



India's Low-Skilled Migration to the Middle East

Policies, Politics and
Challenges

Edited by

S. IRUDAYA RAJAN
PREM SAXENA

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Migration has been one of the oldest survival strategies in human civilization. It is invariably a long-term phenomenon. The case of international migration is quite different and unique. In particular, unskilled and semi-skilled workers from Asia largely move to Middle Eastern countries and also to some South East Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia. Initially, oil boom in the Gulf region attracted cheap male blue-collar workers, and later females migrated to this region to work as domestic workers and nurses in hospitals. But the large proportion of migrants in Middle Eastern countries are dominated by unskilled and semi-skilled workers from the Asian region. The main source countries in Asia are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, also the Philippines and Indonesia send significant number of female domestic workers to this region as compared with other Asian countries.

The large-scale migration from Asia to the Middle Eastern countries is seen as both opportunities and challenges. Despite the prevalence of unfriendly labour working system in the Gulf, the migrants see earning money in this region as a major opportunity through which they can fulfil their left-behind family's monetary needs. On the other side, there are numerous challenges that persist like undocumented migration, *kafala* system, nationalization policy and demographic changes in the Arab countries. Therefore, from the labour-sending countries' perspective, they always observe and make necessary policy-level changes to protect and safeguard their citizens. At the same time, the destination countries also take measures to check the expatriates' flow, so that their country's socioeconomic and political characteristics are unaltered due to large presence of expatriates.

Given this background, the chapters in this book discuss various issues pertaining to the migration of unskilled and semi-skilled from Asia and the Middle East. For compiling this book, papers were selected from an international seminar on “Migration, Care Economy and Development”, organized at Centre for Development Studies (CDS) in honour of Professor K. C. Zachariah. In addition, we also invited papers from renowned and emerging scholars working in the area of migration to Middle Eastern countries from Asia.

This book consists of 16 chapters, the introduction emphasizes the flow of Asian workers to the Middle East with a special focus on India. Interestingly, the opening chapter covers emerging destination for female Asian workers in the Middle East. The chapters that follow deal with different topics like Arab countries’ demographic features, remittances, labour issues, forced migration and female migration to the Middle East. One of the major highlights of this book is that it includes chapters from almost all major labour-exporting states in India like Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan. The book has authors from various disciplines and therefore a multidisciplinary approach can be seen in this book while looking at this migration corridor. Finally, the closing chapter summarizes the policy changes in the Gulf and its effect on the mobility of Asian workers.

We sincerely thank all the contributors to this book who have made significant contribution towards the understanding of labour migration to Middle East and also enriched the literature in the field of migration studies.

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and methodological paradigms relating to migration, transnationalism, citizenship, demography and the complex social relations and structural forces that mediate these processes. His research foregrounds the mobility of populations as a ubiquitous, urgent topic and considers migrant subjectivity as dynamic, fluid, negotiated and contested—thereby warranting sustained policy and conceptual attention.

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Migration to the Middle East: Issues and Prospects

S. Irudaya Rajan and Prem Saxena

OVERVIEW

The oil boom in the Gulf countries resulted in heightened interest for emigration of worker population from South Asia, particularly from India. Historically, it is difficult to trace the emigration of Indian labourers to the Middle East (ME) countries. We define the ME countries as Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, along with the countries that constitute the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. This opening chapter largely deals with unskilled and semi-skilled migration to the ME countries from India and also highlights new emerging destination countries like Israel. This chapter touches upon three aspects: (a) the major challenges emigrants face in India (origin country) at the time of recruitment, (b) the vulnerability they face in the form of various kinds of exploitation

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and human rights violation including harsh working conditions (at destination), especially among female domestic workers and (c) the integration/rehabilitation of emigrants returning to the place of origin after the end of their contract period. With this brief introduction, the first section characterises the emigrant labour force from India to the ME countries, with more focus on Jordan, Lebanon and Israel, and the recruiting pattern followed in India to export workers. The second section deals with the major issues like undocumented migration, issues pertaining to female workers and other labour problems as well. In the third section, the future prospects for the emigration are briefly discussed. The last section briefly introduces the articles included in the volume.

UNSKILLED AND SEMI-SKILLED MIGRATION TO THE ME COUNTRIES

The Gulf countries have the highest proportion of foreign nationals within their total population. Table 1.1 shows the share of foreign nationals in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries during the recent periods, 2010–16. Interestingly, with the exception of Oman and Saudi Arabia, the remaining four countries have a foreign population share of more than 50 per cent. The data also reveals that almost 90 per cent of United Arab Emirates and Qatar population consists of foreign nationals. Overall, the GCC countries together host the largest share of emigrant population in the ME countries (see also, Rajan 2012, 2015, 2016).

Now moving to the Indian context, in the ME countries, especially in the GCC countries, the nature of emigration of Indians to the Gulf countries is unique compared to migration to other developed countries. The reasons are migration to the Gulf countries is dominated by unskilled and semi-skilled workers; they are basically contractual workers, and once their contract expires, migrant workers have to return home (Bhagat et al. 2013; also see Zachariah et al. 2002, 2003, 2006; Zachariah and Rajan 2009, 2012a, b, 2015, 2018). While there are several reasons of international migration, the primary aim of emigrants is to gain monetary benefits through migration and thus improve quality of life. Push and pull factors equally play a role in intentions to migrate overseas among economic emigrants. Push factors determine the scope of emigration from the origin country; so, in India, most commonly cited reasons for international migration are wage differences and unemployment. Though these reasons are primary, there could be some other specific reasons such as

Table I.1 Population and percentage of nationals and foreign nationals in the GCC countries^a

<i>Country</i>	<i>Date/period</i>	<i>Total population</i>	<i>Date/period</i>	<i>Nationals</i>	<i>Foreign nationals</i>	<i>Per cent in total population</i>	
						<i>Nationals</i>	<i>Foreign nationals</i>
Bahrain	Mid-2014	1,314,562	Mid-2014	630,744	683,818	48.0	52.0
Kuwait	31 March 2016	4,294,171	31 March 2016	1,316,147	2,978,024	30.6	69.4
Oman	20 April 2016	4,419,193	20 April 2016	2,412,624	2,006,569	54.6	45.4
Qatar	April 2015	2,404,776	April 2010	243,019	2,161,757	10.1	89.9
Saudi Arabia	Mid-2014	30,770,375	Mid-2014	20,702,536	10,067,839	67.3	32.7
UAE	Mid-2010	8,264,070	Mid-2010	947,997	7,316,073	11.5	88.5
Total ^b		51,467,147		26,253,067	25,214,080	51.0	49.0

Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM), 2016

^a<http://gulfmigration.org/gcc-total-population-percentage-nationals-foreign-nationals-gcc-countries-national-statistics-2010-2016-numbers/>, accessed on 1st January 2019

^bTotal provides the sum of population numbers at different dates. It is not exactly the total population at any of these dates, accessed on 26th December 2018

building house, funding marriage/dowry, providing education to children and meeting medical expenses. Further, pull factors determine the scope of emigration from destination or host countries. Most of the oil-rich countries attract emigration mainly for reasons like better job opportunities and higher income.

However, emigrants to the ME countries are a heterogeneous group with respect to demographic setup, legality of their employment and stay (visa), and most importantly, subnational group size, with each subgroup having their own characteristics at the destination countries. As reported by Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India (2019), unskilled and semi-skilled workers from India (hereinafter called Indian workers) in the ME countries are largely employed in five occupations: ordinary labour, mason, carpenter, technician and helper.¹ Also, the Indian workforce in the ME countries includes legal as well as undocumented and trafficked workers (see also Rajan and Joseph 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017; Rajan 2017, 2018, 2019). The legal employments of Indian emigrant workers in the ME countries can be classified gender-wise and sector-wise.

India is not only the origin country for various emigrants but also the destination country for emigrants from Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Among the South Asian countries, India is the largest supplier of blue-collar workers. Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh (AP), Kerala, Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar are some of the leading states in India that have fulfilled the demand for cheap labour supply to the GCC countries (Kumar and Rajan 2014; Zachariah and Rajan 2016; Rajan et al. 2017; Rajan and Zachariah 2019a, b). Hence, India remains one of the largest suppliers of cheap labour. In 1970s, India adopted a closed economic policy; consequently, labour migration for “3 D” (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) works first started to the GCC countries. India’s lower-middle-class families are engaged in services or “3 D” works and considered as vulnerable workers. Many of these family members went to the Gulf region as expatriate workers on contract basis (D’Sami 2000).

Before discussing about gender-wise and sector-wise recruiting pattern in India, an overview of existing legal recruiting system should be briefly discussed. Generally, in India, Emigration Act, 1983, is the only major legislation in place to regulate the workers going abroad to work. As mentioned in the Act, private recruitment agents (RAs) approved and enrolled within the MEA system are involved in the recruitment of Indian workers

¹<https://emigrate.gov.in/ext/>, accessed on 6th January, 2019.

(Rajan et al. 2010, 2011). At the same time, foreign employers can also directly recruit workers from India. Potential emigrants can also apply directly to the foreign employer, but he/she has to go through the process prescribed by the MEA if they have Emigration Check Required (ECR) passport² and want to emigrate to ECR countries³ for employment. When it comes to the gender-wise and sector-wise recruitment in India, the care-work sector is regulated by the state governments, and private agencies are involved with prior approval from the ministry. Since 2015, this recruitment system has been in practice to stop fraudulent practice of private RAs while recruiting nurses to ECR countries; hence, state-run government agencies are being heavily involved (MEA 2017a). Similarly, all Indian female workers holding ECR passports and going to ECR countries for employment can be recruited directly by a foreign employer through eMigrate system by submitting necessary documents to get emigration clearance. At the same time, if a foreign employer wants to recruit Indian female workers through registered RAs, they can only do so by engaging any of the six state government agencies⁴ (MEA 2016a). However, the process of migration of Indian nurses to ECR countries will be carried out by both government agencies and private registered RAs with prior approval from the ministry. Hence, over the years, we have seen a shift in the recruitment process of workers based on gender. A sector-wise analysis shows that, for many years, the construction sector has attracted many Indian workers, along with the care-work sector, which absorbs a high number of female nurses migrating from India to the Gulf countries.

In the ME countries, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel are three relatively less-researched but interesting destinations where Indian workers' emigration is based on sector. Since the 1970s, Jordan has opened its labour market to foreign workers to meet their increasing labour demand. Unlike the

² Government of India, considering the plight of emigrants, separately created a category called Emigration Check Required (ECR). The main objective in forming this category is to provide safe migration for intending emigrants. Under this category, MEA included 18 countries.

³ Afghanistan, Bahrain, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

⁴ NORKA Roots of Kerala, Overseas Development and Employment Promotion Consultants (ODEPC) of Kerala, Overseas Manpower Corporation Ltd. (OMCL) of Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation (UPFC) of Uttar Pradesh, Overseas Manpower Company Andhra Pradesh Limited (OMCAP) of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana Overseas Manpower Company Limited (TOMCOM) of Telangana.

GCC countries, whose oil-dependent economy, built on their rich oil resources that led to many large-scale infrastructure projects, Jordan has no oil resources and has only phosphate resources and agricultural production, which were of significantly less value. In spite of this, to meet the demand for low-wage workers in the domestic sector, agriculture, construction and service industries, Jordan opened its door for both unskilled and semi-skilled emigrant workforce (International Labour Organization 2017). Data released by Jordan's Ministry of Labour (MoL) shows that 340,995 work permits were issued for foreign workers in 2017. Of this, Indian nationals made up six per cent of all male permit holders, with the majority of them being Egyptian nationals (male) (67 per cent) followed by Syrian nationals (male) (15 per cent). Interestingly, majority of male emigrants are employed in agriculture and manufacturing sectors (apparel and garment) (Sweidan n.d.). Further, in 2018, data published by Jordan's MoL shows that about 76 per cent of emigrant workforces are in garment sector, with workers from Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka constituting the majority of this workforce.⁵ According to legal work permits issued to foreign workers by MoL, Table 1.2 provides nationality-wise share of workforce engaged in Jordan's garment sector as of March 2018.

Looking at another ME country, Lebanon, the flow of emigration is characterised by a high proportion of workforce engaged in low-skilled work, with a young and educated local population having moved abroad. Hence, Lebanon exports skilled labour and imports unskilled workers. Further, unskilled workers constituted mostly immigrants; they work in low-productive economic activities as domestic workers, construction labourers, car repair

Table 1.2 Nationality-wise migrant workers in garment sector, 2018

<i>Country</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Bangladesh	52
India	17
Sri Lanka	14
Nepal	9
Myanmar	5
Pakistan	2
Others	2

Source: MoL, Jordan, 2018

⁵ https://betterwork.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Jordania-Annual-Report_V5.pdf accessed on 9th January, 2019.

workers, attendants at fuel station and so on. Only a small per cent of workers is engaged in the hospitality and industrial sectors (Jaoude 2015). Just like in Jordan, Bangladeshi workforce constitutes the second largest emigrant population in Lebanon, with Indian workers ranked at the seventh position according to 2015 data published by Lebanon's MoL. Moreover, like Nepalese workers, Indian workers in Lebanon are largely employed in construction sector (De Bel-Air 2017). However, other data also shows nearly 8500 Indian nationals are in Lebanon, with most of them working in companies, agriculture farms and so on.⁶ This trend shows that the traditional dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs featured by secondary labour market are carried out by foreign workers (Jureidini 2001).

Another interesting country is Israel; however, it is a relatively less-researched destination in terms of the basic characteristics of Indian emigrant workforce there. Historically, in the early 1990s, Israel started to recruit workers from developing countries to work in specific economic sectors, due to increasing demand for additional workers, particularly low-skilled workers to work in agriculture, construction and caregiving sectors (Population and Immigration Authority 2016). In Israel, among the four main categories of migrants, temporary migrant workers (TMWs) are legally allowed to enter the country under work permit, the details of which are discussed later in the chapter. In addition to low-skilled workers, skilled specialist foreign workers and daily Jordanian workers are also included in TMWs. Since 2013, we can see the trend in the growing number of TMWs legally entering Israel (Table 1.3).

Table 1.3 Year-wise entry of TMWs in Israel, 2009–16

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of entrance</i>	<i>Change in number</i>
2009	26,600	–
2010	32,300	+5700
2011	32,700	+400
2012	29,600	–3100
2013	35,600	+6000
2014	38,200	+2600
2015	42,600	+4400
2016	52,600	+10,000

Source: Nathan (2017)

⁶<https://www.indianembassybeirut.gov.in/page/display/79/58> accessed on 9th January, 2019.

Table 1.4 Major origin country of TMWs in home care, 2011–16

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>					
	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>
The Philippines	20,002	20,676	20,314	20,588	21,274	22,829
India	6744	7478	8665	10,186	11,622	12,121
Moldova	7802	7786	8056	8541	9025	9767
Sri Lanka	4238	4686	5214	5641	8507	5685
Nepal	6644	5934	5436	4765	4220	3830
Ukraine	1494	1483	1508	1654	1895	2096
Romania	1528	1321	1253	1165	1056	931

Source: Nathan (2017)

Indian TMWs in Israel constituted about 12.9 per cent of the total share in 2015, and subsequently showed a decline in numbers in 2016 (10.6 per cent). From Table 1.4, we can see a significant number of the total TMWs in Israel's caregiving sector. Among the major countries of origin, India occupies the second position, and the Philippines tops the list. Interestingly, data shows a constant increase in the flow of Indian workers in caregiving sector (home care). At this junction, it is to be noted that Israel is not in the ECR countries list, so it is exempted from the usual recruiting procedures related to emigration. This opens the door for Israel to be a potential destination for Indians to work in the caregiving sector, as compared with other ME countries.

In Israel, to meet a labour shortage in agriculture sector, TMWs come from Thailand and Sri Lanka. To fulfil the requirement for additional workforce in the construction sector, TMWs are imported from China, Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria (Population and Immigration Authority 2016). Thus, we can see the presence of unique composition of workers from different geographical locality in Israel to work in the three main sectors. At the same time, the caregiving sector has a much wider composition of TMWs from different origin countries, as compared to other two sectors.

From literature point of view, this section is important as it discusses about untouched destinations where Indian workers are emigrating. Further, we discuss about the recent changes made by the Indian government to recruit female workers to work in the ECR countries as nurses and for other jobs, especially as domestic workers. In the following section, we are going to discuss the major issues faced by Indian workers emigrating to the ME countries.

LABOUR ISSUES IN THE ME COUNTRIES

Ministry of External Affairs (2018a, 2019) reported that from time to time they receive grievances from Indian workers in 18 ECR countries (see Table 1.5). Most of the grievances are related to contract violation, poor working and living conditions, salary issues, problems with the employer and issues related to medical, insurance, death compensation and claims. Also, economic slowdown caused due to fall in crude oil prices forced the employers to terminate the workers' contract. Moreover, incidents of unpaid wages were also largely reported due to economy slowdown in the Gulf region. For instance, in 2017, from Saudi Arabia, nearly 4870 Indians working in two main companies, namely Saudi Oger and the Saad group, were deported due to job loss.

Similarly, Indian women workers, especially working as domestic workers, reported their grievances to Indian Missions in the GCC countries. As compared to general Indian emigrant issues, the hardship faced by female domestic workers is relatively high, particularly those related to physical abuse. Moreover, female domestic workers tend to emigrate illegally without proper contract and by violating the recruitment framework prescribed by the Indian government to work in any ECR country. From Table 1.6, we can see the number of grievances filed at Indian Missions in the GCC countries. The same data shows an overall increase in the total number of grievances received, and the country-wise data depicts the increase in the number of grievances received from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, followed by Oman. Shockingly, unauthorised Indian RAs en route female workers to a third country on tourist visa, and thereafter they emigrate to the GCC countries on employment visa, bypassing the Indian government norms to protect and safeguard the female workers (MEA 2017b).

Table 1.5 Grievances filed by Indian workers in Indian Missions in selected ME countries

<i>Mission name</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016 (up to October)</i>
Saudi Arabia	2866	3732	2921	3677
Kuwait	2443	3033	3493	2765
Qatar	3558	3943	3868	3577
UAE	1104	1718	1936	1870
Oman	1748	1358	1097	1929
Bahrain	820	821	833	169
Iran	57	84	83	150
Lebanon	Nil	86	23	67

Source: MEA (2016b)

Table 1.6 Grievances filed by Indian female domestic workers in Indian Missions

<i>Mission name</i>	2015	2016	2017
Kuwait	983	1194	950
Saudi Arabia	341	409	527
UAE	136	209	351
Qatar	372	614	397
Oman	128	174	235
Bahrain	11	12	10

Source: MEA (2018b)

Table 1.7 Country-wise Indians returning to India

<i>Country name</i>	<i>Indians returned to India</i>
Saudi Arabia	45,843
Kuwait	12,753
Oman	5948
UAE	4832
Qatar	2636
Bahrain	403

Source: MEA (2018c)

In connection to undocumented migration, amnesty provided by the GCC countries also helps to know the presence of Indian workers staying/working illegally in those countries. Although this data is a tip of the iceberg, but still it helps to show the problem of undocumented migration. From 2014 to December 2017, nearly 101,336 Indians from different countries returned to India due to various reasons. The country-wise (GCC countries) breakdown of the Indians returned is presented in Table 1.7. From the data, it is obvious that large number of Indians who worked in Saudi Arabia returned to India, followed by those working in Kuwait.

Another major problem is the functioning of unauthorised/illegal RAs all over India. There are number of legal RAs sending workers to ECR countries; however, there are also illegitimate RAs sending workers in a fraudulent way. Like labour-related grievances, the MEA also receives complaints about the functioning of fraudulent RAs. Since workers are emigrating illegally, unless the cases are reported by the victims or caught

Table 1.8 Number of complaints related to illegal agent/agency

<i>State</i>	<i>Number of complaints</i>	
	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018 (up to November)</i>
Delhi	94	70
Uttar Pradesh	79	61
Maharashtra	54	40
Punjab	51	40
Tamil Nadu	28	18
Telangana	17	10
Chandigarh	16	10
Kerala	15	08
Haryana	14	10
Andhra Pradesh	13	04

Source: MEA (2019)

by the concern authorities, the details of such workers migrating to other countries are not fully available with the ministry. Data presented in Table 1.8 shows the number of cases related to illegal agent/agency forwarded to the state police for further action under the Emigration Act, 1983, by the ministry. Data indicates that cases related to illegal RAs are filed more in Delhi, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh than in other states.

Another issue that emerged in the recent years is internal strife in countries in the ME region. In consequence, Indians residing in the conflict-affected countries like Iraq, Syria and Yemen were evacuated safely from these regions. For example, according to MEA data, in 2015, nearly 4748 Indians were evacuated from Yemen, over 7000 Indians from Iraq returned home and over 1000 Indians from Syria safely returned home in 2012 (MEA 2016c). Hence, internal conflict in some ME countries has been an issue for past few years which has had an impact on the Indian workers.

To sum up, following are some of the main problems Indian workers have faced in the ME countries for a long time: illegal emigration and employment-related issues like poor working and living conditions, salary issues, renewal of work permit, physical and workplace abuse, particularly for female domestic workers, companies shutdown due to economic slow-down, war and internal conflict at destination countries.

FUTURE LABOUR MARKET PROSPECTS IN THE ME COUNTRIES

In 2018, major labour-exporting countries in South Asia such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and India showed a sharp drop in labourers emigrating to the ME countries (see Table 1.9). The decline can be connected with the economic slowdown faced by the GCC countries. But it is predicted that in 2020, the GCC countries will become worth US\$2trn economy.⁷ Despite labour market uncertainty caused by multiple factors, the demand for low- and semi-skilled migrant workers in the GCC countries' private sectors is predicted to remain high in the short term. There are numerous mega development projects such as UAE Expo 2020 and

Table 1.9 Number of workers emigrated to the GCC countries from South Asia

<i>Origin country</i>	<i>GCC country</i>	<i>Year</i>		
		<i>2016</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>
Pakistan ^a	Saudi Arabia	4,62,598	1,43,363	1,00,910
	UAE	2,95,647	2,75,436	2,08,635
	Oman	45,085	42,362	27,202
	Qatar	9706	11,592	20,993
	Bahrain	8226	7919	5745
	Kuwait	770	773	493
Bangladesh ^b	Saudi Arabia	1,43,913	5,51,308	2,57,317
	UAE	8131	4135	3235
	Oman	1,88,247	89,074	72,504
	Qatar	1,20,382	82,012	76,560
	Bahrain	72,167	19,318	811
	Kuwait	39,188	49,604	27,637
India ^c	Saudi Arabia	1,65,355	78,611	72,399
	UAE	1,63,716	1,49,962	1,12,059
	Oman	63,236	53,332	36,037
	Qatar	30,619	24,759	34,471
	Bahrain	11,964	11,516	9142
	Kuwait	72,384	56,380	57,613

Sources of data:

^a<https://beoc.gov.pk/files/statistics/2018/country.pdf> accessed on 25th December, 2018

^b<http://bmet.org.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=20> accessed on 25th December, 2018

^cMEA (2019) accessed on 26th December, 2018

⁷<http://graphics.ciu.com/marketing/pdf/Gulf2020.pdf> accessed on 26th January, 2019.

Qatar World Cup 2022, as well as the infrastructure and service needs for the growing GCC population, that require foreign workers in labour market. Many of these labour-intensive jobs cannot be mechanised or nationalised (Malit Jr and Naufal 2017).

Meanwhile, Kinninmont (2015) analysed the future labour trend in the GCC countries and found that, for decades, most of the GCC countries have been taking measures to implement nationalisation of labour force, but they struggle to achieve its objectives mainly due to conflict of interest between the major stakeholders (bureaucracy and private sector owners). Instead, the general trend shows an increase in expatriate presence in the GCC countries. Further, ramification in economic policy, like proposing infrastructure projects, will draw workers in the coming years. At the same time, pressure from influential business owners to import cheap workers mainly to work in construction sector will definitely have an effect on the government's nationalisation policy. Therefore, we believe that the current economic decline is expected to boom in the coming years, and it will probably increase the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in core sectors.

This section aimed to understand the contemporary migrant labour composition in the ME countries from Indian perspective. A rapid analysis of data on emigrant workers was made to understand the emerging Indian emigrant workers in Israel, which is unique. Thereafter, with the help of available database published by MEA, we could be able to analyse the existing challenges and problems pertaining to Indian workers moving to the ME countries. At the same time, it is depressing to see the failure in addressing issues such as illegal emigration, exploitation of female domestic workers and mushrooming unauthorised RAs. Finally, despite these issues and changing political dimensions in the ME countries, it is implausible to replace the low- and semi-skilled workforce in these countries as indigenous workforce is reluctant to fill and take-up "dirty, dangerous and demeaning" jobs.

ORGANISATION AND SALIENT FEATURES OF THE BOOK

The book is distinct in making available studies on regions and countries that have traditionally been overlooked and have not attracted much academic attention till date. Some of the new and original research studies that are included in the study are labour migration from Egypt to the Middle East and from Philippines to Lebanon, migrant experiences and policy prospects in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, and Indian migration to the Gulf.

This book also brings out several studies that focus on migration from individual states in India. Apart from some new studies on migration from Kerala to the Middle East, the book contains studies on migration from Tamil Nadu, Telugu-speaking states (Telangana and Andhra Pradesh), Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. These are very relevant to the debate since recent studies indicate a shift in migrant trends to the Middle East, as low-skilled labour migration from Kerala is gradually being overtaken by migration of low skilled labourers from other Indian states. Thus, the book fills a critical gap in migration research by studying migration from various Indian states.

Based on the earlier set of the data from the revised version of the *World Population Prospects 2012*—the official United Nations population estimates and projections released in 2013—a new dimension in research on migration from India is also being studied—an unexpected phenomenon of multiple openings of demographic window of economic opportunity (not documented in demographic literature) observed in a few Arab countries due to heavy return of old-aged migrant expatriates to their home country (Saxena 2017). It is also argued that the phenomenon of multiple openings of demographic window could also be observed in countries having extremely large fluctuations in crude birth rates (CBRs) in the past. But the latter may not have so much impact on the number of openings of the window as found in case of migrants aged 60+ years returning to their home country. The impact of international out-migration on intergenerational educational mobility among children in migrant-sending households in Kerala and forced migration of Kerala Muslims to the Gulf are some of the interesting topics included in the book.

With conflict and political instability persisting in the Middle East and the nationalisation policies implemented by the Gulf countries, timely research studies are essential in order to evolve informed policies to deal with migration. The studies included in this edited volume are crucial contributions to the growing literature on migration and will be of immense academic interest to scholars, policymakers and other relevant stakeholders.

The opening chapter starts with the significance of labour migration to Middle East countries from Asia. In the past, this region absorbed high volume of labourers from Asia to work in both unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. This mobility has given rise to various issues; the unsolved labour issues such as operation of illegal recruiting agents and illegal migration and problems at destination countries such as salary issues, working and living conditions, abuse and so on, which are discussed in this chapter by

focusing, in large part, on India. Importantly, emerging new destinations like Israel are discussed to highlight the swift mobility of Asian female care workers from the GCC countries due to large number of exploitation cases reported in recent years and ban imposed by some source countries in Asia to recruit female care workers. Thus, gender-wise and sector-wise labour mobility to the ME is discussed to show the characteristics of Asian migrant workforce in this region. Finally, the economic diversification taking place in the Gulf countries shows optimism in their economic growth and in creating jobs. However, in the past few years, we have seen a decline in Asian workforce moving to the Gulf, but the ongoing economic reforms in the Gulf need cheap expatriate workers to meet their labour shortage in private sectors.

For boosting the country's economic growth, it is essential to know "What is demographic dividend and what is its role and significance in increasing the National Income?" During the demographic transition from high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality, age structure of population undergoes age-structural changes. Prem Saxena reviews this aspect in Chap. 2. As a consequence, a stage comes when the growth rate of population in the working ages exceeds the growth rate of total population. In economic terms, it means that production exceeds the consumption and the surplus available could be used for economic growth. It has been empirically found that the relationship between GDP growth rate and demographic dividend is positive, and its impact on economic growth of a country could be miraculous. However, according to Lee and Mason (2008), demographic dividend is a one-time opportunity, available only for a short duration of 30 years to 50 years, and it is not automatic. The latter implies that for reaping maximum benefit for this period, the respective governments should assert to create employment for the new entrants to the working age groups. This requires planning in advance to offer jobs to maximum number of youths. For the planning, it is necessary to know the expected time when the window of economic opportunity would open and how long such a favourable period would last. The present chapter, using the latest available United Nations population projections made in 2017 and released in 2018, gives the estimated years of opening and closure of demographic window, and thus the duration of reaping economic benefits for the countries of the Middle East. The chapter also discusses the migration scenario in the least developed countries of the Middle East in turbulent times. Most of the countries of the Middle East suffered economically and socially due to frequent

unrests, wars, civil wars and conflicts. War-stricken countries, particularly the six least developed countries, namely, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, have been predominantly out-migrating states, and immigration has been virtually nil.

In Chap. 3, Ibrahim Awad and Lina Lotayef review labour migration from Egypt to the Arab Middle East in the last 40 years and its outcomes. It also signals the issues it has faced all along, and which still call for solutions. Egyptian labour migration to countries in the Arab Middle East transformed into a mass movement in the mid-1970s. Two factors were behind this transformation. The first was the very high growth in demand for labour in oil-exporting countries in the Gulf after the historical oil price increase of 1973–74. The second factor was Egypt's drive to find external employment outlets to its fast-growing labour force. In addition to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egyptian migrant workers also headed to Iraq, until 1990, as well as to Libya, Jordan and Lebanon. Labour migration to the Arab Middle East has come to represent 75 per cent of total Egyptian migration. In the present chapter, the authors opined that migration has not been a solution to the employment question the country has and still is experiencing. Supply of labour is still in excess of demand. Further, the authors observed that job quality has not improved. The overall skill quality of the labour force has not been upgraded either. However, individual workers and their families have benefited from their migration experiences through remittances, which allow meeting their needs and alleviating their poverty.

Hierarchically, Filipina domestic workers have developed a reputation of being the most revered of other nationalities engaged in domestic work abroad, largely because of their higher levels of education and command over English as the intermediary language of communication in the Middle East. Ray Jureidini briefly traces the history of Filipinas in Lebanon, the development of human rights activism and the role of the government of the Philippines in its management of labour migration. The research addresses two case studies: first, on the evacuation of Philippine nationals from Lebanon during the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon; and second, on the particular deaths of four Filipinas in 2004 and how the Philippines government responded. The discussion covers live-in as well as freelance domestic work and the beginnings of union coverage for migrant domestic workers in Lebanon. The chapter concludes that attempts by the Philippines government and human rights organisations to regulate and protect migrant domestic workers in Lebanon have not been particularly successful. Despite

the Philippines government's minimum wage requirements since 2006 and a ban on domestic workers paying private recruitment agencies, there is still evidence of serious labour and human rights violations.

Characterised by special demographics such as national contours, the competitive labour markets, the large swell of emigrant workers which involves a sudden surge in the growth and migration levels, sharply dropping fertility rates and a gross loss of balance at both the regional and urban levels, Saudi Arabia along with the surrounding Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states now faces the monumental task of revising policies and programmes related to population. Rshood Khraif, Asharaf Abdul Salam, P.S. Nair, and Ibrahim Elsegacy have done a thorough critical analysis of migration data to (i) scrutinise closely, the niches of the popular drifts in the migration of the Saudi citizens across the numerous expansive governmental factions in Saudi, (ii) probe and appraise the numerous effects of migration on the swarming levels of population in the country as well as the surrounding GCC countries, (iii) examine and imbibe the ever-changing annual variations in the phenomenon of migration within the nation as well as the GCC countries, (iv) study the people migrating between homes through various factors such as their original place of birth or native place and (v) critically inspect the contrasting features between the migrants from other countries and the citizens of Saudi in terms of immediate demographic parameters such as their rate of population growth, changing sex ratios, broadened age groups and age-sex distribution. Highly accurate databases from the Saudi Arabian national censuses, the US Census Bureau and the World Bank Bilateral Migration were reviewed thoroughly, studied further and scrutinised based on the available statistics. The indigenous population that thrives within Saudi Arabia executes their migration between the various regions within the nation based on the varying strength of the pulls and pushes that rise as a result of the crucial infrastructure differentials that contribute to many employment propensities while also affecting their quality of life. With GCC occupying the larger piece of land and thereby carrying a larger population, Saudi Arabia makes it highly unique for those individuals who experience the international migration streams that are caused by the labour requirements and the governmental regulations that are laid down for both the Arabs and non-Arabs. On the other hand, the demographics concerning the immigrants are influenced by the Kingdom's labour requirements which are heavily dominated by male adult civilians who migrate from other countries.

Seema Gaur attempts to enhance the understanding of the evolution of the Indian government policy for protection of unskilled and semi-skilled migrants and assesses whether the policies are adequate and effective. The chapter revisits a study done by the author on Indian migrant workers based on first-hand data collected in the host country Lebanon during late 1990s, regarding poor living and working conditions of migrants and their exploitation. The study had brought out the need for the intervention by the government of sending countries to frame effective policies to protect the migrant workers from exploitation and inhuman treatment. Since then, Indian government has undertaken several measures for the protection of low-skilled migrant workers, especially in the Middle East. Drawing upon comprehensive literature review and anecdotal evidence, it has been observed that the exploitation of low-skilled Indian migrant workers in the Middle East continues unabated. Thereafter, a comprehensive look is taken of the migrants' rights, and efforts made to protect them at various levels including the steps taken by the Indian government. We find that emigration governance framework in India, in addition to exploitative policies in destination countries, emerged as one of the key contributory factors. In the last section of this chapter, we give several suggestions for improving the migrant workers conditions at both origin and at host countries. The recommendations including adoption of pro-migration policies by the sending countries with cooperation from host countries, to ensure that migrants do not fall prey to unscrupulous agents at home and are protected at destination countries.

South-South migration has been a largely neglected subject matter in migration studies, although it constitutes an important part of overall migration flows. Especially labour migration to the Gulf region occupies a central position in this regard. The aim of this chapter is to analyse Indian labour migration to the Gulf region, one of the most important migration paths to the region, by emphasising the whole process of migration, from its initiation to the return migration which gained less academic attention. Serhat Yalçın proposes an analytical framework covering the dimensions of entry, stay, work and exit of migrant workers, allowing incorporating the reasons for and the process of migration, the working and living conditions of migrant workers in the host country and the process of return migration. Based on semi-structured interviews with Indian migrant workers, the chapter analyses these different dimensions and critically discusses the results with reference to already existing literature on these different dimensions. On many occasions, the interviews confirm findings

already presented in different studies. But they also highlight many points which did not gain much academic interest, especially regarding differences between skilled and low-skilled migrant workers. The chapter concludes by discussing three less analysed topics for further research emanating from the interviews, namely: (i) the importance of intra-class differences within the Indian migrant working class, (ii) the role of the Indian state in the context of Indian labour migration and (iii) the need for an approach incorporating the mobility of both capital and labour from India to the Gulf region.

India to Gulf emigration is not a new phenomenon. Its history dates back to several centuries ago. The massive flow of emigration from India significantly started from mid-1970s. During 1973–74, the oil companies were mushrooming in West Asia. Thousands of Indians came to the Gulf, especially from Kerala. In India, Kerala has a significant number of emigrants that end up in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries every year. According to the CDS Migration Survey series from 1998 to 2014, international migration from Kerala accounted to 13.6 Lakh in 1998, which increased to 24 Lakh in 2014. The Gulf emigration registered about 93.9 per cent of the total emigration in 1998, and a decline to 86.3 per cent in 2014. Based on this background, S. Irudaya Rajan and K.C. Zachariah examine Keralite emigrants to Gulf and the role of their remittances on Kerala's economy. In addition, the study also analyses socio-demographic conditions of emigrants from Kerala to the Gulf countries. The study has used the data obtained from Kerala Migration Survey series from 1998 to 2014, undertaken by the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. The study uses two variants of ratio method for estimating: The first method employs the ratio of migrants in the sample of the locality to the number of HHs in the locality and is called household method; the second method which used the ratio of migrants in a locality to the population in the locality is referred to as the population method. This study found that Gulf emigrants and their remittances significantly contributed to the state economy and at the same time improved the educational profile of the emigrants. Based on these results, it can safely be assumed that similar trends in the socioeconomic conditions of the emigrants from Kerala would have occurred wherever they had migrated.

The distant tropes and mystique of the Gulf countries lure huge bands of immigrants from the state of Kerala and is one of the chiefly analysed segment in the nuanced study of migration and development literature in India. As is every case where a significant chunk of people are left ignored,

the Muslims who are the major migrators in Kerala occupy a very little portion in these studies. With this in mind, Ajmal Khan A.T. focuses his research on the harsh and involuntary nature of the situations of Muslims living in the Malappuram district of Kerala that forces them to migrate to the Gulf countries. Thus, this chapter premising its argument on the field work done in a Muslim populated village in Malappuram district, states that the broad generalised reasons found for Muslim migration to the Gulf countries within the pages bound in literature, are highly insufficient and fall short of proper knowledge and understanding of the required scenario. The chapter consults numerous resources and methods such as poring through the currently available literature on migration from Kerala to the Gulf countries, seeking information from a large slice of knowledgeable individuals that inhabit the area, the dire conditions of Muslims in Malabar in the wake of the socioeconomic and political situations prevailing in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s. Based on these gatherings, the chapter poses an argument that widespread unemployment and poverty that crippled these people through the last three to four decades, Umrah and easy free visa facility to the expansive kingdom of Saudi Arabia, unbridled existence of dowry and expensive marriages in the village, the glamorous hopes and dreams for the Gulf countries that will extinguish their cruel suffering in poverty acted as the major factors that forced the migration of loads of people from Malappuram to the Gulf countries. Anu Abraham investigates the determinants of international remittance flow into the Kerala economy. It explores the influence of socio-demographic and migration-specific characteristics of the migrated individual and the migrant-sending (remittance receiving) households on the amount of remittance transfers. Using data from the 2010 Kerala Migration Survey, the amount of remittance sent by a migrant is taken as the dependent variable and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. The results suggest that the migrant's individual characters have a strong influence on the remittance-sending behaviour, while the characteristics of the remittance-receiving household have a weaker influence. The migration-specific characteristics—the duration of migration, destination country and presence of dependents abroad—significantly affect the amount of remittance sent.

Tamil Nadu Migration Survey, 2015, was conducted to have the migration data for Tamil Nadu and understand its impact, as the series of Kerala Migration Surveys helped the government of Kerala in framing policies based on the results. Tamil Nadu Migration Survey results have estimated that there are 2.2 million emigrants from Tamil Nadu who are living

abroad, which is around 3 per cent of the total population of Tamil Nadu. Though Singapore is estimated to receive the largest number of emigrants from Tamil Nadu, accounting to 410,000, followed by UAE with 400,000 emigrants, GCC states between them receive over half of the emigrants, estimated to be 1.1 million. Tamil Nadu has a long history of its people migrating to Singapore and Malaysia and settling there. This had started in the pre-independence era, but the Gulf migration started recently, and it gives different opportunities compared to Singapore or Malaysia. This chapter explores the characteristic distinctions of migration to GCC states. Through descriptive data analysis, the chapter explores the demographic data, and it shows 20 per cent of all migrants to non-GCC countries are females, compared to 9 per cent in case of the GCC countries. It also finds that Muslim population migrating to GCC is four times larger than the share of Muslim population migrating to the non-GCC countries. Educational status of migrants is naturally different as the GCC countries require different educational qualification as compared to the non-GCC countries, and especially it is seen that one-third of the migrants to the non-GCC countries have a college degree or more. Wage problems seem to exist among return migrants from both the countries, but it is slightly higher in case of the GCC countries. As problems such as compulsory expatriation and poor working conditions are some of the reasons for returning among GCC migrants, most migrants in the non-GCC countries return due to family problems and/or expiry of contract. Though countries such as Singapore and USA have higher per-migrant remittance, the analysis and approximation of remittances reveal that the GCC countries contribute to almost 50 per cent of all migration. S. Irudaya Rajan and E. Sownthara Rajan conclude by explaining the need to emphasise the importance of devising policies for migrants to the GCC countries by understating their characteristics thoroughly.

The Indian labour migration to the Gulf countries got momentum in the early 1970s as a result of the price hike of oil. The consequent earnings of large revenues from oil led to the process of industrialisation and modernisation in the six GCC countries characterised by massive investment in social and economic infrastructure. This development required the service of a large number of foreign workers, as the GCC countries could not provide the indigenous labour supplies. These foreign workers mostly came from South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka for working in construction sites and oil companies. However, in recent times, the situation has changed either because of

huge competition among foreign labourers in the Gulf countries or because of Gulf economic crisis. As a result, the Gulf countries are not allowing free migration; instead, they are charging huge visa fees from migrants and are also very selective. Trilok Chandan Goud and Ajaya Kumar Sahoo attempt to study reasons for migration of Indians to the Gulf countries, with a special focus on Telugu migrants from Andhra Pradesh and Telangana states. The chapter further examines in detail the push and pull factors for migration, migrant networks, social conditions of migrants and the socioeconomic impact of the Gulf migration on the migrants and their left-behind families.

The magnitude and pace of international migration has been on the rise in the history of human civilisation. The revolutions in information and communication technology along with speedy advancement in transportation facilities have accelerated the process incredibly in recent times. The cross-border movements of people for long distances and considerably for a long duration have many dimensions attached to it. These also vary with time and space as well as, at the same time, for different migrant groups. Jeetendra D. Soni assesses labour emigration from three districts of Rajasthan, namely, Sikar, Jhunjhunu and Churu, to find its impact on the development of these districts. The people immigrated to the Gulf region for better job prospects and financial avenues. For the present study, a purposive sample of 600 emigrants was selected from the study area, and the required data was collected through personal interview method. The primary objective of the present study has been to ascertain whether or not the emigrants were able to provide economic, social and psychological security to their families left behind in the country of origin. The present investigations also aimed at identifying multifaceted problems faced by semi-skilled and unskilled labourers and the role of the mediators in resolving their issues. The empirical evidence gathered from the analysis of the data collected from semi-skilled and unskilled labour emigrants' attempts to uncover migration and development relationship for the study region.

Mashkoor Ahmad aims to investigate the process of male emigration from urban areas of Bijnor district of Uttar Pradesh—the most populous state of India. The state, being the most populous and one of the poor and underdeveloped states of India, is unable to provide employment to a very large proportion of its young and adult populations. Thus, in the absence of adequate employment opportunities, Uttar Pradesh has emerged as the largest supplier of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour within the country as well as to overseas, especially to the Gulf countries. In the

present chapter, an attempt has been made to find the annual trends of emigrants, their engagement in economic activity in the host country, destination, and the amount of money sent home and its frequency. In addition to these information, arrangement of money to bear the emigration costs, as well as the data on the total amount of money spent on the entire emigration process including the expenses incurred on fraudulent payment made (if any) to unscrupulous agent and/or middleman, has also been discussed. The study is based on both primary and secondary sources of data. Simple descriptive statistical methods have been used to analyse the data. The data revealed that Uttar Pradesh has been the largest supplier of labour, especially to the Gulf countries. Most of the emigrants were motivated by economic reasons or had poor economic conditions at home. However, after emigrating to the Gulf countries, they were not only employed but were also getting higher wages and were thus able to send money to their homes regularly. Further, the data revealed that since the urban areas of Bijnor district were predominantly inhabited by Muslims, Saudi Arabia has been the most preferred destination for the majority of the emigrants.

Migration is a gendered experience. Who moves and who does not, the resources that can be allocated for an individual's movement, the networks that can be tapped to facilitate mobility, the sectors of the economy where there are possibilities of employment, the conditions of work, family support required, the usage of remittances and so on are issues that impact men and women differently. Moreover, the impact of migration on personal relationships is said to be more significant for women migrants than for men migrants. While structuralist, neoliberal or network theorists explain migration in a gender-neutral manner, feminist theorists draw out the contexts and challenges specific to women's migration. Moreover, they give equal importance to the question of what happens after migration. They prefer to study the migration through personal narratives that help explain the nuances of experiences. Nilanjana Ray draws upon some extant anthropological studies on the migration experience of women from Kerala who work as nurses and domestic workers in the Middle East and critically analyses them through the feminist lens. The first section presents the essence of the feminist framework. Using this analytical frame, the second section revisits the narratives of nurse migration. In a similar manner, section three explores the narratives of domestic worker migration. Finally, section four compares the experiences of the two migration streams.

Growing sociopolitical pressure forced the GCC countries to implement nationalisation policy at different point of time to bring down the participation of foreign workforce and to recruit their nationals to address unemployment problem faced by their citizens. This situation has raised serious academic discussion on Gulf nationalisation policy and its impact on foreign workforce flow in past and future. In this context, the final chapter comprehensively addressed this point by examining the composition of the Gulf labour market, economic diversification plans in this region, need of expatriate workers and major issues in the implementation of nationalisation policy. Associated with labour market, *Kafala* system is also discussed to bring out the vulnerability faced by blue-collar workers due to this practice along with the recent reforms incorporated by Qatar government to abolish this system. Hence, the Gulf countries should come forward to make policy measures to replace *Kafala* system so that more flexibility and fair treatment of workers can be exercised.

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CHAPTER 2

Demographic Dividend in the Middle East Countries: An Empirical Assessment

Prem Saxena

INTRODUCTION

The demographic transition theory was propounded as early as in 1929 by the American demographer Warren Thompson; it was considered as a model that describes population change over time. Later, however, demographers realized that along with demographic transition, age structure of population also changes (see Saxena 2008). But neither demographers nor economists had thought till the late 1990s that during demographic transition, there could be a situation when production exceeds the consumption, leaving surplus available for development purpose. However, the publication of the research article entitled “Demographic Transition and Economic Miracle in Emerging Asia” by Bloom and Williamson (1998) proved to be a milestone in revolutionizing the old concepts. Due to ignorance of the period of economic opportunity, also called “Demographic dividend”, in several countries of the West, this favourable period passed away unnoticed during their demographic transition (Lee and Mason, 2006). None of those countries

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could reap economic benefits of the period of economic opportunity. In the present chapter, we give the estimated timings of starting, closing and thus the duration of the period during which demographic dividend could be reaped in countries of the Middle East to enable the respective governments of the countries to create jobs for the new entrants to the working-age groups. It may be mentioned that maximum demographic dividend could be harvested only in case of full employment.

The specific objectives of this chapter have been stated as under:

OBJECTIVES

- (i) The primary objective of the present study is to analyse the timings of opening, closure and duration available for reaping demographic dividend of the 22 Arab countries of the Middle East;
- (ii) To study the patterns of emigration and immigration in the 22 Arab countries of the Middle East and to identify countries and timings in which they experienced heavy emigration/immigration;
- (iii) To estimate the net migration rate per 1000 population in various years in the 22 Arab countries of the Middle East; and
- (iv) To give policy recommendations to the planners and policymakers, suggesting the ways to boost GDP of the country.

DATA AND METHODS

To accomplish the objectives laid down above we use the data from the revised version of the *World Population Prospects 2017* (under medium-fertility variant assumptions)—the official United Nations population estimates and projections released in 2018. Since the duration of demographic window of economic opportunity is most crucial for boosting economic growth of a country, we attempt here to find the timings of opening, closure and duration of demographic window of economic opportunity in the 22 Arab countries. It may be mentioned here that demographic dividend is not automatic. Governments of respective countries have to prepare much in advance to increase employment opportunities to provide employment to new entrants in working-age groups. The government may achieve highest possible GDP if there is full employment in the country, and women also join the workforce in large numbers. To generate employment in a country, it requires long preparation to make maximum use of the available period of

economic opportunity. Thus, it becomes necessary to project in advance the dates of opening and closure of demographic window of economic opportunity so that maximum economic dividends could be harvested. The present chapter attempts to provide the expected dates (years) of opening, closure and duration of demographic dividend. For this, we use the UN population projections made under medium-fertility variant assumptions of fertility decline with one course of mortality assumptions.¹

ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION²

Since the data on international migration by age is not available, Saxena (2017) studied the patterns of emigration and immigration on the timings of opening, closure and duration of demographic window of economic opportunity. To find the patterns of net migration by economic development, the 22 Arab countries were classified in four groups, mainly on the basis of their geographical proximity and economic and social characteristics. The net immigration rate was taken as a proxy to ascertain the level of economic development of the country.

The four groups of countries thus constituted. are: A. "Mashreq Countries"; B. "Maghreb Countries"; C. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries; and D. "Least Developed Countries". Group A. contains six countries, namely, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria. Group B. consists of four countries: Algeria; Libya; Morocco, and Tunisia. The Group C includes six countries, namely, Bahrain; Kuwait; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; and United Arab Emirates (UAE); whereas the Group D is comprised of six countries, namely, Comoros; Djibouti; Mauritania; Somalia; Sudan; and Yemen, designated as the Least Developed Countries (See Saxena 2013).

¹ Mortality has been incorporated into projections by estimating death rates by age groups and sex. Where mortality is relatively high and the resulting life expectancy at birth was relatively low, changes in mortality also play an important role in future population size; when mortality is already low and life expectancy has risen to high levels, mortality has much less effect (UN 2017).

² International migration is particularly unpredictable and difficult to incorporate into projection assumptions. For many countries of the Middle East, reliable information on the number of immigrants and emigrants is not available. In the absence of this information, it may often be assumed that current migration levels will persist for some time and then will slowly decline. However, still in UNDP projects, it is assumed that net flows of immigrants from developing regions will decline from the present 2.6 million annually to 2.1 million in 2050; finally, reaching zero by 2100 (UN 2017).

It has been observed that labour-exporting countries are economically less developed as they cannot provide employment and/or better wages to their unskilled/semi-skilled/skilled populations. A negative net migration rate (NMR)³ shows that migrating countries and its magnitude maybe considered as the measure of levels of economic development. Non-availability of the magnitude of net migration by age is the great impediment to find the effects of the emigration of the population in working-age groups and of the immigration of return migrants in 65+ ages, on the timings of opening and closure of demographic window.

Potential Support Ratio

To find the size and timings of first demographic dividend, we use potential support ratio (PSR) which is the reciprocal of the modified demographic dependency ratio suggested by Miller (2008). The author showed that the modified demographic dependency ratio exactly fits (age-averaged) economic dependency. He demonstrated near equivalence between demographic and economic dependency and preferred the latter over the former. The PSR is defined as:

$$\text{PSR} = \frac{W_{25-64}}{0.9 * D_{0-24} + D_{65+}}$$

Where, W_{25-64} is the working population in the age group 25–64, D_{0-24} and D_{65+} are dependent persons in age group (0–24) and (65+), respectively.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Trajectories of Potential Support Ratios of Arab Countries, 1950–2100

Using the above formula, the PSRs have been computed for 22 Arab countries from the United Nations population projections obtained under

³ Net migration rate (NMR) is defined as the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants in a calendar year divided by the mid-year population of the receiving country over the year. NMR is expressed as net number of migrants per 1000 population (UN 2017).

medium-fertility variant assumption. The trajectories of potential support ratios for 22 Arab states are shown in Fig. 2.1. As can be seen from the figure, the trajectory first continues to go up and cuts the axis $PSR = 1$. This is the time (year) when the window of economic opportunity opens. Later, the trajectory may go further up, but a stage comes when it may take a U-turn, come down and cut again the axis $PSR = 1$. This is the time (year) at which demographic window closes. The difference between the timings of closing and opening of the demographic window gives the duration of economic opportunity during which demographic dividend can be harvested. The difference between the numerical value of PSR greater than one implies that production exceeds the consumption and the surplus available can be used for economic growth and development of the country.

Figure 2.1 presents the trajectories of potential support ratios for 22 Arab countries classified in four groups of countries, namely, *Mashreq* countries, *Maghreb* countries, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and least developed countries from 1950 to 2100, under medium-fertility variant assumptions.

Timings of Opening and Closure of Demographic Window

The trajectories of potential support ratios computed for 22 Arab countries from the United Nations population projections made under medium-fertility assumption are presented in Fig. 2.1. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2.1 gives, respectively, the name of the country, year of opening of the window, year of closing of the window and the expected duration of demographic window during which the dividends could be harvested.

It may be seen from Fig. 2.1 that in some countries, the demographic window opened either exactly in 2015 or before the beginning of the observation period (2015) and/or closed after the end of the observation period—2100. In six of Mashreq countries, the demographic window opened in Lebanon in 2015, whereas in rest of the five Arab states of this group, it opened after 2015. In the three Mashreq countries, namely, Egypt, Iraq and Palestine, the demographic window may close after 2100. In such situations where the window opened before the year 2015 and/or may close after 2100, the expected duration of demographic window has been shown with + sign. The expected durations of demographic window for Egypt, Iraq and Palestine are 62+, 15+ and 45+ years, whereas, in case




Fig. 2.1 Trajectories of potential support ratios for Arab countries, computed from UN population projections obtained under medium-fertility variant assumption, 2015–2100. (Source: Appendix Table 2.2)

Table 2.1 Timings of opening, closure and duration of demographic window of Arab countries under medium-fertility variant assumption, 2015–2100

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year of opening (calendar year)</i>	<i>Year of closure (calendar year)</i>	<i>Expected duration of demographic window (years)</i>
<i>Mashreq countries</i>			
Egypt	2038	After 2100	62+
Iraq	2085	After 2100	15+
Jordan	2038	2097	59
Lebanon	2015	2058	43
Syria	2034	2087	53
Palestine	2055	After 2100	45+
<i>Maghreb countries</i>			
Algeria	Before 2015	2065	50+
Libya	Before 2015	2083	68+
Morocco	Before 2015	2065	50+
Tunisia	Before 2015	2070	55+
<i>Gulf cooperation council countries</i>			
Bahrain	Before 2015	2084	69+
Kuwait	Before 2015	After 2100	85+
Oman	Before 2015	2077	62+
Qatar	Before 2015	After 2100	85+
Saudi Arabia	Before 2015	2087	72+
United Arab Emirates (UAE)	Before 2015	After 2100	85+
<i>Least developed countries</i>			
Comoros	2059	After 2100	41+
Djibouti	2023	After 2100	77+
Mauritania	2070	After 2100	30+
Somalia	2088	After 2100	12+
Sudan	2069	After 2100	31+
Yemen	2040	After 2100	60+

Source: Computed from United Nations (2017) world population prospects: The 2017 revision; Released in 2018, Population Division, New York. (Also see Appendix Table 2.2)

of three countries, namely, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, both the years of opening and closing of the window may be within the observation period, and we may have the exact expected duration of the period of demographic dividend. The countries which have the exact expected duration of demographic dividend among Mashreq countries are Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

Table 2.1 also shows that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries had relatively larger expected duration of the demographic dividend as compared to the countries belonging to Mashreq and Maghreb countries. The least developed countries seem to have, on average, short expected duration of demographic window of economic opportunity.

In his previous study, the author discussed the impact of components of population change and other demographic factors affecting the timings of opening, closing and the duration in which demographic dividend could be harvested (See Saxena 2017). It has been found that the two dependency ratios, namely, the “young-age dependency ratio” and the “old-age dependency ratio”, are the key players in controlling the timings of opening, closing and thus the duration of the demographic window of economic opportunity. The timing of opening of the demographic window is highly sensitive to the magnitude of the young dependency ratio. If this ratio is high due to high fertility and low mortality, the timing of opening of the demographic window may be delayed. On the other hand, if the old-age dependency ratio is increased abruptly due to return of expatriates to their home country after retirement at the age of 65+ years, the old-age dependency ratio may drag the trajectory downwards to forcibly close the demographic window of economic opportunity early, thus shortening the duration of demographic window. Due to increase in both the dependency ratios, the duration of the economic opportunity during which dividend could be harvested may be much shorter (See Saxena 2017). Among Mashreq countries, Iraq has the shortest duration of demographic dividend. This may be due to increase in both young-age and old-age dependency ratios. Further, due to political disturbances in Iraq, the period of demographic economic opportunity has been much shorter.

Among the four Arab states of the Maghreb countries, namely, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, the duration of the demographic window ranged between 50+ years for Algeria and Morocco to a maximum of 68 years for Libya. Tunisia showed duration of demographic window of 55+ years.

Most of the six Arab states which belong to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE), are expected to have relatively larger duration of demographic window, as compared to other Arab countries. Among the six GCC states, Oman is expected to have

the shortest duration (62+ years) in this group of countries, whereas the three countries, namely, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE), may have the duration of demographic window ranging from 85+ years for Kuwait, Qatar and UAE to 69+ years for Bahrain and 72+ years for Saudi Arabia. Except Oman, the other five GCC Arab states are oil-rich with large gas reservoirs. These countries attract large number of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers from countries having surplus labour. The large demand for labour force in these countries gave rise to high immigration streams. These streams created a win-win situation for both the immigrants, as they got employment in the host country, and the state, as the immigrants increased the production which boosted the GDP.

The expected duration of demographic window of six least developed countries, namely Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somali, Sudan and Yemen, ranged from a minimum of 12+ years for Somalia to 30+ and 31+ for Mauritania and Sudan, respectively, to the maximum expected duration of 77+ years for Djibouti.

Trends, Patterns and Magnitude of In- and Out-Migration in 22 Arab Countries, 1950–2050

Figure 2.2 presents the trends, patterns and magnitude of in- and out-migration (net migration) in 22 Arab countries from 1950 to 2050. We use the data given in Appendix Table 2.3 to ascertain the expected magnitude of in- and out-migration per 1000 population in 22 countries from 1950 to 2050. A negative sign of net migration rate (NMR) shows out-migrating countries, and its magnitude may be considered as a substitute for the level of economic development. Appendix Table 2.3 shows trends and patterns of NMR of six Arab countries, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. By and large Egypt is expected to be an out-migrating country during the observation period. During the entire observation period, the out-migration for Egypt varied from a minimum of 0.2 person per 1000 population in the period 2000–2005 to a maximum rate of 2.9 person per 1000 population in 1970–1975. Iraq is also expected to follow the same trend as that of Egypt. However, Jordan experienced large fluctuations of NMR. During the period 1950–1955 to 1965–1975, the country had net in-migration rate of 42.3 per 1000 population.




Fig. 2.2 Trends and patterns of net migration in Arab countries, 1950–2050. (Source: Appendix Table 2.3)

Net Migration Rate: Direction, Magnitude and Period

Net migration rate (NMR) is defined as the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants in a calendar year divided by the mid-year population of the receiving country over the year. NMR is expressed as net number of migrants per 1000 populations.

To assess the direction (in- or out-migration), magnitude and the expected course of migration streams, we study the patterns of net migration separately for each of the 22 Arab countries classified in four groups, namely, Mashreq countries, Maghreb countries, GCC countries and least developed countries of the Arab region. The patterns of net migration in countries of each of the four Arab regions have been presented in Fig. 2.2. In the absence of data on net migration by age, we chose the indirect way of assessing the direction, magnitude and the period of expected “in- and out-migration” in the 22 Arab states. For this purpose, we make three self-evident assumptions which do not require any proof and are acceptable as they are: (i) an economically prosperous country if experiencing large immigration, it should necessarily be in working ages (25–64), (ii) if heavy emigration had taken place in a developing or less developed country, it should be of the working-age population in search of better employment opportunities in the host country and, finally, (iii) if heavy immigration is found in developing or least developed countries, it should be in 65+ age groups. Generally, many countries which hire foreign labour, cannot observe them as citizens of their country after their superannuation. These expatriates have no alternative except to return to their home country.

From Appendix Table 2.3, we look into the magnitude of net migration in each of the 22 Arab states. First, we examine the state of net migration in six Mashreq countries:

Mashreq Countries

Egypt The negative sign shows that during the entire observation period, from 1950 to 2050, the country has been an out-migrating country with little magnitude up to 2015–2018, and is expected to follow the same trend thereafter. No significant changes are expected in the stream of net outgoing migrants in future.

Iraq The country is having similar trend and magnitude of the stream of net outgoing migrants with an exception. The period 1985–1995 wit-

nessed a sudden increase of out-migrants of 7.6 persons per 1000 population. This increase may be due to the war in the country.

Jordan The country experienced high fluctuations in the both the direction and magnitude of net migration. Initially, from 1950–1955 to 1963–1970, the country had net in-migration with staggering magnitude of 42.3 per 1000 population in 1950–1955 and 35.2 per 1000 population in 1965–1970. Later, during the decade 1970–1980, the state became out-migrating, with the net out-migration rates of 3.1 and 7.3 per 1000 population in the periods 1970–1975 and 1975–1980, respectively. Again, during the three consecutive five-year periods, namely, 1980–1985, 1985–1990 and 1990–1995, the state of Jordan received population 6.2, 10.6 and 20.3 per 1000 population of the state, respectively. Later, during the five-year periods 1995–2000 and 2000–2005, the state experienced out-migration of 6.3 per 1000 and 3.5 per 1000 population, respectively. From 2005–2010 to 2010–2015, the state of Jordan received net population of 20.2 and 23.9 per 1000 population, respectively. During the period 2015–2020, the net migration may be nil. Later, however, Jordan may witness net out-migration throughout the observation period, following the same past trend.

Lebanon During the initial three consecutive five-year periods, namely, 1950–1955, 1955–1960 and 1960–1965, the country had net immigration flow of low magnitude with minimum value of 0.2, 4.8 and 2.1 per 1000 population for the three periods. Later, the country experienced net out-migration of higher magnitude. Although the civil war started in the country in 1975, small incidences of conflict between sections of the society had started in 1970. The civil war continued till 1990, when the political settlement took place due to initiative by Taha Commission. The year 1990 is the landmark in the history of Lebanon when after 16 years, the civil war ended and the reconstruction period of Lebanon started. The net migration data is consistent to a large extent with these historical events. Maximum people out-migrated during 1975 and 1990. Later, after the civil war, due to return migration, the net in-migration figures are positive till 2010–2015. However, in future, the trend of net out-migration is expected to continue. Some countries of the Middle East have witnessed large conflicts, and therefore, more Arab states have been out-migrating states.

Syrian Arab Republic Since the beginning of the observation period, by and large, Syria has been or expected to be an out-migrating state throughout the observation period. However, the state may have large net immigration (26.3 per 1000 population) in 2012–2025.

State of Palestine The long ongoing conflict of Arab and Israel has forced large number of inhabitants of the state to emigrate. This has clearly been reflected in the data of net migration of the state. Only in the periods 1990–1995 and 1995–2000, there was some net immigration. In rest of the entire observation period, the net migration was negative, meaning large population had emigrated.

Maghreb Countries

Algeria Throughout the observation period 1950–2050, Algeria has been or expected to be net out-migrating state, with highest emigration rate of 6.6 persons per 1000 population observed in the period 1950–1955; it is expected to be 0.2 persons per 1000 population in the period 2015–2020, 120 and beyond. The long out-migrating scenario of Algerian population reflects poor economic situation in the state. It calls for identifying the push factors responsible for emigration. The most plausible reason for continuous emigration of people may be growing unemployment in the state which may be forcing the people to emigrate to other places in the region or to other countries in search of their livelihood.

Libya As seen in Appendix Table 2.3, Libya continued receiving immigrants during the period 1955–1960 and 1990–1995. It shows that the economy of the state was good till 1995. However, from the period 1995–2000, the state witnessed out-migration of its people which may continue with varying rates of net out-migration till the end of the observation period. Libya had the highest rate (14.0 per 1000 population) of out-migration in 2010–2015. It appears that the state is undergoing economic recession for which the current political situation may be partly responsible.

Morocco The state has been out-migrating from 1950–1955 till 2015, and is likely to experience the same trend of emigration in future. However, net out-migration rate fluctuated from a minimum of 0.2

person per 1000 population in the period 1955–1960 to a maximum of 6.3 persons per 1000 population in 1965–1970. The net out-migrating rate has not been large during the observation period (see Appendix Table 2.3). Presently, the economy of the country is having a slump and is expected to remain throughout 100-year period under observation.

Tunisia Like other three states of Maghreb countries, Tunisia too had experienced out-migration in most of the periods, with an exception of net immigration during the periods 1980–1985, 1985–1990 and 1990–1995. However, the net immigration rate in these periods was small—2.5, 1.3 and 3.2 persons per 1000 population. In the rest of the periods, the country may record net emigration, though small in magnitude. Looking at the pattern of net migration in the four states of the Maghreb countries, it can be said that, by and large, the patterns of net migration, magnitude and direction were similar in all the four countries.

Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

Bahrain A look at the patterns, magnitude and direction of net migration in the Appendix Table 2.3 reveals striking difference in their values in the six Gulf countries as compared to those found for the countries of previous two groups of countries, namely, Maghreb and Mashreq countries. For example, leaving the periods 1960–1965 and 1965–1970, in the rest of the periods, the net migration rate is positive and is expected to be so till the end of the observation period (2050). The magnitude of net in-migration is also high. The country is expected to receive immigrants in bulk throughout the observation period.

Kuwait The state has high immigration rate during the current period, and the same trend of magnitude of net immigration rate is likely to continue throughout the observation period. It may be mentioned that in the period 1990–1995, a heavy emigration (70.6 persons per 1000 population) was recorded in the state. This was the only five-year period during which people out-migrated from the country in large numbers. It may be mentioned here that this period of heavy emigration coincides with the inception of first Gulf war. The invasion of Kuwait was on 2 August 1990. A two-day operation was conducted by Iraq against the neighbouring

state Kuwait which resulted in the seven-month-long Iraqi occupation of the country. Due to the invasion, a large number of immigrants left the country.

Oman The state has recorded a mixed trend of net in- and net out-migration. During the initial first four five-year periods, the state had witnessed a decreasing trend of the magnitude of net emigration rate—initially, the net emigration rate was 4.2 person per 1000 population which had decreased to 3.8, 3.4 and 1.5 persons per 100 population in respective periods, 1955–1960, 1960–1965 and 1965–1970. In the rest of the five-year periods, the net immigration rate was positive, that is, more people are expected to migrate to Oman during the entire observation period ending in 2050. The largest immigration took place in Oman in 2010–2015 and is expected to take place in 2015–2020 also. However, the period from 2030–2035 to 2040–2045 may neither have immigration nor emigration.

Qatar The state being one of the richest states in oil wells and gas reservoirs in the world attracted large number of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour. Thus, a large number of workers immigrated to Qatar during the current period, and the stream of immigrants may continue to immigrate during future years as there are much employment opportunities in the country. However, except in the period 1990–1995 when a small section of expatriates left the country, in no other five-year period of observation, emigration took place in Qatar.

Saudi Arabia The state is the largest exporter of oil to the countries of the world. Ample jobs are created every year. Thus, the state has very high net immigration rate. But for the period 1990–2000, in no other period under observation, emigration took place. Some expatriates who came to work earlier may leave the country after retirement, as they cannot be absorbed as citizens of the host country. They have to leave the state to go to their home country. So, in oil-rich countries, some people have to emigrate. This is the reason that in one or two five-year periods, in each of the six Gulf countries, some people had to emigrate.

United Arab Emirates (UAE) Besides being an oil-rich country, UAE has biggest market for export. The economy of the UAE is the second

largest in the Arab world after Saudi Arabia. Petroleum and natural gas continue to play a central role in the economy, though the rulers of the country are gradually shifting to other sources of income. International trade has been a major driver of economic growth of the UAE. The state has become the choicest destination for many from all over the world to purchase property and live in the UAE. This is evident by the fact that the UAE is one of the states where the net immigration rate picked up momentum after 1955–1960 and recorded immigration rate of 62.4 persons per 1000 population in 1960–1965; it further rose to 55.8, 134.3 person per 1000 population in the periods 1965–1970 and 1970–1975, respectively. In subsequent periods also, higher rates of immigration continued up to 2005–2010. It is expected that a positive trend of immigration would continue till 2050. Leaving initial period 1950–1960 in which the state witnessed emigration of low magnitude, in the rest of the observation periods, the UAE has recorded high immigration rates till 2005–2010. It is expected that the state will continue receiving migrants at least till the end of the observation period 2045–2050.

Least Developed Countries

Comoros The state has been an out-migrating country. Only in 1970–1975, Comoros recorded immigration with a small rate of 7.1 persons per 1000 population. In rest of the periods, the country has been an out-migrating country, with low rate of net emigration per 1000 persons. The same trend of emigration is expected to continue till the end of observation period, 2050. The situation clearly conveys the poor economic condition of the country.

Djibouti The country has faced civil wars and conflicts. In order of their occurrence, these conflicts are the Djiboutian Civil War (1991–1994), funded insurgency (1998–present) and the Djiboutian-Eritrean conflict (2008). During the period of civil war or conflict or insurgency, inhabitants of the country generally move out of the country, and when the crisis is over, some return to their native country. We now look into Appendix Table 2.3 for the trends and pattern of net migration in Djibouti. Until 1985–1990, the country recorded immigration. The rate of immigration during 14 years (1960–1975) was high. In 1985–1990, the rate of immigration was 35.4 persons per 1000 population. After this period, the rate

of immigration decreased, and in two five-year periods, it changed the sign and turned into emigration, though in small magnitude. From the period 2010–2015, again the country recorded immigration, though small in number. This trend is expected to continue till the end of the observation period.

Mauritania The country is a large, mostly desert territory with a population of 2.3 million inhabitants. The country faced three wars: Western Sahara War (1975–1978), Mauritania-Senegal Border War (1989–1991) and Insurgency in Maghreb (2003–). In Appendix Table 2.3, when we look into the patterns of emigration and immigration in Mauritania, we found that from the initial period 1950–1955 to 1990–1995, the country witnessed emigration which varied from a minimum of 0.4 to a maximum of 3.2 persons per 1000 population. Emigration rate was not high. The direction of migration changed from negative to positive in the period 1995–2000—the period in which the state experienced immigration. However, the rate of immigration was quite small, and the same trend is expected to continue till the end of the period. The immigration rate varied from a minimum of 0.4 person per 1000 population to 2.1 persons per 1000 population. Since the country is small and the economy also does not seem to be good, the question of heavy immigration or emigration does not arise. For migration to or from a country, some minimum money is required as a threshold, without which it is not possible to immigrate or emigrate.

