ong 2015). Anecdotal evidence, for example, indicates some private universities encountered financial problems, such as Albukhary International University.[14] In 2014, it was announced that it would close down, with arrangements to reallocate around 600 students to other private higher education institutions.[15] Another case is the closure of Allianze University Colleges of Medical Sciences in 2014 with reports of staff unpaid and stranded students (University World News 2014). Its programs were accredited by MQA in 2009.

Conclusion

The main findings in this chapter show that the governance of PHEIs has evolved over time, in response to changes internally as well as global trends. Internally, the switch from non-regulation to stringent regulatory governance in 1996, with extensive powers given to the Minister, is the key change in this sector. Mok (2008)'s analysis of the regulatory regime in Malaysia concluded that the state intervened extensively to accelerate market-led supply through quality assurance in line with global developments. Nevertheless, despite the powers endowed on the Minister by the PHEIs and the establishment of MQA and various rating exercises, the sector continues to face problems such as employability, which in part reflects ongoing issues associated with quality attainment. Rogue institutions and visa abuse indicate weaknesses in the governance mechanism too, despite ongoing efforts to arrest these problems.

Certainly, the evolving governance regime suggests that the government through MOHE is constantly responding to the problems that emerge and devising ways to improve the delivery system. Nonetheless, as Tham (2013a) argues, the very large number of providers that emerged with consent from the regulators in order to improve access has itself generated problems and unintended consequences. In the face of such a large number of providers, there is a tendency to take a "fire-fighting" approach as regular monitoring may not be able to detect all the problems due to insufficient manpower.

Moreover, signs of excess capacity led to a temporary prohibition or moratorium on selected programs as well as the establishment of new PHEIs to ensure the quality of students and to match demand and supply. These included a moratorium on medical programs from 1 May 2011 to 30 April 2016, dental programs from 1 March 2013 to 28 February 2018, and on the diploma in nursing from 1 July 2010. A moratorium

---

[14]This university is founded by Syed Mokhtar Albukhary, a prominent Bumiputera millionaire in Malaysia. In 2016, he was listed number 9 among Malaysia's 50 richest man.

[15]This plan was later withdrawn, and a new collaboration model was announced.

on the establishment of new PHEIs was also imposed from 1 February 2013 for two years and that was subsequently extended in 2016. The deputy president of MAPCU was quoted as being supportive of the moratorium due to excess capacity and the downturn in enrollment (New Straits Times online, 24 August 2016). Rationalizing this sector is important since alternative pathways are already planned in the current higher education blueprint (MOE 2015) through quality technical and vocational training (TVET) in order to rectify the undersupply of graduates in this area and to meet the demand for this type of skills anticipated in the future.

The functioning of the governance regime for private higher education in Malaysia, however, has also been a process of learning, adaptation, and recurrent intervention. As Fernandez-Chung (undated) observed, for example, even after the establishment of MQA in 2007, there was a lack of collaboration between MOHE, MQA, and the representatives of the PHEIs in the country. MAPCU itself acknowledges that its relationship with the ministry and regulatory bodies has fluctuated over the years, depending on the attitude of the person in charge of the private sector in the ministry especially since the post has traditionally been appointed to a senior academic from the public sector rather than the private sector. The moratorium on the establishment of the new PHEIs was imposed through the intermediation of Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) in the Prime Minister's department at the request of private providers rather than through the dialogues between the private institutions and the MOHE. Better coordination and collaboration between the key stakeholders will facilitate the shift of the governance of this sector toward interventions that facilitate market forces by removing market inefficiencies. Since information asymmetries are common in this sector, the role of regulations is to reduce these informational asymmetries by enhancing transparency and information flows. Data on the development of PHEIs should be made available at disaggregated levels to foster more in-depth research since the sector is characterized by great diversity. This will also serve to inform policy making for the development of this sector.

Focusing on inbound students or a student education hub is also not aligned with the economic needs of the country at this point in its development. The slowdown in economic growth since the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998) indicates a need to shift economic development toward innovation and knowledge-generation. PHEIs like their public counterparts will have to shift from teaching and learning toward research and innovation in collaboration with firms in order to shift the economy up global value chains and toward a knowledge-intensive services sector as the new source of growth. The development of PHEI in the country can therefore no longer focus on access and quantity alone, but it has to focus on quality, research, and innovation, with governance mechanisms able to support this shift and with a greater balance between regulation and institutional autonomy.

References

Badawi, A. (2004). Revitalizing education: Equipping Malaysia for the realities of the 21st century. Opening Address delivered at the Malaysian Education Summit 2004, Sunway Resort Lagoon, 12 April at 10.00 am.

Darmi, R., & Albion, P. (2013). *Malaysian Graduates: What and Why*. Paper presented at 3rd Malaysian Postgraduate Conference (MPC2013), 4–5 July 2013, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. https://eprints.usq.edu.au/24010/1/Darmi_Albion_MPC2013_PV.pdf. Accessed October 23, 2016.

Department of Statistics. (Undated). *Labor force survey report Malaysia: 2014*. https://www.statistics.gov.my/index.php?r=column/ctheme&menu_id=U3VPMldoYUxzVzFaYmNkWXZteGduZz09&bul_id=NHUxTlk1czVzMGYwS29mOEc5NUtOQT09. Accessed October 23, 2016.

EPU and the World Bank. (2007). Malaysia and the knowledge Economy: Building a world-class higher education system. Report No. 40397—MY. https://www.usp.ac.fj/worldbank2009/frame/Documents/Publications_regional/Malaysia-Knowledge-Economy2007.pdf. Accessed October 23, 2016.

Fernandez-Chung, R. (undated). *Quality assuring transnational education: The Malaysian experience*. Unpublished manuscript.

FMT News. (2013). *Merging of ministries to ensure education quality*. http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2013/08/21/merging-of-ministries-to-ensure-education-quality/. August 21, 2013. Accessed October, 18 2016.

Hill, Christopher. (2012). The origins, challenges, and the future direction of transnational education in Malaysia, Chapter 13. In C. T. Ennew & D. Greenaway (Eds.), *The globalization of higher education*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kua, K. S. (2007). *May 13: Declassified documents on the Malaysian Riots of 1969*. Petaling Jaya: Suaram.

Lee, K. H., & Shyamala, N. (2012). The crisis in education, Chapter 10. In H. Hill, S. Y. Tham, & H. M. Z. Ragayah (Eds.), *Malaysia's development challenges: Graduating from the middle*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Lim, P., & Williams, G. (2015). Crisis ahead for private higher education—and solutions. *Penang Monthly*, May 2015. Penang: Penang Institute. http://penangmonthly.com/crisis-ahead-for-private-higher-education-and-solutions/. Accessed October 23, 2016.

Loke, H. Y. (2015). "Malaysia" The HEAD Foundation, Singapore. http://www.headfoundation.org/userfiles/uploads/Final_-_Malaysia_PB.pdf. Accessed October 19, 2016.

Malaysia. (1976). *Third Malaysia Plan, 1976–1980*. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press.

Malaysia. (2016). *The Eleventh Malaysia Plan*. Putrajaya: EPU.

Ministry of Education (MOE). Malaysia. (2015). *Exectutive Summary. Malaysia Education Blueprint: 2015–2025 (Higher Education)*. Putrajaya: MOE.

Mok, K. H. (2008). Varieties of regulatory regimes in Asia: The liberalization of the higher education market and changing governance in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. *The Pacific Review, 21*(2), 147–170. http://www.moe.gov.my/cms/upload_files/files/3_%20Malaysia%20Education%20Blueprint%202015-2025%20(Higher%20Education).pdf. Accessed October 19, 2016.

New Straits Times. (2016). Foreign students may get the nod for job training. *Prime News*, p. 6.

New Straits Times online. (2016). *Private colleges, universities laud moratorium on new higher education institutions*. 24 August. Accessed October 25, 2016. http://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/08/168025/private-colleges-universities-laud-moratorium-new-higher-education-institutions.

Ong, K. M. (2015). Take steps to avoid crisis in private higher education. *Malaysiakini*, 26 May 2015. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/299659. Accessed October 23, 2016.

Ragayah, H. M. Z. (2014). Race-based paradigm in poverty eradication and income distribution analysis and policy, chapter 5. In A. Milner, A. R. Embong, & S. Y. Tham (Eds.), *Transforming Malaysia: Dominant and competing paradigms*. Singapore: Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS) and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).

Sato, M. (2007). *Dilemmas of public university reform in Malaysia*. Clayton: Monash University Press.

Singh, J. S., & Mukherjee, H. (1993). Education and national integration in Malaysia: Stocktaking thirty years after independence. *International Journal of Educational Development, 13*(2), 89–102.

Sirat, M. (2006). Malaysia. *UNESCO (2006), Higher education in South-East Asia* (pp. 101–135). Bangkok, Thailand: UNESCO Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau for Education.

Tan, A. M. (2002). *Malaysian private higher education: Globalization, privatization, transformation and marketplaces*. London: ASEAN Academic Press.

Tham, S. Y. (2011). Exploring access and equity in private higher education institutions: Insights from Malaysia, Chapter 7. In P. Sauve, G. Pasadilla, & M. Mikic (Eds.), *Service sector reforms: Asia Pacific perspectives*. Bangkok: ADBI and ArtNet Secretariat.

Tham, S. Y. (2013a). Private higher education institutions, Chapter 4. In S. Y. Tham (Ed.), *Internationalizing higher education in Malaysia*. Singapore: ISEAS.

Tham, S. Y. (2013b). Internationalizing higher education in Malaysia: Government Policies and University's Response. *Journal of Studies in International Education, 17*(5), 648–662.

Tham, S. Y. (2014). Trade liberalization and domestic regulations: Implications for Malaysia as a regional education hub, Chapter 6. In C. Findlay, H. K. Nordas, & G. Pascadilla (Eds.), *Trade policy in Asia: Higher education and media services*. Singapore: World Scientific.

The Malay Mail. (2013a). *Failure of new system leaves foreign students in a lurch*, p. 2. June 17, 2013.

The Malay Mail. (2013b). *Foreign student uproar*, p. 1. June 17, 2013.

The Malay Mail online. (2016). *One-Stop centre to curb student visa abuse*. http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/one-stop-centre-to-curb-student-visa-abuse. Accessed October 23, 2016.

The PIE News. (undated). *Study in Malaysia "gateway" launched*. http://thepienews.com/news/study-in-malaysia-gateway-launched/. Accessed October 23, 2016.

The Sun. (2012a). *Lack of accreditation causes job woes*, p. 6. December 17, 2012.

The Sun. (2012b). *Shady and lucrative*, p. 1. December 17, 2012.

The Sun. (2016a). *Foreign students inept in English*, p. 4. September 21, 2016.

The Sun. (2016b). *'Legalised' illegal workers"*, p. 6. September 21, 2016.

University World News. (2010). *Malaysia: Eight institutions get self-accreditation status*. May 23, 2010, Issue No: 125. Accessed October 23, 2016. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20100521154149258.

University World News. (2014). Medical college closure after London campus financing problems. November 20, 2014, Issue No: 344. Accessed October 23, 2016. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20141120095240372.

Siew Yean Tham is Senior Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore and Adjunct Professor at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. She was formerly Director and Professor at Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. She has served as a consultant to national agencies in Malaysia (Ministry of International Trade and Industry and Ministry of Higher Education) and international agencies including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank Institute. Her research interests and publications are in foreign direct investment, international trade in goods and services and trade policies, as well as industrial development in Malaysia and ASEAN. In services trade, her research focus is on higher education and trade agreements. Her recent publications include among others *Moving the AEC Beyond 2015: Managing Domestic Consensus for Community-Building* (coedited with Sanchita Basu Das), Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016; and "Institutionalization of economic cooperation in East Asia" in *Institutionalizing East Asia* (edited by Alice D. Ba, Cheng-Chwee Kuik, and Sueo Sudo) (co-authored with Sueo Sudo), Abingdon: Routledge, 2016. She has a Ph.D. in economics from University of Rochester, USA.

Chapter 7
Higher Education in Singapore: The Policy State and Governance

Jason Eng Thye Tan

Singapore has drawn international attention as an example of a paternalistic, authoritarian state that has consistently maintained a highly interventionist stance in social and economic policies over the past six decades. This stance also extends to the governance of higher education (HE) (Tan 2004). This chapter will begin by setting out the nature of state governance in Singapore so that the reader will better understand the context of policy developments in HE. It will then analyse major government reforms over the past two decades allowing universities greater autonomy. It argues, however, that such reforms represent not a total relinquishing of the reins of control, but rather a decentralization and marketization under a "state supervision model" (Mok and Tan 2004). The case of the Singapore Institute of Management University (UNISIM) is offered as an interesting example of how a hitherto private institution can be incorporated into the state framework of publicly funded autonomous universities. The chapter also examines the unsuccessful top-down "global schoolhouse" policy initiative to illustrate the practical limits of the active state interventionist stance in education policymaking.

Background: The Singapore Government's Governance Philosophy

Any discussion of HE governance in Singapore must be framed within the overall context of national governance. The ruling People's Action Party (PAP), which was elected to power in 1959, has enjoyed uninterrupted political dominance for almost six decades. In addition, the first Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew dominated Singaporean politics, and in economic and social policy, for over five decades. The PAP's

J. E. T. Tan (✉)
National Institute of Education, Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: engthye.tan@nie.edu.sg

early governing philosophy has prevailed and continues to exert a massive influence even in the post-Lee Kuan Yew era.

Upon coming to power, the PAP's primary objective was to improve the overall well-being of the citizens by maintaining political stability and maximizing economic growth. It consistently reiterated the key constraints facing Singapore: it is a city state with a small population; it has a diverse multiracial population; a lack of natural resources; a reliance on foreign investment for economic growth; and a narrow margin for risk-taking and failure (Quah 2010). Furthermore, Lee Kuan Yew's views on human nature have prevailed over time. These include an elitist view that society needs a small superior governing elite to formulate policies and that this elite leadership needs to adopt a proactive interventionist leadership style in terms of economic and social policy (Quah 2010).

A fundamental building block of the PAP's rule has been the belief in the need for heavy investment in education in order to enhance the human capital of its population, especially given the country's lack of natural resources. HE is particularly important due to its capacity to nurture and train the future governing elite. Several observers of the Singaporean political system have noted that education has been harnessed actively by the PAP in order to identify and develop top academic performers at an early age. These students are placed in special academic programmes to prepare for government undergraduate scholarships, after which prestigious careers in the top rungs of the civil service await them. The PAP claims that it runs a meritocratic education system in which individuals succeed due to their own merit (as demonstrated largely through performance in high-stakes national examinations) and hard work. This concept of a "meritocracy" is one of the key founding myths of the PAP's governance system (Barr 2014; Barr and Skrbis 2008). Besides enhancing human capital and contributing to elite formation, education is also employed by the PAP as an instrument for developing wider social cohesion among an ethnically and religiously diverse population. For instance, great emphasis has been placed in all schools on what is termed "national education", which aims to foster Singaporean identity, to instil core values such as meritocracy and multiracialism, and to teach about Singapore's nation-building efforts (Tan 2008).

Another aspect of political governance relevant to this chapter is the proactive and constant examination of other countries' experiences in order to identify appropriate solutions for policy problems. This sort of policy borrowing involves launching fact-finding tours of relevant organizations around the world. At the same time, internationally renowned experts are invited to visit Singapore to share their professional opinions. Local policymakers then decide which ideas are relevant or unsuited for Singapore's policy context (Quah 2010).

Control of Universities: Towards Publicly Funded Autonomous Universities

University governance in Singapore began to come under firm government control in the 1960s. Prior to that, the then Raffles College and King Edward VII College of Medicine, both of which began operating during British colonial rule, and which were precursors to the University of Malaya and the University of Singapore, enjoyed considerable operating autonomy. In addition, the Chinese-medium Nanyang University, which began operations in 1955, was fully privately funded and controlled. The situation began to change when the PAP was elected in 1959. A series of confrontations with university staff and students at both the University of Singapore and Nanyang University led the PAP to begin progressively clamping down on academic freedom and imposing draconian legislation governing student activities. The state also began progressively to play a dominant role in such matters as the appointment of senior university officials, funding, admission and strategic planning. The practice of academic staff electing deans and department heads was abolished in favour of direct appointment by high-ranking university administrators.

Another prominent display of governing by fiat came when the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew intervened personally regarding the survival of Nanyang University. The university was plagued in the 1970s by falling standards and difficulties with staff recruitment and retention, as well as a shrinking pool of Chinese-medium secondary school students. Lee was vocal in highlighting the university's numerous shortcomings. He subsequently invited a British academic, Sir Frederick Dainton, to propose recommendations for its future. Sir Frederick's proposal for developing a single, strong comprehensive university in Singapore was unanimously accepted by the Nanyang University Council in 1980. This intervention resulted in a merger with the National University of Singapore to form the publicly funded National University of Singapore (NUS) in 1980.

A second publicly funded university, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), was established in 1991 on the basis of another report by Sir Frederick. This was followed by the opening of the privately run but publicly funded Singapore Management University (SMU), which was officially incorporated as a private university by an Act of Parliament in early 2000. Its establishment marked an interesting chapter in Singaporean HE because it was officially private, while receiving substantial state funding. It was modelled on the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania as a means of establishing quality benchmarks to enable it to compete effectively with the NUS and NTU.

The heavy hand of state intervention was not isolated to such matters as deciding on university closure and merger, and the blurring of the lines between "public" and "private". The PAP government also exercised considerable control when it set up a committee in 1998 to review the university admission system for the NUS and NTU. The then Education Minister claimed that a government-commissioned International Academic Advisory Panel had expressed concern the previous year over the relevance of Singapore's universities to global economic needs. The committee visited

universities, government bodies, testing agencies and high schools in Japan, Sweden, Israel, the UK and the USA to study admission practices. Its recommendations were fully accepted by the two universities and implemented in 2003 (Tan 2005).

In the 1980s, the Ministry of Education (MOE) began granting a small number of top secondary schools greater operating autonomy in such areas as staff recruitment, curriculum and class size. This was on the condition that these so-called independent schools continued to adhere to ministry macro-policies such as bilingualism and civics and moral education (Tan 1993). This policy initiative represents the beginnings of the marketization of education in Singapore. The language of market economics became increasingly frequent in official discourse (Tan 1998). Terms such as "competition", "choice" and "diversity" were commonplace and their benefits extolled. Education Minister Tony Tan quoted approvingly the findings of Chubb and Moe (1990), who had concluded that public schools performed less well than private ones in the USA because they were sheltered from market forces. Tan claimed that granting top schools greater operating autonomy would enable them to serve as role models for other schools showing how to improve the quality of education. They would also help to set the market value for good principals and teachers by recruiting staff in a competitive market. Parents, teachers and students would thus enjoy a wider variety of schools to choose from. Tan (2006) argued that the independent schools scheme represented limited decentralization rather than a complete relinquishing of control over these independent schools. This was due to the central role that the PAP government had assigned to education in terms of supporting economic development and fostering social cohesion.

Similar moves in the direction of decentralization and marketization in Singapore's publicly funded universities began in 1999, when the then Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan commissioned a committee to explore this prospect. Citing the need for change amid the challenges of the knowledge economy and international competition, the committee released its report in 2000. Among its key recommendations were: (a) greater operational autonomy within key government-determined policy parameters in three main areas—overall development of the university sector, funding and subsidy, and manpower planning; (b) greater devolution of authority to deans or heads for greater flexibility in responding to challenges; (c) funding through block grants, with an emphasis on outcome-based accountability; (d) devolution of operational finance decisions towards the lowest operational level feasible; (e) diversification of funding sources; and (f) broadening staff appraisal systems to make them market-driven, performance-based and move away from close linkages to the civil service pay structures (Ministry of Education 2000).

Five years later, another committee that had been commissioned by Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan released its report on appropriate models of autonomy for Singapore's publicly funded universities. This report recommended that all three publicly funded universities (the NUS, NTU and SMU) be turned into autonomous universities by corporatizing them as not-for-profit companies, similar to the prevailing set-up at the SMU. The report also claimed that the NUS and NTU would no longer be constrained by the operational regulations imposed on statutory boards and would thus enjoy greater administrative and financial autonomy to explore different ways

of improving their teaching and research performance and competing within the international arena. Corporatization would send a strong signal that the universities belonged not to the government, but to various other stakeholders. The universities would be granted autonomy to increase the percentage of students admitted under non-academic criteria.

As in the previous report, the committee talked of empowering deans and heads to be more actively involved in decision-making in areas such as curricular matters and academic quality. As far as accountability was concerned, the report recommended that universities each sign a policy agreement with the MOE. This agreement would enable the ministry to outline strategic directions for the entire university sector and set key parameters for autonomy. In addition, each university had to formulate its own performance agreement with the ministry, outlining its key targets in teaching, research, service and organizational development for a five-year period. Third, the ministry would set up a quality assurance framework for universities (QAFU). Under this framework, the universities had to submit annual progress reports and undergo five-yearly on-site external validation by a ministry-commissioned external review panel (Ministry of Education 2005).

In both cases, the respective committees drew lessons from overseas institutions. The 2000 report committee visited the USA, the UK, Canada and Hong Kong. In the second case, the team visited the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Virginia and the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. This practice of policy borrowing is well-established in Singapore and has also been used in the development of reforms at the primary and secondary levels of schooling.

The 2000 and 2005 reports are also illustrative of what Mok and Tan (2004) have referred to as the marketization of Singaporean HE. The state gradually reduced its role in the financing and provision of education, while the market and other non-state sectors became more important in these roles. There is now a diversification of education providers, and decentralization and corporatization strategies have been adopted in educational management and governance. The Singaporean government has moved from the "state control model" to the "state supervision model". This transition involves the move from the "bureaucratic governance" style of centralization and policy dominance towards "deregulated governance" consisting of the decentralization, diversification and mobilization of non-state actors. However, instead of moving towards genuine deregulation, the Singaporean government continues to play a key role in steering from a distance. In this regard, it is important to point out that this followed on the heels of similar moves at the secondary school level. It has also taken place in tandem with wider civil service reforms launched at the end of the 1990s that were framed in terms more often seen in the corporate world, such as their offer of "greater responsiveness to customers" (Quah 2010). As has been pointed out, this marketization was very much a result of active policy borrowing from other countries on the part of the PAP government.

Since the publication of these two reports, and their acceptance by the MOE, two more publicly funded autonomous universities—the Singapore University of Technology and Design and the Singapore Institute of Technology—have been established, in 2009. There are now five such universities, and they account for the vast

majority of university enrolments in Singapore. The MOE has targeted a 40% cohort enrolment rate by the year 2020 in these autonomous universities. At the same time, Singapore has a few branch campuses of foreign universities, such as that of James Cook University (Australia), that are completely privately run and funded, and numerous degree programmes offered by overseas universities in collaboration with local education partners. Government control over these privately run and funded courses mainly takes the form of registration and quality assurance requirements, which have recently been tightened (see the following section for further detail).

The Singapore Institute of Management University: Moving from Private to Autonomous Status

Singapore currently has only one local privately run university, the Singapore Institute of Management University (UNISIM). This section will discuss UNISIM's transition from privately funded and run status to privately run but publicly funded status, and on to publicly funded autonomous status. This is an example of the government progressively incorporating a HE institution into its overall labour force skills development strategy by bringing it into the autonomous fold. In this case, it did so after UNISIM had been a privately run university for a little over a decade.

UNISIM has its origins in the Singapore Institute of Management (SIM), a totally private not-for-profit institute that was established in 1964 with a grant from the Economic Development Board, a statutory board, in order to provide professional leaders and managers to aid Singapore's economic development. It started offering short courses in management before offering diploma and degree programmes (the latter in collaboration with foreign partners such as the University of London and the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology) in the 1970s.

In 1992, the MOE invited the SIM to start an Open University programme in partnership with the Open University of the UK. This Open University, which ran courses over a period of twelve years, largely served the needs of non-degree school teachers who wanted to improve their educational qualifications at a time when most school teachers did not possess a university degree (Cheong 2013). In 2013, the MOE approached the SIM for assistance in catering for a proposed expansion of undergraduate enrolment. The SIM management decided, with ministry approval, to use the Open University programme as the basis for the formation of an entirely new university, UNISIM, and to form a new unit called SIM Global, dedicated to nurturing partnerships with overseas universities to offer degree programmes. The two units would have clearly demarcated target audiences. UNISIM would exclusively (and be the sole local institution to) target local Singaporean working adults without a university degree, while SIM Global would target fresh school leavers and foreign students. SIM Global helped provide limited funding for eight to nine years to help UNISIM find its feet.

UNISIM was set up as a private limited company in 2005 and received a licence to grant degrees from the MOE. In the first few years of its operation, it was "private" in the sense that it was totally self-financing and self-governing, with total autonomy to decide on such matters as staffing, the running of programmes and quality assurance. After a few years of operation, negotiations were held with the MOE to provide financial subsidies for part-time undergraduate students in order to encourage more working adults to acquire degree qualifications. The undergraduate fee subsidies began at 40% and are currently at 55%. With the start of government financial subsidies came, quite naturally, an increase in government intervention and oversight of UNISIM's programmes.

This oversight has come in the form of government representation on UNISIM's governing board of trustees, similar to the practice in the five autonomous universities. The MOE Deputy Secretary (Policy) and the Chief Executive of the Singapore Workforce Development Agency serve on the 15-member board, which is appointed by the SIM Governing Council in consultation with the MOE, and is tasked with broad oversight of the university's strategic direction, governance and quality.

The MOE's "steering from a distance" also extends to quality assurance requirements. In addition to subscribing to the SIM Quality Framework, UNISIM has to participate in the MOE's QAFU. Every five years a ministry-commissioned team conducts an external site-based inspection of various aspects of university governance and course delivery. This is one respect in which UNISIM is identical to the autonomous universities. Next, as a private institution, UNISIM has to submit annual routine reports to the MOE's Council for Private Education (CPE), which was established in 2009 to monitor quality in the private education sector. The CPE audits are more detailed than those of the QAFU, involving a review of course materials and instructor qualifications, for instance. In addition, like all the autonomous universities, UNISIM must submit annual reports to the Ministry's Higher Education Division. However, UNISIM is not required to undergo EduTrust inspections by the CPE, since it does not enrol any non-Singaporean students—EduTrust inspections ensure that the needs of foreign students are adequately addressed.

In October 2016, the then Acting Education Minister (Higher Education and Skills) Ong Ye Kung publicly announced plans to incorporate UNISIM into the fold of publicly funded autonomous universities. Ong claimed that UNISIM had supported generations of working adults and mature learners and had become adept at catering to part-time students: "In this era of SkillsFuture, it is timely to consider putting in the concrete and making [UNISIM] a permanent and recognized path in our education and training landscape" (quoted in Davie 2016). These plans were in line with the ministry's ambitions to lend greater support to its SkillsFuture initiative, which is designed to encourage lifelong learning among the entire population. The official push for SkillsFuture has been dramatically ramped up in the past few years in an official bid to address the impact of technological disruption on the workforce. Ong's proposal was accepted by UNISIM and the SIM Governing Council. This will mean the effective end of the first privately run and funded local university. The change in UNISIM's operating status comes as the MOE tightens operating regulations for

private for-profit schools that offer degree programmes. These include more stringent financial requirements as well as mandatory EduTrust certification (Teng 2016).

The "Global Schoolhouse": An Example of the Limits of State Intervention in Higher Education

This section highlights the limits of the Singaporean government's interventionist stance in HE policymaking and governance. It discusses the various complications and setbacks experienced during top-down policy implementation of the ambitious "global schoolhouse" vision. Ultimately, the vision was quietly abandoned a decade after its initial promulgation.

The "global schoolhouse" vision was outlined by the Ministry of Trade and Industry in a 2002 report. The report claimed that, with its pre-existing reputation as "a hub of educational excellence", and its "excellent infrastructure, business hub standing and cosmopolitan society" (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2002: 1), Singapore was well placed to gain a piece of the estimated US$2.2 trillion world education market. It quoted INSEAD Professor Arnoud de Meyer, Chairman of the Education Workgroup, as saying that "Helping private providers to grow, facilitating partnerships between institutions and attracting new players into the market would create a 'Global Schoolhouse' that offers a comprehensive continuum of learning experiences" (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2002: 1). Unsurprisingly, the rhetoric was entirely economic in nature. The well-entrenched government practice of studying other countries' experiences again came into play. The subcommittee suggested increasing the education services sector's contribution to gross domestic product from 1.9% in 2000 to 3–5% by 2010, which would make it comparable to "established education hubs such as the UK and Australia" (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2002: 1). An ambitious target of 150,000 international full-fee-paying students was set for the year 2015, up from the then estimated figure of 50,000.