Somalia Like other countries classified as least developed countries, Somalia also faced conflicts or civil wars. The Somali Civil War is an ongoing civil war which took place in Somalia during the 1980s and 2009–present. Somalia had experienced almost constant conflict since the collapse of its central government in 1991. There was no government in Somalia for nearly two decades. With this background, let us examine the trend and pattern of migration in Somalia. From Appendix Table 2.3, we find that, by and large, the trend was dominated by emigration. In the country where there is no government, no safety of life and no security of food, inhabitants of the country would prefer to emigrate. Except for the period 1975–1980 in which there was large immigration, from the period 1980–1985, emigration of inhabitants

continued, and the same trend is expected till the end of observation period, that is, 2045–2050.

Sudan The country has a long history of wars, civil wars and conflicts. The first civil war in Sudan took place before 1985. The second Sudanese Civil War was from 1983 to 2005. South Sudanese Civil War was in 2016–2017. Initially, from 1950–1955 to 1990–1995, Sudan experienced little immigration. However, from 1995–2000, the country recorded emigration of inhabitants of the country. This trend of emigration, though small, may continue till the end of the observation period. Magnitude of both immigration and emigration in Sudan was small.

Yemen The Yemini Civil War was an ongoing conflict that started in 2015. Yemen—the Arab World’s poorest country—faced a brutal civil war during three years. The war claimed more than 16,000 lives, left many homeless and left 13 million people to die from hunger. Prior to this furious civil war, the country had witnessed number of small conflicts. The country never remained peaceful. With this background, we examine the trend, pattern and direction of net migration, particularly during the civil war from 2015 to 2018. Appendix Table 2.3 shows that from 1950–1955 to 2015–2018, Yemen experienced emigration throughout this period. The same trend of emigration of inhabitants is expected to continue till the end of the observation period.

CONCLUSION

The primary aim of this chapter has been to estimate the timings of opening and closure of demographic window of economic opportunity and thus to find the duration of the period during which demographic dividend could be harvested. It may be reiterated here that demographic dividend is not automatic. The governments of each of the 22 Arab countries should prepare in advance to generate employment opportunities in the country for the new entrants of the working-age groups. The knowledge of the timing of opening of demographic window would help planners and policymakers to be prepared to welcome this period of economic miracle. If government could create jobs for all available members of workforce, the country would get maximum dividend which would boost country’s GDP. Also, if women join the workforce, the GDP could be doubled.

In the six Arab states of Mashreq countries, the expected duration of demographic window varied from a minimum of 15+ years for Iraq to a maximum of 62+ years for Egypt (see Appendix Table 2.3). The reason for very short duration of demographic window for Iraq may be because the window might have opened much later (see Fig. 2.1) due to high child dependency ratio (see Saxena 2017). For such a short duration of demographic window, it may not be possible for the government to create employment opportunities. Thus, the period would go without reaping demographic dividend. Among the six Arab states of Maghreb countries, the maximum duration of demographic window was 68+ years for Libya. In this group of countries, the window was opened before 2015 in all the six Arab states and closed much later, and therefore the duration of demographic window was large (65+ years). In case of six Arab states belonging to the group of GCC countries, the maximum duration of demographic window was expected to be 85+ years for three Arab states, namely, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). All the countries of this group have vibrant economies due to oil and natural gas reservoirs. These countries have heavy immigration rate of young people in the working-age groups. Thus, young-age dependency ratio becomes much less. This, in turn, allows the PSR trajectory cut the x-axis early. The old-age dependency is also low which may not drag the PSR early to cut the x-axis. Thus, the duration of demographic window is much larger than the countries of any of the three groups of countries. In case of least developed countries, the demographic window may open late and may also close later, since all the six countries of this group are least developed, experienced high mortality due to civil wars, conflicts, incidences of uprising and large emigrations. All these may keep the old-age dependency ratio much lower. As mentioned earlier, both young- and old-age dependency ratios are the key players in controlling the duration of demographic window of economic opportunity. The author, in a separate article, has shown how from the young- and old-age dependency ratios, the duration of demographic window could be augmented (see Saxena 2017).

The history of the Middle East is full of the outburst of civil wars, conflicts and major wars. Hardly any Arab country was left which did not face the brunt of war or civil war, conflicts or incidences of uprising. Among present major conflict seen in the region is Arab-Israeli conflict

which started in 1948 and is still continuing with no sign of reaching some amicable immediate solution to end the crisis in the near future. The other is the ongoing Syrian Civil War 2011–2017. Needless to emphasize that these civil wars and bloody wars in the region have stalled the development of the Arab region. Data suggest heavy out-migration in several countries. Already the population size of most of the Arab countries has depleted. A scenario of uncertain future is prevailing. In some underdeveloped countries, either there is no government, or if it exists, it is ineffective.

APPENDIX

Table 2.2 Potential support ratios of 22 Arab countries from 2015 to 2100

<i>Arab countries</i>	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050	2055	2060	2065	2070	2075	2080	2085	2090	2095	2100
<i>Mashreq countries</i>																		
Egypt	0.88	0.90	0.91	0.92	0.94	1.01	1.03	1.03	1.01	1.03	1.07	1.11	1.13	1.09	1.06	1.05	1.05	1.04
Iraq	0.64	0.66	0.70	0.73	0.76	0.79	0.81	0.84	0.87	0.90	0.92	0.95	0.97	0.99	1.00	1.02	1.03	1.04
Jordan	0.77	0.83	0.90	0.94	0.99	1.03	1.06	1.07	1.09	1.11	1.12	1.13	1.12	1.09	1.06	1.03	1.01	0.99
Lebanon	1.02	1.18	1.35	1.37	1.29	1.25	1.20	1.12	1.02	0.90	0.81	0.77	0.78	0.80	0.82	0.81	0.77	0.75
State of Palestine	0.60	0.67	0.74	0.78	0.82	0.88	0.93	0.98	1.01	1.02	1.03	1.05	1.06	1.06	1.05	1.04	1.03	1.02
Syrian Arab Republic	0.68	0.68	0.85	0.95	1.04	1.12	1.14	1.15	1.17	1.20	1.19	1.14	1.09	1.04	1.01	0.98	0.96	0.93
<i>Maghreb countries</i>																		
Algeria	1.05	1.09	1.07	1.04	1.07	1.15	1.15	1.09	1.03	0.99	1.00	1.05	1.04	0.98	0.92	0.89	0.87	0.87
Libya	1.09	1.18	1.26	1.31	1.33	1.32	1.26	1.20	1.15	1.13	1.12	1.12	1.09	1.04	0.99	0.96	0.95	0.95
Morocco	1.04	1.09	1.08	1.08	1.09	1.12	1.13	1.10	1.06	1.02	1.00	0.99	0.97	0.93	0.89	0.87	0.84	0.83
Tunisia	1.24	1.25	1.21	1.15	1.12	1.15	1.15	1.10	1.02	0.98	0.98	1.00	1.01	0.96	0.92	0.88	0.87	0.87
<i>Gulf cooperation council countries</i>																		
Bahrain	1.93	2.35	2.15	2.07	1.99	1.89	1.82	1.81	1.79	1.72	1.53	1.35	1.21	1.09	1.02	0.98	0.97	0.95
Kuwait	2.11	1.91	1.78	1.70	1.57	1.46	1.40	1.35	1.34	1.33	1.29	1.28	1.25	1.20	1.15	1.12	1.10	1.08
Oman	1.71	1.96	1.93	1.85	1.85	1.85	1.79	1.68	1.47	1.29	1.18	1.12	1.05	0.97	0.90	0.87	0.86	0.86
Qatar	2.64	2.82	2.77	2.62	2.44	2.30	2.21	2.11	1.93	1.71	1.55	1.42	1.32	1.26	1.21	1.17	1.14	1.11
Saudi Arabia	1.37	1.57	1.54	1.49	1.45	1.38	1.33	1.30	1.23	1.16	1.14	1.14	1.12	1.08	1.03	0.98	0.95	0.93
United Arab Emirates	3.32	3.10	2.97	2.78	2.62	2.38	2.16	1.99	1.85	1.74	1.61	1.49	1.36	1.26	1.21	1.18	1.16	1.12
<i>Least developed countries</i>																		
Comoros	0.69	0.72	0.76	0.81	0.87	0.91	0.95	0.98	1.01	1.04	1.07	1.10	1.11	1.12	1.13	1.15	1.15	1.15
Djibouti	0.84	0.95	1.05	1.12	1.18	1.23	1.26	1.29	1.27	1.26	1.23	1.21	1.20	1.19	1.17	1.15	1.12	1.10
Mauritania	0.66	0.69	0.72	0.75	0.78	0.82	0.85	0.88	0.91	0.94	0.97	1.00	1.02	1.04	1.05	1.07	1.08	1.09
Somalia	0.49	0.50	0.52	0.54	0.57	0.61	0.65	0.70	0.74	0.79	0.83	0.87	0.92	0.96	0.99	1.02	1.05	1.07
Sudan	0.59	0.62	0.67	0.72	0.76	0.80	0.85	0.89	0.93	0.97	0.99	1.01	1.02	1.04	1.06	1.07	1.08	1.09
Yemen	0.58	0.67	0.74	0.81	0.90	1.00	1.09	1.15	1.20	1.23	1.27	1.30	1.32	1.31	1.28	1.25	1.21	1.17

Source: Computed from United Nations Data, 2017 (<http://www.esa.un.org>, accessed on 23rd, July, 2018)

Table 2.3 Trends and patterns of net migration in Arab countries: 1950–2050

<i>Arab countries</i>	1950–55	1955–60	1960–65	1965–70	1970–75	1975–80	1980–85	1985–90	1990–95
<i>Mashreq countries</i>									
Egypt	-0.5	-0.4	-0.3	-1.5	-2.9	-2.7	-1.7	-0.8	-1.5
Iraq	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-0.8	-2.7	-7.6	-1.6
Jordan	42.3	29.5	6.8	35.2	-3.1	-7.3	6.2	10.6	20.3
Lebanon	0.2	4.8	2.1	-6.4	-0.8	-20.8	-16.2	-17.0	6.3
State of Palestine	-14.3	-13.2	-13.7	-49.0	-5.3	-11.8	-7.5	-4.1	3.0
Syrian Arab Republic	-3.8	-0.7	-0.6	-0.5	-2.3	-3.9	-1.8	-2.5	-1.0
<i>Maghreb countries</i>									
Algeria	-6.6	-3.7	-4.8	-1.8	-3.2	-2.5	-0.8	-0.8	-0.9
Libya	0.0	6.8	5.8	5.0	4.9	3.9	6.4	0.3	0.2
Morocco	0.0	-0.2	-3.6	-6.3	-5.9	-3.1	-3.0	-3.5	-3.6
Tunisia	-1.0	-9.5	-6.5	-4.0	-3.6	-2.4	2.5	1.3	3.2
<i>Gulf cooperation council countries</i>									
Bahrain	4.9	10.6	-4.8	-8.0	16.0	31.3	1.7	5.6	2.1
Kuwait	4.6	46.7	73.7	48.1	21.6	23.5	14.8	12.5	-70.6
Oman	-4.2	-3.8	-3.4	-1.5	6.3	15.0	12.3	1.3	10.4
Qatar	37.4	21.9	54.2	46.0	50.2	29.2	68.7	27.1	-4.1
Saudi Arabia	1.6	1.4	5.6	7.0	14.8	19.1	24.3	9.9	-1.3
UAE	-0.4	-0.4	62.4	55.8	134.3	97.2	30.3	32.2	34.2
<i>Least developed countries</i>									
Comoros	0.0	-6.7	-8.5	-5.0	-4.5	7.1	-2.7	-2.3	-1.4
Djibouti	3.0	13.1	36.3	36.4	36.5	62.6	5.1	35.4	-14.7
Somalia	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.0	73.1	-12.2	-11.3	-21.4
Sudan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.7	2.8	1.6	5.9
Mauritania	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.5	-1.0	-1.4	-1.9	-3.2	-2.8
Yemen	-2.2	-3.0	-3.7	-8.3	-10.8	-2.0	-1.1	-0.9	9.0

Source: Computed from United Nations Data, 2017 (<http://www.esa.un.org>, accessed on 30th July, 2018)

<i>1995–2000</i>	<i>2000–05</i>	<i>2005–10</i>	<i>2010–15</i>	<i>2015–20</i>	<i>2020–25</i>	<i>2025–30</i>	<i>2030–35</i>	<i>2035–40</i>	<i>2040–45</i>	<i>2045–50</i>
-0.6	-0.2	-0.7	-0.6	-0.6	-0.5	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
-0.2	-2.1	-3.2	2.8	0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
-6.2	-3.5	20.2	23.9	0.0	-11.5	-7.7	-3.0	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
-1.9	30.5	8.8	49.1	-5.1	-24.1	-16.4	-6.4	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7
4.8	-11.2	-4.7	-2.0	-1.3	-0.9	-0.8	-0.7	-0.6	-0.6	-0.5
-1.7	-4.4	3.8	-41.8	-13.2	26.3	9.6	1.7	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
-1.1	-1.3	-2.1	-0.8	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
-2.2	-0.7	-4.0	-14.0	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2
-4.0	-4.4	-3.6	-1.8	-1.4	-1.4	-1.3	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2	-1.1
-0.8	-2.8	-0.6	-1.2	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
12.8	40.0	51.1	6.4	30.6	8.4	6.7	2.9	1.8	1.8	1.7
26.4	2.4	36.4	38.7	4.9	3.1	3.0	2.4	2.3	2.0	1.6
-17.3	1.3	19.2	45.2	25.9	4.1	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
10.7	58.7	127.3	56.5	15.2	8.9	6.7	5.1	3.5	3.3	3.2
-3.5	6.5	7.8	10.8	3.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.0	0.9	0.9
34.6	60.0	103.7	11.0	6.3	5.7	5.4	4.6	4.4	4.2	3.9
-2.4	-3.5	-3.1	-2.7	-2.4	-2.2	-2.0	-1.8	-1.7	-1.5	-1.4
3.0	-2.4	-0.4	1.4	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7
-2.4	-3.8	-3.3	-3.5	-2.7	-1.7	-1.5	-1.3	-1.1	-1.0	-0.9
-4.9	-3.8	-6.6	-3.2	-1.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1
1.0	0.5	0.6	2.1	1.1	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4
-1.2	-1.2	-0.6	-0.6	-1.0	-0.9	-0.8	-0.7	-0.5	-0.5	-0.4

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Egyptian Labour Migration in the Arab Middle East

Ibrahim Awad and Lina Lotayef

INTRODUCTION

Mass Egyptian labour migration to countries in the Arab Middle East started in the mid-1970s. In 1971, a new constitution heralded the rule of Anwar El Sadat. For the first time in the constitutional history of Egypt, a provision was dedicated to migration.¹ Article 52 of the new constitution provided that “citizens have the right to permanent or temporary migration abroad, law regulating this right as well as the procedures and conditions for migrating and leaving the country”. In 1983, law 111 on international migration clearly encouraged migration.² The new head of state who came to power in late 1970 wanted to signify the opening of the country after what had been considered its closure during the socializing

¹ See Article 52 in Egyptian 1971 Constitution Arab Republic of Egypt Constitution can be found at <http://sis.gov.eg>

² Law 111/1983 “Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad”.

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of Nasser's in the 1960s. But as the Egyptian economy was opening up, another consideration for encouraging migration was the need to find external outlets for the growing Egyptian labour force and to thus defuse the employment question. The domestic labour market was not deemed capable of absorbing the Egyptian supply of labour. There was no question of planning the economy to generate domestic demand that matched labour supply, as had been the case in the 1960s.

Demand for labour exploded in the mid-1970s in countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after the historical oil price increases of 1973–1974, which caused a large flow of Egyptian workers to the Gulf. They also headed to Jordan, Libya, Lebanon and, until 1991, to Iraq. In their countries of employment, they occupied jobs at various skill levels. All in all, skill levels noticeably improved with time. Most Egyptian workers returned after 5–14 years on average.³ But even when their stay extended for decades, they were still all considered as temporary contractual workers. In countries of employment, issues Egyptian migrant workers faced ranged from the *kafala* system to irregular migration and to politically caused instability. Forty years later, linkages between migration and the performance of the Egyptian labour market are as greatly significant as they were in the 1970s. However, this chapter considers that migration has not been a solution to the employment question the country has and still is experiencing. Labour migration has not resulted in tightening the domestic labour market. Supply of labour is still in excess of demand. In addition, the quality of jobs measured by terms and conditions of employment is still deficient. Return migrants have not improved the overall skill quality of the labour force to the extent of raising wages or forcing the formalization of employment relations. Wages are still low, and informal employment is rampant. Yet, individual workers and their families have benefitted from their migration experiences through remittances, which allow meeting their needs and alleviating their poverty, in addition to the wage premium that returnees enjoy. A further benefit from migration accrues to the Egyptian economy as a whole. Remittances sent by migrant workers have strikingly grown in the second decade of the twenty-first century, sustaining the balance on current account. Overall, labour migration to the Arab Middle East, which represents some 75 per cent of total Egyptian migration, has not resulted in a deep restructuring of the labour market. However, it has made possible the sustenance of the Egyptian economy and kept the employment condition from a serious

³Zohry and Debanath (2010).

deterioration. In the process, Egyptian migrant workers in the Arab Middle East faced issues that still call for solutions. In the next sections, the arguments advanced in this introduction will be developed.

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN LABOUR MARKET

If encouraging labour migration was meant as a solution to the Egyptian employment question, the purpose was not realized. Demand for Egyptian labour in the Arab Middle East did not make up for the persistent shortage in domestic demand. Egypt's labour market has consistently experienced a lower rate of employment growth compared to labour force growth over the past decades. Between 2008 and 2011, the growth in labour force reached 8.7 per cent, while the growth in employment was only 4.8 per cent.⁴ The seminal political changes of 2011 did not alter the main determinants of the dynamics of the labour market. Rates of overall and youth unemployment still run high. The overall unemployment (Table 3.1) rate dropped to 8.7 per cent in 2008, before reversing trends upwards. By 2013, the overall unemployment rate had reached 12.7 per cent⁵ and dropped slightly to an estimated 11.9 per cent in 2017.⁶ In Table 3.2 unemployment rate by educational level is presented.

Unemployment particularly affected youth between ages 15 and 29, with peak rates between 20 and 24.⁷ According to World Bank Data, youth unemployment has increased dramatically between 2010 and 2014, when it reached 26.3 per cent and 42 per cent respectively.⁸ The 2017 modelled International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates place youth

Table 3.1 Overall unemployment rates (%)

<i>Gender</i>	<i>2007</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>
Male	5.7	5.3	4.9	4.9	8.8
Female	18	18.1	20	22.6	21
Total	8.7	8.3	8.6	9.1	11.8

Source: Migration Policy Centre (2014)

⁴Awad (2013).

⁵World Bank Development Indicators (2015).

⁶CIA World Factbook, Egypt.

⁷Amer and Fargues (2014).

⁸World Bank Development Indicators (2015).

Table 3.2 Unemployment rates by education level

<i>Year</i>	<i>Unemployment rate of persons with primary level or less education (%)</i>	<i>Unemployment rate of persons with secondary level education (%)</i>	<i>Unemployment rate of persons with tertiary level education (%)</i>
2000	0.7	20.4	12.8
2001	0.9	18.7	12.4
2002	0.6	18.8	15.7
2003	0.8	22.0	16.4
2004	0.8	20.4	16.1
2005	1.8	20.8	18.1
2006	2.0	19.2	17.4
2007	1.7	14.9	17.3

Source: ILO key indicators of the labour market, 8th edition

unemployment levels at a slightly lower rate, that is, 34.4 per cent for those aged 15–24.⁹ Unemployment rates were highest for young university graduates.¹⁰ In 2008, 31.7 per cent of those with tertiary education were unemployed. This figure increased to reach its peak in 2010, with 39.7 per cent,¹¹ but has since decreased back to 30.78 per cent in 2016.¹²

Besides unemployment, terms and conditions of employment and informality are causes of migration of Egyptian workers. The findings of a school-to-work transition survey (SWTS) carried out in 2012 by the International Labour Organization (ILO) are eloquent as to the quality of work available to Egyptian youth in their domestic labour market.¹³

In 2012, a majority of young Egyptian employees (75.7 per cent) worked without contracts, which is a sign of vulnerability and of informality.¹⁴ From among young workers, 80.9 per cent of males and 53.3 per cent of females were in paid employment, but without contracts. Beneficiaries of contracts of unlimited duration were only 9.8 per cent and 26.8 per cent among male and female workers, respectively. Lack of contracts of unlimited duration or of any contracts at all meant that 91.2 per cent,

⁹World Bank Development Indicators (2017).

¹⁰Haq and Zaki (2015).

¹¹World Bank Development Indicators (2015).

¹²World Bank Development Indicators (2017).

¹³Barsoum et al. (2014). While in most contexts, a youth is defined as a person aged between 15 and 24 years, for the purpose of the SWTS and related reports, the upper age limit was extended to 29 years of age.

¹⁴Gatti et al. (2011).

almost all surveyed male workers in Egypt, were in vulnerable or informal employment. Informal employment concerns workers in the informal (unregistered) sector and those employed in informal jobs in the modern sector.¹⁵ For these workers, salary or income is the only compensation. They are not entitled to benefits deriving from jobs in the modern sector, such as social security payments or paid annual and sick leaves. It is noteworthy that the majority of informally employed workers (63.5 per cent) were engaged in the modern sector, with the remaining 36.5 per cent holding jobs in the informal sector.¹⁶ The SWTS revealed that, beyond salary, access to benefits was quite low. Only 22.6 per cent of wage and salaried workers were entitled to paid annual leave, the most common benefit enjoyed by workers. Taking wages as an indicator, young Egyptian workers did not have quality employment. One quarter of young workers reported monthly wages below average. About half had monthly wages ranging between 500 and 999 Egyptian pounds.¹⁷ The highest wages of 3000 Egyptian pounds and above went to professionals, who made up only 2.6 per cent of young workers.¹⁸ When wage differentials are taken into account, decisions of Egyptian workers to migrate for employment can be fully understood. In 2004, wages in Qatar were 750 per cent those in Egypt in tourism, 569 per cent in distribution, 859 per cent in distribution, 859 per cent in transportation, 927 per cent in the financial sector, 1484 per cent in construction and 1924 per cent in education.¹⁹ Job satisfaction being a sign of employment quality, the desire to change jobs should be considered an indicator of poor job quality. The SWTS brought out that 50.1 per cent of working youth expressed their desire to change jobs, the percentages being 53.2 per cent for males and 38.3 per cent for females.

¹⁵ Informal employment is measured according to the guidelines recommended by the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS 2003). It includes the following subcategories of workers: (a) paid employees in “informal jobs”, that is, jobs without a social security entitlement, paid annual leave or paid sick leave, (b) paid employees in an unregistered enterprise with size classification below five employees, (c) own-account workers in an unregistered enterprise with size classification below five employees, (d) employers in an unregistered enterprise with size classification below five employees and (e) contributing family workers.

¹⁶ Barsoum et al. (2014).

¹⁷ At the time the survey was carried out, this was roughly equivalent to between US\$70 and 140.

¹⁸ The total of 3000 Egyptian pounds were equivalent at the time to some US\$420.

¹⁹ El Nozahy (2007), as quoted in Awad (2007).

After the brief review of the performance of the Egyptian labour market in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, it can be safely argued that Egyptian workers will still be looking for migration opportunities in the Arab Middle East and beyond in the foreseeable future. Migration in the last four decades did not result in tightening the Egyptian labour market in a way that helps it formalize and improve terms and conditions of employment.

EVOLUTION, VOLUMES, SKILLS AND DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPTIAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

Egyptian labour migration in the Arab Middle East has been conceptualized as falling in five distinct phases.²⁰ In 2005, Zohry considered that the first, prior to 1974, was one of early stage of migration, where teachers and other professionals were sent to assist in tasks of public administration. This stage went back to the 1930s and extended to the 1960s, with Iraq as one of the earliest receiving countries. This could also be considered a technical cooperation stage. The large increases in oil revenues in 1973–1974 marked the beginning of the second phase, one of expansion. Very high growth in demand for labour in the Gulf states, mainly intended for large-scale infrastructure projects, attracted large numbers of Egyptian workers. The next two phases started with the Iran-Iraq war and the decline of oil revenues around the mid-1980s. This was the contraction phase, followed in 1988–1992 by a deterioration one, which saw a large increase in return migration. The second Gulf War and its aftermath forced over one million Egyptian migrant workers to return from Kuwait and Iraq. After that war, however, migration levels began to recover and stabilize with slightly less concentration on the Gulf states as migration to Libya picked up.

Estimates of the volume of Egyptian migration vary (Table 3.3). For 2006, for the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), there were 3.9 million Egyptian migrants, including 2 million in Arab countries, while for the Egyptian Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of Manpower and Immigration (MMI), the volume of Egyptian migration was 4.7 million. For the World Bank, there

²⁰ Zohry, Ayman (2005).

Table 3.3 Number of Egyptian migrants by country of destination 2009

<i>Country</i>	<i>Total migrants</i>
Libya	2,000,000
Saudi Arabia	1,300,000
Jordan	525,000
Kuwait	480,000
UAE	260,000
Qatar	88,500
Oman	45,000
Lebanon	38,000
Iraq	15,000
Bahrain	12,000
Yemen	10,300
Syria	10,000

Source: Migration Policy Centre (2014)

were 3.7 million migrants only in 2010. Using administrative sources of the Egyptian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Manpower and Migration, in mid-2013, one author estimated the total volume of Egyptian migration in 2010 at 6.5 million.²¹ Arab countries absorbed 4.8 million, or 74 per cent of total Egyptian migration. Libya alone received 2 million Egyptians, equivalent to 42 per cent of Egyptian migration to Arab countries and 31 per cent of total Egyptian migration. Saudi Arabia and Jordan came in second and third places with 1.3 million and 525,000 successively. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were in fourth and fifth places, with 480,000 and 260,000, respectively. Lebanon was eighth, with 38,000 Egyptian migrants.²² The GCC as a whole was host to 2.2 million, equivalent to 45.5 per cent of Egyptian migration to Arab countries and 33.8 per cent of total Egyptian migration.²³ Because of the very low dependency rate or, in other words, the extremely high labour force participation rate (LFPR) of Egyptian migrants in the GCC, it will not be far from reality to consider that all are migrant workers. The same assessment applies to

²¹ Zohry, Ayman (2016).

²² Migration Policy Center (2014).

²³ Wahba (2008). Based on the ELMPS 2006, gave another distribution of Egyptian migration by country of destination: Saudi Arabia, 37.43 per cent; Jordan, 16.11 per cent, Libya, 13.64 per cent; Kuwait, 12.27 per cent. UAE, 11.56 per cent; EU, 2.24 per cent and North America, 1.89 per cent. The generation of more reliable information will be discussed later, in Issues of Egyptian Labour Migration to the Middle East.

migrants in Libya, Jordan and Lebanon. However, with the expansion in volumes of Asian labour in the GCC states, the share of Egyptian workers in those countries slowly decreased. This can be seen in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia where the share of Egyptians amongst migrants from the top five countries of origin steadily decreased. The percentage of Egyptian workers amongst the top five sending countries in Kuwait decreased from 16.6 per cent in 1990 to 13.7 per cent in 2000, and finally to 11.7 per cent in 2013. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia the figure dropped from 29.1 per cent in 1990 to 23.8 per cent in 2000, and 19.3 per cent by 2013.²⁴ It is worth noting that Egyptian workers need visas to enter the GCC countries and Lebanon. In contrast, they do not to enter Jordan, which makes access to the Jordanian labour market easier. Visa regulations in Libya have changed over time along with the economic conditions in that country, on the one hand, and with the state of its political relations with Egypt, on the other. Since February 2012, Egyptians need visas to access the Libyan territory. In any case, power vacuum and the collapse of the state in Libya have sharply reduced migration to that country which was the first destination of Egyptian migrant workers.

Two main trends can be detected in the changing origins and characteristics of Egyptian labour migration to the Arab Middle East in the last four decades. These trends concern the rural versus urban origin of migrant workers and their educational attainment. Between the 1970s and 1990s, over 30 per cent of migrants originated from urban areas. This figure fell to 25 per cent in the early 2000s, and it dropped to as low as 21 per cent in 2010. However, the figures show that the urban origin of migrant workers is on the rise again and reached 25 per cent in 2012.²⁵ With regard to the changes in migrant workers' educational attainment, in 1980, 35 per cent of rural migrants had a secondary education degree compared to 55 per cent in 2010. From among migrant workers of urban origin, 22 per cent had a university degree in 1980 compared to 43 per cent in 2010.²⁶ These figures show a notable improvement in the educational attainment of Egyptian migrant worker over time. This improvement in the educational attainment of migrants may be correlated with the

²⁴ Author's calculations based on IOM and ESCWA Arab Region Migration Report (2016).

²⁵ Wahba (2014).

²⁶ Wahba (2010).

Table 3.4 Work permits granted to Egyptians in Arab countries, by occupation, in the period 1985–2002 (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Scientists and technicians</i>	<i>Managers</i>	<i>Clerical workers</i>	<i>Sales and services</i>	<i>Agriculture</i>	<i>Production workers</i>
Bahrain	27.2	5.5	24.3	24.3	0	33.7
Iraq	2.6	0	1.5	1.5	33	62.9
Jordan	1.4	0	1.7	1.7	31.9	62.9
Kuwait	53.5	1.1	21.5	21.5	0.2	14.1
Lebanon	0	0	2.3	2.3	21.1	76.6
Libya	57	9	0	0	0	34
Oman	52.9	8.1	4.1	4.1	1.4	31.5
Qatar	51.5	1.9	6.1	6.1	1	37.4
Saudi Arabia	40.5	0.4	0.3	20.6	7.1	31.1
UAE	41.1	4	2.9	2.9	0.9	50.1
Yemen	69.1	18.1	1.1	1.1	0	7.7
Total	39	2.4	12.7	12.7	8.6	35.8

Source: Migration Policy Centre (2014)

increased unemployment rates of graduates of secondary and tertiary education in the domestic Egyptian labour market.

This improvement is borne out by the changing occupational distribution of Egyptian workers in the Arab Middle East, which is also indicative of a steady amelioration in their skill endowment. Available information (Tables 3.4 and 3.5) for the period 1985–2002 reveals a growth in the shares of scientists and technicians and of managers from 20.4 per cent and 0.3 per cent in the earlier years, to 41.0 per cent and 2.4 per cent in the latter years; in the meantime, production workers decreased from 43.0 per cent to 33.8 per cent.²⁷ Broken down by country of destination, Wahba's calculations, using work permits granted to Egyptian migrant workers, show that workers are, on average, for the same period, highly skilled in the GCC countries and in Libya. In contrast, they are low-skilled in Jordan and Lebanon. They also were low-skilled in Iraq when this country absorbed a high volume of Egyptian labour migration, before the events and conflicts of the years 1990s–2000s.²⁸ Low-skilled labour migration seems to be correlated to access without visas, in the cases of Iraq and

²⁷ CARIM Database (2005), available at <http://carim.org/index.php?areaid=4>, accessed on 3 March 2018; see Table 3.5 in the annex.

²⁸ Wahba (2010).

Table 3.5 Work permits granted to Egyptians in Arab countries, by occupation and year (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
Scientists and technicians	20.4	40.2	41.0
Managers	0.3	0.3	2.4
Clerical workers	8.8	8.0	1.5
Sales and services	18.5	17.3	12.7
Agriculture animal husbandry and fishing	8.9	5.3	8.6
Production workers	43.0	28.9	33.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Migration Policy Centre (2014)

Jordan. In the case of Lebanon, Egyptians enter Syria without visas, after which access to Lebanon is relatively facilitated. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the percentage occupational distribution of work permits granted to Egyptian migrant workers in Arab countries and then its evolution between 1985 and 2002.

ISSUES IN EGYPTIAN LABOUR MIGRATION TO THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST²⁹

Issues and problems faced by Egyptian migrant workers vary according to the country of destination. They essentially concern terms and conditions of employment, which are determined by modes of recruitment, access to and the legal status in the country of destination, the nature and performance of the receiving labour market and political economy considerations. Modes of recruitment refer to whether workers have been recruited through the Egyptian government, private recruitment agencies or informal brokers. Access to the territory is about entering the country of employment with or without visas. In the latter case, entry may be legal, Egyptians being exempted from visas, or illegal. However, stay may extend beyond the permitted period—visitors becoming irregular migrants. The situation of the labour market refers to whether or not there is excess labour supply. The nature of the labour market refers to the extent of its

²⁹Most of the information in this section is based on interviews carried out by one of the authors with Egyptian government officials and representatives in countries of destination.

informality. Political economy considerations are about the power of recruiters and employers and their possible informal relations with regulators of labour migration in countries of destination. A systematic perusal of the working of each of these determinants requires extensive research and sources. The examples of issues and problems, described below, however, bring some evidence to their validity. The examples are drawn from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Libya.

In the GCC countries, Egyptian workers' complaints are typical of those of migrant labour from all countries of origin, including changing the terms of the contracts upon arrival in the country of destination, discovering that no real jobs exist and withholding passports. Egyptian officials report that such problems are rare when the GCC demand for jobs is directly intermediated by the government, but they are more frequent when the intermediation is made by private recruitment agencies and especially by informal recruiters.

In Saudi Arabia, the second largest country of external employment for Egyptian migrant workers, the most important source of complaint was reported to be the *kafala* (sponsorship) system. This is about the recruitment and employment system in the GCC countries, which ties workers to their sponsors. Workers cannot change employment to take up jobs with better working conditions and have to work in those they were originally recruited for. The transfer of sponsorships to new employers/*kafeels* is more often than not refused. Egyptian migrant workers also complain about withholding final payments and of the denial of ending employment relationships, without which they cannot leave the country. Both are considered tactics used by *kafeels* to bargain over final payments. Access to the Saudi territory is not easy. Prior employment contracts are necessary. However, loopholes exist. *Kafeels* at times bring in workers for fake jobs. They make profits out of these illicit practices and set recruited workers loose in the informal labour market. Workers recruited for pilgrimage periods may stay behind and also join the informal economy. In addition, regularly recruited workers at times abscond, abandoning the jobs for which they were recruited and joining the informal labour market. This denotes the existence of an informal labour market with demand for low-skilled workers. Problems for these workers are those usual of informal employment such as underpayment, long working hours and lack of protection generally. When arrested, run-away workers are only released with the approval of their original sponsors. Organs for the settlement of labour

disputes are generally fair, but they resort at times to procrastination in order to weaken the position of workers and to force them to forgo some of their entitlements. Mutatis mutandis, problems in the Saudi labour market apply in other GCC countries. Notable differences may be due to the inexistence of pilgrimage, which occasions relatively easy seasonal access to the territory of Saudi Arabia and the volumes of labour markets. The large Saudi labour market, compared to those of the other GCC countries, may be more difficult to bring under the control of the state.

Before the latest changes it introduced in its *kafala* system, in Qatar, labour migration issues could not be distinguished from those in the other GCC countries. Tying workers to their sponsors was its central objectionable aspect. Sponsors at times surrendered confiscated workers' passports to the authorities. They could pretend that workers ran away so as to avoid payments or to bargain over their amounts. Change of contracts or of employment conditions and disputes over wages were common. Some cases of migrant workers recruited for employment in Qatar were expressive of the problematic employment situation in Egypt and indicative of the challenges for the state in performing its protection function.³⁰ In Egypt, there is a ban on external employment in 24 occupations. The ban is meant to protect especially female workers from abuse. Among them are occupations of house managers and private nurses. However, unable to obtain the necessary approvals and permits, female workers, facing unemployment or low-income issues, are tempted to travel to a country for which they do not need visas, such as Jordan, and from there to fly to their final destinations. Workers take the risk of abuse under the pressure of need.

In Libya, before state collapse, problems were multiple. In the 1970s, on occasion of a political rift with Egypt, hundreds of thousands of Egyptian workers were expelled. In April 1977, upon deportation orders issued by the Libyan government, the Governorate of Marsa Matrouh, bordering on Libya, received thousands of returnees. Then again, in 1985, due to severe economic problems explained by a drop in oil prices, Libya disposed of large foreign worker population, including an estimated 20,000–100,000 Egyptians.³¹ One very specific issue in migration to

³⁰This chapter does not address the changes introduced in the *kafala* system in Qatar in 2017–18.

³¹Tsourapas, Gerasimos (2015).

Libya is geographical contiguity. Unlike other countries of destination, Egyptian workers can just walk into Libyan territory, irregularly avoiding official border posts. The press regularly reports tragedies of workers abandoned in the desert, at times to death, by smugglers.³² Tribal and kinship relations between inhabitants on both sides of the border compound the difficulty for states to bring migration flows under control. Unemployment and employment in the informal economy thus result from irregular access to Libya. The vast surface of Libya and its borders, equally porous, with countries to its west, south and east, are at the origin of excess labour supply, which exerts pressures on wages and labour conditions. This puts at a disadvantage all migrant workers, including Egyptians. Low wages and unbalanced employment relations are characteristic of the Libyan labour market. They are at the origin of complaints and problems. Non-respect of the terms of employment contracts, for formally employed workers, is not a rare occurrence. Examples of collusion between employers and officials responsible for dispute settlement also exist in Libya. In addition, Libya's porous borders make it a transit country for workers seeking to reach Italy. Organized crime gangs from Egypt, Libya and Italy, working together, seize the opportunity to smuggle Egyptians wishing to transit through Libya on their way to Europe.

It is not only in Libya that the political considerations affect Egyptian labour migration to the Arab Middle East. Examples have already been pointed out. In the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Egyptian migrant workers returned to Egypt in urgency when Iraq invaded Kuwait. When Iraq was bombarded and forced to evacuate Kuwait and later as sanctions were imposed on it during the decade, other hundreds of thousands to over a million Egyptian migrant workers returned to Egypt. After 2011, the breakdown of public order, collapse of the state, economic failure, fragmented territory and generalized civil strife in Libya have resulted in violence committed against Egyptian migrant workers and the return of hundreds of thousands from among them to Egypt. At a time of economic slowdown of its own, this massive return exercised additional pressure on the domestic economy and labour market.

³² See, for example, "Rescue of 48 Egyptian migrants in the Libyan Desert and the deportation of another 37", *Al Abram*, 03.11.2013, page 1. The smuggler and informal broker charged each worker EGP 7000, equivalent to a little under US\$1000 at that time.

BENEFITS OF MIGRATION TO THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

The rapid review in the section “The Performance of the Egyptian Labour Market” has revealed that no improvement has taken place in the last 40 years of labour migration in the labour market situation and in terms and conditions of employment in Egypt. The benefits of migration have accrued to individual migrant workers themselves and to their families, despite the issues they face in their countries of employment. These benefits take two forms. First, during their migration experiences, workers acquire skills that are beneficial to them on their return to the Egyptian labour market. Second, savings, whether as financial remittances or money brought back on return, contribute to meeting their needs and those of their families, to improving their human capital and to reducing their own poverty. At times of economic hardship, migrants also tend to increase financial flows to family members in home countries.³³ Remittances also contribute to sustaining balances on current account. In Egypt’s case, this is important given the chronic deficit in its balance of trade.

Details regarding the use of remittances will be addressed later in the chapter. There are two main arguments as to how remittances affect poverty reduction. Approximately 75 per cent of remittances are used by recipient households for general consumption, which has both direct and indirect effects. First, a good part of the money is spent on health and education, which improves human capital. Second, consumption generates demand for goods and services, which activates production and creates demand for labour.³⁴

PERFORMANCE OF RETURNEES IN THE EGYPTIAN LABOUR MARKET

Egyptian return migrants were estimated to be 5 per cent of the population in the year 2012.³⁵ Returnees have higher educational attainment than non-migrants. They also often occupied more positions as employers, entrepreneurs, managers, technical/scientific and clerical staff. Non-migrants tended to be more prevalent in agriculture, manufacturing and

³³Chimhowu et al. (2005).

³⁴See Chimhowu et al. (2005).

³⁵Wahba (2014).

construction. Among returnees, 21.5 per cent were employers as opposed to 12.1 per cent for non-migrants.³⁶

In 2012, in all, 40 per cent of returnees were working in jobs that required skills compared to 37 per cent for non-migrants.³⁷ The higher educational attainment and skill and occupational levels of returnees cannot only be explained by the selectivity of migration at departure. Research has shown that working abroad enabled migrants to acquire new skills and accumulate human capital. Among returnees, 56 per cent tended to experience an upgrade in occupations compared to their pre-migration jobs.³⁸ The skills they acquired and the capital they accumulated during their migration experiences also allowed them to become self-employed or to be involved in entrepreneurial activities. They were less likely to resume employment as waged workers or to join the informal labour market.

A wage premium also exists for returnees. Acknowledging the methodological difficulties of comparing wages of returnees and non-migrants, which are due to change in employment status and in other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, Wahba estimated, in 2015, the real wage premium at 16 per cent³⁹ using data from the 2006 Egyptian Labour Market Survey.

EVOLUTION, SOURCES AND SHARE OF REMITTANCES IN GDP

Over the last four decades, remittance flows have been a major source of foreign currency for Egypt. They have been steady and reliable, at a time other sources were affected by economic cycles and political upheavals.

Egypt has consistently ranked among the top 10 remittance-receiving countries in the developing world. It ranked fifth in 2001, sixth in 2012 according to the World Bank Development Indicators of 2013⁴⁰ and seventh in 2014 according to the World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016.⁴¹ Between the late 2000s and the mid-2010s, Egypt's remittance inflows increased by approximately sixfold, making it the top

³⁶ Wahba (2008).

³⁷ Wahba (2014).

³⁸ Wahba (2015).

³⁹ Wahba (2015).

⁴⁰ Wahba (2014).

⁴¹ World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook (2016).

recipient in the region, followed by Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia, and receiving over 40 per cent of all remittances to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).⁴²

Taking a long-term perspective, remittance flows to Egypt have been on a steady upward trend. According to the World Bank remittances database in 1980, Egypt received US\$2.7 billion. This amount increased to US\$4.3 billion by 1990. The remittance inflows experienced a drop in 2000 to US\$2.9 billion, only to rise dramatically to US\$12.5 billion in 2010. They increased even more dramatically in the following three years, reaching US\$17.8 billion by 2013, and further to US\$19.6 billion in 2014 and 19.98 billion in 2017. In 2013, remittances represented 6.6 per cent of Egypt's total GDP⁴³ and increased to 9.57 per cent in 2017.⁴⁴ In 2012, 60 per cent of remittances were made through formal banking systems as opposed to 22 per cent in 2006. Better recording of the transfers could partly explain the notable increase in remittances.⁴⁵

The geographical distribution of Egyptian migrant workers can be gleaned from the volumes of remittances the country receives. In other words, sources of remittances are a clear indication of the concentration of Egyptian migrant workers and of their insertion in the labour markets of their respective locations.⁴⁶ Incoming remittances from the GCC in 2014 amounted US\$14.2 billion, representing 72.6 per cent of the total US\$19.6 billion.⁴⁷ This is expressive of the importance of GCC labour markets for Egyptian labour. Table 3.6 shows the amount of expatriate remittances to Egypt by country of origin between 2001 and 2009.

In 2014, Egypt received US\$7.6 billion from Saudi Arabia, followed by US\$3.2 billion from Kuwait and US\$1.9 billion from the UAE. The fourth largest country of origin and the first non-GCC Arab state was Jordan, with US\$1.3 billion. This order remained the same in 2017, with Egypt receiving US\$7.7 billion from Saudi Arabia, followed by US\$3.2 from Kuwait and US\$1.95 billion from the UAE. US\$1.3 billion was

⁴² Wahba (2014).

⁴³ World Bank Remittances Database (2010–2014).

⁴⁴ World Bank Development Indicators (2017).

⁴⁵ Wahba (2014).

⁴⁶ El-Sakka (2010).

⁴⁷ Author's calculations based on World Bank Remittances Database.

Table 3.6 Expatriate remittance estimates by country of origin 2010–2017

<i>Country</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>2017</i>
Bahrain	324	356	335	303	364
Jordan	1168	1285	1196	1074	1293
UAE	1670	1837	1774	1622	1953
Kuwait	2920	3211	2920	2620	3156
Lebanon	455	500	465	411	495
Libya	95	104	92	84	101
Oman	218	240	210	190	228
Qatar	939	1033	997	889	1070
Saudi Arabia	6887	7573	7076	6425	7739

Source: World Bank remittances database (2010–2017)

received from Jordan.⁴⁸ Table 3.6 shows the top remittance-sending Arab countries in 2014 according to World Bank statistics.⁴⁹

Relative to GDP, remittances represented a sizeable share in the early 1990s, reaching 14.6 per cent in 1992. Even if in absolute terms remittances grew considerably, as a proportion of GDP, they noticeably fell over the following two decades. In 2009 and 2010, they amounted to a mere 3.8 per cent and 5.7 per cent of GDP. But they picked up to 7.3 per cent and 6.8 per cent in 2012 and 2014, respectively, as other sources of domestic product, such as tourism, collapsed under the effects of the political events and slowing domestic economic activity of those years. Between 2016 and 2017, the GDP from remittances jumped from 5.5 per cent to 9.57 per cent.⁵⁰ Table 3.7 shows the evolution of remittances as a percentage of the GDP in Egypt over the past 20 years.⁵¹

USE OF REMITTANCES AND SAVINGS BY FAMILIES OF MIGRANT WORKERS

Remittances can be considered a safety net for recipient families. Two main theories attempt to explain the motivation to send remittances. In a risk-sharing theory, the migrant and the family at home benefit

⁴⁸ World Bank Bilateral Remittances Database (2017).

⁴⁹ World Bank Remittances Database (2010–2014).

⁵⁰ World Bank Development Indicators (2017).

⁵¹ See annex G.

Table 3.7 Expatriate remittances as a percentage of GDP

<i>Year</i>	<i>Remittance as percentage of GDP</i>
1990	9.9
1991	11.0
1992	14.6
1993	12.0
1994	7.1
1995	5.4
1996	4.6
1997	4.9
1998	4.1
1999	3.6
2000	2.9
2001	2.9
2002	3.3
2003	3.6
2004	4.2
2005	5.6
2006	5.0
2007	5.9
2008	5.3
2009	3.8
2010	5.7
2011	6.1
2012	7.3
2013	6.6
2014	6.8
2015	5.5
2016	5.6
2017	9.6

Source: World Bank development indicators

from remittances. For the family, remittances are a safety net; for the migrant, they are an investment that she/he can rely upon should the need arise. However, studies have shown that sending remittances is also based on human bonds, and is not only a simple economic transaction. Therefore, the second theory posits that sending remittances is out of commitment to the family and the household. It is done altruistically, making the migrant part of a “spatially extended household”. In

this theory, the recipients are free to spend the money as they feel necessary.⁵² In the real world, it can be considered that a mix of the two theories explains the remittances sent back by migrant workers to their families.

Remittances represent the largest source of non-labour income for households in Egypt.⁵³ Recipients use them for household expenses such as daily food and consumables, which contribute to reducing or alleviating poverty. Families receiving remittances contribute to their own human development, as they are more likely to send their children to school rather than have them engaged in child labour.⁵⁴ Recipients of remittances are also likely to spend them on health care, food and general well-being, which also contribute to the development of human capital. In 2010, about 75 per cent of remittances were spent on daily household needs.⁵⁵ This is fairly consistent with findings of international surveys that showed that consumption and welfare use about 80 per cent of the inflows, with only 20 per cent being invested in land, housing and productive projects.⁵⁶ Remittances also helped families start small businesses such as mini markets, buying cattle or cars to use as taxis with a view to generating income.⁵⁷

Figures released in January 2016 (Table 3.8) on the use of money brought back by returnees confirmed the allocation of funds by most migrants to consumptions purposes. When it was carried out in 2013, the Egyptian International Migration Survey 2013 (Egypt-HIMS 2013) brought out that 87.3 per cent of returnees from Arab countries used their savings in meeting daily needs such as buying food and/or clothing for the family. But the survey findings also showed that between investments and acquisition or improvement of factors of production, such as land and human capital, upgraded through education and health care, 89.4 per cent of remittance recipients spent money on improving their future prospects and those of their families.⁵⁸

⁵² Chimhowu et al. (2005).

⁵³ Wahba (2014).

⁵⁴ Wahba (2010).

⁵⁵ IOM (2010).

⁵⁶ Chimhowu et al. (2005).

⁵⁷ IOM (2010).

⁵⁸ CAPMAS (2016).

Table 3.8 Uses of remittances

<i>Items</i>	<i>Last destination</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>Arab region</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>North America</i>	<i>Other countries</i>	
Meeting daily needs: buy food and/or clothing for family	87.3	80.7	70.9	81.9	86.8
Buy other household goods	41.4	47.0	56.6	32.4	41.6
Pay for schooling/vocational training of household members	34.7	37.7	71.0	44.0	35.2
Pay off medical bills	29.8	29.6	24.2	31.4	29.8
Pay off debt	22.4	22.4	8.0	14.3	22.1
Buy apartment/house construction	23.6	28.8	37.9	34.8	24.2
Improve house	13.6	13.9	0.0	19.1	13.6
Pay for wedding, funeral or other social function	3.3	10.0	0.0	0.0	3.5
Buy land	2.1	3.2	0.0	0.0	2.1
Rent more land	2.9	1.9	0.0	4.1	2.8
Improve land	2.6	3.1	0.0	0.0	2.6
Buy farm inputs/implements	5.2	8.7	11.3	14.2	5.3
Invest in non-farm business	3.4	8.0	4.7	3.1	3.7
Financial investment, savings	11.6	19.1	19.9	14.7	12.0
Save money (bank/post office)	11.1	19.3	32.4	27.1	11.9
Other	6.1	8.2	0.0	3.1	6.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Number	3292	96	13	25	3477

Source: Egypt International Migration Survey, 2013 (Egypt-HIMS [2013](#))

CONCLUSIONS

The Arab Middle East has absorbed the largest part by far of Egyptian labour migration in the last four decades, and still do. Therefore, it is this labour migration that has to be taken into account when assessing the consequences for Egypt of the movement of its workers to external labour markets. Labour migration to the Arab Middle East has relieved pressures on the Egyptian labour market but has not contributed to solving the employment question the country has been facing. This problem persists in its entirety. Shortage of employment opportunities and poor job quality have not been redressed.

As a whole, the Egyptian economy and labour market have not been upgraded after four decades of mass labour migration. Nevertheless,

despite issues they face in their countries of employment, individual migrant workers have improved their situations and those of their families. Returnees fare better in the domestic labour market. Families of migrant workers use remittances they receive to meet livelihood needs and to develop their own human capital. In a doubtful overall picture of the consequences of migration for Egypt, these benefits should not be neglected.

Financial remittances have also shored up the Egyptian balance on current account that chronically suffers from the deficit in its balance of trade. The contribution of remittances has been particularly important in alleviating the effects of the slowdown in economic activity and other consequences of the political instability the country has experienced in the first half of the years 2010s.

The Egyptian state has yet to formulate and implement policies that place labour migration to the Arab Middle East and elsewhere at the service of development while also protecting migrant workers. It bears underlining, however, that labour migration alone cannot defuse the questions of employment and development in Egypt.

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Vagaries in the Management of Migrant Domestic Workers from the Philippines: A Case Study from Lebanon

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INTRODUCTION

As of December 2013, the number of Filipinos working and living abroad was over 10 million. Non-official estimates suggest 15 million (Reyes and Torres 2015). Of these, 48 per cent were permanent emigrants, 41 per cent temporary and 11 per cent classified as irregular. Around 60 per cent were female and around 50 per cent in the age group of 25–34 years. In 2014, known remittances of Filipino migrant workers was around US\$28 billion, constituting 10 per cent of GDP. By comparison, the number of migrant workers in Lebanon, over 90 per cent female, has been relatively small—estimated at around 30,000 since the late 1990s. According to the Commission of Filipinos Overseas (2014), in December 2013, there were 1573 permanent, 24,640 temporary and 2900 irregular nationals in Lebanon.

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Middle East countries comprise the second largest source of personal remittances and cash remittances (though bank transfers) from Filipinos working abroad. In 2014, around US\$5.3 billion was remitted from the Middle East compared with US\$11.1 billion from the USA and US\$3.7 billion from Europe (Bangko Sentralng Pilipinas 2015).

In 2012–2013, the official number of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon was 255,813, the largest number from Ethiopia (119,640; 47 per cent), Bangladesh (56,508; 22 per cent), Philippines (42,056; 16 per cent), Sri Lanka (18,101; 7 per cent), Nepal (8663; 3 per cent) and Africa (10,845; 4 per cent) (ILO 2016). The demand for domestic workers to live in with Lebanese families and perform most of the household duties and care for children has always existed in the middle and upper classes. Prior to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), Lebanese households employed Lebanese women and girls from needy rural families as well as Syrians and Palestinians (Jureidini 2009). Traditionally, maids (*khadima*) could be from 10 years of age and remain in the household until it was time to be married. The father of the maid might return annually to collect her wages (Jureidini 2009: 83).

Following the civil war and throughout the 1990s, Lebanon allowed the entry of large numbers of female domestic workers, primarily from Sri Lanka, but also from the Philippines, Ethiopia and, to a much lesser extent, African francophone countries. In contrast to the Gulf states, the attraction of Asian female domestic maids in Lebanon was due to the aftermath of the sectarian conflict that created a distrustful reluctance to employ anyone from different Muslim sects, as well as Syrians and Palestinians. By the year 2000, the number of migrant domestic workers (MDWs) in Lebanon was estimated to be around 150,000, mostly Sri Lankans, with around 20,000 from the Philippines (Jureidini 2014a). Both during and since the war, domestic work came to be seen by Lebanese women as degrading and unacceptable. Indeed, as has occurred in many countries, the provision of domestic services has now become so racialized that nationals are unwilling to undertake such work that is relegated almost exclusively to foreigners.

The presence of women from the Philippines in Lebanon can be traced to nursing services from the late 1980s, most of who were trained by Sister Amelia, a nun from the Roman Catholic “Daughters of Charity” who arrived in 1987 and was instrumental along with Jesuits, Bishop Paul Bassim and Father Martin McDermott, in establishing the first

NGO to cater to the needs of MDWs, the Afro-Asian Migrant Center (AAMC). The Catholic international aid agency, Caritas, later established the Caritas Migrant Center that is now the largest organization assisting MDWs in distress, with full-time lawyers, mobile medical clinics, a safe house and access to prisons and detention centres. In the past decade or so, other local NGOs have been funded to assist MDWs, including Kafa (enough violence), Insan Association, Amel Association, Nassawiya, Dar El Amal and, more recently, the Migrant Workers' Task Force, largely run by domestic workers themselves and local volunteer activists. The International Labour Organization also has been very active in funding research and activating a ministerial committee to draft legislation specifically for the protection of domestic workers. All of these organizations, as well as Human Rights Watch, have been actively involved in human rights awareness-raising campaigns for domestic workers, including public demonstrations and rallies. The Ministry of Labour has generally been cautiously sympathetic and, in June 2015, announced the establishment of a hotline for abused domestic workers. However, over the past 15 years or so, attempts at legislative reform for domestic workers in Lebanon have been wholly unsuccessful (Human Rights Watch 2015).

Similar to the Gulf states, migrant domestic workers in Lebanon are excluded from the protections of the local labour law (Article 7). In Egypt, the exclusion of domestic workers from the labour law makes it explicit that the relationship of the domestic worker and employer in the household is to be recognized as a "personal" relationship, where the employing family needs protection from the domestic worker because she is privy to the secrets of the family. Thus, the sponsorship system for migrant domestic workers, known generally as the *Kafala* system, does not allow domestic workers to change employers without the permission of her employer/sponsor, or *kafeel*. If a domestic worker leaves her employer because of abuse or some breach of contract, she is considered to be an illegal resident because of a 1964 decree that foreign workers cannot change their type of work (and by inference, change employers) without the employer's permission (Saghieh, in Kostrz 2015).

Hierarchically, Filipina domestic workers have developed a reputation as being the most revered of all other nationalities engaged in domestic work, largely because of their higher levels of education and their command over English as the intermediary language of communication in the

Middle East. A 2006 survey of around 600 migrant domestic workers in Lebanon showed 44 per cent of those from the Philippines with a university degree and 45 per cent having completed secondary school (Jureidini 2014a). A more recent 2014 survey of 1541 MDWs in Lebanon similarly showed Filipinas to have the highest level of education of all other migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, 29 per cent with university degrees and 49 per cent having completed high school (ILO 2016). The 2014 study also showed that 63 per cent had jobs in the Philippines before leaving for Lebanon, indicating lower salaries for highly skilled women in the Philippines than domestic worker salaries in Lebanon. The average salary of Filipinas (US\$260) is higher than any other nationality for MDWs. With an average age of 29 years, around 55 per cent are married with dependent children and are there primarily to support their families back home.

From 1955 to 1996, the Philippines government was represented in Lebanon by a series of five local honorary consuls. In 1996, the Republic of the Philippines opened an embassy and consulate in Beirut. In 2000, a resident Labour Attaché, who heads the Philippine Overseas Labour Office (POLO), was assigned to Lebanon. The POLO office also housed the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) that included a training centre to upgrade the skills of overseas Filipinos. Both of these were established through the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) within the government's Department of Labour and Employment. The embassy has played an important and stressful role in its attempts to assist its nationals in Lebanon, while maintaining positive diplomatic relations. It established a safe house for abused Filipina domestic workers and for those seeking repatriation without their passports (routinely held by employers).

The human and labour rights issues pertaining to MDWs in Lebanon have been adequately documented and analysed elsewhere by this author and others (see Abu-Habib 1998; Young 1999; Jureidini 2003, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2014a; Moors et al. 2009). In this chapter, I will focus more upon the role of the government of the Philippines in regulating the deployment of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), the recruitment of MDWs in the Philippines and a case study of the deaths of four domestic workers from the Philippines in 2004 that involved the Philippines embassy in Beirut.

MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

It might be noted that the Philippines government takes a particularly entrepreneurial approach to the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), as the country relies heavily upon their annual remittances, as shown above. Thus, globalization and the business of migrant labour exports are significant for the Philippines as a part of its economic development strategy (Parrenas 2001). The institutionalization of migration began with the Labour Code of the Philippines under the Marcos government in 1974 in the context of the oil price crisis, low economic development, political instability, high population growth, high unemployment and low wages (Asis 2006). The Overseas Employment Development Board and the National Seamen Board that were housed within the Ministry of Labour and Employment developed the POEA, which is now the government agency responsible for “processing workers’ contracts and pre-deployment checks, as well as for licensing, regulating, and monitoring private recruitment agencies” (Asis 2006).

Some years prior to the POEA, it was largely recognized that recruitment agencies in the Philippines and in the destination countries were largely responsible for the vulnerabilities of migrant workers, particularly women deployed as domestic workers. They charged exorbitant fees, engaged in contract substitution (see later in the chapter) and placed workers in risky working and living conditions with non-payment or delayed wages. In 1995, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (also known as Republic Act or RA8042) “was passed to provide a legislative framework for protecting overseas Filipino workers. Among other provisions, it promised direct assistance to workers abroad, penalties for illegal recruiters, legal assistance, reintegration services and the establishment of resources centers in countries of destination” (Asis 2006). The watershed for the legislation was the nationwide expressions of anger in 1995 over Flor Contemplación, a domestic worker in Singapore who was executed. She was convicted of murdering the child in her care as well as another Filipina domestic worker, but many believed she was innocent (Asis 2006).

In the late 1980s, in an effort to encourage labour emigration, the government created a nationalistic branding or label for workers going abroad—*mgabagongbayani*—“the new heroes”, sometimes referred to as “modern-day heroes” which is in contrast to the common critical reference to migrant labour, particularly in the Arab states of the Middle East,

namely, “modern-day slavery” (see Gibson et al. 2010). On an annual basis, the Bagong Bayani Foundation Incorporated (BBFI), in coordination with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), receives nominations for Bagong Bayani Awards. The awards are given to the country’s outstanding and exemplary Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), that “pay tribute to our OFWs for their significant efforts in fostering goodwill among peoples of the world, enhancing and promoting the image of the Filipino as a competent, responsible and dignified worker, and for greatly contributing to the socio-economic development of their communities and our country as a whole” (POEA, <http://www.poea.gov.ph/> Last accessed 23/05/2016).

In further efforts to prepare outgoing migrant workers, the Philippines government requires them to undertake a training and orientation programme under the auspices of TESDA (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority). These are often conducted in crowded spaces, and special attention is given to not only cleaning and tidying, but also to table setting and cooking, using spices typically found in Arabic cuisine. Pamphlets on rights and obligations as well as advice about remittances and household financial management that can include spouses of the migrant workers are given during these seminars.

Another entrepreneurial move was to establish in Beirut, as elsewhere, a training centre to assist in skills development and skills upgrading for their nationals in Lebanon on the assumption that adding human capital value within a neoliberal economic environment will increase foreign currency earnings back home. Towards the end of 2004, the Philippines embassy in Lebanon issued an Employer’s Handbook that was developed in consultation with government officials and NGOs interested in the welfare of migrant domestic workers. The Handbook was designed to impress upon Lebanese employers that they have certain obligations towards domestic employees; it details their needs, albeit in carefully worded terms, to impress upon employers that if they treat the Overseas Filipino Worker well, they will be rewarded with higher productivity. While a worthy exercise, the Handbook does, however, read more like an instruction booklet for a new household appliance, concluding the first section with: “The embassy wishes you a pleasant and happy relationship with your Overseas Filipino Worker”.

2006 ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON

In July–August 2006, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon significantly reduced the number of MDWs, particularly the number of Sri Lankans, but also Filipinas. There is some confusion regarding the evacuation of Filipinas from Lebanon during that time. On the one hand, the European Union (EU) gave an immediate grant to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) of some US\$11 million to evacuate foreigners from non-developed states back to their home countries (at least partly to prevent them from seeking safety in Europe). As the more developed countries provided their own evacuation plans that included many ships, including war ships clambering into the port of Beirut to collect their nationals, it was assumed that countries like Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and the Philippines were unable to do so. The IOM partnered with the Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center that arranged travel documents and hired buses to take them to Damascus, where they took IOM chartered flights to Colombo, Addis Ababa and Manila (see Jureidini 2011).

On the other hand, it was reported that the Philippines government under President Arroyo had also allocated US\$11 million budget for the evacuation of its nationals (Romero 2006). It is not clear if this was the same money given to the IOM or was it an additional amount for Filipinos. The government acknowledged using IOM chartered flights. Perhaps they reimbursed them for the repatriation of between 5000–7000 Philippine nationals out of a total of the 30,000 at that time. Some 2000 were working in Southern Lebanon, the main target area against Hezbollah. In reality, the initial response of the Philippines government was to do nothing, because it did not want to develop any tension with the US government that was supporting the Israeli invasion.

For weeks, the Philippine government, despite mounting concerns from workers' relatives and families, refused to issue an evacuation order. The administration insisted that Filipinos were not at risk in most of the country. On July 23, Vice President Noli de Castro declared that Israeli "specific precision bombings" meant civilians were not in imminent danger. (Pastrana 2006)

A few weeks after the invasion, an explicit directive was made for all Filipino nationals to evacuate, but the vast majority either chose to remain, or were not given permission from their employers to leave, despite appeals

to the Lebanese government. Out of 30,000, only around 7000 were evacuated (Pastrana 2006; Aning 2008). Caritas, again in association with the IOM and the Philippines embassy in Beirut, arranged the evacuation of over 300 Filipina domestic workers from Syria, who became refugees during the civil war, to Lebanon (Caritas 2013).

A subsequent ban on Lebanon was issued by the Philippines government in 2006 because of the conflict, but exempted domestic workers who had left and wanted to return to their same employer. Also in 2006, the Philippines government passed legislation that required all Filipina domestic workers to obtain contracts with a minimum of US\$400 per month and a maximum of 2 years' timeframe. This stipulation came after many years of "problems" their embassies had to face with cases of abuse, non-payment of salaries, excessive working hours and restrictions on freedom of movement. The minimum wage was designed in fact to reduce the market demand for Filipina workers in the Middle East. Of course, such restrictions, including bans on deploying workers to certain countries, created a moral hazard in that workers who were determined to travel to those countries found irregular means to be deployed, mostly with the assistance of recruitment agents who found the business lucrative. Thus, the practice of travelling to non-banned countries in transit, such as Dubai and then to Lebanon, increased the vulnerability of domestic workers, because they could be trafficked to countries other than their planned destination and subject to poorer working conditions and salary and possibly forced into prostitution.

In November 2011, the Philippines government announced a ban on deploying the Philippines nationals to 41 countries, including Lebanon, arguing that these countries had failed to pass certification standards set by the amended Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and also because of the ongoing incidents of abuse. The ban, however, was rescinded only two days later, and the following month, the ban on Lebanon that had been in place since the Israeli invasion of 2006 was officially lifted.

RECRUITMENT AND SUBSTITUTE CONTRACTS

There are over 1000 government-licensed recruitment (land-based) and manning (for seafarers) agencies in the Philippines and an unknown number of unlicensed agents (Asis 2006). In Lebanon, there are over 600 licensed agencies, although not all are active with official offices, and around 200 illegal agencies (Kostrz 2015).

The deployment of Filipina domestic workers requires both a recruitment agency in the Philippines and a placement agency in the country of destination in order for there to be an official focal point outside the employer's household. The employer is required to pay recruitment costs. Although agencies are forbidden from charging prospective domestic workers, the 2006 survey of domestic workers in Lebanon showed 66 per cent of interviewees paid their recruitment agency in Manila, with 26 per cent paying both the Philippines and Lebanese agencies (Jureidini 2014a).

In an interview with an agency in the Philippines in 2012 (by this author), it was widely publicized on the premises that everything was free, and included the promise that the agency will even pay the cost of procuring their passports. During the discussions, however, it was pointed out that the government's requirement of a contract for a minimum US\$400 monthly salary was merely a bureaucratic hurdle that agencies and the workers themselves could circumvent. If no payment is made to the home country agency, arrangements would be made with the employer and the placement agency in Lebanon to deduct up to the first three months' salary for reimbursement, despite the employer also paying the costs. The practice quickly became a standard expectation that workers themselves, once in Lebanon and in the employer's house, could do nothing about. As another agent in Manila explained:

I cannot tell my client that the worker cannot deploy because of money, so I will arrange to take care of the problem here, not to burden them. But they can help me to collect the money. Even the workers will be happy to have their salaries deducted for those costs. They are eager to work. The problem is only the money. So, there is a visa and the company is waiting for the worker, so I will not let them travel because of money? No, I will let them travel. (Jureidini 2014b: 35)

In an interview with another recruitment agent in Manila in 2012, it was explained:

She draws up a replacement (or substitute) contract, or agreement, to replace the mandatory contract that specifies a minimum of \$400 per month for domestic workers. She explained: 'in order not to deceive them, I tell them that their employer is not prepared to pay the \$400, but only \$270. So sign here.' She does not give them a copy of this contract, because it is illegal and she would be liable to prosecution. (Jureidini 2014b: 42, fn121)

Recruitment agents are careful not to provide evidence of contract substitution, or recruitment charges foisted on domestic workers. Thus, it is notoriously difficult to procure documentary proof for prosecution. However, on 25 October 2013, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) did have evidence of contract substitution by the agency, Allskills Manpower Services, in the deployment of seven Filipina nurses to Saudi Arabia. “One contract was used for processing their exit clearance at the POEA, but they were given another grossly disadvantageous substitute contract on arrival in Saudi Arabia. Items in the first contract such as salary, transportation allowance, food allowance, and lodging were either reduced or totally omitted in the new contract” (POEA 2013). The agency’s licence was subsequently cancelled, and it was also forced to give a refund to the women for the recruitment charges that the agency had foisted upon them. “These all violated the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers” (Jureidini 2014b: 89).

In the Philippines, the Labour Code of the Philippines Presidential Decree No. 442, Art. 109, on “Solidary Liability” stipulates that, where a migrant worker does not receive the wages they were promised, such as through practices of contract substitution, the recruitment agency can be charged for the income lost and have its licence suspended or revoked. This means that the onus is on the Philippines recruitment agent to ensure the bona fides of the employer in the destination country (Lawyers Beyond Borders 2011). Thus, substitute contracts are usually kept under lock and key. In the above case, workers were inadvertently provided with a copy of the substitute contract in Saudi Arabia leading to the prosecution of the agent (Jureidini 2014b).

AGENCY: FREELANCE WORK AND UNIONIZATION

Because of their ability to speak English and higher levels of education, Filipina domestic workers command higher recruitment charges to employers in Lebanon. However, over the past decade or so, many Filipina women contract to work as domestic workers, but plan to leave after a short time to go freelance. There is a demand by hotels, restaurants and other places for their services as undocumented workers. If their papers are regularized, the workers will be required to pay the annual visa and work permit costs, and they will most likely have to pay for their airfare home when they decide to return. Interviews with a number of Filipinas in

Beirut suggest that in the end, while the salaries may be higher (US\$600–800), their costs (food, clothing, accommodation, residency and work visas, etc.) may mean they are not making a particularly high net financial gain, but they do have much larger freedom and leisure time. Those working in restaurants (particularly Chinese and Japanese) and bars do work late hours. “Lebanese businessmen consider them to be hard-working and honest. Some female OFWs have also married their Lebanese boyfriends to remain as permanent residents” (Aning 2008).

Freelance workers are of three types: those who have entered the country with a nominal sponsor who allows them to continue freelancing by signing their renewal papers annually; those who have completed their contracts and changed to nominal sponsors, enabling them to work freely; and those who are former live-ins, but who at some stage have run away from their original sponsors and are freelancing illegally. Freelancers (as well as some live-ins) rent rooms either alone or in shared accommodation and work on hourly basis (around \$4 per hour) for different employers. They have the freedom to withdraw their services when they wish. Some Lebanese have taken advantage of this, charging up to US\$1200 to act as sponsor for an MDW. There have been a number of cases where this sponsorship money has been taken, but no papers were arranged and the passport was not returned. In such cases, the domestic worker is usually too frightened to go to the police because of her illegal status and the risk of arrest and deportation. Thus, many remain and work as best as they can for many years, until they hand themselves in to the authorities, pay the required fines and be deported.

It is not known how many freelance domestic workers live and work in Lebanon. Over the years, however, they have been increasingly visible in the public sphere (Moors et al. 2009). Those who are allowed free time off as well as freelancers are most often seen on Sundays, the traditional day of rest and prayer. Live-in workers may have the full-day off or just a few hours to attend church services. It is a day also for shopping at low-price stores and eating at cafés and restaurants they can afford. Telephone shops are also frequented for cheap calls to their families at home. Dowra, in the Armenian quarter, just outside of central Beirut, is particularly popular with MDWs and has restaurants, with Philippines, Sri Lankan and Ethiopian cuisines, as well as hairdressing salons and cafés that cater to MDWs.

Sunday is also the day when informal meetings may take place before and after church services at St Francis Catholic Church in Hamra Street—the one where most Filipinas congregate and where they have established

a flea market at the back to buy and sell second hand goods. These are opportunities for contact with other Philippines nationals and for community development. There have been a number of attempts to organize Filipinas in Lebanon, but they have not been sustainable because of the isolation of most live-in MDWs most of the week. However, most Filipinas are technology-savvy, with both smart phones and the internet. Indeed, a Facebook page “Filipina Women in Lebanon” began sometime in 2010, but entries ceased in December 2013. Most of the entries in 2012–2013 were warnings of sexual relations in Lebanon (with rather smutty remarks and comments), information about the repatriation of over 2000 Filipinos due to conflict in Syria and assistance for “calamity victims” from the Philippines Urban Development Coordinating Council’s Home Development Mutual Fund.

The most recent action in Lebanon was the introduction in January 2015 of a union for migrant domestic workers. From an International Labour Organization (ILO) initiative in 2011, under the Action Program for Protecting the Rights of Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Lebanon (PROWD), the discussions and consultations towards a union was developed in 2012 with the Participative Action Research (PAR) group, including the National Federation of Employees and Workers Unions in Lebanon (FENASOL). By mid-2015, FENASOL claimed to have around 350 members, mainly women from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and Nepal. However, the Lebanese authorities have denied the application for registration. Despite its illegality, there is a determination to continue their activities (see Kostrz [2015](#)).

CASE STUDY: FILIPINA DEATHS IN 2004

A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report in 2008 revealed that between January 2007 and August 2008, around 98 MDWs died in Lebanon. In all, 40 were classified as suicides and 24 were described as having fallen from apartment buildings while trying to escape their employers. A total of 14 died from diseases and other health issues, 18 were killed in car accidents or suffocation from carbon monoxide poisoning from improper heating and two were murdered (Human rights Watch [2010](#)). HRW estimated that at least one MDW was dying each week in Lebanon. What follows is an exposé of four deaths of domestic workers from the Philippines in 2004, the involvement of the Philippines embassy in Beirut and the Philippines government’s response.

It is not clear how many female domestic workers left the Philippines illegally in 2003 to other countries, but it is curious that three of these suffered tragic fates in Lebanon, early in 2004. None of these deaths were adequately resolved, although inquiries by officials of the Philippines have been conducted into at least two of them. Officials at the embassy noted that in 2003, there was an increase of maids not sufficiently fluent in English, and when they encountered problems, their first response was to try to leave. The embassy view was that more skilled workers with English proficiency are more likely to be “less emotional, more tolerant and non-confrontative”. They advised workers to overlook the verbal abuse, including shouting which is considered as a cultural norm in Lebanon.

In the first half of 2004, three Filipina domestic workers fell to their deaths, allegedly while attempting to escape from the high-rise apartments in which they were working—on 24 February, Louela Susan Montenegro, on 4 May, Catherine Bautista (22 years) and on 16 May, Luz Paraz Bacuan (“Liza”).

On 24 August 2004, Hera Olandres also died in a similar manner, but this fourth case was not reported at all in the Lebanese media, presumably because of the prior sexual abuse of the victim. The *Manila Times* reported that she “jumped to her death [from the 6th floor of an apartment building] after she was allegedly raped and sodomized by an owner of a Lebanese agency in Beirut” (Corpuz 2004). In fact, there was no doubt about the assault: “Postmortem medical examinations revealed that the deceased showed vaginal and anal lacerations and other bodily injuries consistent with sexual assault” (Corpuz 2004). Although the police had taken into custody the husband of the recruitment agency and their 15-year-old son, they were released soon afterwards. The inquiry into the case was never resolved, and no charges were laid.

The Philippines media published accusations of negligence against officials at the embassy in Beirut for not protecting the three workers. The labour organization, Migrante International (Philippines), referred to the incidents as a “spate of ‘murders’...[as]...it’s likely they were driven to their deaths by very abusive employers” (www.december18.net, accessed 3 March 2019; see also Rivera 2004).

The deaths were raised in the Philippines parliament and concluded with a statement by the president and a call for a team of inquiry to travel to Lebanon and report on the case. On 12 May 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo announced she would call for the “maximum penalty” for whoever was deemed responsible for Bautista’s death (Ager 2004).

The Undersecretary of Labour, Manuel Imson, also directed the POEA (Philippines Overseas Employment Agency) to investigate the recruitment agencies that had deployed the workers to Lebanon. In May 2004, Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary, Delia Albert, sent a team of inquiry to Lebanon to investigate the three deaths. There were apparent similarities in that all three had fallen from their apartments, all three had left the Philippines illegally, all three had entered Lebanon on tourist visas and the same agent recruited all three.

The circumstances surrounding the death of Catherine Bautista had particularly serious repercussions, partly because she had apparently contacted her family back home asking for money “to pay her employer so she could leave” (Rivera 2004). This is explained by the fact that Lebanese employers who hold the passports of migrant domestic workers (the vast majority) often require their employees to pay them for the return of their passports. The practice is designed to recoup some of their expenses in sponsoring a migrant worker to Lebanon and as an insurance policy against their absconding before completing their contract. As reported, her employer, Nabil Atiyeh, was demanding \$1700 as repayment for the cost he incurred to bring her to Lebanon (Sotelo-Fuertes 2004). A news report by Aning (2004) alleged that Bautista had also accused her employers of “maltreating her” and “had also reportedly expressed her concern about her personal safety to embassy officials”. The fact that she had been in direct contact with her embassy in Beirut was deemed sufficient reason to assert that embassy officials were negligent in allowing her (one report alleged that they had instructed her) to return to her employer’s house. Migrante International went as far as to accuse Philippine Ambassador Ramoncito Marino, Labour Attaché Alicia Santos and Welfare Officer Manuel Pena as having “failed to protect the three workers” (in Aning 2004), although Santos claimed she had been transferred as Labour Attaché to Rome in January 2004, prior to the three deaths.

Embassy officials relate a somewhat different story. They argued that on Friday 30 April, Catherine Bautista’s *madame* had arrived at the embassy’s Training Center near the embassy, where the Labour Attaché resided. Accompanied by Bautista, her employer told officials at the training centre that she was taking her children, separating from her husband forthwith and that she was leaving Bautista in the custody of the embassy. She instructed the embassy not to have Bautista returned to her husband as he was now alone in the house. The embassy contacted an agent with whom they had had dealings in the past and whom they thought they

could trust. They also drew up a formal document that was signed by the agent and an embassy official that under no circumstances was she to be returned to her male employer. Embassy officials cannot explain why, under those circumstances, Bautista returned to the house that weekend. It seems she did not have access to independent accommodation, nor a “safe house”; and perhaps for some reason she simply did not want to remain with the agent and preferred to return to her own room in the apartment, taking a risk that became fatal.

According to the regulations of the Philippines government, Catherine Bautista (as were the other three Filipina women noted above), was “illegal” in the sense that she had not registered as an overseas worker with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a government requirement. When Bautista’s sister, Derish, sought assistance from that department in Manila on 26 April, she was told to contact the Department of Foreign Affairs because they had no record of her (Sotelo-Fuertes 2004). It seems that they did not take the matter seriously when requested by her family to take steps to repatriate Catherine home. On 3 May, the family wired the money through Western Union, but they had “instructed Catherine to tell her employer to bring her to the Philippine Embassy before we would turn over the (money transfer’s) control number” (Sotelo-Fuertes 2004). The employer refused to take her, and her body was found the next day in a ravine below her room in the apartment, with some sheets hanging from her window.

Although the police report on the incident was swift and short, the Chief Public Prosecutor was prepared to reopen the case after requests from the Philippines government (Raad 2004). On 26 May, a team of lawyers from the Department of Foreign Affairs arrived in Lebanon and subsequently recommended the recall of the ambassador, Ramoncito Marino, who returned to Manila the next day, having served only one year of his appointment in Lebanon.

On 3 June 2004, Migrante International organized a protest rally outside the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila, questioning the independence of the department’s team sent to Lebanon to investigate the three deaths. The same day, Ambassador Marino tendered his resignation. The final report of the inquiry on the three deaths conducted by the team sent from the Philippines was not publicly released. In September 2004, Senator Manuel B. Villar made a call for a commission of inquiry into the deaths, but there is no record of such an inquiry having been carried out. In the end, all four deaths were deemed to be mysterious suicides, with no

witnesses prepared to give evidence and a lack of willingness by the Lebanese authorities to take them seriously.

At the very least, the Philippines government did take the issue seriously. In June 2000, President Arroyo appointed Reynaldo Jaylo, former taskforce head of the Drug Enforcement Agency, as director of the Presidential Taskforce Against Illegal Recruitment (PTFAIR), following complaints by women in provincial areas that the jobs they were promised in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries were not what they were promised and some had been trafficked into forced prostitution. On 21 July in Manila, PTFAIR arrested Teresa Maganda who was alleged to have trafficked all three women who had died in Lebanon earlier in the year (Balasa 2004). Five other migrant domestic workers who had brought the complaints against her were allowed to confront Maganda, saying “they were deprived of food and made to work long hours without any days off in Lebanon” (Infante 2004).

Motivated by the controversies over the deaths in 2004, two Memoranda of Understanding were signed on 10 September 2004 between the Lebanese and Philippines Foreign Affairs Ministries. The understandings related primarily to ongoing consultations on political, economic and cultural cooperation, with the view to develop bilateral relations in the future. During discussions, the issue of workers contravening the Philippines labour law was discussed and there were promises of cooperation by the Lebanese foreign minister.

In a somewhat rare move of support from the Lebanese government through the then head of General Security, Jamil al-Sayyed, a formal and public Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the International Catholic Migration Mission (ICMC), Caritas International and General Security on 12 January 2005 to establish a safe house for migrant women (Ghazal 2005a, b). The agreement was long time in coming as the opening of the safe house was the culmination of a three-year long Caritas project, funded with over \$1 million by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. But it also comes with a substantial history of actions by Caritas and the Catholic missions in Lebanon dealing with migrant workers who were victims of abuse. This included a financial partnership in the construction of General Security’s detention centre in Adliyah with a Caritas office that monitors provisions and treatment within the centre and medical assistance for inmates. This was a cooperative venture that helped establish positive relations with General Security and overcame initial concern and criticism. The migrant centre project

included the employment of full-time lawyers to carry out prosecutions against abusive employers, seminars for asylum seekers to assist them in avoiding abuse exploitation and detention, as well as to lobby government to improve the status and treatment of migrant workers in Lebanon.

CONCLUSION

Generally, efforts in the regulation and protection of migrant domestic workers by origin country governments have not altered the kinds of abuse and exploitation that seem to be symptomatic of this occupation. Bans and blacklists serve to provide a sense of outrage as well as a sense of comfort that something is being done. But in reality migrant domestic workers rely upon serendipity to find honourable families who will treat them with respect and pay them properly. The surveys conducted in Lebanon show that abuse of various kinds is relatively small in percentage terms. However, the long hours of work and lack of freedom and leisure are standard for all except the freelance workers, but freelancers must live with the constant fear of being apprehended.

It is generally accepted that the Philippines government has introduced more regulations for the protection of overseas Filipino workers than any other labour-sending country, while at the same time seeking to maximize the outflow of its nationals into global labour markets. Education and skills, reliability and intelligence of Filipino workers are marketed to attract employers abroad.

The vagaries of the international labour market, particularly for Filipina and other migrant domestic workers, show that protective laws in sending countries may not make a difference in the employment conditions and treatment in the receiving countries. Indeed, restrictive policies and regulations can sometimes mean placing migrant workers at greater risk as their determination to seek work abroad for higher wages forces them to take irregular routes that makes them more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.

In the case of Lebanon, we have seen at least in the past 15 years or so a plethora of activities to improve the conditions of MDWs. A key conceptualization of what is required to bring about change to improve human rights has been the notion of stakeholder and population “awareness-raising”. To this end, all of the organizations in Lebanon mentioned above that are involved in advocacy on behalf of MDWs have mounted various types of campaigns to raise awareness of their human and labour rights. There has been a proliferation of posters, pamphlets, booklets and flyers

highlighting the kinds of abuses meted out to MDWs, their rights under national and international law, work obligations on the part of the employee as well as responsibilities of the employer and the placement agencies, language phrase booklets and safety measures with contact details of embassies, ministries, NGOs and so on. These have targeted domestic workers themselves, their employers, recruitment agencies, government officials, the judiciary, the media and the general public.

The extent to which these campaigns, as well as street demonstrations, have actually improved the conditions and treatment of domestic workers in Lebanon is not clear, partly because it is difficult to assess such change. There is no doubt that thousands of individual cases have been assisted by Lebanese NGOs gaining compensation, conciliation and in a few cases prosecutions of violators. There is also evidence of government tolerance for irregular workers who find employment in the services sectors. However, the structural conditions under the sponsorship system for MDWs remain essentially the same, with continuing reports of restrictions of freedom of movement, confiscation of passports and safety and well-being issues such as verbal, emotional, physical and sexual abuse. Complaints include lack of privacy, poor and insecure sleeping arrangements, inadequate food, non-payment of wages, wages less than promised, inadequate rest, inadequate contact with families at home, inadequate health-care coverage, no control over residency status and general demeaning and racist attitudes and treatment. Until the Lebanese government repeals the exclusion of domestic workers from the protections of the labour law, bans the withholding of passports and allows their unionization, their vulnerability to abuse and exploitation will continue.

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Migration in Saudi Arabia: Present and Prospects

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INTRODUCTION

Demographics of Saudi Arabia and the neighbouring countries—Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—receive attention for national demographic profile, emerging strains of labour markets and overdependence of expatriate workforce in structural employment because of the existing demographic imbalance (Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011; Winckler 2002). With rich per capita availability of natural resources, wealth metrics thrive to embark Saudi Arabia upon economic diversification and long-term strategic economic objectives requiring large number of externally sourced labour—both highly skilled and low skilled (Khraif 2009a, b; Ali 1986). This has increased the number of expatriates, despite the increasing attention to native human resource development (UNDP

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2004; Khraif 2000). Labour force in the Kingdom experiences structural changes, with service sector taking the lead in replacing the agricultural sector which perpetuated the heavy need for foreign labour (Khraif 2000; Sufian 1993; United Nations 1990). Expatriate labour force, with their sincere involvement in daily responsibilities, created a total reliance even in private space—direct impact of non-nationals on the lives of citizens (Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011).

Migration is of wide concern among nations, especially in the GCC, although the migration load has declined with time (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has the largest land area and population among the GCC members, where expatriates form 25.9 per cent of the total population (Center for Population Studies 2012). That is, one in every four persons in the Kingdom is an expatriate, indirectly influencing fertility decisions (Khraif 2009a, b; Courbage 1995). The expert and technical labour force brought in to fulfil the increasing requirements of technological development and innovation affects the locally available native manpower in the fast changing Saudi Arabia, resulting in an imbalance on regional and urban scales, impacting upon economy, urban planning, transport, housing and employment and, in return, creating an over-urbanization (United Nations 2009, 2006; Khraif 2007, 2001; Makki 1986). Still, from the role played by migrants in the economy, provisions of government services and social contracts, citizens benefit from their unregulated cheap employment at domestic level (Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011).

The labour and immigration policies are undergoing changes in the Kingdom, expecting its outcome in the near future—absorption of native Saudi youth into the labour force—and skill upgradation—educational, technical and professional.

With this scenario, an analysis of migration data is made in this context in order to:

- (1) look at the Saudi citizens' migration trends within the Kingdom;
- (2) analyse the impact of migration on Kingdom's population growth and also on the neighbouring GCC countries;
- (3) look at the changes taking place annually in Kingdom's migration trends and in the other GCC countries;
- (4) examine the migrants by looking at the origin place; and
- (5) analyse the variation between immigrants and Saudi citizens in terms of demographic parameters.

DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

The Saudi Arabian national census has started publishing migration data by administrative area (place of birth and place of current residence) since 2004, specifically for the native population. Analyses were carried out to calculate the following:

- In-migration rate = (Number of persons entering an administrative area/population in the area)*1000. That is, $IR = \left(\frac{Pim}{Pt}\right) * 1000$
- Out-migration rate = (Number of persons leaving an administrative area/population in the area)*1000. That is, $OR = \left(\frac{Pla}{Pt}\right) * 1000$
- Net migration rate = [(Number of in-migrants–out-migrants)/population in the area]*1000. That is, $NMR = \left(\frac{Pim - Pla}{Pt}\right) * 1000$

The International Database of US Census Bureau provides migration data—net migrants by year, which has been collected for Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states from 1993 to 2012—to compare the changes and its contribution to the population growth. Individual country experiences on migration are plotted.

Further, the World Bank Bilateral Migration Database has been accessed online to trace the migration flow to the GCC states for three periods: 1990, 2000 and 2010. All these data were utilized to explain the migration process in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The findings of the analyses are presented under varying sections such as internal migration, international migration and differences between natives and migrants.

INTERNAL MIGRATION

The capital, Al-Riyadh, is vibrant in terms of not only population size but also migration flows (Table 5.1). As against an in-migration rate of 137 per 1000, the out-migration rate is only 47 per 1000, showing high levels of attraction or in-migrant flows determined by the administrative requirements, educational and employment prospects and the quality of life. Other areas having pull factors are Tabouk (the military headquarters) and the Eastern region (the industrial hub).

Table 5.1 Saudi population by residential status—2004 census

Administrative areas	Total	Born	Born residents	In-migration	Out-migration	Rates		
						In-migration	Out-migration	Net-migration
Total								
Riyadh	3,727,682	3,390,432	3,215,967	511,715	174,465	137.3	46.8	90.5
Makkah	3,582,275	3,514,205	3,279,447	302,828	234,758	8.5	6.6	19.0
Al-Mokarramah								
Al-Madina	1,142,934	1,169,262	1,061,974	80,960	107,288	7.1	9.4	-23.0
Al-Monawarah								
Al-Qaseem	819,403	897,702	770,344	49,059	127,358	6.0	15.5	-95.6
Eastern region	2,551,446	2,345,436	2,235,975	315,471	109,461	12.4	4.3	80.7
Ascer	1,436,459	1,559,768	1,339,085	97,374	220,683	6.8	15.4	-85.8
Tabouk	591,846	535,602	482,737	109,109	52,865	18.4	8.9	95.0
Hail	454,049	504,874	430,085	23,964	74,789	5.3	16.5	-111.9
Northern Borders	240,462	260,365	210,997	29,465	49,368	12.3	20.5	-82.8
Jazan	992,135	1,123,616	961,985	30,150	161,631	3.0	16.3	-132.5
Najran	350,533	356,407	306,481	44,052	49,926	12.6	14.2	-16.8
Al-Baha	330,217	440,550	311,635	18,582	128,915	5.6	39.0	-334.1
Al-Jouf	307,899	310,875	287,749	20,150	23,126	6.5	7.5	-9.7
Born outside	-	118,246	-	118,246	-	-	-	-
Total	16,527,340	16,527,340	14,894,461	1,632,879	1,632,879	9.9	9.9	0.0
Males								
Riyadh	1,902,413	1,718,507	1,629,669	272,744	88,838	143.4	46.7	96.7
Makkah	1,792,150	1,758,094	1,635,396	156,754	122,698	8.7	6.8	19.0
Al-Mokarramah								
Al-Madina	565,535	584,477	525,816	39,719	58,661	7.0	10.4	-33.5
Al-Monawarah								
Al-Qaseem	408,575	451,607	383,842	24,733	67,765	6.1	16.6	-105.3

Eastern region	1,306,173	1,191,946	1,136,323	169,850	55,623	13.0	4.3	87.5	
Ascer	699,519	772,320	649,961	49,558	122,359	7.1	17.5	-104.1	
Tabouk	304,345	272,103	244,697	59,648	27,406	19.6	9.0	105.9	
Hail	221,175	250,255	209,820	11,355	40,435	5.1	18.3	-131.5	
Northern Borders	120,272	131,076	105,675	14,597	25,401	12.1	21.1	-89.8	
Jazan	484,055	557,627	468,909	15,146	88,718	3.1	18.3	-152.0	
Najran	174,621	178,820	150,621	24,000	28,199	13.7	16.1	-24.0	
Al-Baha	154,298	215,238	145,711	8587	69,527	5.6	45.1	-395.0	
Al-Jouf	154,239	156,251	144,175	10,064	12,076	6.5	7.8	-13.0	
Born outside	-	49,049	-	118,246	-	-	-	-	
Total	8,287,370	8,287,370	7,430,615	856,755	856,755	10.3	10.3	0.0	
Females									
Riyadh	1,825,269	1,671,925	1,586,298	238,971	85,627	130.9	46.9	84.0	
Makkah	1,790,125	1,756,111	1,644,051	146,074	112,060	8.2	6.3	19.0	
Al-Mokarramah									
Al-Madina	577,399	584,785	536,158	41,241	48,627	7.1	8.4	-12.8	
Al-Monawarah									
Al-Qaseem	410,828	446,095	386,502	24,326	59,593	5.9	14.5	-85.8	
Eastern region	1,245,273	1,153,490	1,099,652	145,621	53,838	11.7	4.3	73.7	
Ascer	736,940	787,448	689,124	47,816	98,324	6.5	13.3	-68.5	
Tabouk	287,501	263,499	238,040	49,461	25,459	17.2	8.9	83.5	
Hail	232,874	254,619	220,265	12,609	34,354	5.4	14.8	-93.4	
Northern Borders	120,190	129,289	105,322	14,868	23,967	12.4	19.9	-75.7	
Jazan	508,080	565,989	493,076	15,004	72,913	3.0	14.4	-114.0	
Najran	175,912	177,587	155,860	20,052	21,727	11.4	12.4	-9.5	
Al-Baha	175,919	225,312	165,924	9995	59,388	5.7	33.8	-280.8	
Al-Jouf	153,660	154,624	143,574	10,086	11,050	6.6	7.2	-6.3	
Born outside	-	69,197	-	118,246	-	-	-	-	
Total	8,239,970	8,239,970	7,463,846	776,124	776,124	9.4	9.4	0.0	

Source: Census of Saudi Arabia, 2004

Makkah Al-Mokarramah also stands as attractive with high pull factors, whereas Al-Baha, Jazan, Hail, Al-Qaseem, Aseer and the Northern Borders exhibit pushing power. Neither the urban infrastructure in Al-Baha (Al-Baha, Beljarshy), Jazan (Sbia and Abu Arish), Hail (Hail and Baqaa), Aseer (Khamis Mushayt and Abha) and Northern Borders (Arar and Rafha) nor the major governorates in these administrative areas are able to retain the native labour force. Makkah Al-Mokarramah maintains the status without being influenced significantly by the migration flows. Madina Al-Monawarah, the pilgrim location, also records an out-migration, which might explain the decreasing demand for or interest of natives to serve the pilgrims.

The replacement of currently existing expatriate health-care staff by the local nationals—untapped women resources—is imperative to meet the complex health needs and rising public health issues (Maben et al. 2010). But the current trend of out-migration from the Makkah Al-Mokarramah leads to positive net migration. Promoting local-level human resources development shall help in bringing a workable link between the three tiers of health-care delivery through referral system and continuing medical education ensuring population health (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002). The increasing administrative jobs and industrial job market influence the internal migration in the Kingdom, which has reasons other than employment, such as residential mobility—buying or building homes, increase in family size, affordability for better dwelling, rental rates, evacuation by the owner or inadequate services substantiate the migrants' relation with house ownership (Helderman et al. 2006). However, majority of internal movements are from rural to urban in nature, accelerating the urbanization process, as stated by Clarke and Murray (1973), with a successful spatial distribution policy that reduces widespread regional disparity in physical and social infrastructure and uneven settlements scattered at long distances (Al-Khalifeh 1993; Makki 1986). Migration intentions to continue living in a city are determined by the years lived in the city, home ownership in the city, parents' place of residence, land ownership in the village and area of origin (Khraif 1992; 1994).

Areas with higher levels of out-migration require increased levels of employment potential in the destinations in both public and private sectors. On the other hand, those areas experiencing substantial levels of in-migration require redistribution policies, both for population and infrastructure development programmes. According to the recent international strategies on industrial location, the production and manufacturing

units are relocated to land areas not used hitherto, which currently paves way for a return migration. Saudi Arabia's efforts in these lines shall create prospects in the near future in population redistribution. The spatial mobility may be regulated through encouraging local-level human resource development and regional development efforts underway in the Kingdom such as the creation of industrial, educational and medical townships at various geographic destinations.

The Kingdom is no way an exception in terms of sex differentials in migration flows. As seen elsewhere, males migrate more than females here also, as observed in the absolute numbers of in-migrants and out-migrants as well as net migrants. There are 856,755 males migrated from one area to another, as of 2004. The corresponding figure for females was 776,124. While male migrations are determined largely by employment opportunities, the female mobility is caused generally by marriages and family settlements. Area wise, the number of migrants (in-migrants and out-migrants) varies in such a way that Al-Riyadh, Makkah Al-Mokarramah, Al-Qaseem, Eastern region, Aseer, Tabouk, Jazan and Najran have more male in-migrants and out-migrants than females; Al-Madinah Al-Monawarah, Hail, Northern Borders, Al-Baha and Al-Jouf have less male in-migrants. However, male out-migrants dominate heavily in all areas.

The migration rates range from 3.0 (Jazan in-migrants) to 137.3 (Al-Riyadh in-migrants), giving rise to positive net migration rates for Al-Riyadh, Makkah Al-Mokarramah, Eastern region and Tabouk. All the other areas experienced negative net migration rates. In other words, former four areas have more in-migrants than out-migrants; and the latter have more out-migrants than in-migrants. Thus, the areas of Saudi Arabia experience high levels of spatial mobility, with the level of net migration varying largely from -334.1 (Al-Baha) to 90.5 (Al-Riyadh).

A recent demographic survey enlightens this issue by statistics on population classified by previous residence. It reveals a drastic change in the internal migration trend, comparatively. There is a rapid decline in the number of net migrants to a narrow level, of both males and females. All areas, except Najran and Al-Jouf, show a similar trend (Fig. 5.1).

International Migration

Immigrants constitute a considerable share of total population in the Kingdom. They have increased from a mere 791,105 (11.8 per cent of the total Kingdom's population) in 1974 to 8,459,646 (31.3 per cent) in 2010,




Fig. 5.1 Internal migration in the Kingdom, 2017. (Source: General Authority of Statistic (Demographic Survey), 2017)

implying a fast growth of immigrant population in the country during the last three decades. Census 2010 counts the total population as 27,236,156 (18,776,510 Saudi and 8,459,646 non-Saudi). The US Census Bureau estimates a total of 26,534,504 as of 2012, showing a growth of 9,473,754 persons during 1992–2012 (an increase of 5,213,289 during 1993–2002 as against 4,260,465 during 2003–2012) (Salam et al. 2015). Immigrants seeking jobs prompted by the development of oil fields foster not only the national economy but also immigrants' home countries (Roudi-Fahmi and Kent 2007). However, the crowding and mass gathering, resulting from an influx of job seekers, pose public health challenges such as accidents, corona virus infections, viral transmissions and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome - (MERS), (Memis and Al-Rabeah 2013) demanding national attention.

As seen in Fig. 5.2, the positive net migration plays a key role in the Kingdom's population growth. This situation may be compared with other GCC states as the contributions of net migration remain more or less equal in all these nations. Such a high role of migration on population growth may necessitate a review and reformulation of population and labour-related policies and programmes so that immigrants do not pose any burden on the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, in the near future.

The unregulated import of labour played a more decisive role than natural increase in the higher population growth registered during the




Fig. 5.2 Contribution of migration to population growth in Saudi Arabia, in comparison with other GCC. (Data Source: International Database, US Census Bureau. Accessed during 2012)

period 1993–2002 (5,160,132) compared with 2003–2012 (4,298,506) (Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011; Sufian 1993). However, as compared with the other GCC countries—Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE)—the effect of migration on population growth is found lesser in the Kingdom, despite the push to develop infrastructure—power stations, government ministries and industries (Khraif 2000). Perhaps, the Saudization policies that changed labour and immigration laws since 2000 have influenced this trend. On the other hand, it is a fact that liberalization and globalization attract professional or skilled labour force from East Asia and Africa to Western countries. With the changing labour visa regulations, a decline in immigration in the Kingdom is expected in the future, which will create a population structure and distribution conducive for enabling an equitable treatment, policies and programmes. To achieve a positive relation between population dynamics and socioeconomic development, planning for migration at all levels should be associated with decentralization of decision-making in large urban centres and distribution of economic investment over a wide area, where urban population spreads out in medium and small centres (Makki 1986).

According to the US Census data, net migrants in the Kingdom kept on decreasing annually since 1993, reaching the lowest level in 1999. Thereafter, with slight changes, their numbers declined and reached a negative level by 2006, and the same trend continues at present. That is, the immigrants have started returning to their native countries more often (Fig. 5.3). In contrast, the national censuses show a continuously increasing immigrant population in the Kingdom but with lower growth rates, during 2004–2010, as compared to 1992–2004. In short, the migration data (net migrants) as given by the US Census Bureau do not tally with the national datasets. A similar trend is visibly noted in all the other GCC states but at different periods. Oman started experiencing negative net migration since 2003. Similarly, Qatar has the highest rate of net migration, followed by Bahrain. Definitely, these countries will soon follow the trends of Saudi Arabia, as the labour laws of Saudi Arabia are usually adopted by the other GCC states. These data also require comparisons with the national censuses for understanding the trend of immigration.

Saudi Arabia has GCC's major population share as well as land share and the largest share of immigrants, during 1990 and 2000. The trend declined to 788,900, as on 2010; the number of immigrants in the Kingdom was 4,742,980 in 1990 and 5,130,955 in 2000; there was an increase during 1990–2000 but a sharp decline during 2000–2010




Fig. 5.3 Number of net migrants in Saudi Arabia over the two decades, in comparison with the other GCC states. (Data Source: International Database, US Census Bureau. Accessed during 2012)

Table 5.2 Migrants of Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states by area of origin and destination

<i>Year/States</i>	<i>Immigrants</i>			<i>Emigrants</i>		
	<i>Inside the Arab world</i>	<i>Outside the Arab world</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Inside the Arab world</i>	<i>Outside the Arab world</i>	<i>Total</i>
1990						
Bahrain	60,271	111,939	172,210	8179	6233	14,412
Kuwait	1,177,052	408,104	1,585,156	249,493	31,574	281,067
Oman	52,834	370,717	423,551	199,933	3687	203,620
Qatar	121,594	248,198	369,792	2562	1692	4254
Saudi Arabia	1,931,781	2,811,199	4,742,980	121,503	38,275	159,778
UAE	401,340	928,923	1,330,263	37,209	17,413	54,622
2000						
Bahrain	88,662	150,686	239,348	8676	26,342	35,018
Kuwait	1,111,493	385,373	1,496,866	311,406	51,537	362,943
Oman	77,789	545,803	623,592	270,804	3774	274,578
Qatar	155,242	315,442	470,684	2538	2360	4898
Saudi Arabia	2,089,799	3,041,156	5,130,955	148,118	65,265	274,578
UAE	689,563	1,596,048	2,285,611	46,651	26,319	72,970
2010						
Bahrain	57,413	257,990	315,403	3997	26,017	30,015
Kuwait	442,361	1,655,166	2,097,527	184,763	74,595	259,358
Oman	64,979	761,095	826,074	6611	8725	15,337
Qatar	87,727	1,217,701	1,305,428	2619	7230	9849
Saudi Arabia	2,841,452	4,447,448	788,900	62,093	116,619	178,712
UAE	231,536	3,061,728	3,293,264	3007	52,900	55,907

Data Source: ESCWA

(Table 5.2). This is purely due to the job demands and requirements, accounting for national labour force. Emigrants also show a similar trend; there was an increase from 1159,778 (1990) to 274,578 (2000), but a decline to 178,712 (2010). Thus, the migration trends in the Kingdom are undergoing changes, giving hope for future adjustments.

Out of the total immigrants in the Kingdom, three-fifths are non-Arabs (59.3 per cent in 1990, 59.3 per cent in 2000 and 61.0 per cent in 2010). However, in the case of emigrants, a lesser proportion travels out of the Arab World—24.0 per cent in 1990, 23.8 per cent in 2000 and 65.3 per cent in 2010. Saudi Arabia is attracting labour from other Arab countries in Asia and Africa to serve the society, with no language barrier, although

a large majority of paramedics, especially nurses, are non-Arab-speaking (Aldossary et al. 2008). Also, in the professions having no language requirements, non-Arabs are employed. Higher emigration to other Arab countries prevailed in the Kingdom during 1990 and 2000, which has changed to outside the Arab World in 2010, hopefully revealing the higher return migration from the Arab countries as well as increased emigration of Saudis to Europe and America. This has resulted in the Kingdom turning into “heterogeneous, multinational, and multi-religious with higher overall sex ratio, especially at prime working ages, creating social, economic, and security-related problems” (Center for Population Studies 2012; Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011; Khraif 2009a, b; Fouad and Al-Badr 1995; Ali 1986).

Differences Between Natives and Immigrants

The immigrant population (non-Saudi) in the Kingdom has a unique profile in terms of sex ratio, age distribution, residential status and geographic preferences, different from that of the native Saudi population. Migrants bring different demands and desires (Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011), showing a unique profile—adult to middle-aged single males with low educational levels, further impacting upon the national socio-demographics (Alrouh et al. 2013).

Sex ratio, the basic demographic indicator, varies from 114 (1974) to 124 (2004), with native sex ratio slightly more than 100 (106 in 1974, 102 in 1992, 101 in 2004, 104 in 2010 and 2017) but higher than 200 in case of immigrants (201 in 1974, 238 in 1992, 227 in 2004, 238 in 2010 and 217 in 2017). Native sex ratios are close to 100 in the childhood ages but favour males in the middle ages (above 40 years), whereas that of immigrants favour males in the working ages and old ages in 2004 (Table 5.3), but show marked differences in 2010 and 2017.

Differences of immigrants from natives in terms of broad age groups are clear from Fig. 5.4, with a large majority of them being adult and middle-aged (15–59 years). Among the natives, as of 2004, in all, 55.0 per cent of population is aged 15–49 years, whereas among immigrants, the corresponding figure is 78.9 per cent, which is attributed to the immigration policies in the Kingdom. There are marked changes observed thereafter in 2010 and 2017. Foreign-born population in the Kingdom is employed on job contract, with the majority of them without a family status. Thus, only the working-age people immigrate for employment,

Table 5.3 Sex ratio of population by age group—various censuses

Age group	Total						Native						Expatriate					
	1974	1992	2004	2010	2017	2017	1974	1992	2004	2010	2017	2017	1974	1992	2004	2010	2017	
0-4	101	104	102	110	104	104	100	103	101	109	104	104	105	104	104	113	105	
5-9	102	101	102	110	104	104	102	101	101	106	104	104	107	102	105	125	104	
10-14	109	103	95	112	104	104	107	103	94	106	103	103	137	103	105	137	105	
15-19	119	98	102	114	104	104	107	98	101	109	104	104	281	99	106	145	107	
20-24	135	127	112	121	114	111	111	102	97	102	109	109	337	255	187	218	134	
25-29	117	168	144	133	123	123	92	91	103	92	102	102	289	392	261	267	168	
30-34	114	176	151	157	142	142	92	102	99	99	102	102	278	280	262	301	222	
35-39	121	179	170	160	167	167	102	93	99	100	103	103	302	349	355	303	253	
40-44	116	193	187	166	175	175	102	97	110	97	104	104	265	443	420	360	262	
45-49	140	165	186	158	193	193	130	95	113	99	106	106	273	469	465	390	359	
50-54	118	138	171	157	214	214	112	97	111	105	106	106	192	400	444	380	650	
55-59	160	153	132	153	195	195	157	127	95	112	109	109	201	387	392	366	596	
60-64	135	145	111	146	165	165	135	137	94	124	107	107	132	218	264	290	446	
65-69	121 ^a	149	110	162	111 ^a	111 ^a	122 ^a	146	102	156	96 ^a	96 ^a	114 ^a	185	213	212	228 ^a	
70-74	-	123	95	129	-	-	-	124	91	124	-	-	-	115	154	169	-	
75-79	-	138	133	133	-	-	-	139	132	130	-	-	-	120	152	166	-	
80+	-	119	114	137	-	-	-	120	118	137	-	-	-	97	107	131	-	
Persons	114	127	124	133	135	135	106	102	101	104	104	104	201	238	227	238	217	

Note: Calculated from various census years and the demographic survey

^aRefers to 65+ years




Fig. 5.4 Distribution of population by broad age groups and sex, 1974, 1992, 2004, 2010 and 2017

leaving their family in their native countries. Immigrants have rights over the occupation, not on their residential status. Thus, the labour sector in the Kingdom is dominated by males, except in schools and hospitals, thus reducing the opportunities of females in the job market. The sex differentials reflect the job market requirements.

Of late, the labour scenario of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is undergoing changes in terms of labour laws, migration policies and sponsorship-based employment contracts (Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011). Effective implementation of such reforms is expected to develop a labour market steered by the native workforce. The labour market shall undergo a number of reforms in the near future before it stabilizes to a particular overall involvement of native labour force.

As of 2010, immigrants form 31.3 per cent of the total population in the Kingdom; their proportions are higher in Makkah Al-Mokarramah (40.4 per cent) and Al-Riyadh (36.6 per cent), Eastern Region and Al-Madinah Al-Monawarah (Table 5.4). The number of persons per household, an indicator of population density at household level, shows differences between the natives and immigrants. While native households have more than six persons on an average, immigrants have just four, which could explain the immigrants' status (as forced bachelorship), expanded male adults and age-sex distribution. Native households reflect an ideal family setup (father, mother and children), whereas a lesser proportion of immigrants live with their families. Most immigrants live as single in bachelor quarters, employee compounds or in the so-called bed-space arrangements. Thus, census counting of the immigrant population itself is an arduous task.

Housing, yet another indicator of social status, brings out certain unique differences of immigrants' living arrangements from that of natives. Housing sector is composed of traditional housing, villas, apartments and others: natives live mostly in the first three types, whereas immigrants stay in apartments (53.4 per cent), traditional houses (24.9 per cent), and other types (Table 5.5). Apartments are available in the newly developed urban centres and upcoming townships, whereas the less urbanized areas have more traditional houses. Concrete houses are commonly seen all over the Kingdom but vary across areas, depending upon the climatic conditions and livelihoods. Areas such as Northern Borders, Eastern region, Al-Riyadh and Al-Jouf have more than 80 per cent of their houses concreted, whereas the percentages are lower in Jazan. More than 90 per cent of Saudi households in Northern Borders, Al-Riyadh, Al-Jouf and Eastern

Table 5.4 Population size and persons per household—2010

<i>Administrative areas</i>	<i>Population</i>			<i>Per cent</i>		<i>Persons per household^a</i>		
	<i>Saudi</i>	<i>Non-Saudi</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Saudi</i>	<i>Non-Saudi</i>	<i>Saudi</i>	<i>Non-Saudi</i>	<i>Total</i>
Al-Riyadh	4,307,991	2,484,785	6,792,776	63.4	36.6	6.6	4.2	5.6
Makkah Al-Mokarramah	4,128,486	2,798,991	6,927,477	59.6	40.4	5.5	4.3	5.0
Al-Madina Al-Monawarah	1,265,561	516,172	1,781,733	71.0	29.0	6.1	4.1	5.5
Al-Qasem	931,085	288,099	1,219,184	76.4	23.6	7.1	3.4	5.8
Eastern region	2,900,989	1,229,044	4,130,033	70.2	29.8	7.0	4.3	6.1
Ascer	1,601,725	325,362	1,927,087	83.1	16.9	6.5	3.2	5.6
Tabouk	665,485	130,940	796,425	83.6	16.4	6.5	3.5	5.8
Hail	494,809	111,121	605,930	81.7	18.3	7.4	3.2	6.3
Northern Borders	268,694	53,186	321,880	83.5	16.5	8.4	3.7	7.3
Jazan	1,109,590	265,255	1,374,845	80.7	19.3	7.4	4.3	6.6
Najran	403,138	103,968	507,106	79.5	20.5	6.9	3.3	5.8
Al-Baha	348,772	63,748	412,520	84.5	15.5	6.4	2.6	5.4
Al-Jouf	350,185	88,975	439,160	79.7	20.3	7.3	3.3	6.1
Total	18,776,510	8,459,646	27,236,156	68.9	31.3	6.4	4.1	5.6

Source: Census 2010

^aBased on population living in households

Table 5.5 Percentage distribution of households by housing conditions—2010

<i>Administrative area</i>	<i>Traditional houses</i>	<i>Villa</i>	<i>Apartments</i>	<i>Concreted houses</i>	<i>Owned houses</i>	<i>Rented houses</i>	<i>Public station electricity</i>	<i>Public water pipe unit</i>	<i>Public sewage</i>
Saudi									
Al-Riyadh	11.0	40.6	25.9	94.9	53.5	39.8	98.7	89.2	55.7
Makkah	29.5	11.4	51.8	75.6	54.3	40.7	98.4	67.1	40.4
Al-Mokarramah									
Al-Madina	33.7	11.2	48.9	69.7	61.1	36.1	96.9	70.7	44.2
Al-Monawarah									
Al-Qaseem	25.5	42.6	12.8	85.2	70.0	27.3	98.6	75.7	50.2
Eastern region	18.0	35.1	37.4	91.3	55.0	36.7	99.3	91.4	77.6
Aseer	39.8	22.3	20.7	81.0	71.8	24.7	96.8	19.7	24.6
Tabouk	25.0	14.0	47.8	81.8	46.6	46.4	97.2	71.8	55.5
Hail	47.4	34.3	7.7	68.6	78.6	20.2	96.6	50.8	12.0
Northern Borders	19.8	41.9	15.9	95.3	61.9	35.2	97.7	61.9	17.1
Jazan	68.6	12	11.6	48.6	85.3	12.3	96.6	52.9	10.2
Najran	35.4	19.9	27.2	71.3	70.6	26.0	97.0	14.8	5.8
Al-Baha	41.5	15.8	25.7	81.6	85.4	12.9	98.3	11.0	3.9
Al-Jouf	18.4	45.9	22.9	93.6	74.7	23.5	98.5	73.4	25.5
Total	26.9	25.5	34.3	81.9	60.0	34.8	98.2	69.3	45.1
Non-Saudi									
Al-Riyadh	12.3	4.7	54.5	80.2	3.8	65.0	95.6	85.7	64.8
Makkah	30.8	2.4	57.4	67.6	5.6	75.7	96.7	77.4	55.5
Al-Mokarramah									
Al-Madina	27.9	2.5	55.9	66.0	5.0	69.4	96.4	80.6	58.7
Al-Monawarah									
Al-Qaseem	25.5	2.7	39.5	64.9	3.7	47.3	96.1	70.5	52.0
Eastern region	13.6	6.4	66.4	84.3	5.5	65.9	96.9	87.1	76.8
Aseer	36.4	3.0	42.8	64.1	3.7	53.7	95.7	26.3	30.7

Tabouk	41.8	2.2	41.5	57.1	4.7	61.9	93.8	70.6	49.4
Hail	45.6	4.8	30.6	49.5	4.9	53.3	92.1	56.9	9.6
Northern Borders	21.4	7.2	45.5	77.4	4.6	69.6	88.2	72.2	32.3
Jazan	62.1	3.7	19.0	32.5	16.6	55.8	91.9	54.5	9.6
Najran	46.8	2.2	29.2	48.2	6.1	50.9	98.7	12.8	3.2
Al-Baha	30.4	1.3	45.5	67.4	2.4	48.8	96.9	7.2	2.7
Al-Jouf	30.2	3.8	44.5	74.1	3.0	62.3	91.1	70.2	31.0
Total	24.9	3.7	53.4	71.1	5.1	66.7	96.0	75.0	55.3
Total									
Al-Riyadh	11.5	25.9	37.6	88.9	33.1	50.2	97.4	87.8	59.5
Makkah	30.1	7.6	54.1	72.3	33.9	55.4	97.7	71.4	46.7
Al-Mokarramah									
Al-Madina	31.9	8.5	51.1	68.5	43.5	46.6	96.8	73.8	48.8
Al-Monawarah									
Al-Qaseem	25.5	29.3	21.7	78.5	48.0	33.9	97.8	74.0	50.8
Eastern region	16.7	26.1	46.4	89.1	39.6	45.8	98.6	90.1	77.4
Aseer	38.9	17.4	26.3	76.7	54.5	32.0	96.5	21.3	26.1
Tabouk	28.8	11.4	46.4	76.3	37.3	49.8	96.4	71.6	54.1
Hail	46.9	26.0	14.1	63.3	58.0	29.5	95.3	52.5	11.3
Northern Borders	20.2	33.7	22.9	91.1	48.5	43.3	95.4	64.3	20.7
Jazan	67.0	10.0	13.4	44.7	68.6	22.9	95.5	53.3	10.0
Najran	38.9	14.4	27.8	64.2	50.7	33.7	97.5	14.2	5.0
Al-Baha	38.6	12.0	30.9	77.9	63.6	22.3	98.0	10.0	3.6
Al-Jouf	21.9	33.3	29.4	87.8	53.3	35.1	96.3	72.5	27.1
Total	26.2	17.7	41.1	78.1	40.5	46.2	97.4	71.3	48.7

Source: Census of Saudi Arabia, 2010 (Final Tables)

region live in concrete houses, whereas their percentages remain more than 70 in case of immigrant households in Eastern region, Al-Riyadh, Northern Borders and Al-Jouf. Areas such as Aseer, Tabouk, Hail, Northern Borders and Najran have wide discrepancy in terms of percentage of native and immigrant households living in concrete housings.

House ownership is generally restricted to the natives, as per the Kingdom's housing policies; however, there are few immigrants who own their housing as per special sanctions granted by the Kingdom. But the rental housing system is more focussed on the immigrants; still, there are natives who also live in rented housings, which may be due to migrations or for the flexibility of labour force. One-third of the immigrants reside in rented houses, while the rest reside in official houses. Rental houses remain less than 50 per cent in Al-Qaseem and Al-Baha, implying that official houses are higher in proportions. But the proportions of natives living in rental houses are very low in these areas, as compared to immigrants.

With the change in the type of housing, the housing infrastructure—sources of power, water and sewage—changes, especially along areas. For example, the dependence of power varies from 95.3 per cent (Hail) to 98.6 per cent (Eastern region). Native-immigrant variations in the utilization of public source of power are minimal—98.2 per cent of natives as against 96.0 per cent of immigrants. Among the areas, Jazan has lesser proportion of native households, depending on public sources (96.6 per cent) and Northern Borders has least proportion of immigrant households (88.2 per cent). At the same time, Eastern region has the highest proportion of native public sector power beneficiaries (99.3 per cent), whereas Najran has the highest per cent of immigrant public sector power beneficiaries (98.7 per cent). But these cannot be considered as a constraint to quality of life as households have alternative sources such as private stations and private generators.

In Al-Riyadh, Makkah Al-Mokarramah and Al-Madina Al-Monawarah, public water supply users are less than 90 per cent. It is in the Eastern region that there are more than 90.1 per cent of households having access to public sector water supply. While the public sector water usage is lower among the natives (69.3 per cent), its usage is higher among immigrants (75.0 per cent). This is because of varying dependence on catchment tank water and well water.

Conversely, water remains as a severe constraint in the desert areas of the Kingdom due to non-availability or difficulties of supplying to distant places. Hence, some areas have less than 25 per cent of households, depending upon the availability of public water sources (Al-Baha, Najran and Aseer).

Similar situation with the sewage system exists as well; the dependence on public sewage is less than half in the Kingdom, ranging from 3.6 per cent (Al-Baha) to 77.4 per cent (Eastern region). While the major areas have higher proportions, other areas have lesser proportions of households depending upon public sewage. A large proportion of immigrant households depends upon public sewage (55.3 per cent) as against the natives (45.1 per cent), indicating the type of housing along areas. Native households have different accesses like ditches and private sewages.

As pointed out earlier, immigrants are located more in the urban areas as per the preliminary reports of 2010 census, that is, 91.4 per cent of immigrant population as against 78.7 per cent of native population live in urban areas (Table 5.6). Immigrant females are concentrated more in the urban areas (95.6 per cent) as against immigrant males (89.7 per cent), which reflects the job demands. In comparison, the native females are lesser in urban areas. There are regional differences in this dimension as well.

Table 5.6 Urban population in the Kingdom by nationality

<i>Administrative areas</i>	<i>Per cent urban Saudi</i>			<i>Per cent urban non-Saudi</i>			<i>Per cent urban total</i>		
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
Al-Riyadh	90.5	89.8	90.2	92.9	97.8	94.3	91.6	91.9	91.7
Makkah	84.0	82.3	83.2	95.7	98.8	96.8	89.5	87.6	88.7
Al-Mokarramah									
Al-Madina	79.0	77.5	78.2	91.4	98.4	93.6	83.4	81.8	82.7
Al-Monawarah									
Al-Qaseem	74.2	73.3	73.8	77.9	90.6	80.7	75.4	75.4	75.4
Eastern region	92.7	92.8	92.8	90.4	97.2	92.0	91.8	93.6	92.5
Aseer	50.8	47.8	49.3	70.9	82.3	73.5	55.6	50.7	53.4
Tabouk	87.5	86.9	87.2	81.0	95.9	84.6	86.0	87.7	86.8
Hail	57.3	56.1	56.7	66.9	85.9	71.4	59.8	58.9	59.4
Northern Borders	91.6	90.8	91.2	90.5	95.5	91.7	91.4	91.2	91.3
Jazan	39.1	36.0	37.6	55.5	52.2	54.4	43.0	38.1	40.8
Najran	79.2	78.5	78.9	87.1	95.0	89.3	81.3	80.6	81.0
Al-Baha	46.0	42.3	44.1	69.6	76.8	71.3	51.3	44.9	48.3
Al-Jouf	86.5	86.2	86.4	78.3	90.1	80.9	84.2	86.6	85.2
Total	79.5	77.8	78.7	89.7	95.6	91.4	83.4	81.6	82.6

Source: Census of Saudi Arabia, 2010 (Preliminary Tables)

CONCLUSIONS

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is vibrant with high levels of internal migration flows across the 13 administrative areas. There exists tremendous and varying degrees of pull and push factors determined by socioeconomic development, industrialization and urbanization. The major in-migrating areas are Tabouk, Al-Riyadh and Eastern region, while the major out-migrating destinations are Al-Baha, Jazan, Hail, Al-Qaseem, Aseer and Northern Borders. A few areas remain more or less stable without pulling or pushing native population. Public sector employment and proximity to metropolis (Riyadh, Jeddah/Makkah or Dammam) are major pull factors. Makkah Al-Mokarramah maintains the status without being influenced significantly by the migration flows. Again, as seen elsewhere, males migrate more than females, as observed in the absolute numbers of in-migrants and out-migrants as well as net migrants. The regional development—infrastructure development and promoting medium-sized cities—with an aim to create employment encourages native population to continue living at their own birth places. Those areas experiencing substantial levels of immigration require redistribution policies, both for population and infrastructure development programmes. The spatial mobility may be regulated by encouraging local-level human resource development and regional development efforts underway in the Kingdom such as the creation of industrial, educational and medical townships at various geographic destinations.

Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the GCC in terms of both land area and population, thus having the highest level of international migration within the Arab world and beyond. The changing labour laws and Saudization efforts shall curb this situation, bringing a balance between the demand and supply in the labour market. The hiked net migration rate (2000–2005) has immediately been brought to unity, which will reduce at prevailing emigration trend.

Expatriates, in a way, complicate the demographics of Saudi Arabia—sex ratio, age-sex distribution, dependency ratio, regional distribution of population, urban share and housing conditions. Demographic transition underway in the country is reflected in the native age-sex distribution. The positive net migration plays a key role in the Kingdom's population growth. Such a high role of migration on population growth may necessitate a review and reformulation of population and labour policies and

programmes so that immigrants would not pose any burden in the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, in the near future.

Out of the total immigrants in the Kingdom, three-fifths are non-Arabs. Of late, the labour scenario of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is undergoing changes in terms of labour laws and migration policies. Effective implementation of such reforms is expected to develop a labour market steered by the native workforce. The labour market shall undergo a number of reforms in the near future before it stabilizes to a particular overall desired optimum level of expatriate labour force.

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Policies for Protection of Indian Migrant Workers in Middle East

Seema Gaur

INTRODUCTION

India is a major labour-sending country to the Middle East. Indian migrants to the Middle East are predominantly low-skilled, temporary contractual workers, mostly employed in low-paid, marginal, inadequately regulated sectors of economy involving the so-called 3 D, that is, dirty, dangerous and demanding menial jobs that nationals are neither inclined nor willing to accept. Most of them come from the poorer sections of society, and their earning potential in the Middle East, even with low education and lack of skills, is much higher¹ compared to what they get at home and hence seen as a means for upward economic mobility. Pressing

Views expressed are personal and not of the organization, the author belongs to.

¹The wages that migrants earn abroad can be many multiples of what they could earn doing similar jobs at home.

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circumstances at home with dreams of mobility prompt more and more to migrate. The large number of low-skilled labour migrants to the Middle East is one of the main sources of remittances that have swelled India's foreign exchange reserves² in addition to relieving labour pressures. However, these migrant workers may often experience exploitation and violations of their human rights throughout the migration cycle. The protection of migrants is, therefore, becoming a dominant concern in India and the world over.

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section I revisits the study done by the author in 1998 based on first-hand data collected from low-skilled Indian migrants working in the destination country Lebanon, unlike most of the studies based on data collected from return migrants in their home country. It provides some case studies to understand atrocities of agents and employers the migrants experienced at the destination. Exploitations faced by the migrant workers including Indian migrants in the Middle East during various phases of migration cycle, drawing upon observations and analytical insights from the existing works, are briefly discussed. Besides the data and information at the macro level, analysis is supplemented wherever needed by integrating existing micro-level research findings. Section II describes efforts to protect migrant workers at various levels—international, destination countries in the Middle East and India as a sending country. Extensive steps taken by the Government of India to protect migrant workers, including some recent initiatives, are discussed. In Section III, an attempt is made to analyse why migrants are still continuing to experience exploitation in spite of strong proactive measures undertaken by the Government of India. In the concluding section, some suggestions and perspectives for managing labour migration effectively and protecting the Indian migrants are provided.

²India continued to remain highest remittance receiver in 2018 and attracted about \$78.6 billion in remittances (World Bank 2019), registering 14 per cent increase over the previous year. Remittances from the Gulf make up more than half of remittance flows to India, highlighting their significant contribution to Indian economy.

SECTION I: EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS

Revisiting Lebanon Study

A field study was undertaken by the author in late 1990s³ to collect first-hand quantitative and qualitative data⁴ from low-skilled Indian migrants from the states of Punjab and Tamil Nadu working in Lebanon, unlike most of studies based on data collected from return migrants in their home country.

Respondents' profiles⁵ indicated poor economic status of their households and their low earning potential at the origin. Emigration to Lebanon was seen as a lifetime opportunity to improve their economic condition. Emigration imposed heavy costs,⁶ which were financed through loans/mortgages (usually at heavy rates of interest), sale of assets and so on. Apart from respondents migrating to Lebanon with regular, legal work permits, some also went illegally, either by using somebody else's passport and work permit or by entering Lebanon on visitors' visas, or first going to Syria on tourist visa⁷ and then sneaking into Lebanon clandestinely by land route.⁸ Respondents emigrated both through agents and through personal networks, but more through agents based in India. Irrespective of their educational level, the bulk of respondents were engaged in unskilled, semi-skilled and menial jobs in Lebanon.

Migrant Exploitation

The study found that agents/their associates in India promised the respondents to provide a lucrative job in Lebanon and after bringing them illegally to Lebanon, provided jobs in far-flung areas at meagre wages, keeping a portion as their commission. Majority of the respondents reached Lebanon without any written contract paper, and even if one was signed in India, it was mostly replaced by another in local language (Arabic) after

³ Gaur (2003), Gaur and Saxena (2004) and Gaur and Saxena (2010).

⁴ Including case studies, focus group discussions and first-hand examination of the working and living conditions of migrant workers in Lebanon.

⁵ Gaur and Saxena (2010).

⁶ In terms of cost of air ticket, visa, making of passport, contract, work permit etc.

⁷ Advised by the agent to go illegally on tourist visa, process of getting emigration clearance being costly and time-consuming.

⁸ Since it was relatively easier to get visitor's visa to Syria.

arrival in Lebanon without the promised benefits, which now depended entirely on the sweet will of the employer. Further, import and employment of workers in contravention of mandatory limits on number of foreign labour in an establishment caused untold miseries to workers. Exploitation took the forms of lower wages, denial of wages and overtime allowances and airfare, more menial work, very long working hours, hazardous working conditions, denial of free or subsidized food, physical torture, denial of medical facilities during sickness, even cancellation of visa before completion of contract and hardly any access to legal redressal. Further, visits to migrant workers' living sites revealed that the majority lived in subhuman conditions devoid of basic amenities.⁹

Most of the respondents from India in Lebanon earned low salaries, between US\$150–250. They tried to remit as much as possible even at the cost of great personal deprivation in order to repay their debts at the earliest, support their families and improve their living standards. They had little access to health care even in case of accidents and serious diseases due to lack of medical insurance on their own or from employer side. *“The plight of unauthorized migrants was even more precarious due to their unlawful status. Even in serious cases of illness/accidents, they were afraid to seek medical care fearing arrest and deportation. The study demonstrated the critical importance of providing mandatory health insurance to migrant workers in order to protect their health (Gaur and Saxena 2004)”*.

Case of Employer Apathy

“Satpal Singh (name changed) “was employed in a construction company. One day, while at work, he fell down and suffered a severe head injury. He needed immediate brain surgery. The hospitals refused to admit him, because he had no health insurance and his co-workers were unable to make a deposit. Mr Singh died due to heavy bleeding. Although the accident happened at the worksite, the employer did not come forward to bear the medical expenses and save the life of the worker. This case demonstrates the apathetic and indifferent attitude of employers towards migrant workers, even when the latter meet with serious accidents at work”.

Increasing *Arabization* (increasing share of Arabs) in employment resulting in influx of workers from Syria and Egypt willing to work at lower wages, as well post-1995 government policies for regulating¹⁰ the

⁹ Cabins made of tin partitions in temporary sheds (measuring 7 feet × 7 feet), each having generally six bunker beds in two vertical rows, devoid of ventilation, toilet, bath etc.

¹⁰ Law prohibited foreign labourers from changing their jobs from one employer to another.

foreign migrant labour created very tight labour market and caused uncertainties about job and fear of repatriation in the minds of migrant workers. Some respondents deserted the employer and attempted to work outside. While some succeeded, others got deported after imprisonment.¹¹ Many respondents living without families, segregated from the local population, working in hazardous conditions, residing in poor hygienic conditions and facing job uncertainty suffered from various diseases and immense social-psychological stress.

Case of Betrayal by the Agent

“Shivaraman (name changed) from Tamil Nadu, on the promise of lucrative job in Lebanon, sold his meagre plot and took loan at a high interest to finance the emigration. Knowing his desperation, his agent sent him to Damascus on tourist visa and at night sneaked him into Beirut by a taxi and left him without any job or passport. To save him from the police, he was taken to a far-flung area for working in a factory for more than 65 hours per week at merely US\$150 per month, much below the promised amount. Soon, he ran away but was caught by police, and after being kept in jail for two years, was deported. At home, he was saddled with a huge burden of debt.”

The case study shows how duped by recruitment agents at home, Indian migrant workers became irregular workers in Lebanon and suffered untold miseries. However, in spite of all the miseries and exploitation by the agent and the employer, most of them viewed this as a temporary phase and a lifetime opportunity to improve the future of their families at home. They tried to stay as long as possible and also called their relatives and friends to Lebanon, whenever they found any opportunity for them.

The study clearly brought out that exploitation of migrants was largely an outcome of collusion between recruiting agents, middlemen and employers. Irregular migrants were most vulnerable to exploitation due to their inability to seek redressal even through the Indian Embassy due to lack of valid documents. Having come to Lebanon after spending enormous fortunes by selling assets or taking costly personal loans, they are left with no option but to stay and work on any terms and conditions imposed by their employer. The study also brought out that humanitarian advocacy for proper housing, health insurance and other facilities for migrants was at odds with the prevailing labour market realities in Lebanon.

¹¹ Their passports were kept in the custody of the employer.

Policy Recommendations

Since our study had found that in spite of all the exploitation, outcome of emigration appeared to be positive for majority of migrants, in a labour surplus country like India, emigration of low-skilled labour force needs to be encouraged as it relieves pressure on domestic labour force, apart from alleviating poverty. The study had suggested the following measures to ensure migrants' protection at home and in destination countries:

- (a) Strengthening implementation of emigration regulation to curb unscrupulous agents and middlemen;
- (b) Setting up counselling and training centres for prospective emigrants in high emigration areas in India;
- (c) Obligation on the emigrants to take a life and disability insurance before emigrating;
- (d) Abolishing requirement of emigration check in India;
- (e) Issuing temporary longer-term work permits by destination countries directly to the worker rather than the employer;
- (f) Allowing a degree of mobility in the destination countries, at least within the same employment sector, to reduce the risk of exploitation arising from being tied to one employer;
- (g) Making it illegal to confiscate passports of migrant workers in destination countries;
- (h) Destination countries to develop a sponsoring system for employers, whose record on hiring legal workers and their return counts towards their future prospects to sponsor and hire foreign workers;
- (i) Strengthening of Indian Missions and setting up of "Emergency Assistance Fund" to help migrant workers in distress such as for legal aid and hospitalization;
- (j) Mandatory health insurance for migrants by employers through legislation and stricter enforcement and other possible measures;
- (k) Destination countries to develop some facilities for shelter and counselling to the migrant workers, when they are in distress due to accidents, illnesses, sudden job loss and so on;
- (l) Origin countries in Asia to exert pressure on destination countries as an organized group to ensure access to health care for workers including irregular migrants;
- (m) Missions of origin countries to help in extreme cases of medical contingencies by generating their own funds;

- (n) Governments of destination countries to provide medical care to illegal workers at least in case of life-threatening situations on humanistic considerations;
- (o) Setting up of responsible immigration departments in destination countries to protect migrants' rights such as, mandatory vetting of contracts by Labour Department to ensure compliance with labour laws and so on, ensure getting paid in time and so on;
- (p) To develop bilateral and multilateral labour agreements to address migrant protection and development of orderly migration;
- (q) Cooperation among origin, transit and destination countries to combat illegal migration; and
- (r) Destination countries with large number of foreign migrant workers need to set up a welfare organization with members from Labour Ministry, employers from sectors employing foreign labour, concerned missions and representatives of migrants. All welfare-related cases could be referred to this body for quick and impartial addressing of the grievances.

Evidence Post-Lebanon Study

Since 1990, annual outflows from most Asian countries to the Middle East have seen a remarkable increase. India has the longest history of ties with this region. Indians make up the largest share of migrants in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and they surpass the two-million threshold in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the two largest receivers of foreign labourers in the region. From the Indian perspective, this region constitutes a major destination market with the GCC countries, together accounting for about two-thirds of Indian emigration to the rest of the world in 2015.¹² This is clearly reflective of a mutually beneficial relationship between the Gulf countries and India. In recent years, migrants from relatively poorer states, such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, have been substituting those from relatively better off states like Kerala and Karnataka.¹³ The increasing participation of female migrants¹⁴

¹² Chanda and Gupta (2018).

¹³ Sasikumar and Timothy (2015).

¹⁴ More concentrated in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

is another notable feature of Indian migration to the Middle East. Vast majority of Indian migrants are unskilled and semi-skilled workers in labour-intensive sectors including construction, transport, oil, supply, health and service sectors.

World over, the welfare and mobility of migrant labours are officially safeguarded under international treaties as well as the guidelines framed by the government and other rules. However, practically, the whole process of migration is dominated by the players who operate extra legally outside the legal frameworks. This dominance by the outsiders starts from the stage of recruiting labour in the sending countries.¹⁵ In India also, emigration of workers is a complicated process, taking place in a transnational network and involving multiple players including subagents and middlemen (Rajan et al. 2010: 262).

Comprehensive literature review of exploitation faced by migrant workers in the Middle East has been undertaken. Studies done by scholars, reports and papers by the UN, International Labour Organization (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM) and World Bank, reports of various organizations,¹⁶ anecdotal evidence, newspaper reports¹⁷ and so on indicate that low-skilled migrant workers including Indians, by and large, continue to suffer exploitation in various ways during all the phases of migration. For many workers, the situation has become worse following the economic downturn due to drop in oil prices in many oil-exporting GCC countries during the last few years. The range of violation of migrant workers' (including Indian workers) rights is well documented and briefly discussed in the following section.

During Recruitment in Origin Country

The chain of exploitation invariably begins in the pre-departure phase of migration and has serious implications for migrant's conditions of employment and life in destination countries. Recruitment agents¹⁸ lure aspirant migrants with false promises; grossly flout provisions related to the ceiling

¹⁵ Diop et al. (2018).

¹⁶ ADHB (2014), ICHRP (2010), HRW(2014).

¹⁷ *Times of India* (2013: February 13), *The Guardian* (2014: November 29), *Gulf News* (2016: March 25), *The News Minute* (2016: May 11), *Mint* (2016b: August 3).

¹⁸ Rajan et al. (2010) highlighted common problems with recruitment agencies in Kerala, such as non-transparency, visa trading, collecting service fees from both foreign employers and emigrants and collusion with subagents and state officials dealing with emigration.

fees; force them to pay as much migration costs as they can obtain¹⁹; provide incomplete/misleading information about the work they will be doing, their wages, duration and conditions; provide fraudulent visas and travel documents without legitimate job contracts; sign fraudulent contracts^{20,21}; do not offer recruitment after payment of fees; recruit for non-existent job and fictitious employer and so on. CDS²² studies show that many Indians working in the Gulf reached there on other than regular work visas, suggesting widespread abuse of the system (Kumar 2010).

During Transit

Migrant workers may suffer exploitation during transit also, such as being stranded or trafficked along the way, particularly if they have long layovers in transit countries, or when they are waiting for long hours or even days together at airport/other points often without contacts or money to survive before being received in the destination country.

During Stay in Destination Countries

In destination countries, migrant workers may suffer exploitation in several ways such as signing new contracts on less favourable terms²³; complete denial of promised job; abysmally low wages; non-payment,²⁴ underpayment or late payment of wages²⁵; long working hours with no rest; excessive workloads; forced overtime at work without any returns; denial of weekly off or annual leave; working outdoors in extremely high temperatures; deprivation of food²⁶; violation of minimum wage standards;

¹⁹ Including hidden costs: visa fees, recruitment charges (much above officially sanctioned amounts), interviews (practical tests), medical test, insurance, emigration clearance and air fares, Wickramasekara (2011).

²⁰ Majority does not see their employment contract and/or are unaware of its terms, and unknowingly may sign exploitative terms.

²¹ As specimen contract can satisfy emergence clearance requirement, actual contract is mostly not signed at all, or if it is signed, once workers reach destination, it may be changed with another one.

²² Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, India.

²³ Dovelyn (2012).

²⁴ For example, 350 Indian expatriate workers from three companies in Bahrain were not paid salaries for 4–6 months as per reply given by the Minister for External Affairs, India, to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 3566 on 8 August 2018.

²⁵ Employers may force workers to sign receipts for payments without actually paying, resulting in inability to seek redressal.

²⁶ Including non-availability of vegetarian food to Indian workers, many being vegetarian.

constant fear of premature termination of job contracts; changes in terms of employment and living arrangements and denial of leave and air ticket to home town on completion of contract period. As per the recent official data,²⁷ 87 per cent of 55,119 complaints of ill treatment or exploitation of Indians working abroad received during 2013–2016 came from nine Gulf countries.

In the Middle East, migrants are forced to work under the highly oppressive employment system called *kafala*.²⁸ This system enables employers to confiscate passports of workers²⁹ and exert significant control over their workers' lives. It also prevents employees from changing jobs or leaving the country without permission from their employers.³⁰ “*If you leave, you may face detention and deportation for breaching your visa conditions. If you stay, you may risk working for years with no wage, no day off, and living with little food*”. Workers cannot form trade unions, do collective bargaining with employers or go on strike. Attempts by workers to exercise these rights in some Gulf countries have led to mass deportation (ILO 2014). Thus, it creates an excessively unequal power relationship between the employer and the migrant resulting in quite often forced and bonded labour, exploitation and abuse, which may take severe physical and psychological toll on the workers. The system has come under increasing criticism as it has also led to visa trading and promoted irregular migration.

Migrants often face hazardous work conditions, and therefore accidents and deaths may occur. Living in overcrowded labour camps lacking basic amenities like proper drinking water and sanitation may exacerbate health risks coupled with occupational risks. Sometimes, gross human rights violations, including human trafficking, forced

²⁷ About half of those complaints came from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Ministry of External Affairs, Unstarred Question No. 617, answered on 20 July 2016 in Lok Sabha.

²⁸ Kafala system requires employers to sponsor migrant workers for working in the country and restricts the workers from changing employer (*Kafeel*) without their consent; this delegates the responsibility of regulating presence and activities of foreigners on national territory to the employer, everywhere else a state prerogative.

²⁹ Despite most countries prohibiting the withholding of passports, practice is “common”.

³⁰ Leaving the country or switching sponsors or jobs was thus impossible without a “no-objection certificate” from the first sponsor. Whilst exit permit or no-objection letter to change employer is generally not required in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE, exit permits and non-objection letters remain the norm in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman (Asia Pacific Migration Report 2015).

labour, confinement, mental abuse, violence and so on may compound the health risks. However, access to health insurance and health remains a major concern for many migrant workers, who may suffer from serious diseases.