The report listed several advantages of pursuing the global schoolhouse vision. First, the increase in institutional spending and the spending of foreign students would benefit national economic growth. Second, the influx of foreign students would contribute human capital to existing and projected industry needs. Third, the report expressed the hope that some universities would engage in knowledge-based activities such as research and development, patent generation and enterprise development, edging Singapore closer towards becoming a knowledge-based economy. The growth in the number of educational institutions would also help meet growing domestic demand for HE, which was currently unmet. Fourth, the report claimed that the interaction between domestic and international students would "promote societal and community development" (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2002: 1).

The report recommended that a three-tiered system of universities form the core of the "global schoolhouse". At the apex would be so-called world-class universities, which would help mark Singapore's status as a "premier education hub" (Ministry of

Trade and Industry 2002: 5). These universities would focus primarily on postgraduate education and would be "niche centres of excellence" contributing to research and development. Next would be the three pre-existing publicly funded universities—the NUS, NTU and SMU—the so-called bedrock universities which would carry out research and development activities, supply the bulk of domestic university-educated manpower needs, attract regional students through scholarships and fulfil the concept of education as a public good. Forming the base of the pyramid would be what the report referred to as "additional private universities". These institutions would focus on teaching and applied research and cater to the bulk of the additional 100,000 foreign student enrolments envisioned in the "global schoolhouse".

Besides setting out enrolment targets, the report also recommended that supporting mechanisms be put in place, including a quality assurance system to allay concerns over the current lack of such a system for the private education sector. The report also suggested that the Economic Development Board (EDB) (a state-affiliated investment promotion agency) and the MOE co-manage an Education Promotion Agency with overseas offices in order to attract international students. The Singapore Tourism Board subsequently began promoting Singapore as an education destination on its website.

The 2002 report had followed close on the heels of an EDB drive, which was launched in 1998 to attract at least ten so-called world-class universities to establish a presence in Singapore within the next decade. This drive managed to attract prestigious institutions such as Johns Hopkins University, the University of Chicago, INSEAD, the Georgia Institute of Technology and the Technische Universiteit Eindhoven.

In addition, the "global schoolhouse" rhetoric was symptomatic of the Singaporean government's perennial monitoring and capitalizing on international economic trends as part of its overwhelming emphasis on ensuring economic competitiveness. At no time did the report mention the civilizing effects of education or the benefits of a liberal education. Instead, Singapore was urged to stay ahead of competitors in the education hub market, such as Australia and Malaysia (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2002: 5).

The "global schoolhouse" initiative represented a clear move by the Singaporean "entrepreneurial state" (Ziguras and McBurnie 2015) to promote what Knight (2014) has termed the "Third Generation" of cross-border HE, which involved the establishment of education hubs. The Ministry of Trade and Industry's recognition of the need for Singapore to beat competitors in the international HE marketplace is further symptomatic of the trend towards marketization and the commodification of education.

Right from the beginning, the "global schoolhouse" initiative was plagued with difficulties. First, there were a few rather embarrassing high-profile cases of foreign universities changing their mind about establishing campuses in Singapore, deciding to close their campuses and programmes, or being asked to end their Singapore operations after a few years. For instance, in 2005 Warwick University reversed its earlier decision to establish a full-fledged branch campus. The following year, the state-funded Agency for Science, Technology and Research announced that it would

be closing Johns Hopkins University's biomedical research facility due to its failure to recruit the anticipated number of doctoral students and its failure to meet performance benchmarks. In June 2007, a mere four months after having opened to great fanfare, the University of New South Wales-Asia campus was closed, on the grounds of insufficient student numbers and worries over its financial viability. The next campus to close was the Tisch School of the Arts Asia, an offshoot of the main school affiliated with New York University, which decided in 2012 to terminate its master's courses in film, animation, media production and dramatic writing. It had suffered financial deficits throughout its five years of existence despite receiving about US$17 million in financial subsidies from the EDB and additional funds from New York University. The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, yet another of the original group of world-class universities selected by the EDB in 1998, followed suit in 2013, announcing that it was moving its executive education programme from Singapore to Hong Kong in order to be closer to the thriving economy of the People's Republic of China. Around the same time, the University of Nevada at Las Vegas decided to close its bachelor's programme in hospitality management, citing financial viability.

The second issue facing the "global schoolhouse" initiative was that of quality assurance. The first decade of this century saw several cases of fraud in which private for-profit schools closed down suddenly, leaving their students without recourse to financial or academic redress. One such case involved the proprietor of a private school peddling fake Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology degrees for several years before being exposed (Osada, 2015). It took seven years from the initial announcement of the "global schoolhouse" initiative before Parliament passed the Private Education Act, enabling the CPE to regulate all private educational institutions awarding degrees, diplomas or certificates.

A third and probably the biggest challenge appeared in the form of a growing anti-immigration backlash among Singaporeans (see, for instance, Curtis 2014). Amid concerns that two decades of liberal immigration policy had caused cracks in national identity, along with strains on public infrastructure and perceived competition for jobs and school places, the PAP suffered a reduced majority at the 2011 general elections. A Ministry of Trade and Industry report in 2003 had already warned that:

> bringing in foreign talent is a sensitive issue in any society … the reality is that keeping out global talent will not create more jobs for Singaporeans, while sending away foreigners who are already working in Singapore may cause the economy to spiral down further. Moreover, global talent may be attracted to competing cities in Asia, and this will have a profoundly adverse impact on Singapore's aspiration to become a leading global city. (174)

The PAP subsequently bowed to pressure in the last few years, tightening the reins on immigration and ordering a reduction in the percentage of foreign students in publicly funded universities (Tan 2011). This change in immigration policy further dented Singapore's aspirations to become an education hub. Davie (2014), for example, reported that foreign student numbers fell from 97,000 in 2008 to 84,000 in 2012 and 75,000 in 2014. In late 2014 Singapore fell 12 places from third to fifteenth in the London-based educational consultancy Quacquarelli Symonds' annual rankings of the world's best cities for university students (Teng 2014). Two years earlier, the Trade and Industry Minister Lim Hng Kiang had announced in Parliament that:

> Since 2009 the Global Schoolhouse initiative shifted its focus towards building industry-relevant manpower capabilities and helping to attract, develop and retain talent for our economy as global competition for talent has intensified … while the educator sector remains an important part of our economy, the Global Schoolhouse initiative will emphasise quality of education and relevance to the economy, and not student numbers or GDP share. (Lim 2012: 2)

The minister's statement, coming just a year after the PAP's disappointing showing in the 2011 general elections, was an implicit acknowledgement that the original target of 150,000 international full-fee-paying students was near-impossible to achieve. Rather than directly admit that the original enrolment target had been overly ambitious, the government had chosen instead to modify the objectives of the "global schoolhouse" initiative.

The top-down, interventionist "global schoolhouse" initiative ultimately proved unsuccessful in the face of numerous domestic and cross-border economic, political and social issues. Despite its ambition and backing by the weight of government machinery, the attempt to promote Singapore as a major education hub was ultimately downscaled. The term "global schoolhouse" has now quietly faded from public discourse. In retrospect, the global schoolhouse started off as an ambitious dream to transform Singapore into a prominent education hub at the forefront of the international HE landscape. In typical PAP fashion, a great deal of fanfare and official resources was dedicated to ensuring its success, but ultimately it failed after a decade of implementation due to a combination of both internal (e.g. inadequate quality assurance oversight; anti-immigrant sentiment) and external factors (e.g. changes in thinking about the viability of the Singapore branch campuses on the part of university officials in the home campuses).

Conclusion

This chapter has examined HE policy governance in Singapore. It began by bringing into focus the key tenets of the dominant PAP ruling elite, which include the belief in elite governance through a proactive and interventionist leadership style, the importance of education in fostering economic growth and the usefulness of actively seeking policy lessons from other countries. We then discussed the two MOE reports promoting greater operating autonomy in publicly funded universities issued since the turn of the twenty-first century. These reports are evidence of the marketization of HE, and of a transition from a state control to a state supervision model, in which the government performs a macro-supervisory role, setting out general guidelines and regulatory frameworks instead of imposing micro-control. These reports also show evidence of the key tenets of PAP governance.

The chapter has also shown how UNISIM transitioned from being privately funded and run to become a fully fledged public autonomous university. It showed how the boundaries between "public" and "private" have been fluid over time as the state sought in its typical interventionist style to incorporate UNISIM into its wider skills

development policy. The last section then focused on the "global schoolhouse" policy initiative as an example of how this highly interventionist state, which has grown accustomed to a top-down style of governance, failed to cope with the battering that this initiative took as a result of various domestic and cross-border factors.

The Singaporean case shows a ruling elite accustomed to a top-down interventionist governance approach experimenting with attempts at corporatization or decentralized regulation of the HE system while retaining the reins of power. These reins are exercised primarily through legislative, regulatory and financial means. It is logical that the PAP would not desire to relinquish total control in the light of the inordinate importance it has consistently accorded education, not only as a means of supporting national economic competitiveness but also of nurturing the future governing elite, and fostering wider social cohesion. Its efforts at decentralization echo earlier efforts at the secondary school level, which similarly drew on examples to be found in other countries' HE systems. The latest key development in the local HE landscape involves the government incorporating the one locally run, privately owned university in Singapore into the fold of publicly funded, autonomous universities. The official rationale was to harness this university's experiences with working adults and to direct it towards the wider service of the government's lifelong learning policy initiative. This development further strengthened the MOE's already firm grip on locally run universities and maintains the dominance of the Singaporean government over the HE sector.

In conclusion, the Singaporean experience of HE governance is probably not replicable elsewhere due to its unique policy context and environment. Over the past two decades, numerous policymakers and academics have expressed great interest in Singapore's academic success and have even visited the country in a bid to draw lessons for their own countries. It is important for such investigators to bear in mind the limits of an interventionist approach to HE governance.

References

Barr, M. (2014). *The ruling elite of Singapore: Networks of power and influence*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Barr, M. D., & Skrbis, Z. (2008). *Constructing Singapore: Elitism, ethnicity and the nation-building project*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

Cheong, H. K. (2013). Singapore's SIM University. In I. Jung, T. M. Wong, & T. Belawati (Eds.), *Quality assurance in distance education and e-learning: Challenges and solutions from Asia* (pp. 3–24). New Delhi: Sage.

Chubb, J. E., & Moe, T. M. (1990). *Politics, markets, and America's schools*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Curtis, L. (2014, November 4). *"Foreigners are taking our jobs" complain Singaporeans*. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/11205536/Foreigners-are-taking-our-jobs-complain-Singaporeans.html.

Davie, S. (2014, October 2). Singapore may rue fall in foreign student numbers. *The Straits Times*, p. A24.

Davie, S. (2016, October 13). UNISIM set to be sixth autonomous university. *The Straits Times*, p. A1.

Knight, J. (2014). Three generations of crossborder higher education: New developments, issues and challenges. In B. Streitwieser (Ed.), *Internationalisation of higher education and global mobility* (pp. 43–58). Oxford: Symposium Books.

Lim, H. K. (2012, October 17). *Minister Lim Hng Kiang's written reply to Parliament questions on EDB's global schoolhouse initiative*. Retrieved from www.mti.gov.sg.

Ministry of Education. (2000). *Fostering autonomy and accountability in universities*. Singapore: Ministry of Education.

Ministry of Education. (2005). *Autonomous universities: Towards peaks of excellence*. Singapore: Ministry of Education.

Ministry of Trade and Industry. (2002). *Panel recommends "global schoolhouse" concept for Singapore to capture bigger slice of US$2.2 trillion world education market*. Singapore: Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Ministry of Trade and Industry. (2003). *New challenges, fresh goals: Towards a dynamic global city*. Singapore: Ministry of Trade and Industry.

Mok, K., & Tan, J. (2004). *Globalization and marketization in education: A comparative analysis of Hong Kong and Singapore*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Osada, J. (2015, October 15). Man jailed for $2.2 m fake degree scam. *The Straits Times*, p. A8.

Quah, J. (2010). *Public administration Singapore style*. Singapore: Talisman.

Tan, A. (2011, August 21). *Singapore: New "cap" on foreign students*. Retrieved from www.universityworldnews.com.

Tan, J. (1993). Independent schools in Singapore: Implications for social and educational inequalities. *International Journal of Educational Development, 13,* 239–251.

Tan, J. (1998). The marketisation of education in Singapore: Policies and implications. *International Review of Education, 44,* 47–63.

Tan, J. (2004). Singapore: Small nation, big plans. In P. G. Altbach & T. Umakoshi (Eds.), *Asian universities: Historical perspectives and contemporary challenges* (pp. 175–197). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tan, J. (2005). Reforming the university admission system in Singapore: Lessons for Hong Kong. In L. S. Ho, P. Morris, & Y. Chung (Eds.), *Education reform and the quest for excellence: The Hong Kong story* (pp. 63–79). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Tan, J. (2006). Limited decentralization in the Singapore education system. In C. Bjork (Ed.), *Educational decentralization: Asian experiences and conceptual contributions* (pp. 59–70). Dordrecht: Springer.

Tan, J. (2008). National education. In J. Tan & P. T. Ng (Eds.), *Shaping Singapore's future: Thinking schools, learning nation* (pp. 82–94). Singapore: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Teng, A. (2014, November 25). S'pore drops 12 places in ranking of cities for varsity students. *The Straits Times*, p. B2.

Teng, A. (2016, October 22). New measures set to spark exit of more private schools. *The Straits Times*, p. A11.

Ziguras, C., & McBurnie, G. (2015). *Governing cross-border higher education*. London: Routledge.

Jason Eng Thye Tan is Associate Professor in Policy and Leadership Studies at the National Institute of Education, Singapore. He has written extensively on education reform and higher education issues in Singapore.

Chapter 8
Governance, Accountability and Autonomy in Higher Education in Hong Kong

Ka Ho Mok

Introduction

Governments in Asia have exerted serious efforts and concentrated resources on helping a few select universities to improve their global standing. These efforts have resulted in the gradual growth of Asian universities and their steady high rankings in various university league tables. At present, universities are being encouraged to collaborate with the industry or business sector and to engage with the community to promote innovation, knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship. In view of the intensifying competition for global university rankings, in 2014 the government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) started a critical review of university governance through the University Grants Committee (UGC)—an advisory body formed to oversee the strategic directions and macro-policies that govern higher education development in Hong Kong—in order to enhance the global competitiveness of its publicly funded universities. An independent task force led by Sir Howard Newby, former Vice Chancellor of the University of Liverpool in the UK, completed a comprehensive review in 2015.

This chapter highlights the major challenges facing HE in Hong Kong, particularly by examining major governance strategies adopted by universities to enhance their performance. Such changes will facilitate a balance between the call for accountability and universities' assertion of institutional autonomy or academic freedom in Hong Kong. The first part of the chapter discusses the major trends in HE reform in Asia, followed by an examination of the major challenges faced by the HE sector in Hong Kong specifically. The second part focuses on how the UGC reviewed university governance and proposed a new accountability framework to drive the performance of public universities. The final part reflects critically upon the changing university

K. H. Mok (✉)
Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China
e-mail: kahomok@ln.edu.hk

governance model in Hong Kong, especially when universities are forced to address accountability and their assertion of institutional autonomy.

Major Trends in Higher Education Reform in the Asia-Pacific Region

In order to address the influence of globalization and the rapid changes generated by the changing manpower needs of the knowledge-based economy, HE worldwide is undergoing significant reform and transformations. Central to such changes are the massification, privatization, marketization and transnationalization of HE. A wealth of literature has clearly documented the rapid transformations in HE and changes that have taken place not only in the north but also in the south (Kosmützky and Putty 2016; Forrest and Altbach 2011; Marginson 2016; Schwarzman et al. 2015). HE institutions in the Asia-Pacific region are not immune to this overwhelming trend. The governments in this region have endeavoured to reform their HE systems to improve their national competitiveness and secure a good position in the world market. The major features of these reforms are the massification and privatization of HE to generate additional resources for development, the seeking of world-class university status and the internationalization of student learning through engagements in transnational HE (Mok 2017; Mok and Han 2017; Lo 2016; Collins et al. 2016; Oh et al. 2016). The side effects of the rapid massification of HE cannot be neglected, despite the fact that these reform measures have enhanced HE development in the Asia-Pacific. International and comparative research has demonstrated the negative consequences of rushing to expand HE. These negative consequences include exacerbating inequality in tertiary education, the stratification of higher education institutions (HEIs) as a result of the quest for global rankings, underemployment or unemployment of graduate students, decreasing quality of teaching and research, and deprivation of cultural identity (Lo 2014; Mok 2016a, Mok et al. 2016; Mok and Jiang 2017; Liu et al. 2016; Yonezawa et al. 2017).

This chapter establishes broad social and economic contexts in order to examine the major challenges that confront HE in Hong Kong. It refers particularly to the study conducted by Sir Howard Newby on the effect of the most recent review of university governance on university management. Given the potential problems arising from the standardization of performance measurements, this chapter highlights the importance of role differentiation in HE development. This approach was adopted to ensure that HE development fits the diversified needs of students.

Fig. 8.1 Expansion of HE worldwide, in East Asia and in the Pacific Region (indicated by gross enrolment rate) (1999–2014). *Source* United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) database, retrieved from http://data.uis.unesco.org

Rapid Expansion and Quality Monitoring of HE

In order to catch up with counterparts in Europe and North America, HEIs in the Asia-Pacific region expanded enrolment (Hawkins et al. 2014). According to Calderon (2012), HE enrolment in Asia increased by over 50% in the last decade. To cater for domestic economic needs and compete with other nations, governments in the Asia-Pacific region strove to provide their citizens greater opportunities to access university education. Evidence from South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and mainland China shows that both the developed and developing countries in this region expanded their HE provision from a few elite universities to a large cohort of HEIs (see Figs. 8.1 and 8.2).

Special Measures That Drive World-Class Status

Enhanced national competitiveness and hierarchical positioning require the growth of an educated labour force and a rise in the prestige of domestic universities in global university league tables at the country and international levels (Deem et al. 2008). Universities in East Asia are increasingly under pressure to compete internationally. The growing interest in university league tables has become widespread and is no longer found only in the UK and Canada, but also in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan and mainland China (Altbach 2010; Chan 2015; Liu and Cheng 2005; Mok and Hawkins 2010; Mok 2016b). The notion of a "world-class

Fig. 8.2 Expansion of HE enrolment rate in selected Asian countries/areas (1999–2014). *Source* UNESCO database, retrieved from http://data.uis.unesco.org/

university" has become a part of everyday language in many Asian universities (Deem et al. 2008) although there is not yet a consensus on its definition:

> everyone wants a world-class university. Scholars believe in the importance of world-class universities. However, despite the wide use of world-class university, scholars are yet to define this concept. A Google search of this term produces thousands of references. Moreover, many institutions from modest academic universities in central Canada to a new college in the Persian Gulf call themselves "world class". In this age of academic hype, universities in different countries claim this exalted status but often with little justification (Altbach 2015: 5).

Table 8.1 presents different schemes launched by selected Asian governments to pool national/public resources to enable a few universities to compete globally. Central to these schemes is the concentration of funding to help a few universities (especially public ones) to climb up the university league tables.

The recent benchmarking exercises of international universities indicate that government efforts to improve the global profiles of domestic universities have been well rewarded. According to the *Times Higher Education* University Rankings (2015–2016), nine of the top ten universities in Asia ranked among the Top 100 universities worldwide and five were listed in the Top 50: the National University of Singapore (26), Peking University (42), the University of Tokyo (43), the University of Hong Kong (44) and Tsinghua University (47). Table 8.2 presents further details of the performance of Asian universities in global university league tables. The ranking tables developed by Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) and *Times Higher Education* illustrate the positions of Asian universities from 2010 to 2015. Similarly, the Shanghai Jiaotong Academic Ranking shows the rise of Asian universities during the last couple of years (Fig. 8.3).

Table 8.1 Different schemes in promoting world-class universities

Country/region	Project
Hong Kong	Comprehensive education reviews; role differentiation exercise; positioning Hong Kong as international key player in he; university merging and deep collaboration; research assessment exercises; teaching and learning quality process reviews; management reviews and university governance review
Taiwan	Programme for Promoting Academic Excellence of Universities; Five Year—50 Billion Excellence Initiative; Development Plan for World-Class Universities and Research Centers for Excellence
China	"211 Project" and "985 Scheme"
Japan	Flagship Universities Project; "Global 30" Scheme; competitive funding allocation method (the twenty-first-century centres of excellence; the global centres of excellence; the world's first international research centre initiative)
Singapore	"World-Class Universities" Programme

Sources Cheng et al. (2014), Mok (2005)

Table 8.2 Ranking of Asian universities in the Top 100 of the of QS and *Times Higher Education* university league tables (2010–2015)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
QS	n/a	n/a	19	17	17	19
Times	10	9	11	11	11	9

Source QS World University Rankings (2011–2015), retrieved from http://www.topuniversities.com/qs-world-university-rankings; *Times Higher Education* World University Rankings (2010–2015), retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2016/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25


Fig. 8.3 Number of Asian universities in the Shanghai Jiaotong Academic Ranking. *Source* Shanghai Jiaotong Academic Ranking of World Universities (2003–2015), retrieved from http://www.shanghairanking.cn/ARWU2015.html

Table 8.3 World ranking of select Hong Kong universities (2015–2016)

Ranking of world universities (Top 400)	QS (Top 200)	*Times Higher Education* (Top 250)
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (151–200)	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (28)	The University of Hong Kong (44)
The University of Hong Kong (151–200)	The University of Hong Kong (30)	The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (59)
The City University of Hong Kong (201–300)	The Chinese University of Hong Kong (51)	The Chinese University of Hong Kong (138)
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (201–300)	The City University of Hong Kong (57)	The City University of Hong Kong (201–50)
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (301–400)	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (116)	The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (201–50)

Source Shanghai Jiaotong Academic Ranking of World Universities (2015), retrieved from http://www.shanghairanking.cn/ARWU2015.html; QS World University Rankings (2015), retrieved from http://www.topuniversities.com/qs-world-university-rankings; *Times Higher Education* World University Rankings (2015), retrieved from https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2016/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25

The capability of the eight publicly funded universities in Hong Kong is demonstrated by their advantageous positions in global university ranking exercises (Table 8.3). In the academic year 2015–2016, two of the eight were included in the Top 200 Academic Ranking of World Universities of Shanghai Jiaotong University, five were in the QS ranking and three in the *Times Higher Education* table. The overall satisfactory performance of Hong Kong's universities ensured their leading status in the region.

These findings show the steady rise of Asian universities in the global university leagues. As a relatively small economy in the Asia-Pacific region, Hong Kong celebrates the success of Asian universities growing presence on the global map. However, Hong Kong is also becoming increasingly concerned about the intensifying regional and global competition for rankings among universities. This competition also includes HE investments in research and knowledge transfer-related activities. So, the UGC started reviewing university governance and exerted serious efforts to boost the university sector of Hong Kong in order to address the increasingly competitive regional and global environment and assert the global HE leadership. To strengthen the links between universities and the industry, and to bring them together to enhance research capacity, innovation and entrepreneurship, the HKSAR established the new Innovation and Technology Bureau in 2015. This new bureau is responsible for innovation, technology transfer and entrepreneurship, established to encourage universities and industries to work together in projects related to knowledge transfer.

Fig. 8.4 Expenditure on education based on % of GDP (from government sources in educational institutions) (2014). *Source* UNESCO database, retrieved from http://data.uis.unesco.org/?queryid=181. *Note* The figure for Korea is from 2014; for Singapore it is from 2013

Call for "Collaborative Governance" in Enhancing Global Competitiveness

Given the urgency of enhancing innovation and technology/knowledge transfer in Hong Kong, the HKSAR identified problems that universities and the industry need to address synergistically to commercialize research. Figure 8.4 highlights education investment in GDP across selected Asian countries/regions. Investment in education is relatively low in Hong Kong, but education expenditure has repeatedly secured the lion's share of public finance. Figure 8.5 suggests that Hong Kong allocated a relatively small amount of funding to research and knowledge transfer-related endeavours compared with other Asian countries/economies. However, the HKSAR has started investing and actively promoting innovation, technology transfer and entrepreneurship in the last two years.

The highly competitive environment compelled the HKSAR to become more proactive in promoting collaboration between universities and industry through innovation and technology transfer, and in supporting knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship activities across the university sector, industry, business and the community (Mok 2013). The UGC allocated additional funding to the eight publicly funded universities in Hong Kong for knowledge transfer-related activities; this funding boosts the impact of research, technology/knowledge transfer and translational research (University Grants Committee (UGC) 2009–2016) in driving collaboration between the university sector, industry and the community. The author, who is a UGC member, was invited to join a dialogue with senior government officials, including the Chief Executive, Secretary for Education and Secretary for Innovation

Fig. 8.5 Research and development expenditure (as % of GDP). *Source* UNESCO, retrieved from http://www.uis.unesco.org/_LAYOUTS/UNESCO/research-and-development-spending/

and Technology of HKSAR in January 2017. The discussion focused on promoting collaboration between universities, industry, business and the community for knowledge transfer-related endeavours.

Additional funding schemes were introduced following the establishment of the Innovation and Technology Bureau in November 2015 to engage universities in collaborating with industry/business to commercialize research products. Given the growth of the ageing population in Hong Kong, the Bureau of Innovation and Entrepreneurship rolled out a new funding scheme to engage universities and the community in research and knowledge transfer projects to address "ageing and health care". Other forms of funding schemes have been introduced to promote mid-stream research that leads to the commercialization of research products (Legislative Council Panel 2016). This development clearly indicates the emergence of a new governance model that calls for collaboration between the government, the business sector and civil society to co-produce and coordinate service delivery. Engaging multiple stakeholders in collaborative governance reduces the state's dominance in decision-making, which leaves non-state actors, such as the market and civil society, to perform a significant role in shaping policy agenda and implementation, particularly when "collaborative governance" requires the active participation of non-state stakeholders (Ansell and Gash 2008). The growing popularity of "collaborative governance" will result in a new regulatory state characterized by "governance without the government" in public management (Peters and Pierre 1998; Rhodes 1996).

Quantity Improvement and Performance Drives for Quality Enhancement

According to Trow's model, Hong Kong's HE system has entered the universal stage due to the participation of private education/self-financing programmes, thus creating learning opportunities after two decades of expansion (Trow 1973). In the academic year 2014–2015, over 320,000 full-time and part-time students were enrolled in post-secondary courses offered by UGC-funded and self-financing institutions; these courses include those that lead to overseas qualifications and those jointly operated with non-local institutions (Education Bureau (EDB) 2015). A total of 97,583 full-time and part-time students studied in UGC-funded institutions in 2014–2015, of which 6076 were sub-degree students, 80,914 were undergraduates, 3475 were taught postgraduates and 7118 were research postgraduates (University Grants Committee (UGC) 2015). The number of students enrolled in the self-financed sector in 2013–14 was 82,578, including undergraduate, sub-degree, higher diploma and top-up degree levels (Information Portal for Accredited Post-secondary Programmes (iPASS) 2015). The gross enrolment rate of tertiary education in Hong Kong increased from 31% in 2003 to 67% in 2013 (World Bank 2015). The eight UGC-funded HEIs maintained high-quality academic performance during this expansion period. The success of HE in Hong Kong can be attributed to the performance-driven quality assurance culture prevalent in the city state (Mok 2005, 2016b).

The HKSAR positions itself as a regional HE hub with an emphasis on research performance, which is reflected by the research-led formula employed by the government in distributing grants (Mok and Cheung 2011). Since the 1990s, HE in Hong Kong has utilized different forms of performance review, including teaching and learning quality and process reviews (TLQPR), research assessment exercises (RAE), management reviews (MR) and academic quality audits run by the Quality Assurance Council (QAC). The most recent university governance review was led by Sir Howard Newby (Mok and Chan 2016). Universities in Hong Kong, particularly publicly funded institutions under the UGC, have embedded a strong culture of quality enhancement through participation in these performance review exercises, not only for teaching and learning, but also for review and management (Mok and Han 2016). These review exercises emphasize that quality enhancement and performance have continually shaped not only university management but also individual academics who have internalized a culture of performance; this development reveals the "corporate governance" model commonly adopted by public universities in Hong Kong, which holds universities accountable to the public. The silent features of "corporate governance" applied to university management are closely related to the adoption of market principles and practices; these features are embedded with competition, performance management and stringent evaluations of efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the delivery of education services (Mok 2016a; Mok and Chan 2016).

The UGC conducted another review of university governance in 2015 to establish a new accountability framework and drive Hong Kong universities' performance.