The above exploitations may make workers' life miserable. However, their access to redressal and justice is likely to be hampered by the lack of employment contracts; fear of job loss, arrest, detention and deportation for reporting abuse by employer; lack of awareness of their rights; and lack of access to formal legal channels of redress (e.g., courts, embassies, NGOs etc.). They may sometimes resort to absconding, which makes them a criminal and subject to arrest and prosecution, further increasing their personal risk.³¹ Migrants have no right to organize or bargain collectively with the employer; for this act, they may face jail and/or deportation for dissent. In spite of this, there are increasingly strikes and riots in the Gulf. The above situations may prompt some to resort to the extreme step of taking their lives³² reflecting discontent and severe trauma (Rajan et al. 2010: 272).

It is worth mentioning that during the last few years, economic downturn in the Gulf largely due to steep decline in crude oil prices forced the Gulf governments to cut their spending, which adversely affected construction firms, with many going bankrupt. Situation in 2016 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a case in point. Around 10,000 Indian workers were laid off without being paid wages for months together, leaving them stranded with no money to buy even food, let alone exit visas.³³ The Indian government had to come to their rescue.

Women are among the most vulnerable of migrant workers since they work primarily as domestic servant and are not covered by the extant labour laws in the GCC countries. Since their living and working conditions are entirely dependent on personal relationship with the employer, they are always at the risk of abuse, including confinement behind the closed doors (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012; ADHB 2014). The problem is acute with respect to women travelling on tourist visas and subsequently getting these visas converted to housemaid/employment visas on arrival at the destination country.

³¹ Diop et al. (2018: 38).

³² *The Hindu* (2012: August 12).

³³ *Washington Post* (2016: August 1).

SECTION II: MEASURES UNDERTAKEN TO PROTECT MIGRANTS

Low-skilled migrant workers mostly fill the “three-D” jobs: “dirty”, “degrading” and “dangerous”, jobs that the locals refuse to undertake. Lack of legal protection for such jobs heightens migrants’ attractiveness as instrument of “maintaining competitiveness” because they are obliged to work in situations where decent work conditions are not enforced. Therefore, it may be useful to look at efforts made to protect the migrants and harness the benefits of labour migration for countries of origin and destination. Action taken for protection of migrants may be analysed at three levels:

International Approach

International cooperation in the governance of migration processes and protection of migrant workers is taking place at several levels,³⁴ ranging from multilateral and regional to national level. In the spirit of *leaving no one behind*, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has devoted a specific target (10.7) to “*facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people*”.³⁵ The *Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)*, adopted by United Nations General Assembly in New York in December 2018,³⁶ is a milestone towards fulfilling one of the key aspirations of the 2030 Agenda. There is increasing recognition that the governments of origin and destination countries need to cooperate to promote safe migration and prevent the exploitation of migrant workers. At the Middle East regional level, *Colombo Process*³⁷ and *Abu Dhabi Dialogue*³⁸ are some of the ongoing initiatives in which origin and destination countries in the region are

³⁴ UN, ILO, IOM, Global Migration Group (GMG), Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and several NGOs.

³⁵ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, accessed on 30th April 1989.

³⁶ <https://www.unescap.org/blog/new-united-nations-global-framework-on-migration-is-good-news-for-the-asia-pacific>, accessed on 30th April 1989.

³⁷ Regional Consultative Process on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (11 labour-sending countries from Asia), with Sri Lanka as Chair since 2013.

³⁸ Discussions between countries of origin and destination have led to practical outcomes, including research on recruitment processes and pilot cooperation projects on skills development, certification upgrading and recognition.

engaging. At the same time, taking a more proactive approach, several labour-sending countries including India have entered into bilateral labour agreements and MoUs with the receiving countries, with a view to protect the rights of all stakeholders involved in the migration process. These MoUs have established procedures for labour migration, but largely fail to ensure effective protection of migrant workers (Asia Pacific Migration Report 2015: 13).

Steps Taken by Destination Countries

In recent years, there have been a number of small, but nonetheless welcome developments in the Gulf region towards protection of rights of migrant workers. One of the key triggers is concern among the Gulf nations regarding their international image as they are aiming to become international hub for finance, investment, commerce and so on. In recent times, there has been a policy-level commitment towards human rights declarations such as Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. Important progress has been made by most of the GCC nations towards legislative change, including some reforms in kafala aimed at improving protection of migrant workers. While all GCC countries share some dissimilarity in the existing kafala system, they have tried several reforms of this system over the past decade. These include outlawing employer confiscation of worker passports, allowing transfer of sponsorships, banning recruitment fees and withholding of wages. The outcomes of the reforms are not as expected. In most cases, attempts for these reforms have been opposed by domestic groups and vested economic interests, which indicate public support for maintaining the status quo in the Gulf countries (Diop et al. 2018).

In the Gulf countries, the respective governments have taken steps to ensure Wage Protection System (WPS). In WPS, employers are requested to make payments to their employees through bank transfers. However, Jureidini (2018) says that this mechanism opens doors for dodgy employers to use the WPS for their own advantage and disadvantages the employees. Clearly, these incremental changes cannot change the negative experience of migrants in the Gulf countries. However, they do represent some improvement for today's migrant workers over yesterday's workers. Further, they indicate that, at least, the Gulf countries recognize the labour issues facing them.

Steps Taken by India as a Sending Country

South Asian countries have taken lead in developing policies and measures to protect their migrant workers. As far as India is concerned, the Indian government has undertaken a wide range of proactive measures to curb exploitation and to ensure the safety and well-being of Indian nationals, particularly the low-skilled workers migrating abroad, which, inter alia, include the following:

Measures Undertaken in India

1. **A dedicated “Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs”** was set up in 2004 to oversee the emigration affairs, which was merged with the Ministry of External Affairs in January 2016 to achieve the broad principle of “Minimum government, maximum governance”.
2. **Amending the Emigration Act, 1983³⁹** in 2009 to put more curbs on the recruiting agents (RAs) with a view to better protect migrants.
3. **Setting up of eMigrate Portal** to facilitate emigration of Emigration Check Required (ECR⁴⁰) category of emigrants and protect them against possible exploitation by dubious recruiters.⁴¹ It brings offices of the Protector of Emigrants (PoE) and Indian Missions, foreign employers, recruiting agents, emigrants and insurance agencies on a single online platform.⁴² The site posts information of the employer, recruiter and worker along with the conditions of work. The portal also detects any foreign employer/RA with complaint cases pending against them and alerts Protector of Emigrants (PoE) officials at the time of granting clearances of new recruitment by them.

³⁹ Emigration Act 1983 is the main act overseeing emigration of Indian nationals.

⁴⁰ Migrants going to 18 Emigration Check Required countries (countries with relatively poor record of honouring workers’ rights) are required to obtain an “Emigration Clearance” from offices of Protectors of Emigrants (PoE). To ensure protection of potential migrants in destination countries, PoE verifies certain details such as salary, working terms and other conditions in the Employment Contract along with credentials of foreign employer.

⁴¹ Integrated with Passport Seva Project (PSP) to validate passports of registered ECR workers and integrated with Bureau of Immigration system to record departure and arrival of ECR category workers.

⁴² eMigrate is stated to be proving effective in generating record of people going out to work, what kind of jobs they are going to, where they are working and with whom they are working.

4. **Regulation of Recruitment Agents (RAs)**—In recent years, the government has taken several steps to regulate the recruitment industry. Performance of RAs is monitored through online monthly reports filed by them on eMigrate. RA is suspended from the eMigrate system in case of non-redressal of grievances, and not permitted to recruit any fresh candidate till he resolves pending grievance. The recruiting agents are liable to lose licence in case of overcharging fee above the allowed limit. Rating of RAs has also been started to promote good and ethical business practices amongst the registered RAs. “Law and Order” being a state subject, complaints against illegal agents are forwarded to the concerned state governments for necessary action under the provisions of the Emigration Act, 1983. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) proposal to ease norms for recruiting agencies in rural areas by lowering the amount of bank guarantee to Rs 8 lakhs from Rs 50 lakhs for urban areas is a welcome step towards encouraging setting up of more RAs and migration through legal channels.⁴³
5. **Launching a multimedia campaign** “Surakshit Jaaye, Prashikshit Jaaye” towards ensuring safe and legal migration,⁴⁴ from time to time encouraging emigrants to utilize services of the registered recruitment agents and not to go through illegal/fake agents.
6. **To protect Indian female workers**, the minimum age of ECR category female workers (except nurses) proceeding for overseas employment to ECR countries has been fixed at 30 years. They can emigrate only through the seven state-run recruitment agencies or through the foreign employer registered on eMigrate system. Every foreign employer desirous of directly recruiting a female ECR worker is required to deposit a bank guarantee equivalent to US\$2500 in the respective Indian Missions. Even though nurses do not fall under the ECR category, to protect them, recruitment of Indian nurses to ECR countries was specifically brought under immigration clearance.
7. **Pravasi Bhartiya Bima Yojana (PBBY)** is a mandatory insurance scheme for all ECR category workers going to ECR countries and has been revamped in 2017 to ensure expedited settlement of claims.

⁴³ *The Economic Times* (2017: January 8).

⁴⁴ Advertisements on TV channels, radio stations and digital cinema theatres in selected states in six languages.

It covers personal accident covering death and permanent disability⁴⁵ and also provides limited coverage towards hospitalization, transportation of mortal remains, repatriation cover for medically unfit, family hospitalization in India, maternity and legal expenses.

8. **Setting up of Overseas Workers Resource Centre (OWRC)** in Delhi and Dubai to provide multilingual 24×7 Helpline⁴⁶ to impart information and guidance as well as redress grievances on all aspects of overseas employment including legal and regulatory requirements.
9. **Minimum Referral Wage (MRW)**—In recent years, the Indian government has been fixing minimum referral wages in each migrant destination country in order to regulate the wages of Indian migrant workers employed in different occupations in the “Emigration Check Required (ECR)” countries.
10. **Signing of bilateral Labour and Manpower Cooperation-related MoUs/Agreements** with important GCC countries⁴⁷ to provide an overarching framework for active cooperation in protecting workers⁴⁸ and promoting orderly migration.⁴⁹
11. **Launching Pravasi Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PKVY)**⁵⁰ with the objective of skilling the potential emigrant workers to improve their employability in accordance with job opportunities available abroad. Initially, it aimed to focus on professions in demand in the Gulf region.
12. **Pre-Departure Orientation and Training (PDOT)** is aimed at empowering the migrant workers and equipping them to navigate effectively through the new environment of a foreign country. A five-day training programme on Pre-departure Orientation (PDO) as an integral part of Pravasi Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PKVY) has been designed.

⁴⁵ Maximum sum insured under the Policy is Rs 10 lakhs.

⁴⁶ OWRC, Delhi, is linked to the Migrant Resource Centers (MRCs) in Kochi, Hyderabad, Gurgaon and Chennai, with functions similar to that of OWRC.

⁴⁷ Jordan, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Malaysia and Bahrain. An Agreement on Domestic Service Workers (DSWs) Recruitment signed with Saudi Arabia.

⁴⁸ To protect the rights of nurses and female domestic workers.

⁴⁹ Joint Working Groups under these agreements are a mechanism to review labour welfare issues.

⁵⁰ Collaboration between Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Ministry of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship (MSDE).

13. **Cooperation with States**—Since law and order is a state subject, the Ministry of External Affairs has been conducting a series of events with the states to facilitate greater cooperation between the centre and the states for taking strict action against illegal agents.⁵¹ The government has also issued a standard operating procedure for state governments to follow after receiving such complaints. It has also requested states to periodically launch campaigns in the media in regional languages to build awareness among people on the dangers of illegal RAs. The Andhra Pradesh is the first state to formally adopt a policy on protecting migrants.

Measures Undertaken to Safeguard Indian Migrants in Destination Countries

1. **Setting up Indian Workers Resource Centres (IWRC)** in selected countries,⁵² with 24×7 toll-free Helpline to provide guidance and counselling on all matters pertaining to overseas Indian workers.
2. **Setting up “Madad” (Help) 24×7, an online portal** to address grievances related to consular services offered by Indian Missions abroad on priority basis by tracking their redressal process until the final resolution.
3. **Setting up Indian Community Welfare Fund (ICWF)** in Indian Missions in countries with significant overseas Indian population⁵³ to provide “on site” welfare services in times of distress and emergency in most deserving cases.⁵⁴ The scheme has been revised from September 2017 to strengthen arrangements for welfare of overseas Indians. ICWF has been playing a very critical role in the efforts of Indian Mission to ensure the well-being of Indian citizens abroad, especially those to ECR countries and in distress⁵⁵ (Bhaskar 2016). Kumar and Rajan (2014: 113) observe that the enormous boost

⁵¹ For example, a high-level conference of major labour-sending states was convened on 10 January 2018, in New Delhi.

⁵² At Dubai, Sharjah (UAE), Riyadh and Jeddah (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia).

⁵³ Functional in Jeddah and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, Sharjah, Dubai and Kuala Lumpur.

⁵⁴ May include bearing legal fees, payment of fine, air fare for return to India.

⁵⁵ Scheme has proved to be very useful in providing assistance to undocumented workers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during Nitaqat drive in 2013 and Amnesty drive in 2017.

that ICWF can provide to the self-esteem of distressed Indians and their families is incalculable.

4. **Conducting Open House programmes by Indian Missions** in Gulf countries on working days, to provide direct access to workers to convey their grievances. This has done much to instil confidence in Indian Missions.
5. **Support and welfare activities by Indian Missions:** Compared to other South Asian Missions, Indian Missions are much ahead in the communication with civil society organizations and private sectors, as briefly mentioned below:
 - (i) Issuing advisories to Indian nationals, counselling them to regularize their visas and residency documents in the country of their stay;
 - (ii) Taking up worker's complaints with the foreign employers as well as local authorities to settle the matter amicably;
 - (iii) Providing all possible assistance in case of detention of an Indian national for violation of immigration and other laws;
 - (iv) Providing free legal counselling, free interpretation service and assistance in death cases;
 - (v) Setting up "Shelter Homes" for distressed Indian nationals⁵⁶ pending their repatriation, providing temporary free boarding and lodging;
 - (vi) Working to transfer Indian prisoners in the Gulf countries⁵⁷ to Indian jails for completing their sentence;
 - (vii) Extending assistance to Indian workers in companies affected by economic downturn in the Gulf. It includes getting waiver of fines imposed on violations related to Iqama (resident permit), arranging exit visas and providing one-way ticket to return India and arranging gratis transfer of sponsorship;
 - (viii) Providing humanitarian assistance to Indian workers in distress in destination countries such as providing food and medicine to those without job and money;⁵⁸

⁵⁶ In Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Malaysia.

⁵⁷ Such as in UAE.

⁵⁸ For example, support to stranded Indian workers in Jeddah in August 2016.

- (ix) Extending necessary support to facilitate return of Indian nationals who have availed amnesty offers in the GCC countries⁵⁹ such as during the 2018 Amnesty offer in UAE.
6. **Evacuating Indians caught in difficult situations**, impacted by economic slowdown in the **Gulf** region and facing difficulty due to employment-related issues⁶⁰ such as evacuating thousands of Indian workers stranded in Saudi Arabia due to retrenchment and non-payment of wages.^{61,62}

SECTION III: WHY EXPLOITATION CONTINUES?

It is clear that the Government of India has been taking strong proactive initiatives for the protection and welfare of Indian migrants, especially for those working in the Middle East. ILO⁶³ also observes that India is not engaging in the race to the bottom and is taking concrete measures to ensure fair recruitment and decent work for migrants. In addition, the institutional framework for supporting their welfare has been considerably strengthened over the last few years. In particular, an elaborate mechanism for redressal of grievances faced by emigrant workers in the ECR countries, with special emphasis for women workers, has been put in place. A significant development since 2017 includes efforts by the MEA to engage different government ministries, that is, the Ministry of Labour and Employment and the Ministry of Skills Development and Entrepreneurship as well as states in the governance of migration. Various measures by the Indian government indicate a shift in approach to focus more on the quality of jobs for Indian workers overseas rather than the quantity of jobs (ILO 2017b).

⁵⁹ Include return of 75,000 Indians from Saudi Arabia (March–November 2017) and 13,963 Indians from Kuwait (January–April 2018) since 2014. Based on the reply given by the Minister of External Affairs, on 9 August 2018, in response to Rajya Sabha Question No. 247.

⁶⁰ During 2014–2017, 72,415 Indians caught in situations impacted by economic slowdown in the Gulf region and facing difficulty due to employment-related issues were brought back by the Indian government from the GCC countries.

⁶¹ NDTV (2016). Mission accomplished: Indian minister returns home contented, <http://saudigazette.com.sa>. (2016: August 7).

⁶² *Hindustan Times* (2016a: August 5), *Hindustan Times* (2016b: August 6).

⁶³ ILO (2017b).

The issue of plight of Indian workers is being raised at the highest level of government such as Indian Prime Minister Modi taking up the matter with the GCC governments during his visits to countries like Qatar and UAE in recent years. Indian government's high-level efforts⁶⁴ to protect Indian migrants were largely responsible for Saudi Arabian government's careful handling of difficulties faced by thousands of laid-off Indian workers in 2016⁶⁵ and setting up a crisis management group to address the humanitarian crisis.

The question arises why in spite of extensive welfare measures by the Indian government, especially in recent few years, exploitation of migrant workers including Indian workers in the Middle East continues. Many factors join together to contribute to continuing migrant exploitation, which is briefly discussed in the following section:

Intensely Competitive Labour Markets

Middle East/Gulf has one of the most sought-after and competitive labour markets in the world. Indian workers are facing stiff competition from those coming from other Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and the Philippines. Excessive supply of Asian labour in the limited low-skilled jobs markets in Middle East/Gulf countries opened the market for visa trading. It still continues in spite of selling visas or work permits in the GCC countries being illegal and ceilings imposed on recruitment fees by the sending countries. The destination countries are therefore able to find new workers from new origins at lower wages. Further, in most labour-sending countries, including India, the pool of potential overseas workers outstrips the demand in the destination countries, making it extremely difficult to control recruitment and employment practices. Thus, labour market realities are at odds with the objectives of fair recruitment and migrant protection.

Lack of Information/Information Asymmetries

In spite of substantial proactive efforts by the Indian government to create awareness, there is an incredibly low level of information among

⁶⁴ Minister of State for External Affairs V.K. Singh travelled to Saudi Arabia and held extensive talks with Saudi government to resolve the problems of around 7000 Indians.

⁶⁵ *Deccan Chronicle* (2016: August 3).

the migrants and intending migrants about diverse aspects of migration and work abroad. Most of the migrants have no understanding whether the agents arranging their emigration are legal or not (Rajan et al. 2010: 264). Kumar and Rajan (2014: 215) found that most migrants seem to prefer to go to travel agents to get their passports, rather than official network, which begins an exploitative relationship in which travel agent doubling up as recruitment agent offers to procure employment visa, arrange for ECR and so on, fleecing ill-informed migrants. Gurucharan (2013: 15) also finds that more than half the respondents in his study identified accessing correct information as the most difficult aspect of migration.

High Costs of Migration

Existing literature and anecdotal evidence show that in the migration corridors of Asia and GCC, recruitment burden and costs related to it⁶⁶ have heavily fallen on the migrant workers. The “commercialisation” of recruitment processes in these corridors is the reason for the high costs (Abella 2018).⁶⁷ This is because of the highly inefficient migrant labour market, featured by the lack of circulation of information about job opportunities, so that middlemen/brokers dominate and exploit the migrant workers, and even well-intending state policies may impede movement and raise costs. Due to very high migration costs, migrant workers,⁶⁸ when they begin their jobs, are generally burdened by the heavy debt taken to meet exorbitant migration costs.⁶⁹ This implies that they must continue to work irrespective of their legal status, poor living and working conditions or abuse of any other kind in order to meet their debt repayment obligations—a situation described as debt bondage by many. This creates vulnerabilities throughout the migration process, especially in tight labour markets prevailing in the Middle East.

⁶⁶ Migration costs generally include cost of passport, visa, emigration clearance fees, airline tickets, mandatory medical exam and fees of recruitment agent and subagents.

⁶⁷ Based on data collected in surveys of 29 important migration corridors including the Gulf, Abella (2018: 225).

⁶⁸ For example, generally migrants pay 3–4 times of maximum fees allowed to recruitment agents (Breeding 2016).

⁶⁹ In addition to supporting their families in India.

Desperation and Vulnerability of Migrants

Despite the high migration costs, propensities to migrate appear to remain strong. Migration is often the best option available to many in the less-developed regions to improve their condition. Because of the expected large wage differentials between origin and destination countries, the workers are willing to take risks and make huge investments.⁷⁰ This scenario applies to India also. Rajan et al. (2010: 264) observe that gripping push factors drive the hapless intending migrants to the unscrupulous recruitment agents (RAs), presenting the latter with the ideal opportunity to exploit the former and allow the diverse players to masquerade as RAs. The desperation and vulnerability of low-skilled workers stemming in part from their low levels of education and skills, extremely poor backgrounds, the type of work they do and the sectors they work in are exploited to the hilt.⁷¹

Role of Recruitment Agents

Available studies show clearly that the recruitment agents and intermediaries have been responsible for high migration costs and all kinds of malpractices in low-skilled labour migration, which substantially erode the development benefits of migration to the Middle East.⁷² Employment contracting in this region generally depends on the third-party intermediation by job-brokers.⁷³ They largely meet demand for information in the labour market and are able to extract much of the wage gain of migration. At present, there are only 1611 registered agents in India.⁷⁴ Out of these, 1334 agents are active.⁷⁵ Most of them are located in metropolitan cities,⁷⁶ with people in rural areas lacking access to them. Thus, people end up reaching out to large number of unregistered agents, subagents and other intermediaries (operating out of travel agencies, teashops, homes etc.) for migrating. In a large number of cases, such agents send uneducated/semi-educated persons on tourist and other such visas, and not on legal work visas/permit, by promising lucrative employment

⁷⁰ Gaur and Saxena (2010).

⁷¹ Dovelyn (2012).

⁷² Wickramasekara (2002), ILO (2008), Rajan et al. (2010), UNODC (2015).

⁷³ Based on Survey of 29 countries, Abella (2018).

⁷⁴ Parliament Standing Committee (2018).

⁷⁵ As on 17 July 2019 on <https://emigrate.gov.in>

⁷⁶ Major concentration of recruiting agents is at metropolitan cities such as Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, However, they are found throughout Kerala, being a traditional migrant sending state.

opportunities after extracting substantial amounts from them. Thereafter, these workers might be left in the foreign soil at the mercy of private employers (Parliament Standing Committee 2018).

Irregular Migration

Proliferation of vast illegal recruitment industry coupled with the desperation of poor to emigrate in search of high wages has spawned high growth of irregular migration⁷⁷ from India to the Middle East. Such migrants either enter the destination country illegally or their presence becomes illegal if they overstay their visa, if their sponsors file a suit charging them to be absconders or if they run away from genuine sponsors and work for another (Wickramasekara 2011). The visa trading system in these countries also results in making migrants irregular, when sponsors bring workers in excess of what is needed. Irregular migration is sustained by several factors such as migrants' willingness to suffer in search of better future; the network support to initiate and maintain an irregular status; and the "win-win" situation for key players such as sponsors selling visas, intermediaries charging fees and employers getting cheaper labour. Irregular workers are the most vulnerable to exploitation by their employers as they fear to approach their own missions for protection due to fear of being detected, and thus suffer abuse and untold misery. They live in daily fear of round-ups, abusive treatment in detention centres and mass deportation.

Limitations of Emigration Act, 1983

The emigration of Indian workers is governed by the Indian Emigration Act, 1983. It mandates the Protector General of Emigrants (PGoE) to regulate the recruitment process to prevent malpractices and ensure protection of emigrants. In pursuance of this, much of the focus of India's Emigration Act, 1983, is on regulating recruitment agencies.⁷⁸ Experience of more than three decades has shown that it has intrinsic limitations in meeting its intended objectives, including protection of migrants. Kumar and Rajan (2014) observe that protection is the cornerstone of the Act but emigration establishment has to spend substantial time on registration

⁷⁷ Referred to as "illegal", "undocumented" or "clandestine" migration.

⁷⁸ It is mandatory for agencies recruiting Indian nationals for overseas employment to register under the Act.

and clearance. The Parliament Standing Committee (2017) has strongly recommended strengthening the office and establishment of the PGoE.⁷⁹ In recent years, efforts to regulate RAs through eMigrate are noteworthy and are contributing to making registered RAs more responsible. Even list of Unregistered agents is being published on eMigrate. However, regulation of rogue, unregistered illegal intermediaries spread throughout the country largely responsible for migrant exploitation remains a key issue.

The Emigration Act has created a centralized regulatory architecture with central role of the PGoE, with limited role for the states. This implies that although states constitute to be the theatre of action on migration, even the major states of origin are peripheral players, with little or no capacity for migration management. Realizing this, recent efforts by the MEA to actively involve the states in regulation of recruitment industry and protection of potential migrants are in the right direction. It is a welcome step that the MEA has commenced the process of establishing “Videsh Bhawan” at various state capitals in India, to bring together its various offices under a single roof and work closely with states.⁸⁰ This would help in tackling the menace of illegal recruitment agents/subagents better.

The Standing Committee on the MEA (2017)⁸¹ is also of the opinion that administrative and operative measures can supplement but might not substitute legislation. It is noteworthy that the Indian government itself has been conscious of the need to modernize the legislative framework prescribed by the Emigration Act, 1983, and has been working towards bringing out a modern emigration law.

Bypass of eMigrate System

Quite a considerable section of the Indian population who possess ECR passports travels to the Gulf countries on legal tourist visa. However, on reaching the destination, they get their tourist visa changed to employment visa. Such people, along with the section of the population with non-ECR passports who travel to the ECR countries for employment, are not captured in the eMigrate emigration data.

⁷⁹ pp. 30.

⁸⁰ Presently, a pilot project has been initiated. Under it, four offices of MEA—Regional Passport Office (RPO), Protector of Emigrants (PoE) office, Branch Secretariat and Regional Office of ICCR—have been integrated at Videsh Bhavan in Mumbai.

⁸¹ pp. 32.

Irregular Migration of Women

A study by ILO (2016) finds that despite restrictions placed by several sending countries on the deployment of domestic workers to the GCC countries, labour recruiters have continued to facilitate their migration through the use of tourist visas, often resulting in irregular status, gaps in protection and vulnerability to exploitation. In India also, it appears that⁸² that illegal agents may be sending needy Indian women to the Gulf on tourist visas, which do not require oversight by Indian authorities and may be rendering the women vulnerable to exploitation.

Ineffective Reforms in Destination Countries

Various policy initiatives and reforms of illegal recruitment have not succeeded in equalizing the balance of power between employers and migrant workers (Chanda and Gupta 2018: 92). Critics have expressed concern that reforms remain largely cosmetic and any reforms that have been enacted are not enforced due to the lack of political will and capacity to implement and monitor them, leaving migrant workers unprotected as before.⁸³ For example, as regards kafala system, unless the whole structural issue pertaining to this exploitative system is addressed, reform measures to address it will only increase the enforcement and administrative costs (Diop et al. 2018: 42). Weak enforcement of existing laws allows for labour abuse to be rampant. Employers are rarely, if ever, prosecuted for violations of labour laws. In the present form, the kafala system gives unconditional power to the employer, and therefore, employees are voiceless to raise their grievances or to change the abusive employer. The fact is that low-skilled migrants in the Middle East occupy the lowest socioeconomic rung within the destination societies and have no lobbying power to positively influence destination country's policies towards them.

SECTION IV: SUGGESTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on literature review and analysis in this chapter, some suggestions are made in the following section for better protecting low-skilled Indian workers, especially those migrating to the Middle East:

⁸² Gurucharan (2013).

⁸³ Kristiansen and Sheikh (2014).

Developing a Comprehensive Migration Policy

In order to promote safe, orderly and regular migration and realize its full potential, a comprehensive migration policy covering all aspects of migration may be developed. As Gurucharan (2013) observes, this will serve the purpose of defining long-term goals, establishing needed institutional infrastructure, defining roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders, designing related programmes and developing coordinated action and interventions on a real-time basis.⁸⁴ To be effective, this policy needs to be aligned with overall development strategies, and therefore, should be consistent with human resource development, education and training, industrial policy and other relevant policies, and vice versa.⁸⁵

Comprehensive Migration Management Framework

India needs a robust migration management framework in line with the “defined migration policy”. It is suggested that in order to derive wider benefits from international migration, India may move from the narrow objective of *protection* of migrants to the broader goal of *liberalizing the mobility* of economic migrants, which would encompass the objective of their protection also. However, migrant’s protection would primarily be based on their *empowerment*. This implies that the migrants need to be equipped with sufficient knowledge and adequate skill sets in order to make an intelligent choice, to comprehend the process of migration better, to properly tackle the hazards encountered in it, to understand their rights and to seek redressal when needed. India’s current regulatory framework for emigration is based on Emigration Check Required (ECR), that is, prior approval to emigrate, based on exit control of specified categories of citizens. The objective is to protect those with poor educational qualifications or those going to destination countries with a relatively poor record of honouring workers’ rights. Over time, with empowerment being the basis of protection of migrants, India may consider replacing the system of Emigration Check Required (ECR) by the mandatory registration of all emigrants to facilitate emigration and capture data relating to all categories of emigrants to avoid malpractices. As noted by Kumar and Rajan (2014), this has the potential of shifting the burden of regulatory compliance and meeting the migration process standards to the recruitment industry.

⁸⁴ Gurucharan (2013).

⁸⁵ ESCAP (2018).

Legislative Reforms

A paradigm shift in the management of emigration is needed through a new emigration management law⁸⁶ in line with new realities and international conventions. The Parliament Standing Committee (2018)⁸⁷ has also recommended that a new legislation as part of a comprehensive emigration management framework may be brought before the Parliament at the earliest. Presently, three different functions are combined in one institution, with the PGoE being the policymaker, service provider and licensing authority and regulator. Modernizing the migration regulatory regime would require re-engineering the role of the state, with focus on strategic interventions—bilateral and multilateral engagement and overall policy formulation.⁸⁸ Management and regulation may be entrusted to an independent Migration Management Authority (as brought out by CDS studies of overseas emigration also)⁸⁹ to effectively manage the emigration process.

In early 2019, the Indian government has introduced *Draft Emigration Bill 2019* to replace the Emigration Act of 1983. It is based on whole-of-cycle migration approach and empowerment of the workforce through informed choices. The draft bill proposes a three-tier institutional framework, with the Ministry of External Affairs as the nodal ministry. At the top, for overall policy guidance and supervision of emigration management, Emigration Management Authority (EMA) is proposed. In the middle tier, a Bureau of Emigration Policy and Planning to formulate migration policies and a Bureau of Emigration Administration to handle operational aspects and welfare of emigrants with offices across the country are proposed. At the lowest level, nodal authorities in states and union territories are proposed to coordinate migration management. This is likely to provide the much needed policy coherence and coordination in managing safe migration. It is also hoped that steeper penalties along with the provisions for imprisonment provided in the draft bill along with effective enforcement would help in effective supervision of recruitment industry largely responsible for exploitation of migrants.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Overseas Indians Affairs Report (2014–2015).

⁸⁷ Parliamentary Standing Committee (2017).

⁸⁸ Gurucharan (2013).

⁸⁹ Rajan et al. (2011: 168).

Strengthening Enforcement of 1983 Act

As development of new architecture for emigration management may be few years away, administrative machinery under the 1983 Act may be further strengthened by larger manpower and budgetary provisions. Adopting a proactive approach, the PGoE may use all available resources to ensure safety and security of migrant Indian workers, especially in the Emigration Check Required (ECR) countries.⁹⁰

Curbing Abuse by Recruitment Agents

To curb recruitment-related abuses and to minimize recruitment costs paid by the workers remain fundamental objectives in migrant protection. In this context, bringing subagents and brokers into the formal sector, making employers and recruitment agencies accountable for respecting migrant workers' rights, incentivizing recruitment industry to become professional and adopt ethical recruitment practices, providing relevant training and authority to conduct programmes based on a certified curricula,⁹¹ evolving performance standards, regular performance monitoring and periodical rating of RAs, providing effective redressal mechanisms and harmonizing regulations governing RAs at origin and destination are some of the key goals. There is a need to increase the number of registered recruitment agents and ensure their spread across major migrant-sending states, particularly covering rural areas, so that the potential migrants have access to legal agents and do not fall easy prey to illegal agents. Given the extent and quantum of overcharging widely reported in media and validated by various surveys/studies, fines on illegal recruitment agents may be steeply enhanced to act as effective deterrent. The law enforcement agencies at central and state levels need to play a proactive role and ensure that stringent provisions of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC) are applied on erring agents. These aspects, hopefully, will be taken care of after the enactment of the new Emigration Management Act.

Minimum Wage Fixation

The operation of a referral wage has ramifications for both migration flows and migration outcomes. Given the consistent undervaluing of migrant labour overseas, the Indian government is wholly correct in its belief that

⁹⁰ Parliamentary Standing Committee (2018).

⁹¹ As in Sri Lanka.

a referral wage is not just important, but also necessary for workers' economic empowerment. Some scholars have however argued that high referral wages in India in some job categories might have made hiring from lower cost countries such as Bangladesh more attractive for Gulf employers.⁹² The solution lies in fixing how referral wage are determined. It is suggested that they may be fixed so as to strike a balance between the protection of Indian migrant workers in destination countries and not hindering international labour migration from India. This may entail surveying the prevailing market rates in the destination countries as well as drawing comparisons with prevailing wage rates in the rest of South Asia.⁹³ A 2016 ILO report recommends that referral wage may be fixed by a committee of stakeholders. Instead of having wages for specific occupations, wages may be fixed for broad categories (low-, semi- and highly skilled), and within the same category, there may be a wage band due to different skill levels of workers. This is worthy of being examined by India also.

Financing Migration

A critical vulnerability of migrant workers is their excessive dependence on the recruitment agent–moneylender nexus to emigrate for work. This magnifies the cost of migration while alarmingly raising the risk of migrants getting trapped under employment contracts lacking legality and also lured under the pretext of false promises. Hence, it becomes pivotal to consider and come up with policies to finance migration, including provision of soft loans to those migrating. This may reduce irregular migration and offer other benefits such as augmenting flow of remittance through formal and legal channels.⁹⁴

Reducing Labour Migration Costs

The reduction in the costs of migration including recruitment costs is an important element of migrant protection by way of reduction in debt burden on migrants and their families, reduction in their vulnerabilities abroad, stimulating regular migration and achieving better outcomes of migration

⁹² ILO (2016) study finds India's referral wage for carpenters and masons is 40 per cent and 10 per cent higher than that set by Nepal and the Philippines.

⁹³ *The Hindu Business Line* (2018).

⁹⁴ Timothy (2013).

and remittances. The United Nations has included the cutback on recruitment costs as one of its key clauses under the Sustainable Development Goals to boost a more orderly form of migration. Recruitment costs can be reduced significantly via regulation and monitoring of recruitment agencies, incentivizing well-behaved recruitment agencies, educating migrants about their rights, facilitating direct hiring,^{95,96} and effective cooperation between sending and receiving countries.

Augmentation of Capacity of Indian Missions

Over the last few years, Indian Missions in the Middle East countries have been considerably strengthened, and they endeavour to provide all kinds of required support to Indian migrant workers in case of distress. Study by Rajan and Suresh (2016) indicates that the Office of Labour Attachés (LA) in the Indian Missions in the destination countries may be further strengthened through appropriate institutional and technical support in order to better protect the Indian migrant labour workers. Given the magnitude of problems faced by Indian migrant workers in the Middle East, this implies providing even more labour welfare officers and more financial resources and other means to respond to migrant's needs in emergency. Enriching LAs with better training, utilizing services of retired officials and conducting more open days and communicative programmes are suggested. Public events, open house programmes and interpreter services of Indian Missions may be popularized more to further improve communication between Missions and migrants.

Empowerment of Migrants with Correct Information

The “first mile connectivity”⁹⁷—availability of migration-related information including how to get a passport—is most critical to safe migration. To minimize migrant's dependence on intermediaries, there is need to evolve well-defined system to disseminate information about the emerging labour demand in the destination countries as well as changes in their migration policies, required skills and qualifications expected of workers and migra-

⁹⁵ Abella (2018: 239).

⁹⁶ Such a system needs the full support of governments at both ends of the migration link.

⁹⁷ For example, migrants should know that they can get passport on demand as per procedure subject to fulfilling eligibility conditions.

tion procedures, and counsel them and narrow the information gap between promise and reality. There is a need to make migrants understand the economic and legal implications of working abroad including legal recourse avenues available in case of exploitation. The duration of training imparted under Pre-Departure Orientation and Training (PDOT) may be appropriately increased to enable potential migrants comprehend fully. Further, the contents of the training may be imparted in a vernacular medium, so as to facilitate easy comprehension and maximum information absorption by the candidates of the PDOT. Migrants may also be advised to contact the Indian Mission upon their arrival in their country of employment and contact the Mission officials regularly, so that the Mission is kept abreast about their latest employment details and, in case of any emergency, can swiftly come to their aid.

Need for Multi-Agency Collaboration

Protection of potential migrants requires close coordination amongst various central government departments as well as with state and local governments. As recommended by the Parliament Standing Committee (2018), a strong mechanism for grievances redressal system and penalties/punishment to unscrupulous/unregistered agents may be developed by the MEA in coordination with the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the state governments. Standing Committee's recommendation of setting up a nodal agency at the state/UT level to ensure better coordination between States/Union Territories and the MEA is vital for taking strong action against illegal recruitment agents. Close cooperation between the MEA and MHA to build up comprehensive database of those going abroad for either employment or tourism is also needed. This would help to address the issue of persons overstaying on tourist visas to obtain employment and also enable the MEA to help Indian workers abroad in difficulties.

Skilling: Diversifying the Destination Base

The issue of skills development is central to the future of work for migrant workers in the Middle East, both in the immediate term and long term (by 2030).⁹⁸ Prime Minister Modi's declaration to position India as the global

⁹⁸ ILO (2017a).

human resource (HR) capital and as a preferred country of origin to source human resources in 2015 is a highly welcome move.⁹⁹ This requires skilling and training of potential emigrant workers in line with the requirements of destination countries. This needs to be dovetailed with state governments and relevant institutions at the state level as ultimately the training takes place in states. MoUs between origin and destination countries on skills requirements, skill testing and certification are useful to promote recognition of prior learning and improve migrants' employability. Skill development is also one of the four priority areas for the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. Only training is not adequate. There is also a need to address international placement of trained workers. However, building skills recognition across borders is complex, requiring deeper collaboration within India (amongst government, private sector and civil society) and simultaneously with the governments and the employers in the countries of destinations.

Creation of Migration Information Systems

For effective policy formulation and emigration management, there is need to develop a comprehensive database to capture the trends and characteristics of labour outflows, encompassing all categories of migrant workers. Taking forward from the Abu Dhabi Dialogue and Colombo Process initiatives,^{100,101} sending and destination countries together could make efforts to collect data to feed into evidence-based policy-making, which would improve migration governance in the region. The MEA's proposal to register the Emigration Check Not Required (ECNR) passport holder giving basic data what is their profession, where are they going, which country are they travelling to and who will be their employer is a welcome move. This data will be useful for better policy formulation in the days to come. There is also need to conduct regular surveys of potential migrants, migrants in the destination countries and returned migrants and their families, and also develop the capacity to analyse the data collected using big data analytics. Investment in information systems will have long-term benefits leading to the effective development and implementation of migration policies.

⁹⁹ Mint (2016a). Pravasi Kaushal Vikas Yojana (PKVY) launched in 2015.

¹⁰⁰ ILO (2017b).

¹⁰¹ APMR (2015).

Role of Countries of Destination

Protection of migrants against exploitation and abuse is not possible without the cooperation of the destination countries. As described earlier, the Gulf countries have attempted some reforms to protect migrants; however, it is their implementation and adherence by local employers, which is a major weakness in their work environment. Success of reforms will depend on whether workers will have access to redressal mechanisms, when employers don't abide by the new regulations. Therefore, as noted by Abdul Rashid et al. (2018), as far as reforms are concerned; bolstering law enforcement capacity is a must in addition to strengthening worker welfare standards and closing legal loopholes. Destination countries will have to be nudged by the sending countries to give top priority to effective implementation of reforms. Further, lot more work is needed in the Gulf countries to establish a fair and justiciable system for migrant workers. The challenge for governments in the region is to develop policies that tackle discrimination while also helping to balance the legitimate concerns of both employers and workers.

Augmenting International Cooperation

The efficacious management of international migration requires the minimum policy harmonization, which depends on the cooperation between the sending and destination countries. In spite of not being very effective so far, existence of MoUs has political value and signals growing cooperation between source and destination countries. However, one-to-one MoUs between India and each Gulf country alone shall not suffice. In addition, pan-regional pacts are the call of the hour to tackle illegal migration across several Gulf states and other common issues. Hence, India should strengthen existing alliances like the Colombo Process¹⁰² with other labour-sending countries as well as pursue bilateral agreements with the GCC countries for enhancing welfare of its workers in the Gulf. Agreements may be supported by concrete proposals in the areas of model contracts, workplace monitoring, dispute resolution mechanisms, mechanisms for access to justice, monitoring of recruitment agencies and labour inspections systems (Wickramasekara 2012). Joint Working Groups (JWGs), under the agreements to be truly effective, need to be driven at

¹⁰²The Colombo Process shows the benefits of engaging in a cooperative forum among sending and receiving countries.

operational level rather than the policy level (Kumar and Rajan 2014). MoUs/Agreements should have inbuilt provision for their regular monitoring and evaluation. (Wickramasekara 2015; Shah 2018).

The Way Forward

It is clear that even after more than 15 years since our study in Lebanon, exploitation of Indian migrant workers, like workers from other sending countries in the Middle East, continues. This is despite the fact that India has undertaken extensive measures for protection of migrant workers, especially low-skilled workers. These include strengthened protection measures, operationalization of technological platforms like eMigrate, investment in skills development, engagement with the states as well as key-line ministries, cooperation with destination and other origin countries and, above all, the diplomatic engagement with the Gulf countries at the top level. However, several factors join together in continuing exploitation of migrant workers in the fiercely competitive labour markets in the Middle East. Based on extensive literature review, some suggestions have been made for better protection of Indian migrant workers to the Middle East and managing their emigration. However, it is clear that it is a long road ahead to ensuring fair recruitment and migrant protection in the Middle East.

For last few years, the Gulf countries have been grappling with falling oil revenues,¹⁰³ slower economic activity, unemployment among their nationals and the underlying threat of domestic unrests. As a result, the demand for migrant workers in most of the GCC countries has dropped substantially. In addition to the economic and demographic megatrends, changing political and social winds in the region are affecting the GCC economies and their labour markets also. Further, as many Asian origin countries including India introduce new strong measures to protect their workers, countries of destination are increasingly looking towards Africa. Since almost all the Asian countries have viable policies to enhance their levels of emigration, a drop in the demand for their emigrant workers might easily swell and aggrandize the levels of competition amongst all the sending countries. Consequently, this may take a substantial toll on the wages and the working conditions of the potential migrants who may eventually accept jobs¹⁰⁴ in the highly crowded labour markets in the Middle East.

¹⁰³ Although, recently, oil prices have risen to some extent, the Gulf economies have nevertheless suffered a major setback.

¹⁰⁴ Shah (2018).

Migration to the Middle East has undeniably brought immense benefits to individuals, households and the economy in India through valuable foreign exchange earnings. For over-populous countries like India, presently undergoing a demographic transition, migration to the Middle East relieves pressure on domestic economy, while it continues to be seen as a lifetime opportunity for economic mobility by the poor. On the Gulf countries side, despite efforts to reduce dependency on migrant workers and move towards knowledge-based economies, the demand for migrant workers is likely to remain in the short term, though at reduced level. Further, ongoing policies for nationalization of labour markets in the GCC countries may not have much impact on demand for low-skilled workers due to reluctance of national population to work in these jobs and little incentive for employers to abandon extremely cost-competitive labour-intensive processes.¹⁰⁵ The need of the hour is to ensure that Indian blue-collar workers do not lose out on available employment opportunities in the GCC countries to those from other countries.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, Indian government's proactive efforts to ensure that migrants do not fall prey to unscrupulous agents at home as well as to protect them in destination countries need to continue. Skill development policies in line with requirements of destination countries are likely to play an important role in this endeavour. This should ensure a steady flow of foreign exchange remittance to the needy households and the economy as well as relieve some pressure off labour markets in India.

International labour mobility should be a win-win for both the sending and destination countries. Future migration policy shifts are bound to not only pose regulatory and institutional challenges within countries, but also necessitate close government coordination between the sending and destination countries. If the sending countries enhance their cooperation with other countries as well as civil workers, employers and workers while enforcing well-thought-out policies resonating with the national development strategies that foster equitable recruitment, productive employment and strong migrant protection as per the international standards, beneficial outcomes can be expected.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that regulation works more effectively when migrants have alternative options at home and are not migrating out of distress. Therefore, it

¹⁰⁵ ILO (2017a).

¹⁰⁶ Parliament Standing Committee (2018).

¹⁰⁷ Asia Pacific Migration Report (2015).

can be derived that labour migration does not magically solve the deep-rooted problems of poverty and developmental lags that prevail at home. Instead, effective developmental policies would do a better job of opening up meaningful job opportunities right at home. In the long run, this would pave the way for migration by choice, and not out of the need to escape harsh poverty at home.

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Approaching Different Dimensions of Indian Labour Migration to the Gulf

Serhat Yalçın

TOWARDS APPROACHING SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION

Within the broad literature on migration, the main focus of research has been on migration towards the Western countries so that South-South migration has received relatively less academic attention. Yet, the migrant population originating from and living in the South grew from 57 million in 1990 to 90 million in 2015, representing an increase of 57 per cent (UNDESA 2016: 2). Thus, South-South migration flows, which are likely to be under-recorded, “could possibly be the dominant pathway or, at least, be as important as the South-North flows” (IOM 2013: 56). The Middle East takes a central place in this context. Beyond being an important source and transit region for migration flows towards Europe (Fargues 2004; Zohry 2013; Baldwin-Edwards 2005, 2006), the region is also one of the most important destination regions for refugees. In 2014, for instance, the top five destination countries for refugees were within the Middle East, hosting 9.4 million refugees (IOM 2008; UNHCR 2015;

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World Bank 2016). In 2016, the Middle East was hosting 45 per cent of all refugees globally (IOM 2017).¹

Importantly, the Middle East is also one of the main destination regions for South-South labour migration whereby the Gulf countries occupy a central position. Labour migration from South Asia, especially from India, plays a crucial role in this regard. More recently, Indian migration to the Gulf region has gained an increased academic interest. Especially the *India Migration Report*, published annually since 2010, has been an important contribution to the understanding of migration from India and from South Asia generally. Although earlier editions of the reports contained important contributions on Gulf migration, one of the more recent reports focuses almost exclusively on different political, economic and social aspects of Gulf migration (Rajan 2017). These attempts to understand Gulf migration have been further underpinned by other scholarly work, for instance, by Jain and Oommen (2016). These seminal works constitute an immense contribution to our understanding of different dimensions of Indian migration to the Gulf.

Importantly, however, the approach of the whole process of migration, from its initiation to return migration, has been largely absent. The most prominent research topics on Indian labour migration have been the elaboration of trends and patterns of Indian (and Asian) migration to the Gulf (e.g., Oommen 2015), the working and living conditions of migrant workers (e.g., Diop et al. 2017; Gardner 2010a, b) and whether the promotion of migration in order to reduce labour market pressures and the related remittances sent by migrant workers could be considered as part of a development strategy (e.g., Rahman 2015; Wickramasekara 2016). The most comprehensive and important works on Indian labour migration covering the whole process of migration are provided by Zachariah and Rajan (2011, 2015) on emigration experiences of return migrants which provide important insights. Therefore, this chapter could be considered as contribution to their work. Yet, contrary to their work which is based on large-scale household surveys, this chapter primarily builds on semi-structured interviews which allow for an in-depth analysis of migrants' experiences.

The aim of this chapter is therefore to contribute to the research on labour migration to the Gulf, with a specific focus on Indian labour migration. The main objective is to provide a broader perspective incorpo-

¹This is the reason why Arar et al. (2016) critically note that the real refugee crisis due to the civil war in Syria is in the Middle East and not in Europe.

rating the whole process of Indian labour migration to the Gulf region by analysing the migration process from its initiation to return migration. More specifically, the chapter analyses Indian labour migration to the Gulf on different dimensions by working out (1) the entry of migrant workers, that is, why and how migrants have migrated to the region, (2) the stay and work of migrant workers, that is, their working and living conditions and (3) the exit of migrant workers, that is, why they returned to India. The first section of the chapter will briefly outline how the data used for this study have been collected and analysed. The second section will go on to give an overview of the history and trends of labour migration to the Gulf region, especially emphasising the importance of Indian labour migration. In the third and main section, the results of the semi-structured interviews are analysed and discussed. The chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the study and the prospects for further research emanating from this study.

INTERVIEW DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This study is based on semi-structured interviews. The interviews were conducted during a research affiliation at the Tata Institute for Social Sciences (TISS) in Mumbai. Through collaboration with the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), the author conducted interviews during a fieldwork in Thiruvananthapuram in the summer of 2016. The interview partners were selected with the support of the research assistants at the CDS, based on migrant workers' destination country (Gulf countries) and the period of their work (more than 12 months). Overall, 18 male Indian migrant workers with an average age of 43 years were interviewed.² Five of the interviewed migrant workers occupied skilled positions. The countries they worked in included the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman. The period of employment covered by the interviews ranged from 1982 to 2015. The interviews were conducted at places chosen by migrant workers, mainly at their homes or at their workplaces, and lasted between 25 and 50 minutes. Only three interviews

²It is important to note in this context that female migration to the Gulf region is out of the analytical scope of this study. Yet, it is worth mentioning that this aspect of Gulf migration has not gained adequate attention. For female migration from Asia and India to the Gulf region, see Rajan (2015), especially Rajan and Joseph (2015), Kodoth (2015) and Potnuru (2015).

were conducted in English. All of the remaining interviews were conducted with the help of an interpreter with knowledge of English and Malayalam. The records of the interviews were transliterated, and the final transcripts of the interviews were used for this study.

The interviews proceeded according to the proposed analytical framework on the dimensions of entry, stay, work and exit of migrant workers which allows to approach the reasons for and the process of migration, the working and living conditions of migrant workers and the process of return migration. For the dimension of entry, questions included why and how migrant workers have migrated to the Gulf region and whether they have encountered any legal obstacles during this process. The questions for the dimension of stay and work included where and in which profession they have worked, whether they have encountered any problems regarding working conditions, how they would describe their relationship with their employers, what they did/would have done while encountering such problems and, finally, how they would describe their living conditions. On the dimension of exit, migrant workers were asked why and how they returned, whether they witnessed any deportations, how they would assess nationalisation policies in the Gulf countries and whether they have been affected by these policies, and whether they would consider migrating to the Gulf countries again. Whereas these questions provided a base to establish an analytical narrative about the whole process of Indian migration to the Gulf, the interviews also allowed for space to elaborate on related topics such as the overall attitude of Indian migrant workers towards the Indian state and the receiving Gulf states and their perception of and relation to Gulf nationals and other migrant workers with different skill levels.

HISTORY AND TRENDS OF LABOUR MIGRATION TO THE GULF

Migration to the Gulf region can be traced back at least to the nineteenth century when the expanding pearling industry created an increased demand for migrant labour (AlShebabi 2015; Davidson 2005; Jamal 2015). It was also during this period that Britain, of which the Gulf region (with the exception of Saudi Arabia) was a protectorate, was to a great extent involved in the systematic import of migrant labour and thus in the organisation of migration flows to the region. On the one hand, Britain

played an important role in establishing a specific form of regulating migration flows to the Gulf region of which some important characteristics such as the sponsorship system have endured to date (AlShebabi 2015: 5–6). On the other hand, Britain and later on the oil companies were also heavily interested in having a specific composition of migrants which would not pose a threat to the economic and political stability in the Gulf region. This basically meant to limit Arab migration and to encourage migration from Asia, preferably from the Indian subcontinent (AlShebabi 2015; Jamal 2015; Kumar 2016). The recruitment of Indian migrant workers after the discovery of oil took place either through the British administration or through recruitment agencies of oil companies in Mumbai.³ However, local merchants and businessmen in the Gulf region (often of Indian origin) also brought in-migrant workers through a sponsorship system (Errichiello 2012; Seccombe and Lawless 1986).

In Saudi Arabia, which has never experienced British control, it has been basically the oil company Aramco which has played a central role in the emergence of a modern working class from the 1930s onwards (Commins 2012; Niblock 2007). Aramco also played a central role in the composition of the labour force so that skilled workers were brought mainly from the USA, followed by semi-skilled workers from Italy. The cheap and unskilled workers were drawn mainly from the local Saudi population (AlShebabi 2015; Vitalis 2004, 2007; Errichiello 2012). Work and life at the oil fields were thereby organised along a specific spatial (and racial) organisation, with Saudi workers situated at the lowest level with the worst working and living conditions (Al-Rasheed 2010; Commins 2012; Vitalis 2004). This socio-spatial and racial segregation served as a means to gain social control, to hinder any effective organisations of workers and to keep down the labour costs. This situation was only challenged by a range of protests and strikes by Saudi workers from the 1940s onwards (Al-Rasheed 2010; Vitalis 2004). As a result of the prolonged series of strikes and the increased influence of Arab nationalism from the 1940s to the 1960s, “Saudi workers were drawn into the state, with guaranteed job security and numerous privileges of citizenship [...] while migrant workers filled positions in the rest of the economy” (Hanieh 2011: 61–62). The

³ If thought together with the analysis of Singha (2006) on the aim of Britain to introduce passports in India and to control and to redirect the flows of people out of India it becomes obvious that Britain was actively involved in regulating migration flows on both sides of the Arabian Sea.

Saudi workers were replaced initially by Arab and later by Asian migrant workers, including those from the Indian subcontinent.

Migration to the Gulf gained momentum from the 1970s onwards due to increased development projects. Currently, the region is the third-largest destination region after North America and Europe and the largest region hosting temporary migrant workers (Colton 2010; IOM 2008, 2017; Al Youha and Malit Jr. 2014). The number of migrants steadily increased from about two million in 1975 to more than 23 million in 2013, and the Gulf countries are leading the list of those countries with the highest shares of migrants and migrant workers in their population and labour force, respectively. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also continuously appear on the list of countries with the largest numbers of international migrants (Baldwin-Edwards 2011; ILO 2014; IOM 2010; Shah 2004).⁴

Indian labour migration to the Gulf region also gained momentum from the 1970s onwards as migration from Arab countries was restricted out of political concerns and decreased from 72 per cent in 1975 to 31 per cent in 1996. This decrease went along with a steady increase in the numbers of migrants from Asian countries (ILO 2009, 2014; IOM 2008; Kapiszewski 2006; Roper and Barria 2014; Shah 2013). India as the largest migrant source country worldwide in 2015 (IOM 2017) also constitutes one of the most important source regions for Gulf migration, and the big majority of Indian migrants in West Asia are in the Gulf region (Kohli 2014).⁵ The total number of Indian migrants in the Gulf countries increased from more than 6.8 million in 2013 to over nine million in 2018 (Sasikumar and Thimothy 2015; Wadhawan 2018). In 2013, Indian migrant workers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia together have also accounted for 53 per cent of the total overseas Indian workers, so that Indian migration to both of these countries also constitute two of the most important South-South migration corridors (Breeding 2012; Emirates 24/7 2013; UNDESA 2013; Zachariah et al. 2002). The share of Indian migrant

⁴ See on this also the different reports of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs on international migration.

⁵ The Indian state of Kerala can be considered as one of the most important migrant source regions in India. There are, however, not only important migration-related changes within Kerala but also increased migration from other Indian states such as Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh as employers in the Gulf have started to gain knowledge about the capabilities of workers from different regions of India (Breeding 2012; Zachariah and Rajan 2012).

workers at the total migrant stock in the Gulf countries in 2013 was around 20 per cent in Saudi Arabia, around 36 per cent in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE and almost 60 per cent in Oman (Sasikumar and Timothy 2015: 4).

The importance of Indian labour migration is also reflected in remittances sent from the Gulf region. Gulf remittances accounted for 18 per cent (almost US\$105 billion) of the total worldwide sent remittances in 2015.⁶ India, beyond being the leading remittance-receiving country worldwide in 2015 with almost US\$60 billion (IOM 2017),⁷ was also the largest receiving country of remittances from the Gulf. In 2015, India's share at the total of remittances sent from the Gulf ranged from more than 20 per cent in Saudi Arabia, 40 per cent in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait, to almost 50 per cent in Bahrain and even to more than 70 per cent in Oman.⁸ Remittance flows from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to India are also among the worldwide top ten remittance corridors (Bellman 2015; The Economic Times 2016a; World Bank 2016). Overall, 52 per cent of the remittances received by India are from the Gulf countries (Wadhawan 2018).

DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF INDIAN LABOUR MIGRATION TO THE GULF

Entry: The Reasons and the Process of Indian Labour Migration

Many scholars have noted that the prospects of higher wages and the related aim to repay debts are the main reasons for migration to the Gulf and that migration mainly takes place through two channels. First, through one of the almost 2000 licensed recruitment agencies in India which often do not provide sufficient information or even give misinformation to the migrant workers regarding wage levels and working and living conditions

⁶ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data> (accessed 20.06.2016).

⁷ Remittances sent to India steadily increased from US\$0.08 billion in 1970 to US\$13 billion in 2000. They reached US\$70 billion in 2014 (Rajan et al. 2010; Kohli 2014; Weiner 1982).

⁸ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data> (accessed 20.06.2016).

and often demand higher fees than officially allowed.⁹ Second, through relatives or friends who are already working in the Gulf and who provide important information on or even organise the migration process. This is considered to be a result of the importance of connectedness and informal networks in the Indian society which also influences migration decisions and processes (Breeding 2012; Heller 2015; Osella and Osella 2012; Rajan et al. 2010; Zachariah and Rajan 2011; Zachariah et al. 2002).

The interviews largely confirm these arguments. Thus, with the exception of one of the workers who mentioned that he was passionate about working in the Gulf and joining his friends already there, all of the migrant workers stated that they decided to migrate because of financial reasons. The prospects for a better job with higher salaries were the main factors mentioned. In some cases, the fact of being unemployed and the need to repay debts were explicitly mentioned. Although some have noted that they did not really benefit financially from migrating, the prospects of “financial betterment” still hold a strong position in the narratives of the migrant workers. One interesting point, however, reveals itself in comparing the answers of low-skilled and skilled migrant workers. Whereas the financial aspect is almost the sole reason put forward by low-skilled migrant workers, some of the skilled migrant workers additionally also emphasised their desire for a change in their life or their aim to gain more professional experience in an international context.

Only one of the workers migrated through a direct contact with a firm operating in Saudi Arabia. Of the remaining workers only two migrated through a recruitment agency. One of them noted that he was cheated by the recruitment agency which provided him with a visiting visa instead of an employment visa so that he was, after one month of stay, caught by the police, jailed and thereafter deported. It was only after he paid his debt to the same recruitment agency in India that he found an employment opportunity and migrated again, this time, however, through one of his friends who found a sponsor for him. The remaining migrant workers migrated to the Gulf through relatives (especially uncles, fathers and brothers) or friends already working there who gave them the necessary information on vacancies, found a local sponsor for them or provided them with a visiting visa which would enable them to come to the Gulf and look out for a job.

⁹Breeding (2012) notes that beyond the legal recruitment agencies, there are also unlicensed recruitment agencies and thousands of informal “subagents” working for the recruitment agencies and that most of the recruitment agencies have increasingly started “fishing for candidates” in remote rural areas by making use of “subagents”.

*Work and Stay: Working and Living Conditions
of Indian Migrant Workers*

The working and living conditions of migrant workers constitute one of the most salient aspects of Gulf migration. International human rights and labour organisations as well as many scholars have noted that migrant workers, including those from India, face severe working and living conditions (Gardner 2010a; Heller 2015; Misra 2014; Zachariah and Rajan 2011; Zachariah et al. 2002, 2003, 2004). Alongside the fact that some of the interviewed workers complained about the harsh weather conditions and working in an environment with dangerous chemicals, there are several points which the interviews with the low-skilled migrant workers indicate. First, almost all of the migrant workers had to work overtime, ranging from 2 to 4 hours. However, in most of the cases, they stated that they were paid for the overtime work. Second, there are still problems encountered regarding annual and sick leaves. Many of the workers said that there was no sick leave or that it would be deducted from their salary and that they would get an annual leave after two or even after five years of work. Third, there are still cases where the promised wage before departure was reduced (sometimes up to 50 per cent) after arrival. Fourth, many of the migrant workers mentioned that their salaries did not improve during their stay, that there were problems with the payment during the financial crisis in 2008, that they received only one salary every three months, and the duration increased to every 4–5 months ahead of and during the financial crisis and that, in some cases, parts of their salaries were not paid at all. With regard to the living conditions of low-skilled migrant workers, it has to be first noted that, with some exceptions, accommodation was provided for free by the company. Most commonly, four persons shared one room in a flat. But there were also workers who shared one room with six, eight, 16 or even 18 workers. In one of the cases, the workers were removed from the flat and accommodated in a shelter/cabin in the aftermath of the financial crisis, whereas some others have been accommodated in shelters/cabins from the beginning.

The working conditions of the skilled workers illustrate that they did not really face any problems regarding working conditions, annual and sick leaves as well as regarding the payment of salaries. Their working time was thereby usually between 6–8 hours, and they had no problems with the payment of their salaries. In most of the cases there was a paid sick leave and also generous leave regulations. For instance, one of the skilled

workers had 60 days of annual leave per year and additionally “casual leaves” of 1–2 days if his friends or family visited him. It is maybe from this backdrop that some of the skilled migrant workers described their relationship to their employers as “very good”, “very nice” or even “excellent”. In the case of living conditions too, skilled workers had better conditions. Whereas one of them had to share one room with four persons, others had to share their room with another worker or were even provided with staff apartments with attached bathrooms. It was noted that supervisors were provided a flat if they decided to bring their families to the country. One of the workers who had the option to be accommodated in a flat for his own noted that he preferred to share a flat for six persons with his friends already working in the country. This may indicate that sharing a flat with friends/countrymen is a better option in order to have social interaction. In fact, also among the low-skilled workers, it was only one worker who complained about sharing one room with 18 workers and about the hygienic conditions there. Despite the fact that their accommodation could be considered as overcrowded, almost none of the low-skilled workers complained about it. They even explicitly mentioned that their accommodation was not overcrowded, although some of them had to share a room with eight or even 16 persons. This may be taken as an indication of the desire or the need of the workers to socialise which becomes more important considering that social relations in India are an important part of the daily life and considering that they are facing a social exclusion from the society of the country they migrate to.

A last important point to look at is which kind of strategies Indian migrant workers did or would have deployed when encountering problems regarding their working and living conditions. One of the institutions mentioned was the Indian embassy which, according to some, was beneficial for some workers. Another institution which was also mentioned was the labour courts in the Gulf countries. But none of the migrant workers had ever approached these institutions. Others, on the other hand, mentioned that they would have approached the management or the foreman of the company when encountering problems. Overall, however, it should be noted that the low-skilled migrant workers felt relatively helpless at getting help regarding the problems they (would) encounter. One of the workers said that his employer was a very rich man so that no one could put forward complaints and that they, as a result, had to adjust to the situation. Other migrant workers noted that

if they would put forward complaints, the employer or manager would not be helpful but would instead respond that they could return to India if they wished.

In fact, although some of the low-skilled migrant workers also mentioned the labour courts and the Indian embassy as institutions, they also indicated that they did not really expect to get results from approaching them. One of the workers said regarding the labour courts:

We can go to the labour court. But for that we have to take free. The company owners then know that I went to labour court. Then I will lose my job. So, no one is going to the labour court.

Some workers also mentioned that going to the labour court does not really help because at the labour courts, “Their belongings are with Arabic peoples” and because migrant workers “will not be priority”.¹⁰

Complaining at the Indian embassy is equally seen as not really helpful by many migrant workers. Whereas one of the workers said in this context that the Indian embassy is not stronger than the government, another one noted that they also fear to approach the embassy because they could lose their jobs. Interestingly, one of the migrant workers pointed that other embassies, especially that of the Philippines, are supporting their workers and that he wishes “a total change” in this sense. As a result of the aforementioned situation, many of the low-skilled migrant workers only talked amongst themselves about their problems without being really able to push for changes. One of them said in this context: “We can’t do anything against that. [...] We can’t organise. [...] It’s better not to complain”. Another worker pointed to another important aspect by saying that “There is no time. Actual problem is that there is no time. The migrants have to do normal work along with their overtime. So, there is no time to organise”.¹¹

¹⁰See on this also Keane and McGeehan (2008) who, in the case of the UAE, illustrate how difficult and expensive it is for migrant workers to approach labour courts.

¹¹Note in this context also Gardner’s (2010a) note that even “the Hindu/Muslim tensions that South Asian men often report as paramount in their home countries are extremely muted in the labor camps. As the men have noted to me, the difficult working conditions they often face in the Gulf states allow no time or energy for these conflicts. As one Indian migrant noted to me, ‘politics is a luxury we cannot afford here’” (p. 56).

Skilled migrant workers were less ready to talk about existing problems and how to deal with them. One of them straightforwardly said that the “UAE is good for workers” and that “Companies cannot cheat you because labour courts are strong”. Another skilled worker also positively referred to the labour courts in the UAE and said that “There is no difference between migrant or the local people”. Some have also positively stated that the management of the company would try to solve the problems. Only two of the skilled workers have explicitly acknowledged the problems which the low-skilled migrant workers face. But they noted that they were careful at not intervening as this could create problems for themselves. One of them said in this context that they were aware of the problems of the “labourers” and that they sometimes talked about it, but that they were not “going too deep in that”. He noted: “I never interacted with labourers. [...] We not directly involve because we don’t know the proper situation or we don’t know the local language. [...] Because of this fear we are not involving”.

Exit: The Return of Indian Migrant Workers

A last point to be looked at is why and how migrant workers returned to India. This aspect is important because return migration has become a central aspect of Indian migration to the Gulf whereby it is noted that the majority of the workers do not want to migrate again (Zachariah and Rajan 2011). Recent surveys not only found that there is a decline in the number of Indians migrating to the Gulf countries but also that “The number of ‘return migrants’ appear to be more than the numbers we had before” (S. Irudaya Rajan, cited in Badam 2018; see also Rajeev 2017).¹² Additionally, within the literature on the exit of Indian migrant workers out of the Gulf countries, it is also often mentioned that deportation is a common practice (Gardner 2010b). Heller (2015) notes that between 2007 and 2010, more than 200,000 Indian workers have been deported from the Gulf countries, and the MOIA (2011) reports that in 2010/2011 alone, almost 64,000 Indian migrant workers have been deported. There are also more recent examples of deportations whereby the reasons include

¹² Apart from the economic slowdown in the Gulf countries, the decline of Indian (and Pakistani) migration to the Gulf should also be seen in the context of increased migration from Bangladesh to the Gulf from 2013 onwards due to the lifting of earlier restrictions on recruiting Bangladeshi workers (Wadhawan 2018).

undocumented entry, overstaying visiting visa, working undocumented and participating in workers' protests and strikes (Gulf Times 2015; Heller 2015; "Labour strikes in the GCC" 2014; MOIA 2011; Mothaparty 2015; The Economic Times 2016b).

One of the critiques put forward in the context is that the Indian state has not taken the necessary steps to deal with the problems related to deportations. Although India has established an Overseas Workers Resource Centre (OWRC) in the UAE (Dubai) and intends to set up another one in Saudi Arabia, the functioning of these centres is considered to be debatable (Heller 2015; The Economic Times 2016b). Additionally, some of the cases of workers' protests and strikes in which Indian migrant workers also took part illustrate that the Indian state, instead of advocating for the demands of the Indian migrant workers, puts more emphasis on respecting the laws of the countries they work in. For instance, in 2014, a group of Indian migrant workers from Kerala went on a strike in Saudi Arabia to demand better salaries; the Indian embassy declared that "the embassy would like to alert all Indian nationals in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against the nefarious attempts of such self-styled social workers and illegal agents" and added that "Anyone who is found to be in violation of Saudi laws and indulge in strike-related activities would face penalty, imprisonment and deportation by Saudi authorities" (cited in "Labour strikes in the GCC", 2014; The Times of India 2014).

In the case of the interviews, with the exception of one of the migrant workers, all have returned to India. Two of them returned because of health reasons. Some of the others came back on a leave and did not go back because their family members got sick, they wanted to re-join their families, they wanted to be there for the "character formation" period of their sons or because they married; some others returned because they did not want to work there anymore and instead wanted to open a shop in India, because they were not satisfied with their jobs and salary levels, especially due to the financial crisis, or because they had saved enough money to repay their debts. Thus, in most of the cases, the dissatisfaction with the company, the related salary levels and the fact of remaining far away from their families for longer periods were main reasons to return to India.

With regards to deportations, more than half of the workers said that they did not hear or witness any deportation. Only one of the interviewed migrant workers was deported after his first attempt because he arrived on

a visiting visa and overstayed. But he reports that as he migrated later again, some of the workers at his company were deported. Some other workers also said that there were deportations in their company because of salary demands. Beyond this, however, many of the migrant workers said that there were no deportations in their company, but they heard of deportations in other companies because of visa problems and salary demands. Thus, although only one of the workers interviewed experienced deportation, the interviews indicate that deportations nonetheless continue to be a central part of Gulf migration.

Only a small part of the interviewed workers said that they would migrate again, mainly because of financial reasons. An interesting aspect is that some of the workers who returned because of health problems also stated that they would migrate again. Three other workers who had said that their migration was financially not beneficial and that “There is no freedom. [...] It is better to stay in India. Here you have more freedom” also stated they would consider migrating again. The majority of the workers, mainly with reference to their salary problems and the fact of being away from their families, said that they would not migrate again and that it was a good decision to come back. Whereas one of them stated that “Here [in India] it’s a tension-free life”, another one said that “Labour is very difficult in the area [the Gulf]”.