The following section discusses the international standing of Hong Kong in various university league tables, followed by an examination of new governance strategies to boost universities in the city state.

Newby Report: *Managing Performance and Enhancing Accountability*

Since the UGC and the government are strong believers in the idea that competition drives excellence, competition among institutions for a proportion of funded places is embedded in the UGC's overall approach. The process of competing for places requires all publicly funded universities to take a critical look at their activities, notably aligning their special role within the HE sector in Hong Kong and addressing community needs through the academic development plan exercise in considering funded places. In addition, the public universities in the city state have become accustomed to the strong quality assurance and enhancement culture through the regular reviews of their teaching and learning, research and knowledge transfer activities in the QAC's institutional audits and RAEs. Therefore, a strong quality culture is well established in the public universities of Hong Kong. With the intention to further boost Hong Kong universities, the Newby Review attempted to engage university councils and senior management to give serious consideration to performance enhancement and public accountability. The UGC's and Education Bureau's monitoring of the performance of tax-funded universities was publicly scrutinized. Sir Newby was invited to conduct a comprehensive review of university governance in Hong Kong by referring to other major university systems in the UK, Australia, Singapore and the USA. Before the review report was released, Sir Newby conducted several rounds of dialogue with key university leaders, including key council officers and senior management. He also met students and faculty representatives. University stakeholders were also consulted. Six recommendations enhance the effectiveness of governing councils were published after the publication of the Newby Report. The report also highlights the importance of developing a generic voluntary code of practice that specifies the role and responsibilities of council members. The Newby Report urged the eight publicly funded universities in Hong Kong to review their governance structure; such a review will enhance their performance and help develop clear strategic plans and refine their human resources management, finance and sustainability and establish a system for managing risks (University Grants Committee (UGC) 2016). The details of the recommendations are as follows.

Recommendation 1

Institutions and the government should consider training processes and the continuing professional development of council members to discharge their duties in an informed manner. Candidates should be identified based on a skills template, which each institution should draft and keep under review. The UGC should conduct induction on sector-wide issues and the institutions on their individual issues.

Recommendation 2

The UGC should create a mechanism for exploration that draws upon international good practice and establish a written accountability framework. Under this framework, the vice chancellor/president and the council should prepare an annual report to ensure balance between the fiduciary responsibilities of council members, institutional autonomy and public accountability.

Recommendation 3

The council has a vital role in strategic planning, which is a process that clearly displays institutional priorities and forms the basis of the council's assessment of institutional performance. To discharge this role, each university should prepare a set of key performance indicators which are timely and relevant, and which allow the council to assess progress toward the priorities agreed in the strategic plan.

Recommendation 4

Risk management oversight is an irreducible responsibility of the council. Under this responsibility, the council should be satisfied that major institutional risks, both financial and reputational, are clearly identified and effectively managed. Therefore, each council member should prepare a risk register that is reviewed at least annually and, ideally, more frequently.

Recommendation 5

Each council should publish a delegation scheme that displays the sub-structure of its committees. Under this mechanism, the council should be satisfied that the managerial oversight of university activities is being handled effectively, including appropriate delegation and reporting mechanisms.

Recommendation 6

The UGC should conduct a review of university governance on a regular basis, ideally every five years (revised and adapted from University Grants Committee (UGC) 2016).

The UGC has seriously considered the leadership of university councils based on these six recommendations. The development of good governance under council leadership with a clear performance culture is essential for these recommendations, which hold the publicly accountable. The Newby Report highlights the importance of protecting the reputation of the university sector in Hong Kong. It urges universities to develop risk registers and determine methods appropriate for managing the risks identified. Such proposals can be understood as responses to the rise of student activists who question conventional university management and governance; student activism has given birth to movements that fight for democratic and university governance in Hong Kong society since the "umbrella movement" arose a few years ago (Kuhn 2016; Ortmann 2015).

After the publication of the Newby Report, the UGC formed a task force to follow up the implementation of university governance reform in Hong Kong. At present, the UGC is debating the details of an accountability framework or the "Hong Kong compact". The council is attempting to offer an overarching framework for managing the performance of universities. Major sector-wide performance indicators have been conceptualized in teaching and learning, research, knowledge transfer, internationalization, finance management and university governance. The proposed accountability framework is expected to integrate these key aspects of performance by promoting synergy across review measures, such as the quality of the student experience of learning and teaching, the quality of research performance and research postgraduates' experience, knowledge transfer and wider engagement, enhanced internationalization, and financial health and institutional sustainability. A few major sector-wide performance indicators will be adopted for inter-university comparison. However, the list of key performance indicators (KPIs)/performance measures (PMs) is not yet finalized. Thus, individual universities exercise autonomy in developing other KPIs that reflect their unique missions, visions or roles. The proposed accountability framework will hold council chairmen and universities' presidents accountable by negotiating KPIs that are consistent with the strategic development plans of individual institutions. The guiding principles of the funding framework adopted by the UGC can be succinctly summarized as the way in which an institution's strategy is articulated in its strategic plan to advance its mission, vision and role, with particular reference to:

- its competitiveness in Hong Kong and internationally;
- collaboration within and outside the UGC sector;
- capacity building in key areas such as internationalization and knowledge transfer;
- the development of the self-financed sector; and
- the use of the outcomes of key exercises, such as QAC audits and the RAE 2014, to influence longer-term strategy.

At the time of writing, we understand that university heads and council chairmen are expected to meet the Task Force Convenor, Sir Howard Newby, in February 2017 as part of what the UGC calls a "process of strategic dialogue", for further discussion of the details of the proposed accountability framework, followed by a formal agreement signed by the UGC and the universities. Once the agreements are signed between the UGC and respective university councils, universities should ensure that they will deliver what they have promised in the KPIs and strategic directions. When the proposed accountability framework is implemented, Hong Kong's universities are expected to work hard to earn, and secure, their reputation and funding support based on performance. Universities' performance reviews are subject to international evaluations and cross-sector comparisons. However, the UGC is sensitive to the different roles of universities. After signing the performance agreements with the UGC, universities will be expected to demonstrate strong evidence of performance following the "fit-for-purpose" reviews with a strong performance-driven orientation (University Grants Committee (UGC) 2016).

Discussion: Protecting Institutional Autonomy and Asserting Accountability

The discussions of university governance suggest that the great institutional autonomy enjoyed by HEIs is the most distinctive feature of university governance in Hong Kong. The eight UGC-funded HEIs in Hong Kong are self-accrediting institutions under the corresponding ordinance. Under the governance mechanism at the institutional level, the Chief Executive acts as the chancellor, a ceremonial role, and the president serves as the administrator under the supervision of the council. The council is a governing body led by an external member and consisting of the president and vice presidents as *ex-officio* members, staff and student members of the university, lay members from the community who are in charge of the administration of the university and senior staff. The senate comprises representatives from faculties. The academic departments represent the principal academic authority of the university, wherein the president is the chairperson who supervises academic activities and grant awards. Some committees are created to oversee specific areas of academic affairs under the senate. Some institutions establish a court to advise the council; the court is always composed of lay members (Lo 2015). This governance structure was inherited from the British administration puts heavy emphasis on "academic freedom" to enhance "institutional autonomy" in the management and governing of universities in Hong Kong.

The HKSAR does not interfere directly with university governance, regardless of whether they are public or private. The HKSAR believes that the success of HE in Hong Kong depends on universities enjoying "academic freedom" and "institutional autonomy" to direct their development. However, the HKSAR government is serious about quality. Therefore, various forms of external review, particularly those formed by international panels, have been coordinated by the UGC to guarantee external monitoring. However, institutions are given autonomy to engage in self-reflective and self-evaluative processes in order to maintain academic standards to the highest level. The foregoing discussions have highlighted the special role of the UGC in the overall governance of universities in Hong Kong. Unlike other Asian counterparts, the Ministry of Education has a decisive role in Hong Kong, and university presidents and faculty members frequently complain that academic freedom and institutional autonomy are being undermined (Chan and Mok 2016). Nevertheless, Hong Kong universities enjoy a considerable level of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, which is its core value and detrimental to creativity, research innovation and scholarships, and in positioning Hong Kong as a strong contender in this highly competitive world.

However, providing institutions the flexibility to manage their own business does not mean that the government has given them an entirely free hand. Instead, the call for accountability and performance-related pressure are examples of "decentralized centralization" as a major governance strategy to drive institutional excellence, in which corporatization and incorporation measures are introduced to improve performance (Shin and Harman 2009). Shin and Harman (2009) proposed three models for

the analysis of university governance—corporate, state and profession. Hong Kong has adopted a "corporate model" of university governance. The quest for world-class status has strengthened the power of university senior management, especially since "management authority is becoming increasingly centralized within the institutional governance to achieve an enhanced performance and efficiency", while "the tradition of *shared governance* is declining" (Shin and Harman 2009: 8). However, the quest for world-class status has become a highly sensitive issue that shapes the relationship between universities and the government. This issue requires striking a balance between institutional autonomy, protecting academic freedom to promote innovation, and creativity in scholarships and accountability for quality assurance that does not directly interfere with university management. The interactions between the two sectors produce different forms of tension that will require both sides to hold dialogues in order to maintain the position of Hong Kong universities in a highly competitive world.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the importance of performance improvement and self-enhancement in university governance in Hong Kong. Sir Howard Newby's review of university governance suggested the introduction of a strong performance-led regulatory regime. The call to deepen collaboration between universities, the industry, business and community aims to facilitate the emergence of "collaborative governance", whereby an increased number of non-university stakeholders will become involved in future research and academic-related activities. Universities in Hong Kong will adopt international benchmarking and stringent performance evaluations to address the intensified competition for global leadership. University governance in Hong Kong will adopt market ideas and practices to transform universities under the "corporate model" of governance by responding positively to the accountability framework. "Collaborative governance" will emerge as the provision of HE becomes increasingly diversified with multiple non-state stakeholders.

Universities in Hong Kong will encounter potential tensions driven by two related models of governance, namely "market governance", which stresses the importance of performance, and "collaborative governance", which emphasizes the importance of "public participation". Striking a balance between these two governance models will require wisdom from university leaders who can address the contentious relationship between professional knowledge and appropriate skills. The drive for performance management will inevitably lead to a potential risk of over-standardization of performance indicators for addressing public accountability. Given the diverse missions, visions, histories and aspirations of the eight publicly funded universities in Hong Kong, the UGC must be highly sensitive in adopting "standardization risk". Such an approach could become counterproductive to developing a diverse but dynamic HE system in Hong Kong. The success of HE in Hong Kong depends on the maintenance of a delicate balance between the call for performance and accountabil-

ity. It also depends on the necessity of embracing diversity in provision by respecting the unique but different roles that fit individual universities' development (Mok 2016b; Mok forthcoming).

References

Altbach, P. G. (2010). The state of the rankings. *Inside Higher Education*. Retrieved from www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/11/11/altbach.

Altbach, P. G. (2015). The costs and benefits of world-class universities. *International Higher Education, 33,* 5–8.

Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18*(4), 543–571.

Calderon, A. (2012). *Massification continues to transform higher education.* Retrieved from http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20120831155341147.

Chan, W. C. (2015). Higher education and graduate employment in China: Challenges for sustainable development. *Higher Education Policy, 28*(1), 35–54.

Chan, S. J., & Mok, K. H. (2016). After massification and response to internationalization: Quality assurance of higher education in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In D. Neubauer, J. Hawkins, M. Lee, & C. Collins (Eds.), *Handbook of Asian higher education* (pp. 423–438). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cheng, Y., Wang, Q., & Liu, N. C. (Eds.). (2014). *How world-class universities affect global higher education: Influences and implications*. Rotterdam: Sense.

Collins, C., Lee, M. N. N., & Neubauer, D. (Eds.). (2016). *The Palgrave handbook of Asian higher education*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Deem, R., Mok, K. H., & Lucas, L. (2008). Transforming higher education in whose image? Exploring the concept of the "world-class" university in Europe and Asia. *Higher Education Policy, 21*(1), 83–97.

Education Bureau (EDB). (2015). *Figures and statistics*. Retrieved from http://www.edb.gov.hk/en/about-edb/publications-stat/figures/index.html.

Forrest, J. F., & Altbach, P. G. (Eds.). (2011). *International handbook of higher education*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Hawkins, J., Mok, K. H., & Neubauer, D. (2014, October). *Higher education massification in the Asia Pacific*. Paper Presented at The Senior Seminar on The Many Faces of Asia Pacific Higher Education in the Massification Era, Hong Kong Institute of Education.

Information Portal for Accredited Post-secondary Programmes (iPASS). (2015). *Statistical information*. Retrieved from http://www.ipass.gov.hk/edb/index.php/en/home/statheader/stat.

Kuhn, A. (2016). *In Hong Kong, a tussle over academic freedom*. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/02/10/465702928/in-hong-kong-a-tussle-over-academic-freedom.

Kosmützky, A., & Putty, R. (2016). Transcending borders and traversing boundaries: A systematic review of the literature on transnational, offshore, cross-border, and borderless higher education. *Journal of Studies in International Education, 20*(1), 8–33.

Legislative Council Panel. (2016). *2016 policy address: Policy initiatives of innovation and technology bureau*. Retrieved from http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/ci/papers/ci20160119cb1-436-5-e.pdf.

Liu, N. C., & Cheng, Y. (2005). The academic ranking of world universities. *Higher Education in Europe, 30*(2), 127–136.

Liu, Y., Green, A., & Pensiero, N. (2016). Expansion of higher education and inequalities of opportunities: A cross-national analysis. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 38*(3), 242–263.

Lo, Y. W. W. (2014). *University rankings: Implications for higher education in Taiwan*. Singapore: Springer.

Lo, W. Y. W. (2015). Revisiting the notion of Hong Kong as a regional education hub. *Higher Education Policy, 28*(1), 55–68.

Lo, W. Y. W. (2016). The recalibration of neoliberalisation: Repoliticising higher education policy in Hong Kong. *Higher Education*, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-016-9989-8.

Marginson, S. (2016). High participation systems of higher education. *The Journal of Higher Education, 82*(2), 243–270.

Mok, K. H. (2005). The quest for world class university: Quality assurance and international benchmarking in Hong Kong. *Quality Assurance in Education, 13*(4), 277–304.

Mok, K. H. (2013). *The quest for entrepreneurial universities in East Asia*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mok, K. H. (2016a). Massification of higher education, graduate employment and social mobility in the Greater China Region. *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 37*(1), 51–71.

Mok, K. H. (2016b, May). *The quest for the flagship university and global ranking: Challenges and prospects for liberal arts education in Asia*. Paper Presented at The Senior Seminar of The Changing Nature and Value of the Flagship University, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China.

Mok, K. H. (Ed.). (2017). *Managing international connectivity, diversity of learning and changing labour markets: East Asian perspectives*. Singapore: Springer.

Mok, K. H. (forthcoming). Should higher education be vocationalised? The role of liberal-arts education in Hong Kong. In T. Purinton & J. Skaggs (Eds.), *American universities abroad: The leadership of independent transnational higher education institutions*. Cairo: AUC Press.

Mok, K. H., & Chan, S. J. (2016). After massification and response to internationalization: Quality assurance of higher education in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In C. Collins, M. N. N. Lee, & D. Neubauer (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of Asian higher education* (pp. 423–438). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mok, K. H., & Cheung, A. B. (2011). Global aspirations and strategizing for world-class status: New form of politics in higher education governance in Hong Kong. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 33*(3), 231–251.

Mok, K. H., & Han, X. (2016). The quest for effective university governance: The Hong Kong experience. *China Higher Education Research, 8,* 55–60. (in Chinese).

Mok, K. H., & Han, X. (2017). Internationalization and transnationalization of higher education: A review of the Asia Pacific region. In K. H. Mok (Ed.), *Managing international connectivity, diversity of learning and changing labour markets: East Asian perspectives* (pp. 42–72). Singapore: Springer.

Mok, K. H., & Hawkins, J. (2010). The quest for world-class status: Globalization and higher education in East Asia. In F. Lazin, N. Jayaram, & M. Evans (Eds.), *Higher education and equality of opportunities: Cross-national perspectives* (pp. 123–143). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Mok, K. H., & Jiang, J. (2017). Massification of higher education: Challenges for admissions and graduate employment in China. In K. H. Mok (Ed.), *Managing international connectivity, diversity of learning and changing labour markets: East Asian perspectives* (pp. 219–243). Singapore: Springer.

Mok, K. H., Wen, Z. Y., & Dale, R. (2016). Employability and mobility in valorization of higher education qualifications: The experiences and reflections of Chinese students and graduates. *Higher Education Policy and Management, 38*(3), 264–281.

Oh, Y. C., Shin, G. W., & Moon, R. J. (Eds.). (2016). *Internationalizing Higher education in Korea: Challenges and opportunities in comparative perspectives*. APARC: Stanford University, CA.

Ortmann, S. (2015). The umbrella movement and Hong Kong's protracted democratization process. *Asian Affairs, 46*(1), 32–50.

Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without government? Rethinking public administration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8*(2), 223–243.

Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). The new governance: Governing without government. *Political Studies, 44*(4), 652–667.

Schwarzman, S., Pinheiro, R., & Pillay, P. (Eds.). (2015). *Higher education in the BRICS countries*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Shin, J. C., & Harman, G. (2009). New challenges for higher education: Global and Asia-Pacific perspectives. *Asia Pacific Education Review, 10*(1), 1–13.

Trow, M. (1973). *Problems in the transition from elite to mass higher education*. Berkeley, CA: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

University Grants Committee (UGC). (2009–2016). *Knowledge transfer*. Retrieved from http://www.ugc.hk/eng/ugc/activity/kt/kt.htm.

University Grants Committee (UGC). (2015). *Statistics*. Retrieved from http://cdcf.ugc.edu.hk/cdcf/searchStatSiteReport.do.

University Grants Committee (UGC). (2016). *Governance in UGC-funded higher education institutions in Hong Kong—Report of the University Grants Committee*. Retrieved from http://www.ugc.edu.hk/eng/ugc/publication/report/report30032016.htm.

World Bank. (2015). *School gross enrollment rate: Tertiary*. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR/countries.

Yonezawa, A., Chen, S., Jung, J., & Lo, W. Y. W. (2017). Catch-up and identity: Developments in and impacts of university rankings in East Asia. In E. Hazelkorn (Ed.), *Global rankings and the geo-politics of higher education: Understanding the influence and impact of rankings on higher education* (pp. 116–127). New York, NY: Routledge.

Ka Ho Mok is the Vice-President and concurrently Lam Man Tsan Chair Professor of Comparative Policy at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. Before joining Lingnan University, he was the Vice-President (Research and Development) and Chair Professor of Comparative Policy at the Hong Kong Institute of Education (now the Education University of Hong Kong), and Associate Dean and Professor of Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Hong Kong. Prior to this, Professor Mok was appointed as the Founding Chair Professor in East Asian Studies and established the Centre for East Asian Studies at the University of Bristol, UK. Professor Mok is the founding Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Asian Public Policy* (Routledge), editor of the series *Asian Education and Development Studies* published (Emerald) and editors for series published by Routledge and Springer.

Chapter 9
Research, Development and Innovation: Transformation in Taiwanese Higher Education

Yu-Ching Kuo and Sheng-Ju Chan

Introduction

Academia Sinica, Taiwan's most prestigious research institution, formed a cross-sectoral committee in 2013 to make recommendations directly to the Taiwanese government on higher education (HE) and science and technology (S&T) policy (高等教育與科技政策建議書) reformulation. Academia Sinica's primary intention was to call for more policy attention to the missing link between three elements: S&T, economic growth and talent cultivation and attraction. The committee recommended that the government's policy focus should be on facilitating higher education institutions (HEIs) to push the frontiers of S&T and on bridging the gap between supply and demand for skilled human resources (Academia Sinica 2013).

In a lecture, the sociologist Manuel Castells (2009) pointed out that the contemporary university is "becom[ing] a central actor of scientific and technological change, but also of other dimensions: of the capacity to train a labour force adequate to the new conditions of production and management" (1). Taiwanese universities are busy institutions, like their counterparts in many other countries, carrying out missions of teaching, research and knowledge transfer and commercialization. These missions are highlighted across the current research, development and innovation (RDI) related policy documents (Ministry of Science and Technology [MOST] 2013; MOST 2015a). Moreover, the Taiwanese university is conceptualized, in Trencher et al. (2013) words, as "a societal transformer and co-creator" (1). As they are funded by the government, Taiwanese universities' research and develop-

Y.-C. Kuo (✉)
National Cheng Kung University, Tainan City, Taiwan
e-mail: kuoyuching907@gmail.com

S.-J. Chan
National Chung Cheng University, Chiayi County, Taiwan

ment (R&D) activities are required to be more socially oriented and are expected to respond to societal demands. Following in the footsteps of technologically advanced countries such as Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA, government policy initiatives have been launched to reorient Taiwanese universities to undertake so-called third-mission activities (Perkmann et al. 2013; Williams 2008; Jongbloed et al. 2008; Laredo 2007; Etzkowitz 2003; Hall et al. 2003; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) with a strong emphasis on knowledge transfer and research collaboration between universities and industry (Chan and Mok 2015). More recent national RDI initiatives and programmes are designed to synchronize universities' third-mission activities with teaching (the first mission) and research (the second mission) and to make contributions to economic growth and social innovation (National Development Council [NDC] 2015; Ministry of Education [MOE] 2013).

A 2014 report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) articulates the interplay between national research priorities and public research institutions:

> Governments orchestrate public research by defining research priorities at national level, developing research infrastructure roadmaps and implementing technology platforms, or through agreements or contracts, research accreditation systems, and allocation of public resources. Stakeholders, including researchers, students, industry and local actors, participate in decision making. (2014: 195)

Taiwan's Fundamental Science and Technology Act requires that a National Science and Technology Development Plan (NSTDP) is drafted once every four years in order to promote S&T development. Moreover, to catch up with the rapid progression of S&T and to respond to pressing societal demands, the Taiwanese government would draft the White Paper on Science and Technology (WPST) two years after the release of NSTDP (MOST 2015a). Both the NSTDP and WPST are meant to meet the critical challenges of RDI and have a positive effect on contemporary political, economic and social affairs. The overarching framework for the RDI policy mix set the government's goal to close the following gaps: "the discovery gap (from research to significant discoveries), the technology gap (from discovery to industrial strength technology), and the business gap (from technology to successful businesses)" (MOST 2013: 2). To close these gaps requires overall horizontal coordination between implementing agencies as well as overall vertical coordination between ministries and implementing agencies (Cunningham 2007). Under the current RDI policy framework, Taiwanese universities are to function as a catalyst for RDI development. For this reason, Taiwanese universities are supposed to be the major performer of public research as well as the largest recipient of public RDI funding.

Taking a policy regime perspective, this chapter explores the emerging RDI policy regime in Taiwan and reviews governance modality in terms of the current funding framework for RDI activities. This leads us to look at the governmental designs of the agencies and ministries involved. We will also discuss whether the governance gap between the national policy agenda and "policy subsystem" politics could potentially weaken the impact of the policy regime on the future of RDI in Taiwan. We ask to what

extent the emergence of RDI policy governance has impacted the current funding framework and look address whether any resulting horizontal policy coordination has been translated into refinement of the current funding framework for universities in Taiwan.

Taiwan's RDI Policy Governance Modality: Emerging Coordinating Platforms

Taiwan also recently embraced a conceptual shift "from the consideration of R&D policy from within a S&T policy framework to an innovation framework" (Cunningham 2007: 21) as a strategic response to challenges faced by the government, particularly when tackling advancing S&T development, slow economic growth, environmental sustainability and building a diverse and inclusive society (National Science Council [NSC] 2010, 2009, 2005; MOST 2015a, 2013). As progressively mapped out the NSTDP and WPST over the last decade, the overall RDI policy framework is composed of different policy subsystems, including but not limited to industrial development, economic growth, manpower, S&T, social innovation and HE policy. The OECD reported in 2008 that many countries have reinforced their institutional mechanisms for S&T governance with a specific focus on inter-ministerial and interagency coordination and capacity strengthening. Additionally, some countries have restructured their governmental organizations to strengthen the links between R&D and HE or those between industrial upgrading and research (OECD 2008; Lewis 2013). Taiwan is one of the countries that have been working to strengthen the links between HE, RDI and industrial renovation both through governmental restructuring and interdepartmental coordination. Another is Taiwan's neighbour, South Korea, which established the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in February 2008 (OECD 2008). To reflect South Korea's overall national priority and stimulate economic growth, this ministry was transformed into the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning in February 2013 (OECD 2014a, b).

Taiwan has proceeded at a relatively slower pace and taken a more incremental approach to governmental restructuring than South Korea. According to the latest version of the WPST (2015–18) (MOST 2015a), significant governmental restructuring took place almost from the beginning of President Ma Ying-Jeou's second term. The Board of Science and Technology (BOST) was established under the Executive Yuan (the executive branch of the Taiwanese government) in January 2012. As an affiliated organization of the Executive Yuan, the BOST has the responsibility for overseeing Taiwan's national S&T development landscape and to see that both human and financial resources are appropriately allocated. The BOST's missions include reviewing the country's S&T policies and conducting inter-ministerial coordination for S&T policy initiatives (BOST 2016). Furthermore, the National Science Council (NSC) was transformed into the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) on 3 March 2014. Taking over the NSC's departmental responsibilities, the MOST continues

Fig. 1 The emerging RDI policy regime

to promote Taiwan's national S&T development, support academic research and develop science parks. During such significant governmental restructuring, formulating and implementing technology and innovation-driven industrial development policy remains one of the Ministry of Economic Affairs' (MOEA) strengths and its main mission.

The majority of government ministries have a role to play in supporting RDI. The degree to which each ministry takes part in formulating and implementing RDI-related policies and initiatives is subject to its ministerial missions and responsibilities. Under the 2012 plan for governmental restructuring, government ministries and agencies were required to demonstrate their ministerial strengths and jointly commit resources to support RDI. This restructuring is expected to enhance Taiwan's RDI performance through the effectiveness of inter-ministerial coordination in RDI policy domains. Indeed, the quality of the dialogue between, predominantly, the BOST, MOST, MOEA and the Ministry of Education (MOE) is key to the effectiveness of inter-ministerial coordination. This allows the adoption of an incremental strategy to come into play in the formulation of the RDI policy regime. From the middle of President Ma's second term (2012–16) in office, the RDI policy regime began to emerge (as illustrated in Fig. 1). The incremental perspective is quite *implicitly* adapted in Taiwan to reshape RDI governance architecture. Such a perspective is often advanced gradually and is expected to have positive long-term effects (World Bank 2010) with "incremental policy changes introduced in sequential rounds" (OECD 2015a: 30).

Inter-ministerial coordination and alignment across RDI policy domains are clearly needed, particularly when government ministries and/or departments are required to collaborate on newly initiated national programmes that are beyond their usual domain (Cunningham et al. 2013; Costantini et al. 2015). Many countries have made efforts to improve coordination of R&D policy regimes by, for example, merging their MOST and MOE. Taiwan has not taken this direction. Instead, the Taiwanese government has established interagency and inter-ministerial task forces (NDC 2015;

BOST 2016; MOE 2015; Executive Yuan 2016, 2014). On the one hand, these establishments enhance horizontal policy coordination, making sure that ministries work collaboratively for national RDI initiatives. On the other, the establishment of these task forces and the emerging RDI policy regime also reveal the Taiwanese government's intention to tackle their concerns about sectoral fragmentation (NSC 2009; MOST 2013, 2015a).

Taking the policy regime perspective, the RDI policy regime in Taiwan is considered to be a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which multiple stakeholders' expectations converge in the broader area of RDI. This policy regime can be regarded as governing arrangements for RDI-related areas (Krasner 1982; Keohane and Nye 1989; Kratochwil and Ruggie 2001; May and Jochim 2013; Wilson 2000). In the context of the RDI policy regime, each task force emerged to resolve specific pressing issues. While economies, technology and social progress and development have revolutionized the way we live in the contemporary world, they have posed new challenges and issues for governments across the world. The Taiwanese government is particularly concerned with pressing issues such as Internet security and behavioural norms, economic and environmental resilience, the industrialization of emerging technologies, cultivating and retaining so-called talent, technological innovation and the growing gaps between academic research and industry practice (MOST 2015a: ii; MOST 2013: 5). With these rising concerns and new challenges, cross-ministerial boards and task forces (with the increasing involvement of non-state actors) have sprung up like mushrooms.

According to press releases and statements from either the Executive Yuan or relevant governance committees (Executive Yuan 2016; NDC 2015; MOE 2015), these boards and task forces are considered by the Taiwanese government to be mechanisms for engaging the relevant ministries to collaborate in tackling these challenges and issues. For example, the Innovation and Startups Task Force was created in 2014 by the Executive Yuan. This task force presents a multilevel governance structure in itself: led by two Ministers without Portfolio appointed by the Executive Yuan, it includes the ministers of the MOE, MOEA, MOST, the Ministry of Culture (MOC) and the Ministry of Labour (MOL) and the chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission (NDC 2016a). The Ministers without Portfolio are responsible for facilitating inter-ministerial dialogues and coordination, aiming to tackle pressing issues such as social innovation and youth entrepreneurship, enhancing the innovation ecosystem. For example, the BOST, apart from the ministers of relevant agencies, seats on the governance committee are also reserved for industrialists, leading scholars (including fellows of Academia Sinica) and business sector representatives.

While we intend to avoid making any value judgement on such a governance modality, we are concerned about whether Taiwan might encounter governance failure in an RDI policy regime and whether there is any sign of such a governance failure. As Jessop (2006) illustrates, "there is no pre-given formal maxim or reference point to judge its success" (381). One factor behind the failure of governance is that "gaps can open between representatives engaged in communication (networking, negotiation, etc.) and those whose interests and identities are being represented"

(Jessop 2006: 381–82). Despite the improvement of transparency and accountability being a government initiative, most seats in the governance committees of these task forces are reserved for ministerial representatives. Academics, experts from industry and representatives of NGOs are only occasionally invited to sit on the committees. Notably, the current RDI policy governing architecture does not present multiple stakeholders. The contemporary notion of governance has highlighted a shift from a hierarchic bureaucracy towards a greater use of networks in the delivery of public services, indicating an assumption that the state actor "increasingly depends on other organizations to secure its intentions, deliver its policies, and establish a pattern of rule" (Bevir 2006: 364). Taiwan has not yet adopted this notion, nor has it openly encouraged the participation of multiple stakeholders when it comes to appointing or selecting the members of governance committees.

In terms of planning process, RDI initiatives are developed through a bottom-up approach. They are designed and strategies are drafted by individual ministries, with some inter-ministerial collaboration. These initiatives and strategies are mostly submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval. The emerging RDI policy regime (as illustrated in Fig. 1) shows that there has been a governance shift from a bottom-up approach to an integration of both bottom-up and top-down approaches. Such a shift is, again, incremental, and incremental changes, as described by Biermann et al. (2012), are "minor reforms that attempt to increase efficiency and effectiveness of governance without fundamentally altering decision-making rules, basic organizational arrangements, funding levels, or legal commitments, among others" (1307). Taiwan's emerging RDI policy regime could be helpful in coordinating inter-ministerial joint efforts across the government—without requiring any cabinet reshuffle or merging of ministries—to support the research continuum, particularly from basic research towards either experimental development or the commercialization of research products. At different stages of the research continuum, the MOE, MOEA and MOST play their part in supporting Taiwanese universities' RDI activities. The MOE is primarily responsible for supporting institutional research excellence through project grants and developing students' capacity to conduct research and enhancing their innovation skills. One of the MOEA's responsibilities is to facilitate academic-industrial collaboration, often through launching initiatives, while providing funding for HEIs or individual university staff to conduct product-oriented research. The MOST's focus has been more on supporting individual academics and researchers, with some funding support for university's research excellence. Additionally, the MOST has a long history of supporting curiosity-driven scientific research and is still under pressure to provide more funding to support applied research and technology development (See Table 4).

Higher Education Institutions and the RDI Funding Framework

The OECD reported the result of its STI Outlook policy questionnaire 2014:

> Most countries aim at consolidating the innovation ecosystem by strengthening public R&D capacity and infrastructures, improving overall human resources, skills and capacity building, and improving framework conditions for innovation (including competitiveness) … countries at different stages of socio-economic development share some STI policy priorities, while other priorities are specific to certain countries. This is reflected in the relative concentration of countries in strategic STI (Science, Technology, and Innovation) policy fields according to the intensity of their gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD). (90)

Taiwan is not an OECD member country, but has been following similar trends to OECD member countries. The Taiwanese government looks to its universities, as mentioned, as a catalyst for RDI development. To enhance RDI performance, Taiwan has focused recent policy on closing the discovery gap, the technology gap and the business gap, aiming to achieve the policy objective that "an innovation culture should be built by higher education and research organizations which are expected to produce highly original and important discoveries—bedrocks of the high-barrier, high-risk, and high-profit emerging industries" (MOST 2013: 55). To close these gaps, the Taiwanese government spent 3.31% of GDP on R&D in 2017, up from 3.02% in 2013. This places Taiwan ahead of the average in OECD members (2.37% in 2017) (see Table 1). Among its neighbours, Taiwan falls behind Korea (4.55% in 2017) and China (2.13% in 2017). Taiwan's Gross Development Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) over the last decade has steadily increased (MOST 2015b, 2018) and has begun slightly ahead of Japan (3.14% in 2016; 3.20% in 2017) since 2016. Despite of marginally being ahead of China (19.81%) in 2017, Taiwan falls behind OECD members (including UK and USA), at least since 2010 (OECD.STAT 2019a).

Overall, the Taiwanese government's R&D expenditure has been decreasing, which parallels the reduction in HEIs' share of R&D expenditure due to the fact that the majority of HEIs' RDI funding is provided by the Taiwanese government. The business sector's contribution to R&D has been increasing and represented 79% in 2017 of the funding provided by both the Taiwanese government and industry (MOST 2018). This corresponds with what the OECD (2014a, b) indicates:

> The current budgetary outlook puts pressure on public R&D spending and has encouraged governments to adjust the design and governance of public research policy. OECD R&D expenditure by the higher education and government sectors has stagnated as a percentage of GDP since 2010 in a context of weak GDP performance. (198)

Over the last five years, the volume of HE expenditure on R&D (HERD) in Taiwan has been decreasing (see Table 3), from 0.33% in 2013 to 0.30% in 2015. The number has remained the same no sign of fluctuation since 2015. In 2017, Taiwan (0.30%) has fallen far behind South Korea (0.39%), Japan (0.38%) and Israel (0.52%), not to mention the OECD (total) average, which has stayed around 0.41%. Taiwan has been lagging behind developed countries (Table 2).

Table 1 Percentage of GERD financed by government

	2013		2014		2015		2016		2017	
	GERD as a percentage of GDP (%)	Percentage of GERD financed by government (%)	GERD as a percentage of GDP (%)	Percentage of GERD financed by government (%)	GERD as a percentage of GDP (%)	Percentage of GERD financed by government (%)	GERD as a percentage of GDP (%)	Percentage of GERD financed by government (%)	GERD as a percentage of GDP (%)	Percentage of GERD financed by government (%)
Israel	4.07	12.44	4.18	13.53	4.26	14.95	4.39	13.55	4.54	..
Japan	3.31	17.30	3.40	16.02	3.28	15.41	3.14	15.02	3.20	15.00
Korea	4.15	22.83	4.29	22.96	4.22	23.66	4.23	22.68	4.55	21.58
UK	1.64	29.12	1.66	28.36	1.67	27.67	1.68	26.26	1.66	..
USA	2.71	27.53	2.72	25.94	2.72	25.28	2.76	23.56	2.79	22.78
OECD—Total	2.33	28.28	2.35	27.32	2.34	26.86	2.34	25.81	2.37	..
China	1.99	21.11	2.02	20.25	2.06	21.26	2.11	20.03	2.13	19.81
Singapore	1.99	39.33	2.16	37.09	..	..	..	..	..	..
Taiwan	3.02	23.60	3.01	21.98	3.06	21.43	3.17	21.57	3.31	20.00

Source Compiled from OECD.STAT (2019a; 2019b). Data extracted on 07 Mar 2019

Table 2 Taiwan's R&D expenditure indicators

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP	3.02	3.01	3.06	3.16	3.30
R&D expenditure by source of funds (%)					
Business enterprise	75.2	76.9	77.5	77.4	79.0
Government	23.6	22.0	21.4	21.6	20.0
Other national sources	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9
Abroad	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
R&D expenditure by sector of performance (%)					
Business enterprise	75.3	76.8	77.4	77.3	78.7
Government	13.3	12.5	12.4	13.1	12.1
Higher education institutions	11.1	10.4	9.9	9.4	8.9
Private non-profit sector	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Basic research expenditure as a percentage of R&D expenditure	9.3	9.1	8.9	8.3	7.8

Source Compiled from MOST (2018: 6)

Table 3 Higher education research and development (HERD) as a percentage of GDP

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Israel	0.52%	0.52%	0.52%	0.52%	0.52%
Japan	0.45%	0.43%	0.40%	0.39%	0.38%
Korea	0.38%	0.39%	0.38%	0.39%	0.39%
United Kingdom	0.43%	0.43%	0.42%	0.41%	0.39%
United States	0.37%	0.36%	0.35%	0.36%	0.36%
OECD—Total	0.42%	0.42%	0.41%	0.41%	0.41%
China	0.14%	0.14%	0.14%	0.14%	0.15%
Singapore	0.58%	0.59%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Taiwan	0.33%	0.31%	0.30%	0.30%	0.30%

Source Compiled from OECD.STAT (2019c). Data extracted on 07 Mar 2019

According to the MOST's (2018) statistics, R&D expenditure in the HE sector from US$1669.77 millions in 2017 up 1.3% from 2016. However, the percentage of GERD performed by the HE sector has been alarmingly decreasing since 2011(12.20%) (11.7% in 2013, 9.89 in 2015 and 8.94% in 2017) (OECD.STAT 2019d). The MOST (2015b) also indicates that "the negative growth in 2014 was caused by the gradual shrinkage of the second phase of 'Aim for the Top University Project'" (p. 21–22) and by the relative shortage of other governmental institutions.

Taiwanese universities' R&D funding is mostly provided by the government (see Fig. 2). Over the past five years, government funding has accounted for around 82% of R&D expenditure. There has also been a notable increase in funding from the business

Fig. 2 Taiwan's HERD funding by source of funds *Source* Compiled from MOST (2018, p.160)

sector (from 6.7% in 2010 to 10% in 2014) as a result of the collaboration between industry and academia, which has been actively promoted by the government (MOST 2015b, 2018). Despite a slight increase in funding received from the business sector, primarily through industry and academia's collaborative projects, the gradual decline in government funding has hindered universities' RDI performance and productivity, which is what Taiwanese academics and R&D researchers least wanted to happen (Sun 2015).

A number of cross-ministerial and cross-agency national RDI programmes have been launched to address national challenges through interdisciplinary research (see Table 4), with various projects ranging from a few months to four or five years. For example, the Aim for the Top University Project started in 2006 and ended in 2016. These RDI programmes are delivered as part of a set of policy instruments for financing university-based research. As we can observe, these programmes were launched and inspected by various ministries with a focus on universities' capacity in RDI.

In general, Taiwanese universities are funded through the following policy instruments and strategies with the above government-funded RDI programmes, which are integrated as part of their delivery (Chang and Kuo 2016).

1. Competitive Research Funding Schemes

   • These schemes are conventionally application-based, peer review-based and time-bound.

Table 4 Government-funded RDI programmes (since 1997)

Year	Name	Leading ministry	Sub-projects/aims
1997–	National science and technology programmes	MOST, MOHW, MOEA, Academia Sinica, Development Center for Biotechnology, National Health Research Institute and so on	• Sub-programmes include the following: • Networked communications programme; national research programme for biopharmaceuticals; national project for intelligent electronics; national science and technology programme—energy; Taiwan e-Learning and digital archives programme; national programme on nanotechnology • to bring together resources of the up-, mid- and downstream sectors and industry, government, academia and the research community • to boost R&D results through prioritized implementation
2010–	I-RiCE (International Research-Intensive Center of Excellence) programme	MOST	• a research excellence initiative, its sub-programmes include the blue skies research programme, whose researchers are funded to conduct curiosity-driven scientific research • to provide necessary assistance to universities in Taiwan to build up research partnerships with foreign research institutions while attracting leading scholars from abroad • to raise R&D capability in basic science and key technologies

Table 4 (continued)

Year	Name	Leading ministry	Sub-projects/aims
2006–2016	Aim for the Top University Project	MOE	• starting in 2006, the government provided roughly TWD 10 billion annually for the "Development Plan for World-Class Universities and Research Centers of Excellence" (initial project) and succeeded by the "Aim for the Top University Project" in 2011 • to support top Taiwanese universities to approach the standards of top-ranking international universities in terms of infrastructure, experimental instruments and equipment and recruitment of international manpower
2011–	Germination programme	MOST	• to fund six universities to establish incubation centres • to improve the capability of academic research organizations to move research discoveries from the laboratory to industry
2012–	Stimulating the utilization of academic IPs action plan	MOEA (collaborating with the MOST and MOE)	• to promote the diffusion of technologies developed by the academic sector • to strengthen technological linkage between universities and industry • to fund academic research organizations' product-oriented research

Table 4 (continued)

Year	Name	Leading ministry	Sub-projects/aims
2012–	PIONEER grants for AIC programme	MOST, MOEA	• to bridge the gap between academic research and industry practice • to encourage Taiwanese companies to build up alliances with academia to develop key technologies needed in next-generation products
2012–	Minor alliance projects	MOST	• to help resolve the problem of Taiwanese SMEs' insufficient R&D capability • to encourage and fund the establishment of core technological R&D laboratories in universities
2013–	Topic selection and incubation fund	MOST	• to achieve an incubation effect and ensure that promising research results reach the market
2013–	100-Person pioneering project trial programme	MOST	• to encourage researchers to take adventurous research directions and explore new fields of research
2013–	Free excellence academic research trial programme	MOST	• to encourage academic research organizations to break research constraints and to achieve excellence • to boost academic research organizations' research capacities and standards
2014	The industrial value creation programme for academia	MOEA	• to drive new ventures • to spread academic R&D results to industries by facilitating multilateral collaboration • to generate greater industrial value and social benefit

Table 4 (continued)

Year	Name	Leading ministry	Sub-projects/aims
2015	Taiwan rapid innovation prototyping league for entrepreneurs	MOEA, MOST, NDC	• to assist the new start-up team and venture capitalists to quickly verify the feasibility of commercial investment • to select potential new venture sources • to provide professional advanced technology and entrepreneurship advices
2016	Asia Silicon Valley development plan-from IT to IoT: engineering a new industrial transformation for Taiwan		• to build an IoT and start-up ecosystem • to integrate Taiwan's hardware advantages into software applications • to upgrade Taiwan's industry with innovation • to connect with global innovation clusters for technology, talent, capital and markets

Source Compiled from MOST (2015a, b, 2017), NDC (2016b, 2016c)

- The majority of schemes are competitively organized and provided by the MOST for researchers based at universities, government-affiliated research institutions and hospitals.

2. Mission-oriented Project Grants

- Projects are carried out to help achieve the ministry or agency's policy objectives.
- These grants are mostly provided to conduct goal-oriented research.

3. National Initiatives

- These initiatives' objectives are customarily set to correspond to national policy priorities; for example, enhancing research excellence initiatives, stimulating industry-university collaboration and cultivating and retaining research talent.
- The governing body is interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral and has a broad-based representation across the S&T research continuum.

Fig. 3 RDI funding framework: The flow of funding streams and distribution. *Source* Adapted from MOST (2015a: 16)

4. Promoting and facilitating an industry-university collaboration fund

- Some programmes are designed to stimulate university-industry collaboration through providing research grants or matching grants.
- Funded projects are often established to enhance knowledge transfer and reduce the mismatch between demand and supply of skilled manpower.
- Communication platforms and infrastructure are established to facilitate industry-university partnership and knowledge/intellectual property transfer (e.g. Science Park and university-based technology transfer centres).

These policy instruments are delivered through the funding framework illustrated in the WPST (2015–2018) (MOST 2015a), shown in Fig. 3.

Under this framework, RDI funding is distributed across basic research, applied research and experimental development. While the MOE, MOEA and other ministries provide funding for research development and industrial upgrading, the MOST is responsible for reviewing the S&T budget, securing national academic research funding mechanisms and providing research funding to encourage basic and applied S&T research. According to the MOST's 2016 ministerial report, 78.6% of its budget currently goes to supporting academic research (MOST 2016). Additionally, one significant role that the MOST (since 2014; the NSC before 2014) plays in relation to Taiwan's S&T development is to promote the national S&T programmes through engaging the community across the S&T research continuum and bringing together scientists, scholars, entrepreneurs and government officials. Together with other ministries such as the MHW (Ministry of Health and Welfare), MEA, MOE and Council of Agriculture, the BOST and MOST play critical roles in funding Taiwanese uni-

Fig. 4 RDI expenditure by type of R&D. *Source* Adapted from MOST (2018: 12)

versities and other government-funded research institutions to conduct RDI-related projects.

Balancing Basic Research, Applied Research and Experimental Development?

While aligning with the way that OECD classifies and defines R&D activities in its Frascati Manual (OECD 2015b), research in Taiwan is categorized as basic research, applied research and experimental development (MOST 2018). Figure 4 shows how RDI funding has been distributed across these categories over the past five years. The amount of funding distributed across these three categories has been stable on an annual basis. In terms of the share of GERD, expenditure on experimental development has shown a persistent trend of gradual increase over the past five years. By contrast, basic research expenditure has been decreasing slowly, from 9.3% in 2013 to 7.8% in 2017.

As to the different types of R&D carried out in Taiwan, there is substantial variance across sectors. As Fig. 5 demonstrates, HEIs carry out more basic research than other sectors, and the Taiwanese government provides the majority of their research funding. The business enterprise sector focuses its R&D on experimental development and applied research, while the government sector is mainly concerned with basic research. However, as shown in Fig. 5, HEIs' spending on basic research has been decreasing, from 57.1% in 2013 down to 53.6% in 2017, while the business sector's spending has increased, from 3.8% in 2013 to 5.9% in 2017. Such development is driven by the government's active promotion of academic-industrial collaboration (MOST 2015b, 2017).

Fig. 5 RDI expenditure by type of R&D and sectors of performance. *Source* Adapted from MOST (2018: 13)

A question that can be posed here is whether there is a budget war between basic and applied research. In April 2015, the latest strategy planning for RDI budget arrangements and priorities was announced by Shyu Jyuo-Min (徐爵民), then the Minister of the MOST. Shyu's announcement highlighted that the new research funding distribution method would favour research projects in industrial development, economic growth and social innovation. He also said that research of lesser importance to Taiwan would not be on the MOST's priority funding list. His words imply that basic research projects are inferior to applied research projects, attracting media attention and sparking debates among scientists (Sun 2015).

Figures 4 and 5 show a quite persistent RDI funding trend and policy direction. The RDI funding for basic research has decreased in parallel with the drop in HEIs' performance and spending on this category of research over the past five years. Shyu's speech can be considered a policy message as well as a guiding principle for RDI funding distribution, which the policy documents produced over the last decade have been intended to deliver; while curiosity-driven scientific research and problem-oriented research are equally important, more research funding should be provided to conduct the latter. Such a guiding principle for RDI funding distribution is based on the assumption that academic research should be more problem-oriented and should show a grasp of real economic problems and societal demands, while researchers should strive to increase the market value of their research findings (NSC 2005, 2009,

2010; MOST 2013, 2015a, 2017; Academia Sinica 2013). Based on this assumption, one element of the funding strategy is to encourage alliances between academia and industry in order to address pressing issues and facilitate multiple dimensions of knowledge transfer. This wider idea of greater integration with industrial development might be the cause of decreasing government spending on basic research.

The Governance Gap and Coordination Mechanisms

We are unsure whether such a long-term strategic roadmap has been produced and incorporated into the emerging RDI policy regime. Drawing a roadmap requires joint efforts across government ministries. While the issue of fragmented policy governance and competing policy subsystems (Ministry of Education 2013) remains unresolved, a governance gap can be identified here. This gap is between the national policy agenda and policy subsystems, which could eliminate or at least lessen the impact of this policy governance on the future of RDI in Taiwan. This governance gap is reflected in the overlapping RDI programmes run by different ministries and government agencies. For example, the MOST launched the International Research-Intensive Centers of Excellence (I-RiCE) initiative while the MOE is running the Aim for the Top University Project. Both aim to enhance Taiwanese universities' research capability and to cultivate and attract research talent. Such overlapping suggests that both ministries' programmes serve to build up research and innovation capacity at the institutional or even national level. The duplication highlights the gaps at the inter-ministerial level.

In the same vein, Academia Sinica's (2013) report indicates that there is too much fragmentation, duplication and overlapping in ministries' academic-industrial collaborative initiatives. There are misalignments between these initiatives' policy objectives, while multiple ministries seek to cultivate and attract the same pool of highly skilled talent. There is supposed to be a policy coordination mechanism to integrate resources and to coordinate these initiatives. This mechanism, however, had not been functioning as it should. Many academic-industrial collaboration initiatives have similar aims, but are accounted for and run by different individual ministries. This is mainly because each ministry has its own ministerial focus on facilitating these academic-industrial collaborations and supporting HEIs' RDI activities and formulates a budget accordingly. Academia Sinica expressed its concern, through the 2013 report, that these initiatives may not be helpful in producing frontier technology or in meeting the demands of industry. The duplication and overlap result in waste of financial resources (Academia Sinica 2013). Academia Sinica's concern about the policy coordination mechanism in the area of academic-industrial collaboration was addressed in 2013. Industry-Academic-Research Collaboration Task Force in 2018 (see Fig. 1), with the aim to integrate inter-ministerial resources, reduces the gap between academic research and industrial practice and eliminates the mismatch between demand and supply of skilled manpower. The MOE (2015) reported in December 2015 that several inter-ministerial meetings were held in the

first half of 2015. These meetings gathered ministries (MOE, MEA, MOL, MOST and the Council of Agriculture) to discuss the promotion of the academic-industrial collaboration initiatives that have been run by individual ministries, looking for ways to integrate and collaborate. The focus of the inter-ministerial coordination so far has been on minimizing the mismatch between demand and supply of skilled manpower in general and on enhancing the employability of graduates through internships and placements. Arguably, other elements, such as facilitating knowledge transfer, which is often regarded as the essence of academic-industrial collaboration, have been overshadowed by the task force's current efforts. Nor has there been much policy discussion about how to support universities to institutionalize third-mission activities and synchronize them with teaching and research.

Discussion: Governance Modality, Funding Flows and Types of Research and Development

We have examined Taiwan's emerging RDI policy governance modality, highlighting the Taiwanese government's intention to enhance policy coordination, which in turn supports Taiwanese universities in their RDI activities. As mentioned, the governance turn in RDI policy from a bottom-up approach to an integration of bottom-up and top-down approaches has been incremental. The incremental strategy often draws criticism, such as claims that it is "insufficiently proactive, goal oriented and ambitious" and "excessively conservative, because increments are small and bargaining favours organised elites" (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992: 258, cited in Meadowcroft 1999: 33). In light of Weiss and Woodhouse's comments on the incremental strategy, it can be argued that although this emerging RDI policy regime highlights collaboration and negotiation between government ministries, participation and decision-making are reserved for the political elites. Neither the processes nor the results of their policy discussions align with the latest version of the WPST (2015–18) (MOST 2015a), which intends to "strengthen citizen participation mechanisms and enhance openness, transparency" (iii). We have illustrated the emergence of the RDI policy regime reflecting on the current funding framework in general and that for the Taiwanese HEIs in particular. Arguably, the current RDI funding mechanism has remained unchanged for at least a decade. At the time of this writing, the absence of adequate evidence makes it impossible to put forward suggestions regarding any impact of policy coordination on the refinement of the current funding framework for RDI-related projects. We could be left to wonder about the extent to which "political strategy 'incrementalism' might simply be a restatement of the obvious fact that radical change is the exception, not the rule" (Meadowcroft 1999: 33).

According to previous dominant policy discourse, mentioned above, the predominant guiding principle for funding university-based RDI projects is that they should be more problem-oriented and aim to increase the market value of their research findings. However, such a guiding principle raises the question to what extent is it

impossible to differentiate between basic research, applied research and experimental development (Bentley et al. 2015). Gulbrandsen and Kyvik's (2010) research argues that such differentiation is "based on misconceptions about modern knowledge production" (2010: 344), although it can be still useful. In Norway, for instance, "most university researchers will characterize their activities as a combination of two or even all three types" (353). Stokes (2011) notes that:

> This tension (between basic research and applied research) is nicely captured by the familiar idea of a spectrum between basic research and applied research, the one-dimensional graphic that came to represent the static version of the postwar paradigm; research cannot be closer to one of the poles of this continuum without being farther away from the other. (3)

In line with Stokes's work, in the United States, Mazzucato (2015) suggests that "basic science and concrete technological problems feed off each other in dynamic ways", arguing that "policies that assume a linear progression from basic science to commercialization tend to fail". The European Research Council has been avoiding this linear perspective, emphasizing the concept of frontier research:

> The term "frontier research" reflects a new understanding of basic research. On one hand it denotes that basic research in science and technology is of critical importance to economic and social welfare. And on the other that research at and beyond the frontiers of understanding is an intrinsically risky venture, progressing in new and the most exciting research areas and is characterized by the absence of disciplinary boundaries. (European Research Council 2016)

To prevent the policy myopia that results from distorting "the portfolio of public investments towards short-term investments" (Aidt and Dutta 2007: 2), such a linear perspective and short-term thinking are to be avoided. A long-term strategic roadmap is needed to strengthen RDI capability and capacity while considering the financial sustainability of frontier and curiosity-driven research. This argument has significant implications for Taiwanese RDI orientations in recent years. Though problem-oriented and applied research seems to have a better market value in the short term, basic but fundamental innovation may be the cornerstone of major breakthroughs in cutting-edge technology and research.

Concluding Remarks: Political Disturbance Ahead

A governance gap between national policy agenda and policy subsystems has been explored above. The fragmentation, duplication and overlapping in the design and implementation of RDI initiatives and programmes are the by-products of this governance gap. Charbit (2011) categorizes governance gaps like this as "policy gap[s]" (16). Policy gaps, as found by Charbit and Michalun (2009), result from "sectoral fragmentation across ministries and agencies" and "occur when ministries take a purely vertical approach to policy issues that are inherently cross-sectoral" (24). On the one hand, many ministerial initiatives are duplicative, overlap in their aims and target the same talent pools; on the other, when ministries collaborate for national

initiatives, the ambiguity of the roles and responsibilities of the ministries involved is a persistent issue. However, each ministry has developed different practices and organizational approaches in order to support Taiwanese HEIs' RDI activities. The overarching governance structures of these inter-ministerial boards and task forces suggest that the Taiwanese government intends to reduce the degree of sectoral fragmentation in RDI policymaking and implementation across ministries. As suggested by Biermann et al. (2009), some degree of fragmentation is "a frequent characteristic of governance architectures" (16), and "disjointed efforts are the norm rather than the exception" (May and Jochim 2013: 432). Biermann et al. (2009) designate three typologies to differentiate degrees of fragmentation in the context of governance architecture: synergistic fragmentation, cooperative fragmentation and conflictive fragmentation. Taiwan's RDI governance structures may not have an issue with conflictive fragmentation, in which different ministries have "conflicting sets of principles, norms, and rules" (Biermann et al. 2009: 21) when it comes to supporting HEIs' RDI activities. However, Taiwanese policymakers may need to embrace synergistic fragmentation, which "provides for effective and detailed general principles that regulate the policies in distinct yet substantially integrated institutional arrangements" (21). At the time of writing, we have insufficient evidence to suggest the extent to which these task force meetings have effective leeway to make institutional arrangements for inter-ministerial coordination to ensure that HEIs' RDI activities are adequately supported. Inadequate coordination among ministries, as we have discussed in this chapter, can cause duplicate efforts.

Furthermore, the policy gap results in waste of financial resources and hinders the strengthening of what the European Commission (2011) calls the knowledge triangle in the context of the Horizon 2020 research and innovation project: "research, researcher training and innovation" (18). In establishing interagency and inter-ministerial task forces, the administration of former President Ma Ying-Jeou intended to enhance horizontal policy coordination while strengthening connections between RDI and education. That was before March 2016. Taiwan's RDI policy regime has been politically vibrant. Following Taiwan's 2016 general election, President Tsai Ing-wen took office. The emergence of a polarized Parliament has made it difficult to foresee either the direction or priority of RDI policy governance. Its impact on the refinement of the current funding framework for universities in Taiwan remains unknown, but the financial sustainability of university-based RDI projects does not look at all promising. For example, Ma's Minister of Education promised that the Higher Education Blueprint for the New Generation Initiative (the post-Aim for the Top University Project) would proceed as planned by December 2016. In June 2016, the budget for this initiative was frozen by the members of the Legislative Yuan (the Taiwanese Parliament). This decision was made after the publication of the 2016 QS World University Rankings, which indicate that many Taiwanese universities have fallen. The Taiwan's Parliament explained this decision was reached because the Aim for the Top University Project (2011–2016) has not successfully enhanced Taiwanese universities' research capacity, in turn failing to boost Taiwanese universities' competitiveness at the global level (Chang 2016).