CONCLUSION: INDIAN LABOUR MIGRATION AND EMERGING RESEARCH TOPICS

The aim of this chapter was to shed some light on South-South migration by approaching different dimensions of Indian labour migration to the Gulf countries. Based on semi-structured interviews, the chapter has approached the migration process on the dimensions of entry, stay, work and exit of Indian migrant workers. First, the interviews confirm the argument that informal networks and connectedness are the main aspects at initiating migration processes to the Gulf region but that migration through recruitment agencies equally remains important. Second, migration because of financial incentives builds the main block of the narratives of the Indian migrant workers, although they may not achieve the expected financial gains. Third, whereas the skilled migrant workers usually did not complain about their working and living conditions, many of the low-skilled workers often pointed to the problems mentioned in the literature on Gulf migration. Fourth, the interviews reveal that migrant workers

mainly talk among themselves about problems regarding their working and living conditions without taking any action. Although many of the migrant workers mention the Indian embassy or the labour courts as places to go, there are only a few of them who believe that they could really get help from these institutions. Fifth, the interviews also illustrate that migrant workers returned to India because of health reasons, because they wanted to re-join their family, because they were not satisfied with their jobs and wage levels or because they had saved enough money. The majority of them stated they would not migrate again, whereas only a few mentioned that they would migrate again for financial reasons. Fifth, although only one of the interviewed workers was deported, the interviews indicate that deportations remain a real fact for many migrant workers in the Gulf.

By way of concluding, three less researched aspects of Indian migration to the Gulf emanating from the interviews should be mentioned. First, it has been often noted by scholars that the Indian state and other sending countries have remained ineffective regarding the problems and rights of especially low-skilled migrant workers (Davidson 2014; Heller 2015; Weiner 1982).¹³ The effects of official declarations of the Indian state to focus on the problems of Indian migrant workers in the Gulf region have so far remained limited (Misra 2014; Heller 2015).¹⁴ In fact, the interviews conducted with Indian migrant workers also indicate that they do not have big expectations of getting help from the Indian embassy,

¹³Weiner (1982), for instance, reports from two cases in the 1970s and 1980s, where the Indian state has attempted to restrict migration to the Gulf due to the working and living conditions as well as due to the mistreatment of workers. He notes that this attempt has been criticised by those Indians who wanted to migrate to the Gulf, so that the restrictions were eased again. Davidson (2014: 276) reports from the case of the Nepalese ambassador to Qatar who has criticised the situation of their nationals in Qatar “was, however, promptly recalled to Kathmandu within days”. Important economic linkages through investments, oil and remittances are some of the reasons put forward for the reluctance of the sending states to deal effectively with migrant workers’ problems.

¹⁴Heller (2015) argues that whereas Indian embassies “safeguard” Indian companies operating in the Gulf, they do not visit labour camps with the excuse of not having enough staff. He further notes that “In a reply under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI) dated 18 June 2013, the EoI [Embassy of India] in Kuwait admitted that if a complaint is received from an Indian worker working in a reputable company, and if no previous complaints have been received against the company, then there will be no labour camp visits to investigate the complaint lodged by worker(s). This practice by the EoI clearly showed how far the EoI distanced itself from workers in getting out of trouble” (Heller 2015: 711–712).

which principally confirms the findings of Zachariah and Rajan (2011) who note that, according to their study, only a small minority of workers have approached the Indian embassy regarding problems and that only half of them got a positive response from the embassy. More recently, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, and both states concluded economic, political and defence agreements. During this visit, the prime minister also met with the representatives of Indians in Saudi Arabia but did not mention or conclude any agreement on the working and living conditions of the Indian migrant workers (Hindustan Times 2016; Panda 2016). During this visit, Malayalam TV channels in Kerala critically reported on the fact that the prime minister did not mention the working and living conditions of the Indian migrant workers and questioned why he did not visit any of the labour camps.¹⁵ There is a need for more empirical research on the reasons for this state of art, and especially on the perceptions of the migrant workers and on the perspective of the Indian state. The few studies attempting to analyse migration policies of the Indian state (e.g., Kumar 2017) and to comparatively analyse how different states/embassies deal with this problem (e.g., Heller 2015; Rajan and Mishra 2007) should be further developed and empirically extended, especially in the context of the general problems of migrant rights in the Gulf region (Hanieh 2015; Martin 2012; Keane and McGeehan 2008).

Second, the interviews have indicated that there are some important differences between skilled and low-skilled migrant workers not only regarding their working and living conditions but also regarding their perceptions of each other as well as regarding their perceptions of their employers and nationals. For instance, some of the skilled workers either blended out the problems of the low-skilled workers or were careful at not getting involved in their problems or even avoiding to establish any social contacts with them. This difference reveals itself also in the context of the perception of nationalisation policies in the Gulf countries. Thus, many of the low-skilled migrant workers were aware that they would not be affected by nationalisation policies by noting that “Migrant workers do the hard job, normal work is done by locals”, that “Risky jobs are belonging to these migrant people and easy jobs for locals”, or that “Labourers will always be migrant peo-

¹⁵Personal communication with Prof. T. V. Sekher from the International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, India, 15.06.2016.

ple”. Some of the skilled workers, on the other hand, although not directly affected by nationalisation policies, were aware of the increased nationalisation efforts. For instance, one of the skilled workers said that the UAE

is a nice destination for people who are having skilled jobs. [...] But the thing is that now the current situation is changing. They want to put everything in their own families or Arabs there. [...] The old charm is not there.

In short, intra-class differences and perceptions within the migrant working class are aspects which have gained relatively less academic attention and which need to be further researched.

Third, and finally, it has been illustrated that historically and at present India has been an important source country for labour migration to the Gulf region. Equally important is, however, that India also had important historical economic linkages with the Gulf region and that these economic linkages have further improved during the last decades, especially due to increased investments by Indian companies. The number of Indian companies in the Gulf steadily increased, with 45,000 Indian companies operating only in the UAE in 2014. According to Alpen Capital, an Indian Dubai-based investment bank, India was even the third-largest investor in the UAE in 2014, and in Dubai alone, the Indian membership of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DCCI) has risen by 41 per cent between 2009 and 2013. The president of the DCCI declared in 2014 that they were witnessing a yearly average increase of 2000 Indian companies setting up a business in Dubai (Economist Intelligence Unit 2014; Cernigoi 2014; Invest 2014). One of the indications of the interviews conducted with the Indian migrant workers was also that many of them worked for an Indian company or for a company belonging to a national but operated by an Indian. In many cases the managers of the companies were also from India. In fact, this indicates a specific case of “double transnational mobility” (Altreiter et al. 2015) with capital and labour flows from the same source region (India) to the same target region (Gulf). This important fact, and whether it could be also considered as a spatial relocation of class relations, is insofar another equally crucial aspect of the overall relations between India and the Gulf region which needs to be further researched.

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Kerala Emigrants in the Gulf

S. Irudaya Rajan and K. C. Zachariah

INTRODUCTION

The flow of emigration from India has increased significantly during the past two decades, which can be attributed to globalisation and the changing socioeconomic structure of the country. India is emerging as a migration hub of the world; the percentage of the total Indian migration to international migration stock was 6.39 per cent in 2015, up from 4.40 per cent in 1990; about 8.8 million migration stock increased between the years (United Nations 2015). In a global context, South Asian links with the Gulf goes a long way, since the time when West Asian ports were important elements in maritime trade. The discovery of the oil resources led to an economic boom in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries, which attracted a massive influx of migrant workers from South Asian countries, particularly from India (Oommen 2016; Rajan 2017, 2019). Among South Asian countries, India has a major presence in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries, accounting for 1.95 million

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people in 1990, which increased to 8.18 million in 2015 (United Nation 2015). The Gulf region is one of the major destinations for emigrants, especially attracting Indian emigrants. In 2015, Indian emigrants in the Gulf region accounted for 52.52 per cent of the total Indian migrant stock, which increased from 29.11 per cent in 1990 (United Nation 2015). Among the overseas emigration, most people that emigrate from India are contractual labours; the initial flow of contractual labour from India started with a relatively small figure of just 0.16 million in 1985, and had reached to 0.80 million in 2014 (Zachariah and Rajan 2012a, b). The contractual labours from India to the Gulf countries accounted for 0.77 million in 2017. Out of the total of 0.80 million Indian migrant workers who had migrated overseas in 2014, about 96 per cent of the workers end up in the GCC countries. However, this flow of Indian labour emigration to the Gulf countries was 0.81 million in 2008. Furthermore, as a result of the global economic crises and its impact in 2009, there was a decline in contractual labour to 0.59 million (see Table 8.1).

Indian emigrants' contribution to economy through remittance accounted for 3.4 per cent of the GDP in 2014 or around US\$70 billion remittance received from overseas migration in 2014 (World Bank 2015). At the same time, India received more than half of the remittance from Gulf, and it accounted for US\$35 billion in 2014 (World Bank 2015). Among the states of India, Kerala has been receiving significant remittance from the Gulf, mainly due to Kerala-Gulf migration corridor, which is one of the largest in India. The present paper looks at trends of Keralites in the Gulf and its impact on state economy based on the Kerala Migration Surveys.

Table 8.1 Outflow of migrant workers from India to Gulf, 2005–2014

<i>Year</i>	<i>India</i>
2005	454,628
2006	618,286
2007	770,510
2008	818,315
2009	592,299
2010	610,409
2011	603,159
2012	722,139
2013	785,291
2014	775,862
2015	691,365

Sources: Compiled by authors from MOIA Annual Report (2012–2013, 2014–2015)

SOURCES OF DATA

The study was based on various rounds of Kerala Migration Surveys undertaken by Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram. The study used five rounds of Kerala Migration Surveys, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2011 and 2014. For 1998, the data were collected from 10,000 households in 200 localities selected randomly from all the 14 districts of the state, based on the 1991 Census. This was the first migration survey. The second survey was conducted in 2003; it was developed on the basis of the panel data from 125 localities with 40 households each. About 5000 household from the 1998 survey were included in the 2003 survey. In addition, 5000 households were surveyed from 100 new localities. The 2008 survey was conducted 10 years after its first migration survey in 1998. In this survey, the sample size was enhanced to 15,000 household from 10,000 households in the earlier three migration surveys. The 2011 study also included 15,000 households, selected by stratified multistage random sampling technique and covering all the 63 taluks of the state. Like the earlier round of survey, the Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) 2014 is also based on primary data collected from 15,000 households selected at random by a stratified multistage random sampling technique covering all the 63 taluks in the state.

PROCEDURES FOLLOWED IN ESTIMATING THE TOTAL EMIGRANTS IN KERALA

Ratio method has been used to estimate the total number of migrants in Kerala during this survey period (2014). In this survey, to estimate the total emigrants from Kerala, two separate approaches in the ratio method have been employed. Here, the first method is referred to as household method in which the migrant ratio in the sampled locality is used with the same locality HHs number. The second method is referred to as population method in which the migrant ratio in the sampled locality is used with the same locality population.

For the estimation, the key variables included are (1) total emigrants in the sampled locality (sample), (2) total HHs sampled in the selected locality (50) and (3) from India Census data, total number of HHs from the sampled locality (see more details, Zachariah and Rajan 2015).

Then, emigrants (EMI) is estimated using the following steps:

$$\text{EMI (for taluk)} = \left[\left\{ \text{sum of } (H_i \times (m_i / h_i)) \right\} / \text{sum of } H_i \right] \times H$$

Where,

m_i = Number of EMIs in the sample HHs in the i th locality,
 h_i = Number of HHs in the sample in the i th locality,
 H_i = Number of HHs in the i th locality from the census, and
 H = Total number of HHs in the taluk from census

Similar technique is used to estimate different kinds of migration in every district like return out-migrants (ROM), out-migrants (OMI) and return emigrant (REM).

Population method: using population in ratio method

Here, by applying sample population in the chosen locality, we derived the total migrants in the particular locality; also, in the very same locality, migrants are estimated per population. The following formula is used to estimate EMI.

$$\text{EMI (per taluk)} = \left[\left\{ \text{sum of } (P_i \times (m_i / p_i)) \right\} / \text{sum of } P_i \right] \times P$$

Where,

m_i = Number of EMIs in the sample HHs in the i th locality,
 p_i = Population in the sample in the i th locality,
 P_i = Population in the i th locality from the census, and
 P = Total population in the taluk from census

KERALA: GULF MIGRATION TRENDS

In the mid-1970s, oil price hiked, and this impacted the West Asia region; it enabled them to receive a large amount of revenue from oil exporting and this revenue accelerated the process of urbanisation in this region. Moreover, during this time, there was an increased demand for labour to the growing urban Gulf region. As a result, large number of labour migrated to the Gulf, the majority being Indians. According to the United Nations, 2015, Indian migration stock is registered at 8.1 million in the GCC countries, from 1.9 million in 1990. Of this, emigration from Kerala

Table 8.2 Gender-wise emigrants in the Gulf region

<i>Keralites in the Gulf</i>					
<i>Year</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2014</i>
Male	1,172,457	1,403,767	1,726,134	1,786,714	1,823,861
Female	105,112	231,345	220,217	244,403	243,456
Total	1,277,569	1,635,112	1,946,351	2,031,117	2,067,317

Source: Compiled by the authors from various rounds of Kerala Migration Surveys

to the Gulf region was estimated to be about 1.27 million in 1998, and it rose to 2.06 million in 2014. Table 8.2 indicates that male emigration from Kerala to the Gulf region is more compared to female emigration. The estimated number of male emigrants accounted for 1.1 million in 1998, and it increased to 1.8 million in 2014.

Considering female emigration, it is often very culture-specific; it is very common in some cultures, but not so common in others. However, in Kerala, it is not common, at least not yet. Information on female emigration from Kerala is relatively rare (Percot and Rajan 2007). But as of now the female emigrants from Kerala to the Gulf region have shown a considerable increase, as female emigration from Kerala is favourable. Emigration trends to Gulf had increased from 1.3 million to 2.1 million between 1998 and 2014, mainly because education plays a major role for female emigration, and Kerala accounts for higher literacy rates in India. It supported the opening up of higher educational opportunities for females through private and self-financing institutions, which will further encourage female emigration in near future.

Table 8.3 indicates that increasing emigration trends in Kerala-Gulf migration between 1998 and 2014 are noticeable, but at district levels, emigration to Gulf has its ups and downs over this period. The largest number of emigrants from Kerala to Gulf originated from Malappuram district; it accounted for 15.62 per cent of the total Gulf migration of Kerala in 2014, followed by Kannur (15.33 per cent) and Kasargode (11.27 per cent). This was followed by Pathanamthitta, Thrissur and Kozhikode districts which also have significantly high number of emigration to the Gulf. At the same time, Wayanad and Idukki registered least number of emigrants. During 1998, the total number of Gulf migrants had increased in most districts of Kerala, but during the last 16-year period, four districts, namely Thiruvananthapuram, Ernakulam,

Table 8.3 Migration from Kerala to the Gulf region by districts of Kerala

	1998	2003	2008	2011	2014
Thiruvananthapuram	144,764	146,662	198,350	168,516	128,507
Kollam	99,972	121,423	157,915	148,428	156,803
Pathanamthitta	88,287	116,648	168,297	125,550	169,771
Alappuzha	57,776	81,858	102,727	119,970	100,802
Kottayam	35,704	63,440	79,231	94,860	91,370
Idukki	4544	4093	8743	11,160	27,116
Ernakulam	96,726	96,183	81,963	68,634	65,433
Thrissur	144,764	160,305	225,670	188,604	159,750
Palakkad	90,883	139,158	127,315	116,064	66,612
Malappuram	268,106	291,960	330,036	310,806	320,089
Kozhikode	119,447	153,484	163,379	179,118	178,613
Wayanad	4544	4093	38,796	68,076	39,495
Kannur	85,041	191,684	116,387	217,620	314,195
Kasaragod	37,652	63,440	142,615	213,714	231,077
Total	1,278,211	1,634,430	1,941,422	2,031,118	2,049,633

Source: Same as Table 8.1

Thrissur and Palakkad, have experienced decreases in the number of Gulf migration. The largest increase was in Kasargode and Kannur from 2.95 and 6.65 per cent to 11.27 and 15.33 per cent, respectively, of the total Gulf emigration from Kerala (Rajan and Zachariah 2018, 2019).

THE GULF EMIGRATION RATE BY DISTRICT

Malappuram district has the highest number of Gulf emigration rate (emigrants per 100 household) in all periods (Fig. 8.1). During 2008, emigration from Malappuram to the Gulf had a peak of 53 per 100 HHs, but it slipped down to 48 per 100 HHs in 2011 and 46 per HHs in 2014. Thrissur and Pathanamthitta followed, accounting for 36 and 31 per 100 HHs in 2008, which showed a marked decline to 26 and 29 in 2014. Districts Idukki and Wayanad had the least emigration rate.

Corresponding to 100 households in the state, there were 20 Gulf emigrants in 1998; it rose to 24 in 2003; however, there was no change during 2003–2014. Between 1998 and 2014, Kerala to Gulf emigration had gone up from 1.27 million to 2.04 million, and the total emigration of




Fig. 8.1 Kerala to Gulf migration per 100 HHs. (Source: Same as Table 8.1)

Kerala from 1.36 million to 2.4 million over the same period. Keralites are one of the most important expatriate groups living in the GCC countries for employment. On emigration, India adopted less restrictive policies in 2005, but in 2013, India was back to maintaining its level. At the same time policy on immigration was lower in the Gulf except in Bahrain (Rajan 2012, 2018). In 2013, Bahrain made changes in their immigration policy level to lower migration, and other countries like Oman and United Arab Emirates had policies to maintain their level of immigration. So, the flow of Indian emigrants, especially Keralite emigrants, was concentrated in the GCC countries. Table 8.4 indicates the destination of Keralites in the GCC region. During 1998, about 93.9 per cent of the Kerala emigrants lived in the GCC countries. By 2014, the percentage of Keralites in the Gulf had declined to 86.3 per cent. In the Gulf region, Keralites prefer to emigrate to United Arab Emirates (UAE), and it accounted for 37.5 per cent of migration in 2014. During 2008, the corresponding percentage was registered at 41.9 per cent. Saudi Arabia came next as Keralites' preferred destination; it was 37.5 per cent in 1998, and then drastically declined to 21.8 per cent in 2014. In the mid-2013, Nitaqat led to a decline of 3.4 per cent in the number of Keralites in Saudi Arabia (Rajan and Joseph 2013, 2015).

GULF EMIGRANTS BY RELIGION

Table 8.5 shows Kerala to Gulf emigrants by religion. Religion is an important factor related to Keralites' emigration. The percentage of emigration from Kerala to Gulf is highest among the Muslims and accounts for 45.41 per cent in 2014; the least is among the Christians, 19.73 per cent. Hindus showed a steady increase significantly between 1998 and 2014, and it reached 34.86 per cent in 2014. During 1998, Muslim emigration to Gulf was at its peak of 51.60 per cent. However, in 2008, 6.75 per cent decrease was observed, while Hindus had an increase of 6.05 per cent between 1998 and 2008. The trends of emigration to Gulf by religion show Muslims and Hindus have recorded significantly high numbers. At the same time, the flow of Christian has fluctuations and is relatively low.

GULF EMIGRANTS BY MARITAL STATUS

The marital status of the classification of emigration from Kerala to Gulf is one of the phases of changing demographic structure of the state. Table 8.6 shows a divergence among marital status distribution of emigrants from

Table 8.4 Country of residence of emigrants, 1998–2014

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Number</i>					<i>Per cent</i>				
	2014	2011	2008	2003	1998	2014	2011	2008	2003	1998
UAE	898,962	883,313	918,122	670,150	421,959	37.5	38.7	41.9	36.5	31.0
Saudi Arabia	522,282	574,739	503,433	489,988	510,895	21.8	25.2	23.0	26.7	37.5
Oman	189,224	195,300	167,628	152,865	139,571	7.9	8.6	7.6	8.3	10.2
Kuwait	183,329	127,782	129,282	113,967	68,163	7.6	5.6	5.9	6.2	5.0
Bahrain	149,729	101,556	101,344	108,507	74,654	6.2	4.5	4.6	5.9	5.5
Qatar	106,107	148,428	121,613	98,953	62,969	4.4	6.5	5.5	5.4	4.6
Other west Asia	21,221	6696	0	2047	0	0.9	0.3	0.0	0.1	
Subtotal	2,070,854	2,037,813	1,941,422	1,636,477	1,278,211	86.3	89.4	88.5	89.0	93.9
Total	2,400,375	2,280,543	2,193,415	1,838,478	1,361,955	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Same as Table 8.1

Table 8.5 Kerala to Gulf emigrants by religion

<i>Religion</i>	<i>1998 (%)</i>	<i>2003 (%)</i>	<i>2008 (%)</i>	<i>2011 (%)</i>	<i>2014 (%)</i>
Hindu	29.25	29.26	35.31	36.54	34.86
Christian	19.15	21.99	19.84	16.18	19.73
Muslim	51.60	48.75	44.85	47.28	45.41
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Same as Table 8.1

Table 8.6 Marital status composition of emigrants from Kerala to Gulf region, 1998–2014

	<i>1998 (%)</i>	<i>2003 (%)</i>	<i>2008 (%)</i>	<i>2011 (%)</i>	<i>2014 (%)</i>
Male					
Unmarried	50.97	62.37	62.81	63.37	66.55
Married	48.64	37.58	37.16	36.45	33.06
Others	0.39	0.05	0.03	0.19	0.39
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Female					
Unmarried	38.27	38.35	41.54	44.75	42.82
Married	58.64	61.36	56.97	53.65	56.14
Others	3.09	0.29	1.49	1.60	1.04
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total					
Unmarried	49.92	58.97	60.40	61.13	63.93
Married	49.47	40.94	39.40	38.52	35.61
Others	0.61	0.08	0.20	0.36	0.46
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Same as Table 8.1

Kerala in the Gulf. In Kerala, more than half the number of emigrants were unmarried between 1998 and 2014. The number of married persons decreased from 49.47 per cent to 35.61 per cent over the period. Considering gender-wise classification, emigration among married females has the highest number, and among unmarried persons males are high in number. The number of unmarried male emigrants from Kerala to Gulf has increased between 1998 and 2014. At the same time, female emigration to Gulf is significantly high after marriage.

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF GULF EMIGRANTS

Table 8.7 gives the educational attainment of Gulf emigrants from Kerala. The migrants have better educational qualification, and this has a positive effect on the migratory outflows from Kerala (Zachariah and Rajan 2015). During the years 1998 to 2003, the trends in educational qualification of emigrants were considered only up to degree level; however, after 2008, the category of technical qualification has been included. During 1998, emigrants with lower secondary level of education accounted for 42.92 per cent followed by emigrants with secondary level of education (28.4 per cent). Furthermore, the proportions of lower secondary slipped down in 2003, while the proportion of degree holders has gone up to 19.74 per cent in 2003 from 8.94 in 1998. Between 2008 and 2014, there was a rapid increase in the proportion of emigrants with a secondary level and degree level. At the same time, the proportion of emigrants with a lower secondary level has gone down to 26.13 per cent. The proportion among illiterate, literate and primary educational profile showed some fluctuation between 1998 and 2014. The category of “others” included technical degree holders such as diploma, engineering and ITI, and professional technical degree holders registered 5.86 per cent in 2008, which fell down to 3.54 per cent in 2014.

Overall, education is the most determined factor for emigration from Kerala to abroad. It is observed that among the outflow from Kerala to the Gulf, secondary and lower secondary level of education for unskilled and semi-skilled category of employment. The rapid increase of educational profile among the people in Kerala on the one hand, and the state’s inability to

Table 8.7 Educational profile of Gulf emigrants from Kerala

	1998	2003	2008	2011	2014
Illiterate	0.71	4.09	4.78	6.84	1.50
Literate	0.91	0.08	0.11	0.05	0.00
Primary incomplete	3.40	2.71	2.45	1.46	5.92
Primary	10.56	4.42	5.46	1.59	1.15
UP to lower secondary	42.92	39.11	42.78	22.23	16.65
Secondary	28.49	29.84	27.86	52.25	53.09
Degree holders	8.94	19.74	10.70	11.59	18.15
Others	4.07	0.01	5.86	3.99	3.54
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Same as Table 8.1

provide suitable job for the increasing number of young generation or people with higher education, on the other hand, could have had a major impact on the increasing emigration from Kerala (Zachariah and Rajan 2016).

REMITTANCE

India is the largest remittance-receiving country in the world; it accounted for US\$70 billion in 2014. The initial inflow of remittance to India was US\$0.43 billion in 1975, which increased dramatically to US\$12 billion in 2000 and continued to grow to US\$65 billion in 2016. The inflow of remittance to India had a fall of US\$5 billion between 2014 and 2016, but India remains consistently as the highest remittance-receiving country in the world (World Bank 2016). Among the other states of India, Kerala has been receiving a significant share of the remittances. The total remittance to Kerala in 2014 was estimated to be Rs 71,142 crores. It was Rs 43,288 crores in 2008 and Rs 13,653 crores in 1998 (Zachariah and Rajan 2016). The aggregate of the remittances to Kerala was rapidly increased by 43 per cent between 2011 and 2014, and, at the same time, for non-resident Keralites (NRK), it increased by 6 per cent. Migration, remittance and economic development have significant roles to play in Kerala's economy.

According to KMS 2014, total gulf remittance to Kerala accounted for Rs 60,747 crores or about 85.4 per cent of the total remittance of Kerala. During 1998, it was Rs 12,806 crores but 93.8 per cent of the total remittance of the state. The percentage of share of the Gulf remittance to aggregate remittance of Kerala has declined, while the amount of remittance has been fluctuating (Table 8.8).

Among the 14 districts of Kerala, Malappuram has received the largest amount of remittance from Gulf, which is Rs 9829 crores in 2014, followed by Thrissur (6965), Kollam (5765), Kozhikode (5575), Kannur (5431) and Alappuzha (5285), which accounted for a sizable amount, while Wayanad (750), Idukki (556) and Kottayam (1351) registered the least amount of remittance received from the Gulf. The percentage share of gulf remittance out of the aggregate remittance of Kerala has been changing from 1998 to 2014. In 2008, the highest Gulf remittance-receiving district, Malappuram, had a fall from 99.0 per cent in 1998 to 97.9 per cent, and it continued to decline (95.9 per cent). Kasaragod has

Table 8.8 Remittances to Kerala by Gulf emigrants

	1998		2003		2008		2011		2014	
	Gulf remittance (in crores)	%	Gulf remittance (in crores)	%	Gulf remittance (in crores)	%	Gulf remittance (in crores)	%	Gulf remittance (in crores)	%
Thiruvananthapuram	1242	94.9	1726	89.6	4053	84.4	4044	85.3	3605	66.9
Kollam	1080	97.5	1606	88.6	3933	87.8	4085	92.4	5765	91.1
Pathanamthitta	780	86.6	748	78.4	1866	84.4	1901	91.5	2979	69.1
Alappuzha	804	95.7	1255	93.8	1824	92.6	2092	91.1	5285	87.7
Kottayam	315	80.9	412	71.0	1724	75.9	1600	66.1	1351	66.2
Idukki	12	77.8	39	100.0	125	80.0	114	62.5	556	83.6
Ernakulam	1415	89.8	1161	76.6	2473	82.9	4096	66.8	5048	53.9
Thrissur	1794	91.0	2934	90.7	5495	92.2	3954	92.1	6965	94.4
Palakkad	1147	87.5	929	81.0	2669	77.4	2991	90.8	2600	88.3
Malappuram	2358	99.0	2872	99.3	6349	97.9	8506	94.1	9829	95.9
Kozhikode	812	96.3	1256	92.6	3549	89.0	3832	98.2	5575	97.1
Wayanad	20	87.5	58	85.7	541	94.7	497	85.9	750	84.8
Kannur	766	97.8	911	93.4	2506	89.5	4744	92.2	5431	94.2
Kasaragod	201	100.0	623	100.0	1125	96.7	1099	93.4	3620	95.8
Kerala	12,806	93.8	16,422	88.9	38,412	88.7	44,260	89.1	60,747	85.4

Source: Same as Table 8.1

the highest share of Gulf remittance among all the districts in 1998 and 2003, but it decreased to 96.7 per cent in 2008 and 95.8 per cent in 2014. The share of non-Gulf remittance in Ernakulam, Thiruvananthapuram, Pathanamthitta and Kottayam has increased over the years in comparison to the Gulf remittances. Overall, in Kerala, remittances from the Gulf show a decline from 93.8 per cent in 1998 to 85.4 per cent in 2014, because education plays a significant role in the economy and young generation showed a trend to move to Western countries for white-collar jobs. Migrants are better educated than non-migrants (Zachariah and Rajan 2012a, b). Migrant remittances to Kerala are having significant impact on Kerala's economy; moreover, the total remittances received is equal to 36.3 per cent of the net state domestic product (NSDP) in 2014; it increased from 25.5 per cent in 1998 (Zachariah and Rajan 2011, 2016).

IMPACT OF GULF REMITTANCE ON KERALA

As seen in Table 8.9, of the total remittances, the Gulf remittance significantly accounted for 31.0 per cent of net state domestic product (NSDP) in 2014, and increase from 23.9 per cent in 1998. During 2003, share of the Gulf remittance of NSDP decreased to 19.6 per cent. Gulf remittances accounted for 1.8 times the revenue receipts of the state in 1998, but that declined to 1.0 times in 2014. In 2014, the Gulf remittance to the state was 4.2 times more than the finance received from the central government, but during 1998, it was 6.4 times. Remittances were 9 times the export earnings from cashew export in 1998, but this ratio showed a threefold increase in 2008. While considering remittances from marine products, there was a decline from 26.8 in 2008 to 17.7 in 2014. Overall, the Gulf remittances contribute a substantial contribution to the state economy, though a marginal decline was estimated during 2003–2014.

Migration is an important development process for Kerala. The emigration from Kerala to the Gulf is a usual trend in the modern era. At present, about two million Keralites are in the Gulf countries. Among them, Muslim population, especially from Malappuram district, has a larger pre-dominance. The changing educational profile among young generation or among youth attaining a higher professional course such as engineering, medicine, electronic media, designing and technology courses has major determination of change in the destination of Keralites in the future.

Table 8.9 Macro economic impact of the Gulf remittance on Kerala economy, 1998–2014

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2014</i>
Gulf remittance	12,806	16,422	38,412	44,260	60,747
NSDP	53,552	83,783	140,889	159,144	196,077
Per capita income	16,062	25,764	41,814	52,084	63,491
Modified NSDP	67,204	102,248	184,177	208,839	267,219
Revenue receipt of government	7198	10,634	24,936	31,181	58,058
Transfer from central government	1991	2653	7861	7982	14,365
Government non-plan expenditure	5855	9908	18,934	22,546	46,639
State debt	15,700	31,060	61,653	78,239	114,121
Receipt from cashew export	1317	1217	1198	1636	2138
Receipt from marine products	817	995	1431	1670	3435
Modified per capita income	20,157	31,442	54,664	68,375	86,180
Remittances as per cent of NSDP	23.9	19.6	27.3	27.8	31.0
Remittances as ratio of revenue receipt	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.0
Remittances as ratio of transfer from centre	6.4	6.2	4.9	5.5	4.2
Remittances as ratio of government expenditure	2.2	1.7	2.0	2.0	1.3
Remittances as ratio of state debt	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5
Remittances as ratio of receipt from cashew export	9.7	13.5	32.1	27.1	28.4
Remittances as ratio of receipt from marine export	15.7	16.5	26.8	26.5	17.7

Source: Same as Table 8.1

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Forced Migration of Muslims from Kerala to Gulf Countries

A. T. Ajmal Khan

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the Indian subcontinent has been well linked with the present Gulf region. However, until 1970s, this region never experienced large-scale migration. Migration from India to Persian Gulf started during mid-1970s and peaked in the early of 1980s and though later it marked a declining trend, the migration still continues; Indian emigrants were coming from all the states, but south Indian states were dominant in terms of the number of migrants. Indian emigrants to Gulf were employed in the construction projects, dry dock facilities, roads, airports, office buildings, industries, supermarkets, houses and so on. A year-wise analysis of the migration of Indians to Gulf countries shows that the figure, though small—42,000 in 1976—increased quite rapidly through the late 1970s and reached a peak level of more than 272,000 in 1981 after which, it declined slowly until 1986. Towards the end of 1970s (1976–1980), on an average annually around 107,000 people migrated; in the beginning of 1980s (1980–1985) the outflow was 214,600 and between 1985 and 1987 it was 115,500. Between late 1970s and late

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1980s the available data indicates that nearly 40 per cent of Indian workers who emigrated were unskilled and 50 per cent of the emigrants constituted both semi-skilled and skilled workers. Surprisingly, less than 5 per cent of Indian workers constituted both white-collar and highly skilled categories (Naidu 1991) here. It is evident that comparatively the higher number of migrants are the ones who are unskilled and semi-skilled. During 1970s and 1980s, large volume of workers emigrated from South India, more specifically from Kerala (Venier 2007). In 1990s, the Gulf region observed large number of workers due to large-scale demand in various sectors, mainly for their infrastructure development projects. Therefore, Indians who emigrated to the Gulf region worked in different sectors. Migration of labour from India to Gulf was a post-1970s phenomenon, within which some interesting patterns are observed. Some of the estimation shows that nearly 19 per cent of non-resident Indians (NRIs) and persons of Indian origin (PIOs) residing away from India are living in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Khadria 2006). Emigration to the Gulf from India attracted workers from the Southern states of India like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. From these four states nearly 50 per cent emigration clearance for work was granted by the Indian government (ICOE 2009). However, the dominance of the migrant workers from the state of Kerala still continues. In the last four decades, among the leading emigrants-sending states, Kerala tops the list. Due to large-scale emigration, Kerala has acquired economic gains and it also has significant impact on the state economy. The first ever Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) which took place in 1998 estimated around 1.5 million Keralites reside overseas and through remittances the state received 4000 million from the non-resident Keralites (Zachariah et al. 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003). The latest KMS 2018 showed a decline in the number of Keralites living abroad and it is mainly due to the demographic feature of the state. Series of KMS data highlighted the huge stock of Keralites residing in the Gulf region and this trend also reflected in the latest KMS 2018 data (Zachariah and Rajan 2007, 2016). Also, emigration from Kerala has been dominated by males.

GULF MIGRATION AS FORCED MIGRATION

It has been about more than five decades now since the massive labour migration started from the state. However, Gulf migration is not considered as an actual forced migration in the literature, hence it is important to look at the theoretical framework in which migration is looked at. First

of all, distinction has to be made between voluntary and forced migration. The differences between voluntary migration (hereafter VM) and forced migration (hereafter FM) are apparent: in the latter one, a person is forced to migrate due to several reasons, and it is completely opposite in VM, where people tend to migrate out of one's own choice (Düvell 2006). In VM, people incline to migrate for better job opportunities or for educational purposes. But in FM, people tend to migrate because of persecution and violence. As Saskia Koppenberg argues, FM is defined by international law as "entitles those who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion to a set of rights and to international protection" (Koppenberg 2012). While we look closer, the forms of VM and FM are unclear. In case of FM, apart from refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are also included. But sadly, status of last two categories of FM is not clearly defined as refugees. Additionally, migration is driven by multiple factors and reasons. For example, if a person takes own decision to migrate for attaining better education, it is quite different from migration decision because of persecution which is considered as FM. UNHCR also distinguished FM from other types of migration, and refugees are protected by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention that says, "human mobility is growing in scale, scope and complexity while stressing that people are prompted to leave their own country by a combination of fears, uncertainties, hopes and aspirations which can be very difficult to unravel". The interconnection between VM and FM has been gradually recognised and considered as a part of migratory movement phenomenon. The same phenomena may contain people seeking job or educational opportunities, reunification with family members or people facing persecution/conflict or violence in their homeland (UNHCR 2004). Thus, UNHCR indeed maintains its position that it is possible and necessary to identify refugees as a special category of people protected under international law but has, at the same time, become engaged in the broader migration discourse, arguing that often there is no clear distinction between forms of VM and FM when refugees and other migrants move alongside each other (Crisp 2008). In case a migrant is motivated for better economic opportunities, here comes a vital question: can the person's economic situation be treated as a forced circumstance for him/her to migrate? As pointed by Turton (2003), if we look closely, this can also be considered as FM, in which external factors motivate the people to take decisions. With this backdrop, this study examines how the vulnerability of the migrants forces

them to emigrate for better economic opportunities. More specifically, in this study Muslims in Kerala are considered as vulnerable from the research viewpoint, as they are a deprived social group and opportunities are denied to them because of their religious affiliation.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Data for this chapter has been collected from various sources; a village was selected from the Malappuram district which has the largest number of migrants as well as return migrants from Gulf Countries, and the district with highest Muslim population. The village was selected on the basis of its high prevalence of migration to Gulf countries, its backwardness and Muslim population concentration. A households survey was conducted in 128 households from the village, which included around 137 migrants. There were households where either one member is currently working in any of the Gulf countries, or is currently on leave and staying at home, or at least one member had lived and worked in any Gulf country for at least more than two years. In-depth interviews with different sets of people like early migrants, current migrants, people who are on leave, returnees from different Gulf countries, women who are left behind, their family members, old people from the village, social and political figures and local representatives, school teachers, women and other groups' representatives, local bank officials. Interviews with village and Gram Panchayat officials were also helped to get more dynamics of the migration to Gulf countries and data was also collected from Kerala Migration Surveys of Center for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Economic and Statistic Department of the State Government.

CAUSES FOR MIGRATION

Migration takes place primarily because of the fluctuations in social, economic, political and various other fabrics at home as well as the destination to where people migrate. However, there can also be other reasons which contribute to the migration of people from one place to another. As far as migration is concerned, a single reason or only a set of reasons cannot be seen in isolation. There are layers of factors that contribute in different levels for a person or a group of people to migrate from one place to the other. There could be individual reasons, family reasons, community causes and national and international factors which also contribute. The literature that dealt with the reasons or the factors that have contributed to the huge

migration of people from Kerala to Gulf countries have suggested some of the dominant reasons. Migration of Muslims from Kerala to Gulf countries has different meanings and reasons throughout the history. The literature has also acknowledged the historical connections that Muslims of this part of the world had with the Arab lands. However, the socioeconomic and political fabrics changes throughout the periods in which migration process have started, accelerated and slowed down are also extremely important. In the literature, there are some broad arguments that are given as to why Muslims outnumbered the others in terms of migration to Gulf countries. What have come out from the literature mainly as causes for migration from Kerala are the historical, ethnic and religious connections of Malabar Coast to Arabia (Joseph 2001). Apart from this glorified religious, ethnic and maritime relation with Arab countries, there is nothing much available to answer the question as to why Muslims outnumbered among the migrants to Gulf (Khan 2014, 2015). However, it has also clearly mentioned that, among the factors that are associated with migration, community is one of the strong ones, where Muslims from the state have a high probability to migrate to Gulf countries rather than any other country. If one is a Muslim from the state of Kerala, the chances of emigration are 2.2 (49 per cent) times the general average (22 per cent). On the other hand, their chance of out-migration¹ (6.3 per cent) is only 0.55 times the general average (11.5 per cent) (Zachariah et al. 2003).² The reasons why Muslims hold such high probability for migrating to Gulf and the reality behind the reasons that studies have pointed out need to be analysed further. Direct reasons provided by migration returnees in the village are diverse: higher wages than home, unemployment, better job prospects, family, community and other networks.

Table 9.1 gives a picture of the individual reasons of migration. Looking at the individual-level factors of why people have migrated, 40.1 per cent have responded that it was their aspiration that migrating to the Gulf countries will pay them more wages, since there is more value for the currency in the Gulf countries, which will enable them to fulfil their diverse needs. However, there are 33.6 per cent of the people who were unemployed or not engaged in any activity that would help them financially or

¹ Migration within India.

² Working paper on the results of the project, "Migration from Kerala: Social, Economic and Demographic Consequences". The Centre for Development Studies sponsored the research, and the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi.

Table 9.1 Reason for migration

<i>Reasons</i>	<i>Migration status</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>Count</i>
	<i>Currently in Gulf</i>	<i>On leave</i>	<i>Returnee</i>		
Higher wage than home	27.00%	10.90%	2.20%	40.10%	55
Unemployment	25.50%	5.10%	2.90%	33.60%	46
Better job prospects	15.30%	4.40%	2.20%	21.90%	30
Family networks	0.70%	0.00%	0.00%	0.70%	1
Community networks	0.00%	0.70%	0.00%	0.70%	1

Source: Field survey, 2013

otherwise. Unemployment has been a reason for migration always; it was a reason in the initial years of migration from the village and it is still one of the dominant reasons why people go to Gulf countries for work. It may not make sense for someone who is looking from the outside, and will be wondering as to when people are unemployed at home how they can migrate to some foreign countries. The answer is, migrating to the Gulf is a simple and viable option for the Muslim youth than anything else in this part of the country, and it is not that they are assured of gaining full employment in the destination countries, but they migrate in search of that. For 21.9 per cent, better job prospects at the destination country was the reason they migrated. Why one aspires for better job prospects and higher wages than one's home country by getting a good job in the gulf countries is indeed for economic reasons. This has to be understood in the context of socioeconomic and political forces that contributed. A remaining 3 per cent responded that their reasons for migration was attributed to the family, community networks and other reasons like, their friends had sent visa to migrate or they had gone in Umrah visa first and then got settled in a better job and then were caught by the police and then deported and again went in other visa because the job was comparatively attractive. However, looking at the individual reasons might not give the real picture of the reasons of migration. If migrants had money and educational qualifications, they could have migrated to other countries rather than the Gulf region, but here the migrants are largely going to Saudi Arabia alone; they constitute 81 per cent of the total migrants. Is it merely a religious reason why people migrated to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? Or is it something else? This question takes us to the provision of cheapest and convenient Umrah visa in which 32.1 per cent of the emigrants have migrated from the village.

UMRAH AND FREE VISA PROVISIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA

Studies have not really shown the visa details of the migrants to Gulf countries from the state. The kind of visa the migrants used to go to the Gulf countries can provide information regarding the reality of the migrant's condition. Table 9.2 shows the kind of visa in which people migrated: 39.4 per cent of the migrants have gone to Gulf countries with free visa. Free visas are issued without mentioning the type or category of job the migrant has to do. These visas are not generally monitored like other employment visas. About 32.1 per cent migrated with Umrah visa, which is issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for Muslims across the globe to come to the Kingdom and perform the Umrah ritual.

Umrah and free visa have been a huge lifeline for the people in the village; a large number of people from the village went with Umrah visa, worked for a while and then acquired a permanent work permit or employment visa. People were able to go for Umrah visa for a long time where people went for the short-term visa and during the short span they have to carry out the Umrah ritual and come back home, but it was a practice until the 2009 people who went in the Umrah visa were staying illegally and working in Saudi Arabia, mostly people worked as petty workers and small jobs and earned money; if once get caught in between they were deported to their home state or the national capital free of cost. This was prevalent among the migrants of the village; about 32.1 per cent of the total migrants have migrated to Saudi Arabia on this particular visa. Now, this can be considered as religious connection for the people in the village; however, we have to further inquire why they used Umrah visa and not employment visa. First of all, the Umrah visa is very cheap as compared to any other visa which ensures travel permit to Saudi Arabia. Secondly, one has to be professionally and

Table 9.2 Kind of visa with which the person went to the Gulf countries

<i>Kind of visa</i>	<i>Migration status</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>Count</i>
	<i>Currently in Gulf</i>	<i>On leave</i>	<i>Returnee</i>		
Free visa	27.00%	9.50%	2.90%	39.40%	54
Umrah visa	22.60%	6.60%	2.90%	32.10%	44
Employment visa	21.90%	5.10%	1.50%	28.50%	39
Total	71.50%	21.20%	7.30%	100.00%	137

Source: Field survey, 2013

educationally qualified to gain an employment visa. So, the dependency on the Umrah visa is not because of religious reasons but economic reasons as it has facilitated the migration of a huge percentage of the migrants to Saudi Arabia from the village.

At first, people use to go from here to Saudi Arabia in Umrah visa, those days people who were working in employment visa was very rare. It's not that people really want to do Umrah ritual or religious but going to work there as illegal emigrant. I went in Umrah visa and have been working for more than six years, by the time my brother also came in Umrah visa only. Then I could manage to get an employment visa and work there. The life of an Umrah emigrant is extremely difficult, he has to hide from the police always, there were people who were living in rooms for years without not even going out months from the room to hide from the police, once they get caught, it's not that can be sent to home very soon, there are extremely difficult life of prison which can be delayed for long depending on the number of inmates. People did all of these, only because of poverty at home and for a better life, to marry off their sisters or to construct a home of their own. (*An early migrant from the village*)

Another option for the migrants from the village who went to Saudi Arabia was free visa. Free visa allows migrants to come to Saudi Arabia not with very strict rules or requirements; for example, one need not declare their profession during emigration. People who work with these visas generally work in establishments, companies or houses as helpers, salesmen or drivers and other supporting jobs. This is different from tightly monitored visas which are used only for bringing workers for own use. In comparison with an employment visa, free visa is also less costly and not very difficult to acquire as education and skills are not a criteria. This is the reason why people get free visa and migrate. Around 39.4 per cent of the migrants have migrated with free visa, and after the Government of Saudi Arabia introduced the Nitaqat law,³ there is a huge fear, chaos and uncertainty

³ *Nitaqat* was introduced in 2009. Saudi Arabian government has categorised the companies and business organisations in those lines. Various sectors where emigrants were employed were further categorised into 41 types. According to the types of jobs, a particular number of Saudi citizens have to be employed in the organisation. Employers who followed this rule were given blue and green cards and were also given other benefits in recruitments. Organisations which did not follow this were given red cards and were reminded of rules and consequences. Meanwhile, the government has also increasingly started to trace out people who have emigrated to work with free visa and are working illegally, against the rules of the Saudi government. Emigrants who are working with this free visa were caught and sent back to their home countries.

among the families and migrants in the village that the emigrants who are working on free visa will have to come back. In total, 71.5 per cent of the emigrants have migrated from the village with Umrah and free visas. It clearly shows the reality of migration in the village. They had to go for these two categories of visas because both are cheaper, convenient and do not require educational or professional details. These two visa provisions have helped the migrants from the village more than anything else to go and work at their destination countries.

POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Poverty among the Muslims, especially during late 1970s and early 1980s in Kerala, has not come out as one of the reasons for migration in any of the studies that was done on migration to Gulf countries from the state of Kerala. Sachar committee⁴ observed that while there is only 24.7 per cent of the total Muslim population, Muslims constitute 30.7 per cent of the total poor (below poverty line—BPL) in Kerala (Sachar et al. 2006). The report published by the planning commission (1993) pointed out the decline in the population identified as BPL category from 57 per cent in 1977–1978 to 32 per cent in 1987–1988; this is same period of acceleration of the migration and the remittances. But the full credit of this should not also be given to the migration to Gulf countries and remittance (Prakash 1998); considerable decline (at 6 per cent) among the Kerala Muslim population from BPL category is visible, but among the Ezhavas community⁵ relatively high percentage of population moved out of BPL category. Importantly, this community is considered as most migratory in Kerala, but among the Muslim population the poverty level is high. So it's established that, migration to the Gulf has contributed to bring down the number of people who lived below the poverty line in general, where the state has had a considerable decline in the general level of poverty, and interestingly Muslims constitute as one of the communities in which the drastic decline in poverty has been observed in this particular period. Indeed, one has to see the contribution of Gulf migration in this regard

⁴ Sachar committee, which was appointed in 2005 by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, was commissioned to prepare a report on the latest social, economic and educational conditions of the Muslim community of India under Justice Rajinder Sachar.

⁵ Ezhava is a caste-based community or a group of castes among Hindus in Kerala.

and the money remitted by the migrants. Therefore, an inquiry in this line will give an analysis of how poverty worked as a reason for the people to migrate to Gulf. Extreme poverty was one of the phenomena that existed during the 1960s and 1970s in the village, and while some people left for different cities like Mumbai, Madras and Calcutta in search of work, others struggled in the village without a job or a source for their livelihood. Migrants to other cities are the people who went to Gulf countries for work from the village. Those who were in Bombay went by ship to the Gulf Coast, and the first migrant who went to Gulf from the village migrated in this way while he was working in a hotel in Mumbai. It can be interpreted that extreme poverty and hunger had existed during the early days of 1970s in the village. Though some of the Muslim families had land and other resources, the condition of the huge majority of Dalits and Muslims was worse. So when an opportunity of going to the Gulf opened up, they arranged money for the visa (Umrah and other) by taking debts, loan or selling gold of their wives and mothers and went to the Gulf countries without knowing anything. Migration to Gulf countries is a costly affair as far as a common migrant from the village is concerned; they have to bear the cost of flight ticket, visa expense, expenses for work permit and other expenses.

Table 9.3 gives a picture of the sources from which the migrants raised their expenses during the departure. Sources of finance for the migration-related expenses for migrants to migrate from the village to different countries are through the loans from banks, borrowings from different sources like friends and relatives, selling gold and landed property. About 33.6 per cent of the migrants raised their expense for the migration from

Table 9.3 Sources of finance for the migration expenses

<i>Sources</i>	<i>Migration status</i>			<i>Total</i>	<i>Count</i>
	<i>Currently in Gulf</i>	<i>On leave</i>	<i>Returnee</i>		
Loan	10.90%	3.60%	1.50%	16.10%	22
Self-finance	22.60%	8.00%	2.90%	33.60%	46
Borrowings from source	18.20%	5.10%	0.70%	24.10%	33
Selling gold	18.20%	3.60%	1.50%	23.40%	32
Selling landed property	2.20%	0.70%	0.00%	2.90%	4
Total	72.30%	21.20%	6.60%	100.00%	137

Source: Field survey, 2013

their own pocket or from their immediate family; about 16.1 per cent of the people had taken loan to finance their expenses and another 24.1 per cent of the migrants had to borrow money from different sources. While 23.4 per cent of the migrants sold gold, 2.9 per cent had to sell their landed properties to finance their migration expenses.

The situation of the people in the village was miserable; people have lived in extreme poverty and hunger. Even when families that has about ten members to work in the fields, they were not given proper wages and the households didn't have food to eat two times in a day in the village. Now situation has changed, you would not get a single household who don't have food to eat here in the village, to reach this situation migration of youth from the village to Gulf have contributed substantially, they had no option other than going somewhere else to find a way out to live and that made them to reach into Gulf Countries. (An elder from the village)

Only 33.6 per cent of the migrants were able to finance their expenses themselves and rest of the migrants had to depend on other sources like taking loan from nearby banks for interests, borrowing from the friends, relative or others, selling gold ornaments of the female family members, mostly of mother or wife, and even selling the landed property that one has. It reflects the stark reality that migrants even take big risks to finance their expenses for the migration. Since the migrants do not have anything substantial to finance them, they depend on whatever they have with them, even selling the land that they have. Migrants hope that they will have a better life as they migrate, a better job, better pay and then they can recover or repay whatever they spent for the migration and related expenses. That strong hope has led the migrants to take big financial risks to finance their expense. Poverty has directly and indirectly caused the migration of Muslims to Gulf countries from this part of the state of Kerala. On this background, poverty has decreased tremendously from the village and the remittances have to be counted as one of the important reasons why poverty has seen a huge decline in the post-Gulf migration era. So, it has to be argued that poverty was also a reason why people migrated from the village. As far as unemployment is concerned, it has been a reason for 33.6 per cent of the migrants to grab a visa of any kind and migrate to the Gulf countries. However, the percentage of migrants who were unemployed or not engaged in any jobs which will enable them to gain anything as wage during the time of their emigration was 38 per cent. So, lack of availability of employment opportunities at home during

migration has been a strong reason why people migrated from the village to the Gulf countries. So, it has to be argued that poverty and unemployment among the Muslims of the village were the core reasons why people migrated to Gulf countries, especially to Saudi Arabia: a country into which the migration was easier, cheaper and convenient. This has to be seen as a core reason when one talks about the reason of migration from the village to Gulf countries.

DOWRY AND EXPENSIVE MARRIAGES

Dowry is payment in cash or in kind that is given to the bridegroom's family along with the bride during the marriage. Dowry is not only cash but it can be jewellery, landed property, vehicles, electrical equipment or any other household item. Dowry was rampant among the Muslims until very recently in the state of Kerala, though it is in a decreasing trend now in the village. Dowry is an integral part of the wedding of a daughter, a sister or any other female member in the family and costs of the wedding have been one of the reasons why a section of people migrated and stayed for a long time in the destination country, especially the people who had more number of females at home. It was a practice that the bride's family had to hugely pay for the bride as dowry in cash during the Nikah (wedding). Dowry was also given in the form of other materials such as vehicles and landed property. Apart from the dowry, the expense for the gold which was to be given with the bride on the day of the wedding was huge. About 12.4 per cent of the emigrants spent their remittances considerably for the payment of dowry and marriage expenses. People from the village also went to the Gulf because of over-expenditure in marriage expenses, including dowry. Most of the first-generation migrants had in their mind that they have to marry off either their sisters or daughter and construct a good house out of their earnings from migration.

If there is girl child, parents are worried that she will have to be married off with a huge dowry and the marriage expenses, it will be very expensive. They have to find money for that anyhow for gold, people who are migrated to Gulf who have many number of sisters to marry off, their life has been so difficult where they have to find finance for their sisters to marry off, even after many years after the marriages they have to stay at Gulf to pay off debts that family is in because of the dowry and other

expenses. There are many parents after marrying off their daughters they cannot come back because of the debt and they are staying for years. (Migrant from the village)

It is again the matter of money that is needed for the marriage of sister or the daughter of the migrant, including dowry, gold and other expenses, that had to be made anyhow; a huge percentage of the remittances goes for paying dowry, marriage expenses and even paying off the debts which were made because of the expensive marriages. It has to be argued here that dowry and expensive marriages among the Muslims of the region and the village have also been one of the crucial reasons why a section of youth has migrated to the Gulf countries and for another section why they have not been able to stop working in the Gulf countries even when they are old or even not physically well.

THE DREAM OF THE YOUTHS: GULF DESTINATIONS

In the early 1970s the dream of an average Muslim youth of Kerala was to go to Dubai. Dubai was not just a country in their imagination, rather a dream of a better life which was free from difficulties, poverty and sufferings—from the village to a prosperous life. It was a hope for the people who were struggling and for those who did not have much to live their lives. The narrations from the migrants make it clearer.

There was no other way out, the situation was such that no one can even live here and that is the time people, especially youth getting such opportunity to dream about a world. That was Gulf and that was the lot! As far as people in the village are concerned, in the midst of poverty, misery and unemployment they started perusing their Gulf dream, their journey from sufferings to hoping that they will have a prosperous life. Gulf was indeed a dream, the dream of nice perfumes, of good and big concrete houses, of vehicles and better lives; it was dream for the poor who have nothing to live here in their villages during those times. After they got visa and migrated to Gulf, we all could understand that it's not the dream that we saw from the villages, the reality is different here and there after it's the story of struggles to meet the two ends. What left after the expenses at the Gulf has to be sent at homes every month, otherwise things will be in great difficulty as they are fully depended on us, then it's about living the full life of an individual without any substantial savings and only to meet the daily expenses of the family, if the migrant don't have any debt he is lucky then. This is the life of an average men who is living in Gulf countries from Malabar. (A migrant from the village)

This is about aspirations and the desire to get out from the everyday struggles of life and what Gulf dream is about and that is why people sell whatever they have at home, like gold, or take loan and borrow money from wherever it is available and migrate to Gulf countries. It is also aspirations of getting children educated, having a home of their own or getting daughters and sisters married off, or buy a piece of land; these are the aspirations and dreams that an emigrant has in the village that make them migrate to the Gulf countries. These are the reasons why people migrate or why a huge workforce of the village is not able to come back. This has to be seen as entirely different from what is known as “American dream”; for someone to see an American dream he or she has to be rich enough, but the Gulf dream is about getting out of something at home and soon coming back with what they have to have a better life, not to settle or to be a permanent resident of that country to which people migrate.

CONCLUSION

The evidences from the village suggest that the socioeconomic situation that existed during 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and also the prevalence of poverty and unemployment level among the Kerala Muslims triggered them to emigrate to the Gulf countries, mainly to Saudi Arabia. Youth from Malappuram incurred their emigration cost by mortgaging their family members’ jewellery and their small lands and in some cases they borrowed money for interest from money lenders to meet the emigration cost. Due to their low educational level and low skill level they could manage to work as unskilled or semi-skilled workers in difficult working conditions in the Gulf countries. Poverty, joblessness, availability of Umrah and free visa to fly to Saudi Arabia, prevailing dowry system and the practice of luxurious marriage culture existed in the village. Coupled with one or more factors mentioned above, the dream and aspiration to work in the Gulf to enhance their standard of living motivated them to emigrate abroad. Importantly, their religious belief or affiliation has no role to play in their decision to migrate to the Gulf. Thus, it has to be argued that, migration from Kerala to the Gulf countries has been generally considered as voluntary economic migration; however, the evidences from one of the socio-economically backward communities such as Muslim migration from the village shows that the migration from the village is an involuntary migration, which has a socioeconomic forced elements to it.

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Determinants of International Remittance: Evidence from Kerala, India

Anu Abraham

INTRODUCTION

Remittances can be defined in simple terms as the flow of all financial transfers from an emigrant to his home country. According to the IMF, remittances received by a country comprise “personal transfers” and “compensation of employees”, which are items in the balance of payments (*BPM6*) framework (World Bank 2016). Personal transfers consist of all current transfers between resident and non-resident individuals, that is, all current transfers in cash or in kind received by resident households/individuals from non-resident households/individuals. According to the World Bank estimates, remittances exceed foreign aid as the primary source of foreign receipts into developing countries from developed countries. In 2015, worldwide remittance flows were estimated to have exceeded US\$601 billion. Of that amount, developing countries are estimated to receive about US\$441 billion, nearly three times the amount of official development assistance. The actual size of remittances is estimated to be much larger considering the undocumented flows through both formal and informal channels (World Bank 2016). Since remittances are pri-

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vate flows from individuals to households, their developmental impact is direct, thus making remittances a strategic channel of development which leads to economic growth and reduces poverty and income inequalities between and within nations (Acosta et al. 2007; Ratha et al. 2007). Thus it becomes pertinent to analyse the questions: who remits, why and how much? What are the determinants of the incidence and amount remitted?

India is the country with the highest emigrant stock (13.9 million in 2013) and recipient of the largest share of remittance (around 72 million in 2015). There is very little remittance coming in as compensation of employees but large personal transfers, from the USA and Europe (where India supplies a large number of temporary information technology workers) and from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (to where the largest migration corridor from India exists). In India, Kerala is the state with the highest emigrant stock and accounts for 25–30 per cent which is a significant proportion of the remittance that flows into the country (Zachariah & Rajan 2004).

Kerala's international migration is predetermined to be temporary as 90 per cent of the migrants' destination are the countries belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) where permanent residency is not granted to immigrants (Zachariah and Rajan 2003). Remittances are more significant when the migrations are temporary, with the possibility of return, thus making GCC the major source of remittance to the state. Despite the lack of concurrence in the estimates of the amount of remittance received in the state, experts agree that there is a substantial inflow of money into the Kerala economy with personal transfers from abroad—predominantly the Gulf countries—contributing to 25–35 per cent of the net state domestic product (NSDP) of the state according to different analyses (Kannan and Hari 2002; Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan 2003; Zachariah and Rajan 2009; 2012a, b; 2014). But all who migrate do not remit, and there is variation in the incidence and amount of remittances sent. This chapter undertakes to examine the determinants of remittance-sending behaviour of emigrant workers from Kerala.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Remitters self-select among emigrants (Funkhouser 1995) leading to heterogeneity in the incidence and amount of remittance sent. Remittances include both altruistic transfers to support the family left behind as well as investments for future consumption (Lucas and Stark 1985). Several motivations for sending remittances have been identified by researchers which

include altruism, repayment of debt, insurance against future income shocks, to receive services from members left behind, to ensure inheritance and so on, and a combination of these work in mobilising remittances (Rapoport and Docquier 2006). Remittance-sending behaviour is highly related to the characteristics of both the emigrant and the receiving households. Among the variables that have been considered for explaining the heterogeneity in remittance-sending behaviour are socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the emigrant, socioeconomic characteristic of the receiving household, characteristics of the migrant's region of origin, relation of the emigrant to the household, type of migration undertaken (permanent or temporary), duration of migration, destination country and financial ability of the emigrant at the destination. While most studies agree on the important characteristics that determine remittance-sending behaviour, there is substantial variation in the impact of these characteristics in different migration contexts.

The most referred to theoretical framework for explaining remittance-sending behaviour is that of the “new economics of labour migration” (NELM) (Lucas and Stark 1985), which was also perhaps the first comprehensive attempt to theorise remittance-sending behaviour among emigrants. They presented several hypotheses ranging from pure altruism to pure self-interest to create a framework that explains remittances. Using this framework, the authors used cross-sectional data from Botswana to test the different motives of remittance sending among migrants in urban areas to their households in rural areas. Later researchers have undertaken studies from other countries that empirically verified and theoretically augmented this NELM framework. The different motives put forth in the NELM can be broadly classified as—pure altruism, tempered altruism and pure self-interest. Identifying remittances as an insurance mechanism from income shocks for the migrant-sending household (Stark and Levhari 1982) was verified by empirical studies published based on data from different countries (Cox et al. 1998; Gubert 2002). Higher remittance flows to rural households which are predominantly agriculture dependent and hence more prone to income shocks (Rapoport and Docquier 2006) substantiate this argument. In developing countries, remittances may also be a co-insurance mechanism where a household finances (or provides the collateral to mortgage for a loan) the migrant's cost of emigration and in return the migrant sends home remittance to repay this loan (Brown 1997; Cox et al. 1998; Gubert 2002; Ilahi and Jafarey 1999). These studies interpret the motive for remitting to be tempered altruism where there is a self-interest-motivated contractual agreement between the households and migrants.

Two variables of significance which can be directly linked to the altruism/self-interest motivations of remitting are (i) intention to return and (ii) duration of stay at the destination. The emigrant's propensity to return to the home country significantly affects the remittance incidence and amount, with temporary migrants remitting more than permanent migrants (Brown 1997; Cai 2003; Gubert 2002; Merkle and Zimmermann 1992) pointing towards a remittance-sending behaviour which is highly self-interest motivated. Studies that have included "time since migration" as a single independent variable show mixed results as a factor influencing the amount of remittances sent. Many studies conducted among emigrants in the destination found the length of the migrant's stay abroad to have a significant negative effect on the amount of remittance sent (Fairchild and Simpson 2004; Vargas-Silva and Huang 2006; Menjivar et al. 1998). Another set of studies attribute a non-linear relationship between years of migration and remittances saying that it follows an inverted U-curve over time (Amery and Anderson 1995; Cai 2003; Haruta 2016; Liu and Reilly 2004; Lucas and Stark 1985), that is, the remittance sent first increases, reaches a maximum and then starts falling. Both these sets of studies could be explained in the context that more number of years in the destination means a higher probability of settling in the destination country and hence a lowering of self-interest motivation to remit. This aspect has been accounted by Dustmann and Mestres (2010), which finds that the duration of stay and the intention to return together determine the amount and incidence of remittance among immigrants in Germany.

Educational attainment of migrants is positively related to the amount of remittance according to Lucas and Stark (1985), but other studies have shown that this result need not hold. For example, Faini (2006) and Dustmann and Mestres (2011) find that remittances are lower for the highly skilled. Similarly, it has been shown that those with lower earning potential have a higher propensity to remit as in the case of Somalian migrants in Norway (Blom and Henriksen 2009). On the contrary, there is also evidence that the earnings of the migrants have positive relation to the amount and incidence of remittance in the case of rural China (Liu and Reilly 2004).

Demographic characteristics of the emigrant are found to be very pertinent in determining the remittance-sending behaviour. Carling (2008) finds that, controlling for time since migration, remittances tend to increase

with the age of migrants; Funkhouser (1995) finds the effect to be non-significant, while Menjivar et al. (1998) find a U-shape relationship between age and the incidence of remitting. Gender is seen to significantly affect remittance-sending behaviour, though the results differ according to regions. While some studies have found that men have higher probability of remitting and remit larger amounts (Lucas and Stark 1985; Holst and Schrooten 2006), in other studies this result does not hold (Funkhouser 1995). Studies have also found that women remit a larger proportion of their wage though their remittances maybe smaller in absolute terms (Posel 2001) and they fulfil the insurance motive for remitting (Briere et al. 1998). While marital status is a significant determinant of remittance, the magnitude varies depending on whether the spouse is left behind in the source or living at the destination. The emigrants whose spouses are also living in the destination tend to remit less, while those whose spouses/children are in the source tend to remit more (Dustmann and Mestres 2010; Carling 2008). As the number of emigrants from a household increases, the amount of remittance sent by each individual migrant tends to fall while the total remittance received by the households remains the same or increases slightly (Funkhouser 1995; Gubert 2002; Hagen-Zanker and Siegel 2007).

Characteristics of the remittance-receiving households also influence the incidence and amount of remittance. The income of the household excluding remittance as well as the asset index of the household seems to significantly affect the amount of remittances received, but the impact is not homogeneous. Acosta et al. (2007) find that while for some Latin American countries remittance-receiving households are at the bottom income quintile, in others they are at the top quintiles. Fluctuations in income also are seen to be a determining factor (Halliday 2006; Lucas and Stark 1985), suggesting the role of remittance as an insurance mechanism. The study by Cox et al. (1998) suggests that there is a higher incidence of remittances when there are dependents (children, elderly, unemployed, sick persons) in the source households. The number of dependents in the home country (children, elderly parents) is seen to significantly positively link to the amount of remittance while dependents or family at the destination lower the amount of remittances (Dustmann and Mestres 2010). It has also been found that female-headed households tend to receive more remittances (Cox et al. 1998). Community-level factors also play an important role in the determination of the amount of remittances sent (Azam and Gubert 2005; Massey and Basem 1992).

MODEL SPECIFICATION

In a simple model, we take the sample of employed emigrants from Kerala who are working in different destination countries, mostly the GCC, to analyse their remittance-sending behaviour. While modelling the remittance function, we have to be careful about sample selection bias as all emigrants do not remit, leading to a clustering of zeros in the sample (as we take the amount remitted by non-remitters as zero). This could lead to biased and inconsistent estimates if OLS method is employed for estimation. Hence there is a need to employ models that will take into account the selection bias. Researchers have used Heckman selection model and Tobit model to overcome this issue. The Tobit model, though, accounting for the clustering of zeros (non-remitters), assumes that the decision to remit and the amount remitted are determined simultaneously, thereby implying that the determinants affect both the decisions in the same manner. It does not distinguish between the willingness to remit and the ability to remit. On the other hand, the Heckman selection model accounts for the possible difference in the determinants of the decision to remit and the amount remitted. It requires identifying a selection variable, which affects the decision to remit, but not the amount remitted. This selection variable is used along with the rest of the explanatory variables in the selection equation (decision to remit) which is a probit equation, but not in the outcome equation (amount of remittances), which will be a selection corrected OLS. This will correct the selection bias and also differentiate the determinants of the decision to remit and the amount remitted. In case a suitable selection variable cannot be identified, we use the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the selection equation and use it as one explanatory variable in the outcome equation. This will also address the selection bias (Heckman 1979). In our case, we are not able to identify a suitable selection variable, so are using the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman correction model. We also run the Tobit model to compare results.

The dependent variable in the Tobit model and in the outcome equation of the Heckman selection model is the log of the total amount of remittance¹ sent to the source household in the previous year. The natural log of the total remittance received is preferred as the dependent variable over the absolute changes in remittances as it reduces the effects of outliers so that the distribution is closer to a normal distribution and is easier to interpret.

¹Since cash transfers account only for a part of the transfers from abroad, we take into account the money value of goods sent from abroad also as part of remittances.

A vector of explanatory variables—at the individual, household and regional levels—is identified from existing literature as well as by exploration of data. Migration-specific characteristics identified as determinants—“time since migration”, “destination” and “number of dependents at the destination”—are also included as explanatory variables of interest. The explanatory variables identified at the individual level are age, age squared, gender, years of education, marital status and occupational category (as per the National Classification of Occupations (NCO) 2004 categorisation). At the household level, the variables are the number of dependents (children below the age of 14 and adults above the age of 65) in the household, income status of the household—APL (above poverty line) or BPL (below poverty line) based on the ration card—and the socio-religious group to which the household belongs.

The base regression equation is of the following specification:

$$\log(R_{it}) = a_0 + a_1 I_{it} + a_2 H_{it} + a_3 M_{it} + u_{it} \quad (10.1)$$

Where R_{it} measures the amount of remittances and the indices i and t denotes the individual emigrant and time. I_{it} , H_{it} and M_{it} are matrices of individual, household and migration-specific characteristics of the emigrants and u is the error term.

The vector I_{it} includes the age, age squared, gender, marital status (married or unmarried), number of years of education, the relationship to the household head² and occupation³ at the destination. The vector H_{it}

² Spouse of the household head, children of the household head and others based on classification given in NELM (Lucas and Stark 1985).