In this chapter, we have looked at the emergence of RDI policy and its potential impact on the refinement of the current funding framework. We also have discussed the interplay between the current RDI funding framework and university-based RDI projects. Since the overarching RDI policy governance architecture is still under construction, it remains to be seen what President Tsai's administration will do with this meta-level of RDI policy governance. We consider this to be an area that deserves further research and policy attention. Given the continuous uncertainty enveloping Taiwanese universities' RDI activities, we are committed to exploring this impact through further research.

References

Academia Sinica, Taiwan. (2013). 高等教育與科技政策建議書 (*Consultation paper on higher education and science and technology policy*). Retrieved from https://www.sinica.edu.tw/advice/advice_edu2.pdf.

Aidt, T. S., & Dutta, J. (2007). Policy myopia and economic growth. *European Journal of Political Economy, 23*(3), 734–753.

Bentley, P. J., Gulbrandsen, M., & Kyvik, S. (2015). The relationship between basic and applied research in universities. *Higher Education, 70*(4), 689–709.

Bevir, M. (2006). Governance. In M. Bevir (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of governance* (pp. 364–381). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Biermann, F., Abbott, K., Andresen, S., Bäckstrand, K., Bernstein, S., Betsill, M. M., et al. (2012). Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving earth system governance. *Science, 335*(6074), 1306–1307.

Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., Van Asselt, H., & Zelli, F. (2009). The fragmentation of global governance architectures: A framework for analysis. *Global Environmental Politics, 9*(4), 14–40.

Board of Science and Technology (BOST), Taiwan. (2016). *About BOST: Missions & structure.* Retrieved from http://www.bost.ey.gov.tw/bost_en/cp.aspx?n=B262C0BDBDF58D25.

Castells, M. (2009, August 7). *Lecture on higher education*. Paper presented at the Centre for Higher Education Transformation, Cape Town.

Chan, S. J., & Mok, K. H. (2015). The quest for entrepreneurial university in Taiwan: Policies and practices in industry-academy cooperation. In J. Hawkins & K.-H. Mok (Eds.), *Research, development and innovation in Asia Pacific higher education* (pp. 135–154). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chang, C. H. (張錦弘). (2016, June 17). Taiwanese universities are slipping down university rankings—the post-aim for the Top University Project budget has been frozen by the members of Legislative Yuan (大學排名多退步 立委凍結 3 億元邁頂預算). Retrieved from http://udn.com/news/story/6928/1767361.

Chang, Y.-S., & Kuo, Y.-C. (2016). *The interplay between the development of research funding systems and the creation of a sustainable research talent pipeline*. Taipei: The Science & Technology Policy Research and Information Center. (in Chinese).

Charbit, C. (2011). *Governance of public policies in decentralised contexts: The multi-level approach.* OECD Regional Development Working Papers, 2011/04, OECD Publishing. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg883pkxkhc-en.

Charbit, C., & Michalun, M. (2009). *Mind the gaps: Managing mutual dependence in relations among levels of government*. OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 14, OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/221253707200.

Costantini, V., Crespi, F., & Palma, A. (2015). *Characterizing the policy mix and its impact on eco-innovation in energy-efficient technologies*. SEEDS Working Paper, 11. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alessandro_Palma/publication/278321762_Characterizing_the_policy_mix_and_its_impact_on_eco-innovation_in_energy-efficient_technologies/links/557f0b9a08ae26eada8f50e9.pdf.

Cunningham, P. (2007). *Horizontal analysis of country reviews: R&D investment policies*. Synthesis Report for the European Commission. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/research/policymix/userfiles/file/uploadeddocs/synthesis_r&dinvestmentpolicies.pdf.

Cunningham, P., Edler, J., Flanagan, K., & Laredo, P. (2013). *Innovation policy mix and instrument interaction: A review*. Nesta Working Paper No. 13/20. Retrieved from https://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/innovation_policy_mix_and_instrument_interaction.pdf.

Etzkowitz, H. (2003). Research groups as "quasi-firms": The invention of the entrepreneurial university. *Research Policy, 32*(1), 109–121.

Etzkowitz, H., & Leydesdorff, L. (2000). The dynamics of innovation: From national systems and "Mode 2" to a triple helix of university–industry–government relation. *Research Policy, 29,* 109–123.

European Commission. (2011). *Commission Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment-Accompanying the Communication from the Commission "Horizon 2020—The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation"*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/pdf/proposals/horizon_2020_impact_assessment_report.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=none.

European Research Council. (2016). *Frontier research*. Retrieved from https://erc.europa.eu/glossary/term/267.

Executive Yuan, Taiwan. (2016, January 7). *Press release: Task force transforming industries and developing business models*. Retrieved from http://www.ey.gov.tw/en/News_Content2.aspx?n=1C6028CA080A27B3&s=D8AA818BFC3F2593.

Executive Yuan, Taiwan. (2014, July 8). *Press release: New food safety task force to enhance response and communication*. Retrieved from http://www.ey.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1C6028CA080A27B3&sms=E0588283EFAA02AD&s=741352196A71CAC1.

Gulbrandsen, M., & Kyvik, S. (2010). Are the concepts basic research, applied research and experimental development still useful? An empirical investigation among Norwegian academics. *Science and Public Policy, 37*(5), 343–353.

Hall, B., Link, A., & Scott, J. (2003). Universities as research partners. *Review of Economics and Statistics, 85*(2), 485–491. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/innovation/policyplatform/48136600.pdf.

Jessop, B. (2006). Governance failure. In M. Bevir (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Governance* (pp. 381–382). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Jongbloed, B., Enders, J., & Salerno, C. (2008). Higher Education and its Communities: Interconnections, interdependencies and a research agenda. *Higher Education, 56*(3), 303–324.

Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1989). *Power and Interdependence* (2nd ed.). Boston and London: Scott, Foresman and Co., Glenview.

Krasner, S. (1982). Structural and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization, 36*(2), 185–205.

Kratochwil, F., & Ruggie, J. G. (2001). International organization: The state of the art or an art of the state. In L. L. Martin & B. A. Simmons (Eds.), *International institutions: An international organization reader* (pp. 341–364). Boston, MA: The MIT Press.

Laredo, A. (2007). Revisiting the third mission of universities: Toward a renewed categorization of university activities? *Higher Education Policy, 20*(4), 441–456.

Lewis, J. (2013). *Academic governance: Disciplines and policy*. New York, NY: Routledge.

May, P. J., & Jochim, A. E. (2013). Policy regime perspectives: Policies, politics, and governing. *Policy Studies Journal, 41*(3), 426–452.

Mazzucato, M. (2015, July 27). *Re-igniting public and private investments in innovation*. Paper presented at the Middle Class Prosperity Forum. Retrieved from https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=mazzucato-statement-middle-class-prosperity-project.pdf&site=25.

Meadowcroft, J. (1999). Planning for sustainable development: What can we learn from the critics? In M. Kenny & J. Meadowcroft (Eds.), *Planning sustainability* (pp. 12–38). London: Routledge.

Ministry of Education (MOE), Taiwan. (2013). *The white paper on talent cultivation*. Taipei: Ministry of Education, Taiwan (in Chinese). Retrieved from http://ed.arte.gov.tw/uploadfile/Book/3281_%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2%E9%83%A8%E4%BA%BA%E6%89%8D%E5%9F%B9%E8%82%B2%E7%99%BD%E7%9A%AE%E6%9B%B8.pdf.

Ministry of Education (MOE), Taiwan. (2015). *Academic-industrial collaboration task force promotion report*. (printed in Chinese). Retrieved from: http://www.ey.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/19/731743/a19de52c-498b-4d28-a6dd-4d4fac64377c.pdf.

Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Taiwan. (2013). *National science and technology development plan (2013–2016).* Ministry of Science and Technology. Retrieved from https://www.most.gov.tw/most/attachments/bd506e23-01b6-4c98-8150-25254e2ac8c2.

Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Taiwan. (2015a). *White paper on science and technology (2015–2018)*. Retrieved from https://www.most.gov.tw/most/attachments/352fe183-ef55-4894-bf97-3757b97dec37.

Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Taiwan. (2015b). *Indicators of science and technology 2015*. Taipei: MOST. Retrieved from https://ap0512.most.gov.tw/WAS2/technology/AsTechnologyDataIndex.aspx.

Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Taiwan. (2016). *Ministry of Science and Technology*. Retrieved from https://www.most.gov.tw/most/attachments/30b1923c-f27c-44c3-8c95-c5002918dfbc?

Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Taiwan. (2017). *National science and technology development plan (2017–2020).* Ministry of Science and Technology. https://www.most.gov.tw/most/attachments/2abb3ec5-78f0-4c00-80c4-063294ec76ab.

MOST, Taiwan. (2018). Indicators of science and technology Taiwan (2018 Ed.). Taipei: MOST. Retrieved from https://was.most.gov.tw/WAS2/technology/AsTechnologyDataIndex.aspx (last accessed 08 March 2019).

National Development Council (NDC), Taiwan. (2015). *Directions for the establishment of the board of population and talent policy*. Taiwan: National Development Council. Retrieved from, http://www.ndc.gov.tw/en/Content_List.aspx?n=169B3E361A1EEB75.

National Development Council (NDC), Taiwan. (2016a). 行政院創新創業政策會昱設置要點(*Directions for the establishment of the Innovation and Startups Task Force*). Retrieved from http://www.ndc.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?n=7BBB5600A4A2D4E3.

National Development Council (NDC), Taiwan. (2016b). A description of Asian Silicon Valley development plan. Retrieved from, http://www.ndc.gov.tw/en/Content_List.aspx?n=90BEB862317E93FC&upn=7B70255F66FB9DF5.

National Development Council (NDC), Taiwan._(2016c). Promoting innovation and entrepreneurship; fostering innovation of Taiwanese Industry. Retrieved from http://www.ey.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/19/732702/b16116bd-ad7f-4447-9836-5df831a42a96.pptx.

National Science Council (NSC), Taiwan. (2005). *National Science and Technology Development Plan (2005–2008).* Taiwan: National Science Council. Retrieved from https://www.most.gov.tw/most/attachments/68f91ff4-e0b2-4ac1-ac24-325ba9f21391.

National Science Council (NSC), Taiwan. (2009). *National science and technology development plan (2009–2012).* Taiwan: National Science Council. Retrieved from https://www.most.gov.tw/most/attachments/5781899f-6eee-4b32-a568-53e3c19d9193.

National Science Council (NSC), Taiwan. (2010). *White paper on science and technology (2011–2014).* Retrieved from https://www.most.gov.tw/most/attachments/46d88a4b-d7cb-4909-9975-0546b011c3a.

OECD. (2008). *OECD science, technology and industry outlook 2008*. Paris: OECD.

OECD. (2014). *OECD science, technology and industry outlook 2014*. Paris: OECD. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/sti_outlook-2014-en.

OECD. (2014). *The space economy at a glance 2014*. Paris: OECD. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264217294-en.

OECD. (2015a). *Economic policy reforms 2015: Going for growth*. Paris: OECD. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/growth-2015-en.

OECD. (2015b). Frascati manual 2015: Guidelines for collecting and reporting data on research and experimental development, OECD Publishing, Paris. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239012-en.

OECD.STAT. (2019a). *GERD as a percentage of GDP*. Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB.

OECD.STAT. (2019b). Percentage of GERD financed by government. Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB.

OECD.STAT. (2019c). *HERD as a percentage of GDP*. Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MSTI_PUB.

OECD.STAT. (2019d). Percentage of GERD performed by the Higher Education sector. Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/.

Perkmann, M., Tartari, V., McKelvey, M., Autio, E., Broström, A., D'Este, P., et al. (2013). Academic engagement and commercialisation: A review of the literature on university-industry relations. *Research Policy, 42,* 423–442.

Stokes, D. E. (2011). *Pasteur's quadrant: Basic science and technological innovation*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Sun, Y. H. (孫以瀚). (2015, April 13). The government's investment in basic research cannot remain as an empty talk. (國家投資基礎研究不是紙上談兵). Retrieved from http://www.storm.mg/article/46133.

Trencher, G., Yarime, M., McCormick, K. B., Doll, C. N., & Kraines, S. B. (2013). Beyond the third mission: Exploring the emerging university function of co-creation for sustainability. *Science and Public Policy*. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/sct044.

Williams, G. (2008). Finance and entrepreneurial activity in higher education in a knowledge. In M. Shattock (Ed.), *Entrepreneurialism in universities and the knowledge economy: Diversification and organizational change in European higher education* (pp. 9–32). (Maidenhead: McGraw Hill, Society for Research into Higher Education, Open University Press).

Wilson, C. A. (2000). Policy regimes and policy change. *Journal of Public Policy, 20*(3), 247–274.

World Bank. (2010). *Innovation policy: A guide for developing countries*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Yu-Ching Kuo is a postdoctoral research fellow based at the National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan, with a research focus on interdisciplinary teaching and learning in the context of teaching and research nexus. Prior to taking up this post, she was a postdoctoral researcher at National Taiwan University, looking at the impact of innovation models on research and development systems and funding mechanisms. She has published various articles and reports for domestic and international journals, covering a wide range of issues including the interplay between the rhetoric of the concept of science's social contract with society and science and innovation policy making, equity and access to higher education, the impact of discourse on linear innovation models and scientific research, social accountability of science, technology and innovation policies and the discourse of robot tax.

Sheng-Ju Chan is Deputy Dean for Research and Development and Professor of Higher Education at the National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan. His research interests include higher education policy, comparative education and higher education management. He is author of over a dozen publications in Chinese and English and serves as an advisor on higher education policy to the Ministry of Education in Taiwan. His recent articles have focused on governance, cross-border education and internationalization in Asia and have been published in international journals such as the *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, *Higher Education Policy* and the *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*. Professor Chan also serves as the associate editor of the interna-

tional journal *Asian Education and Development Studies* and co-editor of a book series, *Higher Education in Asia*, published by Springer. Professor Chan is actively involved with the comparative education studies community and is the former Secretary-General of the Chinese Taipei Comparative Education Society in Taiwan receiving the Society's research award in 2011.

Chapter 10
Higher Education Governance in Vietnam: Statism Versus Institutional Autonomy

Thanh Nghi Pham and Kimberly Goyette

Introduction

Governance usually refers to the coordination of the activities of a social system. It relates to principles and norms of behaviour in relations between constituents. Traditionally, the governance of higher education (HE) has been conducted by hierarchical control in many countries, with the state at the top of the hierarchy. More recently, though, the governance of HE has adopted a more corporate model of coordination between state and non-state actors (Pham 2010). Despite a series of policy changes designed to move towards this model of cooperation, the governance of HE in Vietnam continues to cling far too much to the traditional hierarchical mould. The problem of how HE is governed at both the system and institutional levels can be defined by the fact that both state controls and market forces have decisive roles in the governance process. In the past, the HE system in Vietnam trained graduates only for a state-planned economy. Funds for HE came from the state, and the HE system was managed centrally; there was only top-down governance. In the multi-sectoral economy which resulted from the *doimoi* (renovation) policy implemented in 1986, the HE system serves not only the state sector but also non-state ones. In these circumstances, higher education institutions (HEIs) are ideally given more autonomy in governance. Although this market-renovation policy has been in place for 30 years, the state still has a strong power over HEIs. This chapter will analyse how this power has affected coordination between the state agency and HEIs in the governance process.

T. N. Pham (✉)
Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam
e-mail: ptnghi2008@gmail.com

K. Goyette
Temple University, Philadelphia, USA

Internationalization and Centralization in Public and Private Higher Education

Public HE is post-secondary education provided by the state. Though there is much variation in its form and control, public post-secondary institutions are typically founded, financed and controlled by the state. The state may devote a ministry or ministries to controlling admissions, creating curricula, setting standards, hiring personnel, funding students, directing research and other activities. The state may take a role in ensuring that particular groups, such as women or ethnic minorities, or members of certain political parties, are equally represented or even favoured in HE. Private universities, on the other hand, are subject to much less state control. The state may decide whether or not to recognize or accredit such institutions and may choose to set certain standards for academic achievement, but private institutions are typically funded by students or organizations other than governments. Private institutions often maintain some autonomy in personnel and admissions decisions (Hoang and Sloper 1995). Public institutions are marked by a greater degree of centralized control, while private institutions have historically been more decentralized. Increasingly, though, public HE has looked to the private sector to find ways to serve more students more efficiently. Reforms to HE that have been centrally controlled and heavily subsidized by the government have begun to require the raising of greater revenue through tuition fees and more autonomy to be given to institutions to make their decisions independent of state control.

The decentralization of decision-making in HE may be stimulated by two related processes. The first is the transition of the economy from state to market control. The second comes from increasing international contacts among educational institutions. Decentralization and a greater reliance on tuition fees may occur when economies undergo the transition from state socialist to market orientation. Market transition theory suggests that with a transition to free-market policies, there is greater demand for more highly skilled labour. While governments may choose to invest in developing these skills, there is also an understanding that individual workers will reap economic benefits from more highly skilled positions. Individuals are then expected to "invest" in their education in the expectation that this investment will be rewarded in the labour market. Students pay higher and higher tuition fees, though some students or institutions may be subsidized by the government, foundations, businesses or other organizations. As student tuition becomes a more important source of revenue for institutions, HEIs themselves become subject to the market forces of supply and demand and rely less on government quotas and mandates. HEIs require more decentralized decision-making in order to assess and respond to fluctuations in supply and demand.

Decentralized decision-making may also occur as a result of the increasing internationalization of HE. Baker and LeTendre (2005) note an increasing trend in the decentralization and privatization of education systems across nations. Although there is wide variability in control over education systems, along a continuum from centralized to decentralized, most nations seem to be moving towards decentraliza-

tion, often mixing elements of state, regional, local and private control. Scholars such as Meyer (1977), Boli et al. (1985) and Baker and LeTendre (2005) contend that HEIs across the globe are becoming more alike: changes in schooling in individual nations become institutionalized and spread to other nations. While Baker and LeTendre (2005) suggest that there is a diffusion of ideas and practices across national boundaries, in their work, the mechanisms underlying this diffusion are unclear. However, one clear way that ideas and practices from one nation influence those of another is through transnational educational programmes and institutions. The existence of such institutions likely influences public and other private HEIs operating within the same nation.

Baker and LeTendre (2005) observe several trends towards homogeneity in education worldwide which result from this internationalization. First is the expansion of universal access to schooling. While primary schooling is near universal around the world, secondary school is fast approaching this ideal. The next frontier in school expansion is at the tertiary level. Access to post-secondary schooling is growing at a faster rate than primary or secondary schooling, mostly because only small proportions of the population attend post-secondary institutions. Demand for post-secondary education is growing, while national institutions have yet to match this demand with a supply of places in HEIs (Altbach 2004). HEIs have argued they need more flexibility in funding and decision-making in order to meet this growing need. Another trend they note is towards decentralization. Increasingly, there are no central bodies monitoring admissions, tuition, or curricula at the national level (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002; Schafer 1999).

More and more, the philosophy of neoliberalism is guiding the growth and governance of HEIs. Neoliberalism argues that societies progress when there is sustained economic growth and that free markets operating with little government interference are the most efficient and socially optimal means to allocate resources (Robbins 1999). When governance of public-sector institutions functions more like private-sector governance, inefficiencies are removed. The role of government under neoliberalism is primarily to provide the infrastructure with which to advance the rule of law with respect to property rights and contracts.

There are many critics of this neoliberal turn, however. When there are greater choices and the market has a bigger influence, there may be increasing inequality between those with market resources and those without. Families who can afford HE tuition will be more likely to attend and have a greater choice of HEIs. Socio-economic inequalities in the attainment of HE increase with increasing decentralization and privatization. Also, when governments allow institutions greater autonomy in the admission of students and personnel decisions, ethnic minorities (and sometimes even women or residents of different regions), who were favoured by national quota systems, may be less likely to benefit from such policies when HEIs themselves create and enforce admissions policies. There will likely be more variation across institutions. However, inequalities based on political party or affiliation may be weakened. When governmental elites—for example, members of particular parties—have a lot of influence, centralization can lead to the children of these elites

reaping educational advantages like admission to particular schools (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002). Decentralization or increased institutional autonomy can weaken this link.

Political Context and Higher Education Governance in Vietnam

The experience of Vietnam after its unification in 1975 shows that the socialist model with centralized power, heavy bureaucracy and state subsidies does not meet many of the requirements of modern socio-economic development. As a result, the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) held in 1986 announced the *doimoi* policy, which advocated the pursuit of an open-market orientation while maintaining the principles of socialism as interpreted by the CPV. This marked a shift from a command economy with centralized planning towards the development of a multi-sectoral economy operated by market mechanisms with a socialist orientation. The socialist orientation in economic development here means development with an emphasis on social justice, such that human beings are not a means or an instrument for development but rather the goal, or target, of development (Nguyen and Sloper 1995). However, a socialist orientation in governance practice in Vietnam refers to the leadership role of the CPV. One-party leadership creates circumstances in which the nation's legislature has to follow party resolutions and cannot stand independently of the party. In HE, "all decision-making structures normally require a parallel party structure, the role of the party being to assess decisions taken in terms of their consistency with party ideology and, if necessary, to exercise a right of veto" (Khanh and Hayden 2010: 130). The party leads the state, and its constituents, including the HE system, follow the party's and, consequently, the state's policies. This limits the implementation of any autonomous policy by HEIs. The exclusive leadership role of the CPV declared in the Constitution, with its bureaucratic model of management, does not adequately serve the economic demands that result from market principles.

The Twelfth CPV Congress, held in Hanoi in January 2016, nevertheless reaffirmed the power of the socialist leadership, and that Marxism–Leninism and the thoughts of Ho Chi Minh are the ideological foundation of CPV policies and strategies. As we know, Marxism–Leninism does not tolerate private ownership, while the renovation policy, as declared, encourages market-based behaviours. The contradiction between ideological principles and renovation policies is an obstacle to the shift of governance from state control to an institution-centred form of management.

To complicate matters, the concept of institutional autonomy is not properly understood by legislators and HE administrators in Vietnam. HEIs are not provided with the freedom to decide for themselves on matters such as organizational structure, human resource management, academic programmes, student enrolment or financial mobilization and utilization.

Higher Education in Vietnam Before the Reform and Overall Policy for Change

For historical reasons, before 1987 the HE system in Vietnam followed the Soviet model. There were only a few multidisciplinary universities, exceptions to the dominant pattern of mono-disciplinary institutions. Multidisciplinary institutions of the basic sciences provided degree programmes in natural, social sciences and humanities, and one or two universities also offered programmes in law, medicine and agriculture. A few multidisciplinary universities of technology offered programmes in engineering, agriculture, forestry, fishery, economics, medicine, pharmacy, sports, culture and arts. There were also national teacher training colleges providing two- and three-year diplomas. Three-year programmes in different areas of engineering, economic, culture and other subjects were also provided by specialized colleges.

All universities and colleges were owned and controlled by the state, which designated the responsibility of managing different types of HEI to different governmental agencies. Multidisciplinary universities and colleges were governed by the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). Specialized universities and colleges were governed by line ministries, such as the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Trade. Each of these ministries had a training department in charge of governing its own training institutions. Finally, local colleges were governed by provincial education agencies or directly by provincial people's committees. Before 1987, no universities were supervised by provincial governments.

In May 1992, the World Bank Higher Education Project identified major concerns: network disintegration, low staff capacity (both academic and administrative), the inadequacy of the curricula, shortages of and out-dated equipment, scarce learning resources and a shortage of learning material and other library resources. These concerns were described as priority issues for change (Sloper and Le 1995). After much resource deprivation, the large number of small institutions and the lack of integration at the system level were considered the most critical issues facing HE at that time. However, limited financial resources to improve staff capability and improve curricula, equipment and learning facilities in HE also compromised the effectiveness and efficiency of the HE system as a whole. Thus, the reorganization and changes in the governance of the system were part of the early reform agenda. The overall goal of reform was to move the system from serving a centrally planned economy to a multi-sectoral, market-oriented economy. A guideline for that change was identified at the Nha Trang Meeting of University Presidents and Colleges Principals in 1987. The meeting acknowledged that HE:

> should be aimed at serving not only the state and the collective economic sector, but also other economic sectors; that the budget for higher education activities should be based not only on the allocation of finance by the state, but also on the mobilization of other resources, including payment of tuition fees; that the scope of higher education and training should develop on the basis of diversity in training forms; and that at the same time, the development of formal training should follow a more rational and systematic pattern which would ensure quality in higher education and also satisfy new and emerging requirements of society and economy. (Tran et al. 1995: 75)

Restructuring the Higher Education System Towards Diversification

The process of restructuring the HE system began in the early 1990s with the establishment of two national universities (National University, Hanoi, and National University, Ho Chi Minh City) and three regional universities (Thai Nguyen University, Hue University and Da Nang University), all of them multidisciplinary institutions.

Other changes took place at the provincial level. In 1997 Hong Duc University was established in Thanh Hoa province, the first multidisciplinary university to function under the supervision of provincial authority. Following this, the multidisciplinary Hai Phong University was inaugurated in the second largest city in the north, Hai Phong, under the supervision of the province. Later, An Giang University was established as the third multidisciplinary university of this kind in Vietnam. Many universities have now been inaugurated in other provinces throughout Vietnam, and almost every province has a university under provincial supervision. This growth began in the area of teacher training and in short-term engineering degrees with three years of training. Secondary professional schools, operating effectively during the time of Soviet Union influence, are no longer necessary because employment opportunities for graduates of these schools are uncertain. Moreover, the skills needed in the labour force have been upgraded, and the higher skill levels provided by professional training have grown in demand. In response to this, during the period 1999–2003, the MOET granted "three-year college" status to 37 secondary professional schools. At the end of this time, these colleges and other three-year colleges amalgamated to become universities under a line ministry or provincial supervision. However, it is important to stress here that amalgamation is usually undertaken based on administrative orders rather than on voluntary agreements between institutions.

The growth of non-public colleges and universities in the early 1990s was considered the most important change in the move towards increasing HEIs' autonomy and accountability. The first pilot project began with the Thang Long Centre for Higher Education in Hanoi, in 1988. A non-public HE sector including semi-public and people-founded HEIs was established a little later, in the academic year 1993–1994, when the temporary regulation for people-founded universities was articulated by the MOET. Since that time, the non-public HE sector has grown dramatically. According to statistics released by the MOET, in 2013, 54 of the 207 universities operating in Vietnam were non-public. Non-public universities enrolled 177,459 of the 1,453,067 students enrolled in the whole HE system.

Public and non-public HEIs in the system have varying levels of autonomy. While academically, they are accountable to the MOET, financially and administratively, they are under the supervision of different governmental agencies. The two national universities have been given the highest level of autonomy; they are directly accountable to the government and government agencies in the appropriate areas. Other HEIs have a lower level of autonomy. They are all under the academic supervision of the MOET, but some are also under the financial and organizational supervision of line

ministries. Local colleges and universities are accountable financially and organizationally to local government.

At the institutional level, new units have been established to expand university activities in different areas and to increase student enrolment. Research and development institutes were established to provide services for research and application activities. Consultation centres were established to provide services to students (i.e. support services including academic skills development and counselling) and external clients. Student service centres and centres for international cooperation have been strengthened at many universities as a signal of the greater autonomy given to HEIs.

In short, there structuring of the HE system has differentiated HEIs by status, which has had a positive impact, increasing the institutional autonomy and accountability of some universities, especially two national universities. At the same time, the control of the system remains under other HEIs. HEIs are under the control of various ministries and the MOET exercises the most extensive authority in different areas of institutional activities. We will examine some changes to governance in these areas to show how far HEIs have been granted autonomy.

Governance in the Academic Area

Student Enrolment

Before *doimoi* (1987), the former Ministry of Education and Vocational Training was responsible for the formulation of a comprehensive plan for HE including development strategies, the speed and scale of HE growth, student enrolment, the number of graduates for a job assignment, staff development and financial provision and infrastructure. This approach was reviewed by the former State Commission for Planning in conjunction with the plans and requirements of other ministries and agencies. The enrolment and graduate allocation plan were considered carefully in order to meet the manpower needs of the labour force as forecast in the national development plan made by the State Commission for Planning.

Since 1987, the enrolment structure has changed such that students are not only admitted though state examination and state subsidies; an additional number of students are now admitted who pay the full tuition. Enrolment plans are now determined by the capacity of each college or university, but the enrolment quota is still controlled by the MOET and the Ministry of Planning and Investment.

The national entrance examination has been used to select new students since 1970. In the early years, this nationwide examination was organized by the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Professional Education. The candidates selected were assigned to colleges and universities by the ministry. In the later 1990s, the responsibility for the organization of entrance examinations and the selection of new students was devolved to colleges and universities. Due to numerous incidents relating

to the organization and selection of new students, which caused public concern, the MOET decided to organize the nationwide entrance examination again in the academic year 2000–2001. This hindered the increasing autonomy and accountability of HEIs. Recently, more autonomy has been given to HEIs in the selection of new students. Instead of the nationwide entrance examination, colleges and universities now develop an enrolment plan and submit it to the MOET for approval. In the enrolment plan, students' scores in the nationwide high school final examination can be used as one of the criteria for selecting new students.

Curriculum Development

Before 1987, curriculum development was entrusted to several academic committees established by the then Ministry of Higher Education and Vocational Training. These committees consisted of leading professors and specialists in each field. In the late 1990s, more authority was given to HEIs to design training programmes based on curriculum frameworks promulgated by the MOET.

Setting up a new programme is a primary responsibility of individual universities, but each new programme must be approved by the Department of Higher Education within the MOET. The two national universities in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are authorized to approve new programmes set-up by their colleges and report them the MOET for registration. Regarding graduate programmes, the national universities are authorized to design, approve and teach new programmes on a pilot basis. When new degrees are to be awarded, the universities are required to assess the whole degree programme and give recommendations to the MOET on whether or not to open the programmes as regular offerings. According to the Higher Education Law of 2012, the national universities enjoy the most autonomy all HEIs (National Assembly 2012).

Quality Management

In the past, HEIs were required to follow the ministry's instructions in the area of quality management. Officers from the Inspection Agency visited universities and colleges when there were incidents.[1] No quality standards or procedures were approved at the institutional level. In 2003, an Agency for Quality Assessment and

---

[1]It should noted that inspection activities are not taken regularly but only in instances where obvious procedures have gone wrong or problems have emerged. When an inspection happens, an inspection mission visits the institution concerned assesses the reasons behind the emergence of problems and assesses lines of responsibility. For example, in a recent newspaper, a Journalist released information that a newly established graduate institution "produces" one Ph.D. graduate per day (about 350 Ph.D. graduates per year)! In response, the MOET sent an inspection mission to the institution to investigate the Ph.D. programme.

Accreditation was established by the MOET as a new body responsible for quality management. At the first stage of the implementation of quality assurance, the agency helped HEIs undertake internal quality management, including the development of quality assurance procedures and the organization of self-assessment for accreditation. In November 2007, the MOET issued quality standards for HEIs as a basis for quality accreditation at the system level. The inauguration of the Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation can be seen as an important step towards increasing institutional accountability. Beside the MOET Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation, three other quality accreditation centres were established, two by the National University, Hanoi and the National University, Ho Chi Minh City and the other by the Association of University Rectors and College Principals. HEIs rely heavily on the quality standards circulated by the MOET, and only a few universities have developed their own quality standards based on their own institutional mission and the goals identified during strategic plan development.

Except in the case of the two national universities, the MOET still provides quotas for student enrolment, controls the selection of new students for admission, structures the curriculum and regulates the training programmes delivered by HEIs. The rectors of universities do not have significant power to affect decisions on curricula, their delivery or the institution's academic standards.

Budgetary Process

State expenditure on HE mainly comes from two different levels of government: central and local. At the central government level, the MOET provides allocations to colleges and universities under its supervision, and the line ministries provide allocations to the HEIs they supervise. At the local level, provincial people's committees provide funds to their colleges and universities. The amount of annual funding provided to each HEI is determined by its current needs and the funding received the previous year. On the basis of consultation with the Ministry of Planning and Investment and the Ministry of Finance, the MOET and line ministries make incremental adjustments according to the needs and development of each institution and to the total budget available for HE. If an HEI improves its internal financial efficiency, the savings may have to be returned to the government budget at the end of the year. HEIs thus rush to spend all allocated funds by the end of the academic year, which is a waste of resources. The controlled budgetary system is very rigid and provides no incentive for financial efficiency. Some HEIs have been given block grants and the power to decide how to spend the funds on a trial basis.

The rate of state finance going to HEIs is declining year by year. In the early years of the reform process, about 90% of funding to HEIs were from the state; by the year 2000, the rate had declined to 55% (Higher Education Project 2000). The revenue generated through tuition fees, research and production contracts is the second major source of funding for HEIs, which has increased dramatically in recent years. HE reforms have provided greater autonomy to colleges and universities to generate

more income. However, HEIs cannot increase tuition fees over the maximum level that the state has mandated and are required to follow strict rules on the utilization of the income they generate. The state still interferes heavily in HEIs' budgeting process.

Reporting System, Organizational and Personnel Management

The Reporting System

In Vietnam, there are five different categories of HEI under different governmental supervision: (a) national universities directly under the supervision of the central government; (b) multidisciplinary universities, specialized universities and colleges under the supervision of the MOET; (c) specialized universities and colleges under the supervision of line ministries; (d) provincial universities and colleges under the supervision of provincial authorities; and (e) non-public universities and colleges. Accordingly, the chief executives (rectors and principals) of public universities and colleges report to the appropriate supervising governmental bodies, and the chief executives of non-public universities and colleges report to the Boards of Trustees and then to the MOET on all academic, financial and organizational matters. Although greater autonomy has been given to HEIs in recent years and control of teaching, research, financial and personnel administration by governmental authorities has relaxed significantly, the reporting system remains unchanged.

The Council of Public Universities and the Board of Trustees of Non-public Universities

In the past, the role of the council of a public university was not clear. Power over the management of the university was entrusted to the university's chief executive. The council used to play the role of a representative body providing consultation to the rector. In 2003, the functions of the university council were described clearly in the University Regulations circulated by the Prime Minister. There was no change in the university council functions prescribed in the 2012 Higher Education Law passed by the National Assembly. The major functions of the council are identified as follows: making decisions on strategic goals and strategies and directions for university development; making decisions on university organization and activities; monitoring the implementation of the university's decisions and democratically regulating its activities. The role and functions of the board of trustees in non-public universities are identified by the Regulations for People-Founded Universities (Vietnamese

Government 2000). According to the Regulations, the board of trustees is the sole owner and representative of the university and is responsible for making decisions on important issues related to university organization, finances and resources.

The clear identification of the role and functions of the university council in public universities and the role and functions of the board of trustees in non-public universities is a step forward in increasing the autonomy and accountability of HEIs. However, in practice, the implementation of these functions is challenging. Although there are parallel structures of power, party committee and university council, usually the decisive role in decision-making belongs to the party committee. The state bureaucracy, through the MOET and line ministries, prevents the implementation of the functions of the university council and, consequently, limits university autonomy.

Selection and Appointment of the Chief Executive of Universities and Colleges

Before the reform, the rector was appointed by the ministry or provincial people's committee supervising the university. Significant change has taken place in the process of selecting and appointing of rectors and principals. Although government agencies still have a decisive role in the appointment of the chief executive of universities and colleges, the academic staff and representative organizations within HEIs have an increasingly powerful voice. HEIs are given the authority to nominate candidates for the chief executive position in consultation with the academic staff and units within the colleges and universities. In non-public HEIs, the board of trustees make decisions on the appointment of the chief executive and the MOET issues a decision to recognize the appointment.

Appointment of Academic Staff

The career ladder for an academic in a Vietnamese university consists of four steps: assistant lecturer, lecturer, senior lecturer/associate professor and high-ranking lecturer/full professor. Promotion from one step to another requires the fulfilment of several criteria, some of which are related to research and teaching achievements, others to seniority. Generally, there are two pathways to academic promotion: the traditional pathway and the scholarship and research pathway (Pham 2015).

The Traditional Pathway of Promotion Mainly Based on Seniority

Before the Higher Education Law was passed in 2012, anyone who had a bachelor's degree could be recruited as a lecturer after a year's probation. At present, to be appointed as a lecturer, an academic must have a master's degree in appropriate specialization. In addition, one is required to have three certifications: Level B (intermediate) foreign language proficiency, Level B information technology and intermediate understanding of political theory and public administration. The criteria for promotion to senior lecturer include holding a master's degree in an appropriate specialization, and three, more advanced, certifications: Level C (advanced) foreign language proficiency; Level C information technology; and middle-level knowledge of political theory and public administration. The candidate must also demonstrate the ability to develop training curricula; teaching plans and materials; and completion of one research project at the institutional level. To be promoted to senior lecturer, one is required to have at least seven years of work experience as a lecturer. The requirement for high-ranking lecturer includes a Ph.D. degree, at least one scientific project or creative work already successfully put into practice and certification of an advanced understanding of political theory and public administration. This last promotion requires at least seven years of work experience as a senior lecturer.

During each step of one's academic career, a lecturer must collect the required certificates. This pathway does not require much research achievement or a significant contribution to the training goals of the HEI. Practically speaking, every academic can get to the level of senior lecturer without considerable efforts.

Scholarship and Research Pathway

If the first pathway of academic promotion relies heavily on seniority, the scholarship and research pathway is mainly based on research and teaching achievements. Since 1975, five decrees have been promulgated by the Prime Minister. The first three decrees recognized the titles of associate and full professor as research titles, and the latter two recognized the titles as also being teaching ones. The process to attain these titles has improved and become more detailed and scientifically based. The last decree, promulgated in 2008, defines in detail not only the criteria but also the organization of the process, the activities of councils convened to decide status changes and the procedures of assessment and recognition.

In terms of organization, there are three levels of councils involved in the assessment of a candidate's file: the council for the professor title at the institutional level, the council for the professor title at the disciplinary or interdisciplinary level, and the State Council for Professor Title. The assessment procedure starts with the institutional council, and the applicant's file is then passed to the interdisciplinary council and to the State Council for the Professor Title (Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) 2009a, b).

Applicants are required to meet several criteria defined by the Regulations issued by the MOET (2009a, b). They are required to have six years of teaching experience, and the three most recent years must be continuous. If an applicant has taught for less than six years, he or she is required to have doubled values of research and publications. In addition, an applicant for an associate professor is required to have successfully supervised two master's dissertations, while the applicant for full professor is required to have successfully supervised two Ph.D. dissertations. Applicants are also required to be proficient in a foreign language. For example, those who are proficient in one of four languages (German, French Russian and Chinese) are also required having a basic level of English. For those who are proficient in English, the other language is not a necessary requirement.

Applicants' publications and research results are assessed according to rules established by the MOET (2009b). For example, a scientific article published in a prestigious journal counts for a maximum of 1.0 point and a book published based on comprehensive research by a prestigious publisher counts for a maximum of 2.0 points. Research completed at the institutional level and assessed by a committee counts for 0.25 points. Completed research at the ministerial level counts for 0.5 points and for 1.0 point at the state level. Applicants for associate professor are required to get at least six points, while applicants for full professor are required to get at least 12. For applicants who work in research institutions or who serve as visiting lecturers, the research and publication criteria are almost doubled: ten points for associate professor and 20 for full professor. This means that applicants should have achieved twice what is asked for in the criteria for scientific publication and research results to ensure sufficient votes from council members. (A two-thirds vote from the institutional council, a three-fourths vote from the interdisciplinary council and a two-thirds vote from the State Council for the Professor Title.)

After the State Council members have approved a file, the Chairman of the Council signs the certificate attesting that the applicant meets the criteria of the title of associate or full professor. The rector of the university then signs a decision to appoint the applicant to the position of associate or full professor.

Since 1976, 10,453 academics have been promoted, among them 1,569 professors and 8,884 associate professors (State Council for the Professor Title 2013). The distribution of these high-ranking academics is not even: 73% of associate and full professors promoted during 2009–2013 work at universities in the Hanoi area, 11% in the Ho Chi Minh City area and the rest, only 16%, in all other areas of the country.

The rate of female professors is very low. In 2013, among 57 newly appointed professors and 514 associate professors, there were only three female professors, accounting for 5.6%, and 116 female associate professors, accounting for 22.6%. There is a commitment to improve the female ratio among teaching and research academics: as the number of female academics increases steadily, the proportion of female academics promoted to associate professor positions will increase accordingly.

The proportion of high-ranking academics of minority origin is even lower. In 2013, there were only six minority ethnic associate professors: two of Chinese ethnic origin, three of Tay ethnic origin and one of Thai ethnic origin. The situation of ethnic

minority academics is difficult. Since minorities in Vietnam usually live in remote and mountainous areas, there are fewer opportunities for them to enter colleges and universities, and, consequently, the proportion of minority ethnic academics among the total number is very modest. This explains why high-ranking minority ethnic academics are rare.

The procedure of the scholarship and research pathway to academic promotion shows that the promotion of academics is centrally controlled. The Chairman of the State Council for the Professor Title is usually the Minister of Education and Training. The rector of the university has little power to affect decisions on the promotion of academic staff via the scholarship and research pathway. Although the HE system in Vietnam has existed for about a century, it is still immature. Most colleges and universities are teaching institutions and immature in scholarship and research activities. Consequently, they are unable to assess and promote academic staff based on scholarship and research achievements. It would be better to give universities with a strong scholarship and research culture more power to promote their academics based on teaching and research achievements.

Conclusion

Before the *doimoi* policy introduced in 1987, HE in Vietnam was highly centrally controlled. Since then, a series of reforms has been initiated in academic, organizational and financial areas. The HE system remains centrally controlled, more or less in the Soviet model. A critical issue of governance in Vietnamese HE concerns institutional autonomy. Beside the two national universities, which enjoy a higher level of autonomy, other types of HEI are still tightly controlled by the state. The government must free itself from direct control of the HE system and its institutions and make the latter accountable for the sustainable development of knowledge and a highly skilled labour force. It needs to develop a foundation for institutional self-governance, expertise, regulations and accountability such that HEIs and their constituents know how they are accountable to each other and to society as a whole. There are also difficult challenges related to the party's role in institutional governance, particularly regarding its ideological platform.

A controversial issue in discussions to date concerns the relationship between the MOET and HEIs. Most parties agree that centrally controlled governance by the MOET is no longer appropriate. Power does not need to be taken away from the ministry, and rather the central ministry should be freed to focus on strategic matters (De Rooij 2005). In recent documents, the MOET has stated that it will concentrate on policy issues, including policymaking and policy monitoring (Pham 2010). There is still a long way to go for the HE system in Vietnam to catch up with the systems in which universities enjoy full institutional autonomy and are fully accountable to stakeholders for their activities and outcomes.

References

Altbach, P. G. (2004). The past and future of Asian universities: Twenty-first century challenges. In P. G. Altbach & T. Umakoshi (Eds.), *Asian universities: Historical perspectives and contemporary challenges* (pp. 13–32). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Baker, D. P., & LeTendre, G. K. (2005). *National differences, global similarities: World culture and the future of schooling*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Boli, J., Ramirez, F., & Meyer, J. (1985). Explaining the origins and expansion of mass education. *Comparative Education Review, 29,* 145–170.

Carnoy, M., & Rhoten, D. (2002). What does globalization mean for educational change? *A comparative approach. Comparative Education Review, 46*(1), 1–9.

De Rooij, P. (2005, April 22). *Vietnam and profession-oriented education*. Paper Presented at Seminar on Instruments and Conditions for a Profession-oriented Approach in Higher Education, Hanoi.

Higher Education Project. (2000). *Major outcomes of the higher education academic and finance surveys in 1996, 1997 and 1998*. Hanoi: MOET.

Hoang, X. S., & Sloper, D. (1995). An entrepreneurial development: Thang Long University. In D. Sloper & T. C. Le (Eds.), *Higher education in Vietnam: Change and response* (pp. 200–210). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Khanh, D. V., & Hayden, M. (2010). Reforming the governance of higher education in Vietnam. In G. Harman, M. Hayden, & T. N. Pham (Eds.), *Reforming higher education in Vietnam: Challenges and priorities* (pp. 129–142). New York, NY: Springer.

Meyer, J. (1977). The effects of education as an institution. *American Journal of Sociology, 83*(1), 55–77.

Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). (2007). *Tiêu chuẩn đánh giá chất lượng giáo dục trường đại học* (*Standards for assessment of education quality at university*). Decision No. 65/2007 QĐ–BGDĐT November 1, 2007.

Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). (2009a, June 2). *Regulation on organization and operation of State Council, Discipline and Inter-Disciplinary Councils, and Institutional Councils for professor title*. Decision No. 3932/2008/QĐ–BGDĐT.

Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). (2009b, June 2). *Assessment, Recognition and cancellation of attainment of criteria, appointment and dismissal of professor and associate professor title*. Circular No. 16/2009/TT–BGDĐT.

National Assembly. (2012). *Luat Giao duc Dai hoc* (*Higher Education Law*), approved by the National Assembly in June 28th, 2012 and having effect in January 1st, 2013.

Nguyen, D. Q., & Sloper, D. (1995). Socio-economic background of Vietnam since 1986: Impact on education and higher education. In D. Sloper & T. C. Le (Eds.), *Higher education in Vietnam: Change and response* (pp. 26–40). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Pham, T. N. (2010). The higher education reform agenda: A vision for 2020. In G. Harman, M. Hayden, & T. N. Pham (Eds.), *Reforming higher education in Vietnam: Challenges and priorities* (pp. 51–64). New York, NY: Springer.

Pham, T. N. (2015, February). Academic career development in Vietnam. In *RIHE international seminar reports: The changing academic profession in Asia: The formation, work, academic productivity, and internationalization of academy* (pp. 119–132). Report of the International Conference on the Changing Academic Profession Project, 2014, Organized by Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University and Research Institute for Higher Education, Kurashiki Sakuyo University, No. 22.

Robbins, R. (1999). *Global problems and the culture of capitalism*. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Schafer, M. J. (1999). International nongovernmental organizations and third world education in 1990: A cross-national study. *Sociology of Education, 72,* 69–88.

Sloper, D., & Le, T. C. (1995). Higher education in Vietnam: The door opens from inside. In D. Sloper & T. C. Le (Eds.), *Higher education in Vietnam: Change and response* (pp. 1–25). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Tran, C. D., Lam, Q. T., & Sloper, D. (1995). Organization and management of higher education in Vietnam: An overview. In D. Sloper & T. C. Le (Eds.), *Higher education in Vietnam: Change and response* (pp. 75–94). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Vietnamese Government. (2000, July 18). *Regulation for people-founded universities*. The Decision No. 86/2000/QD-TTg by the Prime Minister.

Vietnamese Government. (2003, July 7). *University regulation*. Decision No. 153/2003/QD-TTg by the Prime Minister.

Thanh Nghi Pham is Professor at the Graduate Academy of Social Sciences, Vietnam and senior research fellow at the Institute of Psychology, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS). He received his Ph.D. in psychology from the Academy of Education (Soviet Union) in 1989 and a Master of Educational Administration at the University of New England (Australia) in 1997. He was a Fulbright Scholar at SUNY Buffalo (USA) in 1999/2000, Japan Foundation Scholar at Nagoya University in 2003 and received an Endeavour Executive Award at Southern Cross University (Australia) in 2009. His areas of specialization include cultural psychology and values studies, human and human resource development, higher education administration, psychology of education and creativity. Phạm Thanh Nghị is author, co-author and editor of 15 books published in Vietnamese and co-editor of *Reforming Higher Education in Vietnam, Challenges and Priorities* published in English by Springer in 2010. He has published numerous journal articles in Vietnamese and English.

Kimberly Goyette is Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Sociology Department at Temple University, in the USA. She is also the Director of the Center for Vietnamese Philosophy, Culture, and Society at Temple University. Her areas of specialization include education, race and ethnicity, stratification, immigration and demography. She has co-authored one book and one monograph, *Education and Immigration* (with Grace Kao and Elizabeth Vaquera, Polity Press, 2013) and *A Demographic Portrait of Asian Americans* (with Yu Xie, Russell Sage 2003). She has also co-edited the volume *Choosing Homes, Choosing Schools* with Annette Lareau (Russell Sage 2014) and is the author of the volume *Education in America*, published by the University of California Press. Professor Goyette has also published papers in peer-reviewed sociology and demography journals, including *Sociology of Education*, *Comparative Education Review*, *Social Forces*, *Social Problems*, *Social Science Research* and *Demography*. She has served on the Council of the Sociology of Education Section of the American Sociological Association and on the editorial boards of *Sociology of Education*, *Research in Sociology of Education* and *Demography*.

Chapter 11
The Changing Governance of Thai Higher Education

Rattana Lao

This chapter situates the case of Thailand in relation to the broader conversation on the global convergence of higher education (HE) governance. While the definition of governance varies and encompasses a host of contested meanings and definitions, this chapter looks at one specific aspect of governance in HE: the rise of quality-related policy or quality policy for short. The term "quality policy" was coined by Ozga et al. (2011) to connote the current discussion of differing policies: quality assessment/assurance, quality management and quality audit. This ensemble of quality policies shares similar trends, which include a focus on measuring, quantitative indicators, and ranking between and within education systems. Quality becomes a generic goal in and of itself, travelling across public and private organizations, schools and universities (Ozga et al. 2011).

This chapter is organized around two key questions designed to introduce readers to the multiple layers and multifaceted nature of quality policy and its role as a medium of governance, and potentially of convergence, in HE:

1. Has changing governance, in the form of quality assurance, reached the point of becoming "global education policy"? That is, the idea that "similar education reforms and a common set of education policy jargon are being applied in many parts of the world, in locations that are incredibly diverse both culturally and in terms of economic development" (Verger et al. 2012: 1).
2. Has "global education policy" resulted in increasing convergence of QA in HE? Specifically, has there been global convergence in relation to quality policy?.

To address these key questions, the chapter draws upon the case of HE in Thailand, an economy with a long-established HE sector comprising a mix of public and private institutions that cover a diverse array of programmes from postgraduate to specialist degrees. The Thai case is particularly well suited to addressing the key

R. Lao (✉)
Asia Foundation, Bangkok, Thailand
e-mail: rattana.lao@asiafoundation.org; amp.lao@gmail.com

213

themes identified above since quality policy been increasingly recognized as a core concern to help govern and manage the diverse tertiary institutions that operate in the country. The chapter thus explores the case of Thailand to help ascertain how quality policy has been adopted, filtered and adapted into the Thai HE system. Specifically, the chapter seeks to compare the characteristic of quality policy in Thailand with what Van Vught and Westerheijden (1994) identify as the "general model" of quality assessment—a model is comprised of five main characteristics: a meta-level agency, self-assessment, external peer review, published reports and lastly no link to public funding.

Within this context, this chapter also seeks to understand the implications of quality policy for Thai universities and academics, and how the rise of quality policy influences the structure and governance of HE in Thailand. As Vidovich (2002) notes, the rise of quality policy and its diffusion and adoption in various countries also connotes the rise of new forms of governance, such as steering from a distance, as opposed to more traditional "command and control" systems of governance typical of centralized bureaucracies. The rise of the quality policy is thus as much an attempt to transform the governance of HE and to change institutional and individual behaviours in relation to new sets of metrics and systems for measuring performance and, thus, for allocating resources. As the case of Thailand highlights, however, the rise of quality policy, and specifically of performance metrics focused on greater quality, efficiency and effectiveness or creating more "entrepreneurial" universities, does not always result in convergent outcomes internationally or similar institutional responses. By analysing the case of the Thai HE sector, this chapter reveals an essential contradiction, highlighting both Thailand's desire to follow global trends in quality policy, on the one hand, but also to maintain the country's idiosyncratic, if not nationalistic, approach to policy on the other (Lao 2015).

Quality Assurance: A Global Education Policy?

It is readily assumed in various studies that quality policy has gone global. But how, exactly, does a policy "global" and how would we know? Influenced by diffusion theory, Steiner-Khamsi (2004) uses an S-shaped curve to explicate the trajectory of a global policy. Diffusion theorists use this curve to assess the pattern of policy adoption (Meseguer 2009; Weyland 2005). Steiner-Khamsi suggests that policy diffusion is defined by three periods: early adopters, explosive growth and late adopters (Steiner-Khamsi 2006). In the beginning, there are infrequent adopters of any particular policy. This period is categorized as *early adopters* (Steiner-Khamsi 2006). Once the policy has taken off, the rate of adoption proliferates substantially. This period is called *explosive growth*. When a policy reaches the explosive growth period and it is implemented by a large number of countries, that policy is considered to be a global policy. The third period is characterized as *late adopters*. At this stage, the origins of the policy are blurred, decontextualized and deterritorialized (Steiner-Khamsi 2000).

Fig. 1 S-shaped curve and policy diffusion. *Source* Steiner-Khamsi (2010)

The graph below illustrates the S-shaped curve of diffusion, emulation and adoption (Fig. 1).

This graph can reveal the trajectory and the extent to which a policy has been adopted. It can thus be applied to the introduction and adoption of quality policy (specifically quality assessment) in national HE systems and can be analysed comparatively to see when specific countries adopted quality policy and at what stage of the cycle it was adopted. Accordingly, I apply this model to categorize quality policy as either adopters or late adopters. I do so in order to ascertain whether QA has reached the status of a "global education policy"; that is, whether its adoption has achieved both a momentum and level of ubiquity that is global in nature.

To classify countries in relation to the adoption of the quality policy, I undertook a systematic review of the literature on QA in various leading academic journals as well as publications by international organizations such as the OECD and UNESCO. The purpose of the literature review was to ascertain the institutionalization of meta-organizations responsible for QA-related tasks within various national jurisdictions. As revealed in the analysis (see Fig. 2), between 1983 and 2010, at least 48 countries established a meta-organization to conduct quality assurance and assessment. The pattern of QA's global expansion fits Steiner-Khamsi's (2010) S-shaped curve model (Fig. 2), highlighting the sequencing of policy diffusion and the adoption of quality policy across jurisdictions regardless of discrete national differences, such as the level of economic development, indicating that research, analysis and meta-institutional organizations of quality policy are global in scope (Bleiklie 2007: 101).

Fig. 2 Global expansion of QA policy. *Source* Lao (2012)

1980s: Early Adopters Period

Figure 2 highlights several patterns in the expansion of quality policy. During the early adopter period, from 1983 to the 1990s, for example, only a few countries introduced quality policy, including Britain, France, Finland, New Zealand and the Netherlands. The driver behind this adoption was likely a consequence of wider public sector reforms, most notably those associated with the rise of new public management and the desire of governments to reform systems of public adminis-tration, accountability and transparency. Neave (2004), for example, points out that the creation of the National Evaluation Committee in France in 1985 marked the beginning of the modern "hype" on quality policy in HE but conducted in relation to broader public sector reforms in France (212). More broadly, the rise of new norms of financial accountability and of a reorganization of the way in which the state would fund HE across various countries also promoted a focus on quality policy as a mechanism to reform the HE sector primarily through the introduction of new governance systems. As the S-shaped curve model indicates, however, the spread of new systems of governance, regardless of the underscoring motives, is often nascent and formative.

1990s: Explosive Growth Period

By the 1990s, in part reflecting the demonstration effect of policy adoption among early phase adopters, the spread of quality policy enjoyed a period of explosive growth, during which countries in Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Europe and some countries in Asia began to explore quality policy and moved towards the institutionalization of quality assurance systems. In particular, countries such as Poland, Australia, Austria, Spain, Italy and Turkey formed QA agencies and rolled out quality assurance frameworks for their HE sectors.

The rapid expansion of QA in Europe was due to two main influences. On the one hand, many national governments were learning from one another. As early adopters of the quality policy, the UK, the Netherlands and France developed quality policy initiatives that were then studied by countries such as Germany and Austria, prompting subsequent policy emulation of quality assurance systems (Rhoades and Sporn 2002; Pechar and Klepp 2007). The second important influence was the active promotion of quality policy by the European Union (EU). The EU championed the Bologna Agreement, which encouraged standardization and reciprocity in skills recognition, credits and degree structures, and the promotion of student mobility among member states (Ozga et al. 2011). Subsequently, the EU promoted the establishment of external QA systems in all its member states. In 1991, for example, the European Community funded the European Pilot Project for Evaluating Quality in Higher Education in order to raise member states' awareness of QA and transfer the experiences of earlier adopters to other member states (364). Subsequently, between November 1994 and June 1995, 17 countries and 46 institutions across Europe participated in the Pilot Project to strengthen or establish QA systems (Rhoades and Sporn 2002). The number of countries and institutions participating in the programme proliferated quickly. By 2002, more than 30 countries had established national QA systems and become members of the European Network of Quality Assurance, setting in place a dense institutional network of QA regulatory agencies directly responsible for quality evaluation and accreditation (Neave 2004: 212). Further, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, EU policy on education and its commitment to QA began to be adopted in many Central and Eastern European countries, such as Romania, Estonia and Hungary, seemingly commencing a process of the Europeanization of HE reform (Tomusk 2004). Unlike quality policy in the USA, the aim of QA in Europe was meant to set in place "the assurance of equivalent quality across countries" (Rhoades and Sporn 2002: 378). Special attention was thus paid to ensuring the compatibility of national HE systems across European borders in order to prepare member states for the harmonization of HE institutions and reciprocity in degree, credit and skill recognition in Europe.