³ Occupation is coded into ten broad categories according to the National Classification of Occupations—2004. The NCO is based upon a classification scheme adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO), suitably modified for the Indian conditions. It divides workers into various categories, going down to four-digit codes, with the broadest classification being ten single-digit codes: (1) Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers; (2) Professionals; (3) Technicians and Associate Professionals; (4) Clerks; (5) Service Workers and Shop & Market Sales Workers; (6) Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers; (7) Craft and Related Trades Workers; (8) Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers; (9) Elementary Occupations (e.g. sweepers, street vendors, loaders etc.); (10) Workers not classified by occupations. This scheme tries to group workers based on the similarity of tasks they perform, but can also be interpreted as organising workers into broad skill or status groups, for example, professionals occupy a status higher than the associate professionals, who are higher than the unskilled labourers. In our sample, NCO category 6 has zero entries and we have combined NCO categories 1 and 2.

includes the socio-religious group that the household belongs to (this has been categorised as (1) Forward Group—Forward Hindus and Christians, (2) Muslims⁴ (3) Other Other Backward Caste (OBC) and (4) Schedule Caste (SC)/Schedule Tribe (ST)), the level of household income (APL or BPL based on ration card colour), the number of dependents living in the household (adults above the age of 65 and children below the age of 14) and an indicator variable whether the household is in a rural area. The vector M_{it} includes the number of years of migration experience for the individual, number of other emigrants from the household and the destination country (country of current residence which has been recorded separately as each of the six countries in the GCC, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as one category and all others as the last). The estimating equation is specified as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \ln(\text{total remittance}) = & \alpha + \beta_1 (\text{Age}) \\
 & + \beta_2 (\text{Years of education}) \\
 & + \beta_{3j=1\sum 2} (\text{Gender}) \\
 & + \beta_{4j=1\sum 2} (\text{Marital Status}) \\
 & + \beta_{5j=1\sum 8} (\text{Occupation}) \\
 & + \beta_{6j=1\sum 3} (\text{Relationship to Household Head}) \\
 & + \beta_7 (\text{Number of years since migration}) \\
 & + \beta_8 (\text{No. of years since migration}^2) \\
 & + \beta_9 (\text{No. of dependents abroad}) \\
 & + \beta_{10} (\text{Destination country}) \\
 & + \beta_{11j=1\sum 3} (\text{Socio Religious Group}) \\
 & + \beta_{12} (\text{Number of dependents at home}) \\
 & + \beta_{13=1\sum 2} (\text{Wealth Quintile}) \\
 & + \beta_{14j=1\sum 2} (\text{Sector}) + u_i
 \end{aligned} \tag{10.2}$$

⁴The government appointed committee to study the socioeconomic and educational status of the Muslim community in India, known as Sachar Committee, found that Muslims rank somewhat above STs/SCs but below Hindu OBC in all indicators (Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India (2016)).

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES

This study used cross-section data from the Kerala Migration Survey (KMS) conducted in 2011 by the migration research unit of the Centre for Development Studies in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. The survey used the stratified random sampling method to select 15,000 households with 65,000 individuals. The KMS is a large-scale survey started in the year 1998 and conducted every five years interspersed with special rounds dedicated solely to the study of out-migration (international and interstate) from Kerala. This round has a total sample of 4087 emigrants, of which we have included only those emigrants who are currently working and thus have an income from which to send remittances. Also, since remittances are reported as a household-level variable, the amount of remittance sent by each emigrant cannot be inferred if there are more than one working emigrant in the household. Hence for the analysis we consider only those emigrants who are the only working emigrants in the household. After employing these restrictions, we get a sample of 2099 emigrants for our analysis. The detailed descriptive statistics of the emigrants and their households are given in tables below (Table 10.1).

The current reported age of the working emigrants ranges from 15 to 67 years with the mean age being 36.62 years. This distribution is comparable to the age of the working age population in Kerala labour market. The average years of education of the emigrants are close to 11 years and range between illiteracy and above post-graduation. Majority of the emigrants are 10th pass (33 per cent), 13 per cent is 12th pass while 28 per cent has an education level below class 10. Only 7 per cent has general post-graduation, general graduation/diploma or professional qualification (graduate 5 per cent and post-graduate 3 per cent). Thus it can be concluded that only about a fifth of emigrants in our sample are highly skilled and thus have the potential to earn higher wages. The migrants have been in the destination for a maximum of 50 years with the newer ones having

Table 10.1 Characteristics of the emigrant

<i>Characteristics of the emigrant</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Minima</i>	<i>Maxima</i>
Current age of emigrant	36.62	9.439	15	67
No. of years of education	10.86	3.164	0	22
No. of years of migration	9.04	6.411	1	40

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011

migrated just the previous year. The average number of years since migration for the sample is 9 years (55 per cent of the migrants have been abroad for 5 years or less, 70 per cent have been abroad for 10 years or less, 90 per cent have a maximum of 20 years of migration while 10 per cent of the samples have between 20 and 40 years of migration experience) (Table 10.2).

The distribution of emigrants in the sample is skewed in terms of marital status and gender composition. Out of the sample of 2099 working emigrants, 97 per cent are male, out of which about three-quarters are married. Only 3 per cent of the sample is female of which roughly half are married. Thus we can see that the majority (70 per cent) of the Gulf emigrants are married men (Table 10.3).

The mean number of dependents is 1.43 (0.45 for seniors and 0.98 for children) in the household with the minimum being zero and maximum being nine (Table 10.4).

Remittance captured in the data is the remittance received by the household in the previous year as personal transfers in cash and in kind from a member of the household who is currently abroad. About 1874 households (i.e., 89 per cent) in the sample received remittances as cash, 251 households (12 per cent) received remittances in kind, 86 households (4 per cent) received remittances for buying land and 59 households (3 per cent) for buying a specific good. The table above gives the

Table 10.2 Gender and marital status of the emigrants

<i>Gender</i>	<i>Unmarried</i>	<i>Married</i>	<i>Total</i>
Male	565	1458	2023
Female	37	39	76
Total	600	1499	2099

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011

Table 10.3 Characteristics of the emigrant's household

<i>Characteristics of the source household</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Minima</i>	<i>Maxima</i>
No. of dependents	1.43	1.38	0	9
No. of seniors	0.45	0.35	0	3
No. of children	0.98	1.15	0	9

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011; No. of observations: 2099

Table 10.4 Type of remittance received by the household in the previous year

<i>Type of remittance</i>	<i>No. of households</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Minima</i>	<i>Maxima</i>
Total remittance (all types)	2099	79240.51	99507.92	0	1,785,000
Total remittance in cash	1874	69585.47	70978.37	0	920,000
Total remittance in kind	251	1889.93	9697.02	0	225,000
Remittance send to buy land	86	5754.53	42525.01	0	800,000
Remittance send to buy specific goods	59	2034.08	22667.00	0	700,000

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011

mean of the different kinds of remittances received. Empirical evidence suggests that not all emigrants remit and the incidence and average amount remitted varies according to emigrant characteristics. The tables that follow try to analyse the incidence of remittance among migrants based on some significant characteristics. The first column in the table gives the distribution of emigrants according to some of the significant characteristics—destination (current residence), occupational category (taken according to the broad groups in the NCO categorisation), levels of education and socio-religious categories. The second column gives the percentage distribution of total emigrants in each category, the third column gives the proportion of emigrants sending remittance, the fourth and fifth columns capture the total remittances and mean remittance in each category and the last column gives the percentage composition of remittance in each category.

Table 10.5 discusses the emigrant and remittance characteristics according to the destination countries. When we analyse the emigrant composition, 95 per cent of the emigrants in our sample are distributed in different GCC countries with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (38 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (28 per cent) having the highest number of emigrants from Kerala. Though 89 per cent of all emigrants sent remittance back to their households in the origin country, there are variations according to different characteristics of the emigrants. In the country-wise categorisation, it is found that majority of the emigrants are concentrated in the GCC (95 per cent), with the UAE (38 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (28 per cent) being the countries with the highest percentage of emigrants from Kerala. The incidence of remittance from the Gulf countries is equal to or higher than the average with around 90 per cent of all

Table 10.5 Percentage distribution of emigrants, remitters and total, mean and percentage distribution of remittance sent according to destination countries

<i>Destination country</i>	<i>Percentage of total emigrants</i>	<i>Proportion of emigrants sending remittance</i>	<i>Total remittance sent (lakhs)</i>	<i>Mean remittance sent</i>	<i>Percentage of total remittance</i>
OECD	2.19	69.57	43	93,011	3
UAE	38.07	89.11	624	78,212	38
Saudi Arabia	28.39	91.28	465	78,056	28
Oman	10.81	91.19	170	74,874	10
Qatar	7.15	92.00	126	85,223	8
Kuwait	5.05	83.02	77	72,878	5
Bahrain	4.62	89.69	90	92,995	5
Others	3.72	84.62	65	83,595	4
Total (lakhs)	100.00	89.28	1661	79,241	100

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011

emigrants sending remittances home. The maximum inflow of remittances is from the UAE (38 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (28 per cent), followed by Oman (10 per cent). When we analyse the average remittances sent, we find that OECD countries are the origin of highest per capita remittances, indicating that the overall remittance flow is less from OECD regions due to lower proportions of emigrants.

Table 10.6 discusses the emigrant and remittance characteristics according to the occupational categories of the emigrants. Analysing emigrant categories according to occupation shows that the highest number of emigrants is clustered in the categories of service workers (28 per cent) and crafts and related trades (23 per cent) followed by skilled (12 per cent) and unskilled (10 per cent) labourers. The higher occupations have lesser proportion of migrants, probably also because the number of jobs available in higher ranks is fewer. It is interesting to note that there is a falling trend in the proportion of emigrants remitting as the occupational category becomes higher. Among those in the lowest occupation category, 94 per cent remit while only 76 per cent remit in the highest occupation category. Though average remittances fall with increasing occupational categories, per capita remittances increase with higher occupational categories. According to occupation, those in the service sector and trade sent the highest proportion of remittances (23 per cent each) followed by skilled labourers (13 per cent)

Table 10.6 Percentage distribution of emigrants, remitters and total, mean and percentage distribution of remittance sent according to occupational category

<i>Occupational category^a</i>	<i>Percentage of total emigrants</i>	<i>Proportion of emigrants sending remittance</i>	<i>Total remittance sent (lakhs)</i>	<i>Mean remittance sent</i>	<i>Percentage of total remittance</i>
Legislators; senior officials and managers; professionals	6.15	76.74	132	101,942	8
Technicians and associate professionals	6.24	79.39	135	103,179	8
Clerks	6.34	89.47	133	99,718	8
Service workers and shop & market sales workers	28.06	92.19	381	64,740	23
Craft and related trades workers	23.11	90.10	378	78,080	23
Plant & machine operators & assemblers	12.82	94.42	217	80,628	13
Elementary occupations	10.53	89.14	152	68,577	9
Others	6.77	85.21	135	95,436	8
Total (lakhs)	100.00	89.28	1661	79,241	100

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011; ^aNational Classification of Occupations, 2004

Table 10.7 discusses the emigrant and remittance characteristics according to the educational attainment of the emigrants. Considering the educational attainment of the emigrants, the highest proportion of emigrants has completed secondary education (32 per cent) followed by those with primary or middle school education (25 per cent) and higher secondary or diploma (24.5 per cent). They together contribute to around 83 per cent of the emigrant sample, which explains that the average years of schooling is 11 years in Table 10.1. Similar to the occupational category, increase in the level of education also shows a corresponding decrease in the incidence of remittance, that is, as the education level becomes higher the proportion of individuals within each level who remits reduces. According to level of education, those with secondary, higher secondary/diploma sent the highest proportion of remittances (27 per cent each) followed by those with primary/middle school education (23 per cent).

Table 10.8 discusses the emigrant and remittance characteristics according to the socio-religious groups the emigrants belong to. Considering the socio-religious groups to which the migrants belong, the highest single

Table 10.7 Percentage distribution of emigrants, remitters and total, mean and percentage distribution of remittance sent according to educational attainment

<i>Levels of education</i>	<i>Percentage of total emigrants</i>	<i>Proportion of emigrants sending remittance</i>	<i>Total remittance sent (lakhs)</i>	<i>Mean remittance sent</i>	<i>Percentage of total remittance</i>
Below primary	2.91	91.80	42	68,952	3
Primary and middle school	25.30	90.77	402	75,841	24
Secondary school	32.59	92.11	447	65,596	27
Higher secondary and diploma	24.63	88.78	445	86,020	27
Graduation	7.91	87.95	196	117,935	12
Professional degree	4.62	71.13	92	94,861	6
Post-graduation & above	2.05	74.42	37	86,023	2
Total (lakhs)	100.00	89.28	1661	79,241	100

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011

Table 10.8 Percentage distribution of emigrants, remitters and total, mean and percentage distribution of remittance sent according to socio-religious group

<i>Socio-religious group</i>	<i>Percentage of total emigrants</i>	<i>Proportion of emigrants sending remittance</i>	<i>Total remittance sent (lakhs)</i>	<i>Mean remittance sent</i>	<i>Percentage of total remittance</i>
Forward groups	30.76	86.30	688	88,166	35
OBC Muslim	42.02	92.70	640	75,384	39
OBC others	25.09	89.02	403	76,541	24
SC/ST	2.03	79.17	30	62,708	2
Total (lakhs)	100.00	89.28	1661	79,241	100

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011

group contributing to 42 per cent of the emigrant population is the Muslims, they also have the highest proportion of remittance incidence. The forward Hindus and Christians together account for around 32 per cent of the emigrant population while the OBC Hindus and Christians together account for around 25 per cent which leaves only a 2 per cent proportion of SCs and STs taken together. In socio-religious categorisation, Muslim households receive close to 40 per cent of all remittance

inflows while the forward groups account for 35 per cent and OBCs for 25 per cent with only around 2 per cent coming into SC/ST families. The category-wise means in socio-religious groups show that the per capita remittances is highest among forward groups, with the OBCs following close (Muslim and others have the same mean remittance) with the SC/STs lagging behind with a substantial gap of Rs 15,000. This shows that Muslim households receive the highest proportion of remittances only due to their higher share in the emigration. Another observation is that, both in terms of total remittance, per capita remittance as well as the proportion of migrants, the SC/ST representation is disproportionately low.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In this section we present the results of the selection corrected OLS regression and the Tobit regression models. The dependent variable is the log of the total remittance sent in the previous year. The explanatory variables are the migration-specific variables, socio-demographic characteristics of the individual emigrant and the characteristics of the source household (Table 10.9).

First we discuss the results of the selection corrected OLS model. The impact of the migration-specific variables is discussed first in the analysis. It is found that there is positive and highly significant impact of the duration (years) of migration on the amount of remittance sent. For every additional year of stay abroad, the emigrant remits 1.6 per cent more. This result is in tandem with the study by Dustmann and Mestres (2010), who find that remittances increase significantly with the number of years of migration among temporary emigrants in Germany who have an intention to return. This interpretation is valid in the case of Kerala also because the intention to return is implicit in the case of emigrants from Kerala as more than 95 per cent are temporary migrants to the Gulf.

Most remittance literature takes into consideration the characteristics of the destination as a determinant of remitting which is mainly because the focus of these studies was more or less on the countries from which remittances were flowing out. In this analysis, we have taken the different destinations to which Keralites emigrate to see if there is any difference in the remittance-sending behaviour based on the destination. Taking the GCC countries as the reference category, it can be seen that the higher migrant-receiving GCC countries are also destinations from which higher

Table 10.9 Parameter estimates of the determinants of remittance-sending behaviour

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Selection PROBIT</i>	<i>Selection corrected OLS</i>	<i>TOBIT</i>
	<i>Remitter</i>	<i>Log(annual remittance)</i>	<i>Log(annual remittance)</i>
Migration duration	0.0881*** (0.0139)	1.678** (0.907)	3.857*** (0.958)
(Migration duration) ²	-0.002*** (0.00035)	-0.0319 (0.0300)	-0.083*** (0.0319)
Country of residence (ref: GCC)			
Non GCC countries	0.149 (0.119)	-1.432 (17.37)	-1.059 (16.33)
No of dependents abroad	-0.169*** (0.0402)	-9.805*** (3.723)	-15.71*** (3.701)
Age of emigrant	-0.00471 (0.00560)	8.340* (0.347)	8.220* (0.365)
Gender of emigrant (ref: Male)			
Female	-0.0808 (0.129)	6.945 (17.40)	2.476 (16.96)
Marital status of emigrant (ref: Unmarried)			
Married	0.103 (0.0950)	-12.11* (5.567)	-8.917* (6.044)
Relationship to household head (ref: Spouse of household head)			
Children of the household head	0.021 (0.471)	0.007 (0.220)	0.013 (0.538)
Others	-0.296* (0.231)	-0.1604 (0.307)	-0.143 (0.436)
Years of completed education	0.0185 (0.0148)	2.886** (1.376)	3.240** (1.365)
Occupational category (ref: Professionals, managers & higher)			
Associate professionals and technicians	0.315** (0.144)	-28.08 (26.09)	-9.588 (23.93)
Clerks	0.440*** (0.167)	-34.02 (22.29)	-9.185 (20.59)
Sales and service workers	0.571*** (0.144)	-58.91*** (19.85)	-32.69* (18.48)
Craft and trade workers	0.588*** (0.141)	-37.24* (21.04)	-9.113 (19.55)
Plant & machine operators & assemblers	0.698*** (0.174)	-40.86** (20.23)	-10.78 (18.76)

(continued)

Table 10.9 (continued)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Selection PROBIT</i>	<i>Selection corrected OLS</i>	<i>TOBIT</i>
	<i>Remitter</i>	<i>Log(annual remittance)</i>	<i>Log(annual remittance)</i>
Elementary workers	0.588*** (0.176)	-49.17** (20.82)	-20.73 (19.50)
No of dependents in household	0.0541*** (0.0196)	11.78*** (1.152)	12.29*** (1.198)
Socio-religious category (ref: Fwd groups)			
OBC Muslim	0.301*** (0.105)	-2.247 (6.801)	8.140 (7.235)
OBC others	-0.0372 (0.245)	70.32 (45.42)	64.14 (42.69)
SC/ST	-0.0537* (0.0949)	8.186 (6.659)	2.597 (7.029)
Wealth quintiles (ref: Wealth_quintile_1)			
Wealth_quintile_2	0.171 (0.170)	21.96*** (6.359)	24.69*** (7.743)
Wealth_quintile_3	0.206 (0.157)	17.42*** (5.643)	22.10*** (6.946)
Wealth_quintile_4	0.358** (0.150)	27.78*** (5.564)	35.48*** (6.848)
Wealth_quintile_5	0.311** (0.158)	64.30*** (6.327)	68.40*** (7.580)
Location of residence (ref: Rural)			
Urban	-0.412*** (0.0753)	-7.994 (6.360)	-22.92*** (6.783)
Inverse mills ratio		-3.395** (-3.246)	
Constant	0.197 (0.402)	15.37 (37.08)	-42.34 (36.63)
Observations	2099	2099	2099
Wald Chi Sq		481.3	
L R Test Chi Sq		2.870	

Source: Author's calculation based on KMS, 2011

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

amounts of remittances are sent but the results are not significant indicating that destination country characteristics may not be strong determinants of remittance-sending behaviour of emigrants.

The number of dependents in the emigrant's household at the destination negatively and highly significantly impacts the amount of remittances sent. For every additional dependent member in the destination, the remittance sent to the household in the source region falls by 62 per cent. This is similar to the finding reported in Dustmann and Mestres (2010) for immigrants in Germany whose propensity to remit falls when their spouse and children are also at the destination. This could point to a strong self-interest motivation in the remittance-sending behaviour among emigrants from Kerala.

The analysis finds that age is positively weakly significant with an 8 per cent increase in the amount of remittance sent for an increase of age by one year and can be attributed to factors like increased responsibilities or higher earning profile (Menjivar et al. 1998). This result is in tandem with the literature on the migrant's remittance-sending behaviour (Carling 2008).

Considering the gender of the migrant as an explanatory variable is drawn from the literature, but in the case of Kerala, emigration has been found to be male-dominated with only about a quarter of the emigrants being women. In our data, the remittances are reported as household remittances and not individual remittance for each emigrant. This makes it difficult to allocate the amount of remittance sent by each emigrant in a household with more than one working emigrant. Hence, for this analysis, we have considered only those households with only one earning emigrant abroad, and in this process, women form only 3 per cent of the sample. Gender does not come across as a significant determinant of remittance-sending behaviour, which is similar to the finding of Funkhouser (1995).

The marital status of the migrants is a significant determinant at 5 per cent sending 12 per cent more remittances than unmarried emigrants. In our sample of emigrants, a high proportion are married men with spouses left behind which is also corroborated by evidence from other reports (Zachariah and Rajan 2009) and hence this result is in tandem with studies that have found that emigrants who have spouses left behind have a higher propensity to remit and higher average amount of remittances (Dustmann and Mestres 2010; Carling 2008).

Education is seen to increase the amount of remittances sent by 7 per cent for each additional year of schooling, which can be explained by the

fact that education increases the earning profile of the emigrants (Lucas and Stark 1985). This, when read together with the fact that the incidence of remittances is lesser among more educated emigrants (table) is in tandem with existing literature (Funkhouser 1995; Massey and Basem 1992).

Taking occupational categories as a proxy for income data in the absence of the latter, we find that those in higher-level occupations tend to remit lesser. With the highest occupation categories (professionals, managers and higher) as the reference, we find that there is no significant difference in the remittance amount sent by next highest occupation category (associate professionals and technicians). The remaining categories of workers intend to send more remittance but the increase in the amount of remittance sent is only weakly significant. This is in accordance with other studies that have shown that persons in lower occupations tend to remit more compared to persons in higher occupations (Brown and Piorine 2018; Menjivar et al. 1998; Funkhouser 1995). One of the more compelling explanations for this trend is that remittances act as a co-insurance, and lower-income emigrants have a higher co-dependence to family members in the source (Lucas and Stark 1985), again pointing to a self-interest motivation for remittance-sending behaviour.

The analysis finds that the number of dependents in the source household significantly and positively affects the amount of remittances sent. This could perhaps be explained by the fact that more than 95 per cent of the emigrations from Kerala are to the GCC and temporary and leave behind their children. Thus sending remittances back is both a method of saving and investment for a future/retirement and also to support dependents in the source household. The number of dependents would be determining in the case of allocation of remittances as well. The relationship of the emigrant to the household head does not significantly affect the amount of remittance sent which is again contradictory to literature from other parts of the world.

The income status of the household is ascertained by the wealth quintile to which the household belongs, in the absence of income data. There is significant increase in the amount of remittance sent to households that are in higher wealth quintiles. This can be explained according to the self-interest motive of the migrant put forward by Lucas and Stark (1985). As per the socio-religious categorisation, there is no significant difference in the amount of remittances received. The urban households receive 22 per cent less remittance than the rural households. This is also in tandem with Lucas and Stark (1985) hypothesis.

The Tobit results using the whole sample of emigrants (including remitters and non-remitters) are presented in the last column of the Table 10.9. The signs of the coefficients and the level of significance of the explanatory variables are identical to that observed for the results of the OLS for amount remitted on the truncated sample of remitters. This implies that the findings do not differ in qualitative terms from the results discussed above.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to analyse the determinants of remittance-sending behaviour among emigrants from Kerala within the New Economics of Labour Migration framework. The econometric results presented in this chapter indicate that the migrant's individual characters have a stronger influence in the amount of remittance sent and household-level characteristics have a relatively lower influence in their remittance-sending behaviour. It also suggests that the duration of migration, destination and presence of dependents abroad are the most significant determinants of remittance-sending behaviour among emigrants from Kerala. The duration of stay is a more significant determinant of the amount of remittances sent than the country of residence. An interesting finding is also that it is emigrants who have a lower earning potential (engaged in lower occupations/having lower levels of education) who remit more. While marital status is a significant determinant for remittance sending, the number of dependents staying with the emigrant abroad has stronger influence on the amount of remittance sent. The gender of the migrant does not affect the amount of remittance sent but age increases the amount. Household characteristics exert less impact on the remittance-sending behaviour with religion and income status being weakly significant and the number of dependents and migrant's relation to the household head not showing any significance. There is strong evidence to suggest that the motivation for sending remittance among emigrants from Kerala lean towards self-interest rather than altruism. Their decision to remit depends more on their need for an insurance mechanism than their ability to earn or the status of the household in the origin. Thus in line with existing literature, remittances in the Kerala context can be interpreted as an insurance mechanism adopted by emigrants in view of a future return.

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Tamil Nadu Migrants in the Gulf

S. Irudaya Rajan and E. Sownthara Rajan

INTRODUCTION

India has the largest migration presence in Gulf regions because majority of Indian migrants end up for employment in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The initial flow of contractual labour from India started with a small number of 0.16 million in 1985 and it has reached 0.64 million in 2010 (Zachariah and Rajan 2016a). The trends in data on emigration clearances published by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs¹ (MOIA) of the Government of India primarily reveal migration to six GCC countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The above-mentioned countries are

¹ MOIA was established in 2004 as Ministry of Non-Resident Affairs in May 2004 and renamed in September 2004 to handle services for non-resident Indians and persons of Indian origin. It is presently merged with Ministry of External affairs and carries out all the functions.

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referred to as GCC countries throughout this chapter and all the other countries are referred to as non-GCC countries. Since it is mandatory to obtain emigration clearance for Emigration Clearance Required (ECR) passport holders from Government of India to obtain visa from the GCC countries, the records of emigrants are available from MOIA, Government of India. These data enable the researchers to study the trends and other relevant characteristics of all the emigrants from different states of India. The analysis of the data reveals that the workers granted emigration clearances from Tamil Nadu (TN) in 1993 accounted to 70,313 persons, as compared to the neighbouring state of Kerala from which as many as 155,208 persons had emigrated from the state during the same period. Kerala has been the first-ranking state of India sending migrants to GCC countries. In 2006, Tamil Nadu registered a massive increase over Kerala which accounted for 155,631 persons who were cleared for emigration for work as compared to 120,083 in Kerala and retained its position in 2007 too.

Figure 11.1 indicates the volume of Kerala and Tamil Nadu workers who were granted emigration clearance from MOIA over the years. As per the figure, Kerala had the highest flow of migration until 2013. In 2014, Tamil Nadu took over that position. In 2006, Tamil Nadu achieved its peak whereas Kerala registered the same in 2008 with 180,703 workers. After that, there was a decline in the volume of workers from Tamil Nadu as well as from Kerala. However, in 2014, Tamil Nadu surpassed Kerala among the South Indian states and stood behind Uttar Pradesh and Bihar




Fig. 11.1 Workers granted emigration clearance from Kerala and Tamil Nadu. (Source: Compiled by the authors from various MOIA annual reports, MOIA, New Delhi)

at all-India level, as far as the emigration of workers was concerned. This data is just an indication about trends of emigration to GCC countries which required Emigration Clearance of the passport holders who had completed 12 years of schooling.

Being one of the top four migrant states based on ECR data, Tamil Nadu did not have comprehensive data about the migration patterns from state. Tamil Nadu migration survey was an answer to the gap. Tamil Nadu migration survey results have estimated that 2.2 million emigrants from Tamil Nadu are living abroad, which is around 3 per cent of the total population of Tamil Nadu. Though Singapore is estimated to receive the largest number of emigrants from Tamil Nadu accounting to 410,000 followed by the UAE with 400,000 emigrants, GCC states between them receive over half of the emigrants, estimated to be 1.1 million. Historically, Tamil Nadu has people migrating to Singapore and Malaysia and settling there. This started in the pre-independence era, but the Gulf migration started recently, and it gives different opportunities compared to Singapore or Malaysia. As its distinctions are clear between the migrations to these different destinations, this chapter explores the characteristics of migration to GCC states.

OBJECTIVE

This chapter is to understand the specific characteristics of migrants to GCC countries as the policies that are required for half of the international migrants from Tamil Nadu are different from the migrants to non-GCC countries—in terms of their socio-demographic characteristics such as occupation, education, marital status and in their contribution to the economy such as remittances, skill sets. It also understands the data of non-GCC countries in general to know if there is any need for further exploration. The chapter also discusses the future prospects of Tamil Nadu migrants to GCC countries based on the estimates from analysis.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Migration, in India, has been happening since British era but the international migration scene is not studied in depth until recently. In fact, one of the largest surveys for migration was conducted by the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, in 1998 to explore the international migration in Kerala. Studies that explore the characteristics of Indian migrants to

the UAE shows that around 40 per cent are production-related workers—ones that work as electricians, electronics equipment operators, plumbers, welders, sheet metal workers and construction workers (Zachariah, Kannan and Rajan 2002a; Zachariah, Prakash and Rajan 2002b; 2004; Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan 2003). The educational status of these workers is less than secondary except for 3 per cent of them. The average work hours per day of migrants range from 8 to 13 hours. This study also found that almost 22 per cent of migrants have delay in getting their wages. These details compel to understand the uniqueness in the migration to the UAE and other GCC countries. It also makes the comparison with the non-GCC countries necessary if the conditions are different in general. A panel of data analysis of Kerala migration study series shows that the remittances to Kerala has been growing and it estimates that it stands at Rs 71,442 crores. This is 36.3 per cent of Kerala's State Domestic Product (SDP) equivalent and proved to be significant source of development to the state (Zachariah and Rajan 2016a). Tamil Nadu as a state is larger in area when compared to Kerala and it is one with more population, more SDP than the neighbour, but the international migration seems to be similar in the states as per the ECR data (MOIA 2013). As 90 per cent of the Kerala migrants are going to GCC countries and this proportion is 50 per cent in case of Tamil Nadu, it is required to understand the remittances from Tamil Nadu migrants in GCC countries to analyse the economic impact and development support that the state is able to receive (For Punjab, See Rajan and Nanda 2015; Varghese and Rajan 2015).

DATA AND METHODS

This chapter uses the data obtained in Tamil Nadu migration survey 2015 (Rajan et al. 2017) based on study conducted by Centre for Development Studies. Other secondary data sets are also referred from data published by Ministry of overseas affairs yearly based on the ECR passports cleared for emigration.

Descriptive statistics are the major methods used for analysis. Some of the tables obtained from Rajan et al. 2017 have been synthesized for the use of the study.

Throughout the presentation of results, the countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are referred to as GCC (Gulf cooperation council) countries and others as non-GCC countries simply for the objective of our analysis. It is also to be noted that though this chapter talks about international migration, some of the

abbreviations used in the presentation of results are: EMI—Emigrants and REM—Return Emigrant are the categories of international migrants and OMI—Out-migrants and ROM—Return out-migrants are the categories of migrants that migrate within the country across different states in India.

RESULTS

Demographic and social profiles of migrants to GCC countries and non-GCC countries— A Comparison.

RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF TAMIL NADU MIGRANTS TO GCC AND NON-GCC COUNTRIES

According to the 2011 Census, Tamil Nadu's population consists of 87.58 per cent Hindus, 6.12 per cent Christians and 5.86 per cent Muslims. The religious composition (Table 11.1) of the emigrant population is different from religious composition seen in the total population of Tamil Nadu. The majority of the emigrants are Hindus and accounted for 78.5 per cent, 8 per cent of them are Christians and the remaining 13.3 per cent are Muslims. Muslim emigrants are represented more in GCC countries as compared to the Tamil Nadu average—25.4 per cent of Saudi Arabia emigrants from Tamil Nadu are Muslims and this share of Muslim emigrants is over 20 per cent for all the GCC countries except for Oman, which has 14.3 per cent of Muslims in total emigrants which is

Table 11.1 Religious composition of Tamil Nadu emigrants to GCC countries

<i>Religion</i>	<i>Current destination of TN emigrants by country</i>							<i>Overall</i>	
	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Overall GCC countries</i>	<i>Non-GCC countries</i>	
Hindu	67.6	67.6	69.4	64.5	70.8	65.5	67.9	88.9	78.5
Christian	8.8	7.1	16.3	11.8	6.9	10.3	9.0	7.0	8.0
Muslim	23.3	25.4	14.3	23.7	22.3	24.1	23.1	3.8	13.3
Others	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

still above the Muslim emigrants share of overall emigrants from Tamil Nadu. Hindu share of emigrants in GCC countries ranges from 64 per cent to 70 per cent which is well below the overall share of emigrants. In case of non-GCC countries, the Hindu share (88.9 per cent) of emigrant population is way over the overall share and the Muslim (3.8 per cent) share is well below it. In the case of Christians, their share in emigrant population from GCC and non-GCC countries is similar and closer to overall share of 8 per cent of Tamil Nadu emigrants except for Oman and Qatar where Christians share 16.3 per cent and 11.8 per cent of the emigrant populations respectively.

One of the reasons for the larger share of Muslim emigrants in Gulf countries may be due to chain migration. When the infrastructure projects had started picking up in Gulf countries in the early 1970s, labourers from India and other South Asian countries were attracted to GCC countries. However, since the majority of population in these countries was Muslims, Hindu immigrants did not feel comfortable with them due to cultural contrast. With a great difference in food and living habits among these two, Hindus found it difficult to live with Muslims, hence Singapore and Malaysia became the favourable destinations for Tamil migrants due to its stronger diaspora presence.

DISTRIBUTION OF TAMIL NADU MIGRANTS AND RETURN MIGRANTS BY SEX

The analysis of emigrants by sex (Table 11.2) shows that the share of women among Tamil emigrants to GCC countries was less. It may be due to numerous restrictions on women employment including their infamous

Table 11.2 Distribution of Tamil Nadu emigrants to Gulf by sex and country

Sex	Country where the migrant workers were residing							Overall	
	United Arab Emirates	Saudi Arabia	Oman	<u>Qatar</u>	Kuwait	Bahrain	Overall GCC countries	Non-GCC countries	
Male	89.6	94.4	88.8	88.2	90.8	89.7	91.1	79.6	85.3
Female	10.4	5.6	11.2	11.8	9.2	10.3	8.9	20.4	14.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

Table 11.3 Distribution of return migrants to Tamil Nadu from Gulf by sex and country

Sex	Country where the migrant workers were residing							Overall	
	United Arab Emirates	Saudi Arabia	Oman	Qatar	Kuwait	Bahrain	Overall GCC countries		Non-GCC countries
Male	96.4	96.3	93.3	96.8	88.0	89.5	95.0	92.8	94.0
Female	3.6	3.7	6.7	3.2	12.0	10.5	5.0	7.2	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

kafala² system for migration monitoring. Of all the emigrants in GCC countries, only around 9 per cent were women on an average, and this percentage is even lesser (5.6 per cent) if we include Saudi Arabia also which has stricter laws on women rights (Rajan and Joseph 2013, 2015).

This comparison of distribution of sex among return migrants with emigrants is just to see if there is any basic difference in the travelling pattern. From the results (Table 11.3) we see that there is a significant difference in the distribution between emigrants and returned emigrants in case of non-GCC countries. It is observed that the male-female ratio is 80:20 in case of emigrants whereas the ratio is 93:07 in case of return migrants. This might be because that emigrant group contains female population who migrate due to marriage and the returned emigrants are mostly the male population who come back alone to get settled. In fact, this difference is expected as a basic aspect of the classification, emigrants and return emigrants.

Results from Table 11.4 show that among migrants to GCC countries, 50 per cent belong to the age group of 20–34 years against the non-GCC countries where the presence of this age group is 54 per cent. Exceptions to this is Bahrain—where 31 per cent of the migrants were aged from 20 to 34 years and 51.7 per cent in the age group 30 to 49 years. The percentages of TN migrants in these two age groups in Kuwait were 42.3 and 40.0 respectively. Usually the migrants travelling to the Gulf countries have to return to their home country after mandatory retirement at the

² Kafala system is a system used to be in practice to monitor coming in migrant labours through in-country sponsor (usually employer) for every worker. This was widely practised in Gulf countries.

Table 11.4 Distributions of TN migrants by age and country in Gulf and non-Gulf countries

<i>Current age group</i>	<i>Country where the migrant workers were residing</i>							<i>Non-GCC</i>	<i>Overall</i>
	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Overall GCC</i>		
Less than 20	4.4	2.9	5.1	6.6	5.4	3.4	4.3	9.4	6.9
20–34	54.7	51.9	45.9	51.3	42.3	31.0	50.6	54.5	52.5
35–49	32.4	37.5	44.9	35.5	40.0	51.7	36.9	30.8	33.8
50–64	8.0	7.1	4.1	6.6	11.5	13.8	7.8	4.6	6.2
Greater than 65	0.5	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

age of 60 or 62 (or in special cases of 65) years or after taking voluntary retirement around 50 years of age since Gulf countries do not take them as their citizens. Therefore, all the migrants after retirement are supposed to return to their home country. This is confirmed from the data that only very few (negligible percentage) migrants stay in GCC countries beyond 65 years of age. Kuwait and especially Bahrain show different pattern of distribution of migrants than that of the rest of the four GCC countries. The percentages of migrants in the age group 50 to 64 years are nearly twofold than those found in these age groups are in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar. Bahrain has people, mostly migrants, to work as labourers in non-agricultural sector and for domestic help (see Table 11.6). As this work needs good experience, the migrants who start late in the migration process migrate to countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait.

EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF TN MIGRANTS AND IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON THEIR OCCUPATION

Educational status of the migrants in Gulf (Table 11.5) for class 10 to class 12 group which constitutes around 26.3 of TN migrants and the share of migrants completed class 10 to class 12 is around 34.5 per cent in the UAE, a country where employer sponsorship for workers required at least 10th class. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have migrant share of 33.9 per cent and 33.1 per cent respectively.

Table 11.5 Educational status of TN migrants to GCC countries

<i>Educational status</i>	<i>Percentage of TN migrants to GCC countries by educational status</i>						<i>Overall GCC</i>	<i>Non-GCC</i>	<i>Overall</i>
	<i>UAE</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>			
Illiterate/ others	5.2	5.0	9.2	6.6	6.9	3.4	5.8	9.7	7.8
Class 1 to 9	17.1	25.1	18.4	17.1	21.5	20.7	20.4	12.6	16.5
Class 10 to 12	34.5	33.9	28.6	26.3	33.1	27.6	32.8	19.9	26.3
ITI/ certificate/ diploma	25.6	24.2	22.4	32.9	26.9	37.9	25.9	25.2	25.5
PG/PG diploma/ professional degree/PhD	17.6	11.8	21.4	17.1	11.5	10.3	15.1	32.7	24.0

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

Table 11.5 presents the percentages of Tamil Nadu migrants to six GCC countries and non-GCC countries by their educational level. As the data in the table suggests, the percentages of illiterate migrants ranged between the least (3.4) for Bahrain and the most (9.2) for Oman. Some interesting patterns may be observed from the data. Among the migrants having completed schooling from class 1 to class 9, the maximum percentage (25.1) was employed in Saudi Arabia, followed by Kuwait (21.5) and Bahrain (20.7). In the UAE, Qatar and Oman, the percentage staggered at around 17.5. Interestingly, as one moves from “Illiterate” category to class 10 to class 12, it is observed that barring Qatar and Bahrain, the percentages of migrants with educational qualification (years of schooling) showed increase in rest of the four GCC countries. By and large, the highest percentage of migrants in GCC countries is in the class 10 to class 12 categories of schooling.

The last two categories of education in Table 11.5 give the percentages of Tamil Nadu migrants to Gulf countries with some technical qualifications and those having academic degrees like post-graduation and PhD who may be absorbed in Gulf countries as university/college teachers. The migrants having acquired some technical skills and received certificate/diploma after successfully completed training at the government

Industrial Training Institutes (ITI), have had better career prospects in countries like Bahrain (37.9 per cent), Qatar (32.9 per cent), Kuwait (26.9 per cent), the UAE (25.6 per cent) and Oman (22.4 per cent). As the data suggests, Bahrain and Qatar had absorbed relatively more migrants in jobs requiring technical skills in various traits to meet the demand of semi-skilled and skilled workers in industries. The demand for post-graduates and PhD degree holders seems to be relatively more in Oman where maximum percentage of Tamil Nadu migrants (21.4) are located, followed by the UAE (17.6), Qatar (17.1) and Saudi Arabia (11.8). The demand of academic degrees holders seems to be least in Kuwait (11.5) and Bahrain (10.3). Oman has relatively better facilities for higher education and health as compared to other GCC countries.

In the overall migrant's population from TN, people who are illiterate represent 7.8 per cent and illiterates are more than average in non-GCC countries and less than average in most of the Gulf destinations except Oman. More illiterate population is seen in non-GCC countries which may perhaps be partially attributed to the migration of children within 6 years of age as these countries are favourable destinations for family migration as against GCC countries.

TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT OF TAMIL NADU MIGRANTS TO GCC AND NON-GCC COUNTRIES BEFORE AND AFTER MIGRATION

Table 11.6 presents the percentages of Tamil Nadu migrants by type of employment before and after migration. The table gives the scenarios of the unemployment-driven migration and also migration which took place due to wage differentials between countries of origin and destination. In every case, share of employees in private sector had increased after migration. This is expected as most of the migrants go abroad to get a better salary and improved lifestyle. Also, private enterprises provide higher salaries to recruit skilled/qualified migrants. Labourers in non-agricultural sector had also shown increase, though by a small margin except in two GCC countries, namely, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where demand for construction labourers was usually high. Next to that is agricultural sector where the labour employment had recorded a decrease at an average of 5 per cent per annum. This steep fall could be attributed to drought conditions, unemployment, and low income for agricultural labourers in the state that they prefer to migrate and work in different occupations. Most

Table 11.6 Type of employment of TN migrants to GCC and non-GCC countries before and after migration

Employment Type	United Arab Emirates		Saudi Arabia		Oman		Qatar		Kuwait		Bahrain		Non-GCC	
	Before migration	After migration	Before migration	After migration	Before migration	After migration	Before migration	After migration	Before migration	After migration	Before migration	After migration	Before migration	After migration
Employed in private sector	44.3	60.4	29.5	41.3	30.6	42.9	36.8	55.3	36.9	55.4	37.9	51.7	41.0	54.1
Labourers in non-agric. sector	17.9	22.8	24.2	36.9	20.4	30.6	17.1	19.7	15.4	20.0	6.9	31.0	12.2	18.1
Agricultural labour	10.6	1.6	16.2	4.4	11.2	4.1	5.3	0.0	10.0	2.3	20.7	3.4	10.3	1.3
Self-employment	8.8	4.1	10.0	6.5	12.2	10.2	9.2	3.9	15.4	9.2	10.3	3.4	5.9	4.0
Household works	3.6	3.9	2.1	3.5	4.1	4.1	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.4	3.4	3.4	5.0	7.1

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017 data

of them work as non-agricultural labourers usually after migration. Household workers' employment shared constant in most cases before and after migration except for non-GCC countries where it was raised by 2.1 per cent. This could be justified as countries included USA, UK and Australia which also record high demand for domestic workers. Percentages of all those migrants who were self-employed before migration decreased after migration. This is true in case of all the GCC and non-GCC countries. Will it be correct to interpret that this decrease in the percentages of self-employed migrants after migration may be attributed to high occupational mobility in both the GCC and non-GCC countries due to availability of better employment prospects after moving to GCC and non-GCC countries? However, the data supports the phenomenon of the decrease of self-employed migration after migrating to both GCC and non-GCC countries

RETURN MIGRANTS OF GULF COUNTRIES AND THEIR SATISFACTION ABOUT THEIR WAGES

This section explores the problems of wage discrepancy faced by return migrants from Gulf. This can also be seen in terms of expectations versus reality. "Lucrative Salary" is one of the main reasons Tamil Nadu migrants travel to Gulf countries (see also Zachariah, Nair and Rajan 2001, 2006). Their expectations rise through what they read and what they heard or got information through communication. Among all returned migrants from GCC countries, 24.1 per cent of Tamil Nadu returned migrants faced wage problems, comparatively higher to 20.4 per cent facing problems among all Tamil Nadu returned migrants observed in Tamil Nadu migration survey 2015. In Table 11.7, it could be seen that this number is way higher in case of migrants in Kuwait (30.1 per cent) and migrants to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also have migrants having more wage problems than other Gulf migrants Rajan, Prakash and Suresh 2015). These countries have been known for hiring construction and domestic labour from India, proportionately higher compared to other GCC countries such as the UAE.

Table 11.8 shows the percentages of the return migrants from GCC and non-GCC countries answering on the specific question: "Have you received the salary that was promised?" It is heartening to note that a large percentage of the return migrants from the GCC and non-GCC countries expressed satisfaction that the salary received by them was same as what

Table 11.7 Percentages of returned Gulf migrants from GCC countries expressing satisfaction on the wage problem

<i>Whether satisfied with the wage problem?</i>	<i>Country from where emigrants returned</i>							<i>Overall</i>	
	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Overall GCC</i>	<i>Non-GCC</i>	
Yes	18.1	29.3	17.8	19.4	30.1	26.3	24.1	15.6	20.4
No	81.9	70.7	82.2	80.6	69.9	73.7	75.9	84.4	79.6

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

Table 11.8 Percentages of returned Gulf migrants from GCC and non-GCC countries expressing satisfaction on the salary received and what was promised

<i>Have you received the salary promised?</i>	<i>Country from where emigrants returned</i>						<i>Overall</i>		
	<i>UAE</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Overall GCC</i>	<i>Non-GCC</i>	
Yes	76.3	74.4	91.1	74.2	74.7	89.5	76.6	75.2	76.0
No	21.7	24.5	6.7	25.8	20.5	10.5	21.6	21.4	21.5
Not reported	2.0	1.1	2.2	0.0	4.8	0.0	1.9	3.4	2.5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

was promised before their emigration from Tamil Nadu. It may be observed from the table that highest percentage (91.1) of return migrants from Oman had reported that they received the salary they were promised before coming; followed by those who returned from Bahrain (89.5). In case of return migrants from rest of the GCC and non-GCC countries, the percentages of those receiving the amount of the salary they were promised ranged between 74.2 for Qatar and 76.3 for the UAE. Nearly the same situation was for non-GCC countries. The maximum percentage of return migrants who did not answer the question was 4.8 for Kuwait. In the rest of the four GCC countries, namely, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain, the non-response to the question ranged from the minimum of “0” per cent for Qatar and Kuwait, to a maximum of 2.0 per cent for the UAE.

Among those return migrants from GCC countries who said “No” to the question, the maximum percentage was for Qatar (25.8) followed by those who returned from Saudi Arabia (24.5). In these two GCC countries (Qatar and Saudi Arabia), relatively a large percentage of return migrants complained that they were not paid what they were promised by their employer before coming to these countries. Surprisingly 21.7 per cent of Gulf return migrants in the UAE said that they did not receive the pay as they were promised despite the fact that the UAE has been the most preferred destination among the Gulf countries because of their employment security.

PERCENTAGES OF RETURN MIGRANTS FROM GULF COUNTRIES WHO REPORTED THEIR GRIEVANCES TO THE INDIAN EMBASSY

Table 11.9 gives the percentages of Tamil Nadu return migrants from six Gulf countries who reported host of problems they faced in Gulf states to their country ambassador in their respective countries. As can be seen from the table that a large percentage of the return migrants to six GCC countries did not report any problem they faced during their stay in the country. However, the maximum percentage (96.8) of return migrants who did not report any problem was from Qatar followed by the UAE (94.0). The returned migrants who stayed in Bahrain seem to have reported relatively more problems to the embassy/ambassador. Not many had reported any grievances against their employers.

Five types of problems/grievances were “Grievances against employer”, “Problems related to salary”, “Problems of communication due to language”, “Harassment from local police”, and “Other types of adjustment problems”.

With regard to the five problems stated above, only 0.4 per cent of return migrants from the UAE and 2.2 per cent of return migrants from Oman had reported grievances against their employers. Among the return migrants staying in the rest of the four GCC states, namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, none had spoken against their employer to the Indian embassy officials. However, all the migrants returning from the six GCC countries had some or the other problem pertaining to their pay. The majority (9.2 per cent) of Tamil Nadu return migrants from Saudi Arabia complained more problems of payment of their salary and other pay-related issues, followed by return migrants from Bahrain (5.3 per cent), Kuwait (4.8 per cent), the UAE (4.4 per cent) and Oman (4.4 per cent).

Table 11.9 Percentage of TN return migrants from Gulf countries by problems they reported to Indian embassy personnel by country of residence

<i>Nature of problem reported to Indian embassy</i>	<i>Country of stay before returning to home country</i>							<i>Non-GCC</i>	<i>Overall</i>
	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Overall GCC</i>		
No problems reported	94.0	90.1	93.3	96.8	90.4	89.5	92.0	89.8	91.0
Grievances against employer	0.4	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.3	0.7
Problems of pay	4.4	9.2	4.4	3.2	4.8	5.3	6.3	7.0	6.6
Problems of communication	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	5.3	0.6	0.7	0.6
Harassment from local police	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.2
Others	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.6	1.1	0.8

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

Interestingly, barring Saudi Arabia, in the rest of the five GCC countries the problems concerning the pay of return migrants were much less than the ones that returned from the non-GCC countries.

As expected, return migrants staying in GCC countries may have had the problems of communication due to difference in spoken languages. Nevertheless, only a small percentage of the return migrants staying in three GCC countries found communication problem. Their percentages in decreasing order of magnitude were Bahrain (5.3), Kuwait (2.4) and the UAE (0.4). Harassment by local police was experienced by a negligible percentage of migrants. Thus, the TN return migrants from GCC countries had nothing serious to report to the personnel of Indian embassy in connection with their stay in these countries (See Table 11.9).

REASONS FOR RETURNING OF TAMIL NADU MIGRANTS FROM GULF COUNTRIES

In this section we focus upon the reasons for return of Tamil Nadu migrants from six GCC countries to their native country. In Table 11.10 below, the information on eight reasons for the return of TN migrants to home country has been tabulated by place of residence in the Gulf countries. As the data in the table suggests, a large percentage of TN migrants in six GCC countries reported the reason for their return to their home country as the expiry of their contract. Normally for a migrant who had attained the age of superannuation, the contract may not be renewed. If the contract is not renewed, under any circumstances, the migrant is required to leave the country as the employer is not obliged to arrange the resident permit to such migrants. However, some of the migrants may manage to travel again with contract renewed or with a contract signed with a new employer. As expected, the percentages of return migrants vary from country to country. The highest percentage of TN migrants who returned to their native place was 51.1 for Oman followed by Qatar (45.2) and Bahrain (42.1). In the rest of the three GCC countries, the percentages staggered between a minimum of 30.9 per cent for the UAE and maximum of 37.3 for Kuwait.

By and large, the percentage of TN migrants reporting the reason as “Family Problem” for their return stood as the second after the reason “Expiry of Contract”. The percentages of TN migrants, who gave the “Family Problem” as the reason for their return, were 25.3 for Kuwait, followed by Saudi Arabia (22.0), Oman (20.0) and the UAE (18.9). The least

Table 11.10 Percentages of return migrants by reason for their return to their home country by country of residence

<i>Reasons for return</i>	<i>Country of residence</i>							<i>Total</i>	
	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Overall GCC</i>		<i>Non-GCC</i>
Expiry of contract	30.9	34.4	51.1	45.2	37.3	42.1	35.3	40.6	37.6
Family problem	18.9	22.0	20.0	12.9	25.3	5.3	20.3	16.9	18.8
Poor health	11.6	8.8	6.7	16.1	8.4	5.3	9.9	7.5	8.8
Low wages	12.4	8.8	4.4	9.7	7.2	0.0	9.4	6.3	8.0
Voluntary retirement	4.4	4.4	2.2	0.0	1.2	5.3	3.7	4.1	3.9
Compulsory expatriation	3.2	3.3	2.2	0.0	6.0	10.5	3.6	2.7	3.2
Poor working condition	2.4	3.7	4.4	3.2	1.2	10.5	3.1	2.9	3.0
Poor living condition	2.8	2.9	2.2	0.0	4.8	0.0	2.9	2.5	2.7
Job terminated by the employer	1.2	1.5	0.0	3.2	3.6	5.3	1.7	1.6	1.7
Harshbehaviour of employer	0.4	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.5	0.6
Niraqat issue	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2
Exit through amnesty/embassy	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
Others	11.6	8.1	6.7	9.7	4.8	15.8	9.1	14.4	11.5

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

percentage (5.3) of migrants who took decision for their return because of “Family Problem” was for Bahrain. All those migrants who return due to family problems are the ones who would have left their family behind and it is viewed as bigger social cost if these families are unattended.

Another prominent reason for migrants’ return was their “Poor Health”. Among the TN migrants who stated this reason for their return, a relatively large percentage of migrants returning from Qatar was 16.1 followed by 11.6 for the UAE. The percentages of migrants (in decreasing order of magnitude) returning from the rest of the four GCC countries for “poor health” were 8.8 per cent for Saudi Arabia, 8.4 per cent for Kuwait, 6.7 per cent for Oman and 5.3 per cent for Bahrain.

The migrants who reported the reason for their return as “Low Wages”, the maximum percentage was for the UAE (12.4), followed by Qatar (9.7), Saudi Arabia (8.8) and Kuwait (7.2). In Bahrain, “low wages” does not seem to be the push factor for migrants to leave the country. The next reason “Voluntary Retirement” has not been a significant cause for return migration. Although “Compulsory Expatriation” has not been a major reason in the GCC countries, in Bahrain (10.5 per cent) and Kuwait (6.0 per cent), it was higher than in the rest of the four countries.

Now, Tami Nadu is a state of 72 million people and there is wide demand for skilled labour like construction labour, carpenter, electrician, plumber, lathe worker in industries and so on. There is a recent trend in in-migration of this labour supply from other states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. But Table 11.11 shows that around 55 per cent of the returned Gulf migrants have manual skills. These skills are either underutilized or underpaid for if they seek work and eventually fade off when not being employed for a time period of more than 6 months to a year. Other managerial skills and professional skills of return migrants also should be enriched through training and skill-management practices. This is clearly an untapped potential that the state can use.

REMITTANCES BY TN MIGRANTS OF THE GULF COUNTRIES AND THEIR UTILIZATION BY LEFT BEHIND FAMILIES AT THE ORIGIN

Tamil Nadu received Rs 61,843 crores of remittances as calculated by ECR method (Zachariah and Rajan 2016a). This section calculates country-wise remittances only based on household remittances data from Rajan et al. 2017 and emphasize the Gulf countries’ share in household remittances.

Table 11.11 Percentage of Tamil Nadu migrants by skills acquired and by country of residence

<i>Skills acquired abroad</i>	<i>Country of residence of Tamil Nadu migrants</i>							<i>Overall</i>	
	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Overall GCC</i>		<i>Non-GCC</i>
None	6.0	5.5	4.4	9.7	4.8	0.0	5.6	8.3	6.8
Professional skills	7.2	7.3	8.9	6.5	7.2	5.3	7.3	12.6	9.6
Managerial skills	6.4	5.5	2.2	6.5	8.4	10.5	6.1	11.1	8.4
Manual skills	50.6	61.9	51.1	54.8	60.2	52.6	56.4	46.3	51.9
Not applicable ^a	29.7	19.8	33.3	22.6	19.3	31.6	24.6	21.7	23.3

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017 data

^aNot applicable—Some of the return migrants, especially ones who have been in the same occupation before migration have only gained experience but acquired no skills

Tamil Nadu received Rs 14,551 crores as remittances from migrants based on household remittances reported from Tamil Nadu migration survey 2015. Remittances are calculated country wise by taking proportional remittances country wise from the household-wise remittances reported and then the total remittance is distributed. Tamil Nadu received highest proportion of remittances from a non-GCC country—Singapore—a country where the presence of Tamil Nadu migrants and Tamil diaspora is very strong. Among the migrants from GCC countries, Saudi Arabia is the destination country from which 17.39 per cent, that is Rs 2530.66 crore, is received. Migrants to the UAE contribute to 15.56 per cent of household remittances to Tamil Nadu (Table 11.12).

In all, migrants to GCC countries send Rs 7019.51 crore to Tamil Nadu and contribute to 48.24 per cent of the state's total remittances (Table 11.13). Appendix has the complete list of countries and the remittance received.

Table 11.12 Remittances by TN migrants to GCC and non-GCC countries with large remittances by country

<i>Country</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Remittances (in crores)</i>
United Arab Emirates	15.56	2264.65
Saudi Arabia	17.39	2530.66
Oman	4.03	586.19
Qatar	2.79	406.25
Kuwait	7.28	1058.83
Bahrain	1.19	172.93
Singapore	20.27	2949.47
Malaysia	11.95	1739.56
USA	11.80	1717.70

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

Note: This is not the complete list and complete table is in Appendix

Table 11.13 Remittances of Tamil Nadu Gulf migrants—GCC and non-GCC

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Remittances (in Cr.)</i>
GCC countries	48.24	7019.51
Non-GCC countries	51.76	7531.49
Total	100.00	14,551.00

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

Table 11.14 Utilization of remittances by left behind families of TN migrants to Gulf countries by country of residence

<i>Utilization of remittances</i>	<i>The state/country of residence of TN migrants by country</i>							<i>Overall</i>
	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Non-GCC</i>	
Building a house	28.9	35.7	31.7	35.7	25.7	15.8	29.9	30.7
Funding marriage/dowry	13.6	16.8	7.3	14.3	14.3	15.8	14.9	14.8
Buying property/vehicle	6.1	7.0	7.3	3.6	7.1	10.5	8.4	7.4
Education of children	13.2	10.2	12.2	17.9	7.1	15.8	12.0	11.8
Health of a family member	15.8	13.5	17.1	17.9	20.0	26.3	12.2	14.3
Others	22.4	16.8	24.4	10.7	25.7	15.8	22.5	21.1

Source: Compiled by authors based on Rajan et al. 2017

Most of the migrants' families use the remittances received in building a house, which is considered every Indian family's dream, and Tamil Nadu has the same sentiment. Intriguingly, people spend their remittances also on education and health care of their family. Though education and health care should typically be provided by the state, it is not preferred by people due to quality issues. It becomes a part of everyone's lifestyle to give children better education and pursue quality treatment, and in fact people migrate to build their savings in order to send their children to a better college in future. This is an area that seeks attention (Table 11.14).

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF GULF MIGRATION FROM TAMIL NADU AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Gulf migration, as discussed, was always seen as a high-paying prospect for the economically downtrodden and the ones who desired to improve their status quo. They have always been aware of the risks that lay ahead of them when working under kafala system, where they had to pledge their passport to work for a contract period. Of course, they prospered when they worked there. But there was no stability in their occupation or income when they completed their contract and come back.

Table 11.6 shows the occupation conversion percentage of migrants to GCC countries. Percentage of labourers in non-agricultural sector has gone up and the percentage of labourers in agricultural sector has come down. The conversion of labour from agricultural sector to non-agricultural sector is clearly seen and when these employees return from abroad, the government should incentivize the labour to move in the direction where the domestic demand for labour is more.

In answer to a question about skills acquired (Table 11.11) by the migrants abroad, 61.9 per cent returned from Saudi Arabia and 60.2 per cent returned from Kuwait have manual skills. About 55.2 per cent of migrants from GCC develop manual skills and have experience in it for a long period. There has been a clear demand for manual labour (in sectors like construction, carpentry and plumbing) in the state and the state imports a lot of labour from neighbouring states for these works. But they are less prone to join these sectors without better wages as they would compare the wage differential between here and abroad. Minimum wage legislation in these sectors would encourage the returned migrants to participate in these sectors and retain the existing labour force.

Price of crude oil took a fall over a period of time and is at its low of late. This has been a result of thought on global warming and growing awareness of nations about solar energy and other alternate sources of energy. This has led the GCC countries, which highly depend on oil trading for their GDP, to shutdown many ongoing infrastructure projects and stop creation of new projects for their development. This has led to reduction in demand for migrant labours in these countries. Recent incidents in Oman (Omanisation) and Saudi Arabia (mass job reduction) have fuelled this growing concern. There have also been job losses across all Gulf countries and this signifies the return of huge labour force to the state. As discussed earlier in one of the chapters (Zachariah and Rajan 2016b), rehabilitation programmes for returned labour is as necessary as the pre-migration workshops that are conducted. These programmes serve the same purpose—to adapt to the local culture and understand the needs of the job market and where they stand with their present skill set. This would help the state to achieve its share of demographic dividend and avoid social costs incurred due to unemployment.

APPENDIX

Table 11.15 Economic activity of Tamil Nadu migrants before migrating to Gulf

<i>Economic activity: Before migration</i>	<i>Country where the person is currently residing</i>							<i>Total</i>
	<i>UAE</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Non-GCC countries</i>	
Employed in private sector	44.3	29.5	30.6	36.8	36.9	37.9	41.0	38.8
Labourers in non-agric. sector	17.9	24.2	20.4	17.1	15.4	6.9	12.2	15.8
Agricultural labour	10.6	16.2	11.2	5.3	10.0	20.7	10.3	11.3
Self-employment	8.8	10.0	12.2	9.2	15.4	10.3	5.9	8.1
Job seekers	5.4	8.8	11.2	13.2	5.4	10.3	5.8	6.8
Students	3.4	3.8	4.1	3.9	3.1	3.4	8.6	6.1
Too young to work	3.9	1.5	4.1	6.6	6.2	3.4	8.4	6.0
Household works	3.6	2.1	4.1	5.3	5.4	3.4	5.0	4.3
Others	1.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.8	3.4	1.0	1.0
Job not required	0.5	1.5	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.7
Employed in state/central govt	0.3	0.9	1.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.4	0.5
Employed in semi govt. aided school/college etc.	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.6	0.4
Unpaid family worker	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2
Disabled	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 11.16 Economic activity of Tamil Nadu migrants in Gulf after migration

<i>Economic activity: After migration</i>	<i>Country where the person is currently residing</i>							<i>Total</i>
	<i>United Arab Emirates</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>	<i>Non-GCC countries</i>	
Employed in private sector	60.4	41.3	42.9	55.3	55.4	51.7	54.1	52.8
Labourers in non-agric. sector	22.8	36.9	30.6	19.7	20.0	31.0	18.1	22.9
Household works	3.9	3.5	4.1	5.3	5.4	3.4	7.1	5.6
Students	2.8	1.8	3.1	5.3	4.6	0.0	7.7	5.3
Self-employment	4.1	6.5	10.2	3.9	9.2	3.4	4.0	5.0
Too young to work	1.6	1.5	3.1	2.6	1.5	3.4	3.8	2.8
Agricultural labour	1.6	4.4	4.1	0.0	2.3	3.4	1.3	2.0
Others	1.0	1.5	1.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	1.8	1.4
Employed in semi govt. aided school/college etc.	0.5	0.9	0.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.9
Employed in state/central govt	0.3	1.2	0.0	1.3	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.6
Job seekers	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.4	0.3
Job not required	0.5	0.3	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
Unpaid family worker	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1
Disabled	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 11.17 Household remittances of Tamil Nadu migrants from Gulf

<i>Country</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Remittances (in crores)</i>
United Arab Emirates	15.56	2264.65
Saudi Arabia	17.39	2530.66
Oman	4.03	586.19
Qatar	2.79	406.25
Kuwait	7.28	1058.83
Bahrain	1.19	172.93
Australia	2.80	406.74
Bangladesh	0.16	22.67
Canada	0.21	30.95
China	0.03	4.53
France	0.13	19.27
Germany	0.90	130.93
Hong Kong	0.05	6.80
Indonesia	0.39	56.88
Iran	0.01	1.13
Ireland	0.03	4.53
Italy	0.04	5.10
Japan	0.16	23.24
Kenya	0.02	2.83
Libya	0.09	13.09
Malaysia	11.95	1739.56
Maldives	0.06	9.43
Myanmar	0.12	17.00
Netherlands	0.04	5.67
New Zealand	0.04	5.44
Nigeria	0.01	1.13
Philippines	0.13	18.70
Singapore	20.27	2949.47
South Africa	0.43	62.91
Sri Lanka	0.03	4.65
Switzerland	0.19	28.34
Taiwan	0.11	15.87
Thailand	0.72	104.86
UK	0.40	58.27
USA	11.80	1717.70
Yemen	0.00	0.00
Others	0.44	63.77

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Telugu Emigrants in the Gulf

Trilok Chandan Goud and Ajaya Kumar Sahoo

INTRODUCTION

India has exported large numbers of migrants to different parts of the world under different circumstances. Indian migration, mostly as contract labour, to the Gulf countries is a recent phenomenon. According to recent estimates by the Ministry of External affairs, Government of India, as on December 2017, 31 million (31,233,234) Indians were living outside India. The Gulf countries imported a large number of foreign labourers mostly from South Asian countries to work either in the oil companies or in the construction-related jobs in the early 1970s and 1980s by providing travel expenses. Much before this period of significant migrations, South Asians also had presence in the Gulf region. As aptly described by Andrew Gardner (cited in Schlote 2014: 35) there are two distinct periods of migration before the oil boom migrations during the 1960s and 1970s; while the “first period was marked by South Asian merchants trade, the second period was dominated by the ‘British presence in the region’, which resulted in a more constant connection between the Gulf states and the Indian sub-continent”. However, in recent time the situation has changed because of huge competition among foreign labourers in the Gulf and also because of the Gulf economic crisis; as a result, India has witnessed significant return

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migrations from the Gulf. This chapter examines the socioeconomic conditions of Gulf migrants in the two Telugu speaking states of India. The chapter argues that although return is a necessary outcome of Gulf migration, it has mixed results for returnees: while for some the journey is highly successful, for others it is a failure, the latter being the common experience of most of the migrants. Because of their failure in securing jobs in the Gulf countries, large number of the returnees are now called “Gulf victims” in the villages of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.

EMIGRATION TO THE GULF COUNTRIES

Although Indian migration to the Persian Gulf started as early as the 1930s after oil was discovered in the region (Khadria 2006; Pradhan 2010), it was in the early 1970s that the large-scale migration took place as a result of the price hike of oil. The consequent earnings of large revenues accelerated the process of industrialization and social change in the GCC states characterized by massive investment in social and economic infrastructure necessitating the service of a large number of foreign workers.¹ For a brief period during the 1990–1991 Gulf War “the number of low-skilled Indian workers in the Gulf had to leave countries due to Indian government restrictions” (Khadria 2010: 67); however, when the situation normalized, the emigration from Andhra Pradesh had again picked up as the demand for labour in the GCC countries increased and diversified across many sectors from construction to services sector, oil and manufacturing and so on (Breeding 2011). In order to avail of the opportunities, Indian workers began to migrate to the Gulf countries. “At present, out of 15 million expatriates in the Gulf region, South Asians constitute around 9.5 million, of these, Indians are the largest group” (Jain and Oommen 2016: 17). Other estimates give (Sasikumar and Timothy 2015) 22 million migrants in GCC countries, nearly 30 per cent are from India (see also Table 12.1). In 2017 the expected total stock of Indian migrants in the Gulf was estimated to be 8.7 million (MEA 2017).

Migration of Indians to the Gulf is different from migrating to other developed countries like the USA, UK and Canada. Migrants are recruited purely on contract basis as the “Gulf oil countries do not allow family reunion and settlement” (Castles 2000: 277). Although it is difficult to

¹According to Leonard (2005) the historical ties between South Asia and some of the Gulf States even goes back to eighteenth century.

Table 12.1 Population of overseas Indians in Gulf countries, 2001–2017

<i>Country</i>	<i>PIOs, 2017</i>	<i>Overseas Indians, 2001</i>	<i>Overseas Indians, 2012</i>	<i>Overseas Indians, 2017</i>
Bahrain	3257	130,000	350,000	316,175
Kuwait	1384	294,000	579,390	919,354
Oman	919	311,000	718,642	783,959
Qatar	500	130,000	500,000	697,500
Saudi	1963	1,500,000	1,789,000	3,255,864
UAE	3751	900,000	1,750,000	2,803,751

Source: Compiled from Ministry of External Affairs reports (Accessed on 28 June 2018, http://mea.gov.in/images/attach/NRIs-and-PIOs_1.pdf)

know the exact size of the migrant workers in the GCC countries, available information suggests that it was about 12.5 million in 2002; of this total, there were 3.5 million non-Gulf Arabs, 3.6 million Indians, 1.7 million Pakistanis, almost one million Bangladeshis, more than 700,000 Filipinos and over 700,000 Sri Lankan (Rahman 2010). According to Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA 2007: 3) “Indian technicians, nurses, teachers and other professionals handle almost the entire services sector in the Gulf. Around 70% are engaged in semi-skilled and un-skilled work; while 20–30% comprised of professionals and other white collared workers”. Migration from Kerala accounts for more than 50 per cent of the total stock of Indian migrants in the Gulf, with Tamil Nadu ranking second, followed by Andhra Pradesh (Prakash 1998; Zachariah et al. 2002): from Telangana² and Andhra Pradesh—districts like Karimnagar, Nizamabad, Adilabad and Medak from Telangana; East Godavari, West Godavari and Kadapa (YSR district) from Andhra Pradesh had huge out-migration to Gulf Countries.

Pradhan (2010: 95) categorized the Indian expatriate community in the GCC states into four broad groups: (a) unskilled workers, employed in construction companies, municipalities, agricultural farms and as domestic workers; (b) skilled and semi-skilled workers; (c) professionals, such as doctors, engineers, accountants, employed in government and private sectors; and (d) businessmen. The respondents covered in the present

²In October 2016, Telangana state divided 10 districts into 31 districts. (Karimnagar—Jagatiyal, Rajanna-Sircilla, Peddapalli), (Nizamabad—Kamareddy), (Adilabad—Komarambheem, Mancherial, Nirmal), (Medak—Siddipet, Sangareddy). These districts are the major Gulf migrant sending areas in Telangana.

study belonged to the category of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, out of which many were even illiterates. Because of the lack of education, these migrants faced various problems in their migration process, in the host country itself and also after return to their home country. This study explores the internal dynamics of this migration process and its effects on migrants and their families.

TELUGU EMIGRANTS IN THE GULF COUNTRIES

The largest single groups of Indian workers, especially Telugus in the Gulf, are in the construction-related activities, labourers are employed in the building of housing project, dry dock facilities, roads, airports and industries. They work for Indian, British, American, Cypriot and Arab companies. Indians are recruited for the entire spectrum of construction work (Weiner 1982: 8). The number of Telugu construction workers was at its peak in the late 1970s, but declined thereafter, partly because construction work is largely short term—one to two years—but it is common for construction companies to move their labour force from one project to another.

Construction workers live near the construction sites in barracks provided by the employers, with their own canteen and medical facilities; those are usually called as labour camps. Except for the senior engineering and administrative personnel, workers on construction projects come to Gulf without their families. A second large group of migrants are employed by private-sector firms in industry and in services. They are also employed by Gulf governments and by government-maintained institutions. Hospitals recruit doctors from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Nurses are recruited from among the Christians of Kerala and Sri Lanka, civil engineers from India to help design highways, communication and electric power points. Employment in government sectors has less job security than employment in the private sectors since Gulf governments are on the lookout for qualified local Arabs who can take over positions held by foreigners (Weiner 1982: 8).

The characteristics of labour migrants differ depending on both the origin and destination countries of the workers. The migration tradition from India to Gulf countries has existed for many centuries but the present migration from 1970s is different from previous migration. The majority of migrants are married males who predominantly belong to rural areas of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. Telugu emigrants to Gulf countries belong to three categories of labour: professionals (e.g., doctors,

nurses, engineers, architects, accountants and managers), semi-skilled workers (e.g., craftsman, drivers, artisans and other technical workers) and unskilled labourers in construction sites, farmlands, livestock ranches, shops and stores and households (domestic labour) (Khadria 2010: 67). There may be contract migrant workers, guest worker, project-tied workers, temporary workers, highly skilled workers and/or illegal workers. Finally, some are directly employed by local Arab families as *ayah*, cooks, sweepers and gardeners. “In recent times contractors, their sub contractors, as well as labour supply companies and placement agencies are largely responsible for the recruitment of migrant workers within the guidelines of Visa regulations, labour law, and sponsorship law” (Jureidini 2014). Every Arab employer can take six migrant workers to work in his/her house (domestic servant, gardener, car drivers, care takers, cook and cleaner).

SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS

India had a vast reservoir of all types of workers (Naidu 1991), from highly skilled workers to low-paid unskilled labourers. The majority of migrants to the Gulf countries are males. Female workers are less as compared to their male counterparts and they have very less job opportunities, other than as nurses, teachers and domestic servants (Jain 2007). Millions of migrant workers are employed in the Middle East countries; they range from poorly educated (uneducated) ABCD workers (*ayahs*, bearers, cooks and drivers) to highly educated professionals like doctors, engineers and semi-skilled professions like nurses. By and large a majority belongs to the category of less-educated workers engaged in manual jobs. For the same reason they are less aware of their rights and privileges and even if they are aware of their rights and privileges, they are incapable to assert and fight for their rights. In other words, this would mean that most of them are vulnerable to exploitation. The most tragic part of all this is that most of them belong to economically weaker sections from the underprivileged section of the society of the region (Nambiar 1995). The push factors that motivate emigration to Gulf countries are the high density of population, scarcity of land for cultivation, industrial backwardness and high prevalence of unemployment and poverty. Similarly, the pull factors that attract the migrants to Gulf countries are the high wages which allow more savings (Prakash 1998). Telugu emigrants to the Gulf countries constitute two major class segments: (1) skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers,

and (2) professionals and entrepreneurs (Jain 2007). As discussed earlier, the majority of Telugu emigrants are unskilled labourers working in construction-related works and other categories like domestic servants. “Every year nearly 30,000–40,000 housemaids go to the Gulf; of them, 60–70 percent are from YSR Kadapa, East Godavari and West Godavari districts” (The Hindu, 14 November, 2015).

PROCESS OF EMIGRATION

Emigration of workers to the Middle East countries, which are by and large purely temporary in nature, takes place under the provision of Emigration Acts which lay down conditions of recruitment, passage from India and terms and conditions of work abroad. Although Indian emigrants enter the Middle East countries through legal and illegal channels, they get their jobs through: (a) relatives and friends already in employment in the host country (informal network), (b) authorized private recruiting agencies, (c) government recruiting institutions, (d) contractors or companies in India who have taken up construction work in the host country, and (e) direct application to the employee.

Process of emigration plays a crucial role, because most of the migrants emigrate through private recruiting agencies and those agencies commit fraud by taking money from the migrants, giving them tourist visa and sending them to host countries. Informal, family and personal networks are also a major source for getting visa and work permits. Job category also depends on the networks. Subagents (unauthorized agents) in the rural areas are the crucial players of sending migrants to the Gulf countries. Large numbers of migrants depend on subagents for getting visa and work permit.

THE LOCALE AND THE CONTEXT

The field work for this study was carried out in four districts of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana—Karimnagar and Nizamabad districts from Telangana and East Godavari and West Godavari from Andhra Pradesh. Telugu migrants are mostly those who have less agricultural land and some of them are even landless. Even those having agricultural land are unable to cultivate and seek profits due to droughts and low irrigation facilities. Apart from this, natural calamities like famines and floods, shrinking of the cottage industry and lack of employment opportunities forced many of them to migrate to urban areas and also to emigrate to the Gulf countries

(Bhat and Sahoo 2005). As a result of shrinking of cottage industries and traditional caste occupations, many backward caste communities (especially the youth) lost their livelihood and this compelled them to search for new occupations. Caste discrimination and harassment has caused many women to opt for migration over current conditions from costal Andhra region. The alternative was to move to different cities within the country and also to emigrate to Gulf countries, through personal networks.

Table 12.2 shows the data of Telangana state and selected Gulf country and the number of people who migrated through POE clearance since 2011–2016. Highest number of persons migrated to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Table 12.3 shows the data of Andhra Pradesh and selected Gulf country and the number of people who migrated through Protector of Emigrants clearance since 2011–2016. Highest number of persons migrated to Kuwait.

Table 12.2 Telangana-state/selected country-wise number of workers granted emigration clearance/ECNR endorsement in India 2011–2016

<i>Year</i>	<i>UAE</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>
2011	5289	1403	2180	2167	3953	1254
2012	7857	2018	2244	3395	5610	2627
2013	10,716	1971	3362	3632	4298	1904
2014	11,092	1503	3354	2696	4141	1399
2015	13,276	1071	1658	1770	6577	2009
2016	10,776	4933	1828	768	4004	2343

Source: Compiled from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (www.indiastat.com, accessed on 28 June 2017)

Table 12.3 Andhra Pradesh-state/selected country-wise number of workers granted emigration clearance/ECNR Endorsement in India 2011–2016

<i>Year</i>	<i>UAE</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	<i>Kuwait</i>	<i>Qatar</i>	<i>Oman</i>	<i>Bahrain</i>
2011	7417	7051	19,137	1924	6386	1137
2012	6946	1039	25,141	2514	3962	821
2013	10,913	1039	30,038	3805	3499	1136
2014	10,948	8688	25,319	3633	2740	781
2015	12,032	8875	15,890	2611	4150	1017
2016	5771	3571	13,232	612	2827	561

Source: Compiled from Ministry of External Affairs reports, Government of India. (www.indiastat.com, accessed on 28 June 2017)

Migration from Telangana and Andhra Pradesh started with internal migration especially “from the rural areas of Telangana districts to the coal fields of Godavarihani, textile centres of Gujarat and Maharashtra” (Sampath 2006: 6). Male migrants used to migrate to Bombay (present day Mumbai) to work in industrial and construction sites and from there they used to gather information about the opportunities available in the Gulf countries. Naxal (Maoist) movement in Telangana in the 1960s and early 1970s led to large-scale out-migration from rural areas to cities as well as to Gulf region. This trend was noticed mainly during the 1980s and 1990s (Azeez and Begum 2009). Once these migrants had reached the Gulf, they would send information to their children, relatives and neighbours about the opportunities available there. Such migrant “networks” would facilitate further migration (Gold 2005). As Gardner (2011: 9) mentioned “chain migration through personal contacts, often arranged by other family members or acquaintances already in the Gulf, remains a strong link to attract people to the Gulf”. Several scholars have discussed the role of personal networks in migration. Vertovec (2002: 3), for instance, pointed out that “for migrants social networks are crucial for finding jobs and accommodation, circulating goods and services, as well as psychological support and a strong source of getting social and economic information”.

LIFE IN THE GULF

Working and living conditions of migrants are influenced by the host society. Immigrants in the Gulf countries face discrimination in getting salaries and sometimes are ill-treated by their own people (*Frontpage* 2012). Hence, the process of recruitment, wages, terms and conditions of work are the critical factors that affect the living conditions of migrants in the Gulf countries (see Jureidini 2003). For instance, salaries paid to Arab migrants and non-Arab migrants differ significantly (Kapiszewski 2006). The workers are transported daily to the construction sites, factories, production units and other establishments in which they are employed (Zachariah et al. 2004). Migrants have to live in labourers’ camps which are in some cases located near the workplaces; however, in other cases camps are located in isolated areas far away from their work place, which result in creating more inconvenience for workers in terms of transportation and communication. In the case of Dubai for example, David Kendall (2011: 45) gives an interesting photographic analysis about how the “South Asian construction workers, who have limited social rights within

the city, independently access and appropriate the busy road networks on foot". Majority of respondents in this study said that the camps were mostly temporary in nature and that the living conditions were unhygienic with no proper sanitation being maintained.³ In a single room more than ten people used to live together (see, Zachariah et al. 2004). If a migrant decided to live outside the camp, he would have to bear the cost of the dwelling which is unthinkable for an unskilled and daily wage labourer since the employer won't pay extra money.

Although some companies provide medical and housing facilities to the workers, it depends on the policy of the company. Some small companies prefer to recruit workers illegally so that the employer need not have any liability of providing accommodation and extend medical facilities to illegal migrants. Some of the respondents said that they were "illegal" (*kal-livalli*⁴) in the host country because they had entered the country on tourist visas. Tourist visas create several problems such as they cannot earn money legally and face more serious problems in the host country after the expiry of their tourist visa which cannot be extended. This may result in severe punishments, deportation or being sent to jail. In 2007 it was reported that there were around 70,000 migrants who had to return from the UAE alone, and most of these migrants were illegal because they had overstayed beyond the term of their visa (*Indian News*, 5 November 2007).⁵ Many respondents of the present study revealed that there were instances when Indians were sent to jail. Here the role of Recruiting Agents (RAs) cannot be undermined as they play an important role in the migration process. In the present study, it has been found that the construction and services sectors were the main employers of migrants in the Gulf. As Nambiar (1995) observed, "migrant workers employed in the Middle East countries ... ranged from poorly educated ABCD (*Ayahs*, *Bearers*, *Cooks*, *Drivers*) workers to highly educated professionals.

³ As Brusle (2009–2010: 4) pointed out, the conditions of labourers' camps "greatly depend on the willingness of their employer to provide them with proper conditions. If the employer is not of a large company, workers share rooms in some derelict buildings in the centre far from the town".

⁴ An Arabic word commonly used in the Middle East.

⁵ Shah (2008: 6–7) defined an irregular or illegal migrant in the GCC countries as: (1) a person may enter the country illegally (either without required documents or with fictitious documents), (2) the person may become illegal through overstaying after the contract is over and the legal residence period has expired, and (3) when a migrant worker takes up employment for a person other than the sponsor.

However, by and large, a majority of emigrants belonged to the category of less educated workers engaged in manual jobs". Working hours in unskilled professions make matters even more complex and worse. Gardner (2011: 10) pointed out that "migrants are often forced to work long hours than those mentioned in their contract they signed in the sending country, a large number of migrants reported that they never received any payment for working overtime". Working hours vary from company to company; sometimes migrants do not have any time limit and they have to work until the work is completed on a particular day.

PROBLEMS FACED BY INDIAN MIGRANTS IN GULF COUNTRIES

High-level committee on Indian Diaspora (2001) identified general problems and hardships of NRIs in the gulf region:

- (i) Agreements signed with the labourer and the representative of the employer is often ignored on arrival of the labourer in the gulf. Skilled workers are forced to work as unskilled workers.
- (ii) Employers sponsoring visas for labour sometimes do not receive them on arrival and leave them to defend themselves.
- (iii) Several months of wages many have to devote initially to the settlement of debts incurred in meeting the fee extorted from them by their recruiting agents in India.
- (iv) Salaries are often not paid when due; sometimes not paid for several months towards the end of the contractual period.
- (v) Working hours are much longer than the general norm of eight hours a day.
- (vi) To provide accommodation to migrant workers is a difficult task. Shepherds and agricultural workers have to work in remote areas with minimal or no contact with the outside world. This often leads to serious psychological problems.
- (vii) Workers who want to return to India on completion of the contract, or due to an unforeseen circumstance like sickness or death in the family often find that exit formalities are inordinately delayed.
- (viii) On their return to India, illiterate workers, often with little or no knowledge of the facilities available to them under baggage rules, are often harassed and exploited by the customs authorities at Indian airports.

As we discussed, Indian migration to Gulf countries is strictly regulated, the work permit is given for a period of limited number of years on contract basis. Migration to Gulf countries is completely different from migration to other countries like the USA, the UK, Australia and other developed countries. Most of the Indians who migrated to Gulf are illiterates or semi-literates, with a few educated professionals. First, we have to study what are the socioeconomic factors which influenced migration. Here the problem is that Indians migrants to the Gulf are less educated and economically poor, hence they face different problems in completing the process of migration and also in the host society like non-payment of salary, overtime work, poor housing accommodation, no medical facilities and ill-treatment by employers at workplace; women face discrimination by employers and are sexually abused. There were a few cases reported where women were also involved in trafficking: “Though this trafficking racket is spread across India, it is concentrated mostly in the south- in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka” (Hindustan Times, 12 December 2016). “UAE is a destination and transit country for men and women predominantly from South, and Southeast Asia subjected to labour and sex trafficking. Women from some of these countries travel to UAE to work as domestic workers, massage therapists, hotel cleaners, or elsewhere in the service sector, but some are subjected to forced labour through unlawful passport withholding, restrictions on movement, non-payment of wages, threats, and physical and sexual abuse” (Trafficking in Persons Report 2016 <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258886.htm>).

Socioeconomic and cultural factors prevailing in the study areas are the major reasons for migration, most of the respondents in this study were socially backward. Caste system (hierarchies) in the rural areas of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in the early 1970s forced many to migrate to different parts of India and to the Gulf countries. The migrants preferred to emigrate from the villages to find work for the livelihood.

Another problem faced by the majority of Indian migrants is that the employers impound the passport and/or visa of the migrant workers and they cannot take it back till the period of their contract is not over. There is also a large-scale irregular migration to Gulf countries. This irregular migration is generally through unscrupulous agents who bring people to the country without valid visa and through difficult terrain and dangerous land routes. Some migrants are brought on visitor/tourist visa and they overstay after the granted period of stay. Such migrants may easily become

prey of factory owners requiring cheap labour. They grab them and allure them with a good job. They use them like a bounded labour. These workers are not allowed to leave the factory premises. The labourers themselves are cautious not to go outside the workplace because of the fear that they might be caught by local police for not having proper visa and may be sent to prison. A major problem in the migration process is that the migrants have to wait for visa and work permit for many days after paying processing fees. They have to wait to get visa for two to four months without work. Some migrants are taken to Mumbai to wait for visa. Sometimes they have to wait for a longer duration. It has also been reported that a large number of police cases have been filed in local police stations due to clashes between agents, money lenders and migrants. Though migration economically helps a large number of people for sustaining their livelihood, a huge social cost is attached to it. If the migration process has not been completed properly, it may have adverse impact on social life of the migrants and their families.

THE ISSUES OF RETURN MIGRANTS

After the term of contract is over, each migrant has to return to his home country. A migrant worker can neither stay in the country after completing the period of contract nor get permanent citizenship of the country. As per the rule of the land, no immigrant can own property even if he stays legally in the host country for more than ten years.⁶ It is observed that most of the migrants had clear objectives at the time of emigration as to what they have to achieve and how long they would stay in the host country. Migrants always expect that they would earn good money. Some also hoped that they would be able to migrate to another country. However, in these areas it is not so easy to get success too often. Getting employment in a foreign country for a semi-skilled and skilled immigrant is a lifetime opportunity. In recent times it is also observed that because of the increasing number of foreign workers in the Gulf, the recruiting companies in collaboration with the government have reduced the salaries and wages of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. As Rajan and

⁶Although in many cases it was found that the immigrants continue to stay in the Gulf and keep sending remittances to their families to keep them economically well-off over generations (see Ali 2011; Gardner 2011; Vora 2011).

Narayana (2011) argued, “the global crisis has affected the GCC economies through falling oil prices, property and equity prices, investors’ confidence on the market conditions is at the lowest level. As the GDP grows in the GCC countries the economies would boom and the influx of migrant laborers from South Asia would increase. As is well-known that Economic recession slows down the flow of migrants and lead to poor remittances”.⁷ Several migrants reiterated that they wanted to return to India even a little earlier (as they faced difficulties in accommodation and food due to financial problems), but could not return as they could not afford the airfare as they did not have any savings. In August 2008, the Indian consulate in Dubai, for instance, arranged for the return of large numbers of impoverished workers through a special scheme. More recently, 35 illegal immigrants from Andhra Pradesh were provided free air tickets by the Gulf-Telangana Welfare and Cultural Association (GTWCA) and extended amnesty by the government to return to India. They “did not carry the authorised travel documents and the legal residence permits. They were poor and could not afford to purchase the air tickets” (The Hindu, 25 January 2013, p. 4).

As was stated earlier, the main reason for migration to Gulf countries is unemployment at homeland and related economic factors. This situation continues even after their return with having gained work experience of several years in the Gulf. Before migration, these migrants were already in a weak position, then the economic downturn hit them in the Gulf and as a result they were forced to return to India, but they returned to a much worse condition as they had to repay their debt which was taken to purchase the air tickets, pay the visa fee and a hefty amount to the agent for arranging job in the GCC country.⁸ Majority of migrants felt that they were not satisfied with their present life as they were still under debt—the money they borrowed at the time of their migration to the Gulf had not yet been cleared. Migrants depended on money lenders and friends as a source for money for visa and travel expenses. And during their stay in the

⁷The recent crises in Dubai economy, for instance, affected the construction sector directly. Since most of the construction companies ceased their work, it resulted in the forceful leaving of all temporary workers.

⁸India’s economy has grown rapidly with a growth rate of 7 to 9 per cent during post-liberalization and post-financial crisis period. Unfortunately, the growth has been uneven during last two decades across states. Though it had multiplied incomes, it caused increasing insecurity, particularly among low-income groups in rural areas (Sahu 2011).

Gulf countries, they worked on daily wages or as labourers for less salary and hence they could not save enough money to clear their debts.

Among those migrants who could not find any job in India, some were planning for re-emigration to the Gulf. The question arises why they want to re-migrate to the Gulf when their previous experience in Gulf country was not good and satisfactory. Many of the migrants cannot repay the debt even if they engage themselves in agricultural work in the village; while others opined that they would like to re-migrate because of prestige issue and social factors.⁹ Reintegration is another problem for the Gulf returnees; Gulf beneficiaries generally do not have any problem with reintegration, but the problem is for the so-called Gulf victims. Gulf beneficiaries are those who worked in the Gulf and earned enough money that they saved and sent back to their families as remittances, while Gulf victims are those who could not benefit (economically) with the Gulf migration at all but ended with the additional burden of paying their previous debt. Gulf victims have a lot of problems in reintegration because they have to first cope with debt issues. Sometimes they plan to re-emigrate only to avoid the pressure from the moneylenders. Some of the respondents (name changed) described their visit to the Gulf and shared the experience of their return.

Many return migrants are now the “Gulf victims” as they were burdened with huge debts. One of the consequences was that it forced many of them to commit suicide. An article on an internet blog revealed that “within the state of Andhra Pradesh, only the Karimnagar district had recorded the highest number of suicides, with 1,363 persons ending their lives in 2008, and 840 till September 2009 ... the problem that the Gulf migrants faced could account for the large number of suicides in Karimnagar” (Reddy 2009).

CONCLUSIONS

In recent times Gulf countries have also started restricting the inflows of foreign workers despite the fact that “foreign workers have helped in the rapid transformation of the infrastructure as well as institutional development in the Gulf” (Shah 2008: 3). Gulf countries are also planning to impose tax on remittance outflows. Due to decline in oil prices in the

⁹ Social factors like the issue of “prestige” involved in migrating to a foreign country, this has influenced many migrants from the village to go abroad (see Ali 2007).

recent years and high unemployment in Gulf countries for their youths, the government imposed taxation on the remittance of the migrant workers. “The GCC has agreed to introduce VAT following costly military campaigns and a drop in global oil prices” (Times of India, 15 December 2015).

The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the whole process of the Gulf migration, the social factors of migration and the impact of the Gulf migration.

This chapter discussed several factors which have resulted in migration and return migration of Indians from the Gulf. Similarly, reintegration for returnees becomes a serious problem as they undergo social, economic and psychological pressure when they are burdened with debt. The majority of migrants had taken personal loans with a huge interest amount on it, so the amount increased. The amount earned in the Gulf was so meagre that all their savings and remittances were used in order to pay off the interest, leave alone to clear the basic amount of loan. This chapter contradicts the study conducted in Kerala where Osella and Osella (2000: 119) found that the “Gulf migration offers to some the chance of rapid and vast accumulation of wealth ... their newfound wealth and access to consumption may dramatically alter their status and their relationships with others, and offer them the chance to forge new identities”.

The present study is in no way comparable with Kerala migrants’ study, mainly for two reasons: Kerala migrants were educated. Many of them were highly qualified and employed in Kuwait and other Arab countries as professionals holding senior positions. Whereas, the present study focuses on semi-skilled and skilled migrants in which most are either uneducated or not much educated and are working as labourers or some small jobs.

It may be concluded that less duration of stay was one of the factors for not being able to earn sufficient wealth. Since their stay was cut short, the migrants could not achieve what they had hoped to achieve in terms of financial gains at the beginning of their emigration. Another factor was the lack of awareness of the process of migration among migrants. Since many of the migrants were illiterate and were not aware of the visa process, they completely depended on the agents. And the agents were more concerned about their commissions; because of competition among the agents, some lured the potential migrants to arrange them lucrative jobs in the Gulf countries with attractive emoluments. Many of the emigrants on reaching the host country found that all was not the same as the agent had shown

to them. Only then they realized that they were cheated by the agent. Because of them being unsuccessful in getting a good job and attractive salary at the destination, the returnees on their return to their village/district were nicknamed as “Gulf victims”. Although, in recent time, the Government of Andhra Pradesh started special departments in the district called “NRI Cell”, OMCAP “Overseas Manpower Company Andhra Pradesh Limited” and also started several other special programmes (see Migrant Forum in Asia 2012) towards orientating the Gulf migrants, the migrants are less aware of these programmes. Hence, it is suggested that the government should take further necessary steps to popularize these programmes in the districts.

Generally, people migrate for better economic prosperity; the same is followed by migrants in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. But the result in these cases is negative; migrants initially think that they will get good salaries in the Gulf countries compared to India. Though they may get better salaries as compared to India, the entire migration process is expensive and they cannot expect any savings from the salaries they receive in the Gulf country. Because of huge amount spent on visa and work permit, they are unable to save money for their future. They borrowed money from money lenders at high interest rate to get air tickets and visa and work permits. The remittances sent by the emigrants to their left-behind family were not sufficient for the maintenance of the family. In such situations, paying interest regularly on the loan taken was out of question. This resulted in the increase of the loan amount. Some migrants who travelled on a tourist visa knowingly or unknowingly because of less processing fee faced problem in host countries on their arrival. Working in Gulf countries with a tourist visa is illegal and leads to arrest, being put in the jail or deportation.

Due to failure of the immigration process, a number of the return migrants commit suicide as they are unable to repay the huge debt. This is a serious problem observed these days in districts of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. Immigrants are also facing psychological problems, most of the migrants are below 40 to 50 years and the debt burden affects the whole life of the young males in the district. There are thousands of Gulf returnees in these districts and most of them are “Gulf victims”.

The Gulf returnees expect help from the state government to provide employment and clear their debts and resolve their problems. Some of the expectations of the respondents of the present study from the state government are:

- (i) There should be special funds available to Gulf victims in the event of mishaps.
- (ii) The loan should be given to migrant at a very nominal interest. It may be remembered that a migrant may eventually become a source of earning of foreign exchange which may ease the situation of the balance of payment of county's loan.
- (iii) All the agents in the district should be registered by the state government. These agents should advertise the vacancies in Gulf countries and should have correct knowledge about the employer, nature of job, working hours, promised salary, duration of employment, whether accommodation available and other perks and facilities available to the employee, if any.
- (iv) To check exploitation of the clients, the agent should put on a chart displayed at his office giving the fee (standardized) of each task.
- (v) It is advisable that the signed contract of the employee and the employer should be endorsed by the councillor at the Indian embassy in the country. This should be mandatory.
- (vi) In the event of any complaint of the agent by the emigrant, the Indian government should entertain the grievances against the agent and if found guilty, the agent should be punished and his licence may be cancelled.
- (vii) Social welfare schemes and voting rights for NRIs.
- (viii) Helping the victims in the amnesty programme organized by the host nation.¹⁰

It is suggested that future policy on emigration of labour from the state should consider the above issues. There are so many Indians who are working in host countries and are facing serious problems like living on footpaths and under the flyover bridges.

¹⁰The UAE government announced amnesty programme from 1 August 2018 to 31 October 2018, for visa violators, overstaying job seekers, those who entered the country illegally and illegal residents in the UAE.

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Labour Emigration from Rajasthan to Gulf

Jeetendra D. Soni

INTRODUCTION

The technological progression in the last two centuries has changed the world in many ways. It has redefined the human interaction also in terms of movement of goods, services, people as well as exchange of thoughts. Today, the pace and magnitude of international migration is in its highest phase in the history of human civilization. The cross-border movements of people for long distances and considerably for a long duration have many dimensions attached to it. Such international migration has economic, socio-cultural, demographic, psychological and political consequences for both place of origin as well as for place of destination. These also vary with time and space as well as at the same time for different migrant groups. In case of labour migration from one selected part to another, there are some important issues which need to be addressed like the patterns and processes of the migration, causes for such movements, push and pull factors attached to this, migration and developmental interplay, role of service providers or facilitators, implication of such migration for place of origin and destination, future prospects and many more.

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INDIANS IN THE WEST ASIA

Prior to the year 1950, migration to west Asian countries, including the Persian Gulf, was negligible. In 1948, there were only 14,000 Indians spread over Aden, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Muscat, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria (Kondapi 1951). Since the beginning of the 1970s, as a result of oil boom, expansion of infrastructural facilities and shortage of labour, there has been a rapid rise in Indian labour emigration to the Gulf region. There were 1.4 million Indians in the West Asian countries, of whom 1.3 million were in the Gulf region in the early 1990s (Jain 1993). This figure has crossed the mark of 7 million in 2015. Seventy per cent of these workers are concentrated only in two Gulf countries namely the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Most of the Indian workers in the Gulf countries are engaged in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs.

In this pattern of emigration, workers migrate on a contractual basis for two to five years without permission to settle permanently in these countries. Once they complete their contractual employment, it is mandatory to return to India before they are eligible for a new contract. These emigrants can be categorized as temporary or contract migrant workers. Here, a case study of labour emigration from Sikar, Jhunjhunu and Churu districts of Rajasthan (India) for the Gulf region is discussed in detail. They emigrated to the Gulf region in search of job and due to lure of better financial avenues.

OBJECTIVE

The broad objectives of the present study are as follows:

- (a) To identify whether or not the emigration was able to provide economic, social and psychological security to the emigrants and their families.
- (b) To find migration and development relationship for semi-skilled and unskilled labour emigrants from the study region to the Gulf countries. This research may also identify the multifaceted problems faced by the semi-skilled and unskilled migrant workers and the role of mediators in this entire process.

METHODOLOGY

This research is based on primary data collected in a field survey. Since this study requires specific households having some family member who migrated to West Asia, a purposive random sampling technique has been used for sample selection. The field survey has been conducted during October 2014–July 2015 in the Sikar, Churu and Jhunjhunu districts of Rajasthan. The areas for field survey were selected on the basis of information collected by secondary sources and from the migrants and their family members. From this sample group, information has been collected from the selected respondents through a structured questionnaire. For the comprehensive analysis of the data collected through questionnaires and interviews, SPSS 18.0 software has been used. The information, which has been collected through personal interview method and various other sources, is processed and descriptive statistical methods like tables and other statistical diagrams have been used for data analysis and interpretation.

THE SAMPLING AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

As mentioned earlier, for the present study, primary information has been collected from the emigrant respondents selected from a household through purposive sampling from three districts of Rajasthan: Sikar, Jhunjhunu and Churu. Here, household has been taken as unit of study, from which at least one potential labour emigrated to the West Asian countries. The household is chosen as unit of study because in recent theoretical paradigm it is accepted that the decision of emigration is not an individual decision, rather it is a collective decision at the household level in majority of the cases. There were 600 household units selected for this study. From every district, 200 samples were chosen for data collection. To get access to the sample was a big challenge for this study because there is no reliable source of information available regarding the Gulf migrants and their places of origin.

Here, a balance areal representation has also been ensured in the sample selection along with rural-urban composition. The numbers of samples are taken proportionately from all the tehsil areas as per the secondary information. So along with the purposive random sampling, areal random sampling technique is also merged here for suitable sample selection.

All the emigrants from this region for the West Asian countries were males. The average age of the emigrant was 35.8 years in the sample of 600 emigration cases. The maximum (73.2 per cent) of these migrants are up to 40 years of age. From the study area, both Muslims and Hindus have migrated to the West Asian countries, especially to the Gulf countries. The proportion of Muslims is slightly more than the Hindus. The proportion of Muslim emigrants is 53.5 per cent in this case study. Most of the migrants are married in this sample. Only 5.8 per cent sample reported unmarried status.

The semi-skilled and unskilled labours have very poor educational attainment status. More than 65 per cent of the sample is educated only up to eighth standard and about 90 per cent up to tenth standard. Only 2.8 per cent (17 out of 600 samples) are educated above senior secondary level. Among the emigrants very few (2.3 per cent) had professional qualification of any sort. Due to poor educational background these emigrants hardly had an opportunity to get vocational or professional training. They have some sort of specialization in which they were informally trained; they also practise the same. This is a very common practice in the unorganized sector. For example, a mason in the construction sector gives informal training to the youngsters and later they start practising the same profession.

As is evident from Table 13.1, the maximum proportion of sample has specialization in construction sector as mason (29.8 per cent) and followed by labour (22.5 per cent). Drivers and carpenters were 12 per cent and 5.3 per cent in the sample, respectively. The next seven categories, namely salesman, electrician, painter, plumber, steel feeder, mechanic and tailor comprised of about 20.4 per cent of the total sample. In rest of the categories of specialists the percentages varied from steel feeder to store keeper between 1.8 to 0.8 per cent.

Table 13.1 Areas of specialization of the selected emigrants

<i>Specialization</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Specialization</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Mason	179	29.8	Mechanic	16	2.7
Labour	135	22.5	Tailor	13	2.2
Driver	72	12	Computer operator	11	1.8
Carpenter	32	5.3	Foreman	8	1.3
Salesman	21	3.5	Welder	7	1.2
Electrician	20	3.3	Store keeper	5	0.8
Painter	19	3.2	Others	29	4.8
Plumber	17	2.8			
Steel feeder	16	2.7	Total	600	100

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The tendency to move from one place to another in search of new avenues and betterment of life is an integral part of human civilization since time immemorial. The human migration is an important part of human development at various scales. The movements of people and their interaction have influenced the development of human civilization, enrichment of cultures and technological change (Bilsborrow et al. 1984). Many studies and reports on international migration have underlined the close interplay of international migration and development and optimistically pointed out that such cross-border moves comprise a huge potential for development. Further it has been observed that such developments depend upon the composition of migrants, direction of migration flow and use of remittances, sharing of knowledge and skills, growth and role of intermediaries, quality of linkages, level of economic development of place of origin and destination, role of governing agencies and many more (GCIM 2005; World Bank-Working paper 2006 and UN High level dialogue on Migration and Development 2013). According to Naerssen et al. (2008), the approaches to understand migration-development interplay have been broadened in the past decade. Though this is still dominated with more economic aspects of migration and development nexus and human resources, new themes have also been added to these classical perspectives. The migration and development relationship is highly complex in nature. The theoretical aspects of this relationship are discussed in different developmental paradigms.

DOMINANT THEORETICAL PARADIGM

The neo-classical migration theorists played a pivotal role in establishing the dominant paradigm also referred to as optimistic paradigm. The theorists like Lewis (1954), Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) discussed two-sector model of rural to urban migration. According to their perspective the rural-urban (two sectors) as well as developmental-developed are inevitable part of the whole development process. In the second half of the 1950s two eminent development economists, Gunnar Myrdal and Albert O. Hirschman, from the school of unbalanced regional development, outlined the problem of economic development in underdeveloped countries and provided due attention on the non-economic parameters in the process of underdevelopment of regions legged behind in the development.

ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL PARADIGM

This paradigm is based on the structural approach which defines migration in terms of exploitative political and economic relationship between sending and receiving countries. The focus of this approach is on the inequalities and constraints of life produced by macro-economic processes. Here, in the neo-Marxist view, migration is not only a result of these imbalance situations, but an option to overcome this barrier. They have recognized migration as a natural outcome of inequality and spatial differentiation caused by capitalist development. Here, it is important to discuss the work of Amin (1973).

EMERGING THEORETICAL PARADIGM

In the 1980s and 1990s a new approach was adopted to understand the dynamics of the migration process. In this emerging paradigm, interdisciplinary approach was adopted in which causes and consequences of migration are presented more explicitly, highlighting both positive and negative responses in reference to migration and development relationship. In this phase, two new approaches emerged to explain the dynamics of migration and development. These were New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) and Transnational Perspective on Migration and Development (TPMD). Here, in this piece of research these theoretical paradigms are taken into consideration for examining the dynamics of the labour migration between India and Gulf countries with special reference to a case study of Rajasthani emigrants to this region.

GULF MIGRATION FROM RAJASTHAN

Since the largest concentration of labour emigration to the Gulf region from Rajasthan is observed in Sikar, Churu and Jhunjhunu districts, they have been selected for the present study. Thousands of labours emigrate from this region to the Gulf countries every year, largely in search of job, to increase their earning and for ensuring continuous availability of work. The unemployment conditions, poor prospects of agricultural and industrial activities, poor status of human resource and so on are creating a push force for the youth of this region to leave this place. Other than this region, there are some other pockets as well from where a considerably good number of labour is emigrating to the West Asian countries. The adjacent region of the study area in the south, Nagaur district, is also an important

centre in terms of emigration of labour to the Gulf region. In the southern part of Rajasthan, Banswara and Dungarpur are also prominent districts in terms of migration to the West Asian countries. Eastern Rajasthan too is crucial to mention here because a good number of labour is emigrating from this region to the Gulf countries. Among other districts of Rajasthan, Tonk, Bharatpur, SawaiMadhopur, Karauli and Bundi are places from which significant number of youths emigrate to Gulf countries. In central part of Rajasthan, the districts of Ajmer, Nasirabad and Sarwar are important centres from where people migrate to Gulf countries. Some other pockets of Rajasthan from which a significant number of labourers are also emigrating for Gulf countries include Hadauti region which is comprised of Sunel and Patan areas of Jhalawar district. Emigration of labourers from the south, west, south-west and north-west of Rajasthan have been very low.

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In this section details have been provided regarding the data processing and analysis of the data collected from field survey in Sikar, Jhunjhunu and Churu districts of Rajasthan. The maximum emigrants from the study area migrate to Saudi Arabia (about 42 per cent). About 31 per cent migrated to the United Arab Emirates. More than 73 per cent labours emigrated for these two Gulf countries only. Oman is the next preferred destination in the Gulf region for the emigrants of districts of Rajasthan followed by Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. In 1970s mainly semi-skilled and unskilled labour emigrated from India to the Gulf region for taking jobs in construction and other infrastructure development sector. But in the last two decades demand increased for skilled and professional manpower for operation and maintenance services, transport and communication, IT and other such sectors. Particularly, in case of study area, the conditions are very much similar as it was in 1970s. There is a meagre shift from 1970s condition as even today most of labours from study area are semi-skilled or unskilled. Here, slightly more than 50 per cent workers are engaged in the construction activities as mason and labours at the destination. After the above two categories of emigrants, drivers are the third largest group comprising of 12 per cent of the entire sample.

The emigration of workers, semi-skilled and unskilled, is mainly induced by economic factors. The study districts of Rajasthan fall in the semi-arid region. Due to the scarcity of water, poor availability of natural resources and poor educational status, there are very low possibilities of impressive agricultural and industrial growth. Other avenues of employment and

development are also not explored and developed properly in this region like tourism, handicraft, cottage industry and so on. Under these conditions, coupled with increasing population pressure, study region had been trapped in problems like unemployment, low wages, job uncertainties and so on. These economic conditions created a push for young workforce of this region to search jobs outside their region. On the other side, the pull force was generated in the West Asian countries, mainly in Gulf countries due to oil and gas reserves, to attract the workers from districts of Rajasthan. The wage difference between place of origin and destination is also another important factor along with continuous availability of employment which has been the pull factor in attracting the semi-skilled and skilled labour from Rajasthan.

In most of the cases these sample emigrants got information about the employment opportunity in Gulf region by the agents or through their network (these are the people who work for an agent or subagent and catch the prospective emigrants from the origin). About two-thirds of the sample got this information by various mediators/agents. There are many agents and subagents in the study area who have a team of workers who roam around in the field to catch the prospective emigrants. They introduce themselves as agents or subagents. Then, these agents and subagents largely convince these would-be emigrants and facilitate the process of immigration at a very high financial cost. Second most important source of information about the job opportunity in the Gulf is relatives or family members who have previously emigrated and employed in Gulf country. About one-fourth of the sample got information for job opportunity from this source. Irrespective of the source of information, almost all the emigrants ultimately approach an agent at destination to complete the formalities like arranging meeting with the employer, signing of contract and help in settling in host country.

OPINION ABOUT SATISFACTION FROM EMIGRATION

The reason behind asking the question whether the emigrants were satisfied after leaving their home state was to get input on the issue if emigration solved the purpose for which they had emigrated to Gulf region. About three-fourths of the sample was satisfied with their decision to emigrate for the Gulf region; whereas 3 per cent of sample units were partially satisfied. However, nearly 22 per cent respondents were not satisfied with their decision to move.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE WORKING CONDITIONS IN INDIA AND GULF COUNTRIES

Other than the wage difference between India and Gulf countries, there are some other factors also which played an important role in making decision by the emigrants to move to the Gulf countries. Comparing the differences in the working conditions at the origin and host country, it is found that the largest proportion of the sample (41.2 per cent) had reported that due to higher technological inputs, labourer had to do less physical work in the Gulf region. About one-fourth respondents opined that along with the salary more perks were given for overtime in Gulf countries as compared to what the emigrants received at the origin. Other emigrants had also reported that the job security and the continuity of job was also a reason of attraction towards Gulf countries. Nearly 20 per cent of the respondents have mentioned that the working conditions are almost similar in India and the Gulf region. About 6 per cent of the sample had reported that in the Gulf region job timings are lengthier and security and freedom are comparatively less in Gulf countries as compared to India.

EMIGRANT'S SUPPORT TO THE FAMILY BACK HOME THROUGH REMITTANCES

Remittance is person-to-person payment, rather than payment to purchase goods or services or payment towards business (World Bank 2006). Remittance is largely a fund transfer by an individual/emigrant to his/her family, society or community at country of their origin. In the present sample all the respondents have reported that families were receiving remittances from the emigrants regularly. It has been found that most (39.3 per cent) of the remittances are sent by informal channels, especially with friends and relatives. In the study area, there are many clusters of villages and towns which send a large number of emigrants for Gulf countries. Emigrants from these clusters keep themselves well connected among them and use informal channel (with friends and relatives) for sending remittances back home. Other than these there are considerable proportions (28.8 per cent) of emigrants who are using money transfer through formal agency like banking services for this purpose. Only 5.5 per cent emigrants reported using international money order as primary source for remittance transfer. About 11 per cent of the respondents hesitated to disclose the medium of remittance transfer and they simply ignored this query.

It has been found in the survey that every emigrant remits money to their family back home. However, in addition to sending cash, the emigrants support their families by other means too. About 30 per cent emigrants give only monetary support to their family. But there are some emigrants who along with cash help their families by sending articles through friends/relatives or carrying with them household appliances, useful articles and gifts and other expensive items like LCDs, CD player, camera, mobile, radio, watch, clothes, blankets and so on. A majority of migrants belonged to this category. However, a small proportion of the sample (1.8 per cent) supports their family by inviting another family member and helping him in getting employment in the company he works for or else in another company in the same city or in other parts of Gulf countries in addition to sending money to his family every month. This helped their families in using their savings, to initiate new economic ventures, support other family members to acquire training for skill development in order to become a source of earning at home or in a Gulf country.

Table 13.2 shows that the majority of emigrants in low-income category (10,000–15,000) prefer to support maximum by sending cash as means of support to their families back home. This might be because they are mostly taking high interest loans for completing the emigration formalities and now want to repay soon and their survival is tough with low income so their priority is to feed their family first rather than taking consumer articles. With increase in income, there is tendency to support their families both in cash and kind.

Table 13.2 Income category and kind of support

<i>Income category</i>	<i>Emigrant help to family in cash/kind or both</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>Remittances cash</i>	<i>Remittances (cash) & kind</i>	<i>Remittances (cash), kind & occupational assistance^a</i>	
<10,000	28	8	1	37
10,000–15,000	94	177	3	274
15,000–20,000	32	140	3	175
20,000–30,000	17	66	4	87
>30,000	4	23	0	27
Total	175	414	11	600

^aNote: Occupational assistance: Assistance given to family member in training for his skill development for better employment at home or in a Gulf country

USE OF REMITTANCES


According to Haas (2007), remittances function as income insurance and protect people from income fluctuations caused by economic downturns, political conflicts or climatic vagaries. While reviewing various empirical studies Haas found that along with income insurance international remittances also contribute positively to overall household welfare through improved nutrition, food, health and living conditions at place of origin. The National Sample Survey Organization conducted a survey on employment and unemployment in 2007–2008 and discusses about 12 purposes for which a household uses the remittance. Here, it is found that the prime use of remittance in both rural and urban areas is household expenditure (NSSO 2014). According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) survey (2010), about 61 per cent of the remittances received by Indian households are used for meeting the requirements of food, education, health, and so on. Nearly, 20 per cent of these remittances received are deposited in bank accounts for saving. Only about 7 per cent of these funds are invested in land, property or securities.

In the present study the respondents were asked to give information about the use of remittances by the family in order of their priority. About three-fourths (73.6 per cent) of the respondents put debt repayment as their first primary usage of remittances. This may be due to the fact that majority of emigrants (78.3 per cent) had borrowed money from money lenders, friends or relatives before leaving their country and probably the families of those emigrants who had to pay high interest rates preferred to repay the loan first. The second most preferred use of remittances was for improving the standard of living of the family. This use of remittance was purely for consumption purpose. However, once the loan was totally repaid, use of remittances to raise the standard of living of the family became its primary use. Other primary utilization of remittance was “savings”, which almost all the left-behind families of the emigrants do. However, for savings families used different options available in banks and post offices. Very few families of the emigrants used remittances for investment purpose like purchase of agricultural land, investment in small business and so on. However, utilization of remittances on renovation of houses by left-behind families of the emigrants was also found in good number.

Table 13.3 and Fig. 13.1 show that for 92.5 per cent samples this emigration is fruitful in terms of increase in household income. About 3.7 per cent households reported partial increase in their household income. This is obvious also because most of the emigrants were either unemployed or

Table 13.3 Utilization of remittances on household income, amenities, quality of residence and education of children in the family

Status	Household income		Household amenities		Resident quality		Education / productive investment	
	Frequency	Per cent	Frequency	Per cent	Frequency	Per cent	Frequency	Per cent
Increased	555	92.5	520	86.7	451	75.2	445	74.2
Unchanged	23	3.8	34	5.7	79	13.2	101	16.8
Partially increased	22	3.7	46	7.7	70	11.7	54	9
Total	600	100	600	100	600	100	600	100

**Fig. 13.1** Utilization of remittances by families of emigrants at origin. (Source: Table 13.3)

partially employed before they left for Gulf countries. Nearly three-fifths (60 per cent) of the study migrants to Gulf countries emigrated for better prospects and increased income. Only 23 emigrants (i.e., 3.8 per cent) reported no change in their household income. This group is comprised of those emigrants who did not get promised salary or job on their arrival at the destination. By and large, the emigration to Gulf countries brought significant changes in the lives of emigrants' families. The biggest change was in their household income at the origin which raised their standards of living. A large section of the migrants' families renovated their depleted

houses and purchased electronic goods and other household amenities from the remittances received. Another change reported was the significant increase in expenditure on food for better nutrition of family members in general and of children in particular.

More than 94 per cent of the sample group reported that either they have purchased household appliances or these goods were brought by the family members when they visited home during vacation in a year. Generally, these emigrants bring with them many household appliances, useful articles and gifts. Other than that, most of them brought refrigerators, televisions, two-wheelers, kitchen gadgets including gas connection, coolers, cell phones, furniture and so on. About 5.7 per cent of the sample reported that there was no improvement in the household amenities in their cases. These were the households where either emigrants did not get expected salaries at destination or they were still repaying their debts (may be old one or which they have borrowed for emigration of other family member) or spent money in social responsibilities such as marriage or illness or death of their family members.

About three-fourths of the sample reported considerable improvement in the quality of their houses. Most of them modified their old houses by addition of new room/s, modification in kitchen, toilets and bathrooms, improving rooftops and flooring quality, construction of permanent boundary wall, painting and addition of some other facilities. Few of them also constructed new houses on their existing lands. Nearly 11.7 per cent of the sample only went for minor changes and modifications. In case of 13.2 per cent of the sample group there was no change in the quality of their house. Half of them had no extra money for this and the rest of them either provided desired facilities in their home or preferred to save money for children's education and their marriage. Some also saved money for their old age security.

It is a matter of concern that a major part of the remittances is used for consumption purpose whereas only a small part of it was invested on education of children and on savings. Though about 85 per cent of sample emigrants reported increase or partial increase in their expenses on children's education, in reality most of them are not very much aware about the children's educational needs according to the current changing scenario. The only parameter of increased educational standard and recurring expenses is that the children are studying in English-medium schools with little concern of the quality of education and educational progress of the children. In case of college students, parents preferred to enrol their

children in any vocational training courses so that with their skills developed, they can get them employed in Gulf countries in either the same company where the father was working or elsewhere in the Gulf region. However, a strong gender bias was observed among the emigrants. They encouraged sons to attend skill development programmes, but for daughters they preferred admission in a government school and then getting them married at an early age.

PROBLEMS FACED BY EMIGRANTS DURING EMIGRATION PROCESS IN INDIA

Most of the unskilled or semi-skilled emigrants who migrated from the districts of Rajasthan to Gulf countries had little knowledge and awareness about the process of emigration. Due to this shortcoming they had to depend upon others for completing the formalities. Generally, these persons find easily an agent in their area who may have effective network in both the sending and receiving countries. Gaur (2002) in her study of Indian migrant labours in Lebanon observed that the network of agents is widely spread in sending and receiving countries, particularly in rural areas, due to heavy unemployment at the origin and more job opportunities being available at the host country with higher wages. In such situation, network of agents flourishes. The agents charge heavy amount to help in securing a high-paying job at the destination country. His services to his client include: (a) to find suitable job in a Gulf country; (b) help the client to obtain his passport from Passport Office in Rajasthan; and (c) to secure client's visa of destination country. The greatest problem faced by the potential emigrant is to manage finances which include the hefty fee of the agent, cost of air ticket, visa fee, accommodation in the host country and daily expenses for at least a month, that is, till he gets his first salary from his employer.

In the study area, the most crucial problem faced by a potential emigrant from low economic strata is to make arrangements of finances for foreign travel. It has been found that generally the potential emigrants mortgage their property/land to a bank or with a local money lender. Alternatively, in some cases the loan is taken from relatives and/or friends. More than three-fourths of the emigrants faced problem before emigration in managing finance for entire emigration process. They took loans from money lenders and in some cases agents themselves provided financial assistance on heavy interest rates. Some of the persons from the sampled area who had earlier migrated to Gulf country also provided

financial assistance to the new emigrants. About 22 per cent of the emigrants had arranged the expenses either from their savings or by selling their fixed assets and ornaments.

The data collected from the selected 600 emigrants revealed that 23 out of 600 (3.8 per cent) potential emigrants reported that their passports were delivered quite late; whereas, 31 (5.2 per cent) emigrants claimed that they had to wait very long to get their visa. Besides these problems, the emigrants did not face any other problem. This may be due to the help received by emigrants from the agent in securing a job in Gulf country and in completing all paperwork, including applying for a passport in Rajasthan and helping the client in securing visa of the host country. However, for all this help the agent charges on an average Rs 1.25 lakhs (nearly US\$1950) from each person. About 83 per cent of the emigrants took help of the agents and each person paid the above amount to the agent.

All may not be well with some emigrants. After arriving at the destination, some of the migrants to Gulf countries face serious problems. These problems include cancellation of the contract signed earlier and pressure from the employer to sign a new contract on lower wages, longer working hours and poor living conditions with no health insurance benefits. However, when some employers do provide health insurance cover to their employees, the insured amount is so small that it is not sufficient to meet hospital bills in many cases. Gaur and Saxena (2004) reported in their study of an Indian migrant worker in Lebanon a pathetic condition of the emigrant who met with a serious accident while working on a machine. The employer got him admitted to a hospital for treatment. The employee's insurance cover was not enough to meet the hospital expenses beyond a certain amount. When the hospital bill exceeded the insured amount, the hospital demanded more money. The employer disowned the employer and did not pay the balance amount. Due to expensive treatment in a foreign land, his friends decided to send the patient to India. But the hospital authorities refused to discharge the patient until the full payment was made. The Indian community in Lebanon collected funds and sent the patient back to India.

In some of the cases emigrants are cheated at the origin by the agents who sent them on tourist visa instead of working/business visa as promised earlier. After the completion of their visa period the emigrants are no longer allowed to stay at the destination and if they still continue to stay, then they are treated as illegal migrants and are subjected to exploitation by their employers. In many cases, their passports are taken by their employers and they are not allowed to go out of their work premises.

Table 13.4 Responses of emigrants about job-related issues after emigration

<i>Emigrant's response</i>	<i>Got promised job</i>		<i>Got promised salary</i>		<i>Got promised working conditions</i>		<i>Got assured security conditions</i>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Yes	569	94.8	527	87.8	536	89.3	523	87.2
No	31	5.2	73	12.2	64	10.7	77	12.8
Total	600	100.0	600	100.0	600	100.0	600	100.0

Table 13.4 below shows that majority (about 95 per cent) of the study emigrants got jobs which were promised by their employers before they arrived to the Gulf countries. Rest of the emigrants faced problems as their agents in Rajasthan did not disclose the correct job status to them. There are more cases (12.2 per cent) in which the emigrants were not paid the promised salary after arriving at their respective destinations. Among them there are a few cases where as per earlier agreement pay was not given; their earlier contracts were cancelled and they were compelled to sign a new contract at lower wages failing which they faced deportation. Since almost all the emigrants had taken loan to migrate to Gulf countries and they had to support their left-behind families, they had no other choice but to yield to the terms and conditions of their employer as mentioned in their new contract. The data reveal that the majority of emigrants got the job which was promised (94.8 per cent); 87.8 per cent received the promised salary; 89.3 per cent found working conditions as promised; and 87.2 per cent of the emigrants felt that they were given assured security conditions. On the whole, the responses of the majority of the emigrants to the Gulf country did not show discrepancy between working conditions promised prior to migrating and those found/experienced on arrival in the Gulf countries. However, some emigrants did find difference in the working conditions, but the percentage was quite less. Only 5.2 per cent felt that they did not get the job promised earlier and the percentages of those who did not receive promised salary and those who felt that their working conditions were not as promised before migrating are 12.2 per cent and 10.7 per cent respectively. Likewise, only 12.8 per cent emigrants in this case study found discrepancy between what was promised and what they experienced with regard to “security”.

The emigrants face security-related problems in foreign land. Nearly 13 per cent respondents felt that they had not got assured security conditions. In many cases the passports of these emigrants were confiscated by the employers after reaching the destination. The employers generally keep the passports of the employees in their custody, and without their passports the movements of emigrants were restricted and they felt that their living condition was similar to a prisoner. In most of the cases the emigrants had little freedom to lead their life in a way they pleased even after completion of their working hours. Since prior to leaving their home state in India, the majority of the emigrants knew from their friends and/or relatives who had emigrated earlier about the tough living conditions at their destinations, they had accepted the situation. However, only for a few who did not know about the living conditions at the destination prior to emigration, it was difficult to accept the restricted living style but with the passage of time, they adjusted to the new environment and showed little dissatisfaction.

EMIGRATION PROCESS

The process of labour emigration from any part of India to the West Asian countries cannot be understood without getting an insight into the (i) channels of migration; (ii) nexus of agents; and (iii) financing of emigration. Below we give a brief description of these three components of the emigration process.

CHANNELS OF MIGRATION

To understand the process of emigration, it is important to know about the channels available in the market through which a person desirous to migrate to another country in search of employment gets the required information and help to process his papers for travel abroad. As per Gaur (2002), the channels of migration include (i) recruitment agents, (ii) friends/relatives and (iii) direct hire (making private arrangements with some employers in the host country). Another channel of recruitment is the Government Recruitment Agency which is hardly used in case of unskilled and semi-skilled labourers.

RECRUITMENT AGENTS

In labour-exporting counties one may find a good nexus of agents in every district. These agents are very well connected to the rural areas which is the main catchment area of clients who are generally young persons (unskilled and semi-skilled) and are unemployed. These are potential emigrants ready to migrate to a country where they can find employment not for their livelihood alone but also save money to send to their left-behind families at the origin. These agents have a strong nexus with the recruitment agents in labour-importing countries. The agents of labour-exporting and labour-importing countries are well connected with good communication with them. The employers in host countries place their requirements before the agent who passes on the requirement to his counterpart in the labour-exporting country. In such countries the nexus of recruitment agents for labour (unskilled and semi-skilled) recruitment is strong. A recruitment agent arranges to send the required labour even it is not available locally. The networks of agents in different districts facilitate migration from the districts by way of information, arranging passport, visa and job in the host country. It has been found that the majority of migrants come from a few selected districts only. The role played by networks makes migration a chain process and self-perpetuating as evidenced in other studies (Shah 1998; Gaur 2002).

It may be mentioned here that in the three selected study districts, namely Sikar, Jhunjhunu and Charu of the State of Rajasthan in India from which 600 samples had emigrated to the Gulf countries, a large number of recruitment agents and their nominees (as subagents) are spread over with their larger concentration in the remote areas. The potential emigrants contact these agents and subagents of their areas and become their clients. As mentioned in previous section these agents help their client in arranging a job in the Gulf country and help them in securing passports and visas to take up the job. As has been mentioned earlier, these agents charge heavily from their clients. In the present study an emigrant paid on average nearly US\$1950 for the services provided during the entire emigration process. This is many times higher than the actual charges of the emigration process. However, in a few cases, a major part of the cost of emigration was provided by the employer. Of course, a few emigrants were cheated by some unscrupulous agents as they did not get the job by the employer as promised prior to emigrating. Also, these emigrants had to accept lower wages than what they were told by the agent prior to emigration.

In spite of knowing that some agents exploit their clients, almost all the prospective unskilled and semi-skilled emigrants go to the agents since they are quite ignorant about the procedure of getting a passport and securing the visa of the country. Also, in most of the cases only the agent can help in getting a job in the country they intend to travel to. He has to undergo the entire complicated process of emigration of his client. Thus for unskilled and semi-skilled emigrants who are not very educated, taking help of an agent is inevitable. Once the emigration process is completed, the client feels highly obliged for the services provided by the agent. This is also reflected in their responses in relation to the role of the agent in the process of emigration. About 86 per cent of the respondents reported that the role of the agent was very positive in the entire process of emigration. Only those emigrants who did not get the promised job, salary, working conditions and assured security and freedom had a negative perception of the agent's role.

THROUGH RELATIVES/FRIENDS

The third channel of migration to Gulf countries is through relatives/friends who emigrated for the Gulf country earlier. Mostly, the employees of a company who come to know about any vacancy in their company inform their family members or relatives about the vacant position. Since the employee has already worked in the company and might have become a trusted person of the employer, he may recommend his relative for the vacant position. For both the employer and the employee this is a win-win situation, as neither the employer nor the employee would have to pay unnecessarily exorbitant commission to the agents. This is how a person already in employment can help in getting his relative employed in the same company. Such emigrations give rise to chain migration. However, none of the emigrants of the present sample of emigrants came to the Gulf country through their relative or friend.

EMIGRANTS' SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING GULF EMIGRATION PROCESS

In the present study respondents were asked to give their suggestions for the improvement of the process of emigration of Indian workers for the West Asian countries. The objective of this query is to get an insight into the areas where these emigrants faced problems in their own perspective.

This may be useful in addressing the problem areas and also in devising remedial measures to make emigration process hassle free. Below we outline the suggestions given by 600 study emigrants:

18.6 per cent of the emigrants suggested simplifying the process to get passport, visa and emigration clearance because most of the semi-skilled and unskilled labour emigrants were less educated and felt uncomfortable completing the paperwork required. Though they opined that the process has been simplified in the last few years, but it was felt by the emigrants that there was still scope to minimize paperwork and time in obtaining passport and visa of the host country. Since most of the emigrants had schooling up to primary level, with a few not more than secondary level, it was not possible for them to complete the required formalities without external help. About 16 per cent of the emigrants suggested that the Indian government should provide assistance in obtaining passports and Indian embassies/consulates in the host countries should assist the potential emigrants to get their visa early. The general feeling of the emigrants about Indian embassy/consulate is that their staff is not cooperative. Other suggestions given by the prospective emigrants included: the government should appoint authorized recruitment agents and notify them to the public. The authorized agents should work under the control of the government so that they do not charge very high fees from their clients. Such arrangements would stop the agents from exploiting their client. The prospective emigrant would also be confident that they get whatever is promised before emigration. Also, these government-approved agents would not send any illegal migrant to any foreign country. It is also felt by the emigrants that they should be able to send money to their left-behind family at the origin through a legal channel, like banks, at a reasonable commission. If an effective and safe channel is available to remit the money to their family, the emigrants will not send money through their friends/relatives returning to India or by any other illegal channel of sending the money.

About 16 per cent of the emigrants suggested that prior to migrating to the Gulf country the state government should arrange some orientation programme for the prospective emigrants to apprise them about the people and their culture and should warn them not to indulge in any subversive activity which may bring bad name to them and their country. In such training programmes it would be better if a few returned migrants from the Gulf country may also be invited so that the prospective emigrants may interact with them to clarify their doubts and get their personal advice particularly on "DOs & DON'Ts". Almost all the respondents suggested that the Indian government must control the agents to avoid exploitation of emigrant workers.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present study has clearly brought out that the outcome of emigration to the Gulf country in case of majority of emigrants has been positive in terms of improving the socioeconomic conditions of the left-behind families at the origin of the emigrants. Thus, in a labour surplus country like India, as a policy, migration of labour force may be encouraged. It may, however, be understood that though remittances give economic relief to the left-behind families of the emigrants, and is also a source of foreign exchange required to ease out balance of payment situation of the country, labour export cannot be a substitute to sound policies of the government for economic development which may ensure creation of more job opportunities in the country. The government of labour-exporting country should ensure that migrants do not pay unscrupulous agents at the origin and give protection to the workers. Based on the observations made in the present study, we list below some specific recommendations for the security and safety of the emigrants:

1. Prior to signing the contract, emigrants should get them registered at the Indian Embassy or nearby Consulate and get the contract examined and endorsed. This may protect them from exploitation, if any, and also, help them in the event of evacuation, if any catastrophic conditions develop in the host country and deportation becomes absolutely necessary; for the protection of Indian workers, the Indian embassy may charge some registration fee.
2. Labour-exporting state governments need to register all the local agents at district and taluka levels and issue licence to them to do business. Without valid licence no one should be allowed to do business. This may stop exploitation of prospective emigrants by agents from charging hefty commission and sending them through illegal channels. Also, in case of any fraud, the emigrants can approach the concerned government to settle their grievances.
3. For the welfare of Indian migrant workers, the India Embassy/Consulate in the host country should make it mandatory to take health insurance policy of reasonable amount covering major sickness/disability/death during employment either by the employer or by self before joining the work.
4. Indian embassies should generate extra funds to meet the expenses for legal protection of the Indian workers if they are convicted by fraudulent charges by their employer or, in the case of death of the worker, to send his body to his native place.

5. Finally, in areas of heavy concentration of Indian migrants, the Indian embassy may arrange opening of an Indian bank so that the Indian workers could remit money to their left-behind families through official channel which may be cheaper and the safest mode of remittance. This recommendation is based on the success of many countries in increasing the flow of remittances through banking channels after opening of banks in the rural and remote areas of sending country and also making the Indian bank available in the host country (Gaur 2002).

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Emigration from Uttar Pradesh to the Middle East

Mashkoor Ahmad

INTRODUCTION

During the last two decades, due to easy access to the means of transportation, communication and social networking through internet and mobile phones, male migration from poor and underdeveloped areas to the economically prosperous areas within and across national boundaries has increasingly become a major strategy of seeking livelihood. India being the second most populated country in the world has emerged as the largest supplier of cheap labour to various countries, especially the Gulf countries. More interestingly, in recent years poor, underdeveloped and densely populated states of northern India, mainly Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, have emerged as major suppliers of skilled and semi-skilled labour within the country and outside the national borders.

In India and primarily in north India, most of the migration studies undertaken focused on internal migration. Majority of the studies on internal migration dealt with in-migration to metropolitan cities from rural areas and associated problems. Earlier the focus on migration research has been limited to identify push and pull factors of migration in a region

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and their short-term and long-term consequences. To a larger extent, the main reason for having more concentration on internal migration studies has been the availability of wealth of data on internal migration through unbroken series of decennial censuses of India and to some extent the lack of availability of data on international migration in published form. Perhaps, this could be the reason “why the studies on international migration in India were few and far between”. Historically speaking, the era of serious researches on international migration in India began from the Centre of Development Studies (CDS), Thiruvananthapuram, under the dynamic leadership and expert guidance of Professors K.C. Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan. Only in early 1990s a few studies have been conducted to look into various issues of emigration from Kerala, Goa, Tamil Nadu and so on. Later, Rajan et al. (2017) investigated emigration from Kerala to Gulf countries, return migration, remittances and cost of migration as well as problems faced abroad by emigrants. Thus, pioneer studies have been undertaken especially on emigration from southern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh to Gulf countries.

Zachariah and Rajan (2015, 2012 and 2004) have discussed various issues associated with emigration from Kerala. Even today, not much is known on the living conditions of labourers from northern states of India to the Middle East. Only recently, Gaur (2003) undertook a comparative study of migrant labourers from Punjab and Tamil Nadu—the two states situated far apart. These two states of India present a sharp contrast between the living conditions of these migrants due to social, cultural and attitudinal differences (also see Gaur and Saxena 2010). It has been widely felt that there is lack of studies on various issues of emigrants from north Indian states in general and from Uttar Pradesh, especially from small- and medium-sized towns which are characterised by dearth of employment opportunities. The present study is an attempt to fill this gap to some extent.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- (a) To study the trend of emigrants from Uttar Pradesh with major emphasis from urban Bijnor district during 2002–2012
- (b) To highlight the difficulties experienced by potential emigrants in completing the emigration process including obtaining their visa
- (c) To focus upon the problems faced by potential emigrants in arranging finances for the entire emigration process including the professional fee of the agent and also to share their experience, if they had met an unscrupulous agent and their money was wasted due to his fraud

- (d) Finally, to find the engagement of emigrants in economic activity at their destinations and to discuss the amount and frequency of remittances sent by emigrants to their left-behind families

DATA AND METHODS

The study is based on multiple sources of data including Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), Census of India and primary sample survey conducted in five towns of Bijnor district of Uttar Pradesh during February and May 2011. Thus, to fulfil the objectives of the present study, the data have been obtained from both secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources of data include NSSO (64th round, 2007–2008), Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India and Census of India. For the collection of primary data, a well-structured schedule has been used to obtain information about various aspects of emigrants from sampled households of five towns of Bijnor district, namely Noorpur, Haldaur, Jalalabad, Nagina and Sahaspur. In all, 400 households have been surveyed to investigate the process of male out-migration in the above-mentioned towns of Bijnor district. Out of these 400 households, 175 households (44 per cent) have been found to have at least one male out-migrated either within country or outside the country. Thus, among these 175 out-migrating households, 279 males have been reported as out-migrants, of which 228 males out-migrated within the country while 51 males emigrated to other countries. It should be taken into consideration that the present study is restricted to the process of emigration and related issues (Ahmad 2013).

ABOUT STUDY AREA AND POPULATION: UTTAR PRADESH AND ITS BIJNOR DISTRICT

Uttar Pradesh, with about 200 million people (Census of India 2011), is the most populous state of India and is also one of the poorest, underdeveloped states in the country. With 44.47 million people living in urban areas, Uttar Pradesh has the second largest urban system (915 cities and towns) in the country. Majority of the towns are of small and medium size characterised by very less employment opportunities, thereby forcing people to out-migrate within and across the national boundary. In the state of Uttar Pradesh, the share of Muslim population is about one-fifth of the total population of the state. Generally the Muslims of the state have high tendency of emigration to the Muslim-dominated Gulf countries. Table 14.1 shows that the urban areas of Uttar Pradesh have relatively

Table 14.1 Percentages of population of Uttar Pradesh, Bijnor district, and five selected towns of Bijnor district by religion

<i>Religion</i>	<i>Uttar Pradesh</i>		<i>Bijnor district</i>			<i>Selected towns of Bijnor district</i>					
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Jalalabad</i>	<i>Haldaur</i>	<i>Nagina</i>	<i>Sahaspur</i>	<i>Noorpur</i>
Hindus	79.73	83.66	66.00	55.18	63.24	31.15	8.80	73.64	29.06	8.54	27.78
Muslims	19.26	15.55	32.20	43.04	34.85	67.48	89.97	23.43	70.53	91.16	62.87
Others	1.01	0.78	1.80	1.78	1.91	1.38	1.23	2.93	0.41	0.30	9.34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Computations are based on Census of India 2011

higher proportion of Muslim population (32.2 per cent) and in case of urban areas of Bijnor district, the proportion of Muslim population is as high as 67.48 per cent (Census of India 2011). In Bijnor district all the towns are of small and medium size with low employment and business opportunities. Bijnor district is situated in the fertile Gangetic plain and agriculturally the district is very developed. Even in its small- and medium-sized towns, a considerable population is engaged in agriculture and allied activities. In spite of being situated in industrially developed western Uttar Pradesh, the industrial base of Bijnor district is very weak. Though the district has a large number of sugar mills, but in these mills the employment opportunities are seasonal and require unskilled labourers and wages are low. In the absence of adequate employment opportunities, the male population from these towns out-migrate to other big cities or towards the Gulf countries (Ahmad 2017).

EMIGRATION FROM UTTAR PRADESH AND URBAN BIJNOR DISTRICT

Emigration from Uttar Pradesh

India has emerged as the largest emigrating country in the world. At the same time, it has also emerged as the largest recipient of international remittances in the world. During the last few years it has been able to maintain its position as the largest recipient of international remittances in the world (World Bank 2016). Majority of the high-skilled emigration and students' emigration is directed towards the developed countries of North America, Canada and Europe while most of the semi-skilled and unskilled emigration is especially directed towards the Gulf countries (Naujoks 2009).

However, little attention has been paid to the research on emigration from India and from its various states to other countries due to paucity of secondary data on emigration. Even the Census of India, the main source of data on population in India, does not provide information about emigrants from the country though it collects information on many aspects of immigrants in the country. However, a few studies have been conducted on the secondary data provided by Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs and others based on primary data to investigate emigration from some of the states like Kerala, Goa and others which have a high emigration rate. Besides, the NSSO also collects some data on international out-migrants

(emigrants). Research on male emigration from Uttar Pradesh remained a neglected subject though the ratio of emigrants from Uttar Pradesh to the total emigrants from India is very large. Interestingly, emigration of the population from Uttar Pradesh has significantly increased during the last few years. Majority of the emigrants, mostly Muslims, originate from the urban areas of the state. According to the 64th round NSS (2007–2008), about 5 per cent of the male out-migrants from urban area of Uttar Pradesh have been reported to have emigrated to various countries of the world (NSSO).

Table 14.2 illustrates the annual emigration of workers from the state of Uttar Pradesh in comparison to India. Data revealed that in 2002 only 19,288 workers (constituting 5.25 per cent of the total emigrant workers of India) emigrated from Uttar Pradesh to various countries for whom emigration check was done. Though the share of the state declined to 4.11 per cent in 2005, in the next year, that is 2006, the number of emigrants increased rapidly to become 10.77 per cent. In 2009, with about 125,783 emigrants, Uttar Pradesh contributed to slightly more than one-fifth of the total emigrants from India. Interestingly, Uttar Pradesh exhibited a continuously increasing trend among various states of India and in 2011 with 155,301 emigrants, Uttar Pradesh contributed to about one-fourth of the total emigrants from India. In 2012, the number of emigrants from Uttar Pradesh reached as high as 191,341 and consti-

Table 14.2 Number of workers granted emigration clearance/ECNR endorsement from Uttar Pradesh and India annually from 2002 to 2012

<i>Year of emigration</i>	<i>Number of emigrants from Uttar Pradesh</i>	<i>Number of emigrants from India</i>
2002	19,288	367,663
2003	24,854	466,456
2004	27,428	474,960
2005	22,558	548,853
2006	66,131	676,912
2007	91,613	809,453
2008	139,254	848,601
2009	125,783	610,272
2010	140,826	641,356
2011	155,301	626,565
2012	191,341	747,041

Source: Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India




Fig. 14.1 Share of Uttar Pradesh in the total emigration from India, 2002–2012. (Source: Computations are based on Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India)

tuted 25.61 per cent (Fig. 14.1) of the total emigrants from India. This shows that Uttar Pradesh is the topmost emigrating state in India. However, most of the emigration from the state is directed towards the Gulf countries and majority of the emigrants are low-educated and unskilled labourers as these are the emigrants for which emigration check is required. Therefore, it is suggested that emigrants should be equipped with proper technical skills and trainings so as to get higher salaries, consequently leading to higher remittances flow into the country.