2000 to the Present: Burnt-out Period

Since 2000 and the period of explosive adoption, the spread of QA has been more nominal but no less significant. Neave (2004), for example, reported that at least 30 national governments had established QA-related agencies by 2004, while by 2010 this had grown to 48 national systems of QA globally (Lao 2012). Throughout the decade, many more countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America also moved to adopt quality policy and roll out QA systems within their HE systems (Billing 2004; Harman 1998; Mok 2000). As Bigalke and Neubauer (2009) note, "questions of quality and the search for methods of quality assurance" continued to gain an increasingly "central place in higher education policy discussions" (2). Similar observations have also been made by education consultants at UNESCO, who noted that "For the past ten to fifteen years, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and all other Asian countries are trying hard to set up QA" (Interview, 27 August 2010). QA has clearly become an increasingly central facet of HE regulation across the globe.

The Convergence of an Idea: Quality Policy Rhetoric and Practice

The previous section has briefly reviewed the pattern of the global diffusion of quality policy. It illustrates that most Asian countries, Thailand included, have been late adopters of quality policy. In this section, I now address the question of whether the adoption of the quality policy is rhetorical or substantive and, if substantive, whether it represents a form of quality policy convergence. Parallel to the discussion in the globalization literature, there has been a considerable discussion in the HE literature of whether the march towards quality policy represents a global policy convergence or divergence. For nearly three decades, the debate has been framed in a way that has treated convergence and divergence as elements on a binary continuum—as though they were mutually exclusive. The discussion of global versus local falls into similar patterns. The representation of the convergence and quality policy debate, however, is problematic.

I argue in this chapter, however, such a representation of quality policy and its adoption and implementation in various countries is not useful. It is important to move beyond simplistic binary divisions between convergence/divergence and to address the contours of the phenomenon in more depth and with more nuances. More specifically, it is important to analyse whether conceptions such as convergence are even useful when attempting to explain and understand the spread of quality policy across various countries. Goldfinch and Wallis argue, for example, that the idea of convergence needs to be unpacked, and that convergence should be understood across three broad spectrums: the convergence of ideas and paradigms (ideational convergence), the convergence of rhetorics (formal statements or political commitments to cer-

tain policies) and the convergence of practices (administrative procedures, systems, regulatory frameworks, etc.).

In the next section, I explore this conceptualization of convergence in the case of quality policy and its adoption and practice in Thailand.

Quality Policy in Thailand: Ideational Formation, Rhetoric and Practice

The Idea of QA in Thailand

An important impetus driving the adoption of QA in Thailand was the desire to change the contours of Thailand's HE system more broadly—particularly its mode of governance. Decentralization and devolution have become the *raison d'être* of governance approaches to the sector, a factor which has also prompted consideration of quality policy as part of these broader governance reforms. In Thailand's HE system, decentralization came in various forms, including the transformation of public universities into autonomous universities, along with corporatization and related innovations. These developments represent large and significant transformations for the Thai HE system, which historically had been centrally managed through command-and-control-style bureaucratic arrangements. The former president of King Mongkut's University of Technology Thonburi, for example, one of the major advocates of HE reform defined university autonomy in relation to corporatization:

> University autonomy means that the state allows autonomous universities to manage their own three major internal affairs, namely, academic matters (academic programs, university structures), personnel matters (personnel system, recruitment, remuneration, benefits), and finance and budgets (budget management, procurement system). The state can direct, supervise, audit and evaluate autonomous universities. (Kirtikara 2004: 38)

In other words, university autonomy shifts the responsibility for issues associated with academics, finances and budget management, and human resources to university-level administrators but, at the same time, reconfigures governance oversight of accountability and transparency issues, entrusting it to external bodies and to extensive reporting systems to other agencies. The university thus receives operating grants from the Thai government, but entrusts responsibility for the allocation of that budget to university administrators, who may then allocate financial resources in accord with specific institutional needs. At the same time, universities must report their performance in relation to 48 metrics, which are broadly informed by evaluations of institutional performance in terms of teaching, research, impact and community engagement. Within this broad gambit of performance indicators, of course, quality and quality assurance play a central role, with cost/benefits, research outputs and teaching performance all measured in relation to a nominal idea of quality.

The idea of performance and quality as it relates to modes of governance and its operation in autonomous Thai universities can be seen in the changes to the

management of academic labour and the security of tenure/employment. Before the corporatization of universities in Thailand, for example, academics in public universities were considered civil servants. They thus enjoyed long-term, secure employment and benefits. With the devolution of operating responsibility to university-level administrators, however, mechanisms of accountability and performance measurement/management of academic labour have also been transformed. Thai academic labour is now subject to short-term contracts of two, three or five years' duration, contract renewal conditional on individual academic performance (in teaching, research and administration). Moreover, the management of academic labour performance is increasingly cast in terms of quality, defined in relation to standards, benchmarks and related instruments which are designed by the institution to ensure overall institutional quality.

Similar developments can be observed in teaching and academic content. With the devolution of managerial responsibility to university-level administrators, however, authority over programmes and curricula content now rests at the university level. That said, university-level approval of new programmes is also conditional on universities' meeting specific requirements, the state stipulating requirements such as the percentage of full-time staff within programmes, requirements for committee membership to oversee programme development, implementation and management, including the percentage of foreign academics permitted within teaching programmes. Under this system, the state continues to exert authority in terms of defining the regulatory architecture of the HE sector, compliance requirements and operating standards, but broadly defined, in relation to metrics of performance measurement, standards and quality, at the individual academic and institutional levels. In other words, the quality policy is increasingly the main mechanism for sectoral governance, shifting the instruments of governance from centralized state administration to institutional management through systems of accountability and transparency validated in relation to quality/standards.

This relationship between decentralization and QA is evident in the policy document of Office of Educational Standards and Quality Assessment:

> Quality education is in fact a public service required by the state to provide for all people. The state, therefore, assigns the responsibilities of offering education responsive to the needs of direct beneficiaries, i.e. students and parents, as well as those of indirect beneficiaries, i.e. enterprises, the public and the society as a whole. For such provision, it is necessary that the state assess how far it complies with the national educational policy, and how well it serves the needs of the customers or both groups of beneficiaries. (Pittiyanuwat 2008: 1)

This indicates that the role of the state in Thai HE is changing but not disappearing. As the responsibility to provide education has been assigned to other agencies, the state is left with the crucial role of performance measurement and quality indicators, and their manipulation, to maintain its influence. In interviews conducted by the author, for example, policymakers repeatedly noted that in light of institutional autonomy, QA was a way to "check and balance" as well as to ensure "quality" and "accountability". As one policymaker succinctly put it:

> The state must change its role. It cannot control everything but nor can it let everything go. QA allowed us to monitor, check and balance, and these indicators allowed the state to regulate rather than control. (Interview, 5 January 2010)

This statement highlights two countervailing ideas about quality policy in Thailand: how and why it has been adopted, and its manifestation as a mode of governance in the sector. Similar to other countries where QA was introduced as part of a broader set of new public management practices, the Thai state too has envisioned changes to public sector management, desiring greater levels of accountability and public sector responsiveness to society's needs. The devolution of responsibility to institutional (university-level) actors, and thus the introduction of quality policy, thus has to be understood in this context.

The governance of the HE sector in Thailand, as in other countries around the world, has thus been transformed, witnessing the replacement of command-and-control-style bureaucratic systems of governance with more diffuse, regulatory styles which rely on mechanisms of accountability and transparency to govern the sector.

Rhetoric and Quality Assurance in Thailand

The rhetoric surrounding QA in Thailand has morphed and been constantly changing. Between 1994 and 2016, the changing rhetoric can be observed along two continuums or analytical frames. On the one hand, the analysis of quality policy has been framed in relation to the institutional forms it takes and how it manifests and operates (Lao 2012, 2015). In this regard, QA in Thailand has undergone three transformations: being voluntary, being legal and being competitive. Between 1994 and 1999, for example, it was voluntary for traditional universities and those that "cared" about quality. The system was loosely structured with simple standard requirements.

Since 1999, however, QA has become legally mandated as part of the National Education Act (1999), and the systems for quality oversight have become more complicated. In particular, the education quality system in Thailand now comprises three organizations and is coordinated with the creation of the Office of National Educational Standards and Quality Assessment (ONESQA)—the meta-organization which also conducts external quality assessments every five years. In addition to their legal requirements, in 2010 universities also began to introduce other more voluntary QA systems, developing other internal levels of quality surveillance and performance measurement, and responding to what is increasingly viewed as a more "competitive" HE environment.

QA in Thailand thus now comprises formal systems of oversight, reporting and accountability, but also the internalization of a culture of QA within HE institutions, many of which operate voluntary tools of self-assessment. There are different competing explanations as to why the rhetoric and evaluative practices of QA have changed over time in Thailand. The part of this resides in what some characterize as ideational changes about the "mood" and "receptiveness" of academics and uni-

versity administrators to QA, part also resides in the "normalization" of QA, and in what is perceived as the emergence of global norms/standards associated with the adoption of QA systems, which are now seen as an international requirement/or benchmark. Indeed, there has been an evolution of perceptions about QA, perceptions which might be categorized into three distinctive phases in Thailand: hype and following the global trend (1994–2000), QA as a necessary evil (2000–2010) and inertia and maintenance (2010 to present). During each period, different "rhetorics" and "discourses" have thus surrounded the understanding of what QA is, why it is necessary and how it should be performed.

In Thailand, these rhetorics have been important, shaping the approach to, and practical implementation of, quality policy. During the mid-1990s, for example, policymakers spoke of an urgent need to "catch up" with global trends. QA was being widely adopted elsewhere in the world and Thailand was lagging behind, and policymakers were pushing for the introduction and implementation of quality policy. Similarly, the regional adoption of QA by ASEAN and within many competitor Asian states put pressure on Thailand to follow suit. Many argued that Thailand would be at a disadvantage if it did not replicate developments elsewhere in the region. Fact-finding missions were thus established, and Thai officials were encouraged to study developments elsewhere in the region, among ASEAN member states, and to explore the quality policy frameworks that were being implemented. Government study tours were undertaken to countries such as New Zealand, Australia and the UK. The Office of the National Education Council also invited representatives from other countries to Thailand. These included the Chief Inspector of the Office of Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (OFSTED) of the UK, the British Council and the Head of the Education Review Office, New Zealand, each of whom had a significant impact on Thai policymakers and Thai ideational attitudes towards the quality policy.

After this initial phase, we can observe a further phase and changes in the QA discourse. Rather than notions of "catching up", quality policy advocates increasingly began to talk about the need for inclusion of characteristics of "Thai-ness" in the QA process. Indeed, notions of "Amicable Assessment" and the Buddhist conception of being a "good friend" were introduced into the discourse to address an emergent xenophobic resistance to quality policy. So, too, after the introduction of QA, complaints surfaced about QA practices and academic resistance intensified as a result of excessive paperwork, enormous time requirements placed on academic staff, the drain on university resources and the implication of QA on core activities like teaching and research. Despite such complaints, however, the authorities, including senior university-level administrators, continued to assert the importance of QA and QA practices to ensure "quality" and societal expectations regarding standards, degree outcomes and graduate employability—in other words, QA came to be seen as a necessary evil.

More recently, the quality regime in Thailand might be characterized as having entered a period of acceptance and inertia, the regime having settled and been internalized as part of normal university practices, and its role, procedures and consequences broadly understood among stakeholders.

Fig. 3 Mapping out quality policy in Thailand's higher education. *Source* Lao (2012)

Quality Assurance Practice in Thailand

The instantiation, internalization and normalization of QA practices in the Thai HE system have followed similar trends seen in other countries. Indeed, even the institutional contexts of the Thai QA system are broadly measured by the institutional design of QA systems that can be observed in other countries, the Office of the Higher Education Commission and Office of Educational Standards and Quality Assessment being similar in terms of remit and operations to other QA agencies. Indeed, there are striking similarities in terms of meta-level organizational design (ONESQA), self-assessment (SAR reports), peer reviews/site visits, published reports (from OHEC—ONESQA) and institutional activities relative to other countries where QA systems have been adopted. In this sense, Thailand is not an outlier or unusual (see Fig. 3).

On other levels, however, there are differences in the degree to which QA practices filter downwards, the way in which they are utilized in terms of quality outcomes and the impact they have on institutional decision making, practices and sector governance. In part, this is explained by what I argue to be specific issues unique to Thai culture and Thai social relations. Systems of academic seniority and patronage still operate in Thailand, for example, in part setting aside QA processes or at least filtering them in ways that distort institutional QA practices. Despite the operation of a QA system, and thus a performance assessment system for institutions within the Thai HE sector, assessment results have not thus far been used to allocate funding at the national or institutional level. Rather, "favours", "connections" and

"performance", measured in other ways, continue to operate as a means of determining resource allocation, even in the case of research grants. So, too, despite QA operating as a means of guaranteeing accountability and transparency following the devolution of managerial responsibility to universities, in point of fact, the governance culture of ONESQA still makes for a hierarchical and highly bureaucratic approach to sector review and QA. Equally, the QA process also reflects in-built weaknesses, whereby universities are responsible for the nomination and appointment of external reviewers, often leading to the appointment of "friendly" assessors or those known to the relevant departments/programmes. As a consequence, recent research on the impact of QA on university administration has shown that university management and administrators generally do not incorporate QA information into their decision-making processes.

Despite the formal adoption of QA and the broader ideational embrace of the quality policy, the extent to which this has filtered down in practice is uneven, and in some instances problematic.

Governing by Numbers? Changing Governance in Thai Higher Education

At face value, the Thai HE system is governed by numbers—134 indicators from three organizations are legally mandated to be implemented at every level of the Thai HE sector (Sukboonyasatit et al. 2011). Institutional and research funding, for example, the determination of teaching workloads and the deployment of academic labour, even the preservation of curriculum content focused on the protection of "Thai culture", are all nominally subject to QA processes of overt regulation of Thai HE.

As already indicated, the impact at the institutional level of regulation and the outcomes produced are uneven. The findings of Sukboonyasatit et al. (2011), for example, suggest that QA processes are significantly deflected through overly formalized, bureaucratic and often competing administrative systems in which various aspects of QA are farmed out to different organizations. The OPDC is responsible for public accountability, the ONESQA for educational outcomes, while the OHEC is responsible for educational processes, splintering lines of accountability and creating administrative silos, which impacts the operation of QA, data collection, QA findings, and thus institutional compliance and sector governance outcomes.

So too, there is replication and redundancy in terms of the design of performance indicators used to assess quality and outcomes. Of the 134 indicators, for example, 47 essentially cover the same metric, adding to compliance costs and the administrative workloads devolved to universities. In analysing the compliance costs to Thai universities, Apinunmahakul (2016) estimated that each university spends on average US$100,000 a year on collecting data and preparing for QA, while the utilization of this information by university senior-level management is not always obvious.

At the same time, there is evidence to suggest that QA processes and the division of performance criteria into 134 metrics impact the work of academic labour, particularly the way in which academics employ their time at university. Performance-based assessment of research, for example, has shifted the focus of academic labour. Historically, academic labour in the Thai HE context focused predominantly on teaching and related activities. Thai universities have historically been teaching-intensive, research was "optional" or a "sideline" and not a requirement. Increasingly, however, performance-based indicators have obliged academics to conduct and publish a certain amount of research within a given amount of time, setting research productivity benchmarks in order to ensure contract renewal or academic promotion. Similarly, teaching assessments by students have come to form a central performance metric, impacting academic labour in terms of contract renewal and promotion, and teaching performance indicators are now key metrics for institutional rankings.

The introduction of quality policy into the Thai HE system highlights both convergence with international practices but also ongoing differences, partly explained by the manner in which quality policy has been imported, how values associated with it are distilled and filtered into the Thai HE sector, and how the institutional elements of quality policy were constituted and implemented. This, combined with the nature of Thai social relations and traditional social networks, accounts for these continuing differences.

Conclusion

This chapter began with a global survey of HE governance with a particular focus on quality policy. While the S-shaped curve of diffusion theory shows that QA has become a global education policy, a careful reading of the governance literature suggests that some caution needs to be exercised in conclusions regarding whether QA or quality policy have converged in terms of practice. The conceptualization of convergence as a broad spectrum comprising three elements (ideas and ideational formation, rhetoric and discourse, and practices) allows a more nuanced appreciation of the notion of convergence in quality policy and HE, as the case study of Thailand has demonstrated.

References

Apinunmahakul, A. (2016). *Higher education finance for quality higher education*. Bangkok: NIDA.

Bigalke, T. W., & Neubauer, D. E. (2009). Quality and the public good: An inseparable linkage. In T. W. Bigalke & D. E. Neubauer (Eds.), *Higher education in Asia/Pacific: Quality and the public good* (pp. 1–14). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Billing, D. (2004). International comparisons and trends in external quality assurance of higher education: Commonality or diversity? *Higher Education, 47*(1), 113–137.

Bleiklie, I. (2007). The social foundations of the evaluative state and the universities as stakeholder organizations. In *Towards a cartography of higher education policy change: A festschrift in honor of Guy Neave* (pp. 97–104). Enschede: Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS).

Harman, G. (1998). The management of quality assurance: A review of international practice. *Higher Education Quarterly, 52*(4), 345–364.

Kirtikara, K. (2004). *Transition from a university under the bureaucratic system to an autonomous university: Reflections on concepts and experience of the King Mongkut's University of Technology Thonburi*. Bangkok: Office of the Education Council.

Lao, R. (2012). *The logic of the Thai higher education sector and quality assessment* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Columbia University, New York, NY.

Lao, R. (2015). *A critical study of Thailand's higher education reform: The culture of borrowing*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Meseguer, C. (2009). *Learning, policymaking and market reforms*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Mok, K. H. (2000). Marketizing higher education in post-Mao China. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 109–126.

Neave, G. (2004). The temple and its guardians: An excursion into the rhetoric of evaluating higher education. *Journal of Finance and Management in Colleges and Universities, 1,* 211–227.

Office of National Education Commission. (1999). National Education Act of B.E. 2542. Bangkok: Seven Printing Group.

Ozga, J., Dahler-Larsen, P., Segerholm, C., & Simola, H. (2011). Introduction. In *Fabricating quality: Data and governance in Europe* (pp. 1–8). Oxford: Routledge.

Pechar, H. (2002). Accreditation in higher education in Britain and Austria. *Tertiary Education and Management, 8*(3), 231–242.

Pechar, H., & Klepp, C. (2007). Accreditation and differentiation: A policy to establish new sectors in Austrian higher education. In S. Schwarz & D. F. Westerheijden (Eds.), *Accreditation and evaluation in the European higher education area* (pp. 43–64). New York, NY: Springer.

Pittiyanuwat, S. (2008). An overview of quality assessment in Thailand. *International Journal of Quality Assurance and Accreditation, 1*(1).

Rhoades, G., & Sporn, B. (2002). Quality assurance in Europe and the U.S.: Professional and political economic framing of higher education policy. *Higher Education, 43*(3), 355–390.

Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2000). Transferring education, displacing reforms. In J. Schriwer (Ed.), *Discourse formation in comparative education*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.

Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2004). Introduction: Globalization in education: Real or imagined? In G. Steiner-Khamsi (Ed.), *The global politics of educational borrowing and lending* (pp. 1–6). New York, NY: Teachers College Press.

Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2006). The economics of policy borrowing and lending: A study of late adopters. *Oxford Review of Education, 32*(5), 665–678.

Steiner-Khamsi, G. (2010). The politics and economics of comparison. *Comparative Education Review, 54*(3), 323–342.

Sukboonyasatit, K., Thanapaisarn, C., & Manmar, L. (2011). Key performance indicators of public universities based on quality assessment criteria in Thailand. *Contemporary Issues in Education Research, 4*(9), 9–18.

Tomusk, V. (2004). *The open world and closed societies: Essays on higher education policies "in transition"*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

van Vught, F. A., & Westerheijden, D. F. (1994). Towards a general model of quality assessment in higher education. *Higher Education, 28*(3), 355–371.

Verger, A., Novelli, M., & Altinyelken, H. K. (2012). Global education policy and international development: An introductory framework. In A. Verger, M. Novelli, & H. K. Altinyelken (Eds.), *Global education policy and international development: New agendas, issues and policies* (pp. 3–32). London: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Vidovich, L. (2002). Quality assurance in Australian higher education: Globalisation and "steering at a distance". *Higher Education, 43*(3), 391–408.

Weyland, K. (2005). Theories of policy diffusion: Lessons from Latin American pension reform. *World Politics, 57*(2), 2642.

Rattana Lao is Senior Programme Officer of Policy and Research at the Asia Foundation, Thailand. Before joining the Asia Foundation, she was Head of the Thai Studies International Program, Pridi Banomyong International College, Thammasat University, where she taught Thai Politics and Social Economic Development Policy in Thailand. Rattana's research interests include globalization theory, state-society relations and higher education policy. She is interested in issues of university governance, quality assurance and internationalization in the Thai higher education sector. She is the author of *Critical Studies of Thailand's Higher Education Reforms: The Culture of Borrowing* (Routledge, 2015). Rattana obtained her doctorate from Teachers College (Political Science), Columbia University and previously was a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University of Hong Kong, China.

Chapter 12
Cambodian Higher Education Governance: The Politics of Global Summitry and Clientelism

Will Brehm

Introduction

There is a great irony in the governance of Cambodia's higher education sector. Despite the structural organization of higher education spread over a diversity of supervising agencies, governance is concentrated in the hands of a few high-ranking politicians. This reality is at odds with the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports' (MoEYS) aspiration for so-called world class university governance standards.[1] These standards, based on advice from the World Bank, call for operational autonomy of higher education institutions and limited government interference in institutional practices and procedures (Salmi 2009). This chapter sets out to unpack this irony by situating contemporary higher education governance in Cambodia in historical context, specifically by addressing the role of external agents in shaping the institutional and policy contexts that now operate in the higher education sector in Cambodia.

---

[1] The stated vision of the Cambodian higher education is "to build a quality higher education system that develops human resources with excellent knowledge, skills and moral values in order to work and live within the era of globalization and knowledge-based society" and a goal "to develop a good governance system and higher education mechanisms that ensure qualified students have an opportunity to access quality higher education programs which respond to the needs of socio-economic development and labor market" (MoEYS 2014, p. 3). These declarations echo the three factors Salmi (2009), a World Bank staff member, outlines for world class universities: "(a) a **high concentration of talent** (faculty and students), (b) **abundant resources** to offer a rich learning environment and to conduct advanced research, and (c) **favorable governance** features that encourage strategic vision, innovation, and flexibility and that enable institutions to make decisions and to manage resources without being encumbered by bureaucracy" (p. 7; original emphasis).

W. Brehm (✉)
Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
e-mail: willbrehm@aoni.waseda.jp

Theorizing Governance of the Higher Education Sector in Cambodia

The governance of higher education in Cambodia is both complex and institutionally intrusive. Some fifteen different ministries have oversight responsibilities for the higher education sector (a result of the Soviet era; see Pit and Ford 2004), which includes 118 universities (of which 46 are public). Although the large number of supervising agencies might allow for a certain level of decentralized institutional autonomy, in practice this has not happened. Rather, there is a level of *concentrated authority* vested not in MoEYS (or any other supervising agency) but in the Ministry of Economic and Finance (MEF) and the Council of Ministers. The MEF controls the purse strings of public higher education institutions, and the Council of Ministers, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, oversees the quality assurance and accreditation of all higher education institutions (at least through 2015).

How then can we make sense of governance issues in the Cambodian higher education sector? One way to do so is to use the theoretical lens of "global summitry" and more broadly notions of policy diffusion (Alexandroff and Brean 2015; Roberts 2009). Global summitry is a relatively new manifestation, reflecting the rise of global and regional institutional policy-political architectures that impact, shape, and help inform domestic policy and institutional practices. This has been especially the case in Cambodia, where nascent domestic political institutions combined with low institutional capacity have historically made the sector malleable to external agents, typically transmitted through global and regional institutions. In recent years, for instance, the proliferation of higher education summits has brought together policymakers from across Southeast Asia to disseminate "best practices" in the design of higher education institutions and governance of the sector. Cambodia has been greatly influenced by such summits, with the ideas, agendas, and policy practices discussed in such forums being transmitted into the policy-making processes in MoEYS and other bodies responsible for oversight of Cambodia's higher education system.

While the role of external agents in shaping the policy preferences and practices of domestic policy actors is not new, in the Cambodian context it is particularly significant. In part, this reflects the country's tumultuous history, in which war, genocide, and dislocation have weakened various state and juridical systems, and contributed to the social and political relations dominated by systems of clientelism and patronage. I argue in this chapter that by combining the ideas of global summitry and clientelism, we can begin to make sense of—or theorize—the contemporary landscape of higher education governance in Cambodia (e.g., Un and Sok 2014).

This chapter begins with an overview of the Cambodian higher education sector, addressing developments in the governance of the sector since the 1960s. The chapter then turns to the idea of global summitry, analyzing Cambodia's experience amid regional attempts to "harmonize" standards, degree structures, quality assurance systems, and credit systems in Southeast Asia. As I argue, however, theorizing higher education governance in Cambodia exclusively through a prism of external agents without recognition of the historical dominance of clientelism makes for an

incomplete theoretical explanation. In the subsequent section, I thus turn to the role of clientelism and patronage, addressing the case of the Accreditation Council of Cambodia (ACC) and the World Bank's involvement in quality assurance development. The chapter concludes with recent (up to April 2016) developments in higher education governance, offering some observations and obstacles for future development in the sector.

Historical Overview of Higher Education in Cambodia

The first university in Cambodia opened in 1963 and was quickly followed by eight more.[2] The nine universities established in the 1960s were governed by the Ministry of National Education, and, by 1966, enrolled over 7,000 students (Ayres 2000). Despite the overall promise of post-colonial Cambodia,[3] the institutions of education generally and higher education especially experienced massive disruption due to the intensifying conflicts in Indochina (e.g., the American war in Vietnam) and state budgetary shortfalls.

Just as the Khmer Royal University (known today as the Royal University of Phnom Penh) first opened its doors to students, Norodom Sihanouk, then the head of state, cut ties with the USA and aligned more closely with Mao's China. Since the USA had provided essential budgetary support to the education sector commencing in the mid-1950s, the newly founded universities, which included such faculties as medicine, fine arts, agriculture, and oceanography, were starved of essential capital and placed in a state of financial and operational limbo. Despite this precarity, by 1970, 9,228 students enrolled in the higher education sector (William et al. 2016, p. 173).

In the ensuing years before communist rebels, known colloquially as the Khmer Rouge, took control of the state, the financial precariousness of universities was made worse by civil war between the USA-backed General Lon Nol, who had in 1970 overthrown the supposedly non-aligned (in the Cold War sense of the term) Sihanouk, and the budding Khmer Rouge movement in the rural provinces. As the two sides fought for control of the state, destroying many provincial university buildings in the wake of war, the financial instability of universities spiraled out of control. Vann (2012) claimed, "universities in that period faced a severe shortage of teaching staff with foreign lecturers playing a dominant role in university teaching, and employers complained about the lack of competent graduates" (p. 15). The early promise of higher education, seen in the increase in total student enrollment, was thus halted by internal struggles for state power.

---

[2]Kitamura and colleagues (2016, p. 208) show that some institutions of higher education were established as early as 1918 (e.g., the Royal University of Fine Arts) but that the designation of "university" did not occur until the 1960s.

[3]Cambodia achieved independence from France in 1953.

The situation was only to become worse once the Khmer Rouge came to power in April 1975.[4] Under the banner of a "Super Great Leap Forward" (*moha loot phloh moha oschar*; see Chandler et al. 1988, p. 11), echoing Mao's economic program, the Khmer Rouge disbanded all institutions that were thought to be "Western" or have colonial heritage, adopting a brutal political vision of returning Cambodian society to an agrarian utopia. When the Khmer Rouge came to power, for example, they "forcibly emptied Cambodia's towns and cities, abolished money, schools, private property, law, courts, and markets, forbade religious practices, and set almost everybody to work in the countryside growing food" (Chandler 1999, p. vii). Chamnan and Ford (2004) estimate that 75% of higher education professors and 96% of university students were killed by the Khmer Rouge because they represented all things considered evil under the Khmer Rouge ideology. The education system was effectively dismantled; the higher education system went from experiencing an early boom marked with budgetary problems in the 1960s to being non-existent by 1975.