Emigration from Urban Bijnor District

As stated earlier, Bijnor district has very high concentration of Muslim population (43.04 per cent) and in urban areas of the district the proportion of Muslim population is as high as 67.48 per cent (Census of India 2011). Various studies have shown that Muslims are backward socioeconomically and a major proportion of poor Muslims resides in urban areas. They have the lowest literacy rate and poor economic resources. A very high proportion of Muslim children drop out of their studies in the very early ages due to various reasons, especially financial constraints. These Muslim dropout children acquire some training in skilled and semi-skilled works either in their own town or after out-migrating to other places for the same. Thus, in the absence of employment opportunities in their own towns these low-educated or uneducated Muslim youths out-migrate to

big cities within and across Uttar Pradesh or they emigrate to overseas countries. It may be noted that most of the Muslim male population emigrate towards the Gulf countries for two reasons: first they are low educated or uneducated; may be semi-skilled or unskilled workers and can work in these countries because of higher concentration of workers from their own country at workplaces; secondly because of religious and cultural affiliation. All the emigrants from Bijnor district were concentrated in a few Gulf countries only. Saudi Arabia (78.4 per cent) has emerged as the most preferred destination for the emigrants from Bijnor district. United Arab Emirates (17.6 per cent) has ranked as the second most important destination followed by Oman (2 per cent) and Kuwait (2 per cent).

ENGAGEMENT OF EMIGRANTS IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

It has widely been accepted that most of the adult male population emigrate from their home country to the host country especially for employment purposes, better wages and improved living conditions. Therefore, they try to find an employment and engage themselves in an economic activity of one type or other in order to earn livelihood and save some money so as to send remittances to their left-behind families in their home country. Table 14.3 gives the percentage distribution of urban male emigrants from Uttar Pradesh by their engagement in economic activity at their destinations. From the table it is evident that from urban Uttar Pradesh as high as 94 per cent of the total emigrants were engaged in economic activity in host country; whereas, only 5.33 per cent were not engaged in any economic activity at their destinations. It seems that some migrants who were unemployed and/or underemployed in their home country prior to emigration and were unable to use their skills were

Table 14.3 Percentages of male emigrants from urban Uttar Pradesh by their engagement in economic activity in host country, 2007–2008

<i>Emigrants work status in economic activity</i>	<i>Emigrants (in per cent)</i>
Working in economic activity	94.16
Not working in economic activity	5.33
Not known/ not replied	0.51
Total	100.0

Source: Computations are based on 64th Round, NSS, 2007–2008

engaged in different occupations which suited them as they could make use of some other skills and trainings acquired at their home country after emigration to host country. Only 5.33 per cent of emigrants were unemployed in the host country.

REMITTANCES

Remittances are the most significant consequence of migration and of course most of the migrants move elsewhere so that they can send remittances to sustain and raise the living standards of their left-behind families. Various studies have shown the significance of remittances in the socio-economic development of out-migrating households and also of the area of origin. For instance, Srivastava (2012) has discussed that remittances and savings are very significant for out-migrating households because they help to stabilise or improve the living standards of the left-behind families. Remittances also affect intra- and inter-household relations and thus the pattern of growth and development at the area of origin (Srivastava 2012). Similarly, Samal (2006) has pointed out that remittances are the portion of a migrant worker's earnings sent back from the destination of employment to the origin of the migrant. Furthermore, remittances are a positive outcome of migration to the left-behind family members of out-migrants and these remittances play a pivotal role in the livelihood of many households. In the present time remittances have become a focal point in the ongoing debate concerning the viability and sustainability of livelihood options for people living in the underdeveloped regions (Samal 2006). Many families with migrant members benefit from remittances. This money alleviates the worries of many left-behind individuals over repaying loans, if any, meeting the expenses of building a house, paying school fees or for marriage and ceremonies and purchasing agricultural inputs and other household items. It also enables people to purchase consumer goods that improve the quality of their lives. Even though the significance of remittances is crucial to the livelihood of people in rural areas, this money is obtained through the long-term loss of key members from the family and community (Murphy 2005).

As stated earlier, presently India is the largest recipient of international remittances in the world. In 1991, the total amount of international remittances received by India was only about US\$3 billion which increased to US\$14 billion in 2001, US\$69 billion in 2012 and with US\$72.2 billion in 2014, India was the largest recipient of remittances in the world

(World Bank 2016). Interestingly, during the last few years India has maintained its first position among the remittances-receiving countries in the world. These remittances play a remarkable role in the social and economic development of the out-migrating households in particular and out-migrating areas in general. Therefore, emigration should be recognised as an important component of development in the areas of origin and thus, various issues associated with the process of emigration and emigrants' rights at the destination countries should be positively addressed.

Remittance Inflow in Uttar Pradesh

As discussed above, in order to earn a livelihood and send remittances to the left-behind families, most of the emigrants try to engage in economic activity at the areas of their destinations. Many urban male emigrants from Uttar Pradesh who were engaged in economic activity at their destinations sent remittances to their households at origin. As per 64th round NSS, 2007–2008, about 90 per cent of the emigrants from Uttar Pradesh sent remittances to their homes during the last year preceding the survey. The amount of remittances sent by emigrants mainly depends upon education and/or skills acquired; they may also be affected by factors like whether employed in formal or informal sector of economy; whether daily wage earner or a permanent employee. As mentioned earlier, Uttar Pradesh has emerged as the largest supplier of workers within and across the country. Based on the data of 64th round, NSS, 2007–2008, the amount of remittances sent by emigrants to their home during the last one year preceding the survey has been presented in Table 14.4. It is evident that 3.62 per cent of the emigrants sent less than Rs 10,000, and 7.32 per cent of the emigrants remitted between Rs 10,000 and 19,999 during the last one year preceding the survey. Thus, about one-tenth of the total emigrants remitted less than Rs 20,000. Nearly 65 per cent of the emigrants sent an amount ranging between Rs 20,000 and 49,999 during the last year preceding the survey. Amount of remittance sent by about one-fourth of the total emigrants was more than Rs 50,000. Studies have shown that the amount of remittances sent by emigrants is usually higher than the amount of remittances sent by internal migrants. This may be attributed to the fact that emigrants were able to earn more money due to higher wages in various countries they were working in. However, it should be taken into account that the cost of emigration to other countries is much higher than migrating within country, therefore a lower proportion of the migrants decide to migrate to other countries.

Table 14.4 Amount of remittances (during last one year preceding the survey) sent by emigrants to their households in Uttar Pradesh, 2007–2008

<i>Amount of remittances (Rs)</i>	<i>Emigrants (in per cent)</i>
Less than 10,000	3.62
10,000–19,999	7.32
20,000–29,999	17.43
30,000–39,999	11.13
40,000–49,999	36.45
50,000–74,999	14.53
75,000–99,999	4.09
1 lakh and above	5.43
Total	100

Source: Computations are based on 64th Round, NSS, 2007–2008

Remittance Inflow in Urban Bijnor District

The amount of remittances sent by out-migrants during the last one year varied considerably. The amount of remittances sent by the out-migrants to their homes depends on a variety of factors, the most important being their occupation which in turn depends on their skills, education and other such factors. However, collecting the information on the amount of remittances is found difficult, and in many cases respondents may not reveal the exact amount of remittances received in the households. Therefore, chances of under-reporting of remittances are possible. However, all migrants do not send remittances, and the amount of remittances sent by migrants is determined by many factors. In case of emigration from towns of Bijnor district about 76 per cent of the total emigrants have sent remittances to their families during the last one year preceding the survey, while only 24 per cent of the emigrants could not send any remittances. In most of the cases, emigrants who did not send remittances included recently emigrated males from the selected towns of Bijnor district. However, sometimes emigrants with longer duration of stay also could not send remittances due to various reasons including delay in receiving the salaries from their employer or trying to save money at destinations. It may be seen from Table 14.5 that about 8 per cent of the emigrants from Bijnor district sent less than Rs 25,000 during the last year preceding the survey while about 18 per cent remitted between Rs 25,001 and 50,000. About one-fifth of the total emigrants remitted between Rs 50,001 and 75,000 and one-third of the total emigrants sent an amount between Rs 75,001 and 100,000, while about one-fifth of the total emigrants sent more than one lakh during the last one year preceding the survey.

Table 14.5 Amount of remittances (during last one year preceding the survey) sent by emigrants to their households in Bijnor districts, 2011

<i>Remittances in rupees</i>	<i>Emigrants (in per cent)</i>
Below 25,000	7.69
25,001–50,000	17.95
50,001–75,000	20.51
75,001–100,000	33.33
More than 1 lakh	20.51
Total	100

Source: Computations are based on the primary data collected in field survey conducted from February to May 2011

Frequency of Sending Remittances

Frequency of sending remittances varies widely depending upon the family needs and the income of the migrants and their families at origin. Likewise, the amount and use of remittances differ from family to family. If the migrants' families at the origin do not have any other source of income, they regularly demand money for various purposes and try to manage the family with whatever is sent to them. Emigrants send remittances to their families through various channels. According to Collier et al. (2011) the decision to remit, the amount and the frequency to send remittances depend on a combination of different migrant characteristics as well as the duration and form of migration, occupation, salary and socioeconomic conditions at home. As evident from Table 14.6, very low proportion (5.13 per cent) of the emigrants sent remittances monthly. They were mostly the emigrants whose left-behind families at origin had very limited income or no income and no other source of income. Thus, the only major source of money for the left-behind families was the remittances sent by emigrants from their income only. Around 59 per cent of the emigrants sent remittances at the interval of 2–3 months, about 28.21 per cent sent at an interval of 4–6 months while only 7.69 per cent emigrants remitted at a frequency of more than 6 months.

AMOUNT OF MONEY USED FOR EMIGRATION

Arrangement of money required for emigration is a very difficult task because a huge amount of money is required in the process of emigration. The amount of money used for emigration varied widely depending upon the type of visa, type of company (employer), middlemen or agents involved

Table 14.6 Frequency of sending remittances by emigrants to their homes in Bijnor district, 2011

<i>Frequency of sending remittances</i>	<i>Emigrants (in per cent)</i>
Monthly	5.13
2–3 months	58.97
4–6 months	28.21
More than 6 months	7.69
Total	100

Source: Computations are based on the primary data collected in the field survey conducted from February to May 2011




Fig. 14.2 Amount of money used for emigration from urban Bijnor district, 2011. (Source: Computations are based on primary data collected in the field survey conducted from February to May 2011)

who facilitate the emigration process and so on. This money is arranged through various sources and it is rarely that the personal savings are sufficient for bearing various expenses of the emigration. Figure 14.2 illustrates that 8.70 per cent of the total emigrants spent up to Rs 50,000 for emigration, while nearly 24 per cent of the emigrants spent between Rs 50,001 and 75,000 and nearly one-third of them spent between Rs 75,001 and 100,000. However, nearly 24 per cent of the emigrants had to shell out between Rs 100,001 and Rs 125,000. On the other hand nearly one-tenth of the total emigrating households spent Rs 125,000 and more on migration process. Sometimes one has to pay a high cost due to unscrupulous agent and/or bribing a middleman to get better job in the host country.

Below are presented two case studies bringing out both the bright and dark aspects of emigration. However, both the case studies suggest that for unemployed persons with poor economic background, emigration from their native place to a foreign destination may generally prove to be a favourable move for making their economic conditions better. Nevertheless, with every emigration one may have to pay social cost; the cost is to be paid by either the emigrant or his family member(s).

Case Study No. 1

Azhar, 37 (name changed), who once migrated to Delhi in search of economic betterment, narrated his success story. He was originally from a poor agrarian family and earlier worked as an agricultural labourer in others' fields. When he was about 20 years old, his father died due to a massive cardiac arrest and he had to take the responsibility of his family. One of his sisters was disabled and could not walk due to paralysis and his mother remained ill most of the time. Therefore, he needed money for the treatment of sister and mother. Whatever he and his brothers used to earn would be spent within a week; it was difficult for the family to make both ends meet at the end of the day. Therefore, he had decided to move out from his small native town where job opportunities were limited and he reached Delhi with the help of another friend who was working there. Initially he struggled a lot in Delhi because he did not possess any skills. He started working as a rickshaw puller. Usually he hired a cycle rickshaw from a contractor and plied it in North Delhi. Within few months he found a job in a storage hall and earned about Rs 5000 per month, which not only allowed him to send good remittances to his family but also encouraged his two younger brothers to join in rickshaw pulling. Three of them together saved enough money within two years and he sent one of his brothers to Saudi Arabia for work and later another brother also emigrated to the same country. *Azhar* returned home from Delhi to look after his family. His brothers were earning good money in Saudi Arabia and thus their financial crisis was over. Now they have reconstructed their home from a Kutcha house of mud and grasses to a Pucca house and got their sister married. *Azhar* also got married within a few months at the age of 37. He thanked the Almighty for encouraging him to go to Delhi or else those hard days would not have been over.

Case Study No. 2

A middle-aged woman, above 50 years, called herself *Nasreen* (name changed). She was a widow with seven children and narrated her experiences of economic hardship she faced after her husband's death. She was born and brought up in a poor agrarian family and got married to *Shakir* (name changed) at the age of 18. Though her husband earned very little, but they had a happy married life. Unfortunately, her husband died in his mid-40s, leaving the responsibility of seven young children (four sons and three daughters) upon their mother. The mother had to struggle a lot in raising seven children and could not send them to school. Her sons started working as agricultural labourers just after the death of their father. Her fourth son worked as a welder. The income of the four brothers was not sufficient for sustaining such a big family. Therefore, her son (welder) borrowed money from relatives and also took some loan from a moneylender to emigrate to Saudi Arabia. Later his other brothers followed him. Thus, all four sons emigrated to Saudi Arabia where all the four started earning good money. She got one of her sons and a daughter married. Currently, *Nasreen* is living with her two daughters, one daughter in-law and three grandchildren. She had fixed her second daughter's wedding too. But, due to the absence of any male member in the household she felt a great burden on her shoulder since she had to arrange everything for the wedding. Also, she felt insecure managing everything alone. She had to depend on other relatives for many things and missed her sons a lot.

ARRANGEMENT OF MONEY USED FOR EMIGRATION

The process of emigration is relatively complex and difficult as compared to out-migration within the country because the former requires higher economic and social costs in comparison to the latter. As stated earlier, emigration from the study area is mostly directed towards the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. The poorest of the poor rarely emigrate because emigration requires enough money for air fare, visa, interview, medical check-up, taxi fare from home to airport and so on. Besides, before leaving the country, a small function is held in which close relatives are invited, which also requires considerable amount of money. Thus, a

large amount of money is required for emigration which persons belonging to poor economic background cannot afford to manage from their personal savings. Therefore, majority of the persons desirous to emigrate have to arrange money by either selling or mortgaging their immovable assets like house and/or land in order to initiate the process of emigration to a foreign country. Other possible sources of lending money include: relatives, friends or money lender. Among all these sources the latter source charges heavy interest.

Figure 14.3 illustrates that a majority of the emigrants, that is, 39.13 per cent borrowed money from their relatives or friends. Since it is difficult to arrange large amounts of money required for emigration, a large proportion of these households borrowed money from relatives or friends. Slightly well-off people may use the money from their personal savings. However, first they try to save the money for a long time and then they use it for meeting the emigration expenses. A little over one-fifth of the total emigrants used personal money for emigration. Around 15 per cent of the families of emigrants took loans from the banks, and 4.35 per cent of the emigrating households sold or gave their land on lease, while another 4.35 per cent took loan from moneylenders. About 15 per cent of the emigrating families reported that other sources of money have been used for meeting emigration expenses.




Fig. 14.3 Arrangement of money used for emigration from urban Bijnor district, 2011. (Source: Computations are based on the primary data collected in the field survey conducted from February to May 2011)

FRAUD BY AGENTS/MIDDLEMEN

In spite of spending a large amount of money, many emigrants are deceived by travel agents and middlemen who promise to arrange visa, ticket, medical check-up, interview and so on. In many cases these travel agents and middlemen charge some hefty amount and disappear. Many such cases are frequently reported in the news while many more may not come to the knowledge of media and police and thus remain unreported. Of late, *The Indian Express* dated 11 May 2017, reported that about 20 nurses seeking to migrate outside the country were duped of lakhs of rupees on the promise of being given lucrative jobs in Brunei. Each nurse was charged Rs 2.5 lakhs for the promised jobs in Brunei. The nurses were asked to pay Rs 5000 each for the tests. Four of the nurses were sent to Brunei. However, on reaching Brunei they were informed by the hospital that there was no vacancy. The nurses tried to contact the placement agents, but their phones were switched off. Likewise, *The Times of India* on 10 March 2015, reported that in Uttar Pradesh 24 people were duped by their travel agent who had promised jobs in Gulf countries. The travel agent who took their passports and other documents asked these job seekers to reach the airport while the travel agent himself did not arrive at the airport. Similarly, *The Hindu* on 18 September 2009, reported that a group of 29 people comprising of 20 people from Kerala and 9 from Tamil Nadu were promised drivers' job but on reaching Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, they were offered some odd jobs in the desert. Therefore, they had to return to their homes. There are several other instances where jobseekers were deceived by their travel agents and middlemen. Not only this, sometimes even after working for months at the destination without signing the contract, emigrants were not paid salaries by their employers and they had to return to their home country.

Figure 14.4 demonstrates that though 82 per cent of the emigrants were not deceived by the agents or by middlemen, about 18 per cent of the emigrating households were deceived or exploited by the middlemen and travel agencies/agents and sometimes by the employers in the destination countries. These middlemen and agents charged much more than the actual cost of visa, tickets, medical, check-ups and so on. During the discussion with members of emigrating households it has been found that these middlemen and agents called the jobseekers for




Fig. 14.4 Emigrants from urban Bijnor district received/not received by agents/middlemen, 2011. (Source: Computations are based on the primary data collected in the field survey conducted from February to May 2011)

interview many times and for each interview they charged about Rs 1000–2000. Even for three to four vacancies they call hundreds of job-seekers and charge Rs 1000–2000 from each person who wishes to appear in the interview. Apart from the interview fee, they also charge a high amount of fees for medical check-ups. For each medical check-up middlemen and agents charge Rs 3000–4000. Again, each of these medical check-ups is valid for three months only. Some of the emigrants were called three times for medical check-ups and interviews. Many emigrants were deceived by these agents and middlemen in different ways as evident from Fig. 14.4. About 9 per cent of the emigrating households reported that their emigrant member did not get the exact salary as was promised before emigration. Again, 7 per cent of the emigrant's family members reported that the emigrant from their household was not given the promised work and remaining 2 per cent mentioned that the emigrant was not employed with the employer that was promised before emigration. It is suggested that such issues should be properly addressed by the government so that the jobseekers may not be cheated by these travel agents and should not be exploited by their employers at the destination countries. Besides, the minimum wages for emigrants should be fixed.

CONCLUSION

Uttar Pradesh, being the most populous state and one of the densely populated, poor and underdeveloped states of India, has emerged as the largest supplier of cheap labour to the Gulf countries. Most of these emigrants required emigration check because they were poorly educated or illiterate and worked as unskilled or semi-skilled labourer in the Gulf countries. However, the positive aspect of emigration is that a very large proportion of the emigrants, being motivated by economic reasons, were found to be engaged in economic activity in their destination countries. If they had not emigrated, they might have remained unemployed or underemployed at their origin for a long time. Thus, after being employed at their destinations, a very large proportion of the emigrants sent remittances to their left-behind families at the origin.

Emigration of male population from urban Bijnor district has been primarily stimulated by economic motives due to lack of employment opportunities in the urban areas of the district. In other words, emigration of the male population was mainly motivated by push factors operating at household and the town level in Bijnor district. Most of the emigration was directed towards Saudi Arabia. The study has revealed that a significant percentage of emigrants were deceived by the travel agents and the middlemen who arranged or facilitated emigration. They charged exorbitantly compared to the real cost for visa, air tickets, medical check-ups, interviews and so on. Lastly, it was also observed that many emigrants were misinformed and they did not receive the promised jobs, salaries or the work environment at their destinations. Therefore, there is urgent need to address these issues by the governments of both the countries—country of origin and the country of destination.

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Indian Women as Nurses and Domestic Workers in the Middle East: A Feminist Perspective

Nilanjana Ray

INTRODUCTION

Migration is a gendered process. Who goes, why, and where, the experience in the destination country, and impact on family relations are all embedded in social norms and gender relations. Economic theories of migration pointing to structuralist forces have identified wage differentials across geographic regions, core and periphery relationship of former colonizers with their former colonies and the dual nature of valued and devalued work of the receiving economy as the causes of population mobility across borders (Harris and Todaro 1970; Wallerstein 1974; Piore 1979). Another group of functionalist theories believe that micro processes interacting with the individual, the family and the community are initiators of migration. They believe that migration is a rational choice made by an individual to maximize profits or gains (Todaro 1969). Some shift the focus from individual agency to family interdependence and term migration as a family risk-diversion strategy (Stark 1991). Other theorists postulate that migration occurs out of a

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community following the networks created by the diaspora (Massey 1990). All these theories are gender neutral. They assume that the same forces propel men and women and shape their experiences in a similar manner.

This assumption is challenged by feminist migration research that postulates that gender is a system of power relations that permeates all social and economic institutions. Therefore, men and women move under different compulsions, in the context of differential opportunities and experience dissimilar constraints upon their agency. Here, I present the feminist lens of migration research by applying it to two streams of women's migration from the state of Kerala to the Gulf region, namely the mobility of nurses and domestic workers.

The next section describes the essence of the feminist lens and the aspects of women's migration that have been explored. The subsequent section deconstructs the narratives of Indian nurse migration that is extant in the literature. Similarly, the section thereafter deconstructs the narratives of domestic worker migration from extant literature. It is followed by a comparison of the two narratives, and finally are suggested potential areas for future research.

THE FEMINIST LENS OF MIGRATION RESEARCH

Gender analysis of migration focuses on gendered systems of inequality in households, labour markets and cultures that influence women's migration (Morokvasic 1984) and presents how gender relations impact as well as are impacted by migration. Firstly, feminist theorizing explains why some women migrate while others do not by connecting normative gender expectations to macro structural forces and individual agency. At the very outset, opportunities and constraints for men and women in their home country are gendered and dissimilar. Girls' education is given low priority when scarce resources have to be allocated among children, making women educationally disadvantaged than men when entering the labour force. Commensurate with the differential qualifications, women are segregated at the lower end of the informal economy. Limited employment opportunities and meagre salaries work as powerful push factors for women to migrate (Gamburd 2008; Afsar 2011).

Structural elements such as state policies and labour market preferences combine with cultural norms to shape women's migration (Oishi 2005). Domestic service and care work are the two sectors where employer preference demands female migrant workers as "natural caregivers". This gendered

demand matches the social norms about women's nurturing role and, hence, lowers the barriers for their migration. At the same time the construction of reproductive labour as "women's work" leads to its devaluation (Silvey 2004). Studies have also shown how state-employer cooperation increases the magnitude of certain labour flows. Feminist scholars are of the opinion that it is the employer preference and the institutional support provided by both sending and receiving countries that determines the prevalence of migrant women in particular occupations and destinations (George 2005).

Gender norms determine the kinds of social networks that women can access. In societies where women are under patriarchal surveillance, they have access to only female networks and mostly kin networks (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003; Curran et al. 2005).

The feminist lens is also directed towards the period after migration, examining the gendered process of integration and adaptation into host society, the transformation of gender relations within the family, the meaning and form of transnational motherhood, and social mobility in the community of origin. Host states often impose control over low-skilled migrant workers, who are denied rights, citizenship and opportunities for long-term settlement, especially targeting women joining the most devalued sectors of work (Truong and Gasper 2008).

A very significant contribution that the feminist migration scholars have made is in the study of gender relations within migrant households. Transformation in gender relations could be in the form of reversal of breadwinner and caregiver roles of men and women, more egalitarian division of household work and parenting, or voice for women in decision making in family and financial matters (Grzywacz et al. 2009). However, role reversal can be bitterly resisted by partners of migrant women as the notion of masculinity is linked to the breadwinner role. Challenged in their status of the provider and head of the household, men have been known to resort to hyper masculinity in the form of violence or alcoholism (Grzywacz et al. 2009; Gamburd 2000). However, there are also studies of changing definitions of masculinity to encompass co-breadwinner and co-nurturer roles (Hoang and Yeoh 2011).

Some emigrant women need to leave children behind in their home countries. A transnational motherhood puts strain on mothers' relationships with children as well induces feelings of guilt (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avilla 1997; Parrenas 2005; Rajan 2013). The state and media often castigate migrant mothers for abandoning their nurturing role in favour

of earning money. However, the women and their families redefine motherhood as the ability to provide food, shelter and education rather than being physically present (Gamburd 2008).

Economists have often berated female migrants for spending their remittance on daily consumption and conspicuous consumption instead of investing them in productive assets. Feminist migration scholars, however, defend the women by arguing that since women migrants often come from a lower socioeconomic scale than men, it makes logical sense to them to spend on daily consumption needs, which would not be met otherwise. Conspicuous consumption, helping extended kin and neighbours and spending on community projects build valuable social ties that can be a support for the family left behind by ensuring attention and care by community members (Suksomboon 2008).

Thus, the feminist lens of viewing women's migration offers a very holistic perspective of the lived experience of being a migrant.

DECONSTRUCTING THE NARRATIVES OF MIGRANT NURSES

The narratives of nurse migration fit neatly into the feminist theoretical framework. The structural factors that create the context of migration are very clear. To begin with is the structural discrimination against the profession in India. The intersection of neglectful state policies and lack of regulation of the booming private healthcare industry has pushed these low-paid, low-status professionals against the wall. The quality of their training is brought into question by the management of private hospitals to justify low salaries. Appointments and dismissals are unregulated by the state (Nair et al. 2016; Walton-Roberts et al. 2017; Nair and Rajan 2017). The result is that although nursing training can cost a student one to five lakh rupees, their salaries in India are merely Rs 7500 per month for degree holders and Rs 6500 per month for diploma holders (Walton-Roberts and Rajan 2013). The very same nurses can get up to Rs 40,000 per month upon migration to the Gulf countries (Gill 2011). Therefore, the structural discrimination in the home country literally pushes out nurses into the route of migration to be able to repay the debt incurred for their education.

In contrast to the bleak domestic scenario, the demand in the Gulf countries created a channel of mobility. The petrol boom in the 1970s led to the development of the healthcare infrastructure. Here was created an ideal alternative—the recruitment process was simple and the expenditure

on travel documents and tickets, too, were within payable limits (Gill 2011). Gender preference of the Gulf employers followed the global cultural preference of women for care work (Percot 2006a; Rajan and Percot 2011). The result was that a specifically feminized flow of migration directed towards the Gulf countries was created. It was the complementarity of state discrimination at home and a gendered demand in a specific regional labour market that crafted this migratory route.

As remittances flowed in, the Government of India viewed this as a positive opportunity in the career of Indian nurses. The National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2005) noted that it would be advantageous for India to increase the number of nursing schools and colleges, and to ensure that the curriculum and training attains international standards (Gill 2011). The Indian government pursued the policy of upgrading nursing schools to nursing colleges and the nurse training sector was opened to both private and foreign investment. The result is a proliferation of private colleges able to train a larger number of nurses with migration aspirations. Thus, the state, in collaboration with the private sector, facilitated greater flow into this migratory route.

Once this conducive environment was created, let us understand who moved. Ninety per cent of the nurses working in the Gulf countries are Christian women from Kerala (Percot 2006a). The predominance of Christian women in the nursing profession has been shaped by cultural norms. The notion of the “Good Samaritan” in Christianity makes nursing a noble profession. Moreover, as missionaries were the introducers of modern medicine in India, they made the profession acceptable to the community. They certainly gave preference to recruiting women of their own faith (Nair and Percot 2007). While these cultural factors attracted Christian women, the cultural concepts of “purity and pollution” among high-caste Hindus excluded them. Handling polluting bodily fluids and taking care of non-kin males was rejected by the Hindu community. Among the Muslim community, the very notion of women working among non-kin males was anathema. Therefore, Christian women were overrepresented in this profession (Abraham 2004). Hence, we witness the interaction of macro structural forces with cultural norms to create inclusionary and exclusionary criteria at the community level.

Within the culturally shortlisted community, strategy of the families and agency of the young women come into play. Nurses working in Gulf from Kerala hail from rural, lower middle-class families owning less than five acres of agricultural land. Fathers may supplement this income with

small businesses or petty jobs while mothers are mostly housewives (Nair and Percot 2007). In the 1970s, when the Gulf countries first began recruiting Indian nurses, migration seemed to be a “good opportunity” that unexpectedly came in the way for the existing cadre of nurses. However, a new generation of migrants in the last ten years has consciously chosen this profession for its opportunities for migration and builds an elaborate livelihood strategy with their families around mobility (Percot 2006a). Witnessing the high returns to migration, training a daughter to become a nurse has become a family strategy. The family’s expectation is that the remittance by the daughter would bring about an improved standard of living as well as help attain the dream of climbing the social ladder. The possibility of negotiating a reduced amount of dowry or attract a higher-class groom (who is looking for a facilitated migration) makes it a family project.

The agency of the individual herself is more evident among the younger generation of nurses who articulate non-economic reasons. One reason that these women cite is to escape patriarchal surveillance by family, kin and neighbours. Nursing is the only profession that guarantees migration and, hence, its attraction for these young women. The second reason is the desire to see the world and experience new cultures. Visas are expensive and difficult to get. These barriers do not hinder nurse mobility (Percot 2006a; Percot and Rajan 2007). Thus, as postulated by feminist scholars, the interaction between macro structural forces that constrain or provide opportunities in the home country, labour market preferences, family livelihood strategies and individual desires finally determine who moves.

Social networks are the conduit for information. The nursing diaspora sends back information on salaries, conditions of life and so on so that the new migrants are well aware of what to expect (Percot 2006b). This is a very close-knit all-female social network of aunts, cousins and their friends. The nurse aspirants from other communities feel that these networks exclude them and give an unfair advantage to Christian women (Walton-Roberts 2010).

Moving on to what happens after migration, the Gulf countries offer no channels for “settlement”. The contracts are of one- or two-years’ duration. A nurse might work there for decades, but always on a short-term contract that keeps her status “precarious” in the host country. There is no question of gaining citizenship, she is not allowed to own a house and is unable to procure visas for adult children (Nair and Percot 2007). They

never feel “at home” despite living there for decades (Percot 2006a). As feminist scholars have said, the host country, through its immigration laws, prefers to create a floating labour force with no rights.

Opportunity or strategy, the nurses feel liberated by the migration experience. They are not under social pressure to do things they do not want to do, can spend time with their husbands, can dress in a modern way, can have a social life beyond relatives, and enjoy living in a cosmopolitan city (Nair and Percot 2007).

Remittance and gift giving are directed towards the families. While unmarried women remit to their parents in preparation for dowry, the married women have to maintain the ties through remittances and gift giving to ensure care for their left-behind children by the family or for care of the elderly by extended kin (Percot 2006a).

Transnational motherhood is forced upon some and is a choice made by others. Married nurses who stay alone cannot possibly keep their children with them. Their heart breaks when they leave behind newborns or when they see that their children are more attached to the actual caregiver than to them (Percot 2006a). Even if the nurses and their spouses are living in the Gulf, the practical difficulties such as lack of day care facilities, high rents of private apartments and high cost of education make transnational motherhood the only viable option. Indian nurses, too, have changed the definition of motherhood from physical caregiving to being a provider. Being “part time” mothers is considered to be preferable to not harbouring any ambitions for the future of children.

Finally, what is the impact of nurse migration on gender relations? The migrant nurses, do indeed, feel empowered while living abroad. They mention having access to bank accounts with their spouses and a voice in money management (Percot 2006). Moreover, most women remitted money to their parents as well, a break with tradition that implies more power for the women within their households (Percot and Rajan 2007). They are quite conscious of the significance of their economic contribution to the family and that they had opened the migratory route for their spouses (Percot 2006a). However, the impact on gender relations in the home community is not apparent. Firstly, their migration perpetuates rather than challenges the patriarchal norm of dowry. Instead of getting dowry discount, they were expected to pay more due to their better financial position (Walton-Roberts and Rajan 2013). Secondly, the husbands appeared to be “touchy” about the spouses earning more. This sensitivity was reflected in the fact that many of them referred to their wives’ salaries

as “savings” and their own as the means of supporting the family (Nair and Percot 2007). Thirdly, researchers have not come across any husband taking care of the children on his own, as left-behind wives tend to do. It was always the responsibility of female kin (Percot 2006a). Finally, even though they listened to their wives’ opinions while living abroad, the investments back home were made by the men (Percot 2006a). Thus, as feminist scholars would say, greater empowerment within the couple relationship might not translate into change in gender relations when under the surveillance of the community.

DECONSTRUCTING THE NARRATIVES OF MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS

The domestic workers who go to the Gulf weigh their options against the wages available to them in India that range between Rs 100 and Rs 200 per day, a monthly salary of maximum Rs 6000 per month. In contrast, 50 per cent of the housemaids in the Gulf earn Rs 12,000 to Rs 15,000 per month. The highest salary is around Rs 20,000 (Rajan et al. 2015). Trapped at the bottom of the economy at home and being unable to earn a liveable wage, migration is adopted as a way to ensure survival. Therefore, the migration of domestic workers is more akin to distress migration. Here again, the state’s neglect in protecting this marginalized section is the structural push for mobility.

The demand for domestic workers in the Gulf, too, can be traced to the oil boom of the 1970s. The wave of migration was in response to the demand from the new middle class that was employing workers as a symbol of social status (Kodoth 2015a, b). Local domestic workers demand higher salaries and, hence, the ever-increasing demand for Indian women. Thus, the employer preference for low-waged maids, supported by the labour import policy has again created a new profession-specific migratory route to a particular region.

Negotiating this structural context of distress and opportunity, this feminized migratory route is traversed by the most marginalized in Kerala’s society—women from the coastal fishing communities, urban slums, high-land villages and even the remote tribal areas. The majority of the migrants are those who have displayed individual agency to move out of a destitute situation. They have selected the option of mobility after the complete breakdown of marital provisioning (Kodoth 2015a, b). This situation hap-

pens when the husband dies, abandons his wife, fritters away his income in alcohol, is old or an invalid and so on, resulting in being an incompetent provider. Many a time, if the wife wishes to work locally, the husband is suspicious of her fidelity and makes it difficult for her to sustain a job. Therefore, going away out of the sphere of his influence is the only way to earn and put food on the table.

Agency to move by unmarried women is rarer and much more difficult. Although the helplessness of their life stories evokes sympathy in the community, taking this step is the informed decision that they would pay the cost of having to forego a conventional marriage. However, in the absence of a mother in the family who could have been the mover, the elder daughter takes on this responsibility again in the context of absence of a male provider (Kodoth 2015a, b). Both these groups of women display desperate agency within highly constrained contexts.

The middle ground is trod cautiously by some women who earn to supplement the inadequate income of their spouses. This strategy has been termed as “deferred provisioning” (Kodoth 2015a, b) as currently the women earn more but after certain financial goals are reached, the husband is expected to return to the role of the primary provider. The narratives of this group follow the family strategy route—specific needs that cannot be met with local income make the family plan a temporary migration. Other circumstances such as the husband’s inability to get a visa or the prohibitive cost of visas for male workers makes the migration of the wife the rational choice exercised by the family.

However, unlike the policy indulgence towards nurse migration, the domestic workers have to navigate a very prejudiced set of policy barriers and demeaning working conditions that heighten their vulnerability. The Government of India’s protective policy for migrant domestic workers (MDWs) is framed within a gendered and class-based nationalism that considers the migration of Indian women as domestic workers as degrading (Kodoth 2015a, b). The moral outrage over the stories of exploitation and abuse forms the justification for the restrictive procedures. These women mostly fall within the category of Emigration Check Required (ECR) “less-skilled” workers, whose education level is less than matriculation. They have to gain clearance from the office of Protector of Emigrants by presenting a direct contract with the employer attested by the Indian embassy at the destination, payment of a substantial security deposit by the prospective employer and specifying a minimum wage. In view of the fact that the employer preference is for low-wage workers, very few would supply this

deposit or guarantee minimum wage. Obviously, these procedures are a way to discourage migration. Moreover, young women below the age of 30 are not to be allowed to migrate to “protect them from abuse”. The class-based prejudice is reflected in the attitude that these mostly non-literate women lack awareness because of which the state has to step in to prevent their mobility. Curtailing women’s mobility merely channels them into undocumented flows that render them vulnerable to trafficking (Varghese and Rajan 2011; Rajan and Joseph 2013, 2015). Thus, the valuation of the work determines the level of policy support. As Silvey (2004) has said, devalued work is denied both state as well as “public” support.

Social networks become critical for these women to find a route to the Gulf. Relatives and acquaintances working there encourage the women to migrate and help in bringing down the resistance of the families by allaying fears of abuse (Kodoth 2015a, b). They might even be intermediaries for procuring a visa. The fishing communities of the coastal regions, who were the first senders of migrant women, have now developed a self-perpetuating chain migration, with almost every household sending a migrant through contacts with kin (Kodoth and Varghese 2012).

Host nations have a harsh control regime for unskilled workers. Domestic workers are employed under the *Kafala* system, whereby the worker is tied to a particular employer. She can stay legally in the host country as long as she is working for that employer only. Becoming a runaway renders her illegal (Kodoth and Varghese 2012). The destination countries, therefore, forge legal frameworks to track the migrant workers at every step. The virtual captivity of the MDW gives the employer the opportunity to impose slavery like work condition and even perpetuate physical and sexual abuse, secure in the knowledge that she cannot change jobs. Culpable employers are rarely punished and they, in retaliation, slap charges of theft on the runaway women. Instead of redressal from abuse, the laws declare her an absconder, liable for imprisonment (Kanchana and Rajan 2014). Thus, we see the operation of the unequal treatment of skilled and unskilled workers in the immigration and labour regimes in the destination countries (Truong and Gasper 2008).

These women are also trapped in a strong culture of masculinity that demands subservience to conjugal authority. If a provisioning male is present, then a woman’s migration is not tolerated. She has to demonstrate to the community her helplessness and destitution caused by the complete breakdown of marital provisioning to gain approval for mobility. If she needs to supplement the income of her husband due to specific needs, she

has to frame the justification for migration as a decision taken by him and needs to emphasize the short duration of the move. The MDWs are careful to demonstrate their adherence to patriarchy by providing dowry for their daughters and remaining in abusive marriages (Kodoth 2015a, b). Thus, migration might not bring about any change in gender relations despite mobility and economic independence.

COMPARING THE TWO MIGRATION STREAMS

The nurse migration flow is now on an upward trajectory of valuation. Earlier, the migratory route met a dead end in the Gulf region. Now the Gulf is just a transitory phase to reach the USA, Europe, Canada and Australia. The migration trajectory has been directed to a more valued destination and, therefore, this profession has gained value as well. In contrast, the domestic workers are an unskilled group whose lack of skills stigmatizes them. Moreover, they move into a job that is considered menial in both sending and receiving societies. This migration route is known to be an exploitative one, including sexual exploitation, and, hence, those women who choose this form of migration are considered desperate and not skilled. Further, this profession is at a dead end in the Gulf country and there is no extension of the route to the West. Therefore, the valuation of this migration stagnates at the bottom rung of the ladder.

Although the demand for both nurses and domestic workers is high in the Gulf countries, the private sector in India sees only the former as worth investing in. The value addition in training is reflected in higher chances of moving to the West. Hence, private colleges have proliferated and are in high demand despite their high fees. On the other hand, domestic workers do not have any kind of institutional support for value addition. They are hired for their exploitability and not skill set.

The government, too, is operating under the paradigm of “pride” and “shame”. It is considered a matter of pride that nursing training in India is on par with international standards. Therefore, the government encourages the export of this kind of labour flow with pride. On the other hand, the movement of women to work as domestic workers in other countries is considered to hurt the national pride. Therefore, policies try to discourage this migration to the extent possible.

Migration is a high-risk venture for the domestic workers who, without qualifications and state support, are at the mercy of fraudulent practices by exploitative agents. On the other hand, migration is an ordinary career

path for the more privileged nurses. Nurses are not cheated often—there are only a few cases of not getting the salary promised due to the deduction of commission by middlemen. They do not have to face situations of false visas, false contracts, denial of payment for months, being placed in jobs or locations other than the ones being promised—contexts that are quite common in the experiences of domestic workers. Therefore, nurse migration is much more secure than domestic worker migration.

Finally, there seems to be a vast difference in the financial returns accruing from the two migratory routes. Nurses accumulate lifelong savings, send children for expensive professional education, build assets back home, invest capital in businesses, and live a middle-class diasporic life. These imply a high level of financial gain. On the other hand, the remittances of domestic workers go into daily consumption needs, marriage expenses and perhaps building a house. A single daughter's marriage is said to wipe away several years of savings. A woman may have been a migrant for several years and yet be unable to build a house. Return migrants have been known to try to sell their house due to shortfall of savings (Kodoth and Varghese 2012). Thus, their earnings appear to be able to tide over specific needs, but a lifelong asset base seems unattainable.

FURTHER RESEARCH

An underexplored domain of research is the gender relations among couples who live together in the Gulf. Although the man has to be an independent migrant for this living arrangement to come about, yet the woman was the first migrant and, in many cases, it is her employer who provided the loan for the husband to set up a business in the Gulf country. Given this reversal of power dynamics, is there any change in gender relations? Moreover, if the wife is working in a very demanding profession, is there a shift towards a more egalitarian sharing of domestic chores and parenting?

Transnational motherhood has not been explored either among the Gulf migration stream women. Many nurses and all domestic workers leave behind children. What is their relationship with their children? How do they interpret being a good mother? Who are the primary caregivers back home? What is the role of the father in parenting?

Nurse migration to the Gulf has become a “Culture of Migration” among women of the Christian community in Kerala. The stock of community knowledge is transmitted through social networks. It would be interesting to explore how the recent nurse migrants from other communities

gain information and access to this migration stream. In view of the close-knit nature of social networks, can the community outsiders gain from this repository of knowledge or do they have to begin their journey as pioneers? The lived experience of migrants from new source communities could be another area of research.

The vulnerability of domestic workers and the need for policy protection forms the bulk of the literature on women in this migration stream. While some research has been done on agency before leaving, there is no in-depth study of the lived experience of both live-in as well as runaway domestics. The live-in's daily negotiations for a tolerable working condition as well as to enhance her value in the view of the employer and the runaway's strategies to operate in the illegal domain without institutional support would add depth to the knowledge about these women.

CONCLUSION

The migration of Indian women to the Gulf has been well explored in the past two decades. However, this extensive literature, except in a few cases, gives an objective overview and not a subjective understanding of individual lives and choices. Moreover, the focus has been mostly on the trajectory of mobility as successful or unsuccessful migrants. The consequences of the mobility on persons linked to the migrants and social institutions and norms are underexplored. This stream of research is now mature enough to move beyond the question of "What happened?" to "Then what happened?"

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Emerging Policies in the Gulf and Its Impact on Asia

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Currently, GCC citizens are facing many challenges when it comes to finding suitable jobs while on the other hand, the dependence of foreign labour is increasing significantly. Overcoming this relies mostly on changing the culture of khaleeji citizens and their concept of suitable work that provides decent income (Aqeel Al-Jassim, Executive Bureau General Director, Council of Ministers of Labour and Council of Ministers of Social Affairs in GCC countries)¹

The above statement shows the labour market challenges faced by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the coming years. A low level of labour force participation of the locals has resulted in GCC countries seeking foreign labour source to bridge the gap for labour requirement for their

¹https://www.oxgaps.org/files/gulf_affairs_autumn_2015_full_issue.pdf accessed on 20th January, 2019.

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development efforts. The presence of foreign workers is a common phenomenon in all the GCC countries (Rajan 2018). They are seen in multiple sectors, but are predominant in the field of construction and domestic sectors (Kamrava and Babar 2011; Chowdhury and Rajan 2018). Currently foreign workers from South Asian countries—particularly from India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan—dominate the foreign workforce in these regions, with 59 per cent of GCC countries' foreign workers population originating from South Asia (Rajan 2017a, b). At the same time, the mushrooming migrant population also leads to issues like recruiting and monitoring migrant workers, population turnover and intermarriage (Ghimire et al. 2011) which forces the governments in Asia to take various steps to protect their most vulnerable expatriates (especially female domestic workers), which consequently leads to increased tensions between source and host countries. For instance, when two major countries like Indonesia and the Philippines announced new guidelines to hire their nationals by regulating the emigration of women for domestic work, the Saudi Labour Ministry during 2011 announced a ban to issue work permit to recruit female domestic workers from these countries to Saudi. In the case of India, the government banned emigration of female domestic workers below the age of 30 years, citing a high risk of exploitation (Thiollet 2016; Rajan and Joseph 2018; Varghese and Rajan 2011).

From the destination point of view, time and again, Gulf governments have made attempts to channelise and control the immigration procedures. Essentially, the disruptive role of the *kafala* system led states to initiate reforms against this system in Saudi Arabia throughout the 1990s, 2011 in Bahrain, 2009 and 2011 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that were generally blocked by civil societies and recruitment-based interest group (Thiollet 2015). However, in recent years, due to a fall in oil price and a large share of the population being under the age of 40 years, the six GCC countries' governments are imposing stricter restrictions on expatriate visa by pushing nationalisation agendas (Rajan 2019).²

Given this background, this chapter discusses the “nationalisation” of labour market, one of the major policy shifts happening in the GCC countries. This issue has long-term implications but the major question is that does it affect the flow of foreign workers in general, and unskilled and semi-skilled workers from Asia to GCC countries in particular (Rajan and

² <https://www.ibm.com/blogs/insights-on-business/gbs-strategy/nationalization-programs/> accessed on 2nd January, 2019.

Saxena 2019). Although, while there is an ongoing debate on the economic crisis situation faced by this region, it is also equally essential to examine the emerging labour policies. Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to examine (1) whether measures taken by the GCC countries to nationalise their labour market produced significant results, (2) implication of this policy on Asian workers and (3) the changing scenario in labour-recruiting process (*kafala* system). The first section will analyse whether nationalisation in GCC countries is successful or not. The idea of this section is to extract primary findings from the literature that assessed the enforcement of nationalisation policy in this region. In connection with the first section, the second section looks into the recruiting pattern and recent changes in *kafala* system taken by the Qatar government. Literature published related to *kafala* system is used as a base for argument in this section. The final section (third section) concludes with the major observations discussed in this chapter to show how the demand for foreign workforce will be unaltered by nationalisation and the reforms and challenges in *kafala* system in GCC countries.

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND NATIONALISATION POLICY IN GCC COUNTRIES

To begin with, we briefly discuss the economic diversification taking place in GCC countries to regain their economic stability. In Saudi Arabia, the vision for the future includes increased diversification of its income sources from Neom and Qiddiya to the Red Sea project and more.³ The Qatar Chamber (QC) chairman noted that there are more than 150 major projects in the infrastructure, roads, construction, healthcare and education sectors that are coming up. To realise the Qatar National Vision 2030 goal, a bigger role is expected to be played by private sectors along with the public sectors to build the country's economy.⁴ While falling oil prices since mid-2014 have affected GCC economies, the continuation of mega projects will ensure the UAE will continue to be a leading tourist destination, according to the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry report.⁵

³<http://www.arabnews.com/node/1376311/saudi-arabia> accessed on 2nd January, 2019.

⁴<https://www.gulf-times.com/story/618347/150-major-projects-in-line-for-completion-after-20> accessed on 5th January, 2019.

⁵<http://www.arabnews.com/node/1349056/middle-east> accessed on 8th January, 2019.

Work Bank expects that the GCC countries' economic growth will be gradually strengthened in the medium term to 2.7 per cent by 2020 after facing stagnation in 2017, as high energy prices and rising government spending lift output and sentiment.⁶ With optimism surrounding the Gulf economy, it is also quite important to see the recent trend of Asian workforce in GCC countries.

From Table 16.1, it is visible that Asian workforce is on the rise since 2010, although at a slow pace in the past two years. While Pakistani workforce in Qatar has increased, there is a slight increase in Indian workers going to Qatar. But overall, the workforce in GCC countries from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh has decreased sharply in 2018 as compared with the last 10 years. Notably, in case of Bangladesh, we can see sharp decline in their workforce in Saudi Arabia in 2018 (2,57,317) as compared to 2017 (5,51,308). The sharp decline in Asian workforce is a recent phenomenon. Does it have any connection with the nationalisation policies in GCC countries? Let us discuss in the following paragraphs.

Now all the GCC countries have strong governmental enforcement mechanisms in place to implement nationalisation policies, and it is expected to bring even stronger strategies to enforce nationalisation in the near future as well. However, it is complex and challenging for the GCC countries to effectively implement the nationalisation strategies which are presently underway in this region (Hodgson and Hanson 2014). For instance, Saudi Arabia has the largest foreign workforce in GCC countries and has implemented nationalisation in recent time in the name of Nitaqat (Hussain 2011, 2014). However, the policy measure towards the substitution of foreign workforce did not take place. Instead, more Saudi nationals were employed to satisfy the requirements and more foreign workforces were employed to work in sectors that rely heavily on foreign workforce such as construction sector. The easy availability of cheap and low-skilled labour made this sector unattractive to the Saudis (Alsheikh 2015). Hence, due to high level of manual work, sectors like construction and general services, which absorb more foreign workforce, remain untouched by the Saudi nationals in the past and future as well. One of the primary lessons from two decades of nationalisation policies in GCC countries showed that micro-interventions in the labour market that prescribe how individual business must organise their human resources are difficult to implement and monitor; it can also lead to widespread evasion and are prone to political wrangling and post hoc exceptions (Hertog 2014).

⁶<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/11/27/growth-in-gulf-countries-to-rebound-in-2018-2019> accessed on 1st February, 2019.

Table 16.1 Number of workers emigrated to GCC countries from South Asia

Origin country	GCC country	Year										
		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
Pakistan (1)	Saudi	2,01,816	1,89,888	2,22,247	3,58,560	2,70,502	3,12,489	5,22,750	4,62,598	1,43,363	1,00,910	
	UAE	1,40,889	1,13,312	1,56,353	1,82,630	2,73,234	3,50,522	3,26,986	2,95,647	2,75,436	2,08,635	
	Oman	34,089	37,878	53,525	69,407	47,794	39,793	47,788	45,085	42,362	27,202	
	Qatar	4061	3039	5121	7320	8119	10,042	12,741	9706	11,592	20,993	
	Bahrain	7087	5877	10,641	10,530	9600	9226	9029	8226	7919	5745	
Bangladesh (2)	Kuwait	1542	153	173	5	229	132	164	770	773	493	
	Saudi	14,666	7069	15,039	21,232	12,654	10,657	58,270	1,43,913	5,51,308	2,57,317	
	UAE	2,58,348	2,03,308	2,82,739	2,15,452	14,241	24,232	25,271	8131	4135	3235	
	Oman	41,704	42,641	1,35,265	1,70,326	1,34,028	1,05,748	1,29,859	1,88,247	89,074	72,504	
	Qatar	11,672	12,085	13,111	28,801	57,584	87,584	1,23,965	1,20,382	82,012	76,560	
India (3)	Bahrain	28,426	21,824	13,996	21,777	25,155	23,378	20,720	72,167	19,318	811	
	Kuwait	10	48	29	2	6	3094	17,472	39,188	49,604	27,637	
	Saudi	2,80,991	2,74,544	2,93,880	3,56,489	3,53,565	3,30,002	3,08,380	1,65,355	78,611	72,399	
	UAE	1,29,581	1,30,608	1,41,627	1,41,362	2,02,980	2,24,043	2,25,718	1,63,716	1,49,962	1,12,059	
	Oman	74,644	1,05,513	75,671	84,503	63,554	51,319	85,054	63,236	53,332	36,037	
Kuwait	Qatar	46,239	45,562	42,556	63,137	78,380	75,997	59,384	30,619	24,759	34,471	
	Bahrain	17,381	15,078	14,912	20,148	17,317	14,207	15,623	11,964	11,516	9142	
	Kuwait	41,729	37,632	45,164	55,843	72,628	80,420	66,579	72,384	56,380	57,613	

Sources of data: (1) <https://bcoe.gov.pk/files/statistics/2018/country.pdf> accessed on 2nd February, 2019(2) <http://bmet.org.bd/BMET/viewStatReport.action?reportnumber=20> accessed on 2nd February, 2019

(3) MEA, 2019

In order to promote nationalisation in the Gulf region, there is a dire need to enhance the education systems and also to employ proper training mechanisms for the available workforce. Sector- or position-based quota systems were found to be ineffective as it results in the selection of below par candidates with poor qualifications and without any work experiences (Randeree 2012). Also, the replacement of foreign workers in GCC countries has encountered various obstacles. The foremost is that the job opportunities in private sector require less education and they are paid less wages, therefore these jobs in private sectors are given to foreign workforce. Moreover, GCC nationals are unwilling to accept these low job positions (Fasano-Filho and Goyal 2004). Another key challenge in creating jobs in the private sector is that the average incomes for GCC nationals are relatively high, yet they vary significantly between GCC countries. This region cannot compete on wage costs unless it offers projects that largely employ foreign workforce whose salary is low as compared with Gulf nationals.⁷ As seen in the case of Kuwaiti companies, the additional cost of employing Kuwaiti nationals has forced the private sector to employ expatriates in large numbers. As a result, not only Kuwaitis are hesitant to work in private companies but private companies are also not very keen to employ locals due to their demand for high remuneration (Gulseven 2015).

Evidently, the largest socioeconomic issue faced by GCC countries will be to find high-quality jobs for GCC nationals. On the other hand, local labour market policy reforms have implications on the economic prospects of millions of migrant workforce and their family members (Hertog 2016). But as mentioned in the beginning of this section, the new projects and sectors targeted for the growth by governments' diversification initiatives will raise demand for high-paid expatriate employees to act as executives, managers and consultants. There has been a growing pressure by locals against the foreign workers for white-collar jobs and the governments have been pacifying this to an extent by engaging them at managerial levels in telecommunications, banking and engineering. However, such initiatives have been implemented at miniscule levels for the last decade or so and they will continue without substantially lowering the number of foreign workforce employed in GCC countries.⁸ For instance, while a handful of qualified national industrial workers find jobs at prestigious,

⁷ http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/eb/aviva_%20gcc_to_2020_economic_diversification_in_gcc_web.pdf accessed on 19th February, 2019.

⁸ <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/gulf-will-always-need-migrants> accessed on 28th January, 2019.

well-paying, state-owned enterprises such as Saudi Aramco and SABIC, private firms find it difficult to attract qualified and skilled local talent. The Nitaqat policy has mandated private firms to fill certain part of Saudisation quotas, however the scarcity of qualified national workers has put a human resource constraint on the sector, and it has also impacted their production (Yamada 2015).

Jobseekers in the Gulf countries stand at an average of 6.1 per cent; Oman and Bahrain at 15 per cent, Saudi Arabia at 11.8 per cent, the UAE at 4.2 per cent and Kuwait at 4.1 per cent and the lowest in Qatar at 1.5 per cent.⁹ Consequently, the idea of Table 16.2 is to illustrate the outcomes of recent steps taken by the Gulf countries while implementing the nationalisation policies to reduce their dependency on expatriates and to bring down unemployment among their citizens. The table clearly indicates that among the Gulf countries, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have enforced nationalisation policy in full swing and are continuous with policy reforms as compared with other countries in the region. In different phases Saudi Arabia is slowly reducing the expatriate workforce by including more and more private sector, for example, grocery sector which is depending heavily on expatriate workforce will be included soon in the list of banned sectors to recruit foreigners. Also, recently Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the UAE Vice President and Prime Minister stated that the country is showing tremendous progress in providing jobs for their nationals (see Table 16.2). Kuwait's case is unique; the country's first priority is to completely nationalise government sector jobs for their citizens by reducing expatriate workers. Therefore, it is mentioned as "in progress" for Kuwait in Table 16.2 as the country very recently started framing policies to nationalise jobs in private sector as well. The rate of jobseekers is relatively high in Oman and Bahrain as compared with other Gulf countries, but still Oman is showing slight progress in attaining the goal of nationalisation and the phase of nationalisation is quite slow in Bahrain at the 1.0 per cent. Recently (Article 1 of Decree No. 73/2019) Oman government has extended the ban to recruit expatriate workers but small and medium enterprises (SME) are exempted from this rule. Amidst several problems faced by Qatar like death and exploitations of workers at the 2022 FIFA World Cup construction sites, Qatar is keen to execute nationalisation policies. Overall, the major players like the UAE and Saudi

⁹ <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/abu-dhabi/91-expats-in-uae-workforce-experts-call-for-emiratisation%2D%2D> accessed on 27th January, 2019.

Table 16.2 Gauging the outcomes of Gulf nationalisation policies

<i>Country</i>	<i>Nationalisation achieved</i>	<i>Sector aimed for nationalisation</i>		<i>Policy</i>
UAE	Jobs accelerated by 200 per cent in 2018 To double the effort in 2019 ^a	Health Hospitality	Petrochemicals Trading and Tourism ^a	Jobs for citizen remains the first in coming years ^a
Saudi Arabia	Nationalisation picked up in 2018 Remittances by expatriate workers dropped ^b	Car and motorbike showrooms Shops selling readymade garments for men and children Home and office furniture shops Shops selling kitchenware Electrical and electronics shops Watch shops and optical stores	Building and construction material shops Medical appliances and equipment shops Car spare parts shops Shops selling carpets Confectionary shops and patisseries ^c	Banned renewal of work permits for expatriates doing jobs reserved for Saudis ^d Likely to roll out in the grocery sector ^d
Oman	In 2018, 3.6 per cent drop in number of expatriates workers as compared with 2017 ^e	Information technology Accounting Finance Marketing Sales Administration and Human Resources Insurance Information & media	Some medical professions Airport professions Engineering and technical professions ^f	Permits to hire non-Omani workers suspended temporarily in private sector occupations for a period of six month, excluding small and medium agencies ^f
Kuwait	In progress	To achieve 100 per cent in public sector by 2028 To achieve 30 per cent to 90 per cent in private sector by 2028 ^g		Reduce expatriate employees in state-run organisation ^h Create more jobs for nationals in private sector ⁱ

(continued)

Table 16.2 (continued)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Nationalisation achieved</i>	<i>Sector aimed for nationalisation</i>	<i>Policy</i>
Qatar	Prepare competent Qatari workforce ^l	To comprise 90 per cent of public sector by 2026 ^k Increase Qataris in the private sector ^l	To provide 50 per cent or more employment for Qataris ^m
Bahrain	In 2018, Bahraini workforce increased by 1 per cent as compared to 2017 ⁿ Achieved 95 per cent nationalisation in banking sector ^o	Hospitality ^o	Implemented by quota system, nationals hired for every four workers ^{p, q}

Source: Compiled and prepared by the authors, 2019

^l<https://www.ibtimes.co.in/threat-indian-workers-dubai-ruler-says-job-nationalisation-will-double-2019-789649> accessed on 27 January, 2019

^h<https://www.ibtimes.co.in/will-new-year-see-jobs-massacre-indians-ksa-saudization-threatens-160000-jobs-789047> accessed on 28 January, 2019

ⁱ<http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/article/551779/SAUDI-ARABIA/Saudization-in-5-key-sectors-from-today> accessed on 27 January, 2019

^j<http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/527249/SAUDI-ARABIA/12-activities-off-limits-for-non-Saudis> accessed on 20 January, 2019

^k<https://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/expat-visa-ban-extended-in-this-gcc-country> accessed on 20 January, 2019

^l<https://timesofoman.com/article/779361/Oman/Expat-visa-ban-extended-in-Oman> accessed on 1st February, 2019

^m<http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-eycing-100-kuwaitization-in-govt-sector/> accessed on 4th February, 2019

ⁿ<https://www.internationalinvestment.net/news/4000710/kuwait> accessed on 11th February, 2019

^o<http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/kuwait-set-to-nationalize-private-sector-move-to-create-more-jobs-for-kuwaitis/> accessed on 11th February, 2019

^p<https://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/topics/Employment+and+Workplace/qatarization> accessed on 9th February, 2019

^q<https://dohanews.co/minister-qataris-comprise-90-percent-public-sector-2026/> accessed on 7th February, 2019

^r<https://dohanews.co/pm-urges-ministry-to-speed-up-qatarization-of-jobs/> accessed on 7th February, 2019

^s<https://www.qf.org.qa/content/about/jobs/qatarization> accessed on 9th February, 2019

^t[http://lmra.bh/portal/files/cms/shared/file/Newsletter/Newsletter%20Q2_2018%20\(En\).pdf](http://lmra.bh/portal/files/cms/shared/file/Newsletter/Newsletter%20Q2_2018%20(En).pdf) accessed on 12th February, 2019

^u<https://www.gulf-insider.com/bahrainisation-creeping-success-private-sector/> accessed on 12th February, 2019

^v<https://www.arabianbusiness.com/companies-warned-over-bahrainisation-violations-630487.html> accessed on 13th February, 2019

^whttp://lmra.bh/portal/files/cms/downloads/english_attachment/Bahrainisation_Table_English.pdf accessed on 14th February, 2019

Arabia are pushing nationalisation policies very intensively; but still, as discussed in the above paragraphs, Gulf citizens are handicapped with skills required to meet the demands of private sector and also the wage differentiations between national and non-nationals working in non-government sectors. Finally, although it is expected that expatriate workforce presence will either increase or get stable in the course of time, it is also equally important to closely watch whether nationalisation policies in the Gulf countries have any significant impact on Asian workforce in the coming years.

KAFALA SYSTEM AND CONTEMPORARY REFORMS

In *kafala*/sponsorship system, the entry, work and departure of foreign workers at the destination countries are interlinked with the local employer or the sponsor. This method of recruiting foreign workers is in place across the GCC countries.¹⁰ This system exercises unconditional dominance on the entry and the stay of foreign workers in Gulf countries. Besides, through this sponsorship system, the *Kafeel* (sponsor) exercises control while dealing with activities related to business investments and relationships and in entrepreneurship as well. In some cases, the sponsor and the job provider at destination countries are often the same, for example, domestic workers and small business (Thiollet 2016). Due to this *kafala* system, the foreign workers' mobility chances to seek better job opportunities in the internal labour market is highly restricted. Therefore, the sponsor gets fullest benefit by employing workers for low salary, thereby significantly reducing the production competence of the worker by this immovability in labour market (Hussain 2014).¹¹

Under *kafala* system, the *kafeel* exploits the workers by not paying salary on time; overdues and outstanding salaries, passport confiscation, physical and psychological abuses, tortures are some common problems faced by the foreign workers. Under these precarious conditions in the Gulf countries, workers are deprived of their fundamental rights at their workplace, for example free movability in labour market. These multiple circumstances force the foreign workers to run away from their workplace or from the sponsor and seek job illegally or legally elsewhere at the

¹⁰ <https://sitreport.unescapsdd.org/gender/kafala-system> accessed on 22nd February, 2019.

¹¹ <http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/kafala-neither-guarantees-nor-cares-guest-workers-gulf-0> accessed on 18th February, 2019.

destination countries. In GCC, if a worker escapes from their workplace then the worker is framed with criminal charges and it leads to detention and deportation (Mirasol 2017). In a study conducted by Amnesty International (2014),¹² the Indian workers in Saudi Arabia highlighted that workers were forced to work regularly for 15 to 18 hours a day, deprived of any day off and not paid for their overtime work. In some cases, foreign workers were physically abused and beaten by their sponsor. Also, passport confiscation and denial of exit permits after the contract period were reported in the same study. In GCC, almost all the six countries have very similar *kafala* system, but in the case of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the foreign workers have to take permission from their employer (sponsor) while applying for the exit permit. In case the employer denies permission, the foreign employee is trapped.¹³ Further, Kuwait also follows a similar exit permit system for the foreign workers; if the worker leaves the sponsor without *Kafeel's* consent then criminal charges are framed on the foreign migrant worker.¹⁴

Over the years, with the GCC countries gaining visibility in the international realm—especially in trade and diplomacy—a larger spotlight has been shone on their societies at large and especially on the *kafala* system. In this spotlight, *kafala* system has come under intense scrutiny and criticism by the international community. Over time, the economic benefits of having this system have been diminished by increased cost to uphold this system. Increased cost of administration, market incompetence and other factors made the status quo unsustainable. Gulf countries have to recalibrate their policies in accordance with the changing context and also the need to adopt better practices for addressing the problem (Diop et al. 2015). However, the exploitations under *kafala* system continue, especially for the blue-collar workers working in 3 D jobs (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) and earning low wages. Despite the increased pressure given at international level, this system persists. Also, the failures to revamp this exploitative practice of labour recruitments puzzle the stakeholders and policymakers who are optimistically looking to replace this system to address the problems pertaining to foreign workers in the GCC (Diop et al. 2015).¹⁵

¹² <https://amnesty.org.in/news-update/india-government-must-value-migrant-workers-billions-send-home/> accessed on 23rd February, 2019.

¹³ <https://fanack.com/migrant-labour/the-plight-of-migrant-workers-in-the-gulf-states/> accessed on 26th February, 2019.

¹⁴ <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/132/PB2.pdf> accessed on 4th February, 2019.

¹⁵ http://gulfmigration.org/media/pubs/book/grm2017book_chapter/Volume%20-%20Migration%20to%20Gulf%20-%20Chapter%203.pdf accessed on 4th January, 2019.

Kafala system and visa trading are interconnected and it is a million-dollar industry. For an illustration, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for Dh 7500 (US\$2042) work visa is sold to an Indian worker and it is sold for Dh 15,000 (US\$4084) to a worker from Iran. This indicates that despite the measures taken to reduce the visa trading or to reduce the recruitment costs, the workers in sending countries are ready to incur high recruitment costs, which is seen as a major income source for the *Kafeel* (sponsor) at the destination countries (Shah 2008). So far, we discussed the issues associated with *kafala* system and understood the intensity of this recruiting mechanism. Instead of completely replacing this system, partial measures are taken by Gulf countries to address the issues prevailing in this method of labour recruitment. For instance, to enhance the condition of foreign workers, the UAE government has passed some resolutions (Al-Ghanim 2015). Also, the governments in the GCC countries directly or indirectly encourage this recruitment mechanism so that the *Kafeel* can control the foreign workers once they enter their territory (Kanchana 2018). The following statement made by Frank Hagemann, Deputy Regional Director of Arab States, ILO, shows the flipside of this issue.

Some of the issues appear to be related to the visa sponsorship system by which workers are closely tied to their employers. In some instances, this leaves them little choice but to accept the unacceptable, due to their inability to change employers. Some Gulf states appear to be rethinking the utility of the current shape of this system, both to avoid the potential for abuse inherent in an unbalanced employment relationship and to achieve more flexibility in the labour market.¹⁶

In the recent years, among the GCC countries, Qatar faced stiff criticism across various stakeholders for the treatment of migrant workforce under the *kafala* system. To some extent, despite this system prevailing across GCC countries, Qatar appears to be specifically targeted due to political economy revolving around the country's winning bid to host the FIFA World Cup 2022. Consequently, the growing international pressure faced by Qatar to reform *kafala* system to protect the foreign workforce resulted in core reforms. In the future, these reforms may put pressure on other GCC countries, but that remains to be seen. Officially in 2014 the Qatar government came forward to change the years-old labour-recruiting system. This action was taken as several international agencies such as

¹⁶ https://www.oxgaps.org/files/gulf_affairs_autumn_2015_full_issue.pdf accessed on 17th February, 2019.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and various media stories reported the death of Nepalese workers at the construction sites of football stadiums in preparation for the 2022 World Cup. In his article Abdullab¹⁷ highlighted the core reforms brought by the Qatar government to abolish *kafala* system: (1) abolishing exit permit system, (2) flexibility to change the jobs by the employee at the end of the contract period, (3) fine up to US\$14,000 to be charged to the employers holding the foreign worker's passport, (4) to provide international standards living condition with adequate housing, and (5) appointing authorities to monitor the employers and to report violations if any.

The measures taken by the Qatar government have been brought to the spotlight and have been facing harsh criticism for its unfair clauses in the Labour Reform Bill 2018. Whilst it allows the temporary exit or final departure of a migrant worker, it excludes migrants who do not fall under the labour law, such as those who work in the military, public and domestic work sectors. The bill also has provisions for the employers to specifically exclude some workers from this law. This unfair and cruel clause of exit permit requirements has to be abolished by the Qatari authorities. Hence the partial cancellation of these exit permits inevitably leads to the addressal of a specific element of the *kafala* system that has long since suffocated and trapped a section of the workers in extremely abusive conditions and left the workers helpless and unable to switch their employers without their preliminary employer-sponsor's system.¹⁸ Yet the steps taken by Qatar at policy level to do away with *kafala* system will have an impact on Asian workers to work in flexible environment in the future. Moreover, the remaining Gulf countries should come forward to reform this system to end labour abuse in *kafala* recruiting system.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter touched upon a couple of major challenges faced by the Gulf countries in their labour market. Due to the nationalisation policy, this region is taking policy measures to employ their nationals to replace the foreign workforce which is highly constituted by Asian workers. However, the prevailing issues among the Gulf citizens such as the skill mismatch in order to meet the requirements of the private sector, wage gap between

¹⁷ <https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/views/political-views/351955/the-sponsorship-system-in-qatar-challenges-and-implications> accessed on 28th December, 2018.

¹⁸ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/06/qatar-end-all-migrant-worker-exit-visas> accessed on 28th December, 2018.

nationals and expatriates, nationals' high preference to work in public sectors and unwillingness to take up unskilled and semi-skilled jobs are the factors which hinders to implement nationalisation policy successfully. Therefore, instead of cutting down the flow of foreign workers, Gulf countries will depend on expatriates to meet labour market demands. Major migrant source countries in Asia like India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal faced a sharp decline in their workforce emigrating to Gulf countries over the past year, and while this is the consequence of economic crises faced by this region, it is expected to boom in the coming years. In order to shift the oil-based economy model, the Gulf countries have taken measures to diversify their economy as discussed in this chapter. These measures are expected to create and increase employment opportunities both in public and private sectors. But whether this translates into an expansion of opportunities in these sectors for nationals remain to be seen, while the expatriate workforce is expected to continue to meet the demand for the diversified economic future of the Gulf countries. Finally, another aspect discussed in this chapter is also related to labour market, that is, the recruitment under *kafala* system. Violations taking place across the Gulf countries by this system highlighted the vulnerability of foreign workforce suffering under this sponsorship system, especially blue-collar workers. While steps taken by Qatar government to reform *kafala* system are encouraging, there is still a long way to go in order to protect and safeguard the foreign workforce in the Gulf countries.

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