After three years, eight months, and twenty days of genocidal rule, the internally divided Khmer Rouge was quickly toppled in 1979 by dissidents and defectors who organized in and received support from communist Hanoi. The new regime that controlled the state, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), emphasized education in its massive state rebuilding project. Eight higher education institutions reopened in the 1980s; however, only 702 students enrolled in the tertiary education sector in the first year (Williams et al. 2016, p. 173). Since the PRK was backed by Hanoi and its patron, the Soviet Union, higher education in Cambodia aimed "to provide good political training with its primary goal of promoting socialism in Cambodia" (Vann 2012, p. 16). Higher education in this period was an elite, fee-free institution, reserved for those who came from families in positions of power, with most graduates automatically guaranteed a civil service position (Chamnan and Ford 2004).

Similar to the 1960s, higher education in Cambodia during the Soviet period was heavily influenced by foreign agents. Many professors came from Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union; textbooks and curricula were translated from countries in the Soviet sphere of influence; and the language of instruction was typically either Vietnamese or Russian (Clayton 1999). There was even a mobility scheme whereby Khmer students studied in Vietnam, the Soviet Union, or Cuba. Unlike the 1960s, however, universities were administratively organized under different government ministries, which was like other communist countries at the time. Starting in the 1980s, ministries governed universities that shared a common area of interest. For example, the University of Health Science was administered by the Ministry of Health and the University of Agriculture by the Ministry of Agriculture.

The system of higher education changed again in 1989 when the Soviet Union ended central economic planning and embraced markets as part of *perestroika*, which was adopted by Vietnam under the heading *doi mói*. Soon, foreign professors in

---

[4]In a move he would later regret, Sihanouk backed the Khmer Rouge in an ill-fated attempt to regain state influence, which he had lost to Lon Nol in 1970. The Khmer Rouge used Sihanouk's Royalist credentials to legitimize its growing communist uprising against Lon Nol. Once in power, however, the Khmer Rouge imprisoned Sihanouk in the royal palace, leaving him powerless to combat the genocide for which the Khmer Rouge is infamous.

Cambodia returned to their home countries while financial support to the sector was reduced. This was like the situation in the 1960s when the USA reduced economic aid. By 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and Vietnam had withdrawn government support in Cambodia, ending early than planed a 25-year friendship agreement. Cambodia's two patrons for a decade had disappeared almost overnight, leaving a sizable gap in human and financial resources for universities. A new patron quickly emerged in the form of the United Nations, which administered Cambodia for the two years before the 1993 elections (Doyle et al. 1997). Cambodia was again changing at the behest of the geopolitical order of the era.

Under the banner of liberal internationalism, Cambodia was to transition its Soviet-inspired institutions to so-called democratic institutions through the direct involvement of the international (i.e., Western) community, which had just triumphed over the Soviet Union. One such early educational intervention as pointed out by Vann (2012) was the Cambodian Australian National Examination Project (CANEP) that worked with the newly created MoEYS "in improving and enhancing all aspects of the Cambodian national secondary school exams, particularly grade 12 … the final high school leaving exam" (p. 19). Although the CANEP reforms increased the number of high school graduates, the Soviet-inspired system of elite higher education, which relied on challenging entrance examinations, proved unable to support the large numbers of students seeking tertiary education. Even for the students who could pass the higher education entrance examinations, the publicly funded system of higher education could not support a massive increase in student enrollment. There were simply not enough seats available for the number of students demanding higher education. In this environment, the newly established MoEYS granted permission in 1997 for the first private university to open, which was in line with the government's privatization policies and encouraged by the Western international community (Ngoy 2005). Allowing private universities to open also expanded access to higher education without burdening the MoEYS budget, allowing it to concentrate on basic education, which had been the chosen area of focus by various international actors such as UNICEF and the World Bank under programs such as the Education For All and Millennium Development Goals (King 2007).

Another intervention as part of the new liberal internationalism that defined the Cambodian Post-Soviet period was the idea of New Public Management (NPM), a policy approach that arose in the UK under Margaret Thatcher. As Turner (2002) notes, NPM embodied a system of governance based on seven features:

> letting the managers manage; setting explicit standards and measures of performance; greater emphasis on output control; disaggregation of units in the public sector; greater competition in the public sector; greater use of private sector management techniques in public sector settings; and greater discipline and parsimony in resource utilization (p. 1495).

A specific outcome of the NPM reforms in Cambodia was the Royal Decree on the Legal Statute of Public Administrative Institutions (PAI), which was signed in 1997 and revised in 2016. Although the 1997 Royal Decree impacted the administration of institutions across the government, including water and power administrative units, in higher education the law increased autonomy in some of the publically administered

universities by establishing independent governing boards. These boards were supposed to be able to make financial and management decisions without the oversight of the parent ministry. In effect, PAIs turned *some* public universities (a total of 10 institutions in 2016) into "quasi-government institutions" (Rany et al. 2012, p. 238). PAIs were thus a private sector management technique being employed in the public sector. PAIs also met Turner's (2002) NPM feature of "letting the managers manage" by supposedly removing bureaucrats from the daily operations of universities.[5]

In the end, the NPM reforms resulted in Cambodia having three distinct types of higher education institutions: completely public (i.e., universities managed by their parent ministries, reflecting the legacy of the Soviet Union period), Public Administrative Institutions (i.e., public universities with semi-autonomy, which were the product of NPM), and completely private institutions (i.e., universities with little government oversight). It should be noted, however, that the 2016 Royal Decree on PAIs removed some of the autonomy originally provided in the 1997 decree—a development I return to later in the chapter.

Another specific outcome of the NPM reforms in higher education was the introduction of fee-paying students inside public and PAI universities, replicating the trend in private universities and moving away from the Soviet system of fee-free schooling, which continued its legacy through the government-sponsored scholarship scheme (William et al. 2016, p. 175).[6] In the 2016 *Education Congress Report*, for example, data on student enrollment and scholarships indicated that 87% of bachelor degree students paid fees in 2015 (MoEYS 2016, p. 43). In effect, the meaning of "public" had been transformed, no longer reflecting the idea of fee-free education as it had been during the Soviet period but rather on the administrative and regulatory rules public (and PAI) universities must follow.[7]

The changes in governance since the arrival of liberal internationalism, which included NPM and privatization reforms, have resulted in a move toward a mass system of higher education that relies on fee-paying students. In the early 1990s, only 1% of college-aged youth enrolled in tertiary education. By 2014, that number had climbed to 16% (Vann 2012). In the 2015–2016 academic year, 182,987 students were enrolled in a bachelor degree program (MoEYS 2016, p. 43). Although the 2015–2016 enrollment rate is lower than the previous year (likely because of the stricter high school leaving examination reforms implemented in 2014, which drastically reduced the number of secondary graduates), the trend remains: Since the 1990s, and especially after 1997 when private universities began operating and public universities began charging fees, higher education enrollment has experienced exponential growth. The system has thus moved away from being an elite fee-free

---

[5]It is not clear to me that the Royal Decree changed in any meaningful way the manner in which politicians were involved in higher education governance in the first place.

[6]It should be noted that publically funded scholarships are given to students to study at public and PAI higher education institutions but not private ones. Some private universities offer their own scholarships.

[7]For instance, public universities receive financial subsides related to paying for services, such as electricity.

sector in the 1960s toward being a mass fee-based system by the 2010s (William et al. 2016, pp. 180–181).

Despite the movement toward mass higher education, Soviet legacies remain. As of 2016, for example, there were 118 higher education institutions (36 public, 10 PAI, and 72 private) operating in the country and supervised by 15 different ministries/agencies. This type of governance system reflects reforms implemented in the 1980s when Cambodia was heavily influenced by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. MoEYS supervises the most institutions (71, including 59 private) while 25 are supervised by the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training. The rest of the 22 higher education institutions are supervised by 13 different government ministries and/or agencies, including the National Bank of Cambodia, Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and the Ministry of Health (MoEYS 2016, p. 42). Although a Supreme National Council of Education is supposed to coordinate long-term strategies across the 15 ministries/agencies supervising universities, as was envisioned during the liberal international period of educational governance, it has not yet been established, leaving ministries to compete for influence and resources (Un and Sok 2014, p. 7).[8] In effect, the massive dislocations since independence from the French in the 1950s and the fits and starts of various systems of higher education ever since have created a mélange of governance arrangements: an increasingly powerful MoEYS slowly turning into its historical antecedent, the Ministry of National Education; multiple ministries overseeing different universities as per Soviet organization; and the rise of private universities emblematic of privatization movements of the liberal international order in the 1990s.

Global Summitry in Higher Education: The Rise of ASEAN Harmonization

As the previous section argued, the system of higher education in Cambodia has been heavily influenced and supported by regionally dominant foreign actors and resources. The USA provided essential financial support from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s as part of its geopolitical struggle to control Indochina; the Soviet Union and Vietnam rebuilt the system of higher education in the 1980s through a system of technical assistance, writing curricula and advising on management structures; and in the 1990s, various international development institutions began to play an active role in the governance of the schooling system and higher education sector.

---

[8]Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting to point out that MoEYS oversees the bulk of private institutions (59 out of 72). It could be argued that in the crowded space of higher education governance, where 15 different ministries compete for influence and resources, MoEYS implicitly or explicitly advocated the privatization of higher education as a way to increase its relative power among the competing ministries (or at least, MoEYS gained the most from privatization in terms of power relative to the other supervising ministries). With most universities under its control, MoEYS is in a strong position to exert authority over the entire higher education sector.

Although there are still many examples of multilateral and external actors actively participating in the higher education system,[9] the technical assistance by such actors is now less pronounced than it was in previous decades. This is not to say, however, that Cambodia since the 2000s has been developing its higher education system independently. Rather, it is to highlight that the locus of external influence has shifted from direct involvement (although examples of this still persist) to indirect influence. The latter can be found in the rise of regionalization as the primary means by which the transfer of educational ideas is occurring in the Cambodia higher education sector. Hirosato (2014), for example, claims that international trade among the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Cambodia is a member, together with the increased mobility of people within the region "places higher education in a pivotal role in developing human resources capable of creating and sustaining globalized and knowledge-based societies and promoting 'brain circulation' in and outside Southeast Asia" (p. 145). Indeed, in more recent years the role of ASEAN in promoting regimes of good governance, comprised of standardized approaches to degree structures, academic calendars, and quality assurance systems has been noticeably enhanced (Yavaprabhas 2014, p. 94). ASEAN, for example, has championed regional harmonization as part of a larger political project to strengthen the organization and the ability of member states to compete internationally. Through regionalization, Cambodia is thus being encouraged to harmonize its higher education system and align it with international practices as a means to position its economy internationally (see Footnote 1).

The push for higher education regional harmonization is not occurring in an *a*political vacuum, however. Specific values are contained within such practices and the reforms they recommend. The idea of "global summitry" is helpful in understanding these broader forces and how governance of the higher education sector in Cambodia is being impacted.

Global summitry is a term popularized by Alexandroff and Brean (2015), two scholars of international relations. The concept embodies the notion that the global political architecture of the post-2008 era is dominated by networks of policy communities, international organizations, and communities of practice where leaders exchange ideas and adopt specific ideational perspectives about governance and approaches to governance. Global summitry is thus concerned with the "policy behavior of the actors engaged in the influence of outcomes of common concern in the international system" (p. 2). Instead of focusing on the amorphous concept of globalization, global summitry focuses on the practices of policy transfer and ideational formation that transmits specific governance practices into national contexts.

In the Cambodian context, global summitry has become an increasingly important driver shaping governance practices in higher education. The global and regional summits serve important functions in agenda setting, defining policy discourses, and setting in place approaches to how specific communities of practitioners and policy makers communicate notions of best practice in the governance and management of higher education, sector reform, and composition. Cambodian leaders and bureau-

---

[9]The country is still dependent on international assistance from institutions such as the World Bank.

crats, for example, participate along with other education officials from regional neighbors as well as Western countries, but often as a net receiver of ideas and practices in relation to the management of higher education. As Yavaprabhas (2014) argues, the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) is one of the most important regional institutions in Southeast Asian higher education harmonization. Although started in 1965, annual meetings of SEAMEO were not held until 2005, around the time when Alexandroff and Brean (2015) locate the ascendance of Global Summitry as a defining feature of the global order. These meetings, held at SEAMEO's Regional Center for Higher Education and Development (RIHED), are organized by a Director General, Secretary General, and Commissioner of Higher Education in Southeast Asia, and involve the ministers of education from the 11-member states of ASEAN to promote educational harmonization:

> Since its work is at the level of 'government,' agreements at meetings hosted by SEAMEO RIHED are highly likely to affect all HEIs [higher education institutions] in every country in the region, which means around 7,000 HEIs (Yavaprabhas 2014, p. 90).

It is, however, not simply a process of senior-level summitry which promotes policy transfer and harmonization in higher education. Equally, the communities of practice that operate beneath these summits are engaged in deepening levels of "shared thinking" and adopting similar policy practices that are translated into national contexts. In Cambodian higher education, for example, the rise of summitry at various levels is increasingly evident. The 2016 *Education Congress Report* details the many summits (including conferences and meetings) in which lower-level Cambodian officials (and sometimes teachers) participated (see Table 1). These summits are often under the guise of "training" whereby the purpose is to build bureaucratic capacity and the ability to manage the higher education system or, where necessary, to reform it in line with dominant practices in the regional and international order. Rather than explicit intervention into Cambodia's higher education sector as has been the country's historical experience (i.e., French colonialism, Vietnamese/Soviet intervention, and the United Nation's liberal internationalism), the contemporary order transmits policy and governance practices through various regional and international forums, creating a seemingly homogenous system of higher education that is being articulated by Cambodians themselves.

In the next section, I address how global and regional summitry is impacting a particular policy area in higher education in Cambodia—quality assurance and accreditation.

Clientelism in Quality Assurance and Accreditation

The concept of quality assurance initially entered the Cambodian higher education policy space through the idea of university accreditation in the early 2000s. The World Bank was the primary external agent advocating such a reform by encouraging the adoption of a law on accreditation as a precondition for a US$30 million higher

Table 1 Partial list of 2015 "summits" in higher education, Cambodia's participation

Event	Where	Type	No. of Cambodian participants	Organized by
Second Higher Education Forum: EU-Cambodia Higher Education Policy and Cooperation	Cambodia	Conference	200	European Union
Training on "project management team to achieve transformation" in higher education	Malaysia	Training	4	SETYM International
7th annual ICMI-East Asia Regional Conference on Mathematics Education	Philippines	Conference	5	East Asia Regional Conference on Mathematics Education
Summer Institute: "Higher Education for Tomorrow in Hong Kong" and Asian Higher Education Summit	Hong Kong	Workshop	8	The University of Hong Kong
International conference on quality of higher education, global expectations, and best practices	Vietnam	Conference	13	British Council Vietnam and Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization Regional Training Center (SEAMEO RETRAC)
6th International Conference on Teaching English as Second Language	Vietnam	Conference	13	SEAMEO RETRAC
8th International Conference on Industrial and Applied Mathematics	China	Conference	4	Professional Society
Learning for Sustainable Futures: Making the Connections	UK	Conference	4	UKFIET, The Education and Development Forum
7th Annual Higher Education Summit Asia	Singapore	Conference	5 Cambodians	IBC Asia, a division of Informa PLC.
Internationalization of higher education: moving beyond mobility	Italy	Conference	3 Cambodians	International Association of Universities

Source MoEYS (2016)

education loan. The case study I explore here highlights the nature of policy transfer from international bodies and their articulation into national contexts.

From early 2001 to mid-2002, the World Bank hired a team of consultants to study the higher education system in Cambodia. The team was led by John Dawkins, the former Australian Ministry for Employment, Education, and Training (1987–1991). Dawkins championed what was termed a tertiary "revolution" whereby he controversially incorporated features of NPM into Australia's higher education system. One of Dawkins' team members studying Cambodia was Mark Turner, an Australian professor who has spent his career studying public sector reform in developing countries. At the time of his consultancy with the World Bank in Cambodia, Turner (2002) wrote that NPM entered countries in Southeast Asia through "courses in leading public administration training institutions throughout the region; for more than a decade academics and bureaucrats have been *attending international workshops and conferences where NPM … is a major topic*; and published materials on NPM have been circulated in academic and government circles over the same period" (p. 1496; emphasis added).

During multiple trips to Cambodia the team of consultants "met with university and education-ministry officials to discuss the proposed laws" (Lin-Liu 2001). The proposed laws, one of which ended up being the Royal Decree on PAIs (see previous discussion), were preconditions for World Bank loans to fund higher education initiatives in Cambodia. Specifically, the proposed reforms involved the introduction of legislation for the accreditation of universities in the higher education sector. For the World Bank, and Turner, it was the lack of formal accreditation systems that posed the greatest risks to Cambodia's higher education system (Lin-Liu 2001). John Dawkins, for example, noted the absence of such a system posed the potential for chaos in the sector. The introduction of a legal framework for accreditation was needed (Sine 2002).

To facilitate its agenda, the World Bank utilized multiple avenues to build support. These included capacity building programs, summitry, and agenda setting. One such conference was held in Phnom Penh between July 31 and August 2, 2002. This conference, which was attended by Dawkins and Turner, focused on accreditation and higher education (Falby 2002). At the conference, attendees discussed the draft legislation and governance reforms to the higher education sector:

> The draft legislation calls for a board [overseeing the accreditation process] nominated by school directors, foreign donors to education, Southeast Asian university networks and the Ministry of Education. The board would be chaired by the Minister of Education and include four Cambodians with advanced degrees or extensive experience in higher education. It would also include two members, foreign or Cambodian, with experience in existing accreditation programs… The World Bank has offered to release a major loan to train teachers, develop curricula, upgrade libraries and buy equipment if the law passes (Sine 2002).

As is typical of the legislative process in Cambodia, however, political revisions are often made behind closed doors, and are often driven as much by clientelism and the politics of patronage as they are by processes of orderly policy making. The law on university accreditation was no different, undergoing a series of revisions that produced unintended outcomes. Changes to the law commenced on February 21,

2003, with the Council of Universities in Cambodia chaired by Senior Minister Sok An, revising various provisions in the legislation. These included (1) Sok An, a close ally of Hun Sen, was to be appointed the Permanent Vice-Chair of the Accreditation Committee; (2) it would be optional rather than compulsory to invite two experts in accreditation to sit on the committee; (3) and the body would have three additional members on the committee, representatives from the ministries of agriculture, health, and culture, diluting the power of MoEYS. In short, the proposed changes by the Council of Universities in Cambodia politicized the board.

After the revisions were made, the World Bank sent a team to review the new legal framework. The World Bank said of the proposed changes: "We've always said that we would prepare a project if there's a satisfactory legal framework, and that hasn't materialized yet. The longer you wait, the more competition there is for funds [by other World Bank projects around the world]" (Woodsome 2003). With the World Bank's preconditions not met, it decided in March 2003 to defer the loan for higher education (although it did provide loans for primary and secondary education).

Despite an absence of World Bank funding, Cambodia nevertheless moved forward with the accreditation law. On April 19, 2004, the Royal Decree on Accreditation of Higher Education was signed into law. The Accreditation Council of Cambodia (ACC) was subsequently established and situated under the Council of Ministers, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. As noted by Un and Say (2014, pp. 9–10), the ACC's "ability and capacity as a quality assurance guarantor have been legitimately questioned. Some question its independence from political interference; others see it as a body with little professional experience in accreditation and operated by less experienced staff or criticize its 'very complex and bureaucratic' application procedure." As Ford (2015) concludes, "key features of the draft law were amended by the Council of Ministers; their removal effectively eliminated the independence and broad stakeholder participation of the proposed Accreditation Committee of Cambodia (ACC) and its nomination committee, resulting in a greater concentration of central control in spite of the government's stated policy direction toward decentralization" (p. 13).

The attempts by the World Bank to have Cambodia adopt accreditation and quality assurance legislation produced unintended outcomes, in part a result of an entrenched politics of patronage and clientelism (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). In Cambodia, it is not uncommon for individuals to pay various "fees" to a person in some position of power who provides a level of protection or service. Ebeling (2008), for example, found that 70% of the population pays an informal fee *everyday*. These fees often go to police officers, school teachers, and doctors. These types of social positions provide needed services (safety, education, and health) to individuals, who thus see an informal fee as a necessary payment. This is called a patron-client relationship and is the basis of the social system of clientelism (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984).

One such patron-client relation involves university and government officials. Government officials (the patron in this relation) sit on many boards of universities and stand to gain both politically and financially from their involvement with universities. They can receive payments for their involvement or they can advance their political identities through their involvement. Universities (the client) meanwhile are

offered protection in the sense that they will not be overly regulated by government agencies and can pursue their work uninhibited. Private universities stand to gain the most as they are for-profit entities. Ford (2015) argues that in multiple cases of legal reforms, including the case of accreditation, the "new laws that have challenged powerful, politically connected vested interests have been obstructed, or if legislation was passed then actual enforcement has been weak" (p. 13). In the case of the ACC, the changes implemented by Sok An at the last minute resulted in weak enforcement of quality assurance. Indeed, the main achievement of the ACC between 2005 and 2009 was the accreditation of foundation year programs at universities. Regulation was not tough, leaving in place the patron-client relations between government officials and university administration.

The story does not end here, however. The adoption of an accreditation and quality assurance system also created a politics of competition between various government ministries and bodies, in part to capture the spoils of patronage. In October 2013, for example, the secretariat of the ACC, which did the actual work of university evaluation, moved from being organized under the Council of Ministers to being placed under the structure of MoEYS. This occurred after the World Bank initiated a US$ 23 million project in 2010 entitled the "Higher Education Quality and Capacity Improvement project." Still, the final stamp of approval for accreditation had to come from the board of the ACC, which continued to sit under the Council of Ministers. By April 2016, however, that arrangement changed: Both the ACC board and its secretariat now sit under MoEYS. The back and forth movement for ownership over the process of accreditation and quality assurance highlight the instability of the quality assurance regime in Cambodia and the dynamics of clientelism. It also explains why the emergence of a quality assurance regime remains formative, essentially functioning only in relation to foundation year programs.

Arguably, then, the attempts by the World Bank to have Cambodia adopt governance practices typical of advanced Western countries and to drive notions of sector harmonization, contributed to poor governance outcomes in the sector. Indeed, such approaches when melded with the country's engrained system of clientelism, produced governance systems that further empowered elites and contributed further to systems of informal patronage.

Conclusion

The case of the ACC provides an example of the confluence of global summitry and clientelism in higher education. This chapter has argued that these two ideas explain the contemporary form of higher educational governance in Cambodia. Thus, while the World Bank was directly involved in bringing the idea of quality assurance to Cambodia with its conditional preconditions for loans to the higher education sector, and by building popular support for university accreditation through conferences, seminars, and summits where various Cambodian government and university officials were trained on governance techniques, this initiative produced unintended out-

comes. Indeed, the transfer of quality assurance systems did not happen as smoothly as the World Bank had hoped. Political patronage continues to exert a powerful presence in Cambodia, where such reform initiatives or attempts to harmonize educational systems in terms of regional and global practices can also provide avenues for deepening patron-client relationships which further the interests of elites. Cambodia, unfortunately, provides a lesson in the limitations of harmonization processes and the need for new approaches in development assistance.

References

Alexandroff, A. S., & Brean, D. (2015). Global Summitry: Its meaning and scope part one. *Global Summitry, 1*(1), 1–26.

Ayres, D. M. (2000). *Anatomy of a crisis: educational development and the state in Cambodia, 1953–1998*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Chamnan, P., & Ford, D. (2004). Cambodian higher education: mixed visions. In P. G. Altbach & T. Umakoshi (Eds.), *Asian universities: Historical perspectives and contemporary challenges* (pp. 333–362). Baltimore: Jonh Hopkins University Press.

Chandler, D. (1999). *A history of Cambodia*. Calorado: Westview Press Inc.

Chandler, D. P., Kiernan, B., & Boua, C. (translators) (1988). *Pol Pot plans the future: Confidential leadership documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*. Mongraph Series 33. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies.

Clayton, T. (1999). Education under occupation: Political violence, schooling and response in Cambodia. *Current Issues in Comparative Education, 2*(1), 70–79.

Doyle, M. W., Johnstone, I., & Orr, R. C. (1997). *Keeping the peace: Multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ebeling, R. (2008) *Global corruption and the role of government*. Online: http://www. nassauinstitute.org/articles/article736.php?view=print.

Eisenstadt, S., & Roniger, L. (1984). *Patrons, clients and friends*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Falby, P. (2002 March 28). Politics delays higher education dreams. *The Phnom Penh Post.* Online: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/politics-delays-higher-education-dreams.

Ford, D. (2015). Cambodian accreditation: An uncertain beginning. *International Higher Education, 33,* 13–14.

Hirosato, Y. (2014). Subregional collaboration in higher education: Harmonization and networking in the greater Mekong subregion (GMS). In A. Yonezawa, Y. Kitamura, A. Meerman, & K. Kuroda (Eds.), *Emerging international dimensions in East Asian higher Education* (pp. 145–165). London: Springer.

King, K. (2007). Multilateral agencies in the construction of the global agenda on education. *Comparative Education, 43*(3), 377–391.

Kitamura, Y., Umemiya, N., Hirosato, Y., & Dy, S. S. (2016). Quality of education and research in Cambodian higher education institutions. In Y. Kitamura, D. B. Edwards, C. Sitham, & J. H. Williams (Eds.), *The Political economy of schooling in Cambodia: Issues of quality and equity* (pp. 205–218). Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ledgerwood, J., & Vijghen, J. (2002). Decision-making in rural Khmer villages. In J. Ledgerwood (Ed.), *Cambodia emerges from the past: Eight Essays* (pp. 109–150). Dekalb, IL: Northing Illinois University.

Lin-Liu, J. (2001 September 14). A developing country attempts accreditation. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*.

MoEYS. (2014). *Policy on higher education vision 2030*. Phnom Penh: MoEYS.

MoEYS. (2016). *Education congress report*. Phnom Penh: MoEYS.

Ngoy, M. (2005). *A current update of higher education in South-east Asian countries: The case of Cambodia.* Paper presented at the Regional Seminar on Higher Education in South-east Countries, 29 September 2005, Bangkok, Thailand.

Pit, C, & Ford, D. (2004). Cambodian Higher Education: Mixed Visions. In P. Altbach, & T. Umakoshi (Eds.), *Asian universities: historical perspectives and contemporary challenges* (pp. 333–362). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Rany, S., Zain, A., & Jamil, H. (2012). Cambodia's higher education development in historical perspectives (1863–2012). *International Journal of Learning and Development, 2*(2), 224–241.

Roberts, D. (2009). *The superficiality of statebuilding in Cambodia: Patronage and clientelism as enduring forms of politics*. In Paris, R., & Sisk, T. (Eds.), *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations* (pp. 149–170). New York: Routledge.

Salmi, J. (2009). *The Challenge of establishing world class universities*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Sine, R. (2002 August 1). "Panel to air plan for accreditation board." *The Cambodian Daily*. Online: https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/panel-to-air-plan-for-accreditation-board-33582/.

Turner, M. (2002). Choosing items from the menu: New public management in Southeast Asia. *International Journal of Public Administration, 25*(12), 1493–1512.

Un, L., & Sok, S. (2014). Higher education governance in Cambodia. *Leadership and governance in higher education, 4,* 72–94.

Vann, M. (2012). *Stakeholders' perceptions of quality in Cambodia Higher Education*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. RMIT University.

Williams, J.H., Kitamura, Y., & Keng, C.S. (2016). Higher education in Cambodia: Expansion and Quality improvement. In Y. Kitamura, D. B. Edwards, C. Sitham, & J. H. Williams (Eds.), *The Political economy of schooling in Cambodia: Issues of quality and equity* (pp. 167–186). Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Woodsome, K. (2003, February 24). World bank: Education loan still waiting. *The Cambodia Daily*. Online: https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/world-bank-education-loan-still-waiting-23513/.

Yavaprabhas, S. (2014). The harmonization of higher education in Southeast Asia. In A. Yonezawa, Y. Kitamura, A. Meerman, & K. Kuroda (Eds.), *Emerging international dimensions in East Asian higher education* (pp. 81–102). London: Springer.

Will Brehm is an Assistant Professor at the Waseda Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. His research interests include the intersection of comparative and international education with international relations and the political economy of development, focused primarily in Southeast Asia. He hosts a weekly podcast on education, globalization, and society called FreshEd.